Gender Dynamics in Transboundary Water Governance: Feminist Perspectives on Water Conflict and Cooperation

Sehring, Jenniver (Ed.); ter Horst, Rozemarijn (Ed.); Zwarteveen, Margreet (Ed.) Book Gender Dynamics in Transboundary Water Governance: Feminist Perspectives on Water Conflict and Cooperation Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management Provided in Cooperation with: Taylor & Francis Group Suggested Citation: Sehring, Jenniver (Ed.); ter Horst, Rozemarijn (Ed.); Zwarteveen, Margreet (Ed.) (2022) : Gender Dynamics in Transboundary Water Governance: Feminist Perspectives on Water Conflict and Cooperation, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, ISBN 978-1-000-63589-8, Routledge, London, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003198918 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/281299 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Gender Dynamics in Transboundary Water Governance This volume assesses the nexus of gender and transboundary water governance, containing empirical case studies, discourse analyses, practitioners’ accounts, and theoretical refections. Transboundary water governance exists at the intersection of two highly masculinised felds: diplomacy and water resources management. In both felds, positions are mainly held by men, and core ideas, norms, and guiding principles that are presented as neutral are both shaped by men and based on male experiences. This book sheds light on the often hidden gender dynamics of water confict and cooperation at the transboundary level and on the implicit assumptions that guide research and policies. The individual chapters of the book, based on case studies from around the world, reveal the gendered nature of water diplomacy, take stock of the number of women involved in organisations that govern shared waters, and analyse programmes that have been set up to promote women in water diplomacy and the obstacles that they face. They explore and contest leading narratives and knowledge that have been shaped mainly by privileged men, and assess how the participation of women concretely impacts the practices, routines, and processes of water negotiations. This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars of water governance, water diplomacy, gender, international relations, and environmental politics. It will also be of interest to professionals and policymakers involved in supporting gender mainstreaming in water cooperation. Jenniver Sehring is Senior Lecturer in Water Governance and Diplomacy at the IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, the Netherlands. She coordinates the joint Master programme Water Cooperation and Diplomacy and is an editor of the Central Asian Journal of Water Research (CAJWR). Rozemarijn ter Horst is Lecturer and PhD Researcher on data and models used for water management and governance at the Water Resources Management group at Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and is connected as a visiting researcher to IHE Delft Institute for Water Education. Margreet Zwarteveen is Professor of Water Governance at the IHE Delft Institute for Water Education and the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. She is the co-editor of Drip Irrigation for Agriculture: Untold Stories of Effciency, Innovation and Development (Routledge, 2017). “In this seminal collection, the authors expose the inherent genderedness of business-as-usual transboundary water management and provide readers with tools and experience to unravel and dismantle implicit and explicit bias at various scales. While focusing on gender, their work is equally relevant to cultural, racial, and inter-generational examinations. The authors voice the need for active mitigation of institutional bias and a critical re-thinking of decision-making processes and priorities. With this important new release, the authors make visible the untenable cost of the status quo and the urgent need to course correct to meet the water and environmental crisis of today for all of society.” Elizabeth A. Koch, Operations Lead, Transboundary Water Cooperation, Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) “This book provides a unique account of what ‘gender mainstreaming’ means in transboundary water resources governance, from conceptual understanding to real life experiences. The comparative case studies across basins and basin organisations uncover critical narratives on participation in formal institutions and transboundary governance processes from a gender perspective, drawing attention to issues of inclusion, participation, and intersectionality. The depth of the case studies portrays uncontested responsibilities of duty bearers, being confronted with the lived experiences of women in society, and provides examples of transformational approaches to engender transboundary water management. Its conclusions on gender and feminism concretely summarize the contemporary state of knowledge and provide a well guided, forward-looking perspective on what and how inclusion can and should be in transboundary water governance.” Donald Kasongi, Secretary General, Nile Basin Discourse “This book uses a feminist gaze to pry open the masculinist terrain of transboundary water governance. It skillfully unravels how water diplomacy and management professions come to be gendered. It also questions the persistence of state-centric and technical framings in transboundary water governance agendas that exclude other knowledges. Finally, the book is self-refective and respects the situated knowledges of its contributors, thus amplifying a truly inclusive feminist ethos. I recommend this book not only to water professionals but also to aligned political ecologists who may be pondering on the positioning of feminist contributions to social justice in transboundary waters.” Bernadette P. Resurrección, Associate Professor and Queen’s National Scholar on Development in Practice, Global Development Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada “As noted in the introduction to this wide ranging and nuanced volume, representatives of the interests in water diplomacy have historically been both overwhelmingly male and technical in their backgrounds and outlooks. Fortunately, that imbalance is slowly changing. Not only are women increasingly representing water constituents in dialogue at all scales, but the frameworks that are used to inform policy are moving well beyond the historical “deifcation of quantifcation” to include alternative, critical, affective, spiritual and, yes, feminist approaches – what the editors and authors refer to as the “gendering” of the feld. The editors, all cutting edge “pracademics” in their own rights whose worldviews are deeply informed by their professional experiences as well as their academic frameworks, bring together a rich set of authors whose compelling case studies from around the world and thoughtful assessments weave a collective narrative of much needed global change, as well as the far-reaching implications that result.” Aaron Wolf, Professor of Geography, College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University, USA Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management Water Allocation Law in New Zealand Lessons from Australia Jagdeepkaur Singh-Ladhar Reciprocity and China’s Transboundary Waters The Law of International Watercourses David J. Devlaeminck Water Management in China’s Power Sector Xiawei Liao and Jim W. Hall Reviving Indigenous Water Management Practices in Morocco Alternative Pathways to Sustainable Development Sandrine Simon Transnational Corporations in Urban Water Governance Public–Private Partnerships in Mexico and the US Joyce Valdovinos Defining Effective Transboundary Water Cooperation Melissa McCracken Corporatization and the Right to Water in Colombia Conficts, Citizenship and Social Inequality Marcela López Gender Dynamics in Transboundary Water Governance Feminist Perspectives on Water Confict and Cooperation Edited by Jenniver Sehring, Rozemarijn ter Horst, and Margreet Zwarteveen For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ books/series/ECWRM/ Gender Dynamics in Transboundary Water Governance Feminist Perspectives on Water Confict and Cooperation Edited by Jenniver Sehring, Rozemarijn ter Horst, and Margreet Zwarteveen First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Jenniver Sehring, Rozemarijn ter Horst, and Margreet Zwarteveen; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Jenniver Sehring, Rozemarijn ter Horst, and Margreet Zwarteveen be identifed as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-05730-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-05732-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-19891-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003198918 Typeset in Bembo by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India Contents List of fgures List of tables List of contributors ix x xi 1 (En-)gendering Water Diplomacy JENNIVER SEHRING, ROZEMARIJN TER HORST, MARGREET ZWARTEVEEN 1 PART I Rethinking Frameworks and Knowledge 21 2 An Interview with Dr. Mariana Yumbay Yallico, Human Rights Activist in Ecuador DIEGO JARA AND MARIANA YUMBAY YALLICO 23 3 Is Academic Knowledge Production on Transboundary Waters in South Asia Gender Neutral? RITU PRIYA AND TANIA DEBNATH 39 4 A Gendered Perspective on the Multiple Scales of Water Conflict ALYSSA OFFUTT 58 5 Thinking through Networks: Towards a Feminist Water Diplomacy MEDHA BISHT 73 xiv Jenniver Sehring is Senior Lecturer in Water Governance and Diplomacy at IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, the Netherlands. She coordinates the Master programme Water Cooperation and Diplomacy and is an editor of the Central Asian Journal of Water Research (CAJWR). Jenniver has extensive research and policy experience on water confict and cooperation, especially in Central Asia. She has worked for and advised among others the Council of the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the German Federal Foreign Offce. Rozemarijn ter Horst is lecturer and PhD researcher at the Water Resources Management Group at Wageningen University, the Netherlands, since October 2020. She researches how hydrological models shape societal interactions over shared waters, and in turn are infuenced by those processes. Rozemarijn’s research interests encompass sociotechnical imaginaries, specifcally the role of data and technologies in identifying generally accepted options for development, and understanding interactions between different knowledge systems, including between laypeople and experts as well as between different disciplines. Her interest in gender comes from understanding social structures that affect the way humans interact. Pilar Carolina Villar is Professor of Environmental and Water Law at Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Brazil, and is Executive Director at the International Water Resources Association (2022–2024). Since 2009, she has worked on transboundary waters, and researches and advises on legal frameworks related to national and international transboundary waters, notably on the Plata Basin and the Guarani Aquifer System. Tobias von Lossow is Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague, the Netherlands, as well as Lecturer at the Freie Universität Berlin and Affliate Researcher at IHE Delft Institute for Water Education. He is the leader of the Planetary Security Initiative (PSI) and is a member of expert groups on water and security in the Middle East. Previously, he worked at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). For more than ten years, Tobias von Lossow has been working on water security, water conficts, hydro-politics, water diplomacy, and the role of water in armed conficts and fragile settings – with a regional focus on the Middle East and Africa. Mariana Yumbay Yallico is a lawyer specialised in human rights and criminal law and is an activist for indigenous peoples’ movements from Guaranda in the Ecuadorian Andes. She served as the frst indigenous female judge of the National Court of Ecuador and as Subsecretary for Social Affairs and Water Resources of the National Water Secretary of Ecuador. She has also contributed to the establishment of the Binational Commission xv for Integrated Water Resources Management of Transboundary Basins between Ecuador and Peru. Margreet Zwarteveen is an irrigation engineer and social scientist. She worked with the International Water Management Institute and the University of Wageningen before joining IHE Delft Institute for Water Education in 2014 to become its Professor of Water Governance. Her professorial affliation is with the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Margreet studies water policies and practices, focusing on questions of (gender-)equity and justice. She favors an interdisciplinary approach, seeing water distribution as the outcome of interactions between ecology, technologies, and society. She is the coordinator of the project Transformations to Groundwater Sustainability and is a member of two EU-funded International Training networks: WEGO and NEWAVE. 1 (En-)gendering Water Diplomacy Jenniver Sehring, Rozemarijn ter Horst, Margreet Zwarteveen Cooperation and confict around transboundary water resources have been studied from many angles: hydrological conditions, technical solutions, legal norms, institutional capacities, costs and benefts, power interests, as well as geographic, economic, and political disparities. In the past decades, awareness has been growing that the use, management, and protection of transboundary water resources is intrinsically political and embedded in complex political and socio-cultural settings. This awareness has translated into more attention to governance arrangements and diplomatic processes. Photos depicting water diplomacy or transboundary water governance-in-action – for instance of negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the signing of the water allocation protocols of the International Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia, or the staff overview on the website of the Lake Chad Basin Commission – show a variety of experts involved in this comprehensive task: diplomats, water offcials, engineers, environmental experts, and lawyers. But frst and foremost, they display the gatherings of men. As a matter of fact, the majority of professionals engaged in transboundary water governance are men. A recent survey of 117 transboundary river basin organisations worldwide found that – at least based on the publicly available data – fewer than one-third of their staff and fewer than one-ffth of staff in the highest leadership positions are women (Best 2019). Despite these clear gender disparities, few studies exist that look at transboundary waters from the angle of gender. This might be because many consider the male dominance or masculinity of transboundary water governance as normal, and therefore as not needing explanation. In water diplomacy, after all, two highly masculinised professional felds come together: diplomacy and water resources management. By calling these professions masculinised, we do not only mean that positions in this feld are mainly held by men – as refected in the numbers mentioned above. The genderedness of professions also becomes manifest in the ideas, values, and principles used to defne and measure professionality – what makes a real or true water diplomat? Who qualifes as a water diplomat? Terms used to describe and assess professional performance are often gendered in their association with behaviours and personality traits seen as belonging more to (or appreciated more in) one gender. For instance, the ability to negotiate can be expressed in DOI: 10.4324/9781003198918-1 2 Jenniver Sehring et al. terms of someone’s ability to win an argument. This may be associated with forms of competitiveness that are seen as coming more “naturally” to men, or that are more positively appreciated when encountered in men than in women. The ability to negotiate can also be expressed in terms of skills that may be easier to recognise in women, for instance as one’s ability to reach a compromise, thereby differently gendering the art of negotiation and making it easier for women to be seen and valued as professional negotiators. To date, there has not been much critical feminist research to unravel and refect on the genderedness of transboundary water governance. Most research on gender and water governance has focused on households, local irrigation agriculture, or water system levels (drinking water or sanitation) (De Silva et al. 2018).1 The few articles and reports that do refect on the genderedness of transboundary water governance are frequently referred to throughout the chapters of this book; we therefore briefy discuss their main arguments. Earle and Bazili (2013) noted relatively early on that, in contrast to the national and local levels, questions of gender are not incorporated in international transboundary water management. Based on an assessment of two River Basin Organisations (RBOs), as well as international legal instruments, they concluded that the laws, policies, and strategies at the transboundary level hardly address gender, if at all. They point towards the intersection of the masculine discourses and practices of both the water management community, dominated until recently by the “hydraulic mission” approach (Molle et al. 2009) and with military antecedents, and among scholars of international relations (IR), international water law, and political science. Von Lossow (2015) notes that if questions of gender are addressed in interstate water politics, it is often at the request of donors. He assesses the Gender Mainstreaming Policy and Strategy of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and shows how the responsibility for questions of gender is attributed to the national level, ignoring the role of gender at the interstate level. Carmi et al. (2019) studied the challenges that women face in attaining high-level positions in water diplomacy in Jordan, Lebanon, and the State of Palestine through a survey of 33 female water professionals. Their answers highlight the challenges of a male-dominant society and negative perceptions of female decision makers by other women, among others. Refections on gender in transboundary water governance can also be found in a number of policy reports (e.g., Fauconnier et al. 2018) which list the (potential) benefts of more women’s involvement in transboundary water governance in support of a call for action to change structures that diminish the recognition, opportunities, and voice of women. These fndings show that questions of gender in transboundary water governance are about both what is discussed and negotiated in transboundary deliberations and who participates in these deliberations. There can be a relation between the two, though it is unlikely to be causal and needs further elaboration. There are clearly many questions still left open when it comes to gender and transboundary water governance. This book builds on, and aims to expand, the scholarship on this topic. It originates from the online workshop 3 (En-)gendering Water Diplomacy “(En)Gendering Transboundary Water Governance: Feminist Perspectives on Water Confict and Cooperation” organised by IHE Delft on 29–30 September 2020. The event brought together more than 100 researchers and practitioners from around the globe. Some of the presentations held at the workshop were summarised in a series of blog posts on FLOWs, the Water Governance Blog at IHE Delft Institute for Water Education.2 Others were transformed into chapters for this edited volume. Both the workshop and the subsequent work on this edited volume were fnancially supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs via the DUPC2 Programme with IHE Delft. This support has also enabled the open access publication of this book. In the remainder of this introduction, we frst share our understanding of transboundary water governance, water diplomacy, and gender. We then elaborate on our argument that transboundary water governance is a masculinised feld by exploring the dominating masculinities in both the water sector and diplomacy. We continue by explaining what we mean by a “feminist perspective” on transboundary water governance. The chapter ends with an overview of the sections and the individual chapters of this book. Gender, Masculinities, and Transboundary Water Governance and Diplomacy Water Diplomacy and Transboundary Water Governance In current debates, interactions over water between representatives of states are often referred to as water diplomacy (Klimes et al. 2019; Keskinen et al. 2021). Water diplomacy stresses the role of negotiations and other foreign policy tools in decision making on transboundary waters, together with a broadening of the traditional diplomatic spheres to multiple tracks (Barua 2018; Mirumachi 2020). With water often seen as a strategic resource and related to (violent) conficts, either as cause, trigger, or instrument (DeStefano 2017; Ide 2015; Gleick 2019), the water diplomacy discourse draws not only from IR literature but also, to a greater extent, from peace and confict studies. The discourse around water diplomacy acknowledges the complexity of water-related problem settings and their interlinkage with other policy felds, issue-areas, and professional and academic communities. It also considers the interrelatedness of transboundary water governance with regional security and stability beyond the water sector. We use the term water diplomacy when referring to the political processes and practices of preventing, mitigating, and resolving disputes over transboundary water resources and developing joint water governance arrangements by applying foreign policy means. This defnition involves looking beyond statecentric conceptualisations and focusing on how diplomats and others actually do transboundary water cooperation at different levels. We use the broader term of transboundary water governance to refer to the institutions (including organisational structures as well as formal and informal rules and norms), processes, and practices that regulate water use, protection, 4 Jenniver Sehring et al. and management at a transboundary level. These practices and processes mostly occur within established decision-making mechanisms of transboundary river basin organisations or other institutionalised arrangements. The main actors are offcials from the respective line Ministries dealing with water, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, other relevant national agencies, but also third parties engaged in these processes, academic experts, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It therefore includes water diplomacy processes, but also interactions beyond these. Zwarteveen et al. (2017) stress that water governance is about distributions of water, but also of voice and authority, and expertise. Decisions about water are therefore inherently political choices, which are based on certain norms and rules, and are also infuenced by which and whose authority and forms of knowledge are seen as legitimate. Focusing on distributions helps to recognise governance as a political process, dealing with contentious questions of fairness, justice, and representation. Water governance takes place through complex processes only some of which are regulated and institutionalised, which is also why not all involved actors are formally designated as water decision makers. In transboundary contexts, this means that understanding confict and cooperation between states requires looking beyond the state to grasp the complexities of the politics of the distribution of water, voice, and knowledge among different actors and at different scales. Critical scholars of transboundary water interactions stress that there is not a linear development from confict to cooperation. Rather, confict and cooperation are both inherent in transboundary water governance and often occur simultaneously. Neither is confict per se negative and cooperation positive, but both can have constructive as well as destructive dimensions (Mirumachi 2015; Zeitoun & Mirumachi 2008; Zeitoun et al. 2020). We therefore understand transboundary water governance as a dynamic feld where different state and non-state actors with different interests and backgrounds interact in processes of decision making on shared water resources, with different degrees of institutionalised cooperation. As a specifc feld of governance, it is not only shaped by the geographic, climatic, or hydrological conditions of water availability, but embedded in the general political relations among basin countries, in the respective political systems and bureaucratic cultures. For example, the European integration smoothed transboundary water cooperation among European Union member states, not only due to common water quality standards, but also because of shared policy priorities, close overall cooperation, reduction of language and travel barriers, etc. In other contexts, like the Indus, the Jordan, or the Kura river basins, political tensions between riparian countries make even technical collaboration efforts an issue of security politics. Also, how independent from their respective national directives staff members of a transboundary basin organisation are depends not only on the formal mandate but also on the political setting and on bureaucratic and decision-making cultures. As these relations and cultures are always gendered, looking at transboundary water governance with a gendered lens does not stop at documenting and explaining 5 (En-)gendering Water Diplomacy the formal roles and positions of men, women, and those with a different gender identifcation. Gender and Transboundary Water Governance Gender is about identities and identifcations, about who and what is understood as “man”, “manly”, “woman”, or “womanly” – or something else altogether. Although “embodied”, these identities and identifcations are never just or purely ordained by biology but constructed by society. They are deeply cultural performances that always emerge in specifc histories and places, with gendered difference intersecting with other differences – such as those based on class, race, age, religion, etc. – to form power-laden social hierarchies (Butler 1990; Shields 2008; Goodrich et al. 2019). One’s gender co-shapes opportunities for expression and self-realisation, and co-determines how one is perceived and valued by others. Beyond individual identities, gender manifests itself in societal structures (of kinship, property, divisions of income and labour, etc.) as well as in symbols and discourses (dress, ways of moving and behaving) (Harding 1986; Zwarteveen 2017). In addition to the dominance of one gender in important positions, then, gendered hierarchies and differences also become institutionalised and normalised in how notions of and associations with “male” or “female” shape the defnition and qualifcation of what and who matters in transboundary water governance. Hence, analysing how transboundary water governance is gendered means identifying and questioning men and their dominance, as much as it entails unravelling how prevailing professional norms and institutions themselves are shaped and coloured by what it means to be a “real” or “good” man. A critical re-evaluation and reassessment of everything and everyone that is marginal to or not ftting the male norm is a necessary accompaniment. To date, the analysis of gender and water has focused mostly on women – on their role and positions, their marginalisation, or on strategies for their inclusion or empowerment. These studies have yielded a wealth of data and provide an important empirical basis for feminist understanding and action. Yet, without also looking at men, and questioning how the male–female distinction has emerged and operates in transboundary water governance, the analysis remains incomplete. This can be done by taking inspiration from masculinity studies, and from a focus on “masculinisation” as a historical process. Masculinities Based on Whitehead (2002) and Zwarteveen (2017), we defne masculinities as “those practices and ways of being that serve to validate the masculine subject’s sense of itself as male/boy/man” (Zwarteveen 2017, p. 82). Being (seen as) male or masculine is loosely related to visible biological features, making it somewhat more diffcult for some bodies to be seen, accepted, or treated as “real” men than for others. We use the term masculinities in plural 6 Jenniver Sehring et al. to indicate that there are several masculinities, a diversity that emerges partly from how gender intersects with other axes of difference (e.g., class, race, age, sexual preference, professional feld or religion), but also from differences in how people can or prefer to perform their gender. Even within a relatively small socio-cultural setting, be it a country or a ministry, there may be multiple masculinities. The concept of hegemonic masculinity expresses that masculinities are not only plural, but are also hierarchically ordered – with some ways of performing masculinity being considered as superior to others (Connell 1987; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005). Hegemonic masculinity, then, is the socially or culturally preferred way of being a man – it expresses what a “real” man is supposed to be like. The current masculine character of transboundary water governance is the result of historical processes: there is nothing natural or normal about it, nor is it static or inherent to the feld. Spike Peterson’s (2004) defnition of masculinism neatly captures such processes as: the discursive, cultural, material, and structural privileging of that which is associated with “maleness” or masculinity (which is not limited to men) over that which is associated with “femaleness” or femininity (which is not limited to women). (p. 45) Masculinism therefore justifes, normalises, naturalises, and depoliticises existing gender hierarchies in transboundary water governance, as we discuss in the next section. Water Resources Management and Diplomacy as Masculinised Fields While both water resources management and diplomacy are masculinised professional felds, they are so in different ways. In what follows, we review and summarise research about the genderedness of the two professions. This, we hope, provides a useful starting point for refecting on and examining what happens when the two come together in transboundary water governance. Tracing the Historical Emergence of Diplomacy and Water Resources Management as Professions A frst way to identify and trace how the two professional felds that come together in transboundary water governance are gendered is by studying how they historically emerged as professions. Diplomacy, at least in its formal and professional form, has long been a feld reserved for men belonging to the upper-class elite or nobility. Diplomacy has therefore come to be culturally defned at the intersection of aristocracy and gender (Neumann 2012, Aggestam & Towns 2019). Even in Sweden, a country considered particularly liberal and 7 (En-)gendering Water Diplomacy progressive in terms of social and gender equity, a female diplomat who entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1986 noticed that its leadership “was strongly dominated by elderly distinguished men from the upper classes dressed in dark suits” (Sparre in Niklasson, B., & Robertson, F. (2018), p. 68). It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that women started entering the Foreign Service; in most countries, they could frst have administrative and consular positions before being allowed to occupy diplomatic posts (Neumann 2012; Enloe 2014; Herren 2014). In the 1920s, the frst female diplomats started working in the United States and some European countries, followed by Turkey in 1932, Brazil in 1938, and Japan in 1950. Until the 1970s, or even more recently, however, in many countries married women continued to be banned from postings abroad or from working in the same embassies as their husbands (de Souza Farias & Do Carmo 2018; Fowler 2018; Rumelili & Suleymanoglu-Kurum 2018). Still today, globally 85 per cent of all ambassadors are men, and the more prestigious ambassadorial positions are less frequently occupied by women (Towns & Niklasson 2018). With diplomacy changing, also masculinities in diplomacy are changing. Neumann (2012), based on a study of the post-Second World War Norwegian Foreign Ministry, identifed three types of masculinity: (1) the dominant civil servant masculinity, which stemmed from bourgeois, upper-middle class families; (2) the subordinate petit bourgeois masculinity, refecting the upward social mobility under social democratic governments and after the Second World War; and (3) the troublemaking masculinity of the “68er”,3 challenging existing practices and norms (and supporting female colleagues). In addition, as Towns (2020) shows, a certain idea of femininity is also often associated with diplomacy as a soft (or weak) alternative to military power and violence. The underrepresentation of women in formal diplomacy does not mean that women have not played a role in diplomacy. Scholars in diplomatic history have shown the important (but usually unoffcial) functions of women behind the scenes (Bastian et al. 2014; Aggestam & Towns 2018). However, with the professionalisation in the nineteenth century “diplomacy came to be defned as an exclusively male and masculine profession” (Rumelili & SuleymanogluKurum 2018, p. 90). Yet, in modern diplomacy women have also played crucial roles, most visibly as the spouses of ambassadors. They are responsible for hosting dinners, organising social events, or, more generally, for maintaining informal relations. Many diplomats would agree that such social events – that happen outside offces – are key to creating and maintaining relations of trust with their counterparts from other countries. This is important as trust is key for diplomacy to work (Aggestam & Towns 2018). Nevertheless, although diplomacy relies and has always relied on work done by women (often wives of male diplomats), this work is hardly recognised as an integral part in the “formal, anti-emotional, masculine-dominated world of traditional diplomacy” (Ross 2007, p. 156). Not only is international politics male-dominated, but also its study. Mainstream IR has been “both an androand Eurocentric enterprise that […] 14 Jenniver Sehring et al. and understanding of the original category (e.g., diplomacy) changes and with that also the associated meaning of masculinity. Therefore, aiming for the inclusion of more women in transboundary water governance – while bearing the risk of being only about achieving a quota of female actors – can also, and ultimately probably will, pave the way for the reframing and restructuring of the very concept and understanding of transboundary water governance and diplomacy. We are convinced that such a perspective contributes to questioning the taken-for-grantedness of the status quo and to better understand the rules of engagement in a feld in which the exchange between people is highly orchestrated through diplomatic protocol and informal etiquette, while acknowledging that these interactions occur simultaneously between people as individuals and as representatives of their states. In this sense, a feminist approach is also not only about visibility and empowerment of women, but about addressing all inequalities that are linked to a devaluation of “female” or “feminine”. This includes raising awareness of and challenging the dominance of the Global North in the scholarship in our feld, while the objects of study are often transboundary basins in the Global South. We have tried to address this imbalance by reaching out to authors from diverse backgrounds, and including case studies from both the Global South and the Global North. This was also important to situate both gender and transboundary water governance in specifc contexts, explore their dynamics in their own particular setting, and nurture attentiveness and sensitivity to the conceptor language-dependence of knowledge about gender in transboundary water governance. However, this endeavour did not reach the success we had hoped for. Therefore, we acknowledge the early stages of the discussion on gender in transboundary water governance, and the path still to go to make all the different voices and perspectives heard. Another ambition not met is that in the chapters, gender and transboundary water governance is discussed through binary categorisation (explicit or implicit), primarily focusing on cisgender individuals. We did not succeed in making visible those who do not identify according to these binary cisgender norms. By at least being explicit about their absence, we want to signal our awareness that there is much more to unravel in terms of gender and transboundary waters than we manage to do with this volume. In this sense, the book is only a frst step in identifying gender-based hierarchies and power differences as a basis for questioning and possibly changing them. Outline of the Book This volume contains empirical case studies, discourse analyses, practitioners’ accounts, and theoretical refections to assess the nexus of gender and transboundary water governance. The authors are a mix of well-established academics, promising young researchers, and experts with a practitioner background. The different positions of the authors as researchers, gender (En-)gendering Water Diplomacy 15 experts, or practitioners make for diverse texts, ranging from theory-guided research chapters to chapters that are written from a practitioner’s view. There are two chapters in the format of written interviews, allowing us to bring the rich experience of female water negotiators to light. For several contributors, writing for an academic book like this was a new and sometimes challenging endeavour. We are grateful for the extra effort they undertook to share their insights. The frst section of the volume is entitled “Rethinking frameworks and knowledge” and collects contributions that question the established ways of thinking about transboundary water governance and the categories and terms used in its discussion. This section aims to invite the reader to rethink supposedly neutral theories and approaches and discover the way they are gendered. In Chapter 2, Diego Jara and Mariana Yumbay Yallico present the perspective of the frst indigenous female judge of the National Court of Justice of Ecuador, who has been involved in the negotiations for the establishment of a binational water commission between Ecuador and Peru. Her account shows the importance of considering not only different genders, but also different forms of knowledge and different understandings of what “transboundary” is, and of who sets and defnes borders. Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath review the academic literature on transboundary waters in South Asia in Chapter 3 to show how knowledge production is dominated by men, and ask if and how this is linked to different disciplinary backgrounds and theoretical approaches. In Chapter 4, Alyssa Offutt reviews the literature on the water-confict nexus at multiple scales. She analyses how far gender is considered and shows where the blind spots are that hinder a full understanding of the genderedness of water conficts. Medha Bisht asks in Chapter 5 what feminising water diplomacy could mean. She brings together network studies and diplomacy in order to develop a more relational understanding of (water) diplomacy and applies this to the collaboration between India and Bhutan on the Saralbhanga/Saralpara river, a tributary of the Brahmaputra river. The next section focuses on more practical questions: (how) can gender mainstreaming policies help support more gender equality in transboundary water governance? Ellen Hagerman, Hellen Natu, and Christine Ochieng (Chapter 6) refect on one specifc international programme to foster women’s participation and leadership in transboundary water governance in the Nile basin. Based on in-depth interviews with stakeholders, they assess the challenges to achieving a truly transformative approach for gender equality. These challenges are partly rooted in the fact that gender inequalities are deeply entrenched in daily practices, private and professional socialisations, and cultural norms that we are often not aware of. However, awareness is the frst step toward changing them. In Chapter 7, Tobias von Lossow looks at fve transboundary basins – Nile, Jordan, Zambesi, Indus, and Danube – and assesses whether and which gender-related policies are in place. His assessment is that presence and effect of gender policies are very modest, but he was nevertheless able to identify several factors that can help in promoting gender policies. 16 Jenniver Sehring et al. The third section aims to unravel some of the hidden gender dynamics in procedures, rules, and norms within transboundary water organisations and in negotiation processes. Jenniver Sehring analyses the gendered norms and practices within the transboundary Chu–Talas Commission in Central Asia in Chapter 8 and shows how they affect men and women differently in terms of access to and performing work on transboundary waters. In Chapter 9, Rachana Mattur and Rozemarijn ter Horst study an exceptional commission: in the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, a majority of leadership positions are held by women. They show how political and societal developments over the past decades have changed the water sector and transboundary decision making in the basin. Alexandra Said takes another look at the Nile basin in Chapter 10, focusing specifcally on the Nile–Technical Advisory Committee to understand why there are so few women represented and how gender affects the decision-making processes in this committee. The last chapter (Chapter 11) in this section is again an interview chapter, it is a dialogue of Rozemarijn ter Horst with fve female water diplomats and experts: Maria Amakali from Namibia, Anamika Barua from India, Nadia Gefoun from Sudan, Heide Jekel from Germany, and Pilar Carolina Villar from Brazil. They share their personal experiences of gender dynamics in water negotiations and more generally in manoeuvring in a male-dominated feld. In the concluding chapter, we refect on the main insights gained from the chapters of this book, the different approaches taken by the authors, and the value a feminist perspective adds to understanding the dynamics of water confict and cooperation. Notes 1 De Silva et al. (2018), by analysing over 10,000 papers published between 1977 and 2016 that contain the keywords “women” and “water”, found that the vast majority of them focused primarily on women’s health in relation to water access and water quality and on the role of women as water users, rather than as managers and governors. 2 The blog series can be found on FLOWs at https://fows.hypotheses.org/category/ research/engendering-water-diplomacy-research 3 The 68ers refers to a progressive student movement in European states and the generation born at the end of the Second World War and politicised in the late 1960s. 4 These are the sons or sometimes the paid assistants of large landholding farmers, many of whom descended from Spanish colonial families.A large proportion of those who were enrolled in the frst engineering colleges in Peru belonged to this group, colouring it with a distinct countryside form of male behaviour. 5 This is in stark contrast to diplomacy, which happens to be presented as a soft (or feminine) alternative to the military, see Towns (2020). 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These rights ensure the participation of indigenous peoples in the use, management, and conservation of natural resources located in their lands, as well as the free, prior, and informed consultation in relation to plans and programmes that potentially have an environmental or cultural impact on their territories (Idem: Art. 57). This chapter provides insights on how the management of freshwater resources in transboundary contexts is perceived from the perspectives of an indigenous woman. We emphasise transboundary contexts in this chapter, as the experiences do not only address interactions between nations, but also their impact on people living in the border regions, as well as water that crosses boundaries in a legal pluralist state. Dr. Mariana Yumbay Yallico is a Kichwa woman from the Waranka people in the Ecuadorian Andes. She is a lawyer specialised in human rights and criminal law, and an activist for indigenous people’s movements. She became the frst indigenous female judge of the National Court of Justice of Ecuador, and more recently, she became the Subsecretary for Social Affairs and Water Resources of the National Water Secretary of Ecuador. In this capacity she was part of the negotiations for the establishment of the Binational Commission for Integrated Water Resources Management of Transboundary Basins between Ecuador and Peru (EPBCTW).1 According to Dr. Yumbay, indigenous women and particularly Waranka women have a close relationship with nature, as both give life. They are also holders of ancestral knowledge and custodians of the Kichwa culture and language. Despite their fundamental role in society, indigenous women have been subject to different forms of discrimination and racism for centuries. This has led to the gradual loss of their identity, including traditional clothing and language, and they were particularly oppressed during the ’80s. This situation improved through a series of different indigenous uprisings during the ’90s and the adoption of bilingual intercultural education which has helped them DOI: 10.4324/9781003198918-3 30 Diego Jara and Mariana Yumbay Yallico peoples or nationalities recognized by Ecuador with presence in the border areas” (Art. 7). Therefore, the work on the border has been free of confict, the management has been developed in complete harmony among the indigenous peoples. I must add that the governance of transboundary water has been carried out through [the indigenous peoples’] own institutions and organisations, applying their knowledge, wisdom, and ancient practices, establishing regulations that allow the exercise of collective ownership, conservation, and care. The structure and theories of transboundary water management have been developed mainly by men in more industrialised countries from a position of privilege. Do you consider that this system appropriately addresses the rights of indigenous peoples and the inclusion of women? What aspects specifically could be improved in these areas? Indeed, this is what has happened, but it is not a reason to question this knowledge. I consider that any contribution is welcome. What I do consider necessary is to collect the knowledge, practices, wisdom, dynamics to know the institutions and rights of indigenous peoples. Ignorance sometimes makes us end up imposing theories or structures alien to the life of these peoples and this is what has happened with the work developed over the years from the governing institutions for water in Ecuador,8 for example, this has led to the weakening and fragmentation of the community structure and its institutions. What should have been done was simply to recognise the indigenous peoples’ own forms of community organisation and that the same institution should have been in charge of water management and administration. Only since 2008, when the new Constitution entered into force and as a result of the adoption of the SENAGUA Ministerial Agreement 031 from 2017, the autonomy of the communities, peoples, and nationalities was respected. Now, these communities in their condition of community governments are the ones who can decide which organisation carries out the water management and administration (Registro Ofcial 2017). In addition to respecting their organisational structure, I believe that through these, their own organisations, work should be pushed to ensure greater participation and strengthening of women’s leadership but based on the logic and philosophy of indigenous peoples. That means taking into account the principles of complementarity, of duality between men and women. What actions are needed to achieve more inclusive and fair processes in conflict resolution? I believe that it is necessary to carry out planned and participatory work, ensuring the sound and effective participation of local stakeholders in all processes, which will allow the empowerment of plans, programmes, projects. Interview with Dr. Mariana Yumbay Yallico 31 On the other hand, it is key to guaranteeing the exercise of the collective right of free, prior, and informed consultation. This will contribute to the minimisation of internal conficts. And for those cases in which internal conficts arise, the solution for the reestablishment of harmony and balance within these peoples or nationalities must be guaranteed through their own institutions, authorities, and, most importantly, based on their own norms and judicial mechanisms for confict resolution. This has been adopted by the Ecuadorian Constitution9 in accordance with international instruments, in particular with Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization10; therefore it is binding and of obligatory application. This instrument has also been ratifed by sister countries, in this case Colombia and Peru with whom we share the waters. Likewise, it is necessary to achieve greater empowerment of the communities in all the work that is done in terms of water management and administration, which will reduce the number of conficts. For its part, the state, through its institutions, should promote intercultural and horizontal dialogue, within a framework of respect for the autonomy of indigenous peoples and nationalities, and seek strategies to ensure the full exercise of collective rights enshrined in the various normative instruments. What has your experience as an indigenous woman been like when negotiations between indigenous peoples and the government take place? Since 1990 I have been participating in struggles, uprisings, marches, and other activities. Effectively, days of struggle in defence and vindication of rights have concluded in the conformation of dialogue roundtables with the governments. However, dialogue roundtables have not been effective as there have been no concrete answers from the state. On the contrary, they have been used to neutralise the struggle of the indigenous peoples and diminish their proposals, with no answers to the collective demands at the end. That is the experience we have had over the years, while the only results have been people imprisoned and sometimes even killed. Furthermore, these social struggles of resistance for the demand of rights have been considered, by the governments and the factical11 powers that control the state, as terrorist acts. Therefore, I would say that there have not been true horizontal dialogues or true negotiations. On the contrary, there have been spaces that have been opened so that in the end the state evades its responsibility, does not attend to the demands of the people, and continues to postpone discussing inequality, exclusion, and poverty, among other issues that have been raised. Based on these experiences, I believe that it is necessary that all negotiations or dialogues should be carried out in a framework of respect, sincerity, transparency, and equality, as well as an understanding that indigenous peoples only demand their rights be both exercised and respected. The aim is that, if 32 Diego Jara and Mariana Yumbay Yallico they sit at a dialogue roundtable, it is effectively a dialogue with results, not to impose the proposals of the governments in power. Do you consider that the fact of being a woman and belonging to an indigenous people has had a positive influence on the resolution or prevention of any conflict? I would say that it is not determinant; the most important thing is to know, be involved, and be part of the organisations, given the fact that an indigenous woman is linked to her family and the community in a permanent way. Due to the complex economic conditions in the communities, women are the ones in charge of the family, the community, and the organisations, while their partners go out to work in the cities. In fact, when a confict is generated, women are the ones who resolve conficts within communities and their families. On the other hand, an indigenous woman, being part of a community or a village, lives in the midst of complicated conficts that are resolved in a communitarian way. This reality allows her to have knowledge and skills to face the adversities of family and community life. A woman’s character of struggle and courage is consolidated from a young age and the strategies to resolve conficts are learned in the process of being a permanent part of a collective whose struggle is historical. To that extent the intervention of indigenous women in confict resolution is positive and decisive. During the resolution or prevention of a conflict, have you felt any type of limitation or discrimination for being an indigenous woman? If so, what recommendations do you have to counteract these limitations? It is necessary to take into account that, within the communities of indigenous peoples and nationalities, there is a system of administration of justice. Through this system, all conficts arising within these territorial spaces are resolved, and the community assembly is the highest body responsible for resolving conficts. If I am a member of the community organisation, I can use my expertise but I cannot infuence a decision, since those who resolve the confict are all community members, following their procedure, applying their principles, rules, and sanctions. From my experience, I have not felt discriminated against by the communities, peoples, or nationalities. On the contrary, I have been invited to participate in the assembly of judgement and confict resolution to advise and guide the process of confict resolution in a framework of respect for human rights and others. My participation has been to strengthen the actions of the indigenous authorities, respecting their own dynamics of confict resolution, which is fundamental. Interview with Dr. Mariana Yumbay Yallico 33 Do you consider gender diversity important for transboundary water governance? Why? How can inclusion and representation in institutions be promoted? Gender diversity is important, since all societies are made up of men, women, and other sexes and gender identities, so that all actions are carried out within a territory. Within this framework no one should be excluded from the governance of transboundary waters. Mechanisms must be adopted to ensure the participation of the different groups, given the fact that women and men have their own visions, and these different visions can contribute to the management and governance of transboundary waters. Creating awareness of equity between men and women, making visible their contribution throughout history: no action has been carried out only by men, but rather, women have always participated. It is also important to strengthen the continuous education and training of women on topics such as participation and leadership, women’s rights, governance, rights of indigenous peoples, and philosophy of indigenous peoples and nationalities, among other topics that could strengthen and develop the skills to assume new responsibilities both within community organisations that manage and administer transboundary water, as well as assuming representation in the institutions, so that, from that space they can generate advocacy actions. How can indigenous peoples’ ancestral knowledge support water governance and conflict resolution? It is essential to understand that indigenous peoples have knowledge and wisdom that have been preserved throughout history through collective memory, transmitted from generation to generation, and it is this knowledge that has allowed them to ensure their survival until today. Hence, indigenous peoples have millennia of historical continuity because they were in this territory before the very constitution of the nation states. The care of Mother Earth, water, and other elements found in nature has been possible thanks to the use and application of this knowledge. An example of peoples’ knowledge is water sowing,12 which they have been applying throughout history and which has allowed them to ensure the use of water for various needs. In the same way, they know which are the plants to sow that will allow water storage and conservation, as well as which animals are not suitable to keep in areas where water sources are born, and so on. However, this knowledge is not found in books, but in the collective memory. That is why it is important to systematise this knowledge so that it can be preserved for future generations as a collective property. Another important element to consider is that indigenous peoples, without the support of the state, have been building and strengthening their own organisational institutions through which they have been able to carry out their own governance of their territory. This also includes everything related to 34 Diego Jara and Mariana Yumbay Yallico water, as within the vision of the indigenous peoples there is no separation of land, water, animals, and other elements. On the contrary, it has been treated as an integral part of a whole including the human being. In these systems of organisation, peoples’ knowledge, principles, norms, etc. have been put into practice. Among these principles, for example, is the minga, the randi randi,13 reciprocity, relationality, which are put into practice on a daily basis. Hence, almost all of the irrigation systems are built in indigenous peoples’ and nationalities’ territories with the minga, community work, where men and women of any ages can participate. If this had not been built in this way, you can be sure that the communities and indigenous peoples would live in much more critical conditions today. So it has been fundamental to organise and unify communities to work out all these great projects that have allowed them to bring water both for irrigation and human consumption. The governance of the indigenous peoples is based on the full and effective participation of all its members; therefore, all decisions will be adopted in large assemblies with the participation of all the community members, and that makes everyone feel obliged to comply and empower themselves with the decisions adopted for the good of their organisation. On the other hand, as I already mentioned, in Ecuador, the state is recognised as plurinational and intercultural. This implies the recognition of the existence of the various nationalities and indigenous peoples, each with its richness, wisdom, knowledge, languages, religiosity, institutions, organisational systems, legal systems, among others. So that, in Ecuador the legal pluralism is in force, which is nothing more than the full force of the different legal systems in the same territorial space, within a framework of respect for the autonomy of peoples. In this sense, in accordance with the provisions of Article 171 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 (in Constitute 2021), it is recognised that the authorities of the communes, communities, peoples, and nationalities have jurisdictional functions to resolve internal conficts within their territorial scope, applying their rules, principles, procedures, and sanctions. Thus, by respecting the human rights prescribed both in the Constitution of the Republic and in international instruments, indigenous peoples have competence and jurisdiction to resolve all conficts. This implies that if conficts arise related to water use and administration, the community authorities will be able to resolve them, and this is what should be strengthened. Therefore, the state, through its institutions, must respect the decisions that are adopted within the system of indigenous justice administration, and thus contribute to the true construction of a plurinational and intercultural state like ours [Ecuador’s]. How has the situation and decision-making position of women and indigenous peoples regarding water management in your country evolved over the last 30 years? The situation of indigenous peoples and women in decision making in a general and broad way has been strengthened from the ’90s onward, and concretely Interview with Dr. Mariana Yumbay Yallico 35 from the uprising carried out in June 1990 when an irruption of the indigenous peoples happened. From this moment on, women were more present in political processes with demands that had been postponed for many years, and that had not been attended to by the rulers. It is in this uprising that around 15 mandates were raised, among which are: the constitutional reform, the participation of indigenous peoples in the various decision-making spaces, the restitution of lands and territories and their titling, access to water for irrigation and human consumption, the right to intercultural bilingual education, the right to preserve ancestral medicine, and the right to strengthen their own organisations and institutions, among others. However, these demands were not immediately met. On the contrary, for example, in terms of constitutional reform, it occurred only in 1998 and recognised about 15 collective rights, among which are the right to keep lands and territories and that the same are imprescriptible, indivisible, and unseizable, as well as the right to conserve their natural resources, among which is water. It should be noted that the 1990 uprising was possible thanks to the work developed during the ’70s and ’80s, which focused on the construction of a great social fabric. The indigenous peoples and nationalities had organised themselves by forming community organisations. This work was the cornerstone for the resistance actions that marked Ecuadorian history and the role of the indigenous peoples in Ecuador in their struggle for the recognition of their rights. During the ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, the struggle of the indigenous peoples for the vindication and recognition of their rights was unique. Fundamentally, the recognition as subjects of rights and the recognition of their lands and territory. This was the banner of the struggle for both men and women, so that there was not a divided struggle, with approaches for men and another for women. On the contrary, there was the need and awareness to fght frst for general rights and later for specifc rights. It is important to point out that women have always played an important role in the struggles and their participation was key in the uprising of 1990, which led organisations to strengthen their participation through the creation of Women’s Secretariats at the level of all organisations. It is from this space that training processes are carried out to strengthen the participation of women at different levels. Therefore, I consider that this space created for women contributes enormously to the empowerment of women’s role in the management of transboundary waters at the national level. In what other aspects do you consider that gender mainstreaming and the involvement of indigenous peoples are important for transboundary water governance in Ecuador? The incorporation of the gender perspective and involvement of indigenous peoples cannot only be reduced to local work; I believe that greater participation in decision-making spaces should also be sought, so that it is they with their 36 Diego Jara and Mariana Yumbay Yallico own thoughts and voices who can have an impact from within in strengthening the governance of transboundary waters. This will allow indigenous women and peoples to not only play a role as local actors, but also in decision-making spaces at national and international level, and from up there, they will be a great support for advocacy. On the other hand, it is also fundamental that the knowledge that indigenous peoples have in relation to participation, organisation, and others, be systematised and incorporated as part of public policies or serve as good practices in other places. What aspects do you consider necessary to improve the current situation of women and indigenous peoples in water governance in Ecuador? During the time I worked at SENAGUA, the National Water Secretariat, I was able to observe that there is indeed a great social structure around water. However, there is a lack of greater participation of women leading those processes and those social structures. Therefore, I think there is a need to ensure greater participation of women as leaders of the organisations leading water administration and in particular, governance, and not only as treasurers or secretaries. The active role of women over the years should be taken into account, because it has been women who have always been present in community assemblies, in mingas, in the great political struggles. So it is urgent that we seek mechanisms for women to have greater participation in the decision-making processes; everyone should be involved in this effort, including the state authorities. On the other hand, there is an urgent need to solve the problems affecting indigenous peoples in the governance of transboundary waters; I refer to the pollution generated by mining and other activities, which greatly affects the lives of peoples, since rivers are not only used for navigation, but also provide food, among others. Therefore, the life of indigenous peoples living on the borders will always be threatened as long as there is no control and the corresponding sanctions to those responsible for causing pollution, and damages repair. Therefore, the state must assume responsibility and guarantee access to quality water and protection of rights that peoples deserve in relation to governance. In the same way, although it is true that indigenous people have the right to exercise water governance, it does not imply that the state should ignore the unresolved needs from populations living on the borders as well as the overall indigenous population, given the fact that indigenous peoples do not have the required economic resources, for example, the provision of water quality for human consumption. These issues should be prioritised and incorporated into action plans of the decentralised autonomous governments in order to work in full coordination with the authorities of the indigenous peoples and solve these problems that affect them to this day. Interview with Dr. Mariana Yumbay Yallico 37 What message could you share from your experience with people who are doing or striving towards transboundary water governance work/research? There is a lot of work to be done regarding transboundary waters, so I salute the authors’ contribution. On the other hand, it is essential to guarantee the active participation of men and women of all ages in the work of transboundary waters. Given that, within the vision of these peoples, there is no age difference. On the contrary, if participation in activities begins at an early age, the knowledge will be transmitted from generation to generation. In the same way, it is guaranteed that the knowledge, wisdom, and practices of indigenous peoples are incorporated in the plans, programmes, and projects to be implemented, as well as in the public policies designed by the state, which will allow governance of the transboundary waters to be successful and the greatest empowerment and sustainability. In the same way, the strengthening of the peoples’ organisational structure is ensured, as well as the strict respect for the legal systems that the peoples have for the resolution of conficts. Thank you for this interview Notes 1 The Binational Commission for the Integrated Water Resources Management of Transboundary Basins between Ecuador and Peru was established through an Agreement in 2017 to consolidate the bilateral cooperation for the management and protection of the nine river basins shared between these countries. 2 The term “indigenous nationalities” refer to ancient and native peoples or groups of peoples preceding the creation of Ecuador, self-identifed as such, sharing a common historic identity, language, culture, living in a defned territory, through their own institutions, traditional social, economic, legal, and political organisation. 3 The term “indigenous peoples”refers to native collectivities,constituted by communities with particular cultural identities that distinguish them from other sectors for Ecuadorian society, governed by their own social, economic, politic, and legal systems. 4 “Minka” is a Kichwa term to describe community work for the beneft of all its members. An example of a “minka” is the clearing of ditches for irrigation. 5 Tayta, Kichwa term for “father” 6 Mingas, from the Kichwa term Minka, meaning “collective work”, and can apply to different communal tasks, including public works but also movements for indigenous rights. 7 “Wawas” a term from Kichwa meaning “babies” or “little children” 8 In 2008 the Water National Secretary (Secretaria Nacional del Agua or SENAGUA), was established as the main institution in charge of the management and governance of water resources. In 2020, SENAGUA and its functions were absorbed by the Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition. 9 The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 Art. 171 (in Constitute 2021) states: “The authorities of the indigenous communities, peoples, and nations shall perform jurisdictional duties, based on their ancestral traditions and their own system of law, within their own territories, with a guarantee for the participation of, and decisionmaking by, women.The authorities shall apply their own standards and procedures for 38 Diego Jara and Mariana Yumbay Yallico the settlement of internal disputes, as long as they are not contrary to the Constitution and human rights enshrined in international instruments”. 10 The C169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989,Article 8 (in ILO 2021) “1. In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary laws. 2.These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defned by the national legal system and with internationally recognised human rights. Procedures shall be established, whenever necessary, to resolve conficts which may arise in the application of this principle” (Art. 8). 11 According to Dr.Yumay, factical powers refer to strong economic groups, bankers, and media. 12 Water sowing is an ancestral process that involves gathering and infltrating (Sowing) rainwater, surface runoff, and hypodermic or groundwater to retrieve (harvest) it at a later date and/or place (see Martos-Rossilo et al. 2021). 13 Randi randi, a Kichwa term meaning “giving and giving” to describe a system barter exchange. References Constitute. (2021) ‘The constitution of the Republic of Ecuador’, https://www .constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2015.pdf?lang=en, accessed 23 December 2021. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2021) ‘C169 - Indigenous and tribal peoples convention, 1989 (No. 169)’, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p =NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169, accessed 20 January 2022. Martos-Rosillo, S., Durán, A., Castro, M., Vélez, J. J., Herrera, G., Martín-Civantos, J. M., Mateos, L., Durán, J. J., Jódar, J., Gutiérrez, C. & Hermoza, R. M. (2021) ‘Ancestral techniques of water sowing and harvesting in Ibero-America: Examples of hydrogeoethical systems’, in M. Abrunhosa, A. Chambel, S. Peppoloni & H. I. Chaminé (eds), Advances in Geoethics and Groundwater Management: Theory and Practice for a Sustainable Development. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 483–487. Pacari, N. (ed) (2020) ‘Las luchas y las conquistas de las mujeres Kichwas que clausuran el silencio’, Report, Riobamba, Ecuador. https://rosalux.org.ec/pdfs/luchas-conquistas -mujeres-kichwas.pdf, accessed 20 January 2022. Registro Ofcial. (2017) ‘Acuerdo No. 2017-0031 Directrices y regulaciones para garantizar la permanencia y fortalecimiento de la gestión comunitaria del agua y de la prestación comunitaria de los servicios de agua potable y saneamiento; y, riego y drenaje’, Regulation, Quito, Ecuador. http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ecu183262.pdf, accessed 20 January 2022. 3 Is Academic Knowledge Production on Transboundary Waters in South Asia Gender Neutral? Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath Introduction It is necessary to examine the relationship between people and water in the modern world. Linton (2010) argues that the discursive and material practices around water in modern times have concealed its social nature. “Modern water” has been universally accepted as an “intellectual abstraction, [which is] materially contained, de-territorialised and socially alienated” (Linton 2010, p. 40). However, this way of thinking about water excludes several other water worldviews, often those in direct interaction with water such as farmers and women. This is true of academic knowledge production on transboundary water governance, too. Von Lossow (2015) points out three characteristics of academic approaches to transboundary water in particular. Firstly, it deals with issues of confict, confrontation, and warfare that are associated traditionally with masculine ideas of virtue and power. Secondly, state-centric models based on national interest dominate both research and policymaking for transboundary water. Thirdly, water management is usually seen in terms of hydroengineering and building of large-scale water infrastructure (Von Lossow 2015, p. 107). Thus, the very approach to transboundary water has been masculine and developed around a state-centric “hydrological mission” (Molle et al. 2009, p. 328). Gender research has been highlighting the problems with such objective knowledge for a long time (Allen 1999). All knowledge production is discursively mediated. Talking about a feminist approach to water, it has been highlighted that knowledge creation about water is also a social process. Thus, in order to understand the feminist perspective on water it must be acknowledged that the very way in which modern water is understood is an outcome of the power structures and must therefore be evaluated critically (Zwarteveen 2010). There can be more than one way of “knowing” water. Particularly for transboundary water governance, the role of gender in the process of such knowledge production remains largely unexplored (Singh 2019; Earle & Bazilli 2013). DOI: 10.4324/9781003198918-4 46 Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath Collaboration: Gendered Networking Patterns Gendered patterns of formal and informal academic networks have been a subject of study in the past 20 years (McDowell 2006; Boschini 2007; Barios 2013; Hopkins 2013; Santos et al. 2020). Authors, like McDowell (2006), have shown that there is a propensity of academics to publish together with coauthors of the same gender. Moreover, women scholars tend to match more with co-authors who have fewer publications in journals with a high impact factor (Ghosh & Liu 2020, p. 580). We found the gendered pattern of co-authorship to be true for South Asian transboundary water research, too. Table 3.4 presents the networking pattern of the reviewed articles based on gender. First, it is noted that almost half of the papers reviewed were single-authored. Among these 52 single-authored papers, 37 have a male author and only 15 a female one. Among 53 papers with multiple authors, 23 papers had only male co-authors, compared to only fve papers with all-female co-authors. These constitute 21.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent of the total observations, respectively. On the other hand, 25 (23.8 per cent) of the papers have both male and female co-authors. Interestingly, of these 25 papers, 16 were led by female scientists and only eight by men. Thus, compared with male scholars, female scholars have a greater tendency to collaborate with mixed groups of co-authors. Regional Study Area It is noted that 49.5 per cent of the papers are about the Ganges–Brahmaputra– Meghna (GBM) basin, 27.6 per cent about the Indus river basin, and 13.3 per cent study both Indus and GBM basins (Table 3.5). While male author-led papers are spread more or less evenly across these basins, it is remarkable that almost 60 per cent of the female author-led papers are focused on the GBM basin. Female representation is very low in papers on the Indus basin. Table 3.4 Gendered networking patterns in South Asia transboundary water research Freq. Percentage Total Observation 105 100 Single author (49.5 per cent) Male sole author 37 35.2 Female sole author 15 14.3 Total 52 49.5 Papers with collaboration All-male authors 23 21.9 (50.5 per cent) All-female authors 5 4.8 Male frst author with at least one 8 7.6 female co-author Female frst author with at least one 17 16.2 male co-author Total 53 50.5 Transboundary Waters in South Asia 47 Table 3.5 River basin studied and gender of the sole/frst author River basin Total literature reviewed Male sole/frst author Female sole/frst author Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Indus 29 27.6 22 32.4 7 18.9 Ganges–Brahmaputra– Meghna Indus and Ganges– Brahmaputra–Meghna Not specifed 52 14 10 49.5 13.3 9.5 30 11 5 44.1 16.2 7.4 22 3 5 59.5 8.1 13.5 It makes geographical sense that more papers are published on the GBM basin rather than on the Indus basin. GBM is a larger river system, almost 1.5 times the size of the Indus drainage basin. Further, GBM is shared between fve countries, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, and India, with several bilateral treaties between countries for transboundary water sharing. Indus, on the other hand, has only one major treaty between India and Pakistan. This has also enhanced the scope of transboundary water-related academic inquiry on GBM. Within our dataset for the GBM basin, we found literature covering diverse aspects, including bilateral cooperation for hydropower generation, navigation, and water sharing (Saklani et al. 2020). Additionally, most of the literature on the Indus basin in our dataset was discussing the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Due to the strained political relations between India and Pakistan, there is very little literature exploring other avenues of cooperation. Moreover, there is a higher presence of authors with diplomatic and defence backgrounds writing about the Indus basin. As women are generally underrepresented in these felds, it could explain their lower representation as authors on the Indus basin. Theoretical and Conceptual Approaches and Gender This section tries to identify the various conceptual outlooks and theories adopted by scholars writing on transboundary waters in South Asia. We look for gender-based preferences for theoretical and conceptual approaches among authors. We also look at their current departmental affliations or disciplines to fnd any correlation with their preferences. The key conceptual approaches identifed through a review of literature are hydro-hegemony, integrated water resources management (IWRM), (neo-) institutionalism, hydro-social discourse analysis, nexus approach, polycentric governance, water war and water scarcity framework, and technical solution. It is interesting to note that that feminist analysis is totally missing in the academic discourses regarding shared waters of South Asia in all 105 articles included in 48 Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath Table 3.6 Number of papers published by gender and theoretical framework Theoretical framework Total literature Male sole/frst Female sole/frst reviewed author author Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Hydro-hegemony 29 27.6 19 27.9 10 27.0 Integrated water 22 21.0 17 25.0 5 13.5 resource management framework (Neo-)institutionalism 18 17.1 11 16.2 7 18.9 Hydro-social discourse 10 9.5 5 7.4 5 13.5 analysis Nexus approach 9 8.6 5 7.4 4 10.8 Polycentric governance 9 8.6 5 7.4 4 10.8 Water wars & water 6 5.7 4 5.9 2 5.4 scarcity framework Technical solution 2 1.9 2 2.9 0 0.0 Total 105 100 68 100 37 100 this review. We have divided all the articles on the basis of the gender of the frst author in order to assess whether we can identify gendered preferences with regard to the theoretical framework followed and/or the solutions provided (Table 3.6). The key aspects of these frameworks and the gender pattern are discussed below. Hydro-hegemony In our database, we noted that hydro-hegemony is the most common theoretical perspective taken by authors irrespective of gender. This theoretical perspective highlights water as a security issue, focuses on the role of power, and takes a state-centric approach. Authors analyse the tactics used by states to achieve or counter hydro-hegemony, including coercion, pressure, treaties, and knowledge construction, among others (Zeitoun & Warner 2006); 27 per cent of the authors look at water issues from the state securitisation perspective. It is important to note that there is no gender difference in this perspective. Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Framework The second most common approach was the IWRM framework. For proponents of IWRM, cooperative watershed management is the only way to “incorporate all of the physical, political, and economic characteristics for a river basin” (Rahman & Varis 2005, p. 17). Thus, river basins become more relevant than political boundaries. This approach has been taken by several Transboundary Waters in South Asia 49 authors for analysing water relations in South Asia. Overall, 22 of the 105 papers being considered have focused on this framework. Looking at the gender segregation, 25 per cent of papers with sole/frst male authors have adopted the IWRM framework in contrast to only 13.5 per cent of the sole/ frst female authors. (Neo-)Institutionalism (Neo-)Institutionalism is the third most common theoretical perspective among the authors. This is a water-rational approach based on the liberal theory which argues that the interests of the states lie in mutually benefcial outcomes (Dinar 2011). The authors focus on explaining how institutions facilitate or hamper water cooperation. There is also much inquiry into the design of institutions and their impact on water conficts (Saravanan 2015). Overall 18.9 per cent of female authors and 16.2 per cent of male authors have used this framework for analysis. Hydro-social Discourse Analysis Bringing out hydro-social relations through discourse analysis is a theoretical framework adopted by ten of the papers. This approach focuses on water as a medium of politics (Agnew 2011). Control over water narratives becomes a medium of control over the population dependent upon the water resource (Linton 2010). It highlights “naturalised, universalised, and hegemonized” perspectives on quantity and quality of water (Mirumachi 2015, p. 5). This approach is considerably more common among female authors as compared with male authors: 13.5 per cent vs 7.4 per cent. Nexus Approach The Nexus approach is an emerging conceptual framework that aims to systematise the interconnections between water, energy, and food interfaces in a river basin for achieving sustainable adaptation (Rasul & Sharma 2016). Out of the nine authors looking at water through the Nexus approach, fve are male and four are female. In percentage terms, 10.8 per cent female sole/frst authors and 7.4 per cent male sole/frst authors have advocated this approach. Polycentric Governance The polycentric governance approach is adopted by nine articles. Polycentric governance advocates for multi-level governance. Distribution of power is the key aspect of polycentric water governance with “differently sized governance units with different purposes, organizations and spatial locations interact to form together systems” (Pahl-Wostl 2012, p. 27). This approach is used by 10.8 per cent of female sole/frst authors and 7.4 per cent of male frst/sole authors to look at transboundary water in South Asia. 50 Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath Water Wars and Water Scarcity Framework The water wars and water scarcity framework is not very commonly adopted by authors. Some scholars claimed that increasing water shortage could lead to an escalation of violence between states. These water war predictions were based on the concept of water as a scarce and limited natural resource (Linton, 2010, p. 191). Overall increasing human population, economic growth, water pollution, as well as climate change are cumulatively going to create situations of water stress for several regions of the world and might lead to water wars (Postel 2000). This framework has been adopted by 6 of the 105 studied research works. Both male (5.4 per cent) and female (5.9 per cent) have similar representation. Technical Solution Finally, two articles have worked on purely technical aspects, not focusing on any theoretical framework of international politics. Both are male sole/frst author research articles. The water worldviews adopted by authors are not adequately explained by their gender. The most common framework adopted by authors irrespective of gender is hydro-hegemony. The theoretical framework of (neo-)institutionalism has also been equally adopted by authors of both genders. Female authors show a greater preference for the three non-state-centric approaches consisting of hydro-social discourse analysis, Nexus approach, and polycentric governance. However, the difference is less than 5 per cent for all three approaches. Male authors show a greater preference for IWRM and water wars and water scarcity framework. Technical solutions are only suggested by male authors. Overall, both male and female authors have suggested both state-centric and non state-centric approaches. While male authors show inclination towards an integrational approach like IWRM, more female authors have chosen the Nexus approach which is also based on interconnectedness of various aspects of a river basin. It is seen that preference for none of the frameworks is explained suffciently by gender, nor did we fnd any evidence of a regional pattern in preference for any particular theoretical frameworks (Table 3.7). In order to analyse the variations in theoretical perspectives adopted by authors, we also look at their departmental affliation and disciplinary background. Authors’ Disciplines and Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks We looked at the departmental affliation and disciplinary background of the authors for our database. We found that scholars represented various felds across science and social sciences. The majority of papers were contributed by authors who have backgrounds in geography and environmental sciences followed by engineering, hydrology and water resource management, international relations, political science, economics, law, and sociology. Additionally, Table 3.7 Frequency of authors based on regional affliation and the theoretical framework used by them Theoretical framework Gender of sole/ Regional affliation of author frst author No information South Asia Asia excluding SA Europe North America Australia Total Hydro-hegemony Male 1 13 1 1 3 0 19 Female 0 2 4 2 2 0 10 IWRM Male 0 9 1 1 4 2 17 Female 1 0 2 0 2 0 5 (Neo-)institutionalism Male 2 5 1 0 3 0 11 Female 0 0 2 1 4 0 7 Hydro-social discourse analysis Male 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 Female 0 2 0 2 1 0 5 Nexus approach Male 0 4 0 0 1 0 5 Female 0 2 0 1 1 0 4 Polycentric governance Male 0 2 1 0 1 1 5 Female 0 2 0 1 0 1 4 Water war & water scarcity Male 0 1 0 0 3 0 4 Female 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 Technical solution Male 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transboundary Waters in South Asia 51 Total 4 46 14 10 26 5 105 52 Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath Sociology Law Economics Bureaucracy Political Science Hydrology/Water Resource Management International Relations Engineering Geography and Environmental Sciences Female sole/first author Male sole/first author 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Number of articles Figure 3.3 Departmental affliation/Disciplinary background of the authors 11 papers were authored by former civil servants or military personnel. The disaggregation of the data on the subject expertise per gender is shown in Figure 3.3. The disciplinary background of the authors can partially explain their preference for particular conceptual frameworks. Most of the writing in transboundary water governance comes from subjects like political science, international relations, law, and engineering that have a stateand institutioncentric approach in general which is followed by all authors irrespective of their gender (Earle & Bazilli, 2013; Maliniak 2008). Political science and international relations are two disciplines that have traditionally taken a state-centric paradigm. Indeed, Tickner (2006) highlighted how some of the most prominent researchers in international relations came from military backgrounds. Singh (2019) noted that transboundary water research in South Asia lies at the “intersection of two masculinized felds – water resource management and the disciplines engaged in the research of transboundary water management, namely, political science and international relations” (Singh 2019, p. 140). Thus, the subject has traditionally been broached within a state-centric paradigm, informed by knowledge produced by technical experts and an absence of innovation from the social sciences (Earle & Bazilli 2013). This is refected in the relationship between the authors’ disciplines and their preferred theoretical frameworks for our dataset, too. Table 3.8 presents a cross tabulation between the theoretical perspectives adopted by scholars and their departmental affliations or disciplinary background. Hydro-hegemony, the most common theoretical perspective, has an over-representation of scholars from backgrounds in engineering and authors who have been former civil servants or army personnel. Notably, most of these authors are men (see Table 3.9). In our database, these included four out of 16 Table 3.8 Authors’ disciplines and their preferred theoretical frameworks Theoretical framework Authors discipline/Departmental affliation1 Geography Engineering WRM IR PolSc CS Economics Law Sociology Total Hydro-hegemony 4 5 3 2 3 7 3 2 0 29 IWRM 4 4 3 4 2 1 2 1 1 22 Institutionalism 0 1 4 3 7 2 0 1 0 18 Discourse analysis 5 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 10 Nexus approach 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 0 9 Polycentric governance 2 2 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 9 Water wars and water 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 scarcity framework Technical solution 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Total 19 16 15 14 13 11 10 7 1 105 Source: Author’s calculation 1 Subject expertise/Departmental affliation – Geography includes Environmental science, WRM includes Water Resource Management and Hydrology, CS includes former civil servants and army personnel, PolSc includes political sciences, IR includes International Relations. Transboundary Waters in South Asia 53 Table 3.9 Discipline wise frequency of authors and the theoretical framework used by them Theoretical framework Departmental affliation/Subject expertise Sole/frst Political Engineering Geography and International Economics Hydrology/ Bureaucracy Law Sociology Total author Science Environmental Relations Water Resource Sciences Management Hydro-hegemony Male 0 4 3 0 2 2 7 1 0 19 Female 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 10 IWRM Male 2 4 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 17 Female 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 Institutionalism Male 3 1 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 11 Female 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 7 Hydro-social discourse Male 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 analysis Female 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 Nexus approach Male 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 Female 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 4 Polycentric Male 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 governance Female 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 Water wars and water Male 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 scarcity framework Female 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Technical solution Male 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 Ritu Priya and Tania Debnath Total 13 16 19 14 10 15 11 7 1 105 Transboundary Waters in South Asia 55 fve scholars from engineering backgrounds and all seven former civil servants or army personnel. The second state-centric theoretical perspective of institutionalism has the highest number of authors with subject expertise in political sciences, international relations, and water resource management. In contrast to this, IWRM is a perspective which is adopted by scholars with specialisation across disciplines. For the three non state-centric approaches – discourse analysis, Nexus approach, and polycentric governance – disciplines such as geography, environmental sciences, and environmental economics have a greater representation. It is seen that engineering and diplomacy are mostly represented by men. Three out of four authors working within the framework of water wars and water scarcity come from technical disciplines like engineering and environmental sciences. Thus, the disciplinary background of the author is a better explanation of their conceptual framework preferences than their gender. Conclusion For this chapter, two main research questions were posed. We looked for the representation of women scholars in transboundary water governance studies in South Asia and enquired whether their theoretical understanding on transboundary water governance in South Asia is different from male authors. Based on the results of our analysis of 105 papers, we were able to note that transboundary water research in South Asia is numerically dominated by male scholars with only 35.2 per cent of the articles having a female sole/frst author. However, there has been increasing female participation over the past two decades. Collaboration among scholars also showed a gendered pattern. Among 53 papers with multiple authors, 23 papers had all-male co-authors, compared to only 5 papers with all-female co-authors. Secondly, we found authors taking diverse theoretical and conceptual perspectives on transboundary water governance including hydro-hegemony, IWRM, (neo-)institutionalism, hydrosocial discourse analysis, Nexus approach, polycentric governance, water war and water scarcity framework, and technical solutions. However, we found no evidence of gender-based preference for these views on transboundary water. Taking a hydro-hegemonic theoretical approach is most common among both male and female authors and is adopted by 27 per cent of all authors. Overall, both male and female authors have suggested state-centric approaches as well as non-state-centric approaches. The disciplinary background of authors rather than their gender was better correlated with their theoretical preferences. Most research coming from authors trained in disciplines like engineering, political sciences, international relations, and law was state-centric and focused on technical aspects, irrespective of the gender of the author. Even when female authors are present, the approach is masculinised, focused on power struggle and confict. On the other hand, non state-centric theoretical frameworks have a higher representation from diverse disciplines including geography, environmental economics, etc. Like most of academia, transboundary water research in South Asia is a male-dominated domain. This is indicated by the presence 62 Alyssa Offutt the household. In other instances, such as the unplanned areas of Delhi and the Cochabamba Valley, both genders perceive that men are unaffected by water collection and thus do not care to alter water systems or initiate repairs (Beltrán 2004; Truelove 2011). Additionally, in the case of the unplanned areas of Delhi, men frequently control water resource access through the transport of water tanks and illegal management of wells, enabling them to both support women in alternate water access while also providing an impediment and potential source of confict (Truelove 2011). Within these settings, males’ sense of responsibility refects their gendered identities, roles, and beliefs that can evoke responses to, and at times, propagate conditions of water confict, broadening the gendered perspective on interpersonal interactions. Gendered Dimensions of Local/Regional Water Conflicts Local/regional water conficts are conficts that occur between groups of people at local and regional scales and group responses to a state actor. A variety of factors infuence broader local/regional involvement in waterrelated confict which can challenge inequality, and in some cases, become violent and contribute to intrastate destabilisation (Myrttinen et al. 2018; de Silva 2018; Pearson et al. 2021). Within this social scale, existing literature identifes relationships between gender roles and identities in the initiation and propagation of confict and assesses how these same identities can be performed and contested in ongoing water conficts. Gender Roles and Identities as a Contributing Factor of Local/Regional Water Conflict Several authors have argued that gender roles and related identities can combine to be a contributing factor of confict, and that environmental conditions, such as water stress, can trigger or perpetuate this causal chain by shifting gendered divisions of labour (El-Bushra & Sahl 2005). For instance, drought and changing climate can disproportionately impact male income sources and cause a male-outward migration that results in women becoming the head of their households (Goh 2004; Beltrán 2004). Simultaneously, water-related migration and confict can also limit access to natural resources and traditional livelihoods, affecting both genders (El-Bushra & Sahl 2005). When these conditions exist, women tend to engage in more economic activity and male economic activity often decreases, which has a range of implications that both empower and increase the vulnerability of all actors (El-Bushra & Sahl 2005; Herbert 2014; Fletcher 2018). The shift in economic gender roles can also cause a discord with gendered identities. El-Bushra and Sahl (2005) describe how in some cultures men are expected to be breadwinners who supply for their families. This expectation can be expressed and reinforced by both genders, linking the role of generating fnancial resources with an identity of masculinity (Birchall 2019). When Gender and Scales of Water Confict 63 actors are unable to live up to their identity because of external factors, this is considered a “thwarted identity” (p. 111), which can elicit destructive behaviour including violence and the perpetuation of confict in the interpersonal, local, and regional sphere (El-Bushra & Sahl 2005). Although not specifc to water conficts, this notion of “thwarted masculinity” (ibid., p. 111) can apply to instances where gendered divisions of labour have shifted as a result of water stress, thus presenting a causal relationship where water can contribute to a dissonance in gender roles and identities that can further contribute to and perpetuate confict. Similarly, these gender roles and identities of masculinity, when paired with decreased economic activity from water stress, can also evoke alternate responses in fragile contexts, including that some men join armed groups as a means to gain fnancial security (El-Bushra & Sahl 2005; Herbert 2014). As a result, this response may further perpetuate local/regional conficts. The Practice and Contestation of Gender Identities in Local/Regional Water Conflict Literature on local/regional water confict also discusses how gendered identities are practised in water confict through analysing how they are both performed and contested. These identities are highlighted in analyses that discuss how women are instrumental in shaping water confict, often in response to state actors. Peredo Beltrán (2004) discusses the role of women within the Cochabamba Water Wars, where residents of the Cochabamba Valley contested the privatisation of water resources. She argues that women were integral in mobilising and building cohesion within the community. Women engaged in media campaigns that shaped narratives of the confict and built community through cooking meals for participants, caring for protestors, engaging in micro-negotiations, and helping to avoid violence (ibid.). Within this, women expressed a gender identity of protection and care that helped to build solidarity between sectors and urban and rural protestors for a unifed community voice. Simultaneously, women contested gender identities that stereotype men as fghters and women as vulnerable by engaging in confrontation with the police and caring for the blockade (Herbert 2014; Beltrán 2004). These activities strengthened the local/regional response to privatisation although women were excluded from the negotiations that led to confict resolution (ibid.). In British Colombia, Canada, women of the Heiltsuk community played a similar role in initiating and shaping a confict between the Heiltsuk First Nations tribes and government agencies that manage herring fsheries in the area. Women participated in confictive behaviours through engaging in a physical standoff that was the trigger of social disruption and through participating and leading protests and offce occupations (Harper et al. 2018). Women also organised and built community through the mobilisation of networks, intragenerational songs, logistics coordination, shared vision development, and emphasising peace (ibid.). Along with their roles as elected decision makers and 64 Alyssa Offutt through coordination with traditional authorities, Harper et al. (2018) argue that women’s activities created a necessary precondition for socio-economic change, in essence enabling the initiation, implementation, and resolution of this regional water-related confict. Although women engaged in a broad range of activities similar to women’s roles within the confict of the Cochabamba Valley, the authors argue that these roles did not as directly confront typical gender identities due to historic gender balances and role fuidity of the Heiltsuk society. Instead, these roles aligned with the context-specifc gender identities and represent the signifcant impact that women can have in confict resolution. Other gendered identities can also play a role in the initiation and resolution of confict. Lebel et al. (2019) discuss how the narrative of the mother has been operationalised in the Mekong river basin. They posit that the narrative of women protestors as mothers can help to build support for women’s leadership in negotiations with the government, such as in the dispute over fsheries compensation from the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand. In addition, depictions of the river as a mother can also be used to mobilise the community to safeguard nature and links to the gendered identity of females as vulnerable and in need of protection (ibid.; Herbert, 2014). From these examples, it is clear that gendered narratives can simultaneously empower women in negotiations while perpetuating narrow gender identities. Along with the other case studies, these fndings show how a range of gendered identities shape women’s participation and their ability to infuence the resolution of local/regional water conficts. Gendered Dimensions of Transboundary Water Conflict Within this analysis, transboundary water conficts primarily present the interactions between state actors. Although these interactions are predominantly cooperative with the establishment of transboundary institutions, confict can underlie cooperation and lead to an elevation of tensions that are exacerbated by the geopolitical environment (Wolf et al. 2003; Zeitoun & Mirumachi 2008). Various gendered dimensions are linked to the formation and the practice of transboundary water confict including gendered institutions, ideologies, and identities that directly affect transboundary systems, as expressed in the following examples. Gendered Institutions and Transboundary Water Conflict Within transboundary basins, water management by state actors is often perceived as masculine, and thus, as a masculine institution (e.g., Earle & Bazilli 2013). In part, this perception is inherent to the level of scale, as states are traditionally conceptualised as masculine and are predominantly governed by men (Nagel 2015). Furthermore, many actors in transboundary water governance come from the male-dominated felds of engineering, international relations, and policymaking, which shape the discourse and practices of Gender and Scales of Water Confict 65 transboundary interactions, even when not all representatives are male (Earle & Bazilli 2013; Sehring 2021; von Lossow 2015). As a result of the content and scale, gender is perceived to shape interactions in transboundary systems, including potential water confict. This perception of masculinity is furthered by the actions of water management. For instance, state management of transboundary water resources lends itself to securitisation, which entails that water insecurity, often through the framing of climate change, is perceived and communicated as a national threat (Fischhendler 2015; Dankelman et al. 2008). Once initiated, this securitisation can have gendered implications as it often justifes military involvement or actions that are critiqued for being highly masculine and for perpetuating broad policies that disadvantage women’s security by ignoring gendered impacts (Fischhendler 2015; Nagel 2015; Detraz 2009). Through these processes, the securitisation of water resources not only generates gendered outcomes but can also tie to potential water confict, as securitisation can justify the decision to not cooperate which may cause tensions between states, often in the form of mild verbal disputes (Fischhendler 2015). The desire to achieve water security can also lead to a reliance on dam construction for water storage at international and national scales. Within ecofeminist perspectives, this dam construction perpetuates a hydraulic mission to control the environment and is perceived as a masculine act underlain by gendered ideologies of patriarchy and notions of power and strength (Earle & Bazilli 2013; von Lossow 2015). Although the propagation of dams can support water security by buffering changes in water availability, it can also be a source of confict at multiple scales. The development of large dams, especially when constructed unilaterally, can be a major source of tension in transboundary basins and can cause conficts even where cooperative agreements exist (Wolf et al. 2003). Similar government acts within a country can also trigger local and regional tensions as exemplifed domestically over the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand (Lebel et al. 2019). Along with the securitisation of water resources and interactions amongst state entities, this propagation of infrastructure and its repercussions demonstrate how gendered institutions, such as transboundary water management, and masculine ideologies can contribute to the development of water confict. Gendered Identities and Transboundary Water Conflict The gendered identities of state actors can also play a critical role in the practice of transboundary water confict. Sehring (2021) describes a confrontational negotiation style in Central Asian transboundary governance as “strongman” diplomacy which is characterised by frm positions with limited fexibility and aligns with masculine stereotypes of toughness. Sehring (2021) explains that negotiators evoke “strongman” behaviours to align with social expectations in transboundary negotiations. However, these behaviours can cause potential disagreements or perpetuate water confict and are a result of gendered identities 66 Alyssa Offutt that are held and propagated by the broader society. Similar “strongman” behaviour can also be observed by government actors on a national scale, leading to violent interactions over water management in Palestine (Selby 2003). As a result, these gendered identities can contribute to ongoing water conficts. Gender identities can also be instrumentalised as narratives to support transboundary water confict. Similar to the use of mother imagery for a river, Birchall (2019) describes how gender stereotypes of women in need of protection are often used to justify and mobilise actors into confict. While these narratives have been primarily observed in ethnic intrastate conficts, such as during confict in Kosovo, they can also play a role in transboundary discourses (ibid.). For example, by discussing the benefts that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will bring to women through the #itsherdam social media campaign, the campaign uses women’s vulnerability to mobilise public support for a highly contested infrastructure project along the Blue Nile (Fantini 2020). Similarly, the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) promotes the benefts it will have for poverty reduction, especially for women along the Tigris and Euphrates basins, although the dams are a source of tension with downstream neighbours (Ronayne 2005). These evocations of gender identity help to legitimise positions that may contribute to water confict, and in each case, were strategically employed to pressure and justify behaviour, shaping the relationships in transboundary basins. The Multi-Scalar Gender Implications of Water Conflicts Gendered roles, identities, institutions, and ideologies intersect in different ways throughout interpersonal, local, regional, and transboundary scales of water confict. As a result of different intervening factors and pressures, these scales had different intensities and implications of water-related confict on genders. However, the interrelated nature of water confict also applies to the role of gender within these processes, requiring that the ways in which gender transcends scale and is infuenced by other levels of scale also be addressed. Within the scope of water confict, ideologies and institutional ideas can prevail at all scales, and several academic and policy discourses of water and confict are observed to have broad gender implications. For instance, a frequent narrative of water confict is that water scarcity causes confict (HomerDixon 1999). Albeit critiqued, this perspective is often reproduced and can be perceived as a neo-Malthusian idea that population growth will lead to confict over water resources (Fröhlich & Gioli 2015). This argument is imbued with gender implications that target women, and particularly poor women, for their role in reproduction while ignoring context-specifc differences (Detraz 2009; Hartman 2010). This logic can affect policies on national and international scales as the argument is embedded in foreign policy approaches of multiple developed countries (Shaffer 2017). Other ideologies such as patriarchal ideas Gender and Scales of Water Confict 67 that privilege men were also observed to infuence the distribution of roles and identities throughout the case studies, shaping patterns of behaviour at all scales. Water-related interactions also have multi-scalar implications that affect both gender and water confict. For instance, the propagation of infrastructure projects, such as dams, impacts local communities and disproportionately affects women (Ronayne 2005; World Commission on Dams 2020). Dams can cause a decrease in economic opportunities that reduce the position of women within households and communities, therefore affecting not only their fnancial security but also the ability of women to initiate and engage in conficts (Lebel et al. 2019). Infrastructure projects can also displace confict, evoking local and regional protests in responses that mobilise gender (ibid.). Confict at a transboundary scale can exacerbate these impacts, as a lack of cooperative agreements prevents the ability to constrain infrastructure design (von Lossow 2015). In essence, transboundary water confict over infrastructure and state actions can have trickle-down gendered implications for conficts at alternate scales. Other conficts can also have top-down implications for actors at local/ regional and interpersonal scales. El-Bushra and Sahl (2005) discuss how national-level confict can adversely impact otherwise positive local relations in Mali and Somalia, causing potential destabilisation and perpetuating notions of “thwarted masculinity” (p. 111) at the local scale. Based on the proposed causal chain, this top-down infuence could contribute to potential waterrelated conficts. Similarly, local/regional conficts and environmental disasters are often correlated with an increase in domestic and sexual violence and water insecurity (Dankelman et al. 2008; Fletcher 2018; SIDA 2015 as cited in de Silva et al. 2018). These processes not only perpetuate gendered confict but can also generate potential interpersonal water conficts, especially in relation to water provision. Furthermore, existing and previous conficts can also endanger women whose roles include water collection, as fghting can limit water access, and the existence of landmines on the paths to water sources, as occurred in Mozambique, can threaten the security of women who collect water in postconfict environments (Greenberg & Zukerman 2009). International actors can also play important roles in water confict. For instance, the water confict in Cochabamba Valley was triggered in part by international development banks and free trade agreements that encouraged the privatisation of water resources, evoking gendered confict responses (Beltrán 2004). As a result, these topdown actions can displace gendered dimensions of water confict to regional, local, and interpersonal scales. However, gender and water confict can also have bottom-up implications for alternate levels of scale. Although studies on gendered infuence are limited, the mobilisations of gendered identities in the Cochabamba Valley and Heiltsuk communities were instrumental in reaching confict resolution and shaping the actions of the state (Beltrán 2004; Harper et al. 2018). Given that regional stakeholders have elevated water conficts to a transboundary scale 68 Alyssa Offutt in other settings, it is likely that the gender dimensions of regional conficts in transboundary systems could similarly infuence state interactions (Offutt 2020). Furthermore, public pressure of gendered ideologies was observed to infuence the behaviour of state actors and evoke “strongman” diplomacy demonstrating the potential bottom-up infuence on tensions and gendered expectations at a transboundary scale (Sehring 2021). Given the potential for mutually infuential relationships of water, confict, and gender at multiple scales, it can be concluded that interactions cause a cascade of gendered implications. Therefore, a multi-scalar approach is useful to effectively address these dynamics and facilitate confict resolution. These approaches will not only help to identify and address the source of water confict in transboundary basins but can also identify the gendered ramifcations of water confict that can be mitigated to reduce the potential for latent confict. Conclusion Through an analysis of multiple scales, it is clear that gender is infuential in the development and impacts of water confict. Gendered roles, identities, institutions, and ideologies combine to shape behaviours that contribute to the life span of water conficts from their initiation to their resolution. Within this, gendered identities were particularly infuential and played roles at all scales, demonstrating how gendered expectations are a strong motivator of behaviour that was implemented, contested, and evoked to gather support in water conficts. Gender was also impacted by discourses that present water confict as gender neutral, such as those linking population growth and scarcity to water confict. Given the importance of gender within these water confict processes and policies, analyses must incorporate a gendered perspective for a more comprehensive understanding of the water confict, identifcation of entry points for interventions and empowerment, and resolution that addresses all actors. Additionally, the breadth of water conficts presented also demonstrates that dominant narratives portraying women as victims are woefully inadequate. At interpersonal, local, and regional scales, women regularly engage in and navigate water conficts. Women in government roles at the transboundary scale likely do the same. Although women are also negatively impacted by these conficts, and the victim narrative is used to gather public support at local/ regional and transboundary scales, women’s participation in water confict can contest existing water governance arrangements that are perceived as unfair to provide greater water access within their communities. Additionally, men also suffer from water-related conficts and constraining gender identities, showing that narratives must be upended to fully identify the actors and impacts of water conficts. Finally, the relation between gender and water confict differed across interpersonal, local/regional, and transboundary scales and was infuenced by interactions at other scales. These differences are related to varying intervening Gender and Scales of Water Confict 69 factors and pressures that shape the gendered dynamics between actors and the implications of confict on water security. However, the case studies illustrate the potential for top-down implications and bottom-up pressures, which emphasise the interrelated nature of gender in multi-scalar water confict as well as the potential for unforeseen gendered implications at alternate levels of scale (e.g., the construction of dams shifting power dynamics in interpersonal and local water conficts). Therefore, given the potential for localised and regional water conficts across borders, as well as for the connections between geographic scales, multi-scalar approaches can enable a more complete understanding of the dynamics of transboundary river basins. This comprehensive approach can build on the patterns observed at the different scales to identify how impacts can cascade and invoke diverse combinations of roles, identities, institutions, and ideologies. Limitations exist within the analysis of gender in the water-confict nexus. Literature on gender and water confict is sparse and does not always identify mild tensions as confict. Furthermore, where confict is identifed, it is often related to violent confict. Together, these trends limit the range of intensities and gendered relationships for analysis. The existing literature also predominantly focuses on the Global South, constraining the range of contexts assessed and the potential for evaluating other intersecting privileges. Additionally, existing studies were predominantly confned to singular scales with limited analyses at multiple scales or interactions between scales, particularly within transboundary basins. Where scales were assessed, interactions primarily focused on the construction of dams. Finally, the majority of literature focuses on women and women’s vulnerability in relation to water stress and confict, often through the perspective of climate change, and does not always address causal mechanisms in the analysis of water confict. For the feld to advance, more gendered analyses and approaches that identify space and agency for males, females, and gender non-conforming individuals are needed within a broader range of topics, contexts, and multiscalar environments. These analyses will further enrich the discourse and underscore the importance of gender in the formation, practice, and impacts of confictive interactions. This chapter provides a frst step in consolidating the discourse of gender and water confict at multiple scales to both emphasise the importance of gender in transboundary water confict and provide a foundation for future research of the interrelated, gendered implications in transboundary systems. By identifying the importance of gender and scale within water conficts and the limitations of current literature, this chapter presents opportunities for growth and strengthening understanding of the gendered dimensions of water confict. 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(2011) ‘Suffering for water, suffering from water: Emotional geographies of resource access, control and confict’, Geoforum, vol. 42, pp. 163–172. Truelove, Y. (2011) ‘(Re-)Conceptualizing water inequality in Delhi, India through a feminist political ecology framework’, Geoforum, vol. 42, pp. 143–152. Tuana, N. (2013) ‘Gendering climate knowledge for justice: Catalyzing a new research agenda’, in M. Alston & K. Whittenbury (eds), Research, Action and Policy: Addressing the Gendered Impacts of Climate Change. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 17–32. 78 Medha Bisht transformational, and (3) as capacity building primarily undertaken through the processes of coalition building (Riker 1962; Dupont 1996). A signifcant factor which emerges from all three aforementioned ways of approaching power and diplomacy is the focus on processes and relations, which is elemental in defning power in diplomatic studies. This is ontologically signifcant because it indicates that processes, relations, interactions, and practices are central for determining the meaning of power. Vij et al. (2020) rightly claim that “the literature on transboundary rivers is power-blind or at least power shy” (p. 250) and draw attention to both covert and overt interactions which are signifcant for understanding the intersection of power and water diplomacy. Alternatively, if one casts a look at how power has been employed around the literature on power and transboundary water cooperation, terms such as soft power, ideational power, hegemonic power, and hard power are employed. In these renditions, negotiated arrangements normally privilege the dominant and powerful. Terms such as benevolent hegemon, positive water agreements, and negative water agreements are often employed, as the defnition of power is largely employed in an instrumental manner (Barua & Vij 2018; Barua 2018; Zeitoun & Warner 2006; Barua et al. 2018). Important as these terms are for explaining the role of power in transboundary water politics in regions, it limits the relationship between power and diplomacy to instrumental and fxated ways, where power is essentially defned in terms of “acting in concert” or coalition building and forming alliances through persuasive practices (Tickner 1988). It is here that a networked understanding of power can offer insights to understand how processes, interactions, and relations can shine a light on the nature of power which is more than just being instrumental and fxated towards certain defnite ways. Power through a networked lens is understood more through partial connections, where different (human and non-human) actors in a network, are mere mediums of translations, through which a specifc situation is transformed. This shift in focus has ontological ramifcations for making sense of how power gets activated and is translated through socialisation between (human and nonhuman) actors, leading to solidarity politics. Introducing Network Studies Network studies ontologically draws attention to the study of relations, interactions, and practices, thereby addressing some of the conceptual gaps which can be relevant towards understanding networked power. This is signifcant because not much work on network diplomacy has beneftted from alternative traditions for studying power in networks.6 This chapter takes into consideration the following conceptualisations of power, namely Kahler’s (2009; Burton et al. 2009) analysis, which is signifcant for underlining the importance of connections and relations in network studies, and Haraway’s (1988, 1991) analysis which takes the discussion a step further by refecting on Thinking through Networks 79 how non-human and human actors can lead to strong alliances adding on to the specifc dimension of networked power. Kahler’s (2009) understanding of power elaborates on various forms of intangible power generated through the position of an actor in a network. These are bargaining power, social power, and delinking power. Bargaining power is exercised by those actors who are otherwise infuential but are also weakly connected. These actors can become important brokers in a network, and are thus a powerful node in a network due to the infuence they can exercise in terms of exercising intellectual, reputational, fnancial, and ideational power. Social power, on the other hand, is created and augmented through ties with states. This could be generated through their association with important bilateral and multilateral platforms. Social power has also been equated with soft power. Delinking power (or power to exit) is often exercised by the less embedded actors who are at the margins of a network. Thus, exploring the outside options for these actors and/or the ways in which these marginal actors are connected to important nodes in a network are determinants in the stability of a network. Power determined by a position of a specifc actor in a network is mediated through social relations. Subsequently, the nature of connections often leads to successful alliances and capacity development of varied actors in a network (Kahler 2009). Haraway’s (1991) work offers a similar yet distinct insight on alliances, which is done through the analogy of a cybernetic organism (or cyborg) – a term used by the author to reject boundaries between humans and machines. The cyborg analogy offers a useful concept to network theory by focusing on partial connection. Partial connections are explained through the notion of translation through which technological objects are transformed and modifed (in science and technology studies) and have been defned as a process of making connections, of forging a passage between two different/ hybrid domains (Seres in Vicsek et al. 2016). By taking both human and non-human interactions into account, Haraway (1991) argues that potential translation between them changes and redefnes the relationship in a situation. These hybrid connections are alliances which are maintained in networks, as long as specifc conditions for their existence are ensured. The focus is on how the heterogeneous elements shape and support each other, and become a source of power or even the politics around solidarity (Vicsek et al. 2016). Haraway (1991) is interested in examining “effects”, i.e., how power is activated through socialisation amongst agents, not only the living but also the non-living. Consequently, it is safe to assume that entities have no essence in themselves, but rather that their properties are formed and shaped through their relations to each other (Vicsek et al. 2016; Bisht 2020). This reconfguration of power explains how alliances and new coalitions fnd meaning for weaving webs of connections. Thus, while Kahler’s (2009) network analysis can be useful in studying connections between state and non-state actors, with a primary emphasis on the position of actors, Haraway (1991) offers a more spontaneous meaning of power. The latter can be 80 Medha Bisht studied by understanding connections between humans and non-humans, and in giving meaning to solidarity politics which is an important aspect associated with feminist politics (Haraway 1991) To explain some of these theoretical propositions, the following section uses the Brahmaputra basin as an illustrative example. Brahmaputra Basin: Reflections on Power through a Networked Lens Flowing through the Himalayan foothills is a minor transboundary river, the Saralbhanga/Saralpara, a tributary of the Brahmaputra river. Unlike the key major river systems of South Asia, Saralbhanga is a smaller river system and offers an interesting tale of cooperation between India and Bhutan (see Bisht 2019). While much has been written on the hydro relations between Bhutan and India (Bisht 2011), not much is known about one of the major irritants, fashfoods, which often make the inhabitants of India–Bhutan border towns insecure. The issue of fashfooding was frst documented as a water induced disaster in 1994. Since then, intermittent fashfoods have led to degradation of agricultural land and infrastructure loss over time. The story of cooperation goes back to 2016 when fashfoods led to economic losses for bordering districts in Southern Bhutan and Northern Assam in India (Acharya 2017; Basu 2018; Kuensel 2017). These developments raised further concerns as the Bhutanese government responded by diverting the Saralbhanga river. This alarmed the local farmers in lower riparian Assam State in India, who were concerned that such a move would increase the sediment load in the river, causing much agricultural degradation. In the past, in order to meet their local requirements during the monsoon season, farmers in Assam built an indigenous dam – Dingo, a check dam – for diversion of water, which helped farmers downstream to irrigate their crops. The decision of the Bhutanese government in 2016 to put an embargo on the building of the indigenous check dam raised concerns and tensions (Yashwant 2018a; Yashwant 2018b; Bisht 2019). The Formation of a Network It was in response to this crisis that a loose network under the umbrella framework of Transboundary Rivers of South Asia (TROSA) took shape. The TROSA was a fve-year (2016–21) regional programme implemented by Oxfam and its partners in Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar to understand the challenges related to transboundary rivers. Funded by the Government of Sweden, under the umbrella framework of this regional programme, facilitated primarily by Oxfam India, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and collectives have come together. TROSA is thus not unique to the case of Saralbhanga river and has helped mobilise a collective of organisations, particularly communities inhabiting the border towns of Thinking through Networks 81 Bhutan, Nepal, India, and Myanmar. However, the case of Saralbhanga river is signifcant for understanding networked power. The network included a mix of local NGOs and existing informal collectives. NGOs such as Northern Research and Social Work Networking from India, Bhutan–Transparency International (BTI), and Bhutan–India Friendship Association (BIFA), a non-governmental organisation which has local chapters in districts of Bhutan (Royal Government of Bhutan, n.d.), played an important role. Meanwhile, the All India Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and Bodo Women Forum for Peace and Development were the local collectives. This network has a useful lesson to offer for transboundary water cooperation, as it suggests a different way through which transboundary cooperation can function. For instance, the roles played by various organisations were distinct from and complementary to each other ranging from fnancial, logistical, ideational, and relational functions, thus adding to Kahler’s (2009) social power, bargaining power, and delinking power. The TROSA network, as it formally came to be called, played an important role in anchoring all organisations (formal and informal). Kahler’s (2009) conceptualisation of networked politics is helpful to understand the position of actors and the importance of position in terms of generating specifc forms of power. The Bhutan–India Friendship Association (BIFA), for example, is an NGO with chapters in Phuntsholing, Nganglam, Samdrup Jhomkar, Jomotsangkha, Thimpu, and Gelephu districts in Bhutan. The presence of BIFA representatives played an important role as they facilitated the meeting with the Deputy Commissioner of the Sarpang district of Bhutan. This resulted in Bhutanese offcials agreeing to allow farmers from Assam to build a check dam, which was used for diverting water from the Saralbhanga river for irrigation purposes in the past. BIFA thus played the role of a metaphorical bridge builder by engaging the Bhutanese government in an offcial capacity. The presence of the Bhutan–Transparency Initiative was also signifcant, as it facilitated access and outreach to Bhutanese decision makers. Thus, the webs of connections in networks that were formed particularly in Bhutan enhanced the TROSA network’s social power. Meanwhile, one can say that local NGOs such as India’s Northern Research and Social Work Networking (NRSNW) and international NGOs such as Oxfam enhanced India’s bargaining power. While Oxfam India had fnancial leverage, NRSNW was an established NGO of strong local repute working on building capacity of communities. It was also signifcant for routing in funding and contributing to the logistical aspects associated with the network, such as organising dialogues and meetings with the community. Both Oxfam India and NRSNW played an important role as brokers in reaching out to NGOs from Bhutan on one hand and to the community on the other. Oxfam’s role as a fnancial partner helped in facilitating the entire process. Delinking power can be associated with the power to exit from the network, and in case prevalent, can make a network unstable. Delinking power was possessed by informal networks of students’ and women’s movements – the 82 Medha Bisht All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and Bodo Women’s Forum for Peace and Development (BWFPD) – given their strong connections to mobilise the local population. While ABSU has been spearheading the student movement since the 1970s in Assam, India, BWFPD have been active in spearheading the women’s movement. Both of these collectives have been active in spearheading the informal movement for a separate state, Bodoland, in Assam, playing an important role in peacebuilding in this confict torn area. Further, as shared with the author, BWFPD had always been a connector for mobilising students, and the village men and women felt more comfortable in communicating with women leaders than men about their issues. It was further shared that, as a collective, the Bodo women have strong ties to the ABSU and are more easily able to mobilise villagers about local concerns (BWFPD representative, personal communication, 9 March 2018). This has been due to the diffcult militant history experienced by the Indian districts bordering Bhutan, where women’s movements have been at the forefront of raising the issues concerning local people (Choudhury 2017). This combination of both formal organisations and informal networks has become a signifcant entry point to understanding how alliances and coalitions – which help build power in a network – can be created and sustained in the border regions. Meanwhile, exit power in the network for collectives and/or informal organisations was minimised by giving them long-term hope of sustainable cooperation with Bhutan. Local collectives were particularly interested in issues related to maintaining their livelihoods and how these issues could be seen as opportunities for women collectives in the region. The promise of long-term benefts, not exclusively water centric, helped to increase the cohesiveness and expectation of members from within the TROSA network. A member of the BWFPD shared that one of the main attractions to the network was the livelihood promises that such an exchange could offer to the Bodo women (BWFPD representative, personal communication, 9 March 2018). Many women in informal collectives, were members of NGOs, groups, vendor associations related to livelihood programmes, and this initiative offered a promise for connecting with Bhutanese citizens on the other side (ibid.). This was an interesting insight, as Bhutan–India share an open border, which means that people can move across their border towns without passports. These conversations add to the understanding that a reason for the success of the TROSA network was because it responded to the needs of the women, who were exploring opportunities for security livelihood opportunities through trade with Bhutan border towns. This ignited the long-term interests and expectations of the women to own the process and mobilise others (particularly the men) towards the goal. Signifcantly, it was reported that in June 2019, over 500 people from 36 villages of Saralpara area in Kokrajhar district participated in Shramdan [voluntary work] to repair traditional diversion based irrigation canal [local natives called Jamfwi/Dong] from Saralbanga Thinking through Networks 83 river, which fows downstream from Bhutan through Kokrajhar district in Assam. (Preetam 2019) Moreover in 2018, India and Bhutan announced the opening of a Border Trade Centre between the border districts of Assam and Bhutan, which has helped sustain the interests of the locals, particularly women (Singh 2018). Conclusion: Towards Feminist Water Diplomacy Networks are signifcant in highlighting the value of connections as well as the distinct positions and locations that multiple actors occupy in them. They are useful for understanding how power is produced and reproduced and the role played by multiple actors including the non-human in sustaining this alliance. When it comes to non-human actors, the Saralbhanga river plays an important role in this area. The kind of mobilisation that the communities around the Saralbhanga river experienced would not have been possible without the ownership of resources and the river itself. While the benefts for maintaining livelihoods coming out of the cooperation played an important role, the protection of the river and the Manas bio-reserve (of which the entire ecosystem of the river is a part) offered a natural connection for people to take forward this cooperation in a meaningful manner (BWFPD representative, personal communication, 9 March 2018). This is suggestive of the fact that alliances and coalitions thus cannot be solely attributed to the interests of the actors but also need to be cognizant of how the multiple parts (human and non-human), as Haraway points out, work together to construct the cohesiveness and also a vision for the network. Consequently, power in networks is suggestive of collective power, which stems from processes of socialisation giving meaning to a more relational form of interaction, and are indeed an expression of solidarity in politics. The discussion above shows the possibilities for activating and translating power through networks which can make way for feminist diplomacy. Feminist diplomacy thus can be approached in two ways. First, different aspects of power can be a means to achieving a specifc end goal. This meaning of power is amplifed through networks, where plurality and perspectives of actors are essential in building the cohesiveness of a network. Second, power, when studied through a networked lens, gives a distinct perspective to diplomacy, where processes become central to its analysis. How power can morph into bargaining power, social power, and delinking power through connections between both human and non-human actors can help us understand how shared ways of seeing and understanding things can evolve. Water diplomacy or transboundary water cooperation needs to go beyond the binary between water governance and water diplomacy and critically engage with situated perspectives from the ground. Network diplomacy can offer a way to give agency to these perspectives and enhance their capacity and actors through 84 Medha Bisht alliances. Based on the analysis above one can argue that, thinking through a networked understanding of power will not only help broaden some of the arguments associated with power but also help us navigate feminist ways of engaging in diplomacy, which can enhance the emancipatory potential of diplomacy studies. Notes 1 The Dublin Principles is a good example of “deepening” of water discourse, recommending action at the local, national and international level. Foregrounded in the vision of sustainable development, and emphasising the importance of translating the UNCED vision, it recommended four principal guidelines: (1) water being a fnite resource, needs a holistic approach, (2) water management should be based on stakeholder inputs, (3) policies should be responsive to women’s needs, (4) economic management of water shall expedite sensibilities towards water being a human right. (For further details see,The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, www .gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html) 2 Others have contributed to the debate, including Metzl (2001). 3 For a feminist critique of practice theory see Standfeld (2020). 4 Zawalski (2019) has talked about relationality, which is more proximate to the understanding of processes of knowledge production in international relations. These processes, as she points out have led to the evisceration of feminine voices, and feminist ways of thinking in IR.The ontological focus on processes employed in this chapter is more about observing fuidity in processes, in which multiple actors (human and nonhuman) participate, which can give a distinct meaning to the understanding of power, security, order, etc. 5 Tracing the agency of women in early modern times, Sluga and James (2016) argue that the agency of women can be found in large social networks, where women had the ability to maintain friendships over large distances and were central to the roles as news gatherers and political intermediaries. 6 Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Actor Network Theory (ANT) are two distinct traditions.While both these traditions have a different ontological and traditional focus, signifcantly both offer distinct insights on the understanding of power – which is emergent, fuid, and explains how it is activated, maintained, and sustained. For instance, SNA employs quantitative methods, and is methodologically inspired by natural sciences. It not only helps one to understand different forms of power, but also how the meaning of power is dependent on the position of an actor in a specifc network.Actor Network Theory on the other hand is more critical and qualitative in nature, focusing on an agentic understanding. Underpinned by network thinking, it understands power in relational terms. Thus, in both these traditions, even if they are based on different metatheoretical/methodological traditions, power gets a distinct and a nuanced meaning – a concept which has an emergent property, is fungible, and which is not captured through fxed attributes. (For work on networks and international relations, from the perspective of SNA and Ant, see Kahler 2009; Slaughter 2017; Nexon & Pouliot 2013; Barry 2013.) References Acharya, G. 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Overall, it involves a shift from normal operations to a more in-depth confrontation with the structural and institutional arrangements that shape inequalities. Despite efforts and achievements in addressing gender inequalities in the Nile basin, making a contribution towards a transformative approach is not without its challenges. It requires sustaining all actions and commitments with multiple stakeholders at multiple levels and countries, securing additional funding, ensuring a movement from commitments to implementation, and moving commitments from the grassroots to the leadership level. It also requires navigating resistance in what remains a male-dominated feld. Whereas the NBI, NBD, and other actors have developed a number of key documents and activities on gender equality, the realisation of commitments and actions connected to the achievement of a gender transformative approach have been limited. Challenges and Recommendations The following section captures some of the challenges and lessons learned related to the efforts of the NBI, NBD, and their affliates to collectively contribute to the movement towards a transformative approach to gender Gender Equality in the Nile Basin 95 equality while also noting recommendations to address these challenges. As stated above, it is based on interviews with key stakeholders and the practical experience of the authors. Lack of an Overall Systematic Approach A key challenge for organisations working in the Nile has been to establish an overall approach to integrating gender equality at all levels and throughout all relevant sectors. Inputs from interviewees show the need to move from a token approach to gender mainstreaming towards an institutionalised approach that is driven from the top, taking into account the key role that government ministers and senior bureaucrats play in infuencing decision making as part of the NBI’s transboundary negotiations. This means looking at structures and processes, as well as the overall dynamics that have the potential to foster fruitful debate and create agency for both women and men, thereby enabling them to jointly address transboundary water management. Professor Sumiah Elsayed of the Sudan Nile Discourse Facility (SDNF) believes it means moving away from a standardised approach to mainstreaming gender into documents towards making gender an issue for all programmes and policies (S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). This requires a holistic and tailored approach whereby gender is integrated into everything that the NBI and its partners do. This also requires allocating the necessary fnancial and human resources to ensure that words translate into results. It also entails identifying critical entry points. However, even within the process of measuring the change, critical details are often overlooked. Donald Kasongi, Secretary General of the Nile Basin Discourse, shares: “If we want to transform, which is a very conscious change, there is a need to take time to do a proper analysis of the prevailing situation and how it is defned” (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). This means establishing a baseline, agreed upon by all parties involved, for a measurable outcome for specifc elements of a project. For the NBI, it also involves navigating multinational, multicultural, multilingual, and other contexts where there are clear differences in gendered conditions and expectations. Professor Elsayed emphasises the importance of studying these different cultural contexts to better understand how they articulate gender inequalities and how these inequalities can be strategically overcome. However, for a variety of reasons, commitments do not always translate into implementation (S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). Gladys Wekesa, former Chair of the NBI’s Nile–Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC), has suggested appointing a champion at the top level of countries where they can infuence the gender agenda, as well as offering opportunities for infuential people to move the agenda forward (G. Wekesa, interview, 19 August 2020). Kasongi also recommends fnding a way to encourage countries to set aside their cultural differences to work towards a common vision where women and men from all of the 96 Ellen Hagerman et al. cooperating countries are treated equally and are able to share the water resources in an equitable manner (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020) Inevitably any work that requires addressing cultural differences, also requires the investment of a signifcant amount of time and the application of an approach involving multiple interventions and liaison with multiple sectors to secure a common vision of gender equality. Adding on more time and interventions also requires that adequate funds are allocated to achieve longterm and sustainable results. There is a need to crystallise the linkage between transboundary water and gender, and make connections to other sectors. As part of Gerald Kairu’s work at Global Water Partnership Eastern Africa (GWP EA), he is developing a climate investment plan where he emphasises the importance of ensuring that other sectors are required to plan for and integrate a gendersensitive approach to their projects. In related work on National Adaptation Plans, Kairu sees the potential for incorporating a gendered perspective that takes into consideration the fact that climate change impacts women more than men (G. Kairu, interview, 20 August 2020). Refecting on this issue, Mubarak Mabuya, Program Manager, Gender Affairs at the IGAD Secretariat, an eight-country trade bloc that includes governments from the Nile basin, states: You need to look at transboundary water resources and what is the nexus with other issues, such as peace and security, to understand how this impacts gender equality. (M. Mabuya, interview, 20 August 2020) To achieve a transformative approach to gender, Mabuya suggests that gender needs to be put on the agenda of all Basin discussions, such that men and women working in all Nile basin programmes and projects understand the gender issues and place emphasis on gender as part of their individual sectoral work (ibid.). There is also a failure to conduct gender analysis as a matter of course for all projects and to develop a gender mainstreaming strategy as part of efforts to adopt a holistic approach. Strategies recommended by interviewees (G. Kairu, interview, 20 August 2020; S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020; D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020; G. Wekesa, interview, 19 August 2020) to overcome these barriers include organising effective and participatory consultations which could include separate sessions for men and women, engaging community leadership to secure buy-in for women’s inclusion, and devising and instituting monitoring mechanisms that can track whether actions identifed at the project preparation phase are put in place at the implementation phase. To ensure that gender strategies are not “tick the box” exercises, Professor Elsayed also recommends conducting an assessment of gender strategies in terms of their content and their application to the project context to assess their effectiveness and application and to gather best practices and lessons learned (S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). Gender Equality in the Nile Basin 97 In response to the lack of a systematic focus on analysing and discussing gender issues, Fred Mwango, Regional Water Expert at the Water Unit in the IGAD Secretariat, has noted that there needs to be a focus on discussing gender at meetings as well as requiring that there is deliberate action at the country level (F. Mwango, interview, 20 August 2020). It is therefore important to invest in empowering the Nile Basin Initiative’s desk offces to follow up on gender commitments, for instance by organising regular meetings that focus on gender. Mabuya suggests that the NBI Secretariat organise a dedicated Conference of Ministers Meeting to identify specifc ministerial commitments and to set specifc normative standards aligned to the NBI context. He also suggests packaging the transformative agenda as part of an awareness-raising process to educate people at all levels of the NBI and to facilitate conversations with the right stakeholders in the right places (M. Mubuya, interview, 20 August 2020). Establishing an understanding of what gender equality means within the NBI context with relevant stakeholders is equally important. Drawing upon her extensive experience working on gender in Sudan and in the Horn of Africa, Professor Elsayed emphasises the need to understand how gender is defned within each country’s context, including determining what is the most appropriate terminology to use. In contexts where it is needed, she suggests using terminology that may not be universally understood or accepted but is understood in the local context to facilitate discussions about inequalities. Strategies should be developed to enable different countries to unpack the terminology and adopt language that speaks to their own contexts (S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). Kasongi, in speaking of his prior experience working with NGOs on gender, has noted that programmes like Stepping Stones2 have potential for replication, particularly through NBD’s work, since they create a safe space to discuss ways to shift cultural norms (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). The programme seeks to foster joint decision making and collaboration by frst establishing separate safe spaces for women and men to discuss their challenges and perceptions related to gender equality. The authors believe that initiatives such as “Women of the Nile” offer another model that could be adapted to the Nile’s different working contexts. In this case, women are brought together to discuss their own problems as far as the management of the Nile basin in the absence of their male counterparts. This provides a separate space for women to discuss issues and come up with solutions. The authors note the importance of ensuring that solutions are embraced and supported by men, particularly since they are frequently seen as the gatekeepers. Sustainability of efforts across the board is essential to fostering a transformative approach. Kasongi believes that a lack of access to fnancial resources should not be a limiting factor to sustaining efforts to incorporate gender into the NBI’s work (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). While some interventions can only be sustained with fnancial resources, social and institutional aspects need to feature at the beginning of the project to lay the 98 Ellen Hagerman et al. foundation for accessing these dimensions throughout a project or program. This multidimensional approach offers the potential to cover shortfalls when fnancing is absent. Before thinking about fnancial sustainability, Kasongi recommends thinking about social structures being built from the beginning to ensure that gender is entrenched (ibid.). It is also important to consider the institutional issues including ensuring that ownership of the project is owned by both women and men at the very beginning of the project. According to Kasongi: This goes back to the issues of structures and are they trusted by the people. Are these committees owned by the people? When you try to look at a project and you think about how it can be sustained, you need to embed the ownership from Day One and have the institutions establish collaboration so that people feel ownership. (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020) Insufficient Capacity on Gender at All Levels In addition to reviewing and revising the approach to integrating gender considerations into the work of Nile partners, it is important to note that countries are at different stages and have different levels of capacity to fulfl their commitments. Some countries within the Nile basin have strong policies to mainstream gender and have the potential to serve as a role model and motivator for other countries. Countries that face capacity-related challenges need targeted support. Fred Mwango from IGAD has noted that the size and complexity of the Nile basin framework means that some countries will need to be supported in terms of sensitisation on a continuous basis (F. Mwango, interview, 20 August 2020). This requires conducting a capacity assessment to determine whether gender skills are accessible at the country level as well as to determine the level of openness and understanding about the importance of integrating gender considerations into the NBI project and institutional work. The NBI, for example, has made some advances to build internal capacity through the provision of capacity building to staff on gender equality delivered by a gender specialist. However, the NBI’s size and complexity make it diffcult to build capacity of all stakeholders such that gender equality is mainstreamed at all levels and across all sectors where it operates (G. Wekesa, interview, 19 August 2020). Lack of capacity is thus an overall challenge for the organisation. At the Nile-TAC level, Gladys Wekesa notes a lack of capacity to ensure that gender issues are taken up by each country (ibid.). This is compounded by the absence of a follow-up mechanism. Sustaining the capacity is equally challenging. With the arrival of new Nile-TAC members, Wekesa identifed a similar problem as Mwango, namely the turnover of staff. Also at this level, capacity building needs to be a continuous process (ibid.). Building institutional capacity at all levels so that everyone has the same level of understanding to enable men and women to feel comfortable in raising their voices represents a critical point of departure to secure buy-in for Gender Equality in the Nile Basin 99 gender-sensitive interventions. Making it a requirement to have a 50–50 balance in meetings and programming and linking it to accountability was put forward as another way to open the space for women to gain skills and experience. However, the authors believe that reaching quantitative targets should be approached with caution, given the growing criticism of head count responses to gender equality. Ideally, this approach needs to include tailored approaches to overcoming barriers to participation and leadership in male-dominated spaces. The authors also believe it is important that a quantitative focus on representation does not preclude ensuring a qualitative assessment that considers whether women’s voices are heard, and actions are taken in response to issues they have raised. Aside from soliciting qualitative input from women about their experiences, it requires ensuring the creation of a favourable enabling environment for women such that their capacities to voice their concerns are met with a level of openness and understanding from their male colleagues. Given the strong patriarchal attitudes, Professor Elsayed emphasises the importance of setting up programmes dedicated to male perceptions. Capacity building focused on the development of strategies to change the mindset of men is therefore critical (S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). This could include strategies on how to engage men as well as to address male resistance to women’s participation.3 It will also require targeted training or awarenessraising sessions with men aimed at opening the space for them to discuss key concerns such as their misperceptions of gender as being only about women, understanding that gender equality need not be about men losing power, as well as fostering an appreciation that men beneft from women’s inclusion and empowerment. The approach will therefore need to invest in understanding the different cultural contexts and the way that gender is understood and articulated. Given fnancial and human resource challenges in providing capacity building across so many countries and levels of operations, the authors believe it will require the adoption of a wide variety of approaches. Capacity building on gender equality should therefore look at ways to move beyond the conventional training model. Interviewees have suggested it should also happen within the working context such that more innovative approaches such as coaching or “learning by doing” are used (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020; G. Kairu, interview, 20 August 2020; S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). To ensure sustainability and a broad and transformative reach, this means going beyond delivery of one-off training to a limited number of staff. According to Gerald Kairu of the GWP EA, the topic of gender has been talked about a lot in the region, with most countries developing gender strategies. When it comes to implementation, Kairu emphasises that this is where the challenges associated with a lack of capacity lie. Countries and the partners with which they engage often lack the capacity and priority to implement policy (G. Kairu, interview, 20 August 2020). Tabitha Ndegemo, a gender consultant appointed to provide gender analysis at the project preparation phase of an 100 Ellen Hagerman et al. NBI project, also confrms that there is insuffcient follow-through beyond the project preparation phase. This is compounded by the fact that many specialists working on NBI projects have inadequate knowledge, expertise, or openness to apply a gender lens. Ndegemo also suggests that more work is needed to educate people about gender-based budgeting as part of the capacity building process as well as working with leadership at the country and Nile basin level to ensure that performance measures are in place to hold project implementers to account in integrating gender throughout the project cycle (T. Ndegemo, interview, 28 August 2020). Inadequate Representation of Women Within the water sector, women are frequently seen as resource users and not as key stakeholders. This has impacts on the potential to ensure their representation at transboundary water management meetings. According to Kasongi: We sympathize with women as resource users, so we focus on how to alleviate their workload and getting infrastructure to do other household tasks, but we have not considered them as stakeholders. (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020) Other barriers to women’s representation include a failure to both involve women in the consultation process and address their obstacles to participation. This oversight means women are often denied an opportunity to articulate differences in terms of their ability to access and control water resources, as well as to be part of the decision-making processes that can determine whether they are able to provide enough water to care for their family. Seeing women playing a role across the gender continuum from fulflling basic needs to being empowered as decision makers and leaders requires leadership within the NBI and its affliates to champion a variety of interventions that acknowledge these different roles. Some interviewees have called for the need to accommodate cultural differences in understanding gender. However, Kasongi believes there is a need to step away from individual units and countries falling back on pre-set cultural norms about the roles and relationships between men and women towards the articulation of a common vision that favours equal representation in discussions about equitable sharing of water (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). According to Professor Elsayed, a starting point is to do an audit within countries. This would enable the use of evidence in the form of statistics to show that some countries are ahead in fostering women’s voice and representation while using it to motivate other Nile basin countries to take action (S. Elsayed, interview, 31 August 2020). While representation is critical, it is not enough. As was clarifed by Peres Wenje of the Kenyan Nile Discourse Forum (KNDF), even when women are assigned important positions, their contributing position is often limited because Gender Equality in the Nile Basin 101 it tends to be linked to secretarial roles in contrast to men who are assigned responsibilities connected to impactful decision making. In the case of KNDF, it is usually the Chair and Secretary General, both of whom are male, who dominate discussions despite the fact that women occupy the important positions of Vice-Chair and Treasurer. Wenje explained that gender stereotypes also manifest in management roles at the project level. Women tend to be assigned the management of female-related water issues such as menstrual hygiene whereas men are responsible for major technical projects, further reinforcing men as the technical leads and marginalising women’s role. Concerted efforts to involve women in projects that fall outside a woman’s reproductive role is a critical frst step. Encouraging men to take on typically female roles such as note taking offers another opportunity to shift gender norms by enabling men to go through the experience of their female counterparts (P. Wenje, interview, 24 August 2020). According to the authors, the absence of women within WRM assuming technical and decision-making roles is nonetheless a key obstacle to ensuring that women are seen more as leaders. Women’s absence in the feld of transboundary water management is clearly linked to the challenges they face in acquiring technical capacity. Access to education represents a major obstacle to the acquisition of technical capacity. Many girls in the Nile basin region face cultural barriers to advancing to the necessary educational levels and are frequently discouraged from choosing Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics subjects which are critical for the study of subjects of relevance to WRM. Even if women acquire the necessary technical background, Kasongi believes that measures are needed to deal with women’s own internal barriers including a lack of confdence (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). Capacity building targeted to developing critical soft skills offers an important frst step. Mama Asia Kapande, who is Chair of the Tanzanian Basin Forum, clarifes that the forum has devised a strategy to build women’s confdence as part of the projects they implement that offers a model for adaptation for the NBI’s work: To build confdence, we train them to believe they can do it and to understand that they can do what men are doing and even do better than men by letting go of their age-old beliefs. (MA Kapande, interview, 28 August 2020) Given that so few women are able to enter the feld, the authors believe that the NBI and its partners need to identify role models and mentors to support women to stand up and be heard. There is also a need to deal with the existence of strong cultural drivers which affrm men as the leaders, thereby discouraging women from striving to secure positions in a male-dominated feld. Kisolo has noted that women are told that they have the right to be elected to be a leader and that their representation is needed. However, she confrms that this often fails to translate into women’s voices being heard: 102 Ellen Hagerman et al. Much as we have the documents including strategies and laws that talk about women’s empowerment especially in transboundary water management, the voices of women need to be heard. (S. Kisolo, interview, 31 August 2020) It can also be problematic for many women to balance gendered family roles with professional progress. Even if capacity building and mentorship are provided to build confdence, Kasongi emphasises the importance of considering the enabling environment to determine what is the best way to make it more responsive (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). Too often mechanisms are set up, such as the appointment of Gender Focal Points, without ensuring that these people, many of whom are junior and most often female, are provided with the necessary support and capacity to play an effective role. The main role of a Gender Focal Point is to assist in activities associated with the mainstreaming of gender.4 As Kasongi has noted: We can end up with structures such as committees and we leave it there. We give the responsibility to a Gender Focal Point but how does the responsibility cut across the institution? (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020) Revisiting the use of Gender Focal Points as a stop-gap response to addressing gender equality within institutions globally is now being requested by a number of organisations. The authors believe that women’s representation needs to be more effectively embedded within the operations of Nile basin organisations to facilitate institution-wide acceptance that their rights to speak should be respected and taken into account by all relevant stakeholders. Insufficient Incorporation of Gender at the Governance Level According to interviewees, women who are brought into the Nile basin institutional context generally have a good understanding of the governance processes and structures. However, according to Kisolo: “Understanding how they work does not mean that these committees and related governance structures are designed in a format that is favourable to women” (S. Kisolo, interview, 31 August 2020). This is compounded by the fact that women tend not to be consulted to better understand what kind of structures they want or need to make it a productive environment. Kisolo also questions whether the ideas of women are accepted when they attend water committee meetings (ibid.). The context of meetings should therefore be built from a needs assessment that identifes the best approaches to maximise women’s participation, given their own needs and commitments. The NBI is an intergovernmental institution with its own approach to governance which can contrast with the NBD which operates as a civil society Gender Equality in the Nile Basin 103 institution. When Mama Asia Kapande was the Secretary General of NBD and was attending meetings of the NBI and NBD, she noted that there had been a lot of discussion about how to involve more women in these different governance positions. She specifcally noted that the efforts were focused everywhere except for the critical position of Chairman (MA Kapande, interview, 28 August 2020). According to Kapande, this is linked to sheer numbers such that men, who represent a much greater number at meetings, decide through a voting process who is the leader. The fact that men tend to dominate in terms of numbers and key leadership positions within Nile basin meetings can also infuence what issues are considered salient as well as how decisions are made (ibid.). For example, Gerald Kairu has noted that, since the governance structure of NBI and its affliates are male dominated, male issues are prioritised because men’s greater presence enables them to table the topics and to vote on the results (G. Kairu, interview, 20 August 2020). The actual process of decision making and its connection to cultural beliefs about men as decision makers represents a big challenge for women’s participation in governance processes. According to Kairu: There is a tendency for people to think that men have more power than women, which sets up a misguided dynamic in terms of the approach to discussions, decision making and how relationships between males and females operating within the Nile Basin are forged. (G. Kairu, interview, 20 August 2020) Kairu emphasises that efforts need to be taken and processes instituted such that taking decisions that beneft both men and women is a necessary prerequisite. There is therefore a need to address critical perceptions around power as part of capacity building and awareness-raising processes. According to Kasongi, one of the ways to involve more women in these transformative processes is through engaging with the leadership to drive the transformation (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). Who has access to real decision making is reinforced by how the NBI and its affliate countries look at decision-making practices within the organisation. These tend to be aligned to existing cultural norms that position men as the key decision makers. It is also connected to self-interest with men being reluctant to share power with their female contemporaries. Interviewees have confrmed that the male-dominated decision-making process persists in most of the countries where the NBI and its affliates are working. Placing women in management positions can do little to overcome women’s lack of access to decision making and to power. When given the chance, women are certainly able to hold their own when representing issues assigned to them. However, according to Kasongi, women are put in management positions, but their roles tend to be subordinate to the roles of men: “You don’t see women presenting on the role of women in the value chain. They assume that men have the ideas” (D. Kasongi, interview, 26 August 2020). Kasongi emphasises that there 110 Tobias von Lossow Gender in Transboundary River Basins Ways and means to discuss and address the gender dimension in transboundary river basins differ remarkably from basin to basin. While gender is, of course, highly contextual, universal principles, guidelines, or agendas that would serve as global or regional reference points are lacking. Instead, gender is placed – sometimes more squeezed in – in specifc broader regional, basin-wide, or national (political) contexts. Historic, geopolitical, socio-economic, and legal factors, for example, are just a few drivers that form the broader setting in which gender relations are embedded and hence form the framework in which they could be addressed. This setting determines agency, institutionalisation, topics, and measures in transboundary water politics and policies, and subsequently also the conceptualisation and implementation of gender(-related) policies. For the fve selected cases – Nile, Jordan, Zambesi, Indus, and Danube – a short historic and hydro-political background is frst outlined. In a second step, this chapter explores the political and institutional arenas for addressing gender basin-wide – before looking into the institutional setting and programmatic basis, including defnitions, actors, goals, etc. of gender-related policies and politics. A broad range of activities and actions are considered, such as the formulation of strategies, the representation of women in transboundary decision making, and gender-sensitive project implementation, which form the basis for assessing actual achievements and visible results. The Nile River Basin: Gender Stuck in the Shadow of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam The Nile river is among the most prominent cases of transboundary, interstate water conficts. The world’s longest river hosts 11 riparian states – among them the big rivals and regional powers Egypt and Ethiopia, as well as Sudan which is geographically and (hydro-)politically located in between the two. The basin has received renewed and particular attention over the last decade due to the increasing tensions related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which was built by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile. As the confict got more tense between Egypt and Ethiopia, the main focus in the basin has shifted from a broader, basin-wide water governance and management perspective towards trilateral negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over GERD. Confict-resolution efforts, mechanisms to reduce tensions, declarations, and statements have increasingly targeted the flling process of the reservoir and the dam’s operational procedures rather than the broader Nile water question (von Lossow et al. 2020). Meanwhile, the more practical work on the ground has been continuing within the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which was established in 1999 (NBI 1999). NBI was supposed to transform into a permanent Nile Basin Commission, but the riparian states could not agree on a framework agreement over the distribution and utilisation of the shared waters. While the NBI failed in delivering on this political track, it Gender in Transboundary Water Policies 111 succeeded in becoming the central institutional body and facilitator for a basinwide, cooperative project implementation on the practical level. NBI’s goal to foster a broader, basin-wide socio-economic development (NBI 2022) is the obvious framework for promoting, addressing, and implementing gender in the basin. In 2008, an assessment of the Gender Equality and African Regional Institutions (GEARI) project concluded “an absence of gender considerations [in NBI], in large part due to the absence of a policy framework and lack of strong and visible political will” (Nakafeero 2008, p. 1). Four years later, NBI published its gender mainstreaming policy and strategy (NBI 2012). This frst major reference document names gender disparities in the riparian states, such as the “exclusion of women from participating actively in water related issues” or women’s discrimination in water management as a result of “social gender power imbalances” (ibid., p. 4). The document also mentions that gender and women’s empowerment had not yet been incorporated in NBI’s policies, programmes, projects, and institutional procedures – despite efforts and will at the senior management level (NBI 2012). The gender mainstreaming strategy strongly advocates promoting gender in the basin but attributes a main responsibility to the national level, where the riparian states failed to establish gender principles in water policies and legislation according to the document. NBI is portrayed as a regional supporter of national gender mainstreaming efforts, but it lacks explicit gender-related goals, specifc practical recommendations, or a concrete strategic approach on how to achieve gender-related goals (von Lossow 2015). Except for some concrete institutional adjustments, such as introducing an NBI gender coordination point, the strategy provides a more generally formulated policy vision, mission, principles, and objectives (NBI 2012). At this point, gender did not receive appropriate attention in the basin – neither on the political nor on the practical level of project implementation. Women were “more often than not, […] left out of the Nile Basin Initiative programmes” underlining the necessity to better integrate women not only with regard to the “benefts of programming but also in decision-making for NBI as an organization” (NBD 2012, p. 1). The situation changed in the following years, with gender equity and mainstreaming becoming more prominently on the agenda and also more concrete – within the core NBI structures, its policies, programmes, strategies, and procedures (World Bank Group & Nile Basin Trust Fund Partners 2015). Gender workshops focused on awareness-raising and capacity building, such as in the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP). NELSAP’s goal was to provide “practical knowledge and skills in the methods, tools and techniques” to participants in order to integrate gender into projects and to increase the attendees’ “understanding of the importance of gender mainstreaming in general, in organisation culture and in the project cycle in particular” (Randell & Kazimbaya 2013, p. 6). NBI also established women’s networks – such as an advocacy group to ensure that NBI initiates projects that impact women at the grassroots level. In addition, NBI contributed to the development of regional, 112 Tobias von Lossow gender-inclusive programmes and increased efforts to support national commitments on gender in riparian states (World Bank Group 2015). Still, at the political stage, where tensions have been increasing in the basin over the last fve to ten years, women are neither playing a prominent role in NBI – the women’s groups are not prominently visible – nor in the trilateral talks around GERD between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. The reappearing securitisation of the Nile water question(s) in the context of GERD – which also has been lowering the political standing of NBI – illustrates a partial roll back of gender mainstreaming specifcally in the transboundary water settings. In the realm of interstate water politics, disputes, and conficts, and the state-centric explanatory approach of “us” and “them”, gender does not play any role. The Jordan River Basin: Gender Forgotten in the Shadow of a Larger Conflict The Jordan river is located at the epicentre of the Middle East confict, hosting Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria along its banks. The highly politicised water question related to Israel’s control over the resources at the headwaters of the Sea of Galilee, over the supplies in the Westbank and Gaza, and the unevenly distributed resources has repeatedly been seen as a central pillar in the overall confict setting (see Haddadin 2002; Zeitoun 2012; Brooks et al. 2020). The Jordan river is the most important water resource in the region as the Westbank and Jordan have hardly any alternative freshwater resources available. Meanwhile, Israel extracts water from the Jordan river and the two big aquifers – the mountain and the coastal aquifers – and has managed to remarkably increase the amount of freshwater resources through desalination in the last years. The water demand and consumption in the Jordan valley has increased and drastically reduced the amount of water reaching the Dead Sea over the last decades. The Red Sea–Dead Sea Conveyance (RSDSC) was one of the largest and most contested transboundary water projects in the basin – carried out mostly in Jordan but co-fnanced by Israel and international donors. Along the planned pipeline diverting water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, desalination was intended to provide drinking water to Israel, Jordan, and Palestine while the brine was to help to stabilise the Dead Sea’s decreasing water table. Additionally, generated hydroelectricity was to meet the project’s energy needs. Still the project remained highly contested: proponents highlighted the win–win– win situation for the riparian parties – drinking water, electricity, and ecological benefts serving the tourism sector at the Dead Sea – and the peace dividend of that cooperation for the whole region. Critics invoked the high costs: initial costs of up to 5 billion USD and similar costs for running the project in the frst decade, as well as benefts unequally distributed and disadvantaging Palestine, among others. Amman fnally withdrew from the RSDSC in summer 2021. A few months later, Jordan signed a big energy water deal with Israel and the United Arab Emirates according to which solar power from Jordan would be sent to Israel in exchange for desalinated water (Christou 2021). In this politically highly sensitive region, there is no basin-wide political regulatory body or water management framework along the Jordan river that Gender in Transboundary Water Policies 113 would have the explicit or implicit mandate to address gender-related issues and implement respective programmes. Instead, various bilateral or trilateral negotiation processes, temporary agreements, cooperative efforts, or joint projects would be the platforms to take gender into account in the formulation of water policies, such as RSDSC. But even RSDSC – which underwent plenty of negotiation rounds and various assessments under regional and international observation – hardly addressed any gender issues.The updated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for the project, for example, just highlighted existing unequal gender relations and that gender dynamics would need to be monitored during the project implementation (RHDHV 2017). So far, gender has not prominently appeared in offcial policy documents related to – usually undisclosed or at least confdential – water negotiations between Israel, Jordan, and Palestine. Most of the water plans and strategies for the basin during the last three decades only indirectly address gender through the social justice or peacebuilding dimensions. The broader Middle East confict and respective peacebuilding measures dominate the interstate water relations – another feld in which women do not play a prominent role. On global average, women only constituted “13 percent of negotiators, 6 percent of mediators, and 6 percent of signatories in major peace processes” between 1992 and 2019 (CFR 2022). The Middle East confict brought plenty of international actors – donors and partners, NGOs, and international agencies – to the region and the Jordan river basin, some of which have more elaborate gender approaches against the broader confict in a place that touch slightly upon water questions and/or the Jordan river basin. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), for example, developed a Gender Equality Policy in 2007 that forms the basis for their three Gender Mainstreaming Strategies for 2008–15, 2016– 21 and 2023–28. These strategies have focused on organisational as well as programme changes (UNRWA 2020; UNRWA 2021). Similarly, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) addresses gender in the wider region. In the ESCWA Arab Gender Gap Report 2020, the environment chapter focuses mainly on water – and here on access, sanitation, handwashing, etc. (ESCWA 2019). With gender being absent in programmes and policies on the river basin level, the Jordan refects several water–gender patterns in the region and beyond. Women are attributed an important role in water management and decision making at the household and community level, but they are mostly absent from high-level water negotiations or agreements (Wilson Center 2021). Moreover, it is widely acknowledged across civil society and state institutions that women are the most vulnerable to water-related threats while simultaneously being important actors in making water management more effcient. But the reality in the Jordan river basin illustrates that women hardly play any role in transboundary water management – neither when it comes to the region’s most important surface waters nor transboundary water infrastructure projects. 114 Tobias von Lossow The Zambesi River Basin: A Glimpse of Hope in a Strong River Basin Organisation The Zambesi is the fourth-largest river basin in Africa, providing plenty of economic and ecological benefts for Southern Africa (Lautze et al. 2017). The level of cooperation in the basin is high, with well-established and, to a large extent, institutionalised joint efforts. As the Zambezi river basin is located in the area of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and with all riparian states being SADC members, the water governance of the Zambezi falls – as all river basins in the region – under the regulations of the revised SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses (SADC, 2000). The protocol is to “foster closer cooperation for judicious, sustainable and coordinated management, protection and utilization of shared watercourses and advance the SADC agenda of regional integration and poverty alleviation” (ibid., p. 3). Consequently, the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) – one of the major RBOs in Africa – is in accordance with the revised SADC Protocol (SADC 2000). Based on the Agreement of the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (Zambezi Commission 2004), all eight riparian states established the RBO as an intergovernmental organisation in 2014 with the mandate “to promote the equitable and reasonable utilization of the water resources of the Zambezi Watercourse as well as the effcient management and sustainable development thereof” (Zambezi Commission 2004, p. 4). The backing by a broader political regional organisation gives ZAMCOM a comparatively strong agency. However, ZAMCOM is also politically accepted and supported by its member states, fnancially better equipped than other RBOs, and politically and fnancially supported from outside. ZAMCOM is the obvious institutional framework for addressing gender-related issues in basin-wide water management and governance. It has a well-codifed and consistent gender approach. The Agreement already states that the designation of the Executive Secretary and technical personnel shall refect equitable representation of the Member states and a fair gender balance (Zambezi Commission 2004, p. 9). In addition, the organisation’s Integrated Water Resources Management Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Zambezi River Basin of 2008, lists gender mainstreaming in Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) among the topics to be addressed (Euroconsult 2008). The 2018 published Gender Mainstreaming Strategy and Implementation Plan provides a well elaborated framework (Munyayu et al. 2018). This document derives its principles on gender from the Dublin Convention principles and lists concrete goals and processes to ensure the progression of gender mainstreaming, among them fve specifed strategic objectives: 1. institutionalise gender mainstreaming in ZAMCOM through the creation of an enabling policy and organisational framework, Gender in Transboundary Water Policies 115 2. build and strengthen capacity to effectively mainstream gender in ZAMCOM through targeted, periodic education and training across all ZAMCOM organs, 3. strengthen gender equity in the establishment and operations of the National Stakeholder Coordination Committees (NASCs) and the decentralised basin management structures in the riparian countries, 4. integrate a gendered approach in programming and generate evidence on the merits of the approach, and; 5. develop and implement a gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation system which enables effective tracking of gender responsiveness of policies, processes, programmes, projects, and related outputs and outcomes. (Munyayi et al. 2018, p. 4) The Gender Mainstreaming Strategy and Implementation Plan sets out a system of accountability, including central organisation audits and data sharing between riparian states. In addition, it lists responsibilities for different layers of the organisation (from the secretariat to member states) in meeting these fve objectives (Munyayi et al. 2018). Beyond its quite consistent policies, ZAMCOM has been quite visible with gender-related activities, for example holding a gender session at the 9th SADC River Basin Organisation’s Shared Watercourse Institutions Workshop (Zambezi Commission 2021). Comparatively advanced in addressing gender issues, the Zambezi river basin also benefts from SADC as second regional actor in the basin actively promoting gender mainstreaming and gender equality. The 1992 SADC treaty features a non-discrimination clause that lists gender at frst, stating that “SADC and member states shall not discriminate against any person on the grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability” (SADC 1992, p. 7). Similarly, the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development aims to “provide for the empowerment of women, to eliminate discrimination and to achieve gender equality and equity through the development and implementation of gender-responsive legislation, policies and programmes and projects” (SADC 2008, p. 10). With ZAMCOM and SADC, both likewise engaged in transboundary water courses and gender, two regional political bodies support and impact water policies related to gender as well as gender policies in relation to water in the basin – and even beyond. Indus River Basin: Gender in the Shadow of a Treaty and National Gender Policies The contested waters of the Indus river basin are another puzzle piece in the regional rivalry between the nuclear powers India and Pakistan. Conficts over 116 Tobias von Lossow the shared water resources have repeatedly intensifed tensions between Delhi and Islamabad. With the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) (United Nations 1960), the basin hosts a frequently referred to model of confict resolution and cooperation. While the arrangement has some outstanding features, such as the elaborated and regularly applied confict–resolution mechanism, it does not foster proactive cooperation, basin-wide water governance, joint water management, or cooperative project implementation (United Nations 1960; von Lossow 2013). Instead, IWT de facto divides the tributaries between the two riparian states, accrediting rights for India over the Sutlej, the Beas, and the Ravi rivers (about 20 per cent of the Indus waters) and rights for Pakistan over the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab rivers (roughly 80 per cent of the Indus waters) (Memon et al. 2019). While IWT is a more political and hard securityoriented treaty addressing water through the confict–resolution mechanism, it hardly covers issues or development on the subnational, local, and individual levels. Socio-economic development, environmental protection, and gender mainstreaming do not play any role here. Basin-wide policies and programmes on gender outside IWT are limited. Most programmes addressing gender are implemented by external donors and focus on only one, not both, of the countries, such as the Green Climate Fund’s Gender Assessment and the related Gender Action Plan for the Indus basin that concentrate on activities led by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on climate resilient agriculture and water management in Pakistan only (Green Climate Fund 2019). Other initiatives are knowledge and research networks, such as the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) Gender Resource Group Consultation or the Upper Indus Basin Network (ICIMOD 2020). Most of the studies and analyses deal either with the Indian or Pakistani perspectives and national policies. Here, participatory elements in the water governance are very limited and gender and women’s empowerment has historically and politically never been on the agenda. In Pakistan, women’s role in water is basically granted from men as traditional norms still dominate gender perceptions (Minardi et al. 2021). Women usually have the operational management of agriculture, sanitation, and water collection for domestic purposes. However, water-related tasks are often tightly controlled by men. In recent years, attempts to modernise agriculture in the Indus region have mainly focused on men, such as the digitalisation drive (Green Climate Fund 2019). This is largely due to landowning rights being heavily skewed towards men. Regional governments are addressing this imbalance through the creation and allocation of land packages given to women but more than 90 per cent of the land in the basin is controlled by men and NGOs still struggle to overcome the strict gender traditions (ibid.). Multilateral and international organisations try to address gender and women, such as the Green Climate Fund’s investment into women-only training and educational schemes around technical felds focusing on water, agriculture, and natural sciences, or targeting female farmers with the distribution of stronger seeds and agricultural information sharing (Green Climate Fund 2019). Gender in Transboundary Water Policies 117 India is more advanced in gender mainstreaming processes than Pakistan. On a national level, the government’s tenth fve-year plan mentions the need to integrate gender aspects into the management of water resources. Since the 1990s, regional efforts have attracted attention, such as the Women, Water and Work campaign, initiated by the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in 1995 (Panda 2007). SEWA, a membership-based organisation established in 1972, plays an important gender-related role itself – being the frst union for self-employed women with more than 1.75 million members today (de Luca et al. 2013). SEWA aimed to accelerate the positioning of women in decision-making roles in local communities, spun off into over one hundred replica projects nationally, and is seen as a model of female rural empowerment. However, despite some political efforts in the private sphere, domestic abuse, neglect for female education, and male child preference are still rampant (Panda 2007). Finally, much of the work done in both the public and private spheres on gender mainstreaming in India takes place outside of the Indus river basin due to the contested geography of the river and its importance to Indian sovereignty. Criticism is problematic and the government refrains from opening the territories to NGOs. This results in Kashmiri women in particular suffering from some of the worst imbalances in Indus riparian water communities (Parvaiz 2017). Gender mainstreaming in the Indus river basin has almost no presence in governmental and non-governmental channels. Both India and Pakistan have institutionalised legislation that discriminates heavily against women. Women have been relegated to roles of domestic water usage and organisations have few to no positions for women nor gender mainstreaming policies. NGOs and other private actors fnd diffculty in accessing the Indus river basin given the state of war between the nations and the heavy militarisation of the region and of the water issues (Price et al. 2014). In recent years hardly any gender achievements have been accomplished and gender is more or less kept off the political agenda. This is related to the national level in both countries, where the rather conservative societies do not consider gender a political priority. Consequently, it is not surprising that this context shapes a situation where gender is neither refected in IWT nor in its implementation policies at national level. The Danube River Basin: In the Shadow of Regional Integration The Danube river basin used to connect the East and the West during the Cold War and was one of the few examples of an ongoing political cooperation across the Iron Curtain, particularly under the 1985 Bucharest Declaration (Varduca 1997). The basin stretches into the territories of 19 states before draining into the Black Sea. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the institutionalisation of water cooperation in the basin progressed remarkably – 11 of the Danube riparian states signed The Danube River Protection Convention in 1994 (ICPDR 1994). After coming into force in 1998, the International Commission for the 118 Tobias von Lossow Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) was created (ICPDR 2021). Today, 14 riparian states are members of ICPDR – the cooperation was reaffrmed with its declaration in 2016 (ICPDR 2016). The developments and water politics in the basin additionally beneftted from the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and its neighbourhood policies – similarly as the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) has beneftted from regional political and economic integration processes since the 1950s. While the highly institutionalised cooperation in ICPDR seems to be the obvious arena for addressing and implementing gender issues related to transboundary water politics and action, neither the convention nor the updated declaration mention gender, nor do they offer guidelines, principles, or strategies on gender (ICPDR 1994). This is related to the perception that many of the member countries have legislations in place that are supposed to uphold the role of women in society and the onus is on national governments to promote women’s rights in leadership. As the Danube basin is a fairly developed region with stable water supplies, some voices consider gender mainstreaming to be less relevant for ICPDR, as gender equality was almost reached in the water sector (Negru 2016). On request, ICPDR promotes gender equality, but the absence of gender in the ICPDR mandate and documents weakens the organisation’s ability to support and achieve gender-related goals across the basin. Interestingly, and despite the lack of a programmatic gender approach, ICPDR has achieved gender balance among the Permanent Secretariat staff (fve women, fve men) as well as in the Expert and Task Groups where there are fve female chairpersons out of a total of eight (ICPDR 2020). This may be related to gender mainstreaming policies in the ICPDR member countries. Beyond ICPDR, the European Union actively promotes gender equality, women’s empowerment, and other gender-related action. With the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, gender mainstreaming became an offcial policy approach in the European Union, later being confrmed with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon that once more promotes gender equality in the European Union (European Commission 2015). The strategy for equality between women and men for the period between 2010 and 2015, underlined the European Commission’s commitment to increasing its efforts and activities related to gender equality. The Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2021 actively promoted the European Union’s comprehensive approach to water, explicitly highlighting “an inclusive society that promotes gender equality and women’s participation” (Communication Offce 2021). As all transboundary rivers in the European Union, including those that run outside of its territory, fall under EU regulations, EU gender policies – related to water and beyond – also apply for the Danube. Besides the European Union, each national government has gender policies and programmes in place though few national programmes have a gender dimension incorporated in their domestic water policies. While gender is promoted in the context of transboundary water cooperation abroad, it is not addressed in intra-European water policymaking nor does the Danube feature a basin-wide gender approach. Gender in Transboundary Water Policies 119 The gender achievements in the Danube basin are rather limited. Referring to national legislations for promoting gender completely removes it from the regional, transboundary level. The Danube is an illustrative example that absence of gender in transboundary water issues is often not perceived as problematic. An interview with Simona-Olimpia Negru, Romanian Secretary of State in the Ministry of Environment, Waters, and Forests featured on the ICPDR website, highlights that “women are numerous in planning actions, including legislation, in deciding policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels water management” and that the educational systems in the Danube region achieved that “key positions in decision making and management in various economic and social felds are no longer the exclusive domain of men” (Negru 2016). According to her, “society offers everyone equal access to a career, a voice in leadership and the opportunity to really change something for the future” (ibid.). Instead of identifying gender gaps in the ICPDR or in the riparian countries, gender in transboundary water affairs was linked to insuffcient water supplies and rather relevant for developing countries. In Africa, for instance, “[where] women are the ones responsible for carrying water over large distances […] [and] take care to conserve water when using it in the household for cooking, bathing and cleaning” (ibid.). Such statements on gender in transboundary water contexts are counterproductive to gender mainstreaming and gender equity. First, they ignore existing gender inequalities in Europe and prevent the ICPDR from beneftting from gender-sensitive policies. Second, such a narrow understanding promotes and reiterates simplistic and traditional perceptions of women and girls portrayed as a uniform, passive, and victimised group in the Global South, ignoring their potential as high-level decision makers. Third, considering gender mainstreaming as less important in Europe than elsewhere weakens the role and power of gender concepts. Instead, it promotes the perception of gender critics that see it as an imposed developmental programming by Western donors. Factors Promoting Gender in Transboundary Rivers The analysis of the fve cases explored the most prominent gender dynamics related to transboundary water governance – resulting in a broad spectrum of gender-relevant aspects in water politics, policies, and management. While in some basins, for example, gender equity is addressed by reaching parity between men and women in decision-making bodies of an RBO, such as in the Danube, in other basins the focus is more on promoting gender mainstreaming in basin-wide programmes, such as in the Zambesi. The cases illustrate the differences and similarities in how gender is either pushed and addressed through treaties, organisations, policies, etc. in some cases or sidelined and ignored in others. Despite the broad spectrum of gender-relevant aspects in water politics, policies, and management, gender is often not appropriately addressed in transboundary water governance. Part III A Gender Perspective on Transboundary Water Institutions and Processes 8 Gendered River Basin Institutions The Chu–Talas Commission in Central Asia Jenniver Sehring Introduction This chapter sheds light on how gender perceptions and identities are shaping transboundary water governance in the Chu–Talas basin in Central Asia. I look at the bilateral Chu–Talas Commission (CTC), a joint basin organisation established in 2006 by Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. When conceptualising water institutions as “gendered”, I build on Feminist Institutionalism which has shown that political institutions are not gender neutral. This also counts for water institutions (understood as the formal and informal rules and practices to govern water), including those at transboundary level. This lens shows how “constructions of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily life or logic of political institutions”, hence that gender relations are “embedded in particular political institutions and constraining and shaping social interaction” (Mackay et al. 2010, p. 580). Data for this chapter has been collected as part of a comparative analysis of gender and transboundary water governance in three different river basins, which also includes the studies by ter Horst and Mattur on the Rhine basin (Chapter 9 of this volume) and of Said on the Nile basin (Chapter 10 of this volume).1 They are based on a literature review, own participation in meetings of the CTC, as well as 17 semi-structured interviews with members of the CTC and water professionals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.2 I frst introduce the CTC and describe to what extent it is both representative and extraordinary for Central Asia. I then discuss how Feminist Institutionalism can help to unravel the gendered nature of transboundary water governance. I continue with a brief overview of gender relations in Central Asia to sketch the political context, and subsequently discuss the genderedness of institutions, focusing on three gendered norms and practices: duty travels, leadership norms, and negotiation styles. I fnally refect on how gender intersects with other relevant power relations, namely generational and urban–rural divides. DOI: 10.4324/9781003198918-11 130 Jenniver Sehring The Chu–Talas Commission and Transboundary Water Relations in Central Asia The vast landmass of Central Asia spans – depending on defnition – the countries between the Caspian Sea in the West and China in the East, between Russia in the North and Afghanistan and Iran in the South. In this chapter, I use the term to refer to the following fve countries: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. They share a long, common history, being interconnected through the Silk Road, conquered by Russia, later integrated in the Soviet Union, and fnally becoming independent nation states in 1991. The major basin that these fve countries share is the Aral Sea basin, tragically famous for the environmental catastrophe of the Aral Sea desiccation. The efforts, successes, and failures of interstate collaboration in this basin, and the related political tensions, has attracted signifcant scholarly attention (e.g., Xenarios et al. 2020; Menga 2018; Weinthal 2002). However, there are also a few smaller, often bilaterally shared, basins in the region; between Kazakhstan and China, between Kazakhstan and Russia, and between Iran and Turkmenistan. Among these smaller bilateral basins are the Chu and Talas basins. The Chu–Talas basins cover together an area of approximately 115,000 km2 shared by Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. The Chu and Talas rivers are the major rivers of the basins, which also encompasses numerous smaller rivers. The Chu river is 1,186 km long and the Talas river 661 km. A major part of the basins is located in desert or semi-desert zones in Kazakhstan, while the rivers originate in the Tien Shan Mountains in Kyrgyzstan, where most of the run-off is formed (UNECE 2011). Most of the rivers’ infrastructure was built during the Soviet period: two reservoirs on Kyrgyz territory to store water for irrigation (Kirov and OrtoTokoi) and extensive canal systems for irrigation in Kazakhstan (By-Pass Chu Canals, Western Bolshoi Chu Canal, Eastern Bolshoi Chu Canal, Chumysh Hydrosystem). A 1983 USSR regulation determined that the Kazakh Soviet Republic would receive 42 per cent of the water resources from the Chu river basin and 50 per cent of the resources from Talas basin, and that the Kyrgyz SSR would receive the remaining percentage of the water resources from the Chu and Talas basins, respectively. In 2000, the governments of both countries signed the Agreement on Utilization of the Water Facilities of Interstate Use on the Chu and Talas rivers. The agreement confrmed the water allocation as established in the Soviet Union, and obliged Kazakhstan to contribute to the costs of operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation of dams and reservoirs located in Kyrgyzstan and serving irrigation needs in Kazakhstan. In addition, it stipulated the establishment of a permanent commission and the implementation of joint activities (Libert 2015; Ni 2018). In 2006, the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas – the offcial name of the aforementioned CTC – was established. Gendered River Basin Institutions 131 The CTC’s mandate includes the approval of the allocation of water resources between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, measures to maintain and rehabilitate water facilities of interstate use, and approval of fnancial plans. The establishment and further functioning of CTC was supported by several international donors, including the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Asian Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (Ni 2018; Wegerich 2008; Libert 2015). The CTC’s structure is defned and illustrated below (Figure 8.1). It is headed by two co-chairpersons, representing the main ministries in charge of water – currently Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Agriculture and the Kyrgyz Republic’s State Agency for Water Resources. A small joint Secretariat was established, co-headed by a Kazakh and a Kyrgyz director. The Secretariat is the CTC’s permanent executive body that coordinates the work of the commission, prepares meetings, and follows the implementation of decisions taken at the meetings. There are six thematic Working Groups (WGs) with experts from both countries to deal with issues such as infrastructure safety, legal and institutional matters, water resources allocation, monitoring and data exchange, as well as environmental protection (see Figure 8.1). Both WGs and CTC usually meet twice a year, with the respective delegations being nominated by the government. CTC members come from the respective line ministries, the foreign ministries, environmental and hydro-meteorological agencies, as well as provincial/district authorities. International and donor organisations participate State Water Agency of The Kyrgyz Republic Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan Co-Chairman Kyrgyz Republic Co-Director Kyrgyz Republic Co-Director Kazakhstan Co-Chairman Kazakhstan Chu–TalasWater Commission Joint Secretariat Legal and Institutional Issues O&M and Rehabilitation Works Economics, Monitoring, Data Exchange Safety of Hydraulic Infrastructure Working Groups Environmental Protection Water Resources Allocation Figure 8.1 Structure of the Chu–Talas Commission (author’s compilation) 132 Jenniver Sehring as observers in the meetings. The protocol of each session with the agreed decisions is drafted, negotiated, fnalised, and signed by the Co-Chairs after the meeting. Meeting locations alternate between Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. CTC is thus still a relatively young organisation. It was established in a region that is characterised by often occurring water tensions, lack or insuffcient agreements for other basins, and usually tough and polarised water negotiations. In this context, CTC is often praised as an exceptional example for water cooperation in Central Asia (Libert 2015; Ni 2018). It has a clear mandate and procedures, can take binding decisions, and manages to maintain good working relations even in times of political disagreements or instability. Many members of CTC and its WGs have been involved for many years and have good personal relations. Interview partners explained this with a similar understanding of the issues at stake as well as with the close cultural ties, joint past, and shared mentality of the two countries. The Soviet period has many legacies, including Russian as a lingua franca, but more importantly a strong network and community of water experts jointly educated in the USSR. This provides them with longstanding personal ties and shared norms on water management, resulting in similar opinions on preferred solutions (Sehring & Ibatullin 2021). However, there are also challenges. Neither the CTC nor the Secretariat have a legal status with implications for bank accounts, permanent positions, salary for the Secretariat staff, as well as receipt and transfer of funding, among other things. Much of CTC’s work is dependent on projects funded by international donors. These projects do not only enable additional studies but keep up the normal functioning by paying the salary of key positions in the Secretariat and the costs of the bi-annual meetings, for example. As a result, the CTC’s work remains unstable, lacks fnancial sustainability, and has been criticised for being donor-driven and lacking ownership (Ni 2018; Wegerich 2008). Without doubt, factors like donor-dependency, type and robustness of an agreement, economic mechanisms, political interests, and relations between the two countries can explain a big part of the challenges, developments, and results of transboundary water cooperation in the Chu–Talas basin. But they overlook an important aspect, namely how the consistency, change, and outcomes of transboundary water institutions are impacted by gendered practices, routines, and norms of behaviour that enable or constrain constructive cooperation. A Feminist Institutionalist View New Institutionalism has put focus on how actors are being shaped and are shaping institutions, defned here as “a set of rules stipulating expected behaviour and ruling out behaviour deemed undesirable” (Streeck & Thelen 2005, pp. 12–13) in both formal and informal ways. Different schools (most importantly Rational Choice, Historical and Sociological Institutionalism) Gendered River Basin Institutions 133 put different weight on power, ideas, rational behaviour, or historical path dependencies for explaining the persistence or change of institutions. Feminist Institutionalism, which evolved in recent years as a dedicated school of New Institutionalism in Political Science, seeks to understand how gender impacts the way political institutions work, their outcomes, how they distribute power, how agency works within them, and how they do or do not change (Mackay et al. 2010; Chappel & Waylen 2013). Seeing institutions as gendered means to understand gender roles as not existing primarily at individual level and to emphasise that “constructions of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily life or logic of political institutions” (Mackay et al. 2010, p. 580). While looking at one specifc organisation, namely CTC, the institutional perspective is not confned to formal aspects of the organisation but looks in particular at the often hidden aspects – informal rules and practices – and the impact they have on institutional design and outcomes as well as the interaction between the formal and informal (Chappell & Waylen 2013; Aggestam & Towns 2018). It thus requires looking at institutions in the broader sense, including daily practices within the organisation as well as the political and socio-cultural settings in which CTC is embedded. Behaviours, roles, and identities of male and female water professionals engaged in transboundary negotiations are determined through processes of socialisation, norms, and practices in bureaucracies, resulting in certain expectations and patterns of acceptable behaviour for men and women (Mackay et al. 2010; Aggestam & Towns 2018). For example, certain masculine norms of leadership can be performed by both men and women, but are socially accepted only for men. At the same time, a male leader can show soft or feminine character traits, but runs the risk of being ridiculed. Chappell’s (2006) concept of a “gendered logic of appropriateness” (p.223) can help to explain this. It builds on the work of Sociological Institutionalism scholars who argue that rules are followed and norms are powerful not only because of domination mechanisms, but because actors perceive them as natural and rightful, as appropriate in a given situation (March & Olsen 2013). In a gendered understanding, this logic “prescribes (as well as proscribes) ‘acceptable’ masculine and feminine forms of behaviour, rules, and values for men and women within institutions” (Chappell & Waylen 2013, p. 601). Based on Chappell and Waylen (2013) as well as Lowndes and Roberts (2013), I look at gender in the CTC along two dimensions: 1) the nominal dimension, which refers to the participation of men and women, and can show the historical and ongoing dominance of men in positions of power in CTC and other relevant water agencies in the basin; and 2) the substantive dimension, which refers to the hidden gender bias in supposedly gender neutral formal and informal rules, norms, and practices, like dress codes, negotiation styles, meeting agendas and timing, wording used, etc. 134 Jenniver Sehring The Chu–Talas Commission as a Gendered Institution Before looking at CTC as such, the next section gives a brief overview of the gender relations in the political and socio-cultural context of Central Asia in which the CTC is embedded. Gender, Water, and the State in Central Asia The liberation of women was one of the prominent objectives of the Soviet restructuring of society. Soviet policies promoted the empowerment of women in the public sphere, and women have worked in all economic sectors, overcoming earlier gender divisions. This was achieved through giving women access to education and training as well as family and child welfare policies. In Central Asia, the dependence on kinship ties, religion and genderrestrictive traditions was pushed back – at least on the surface (Kandiyoti 2007; Constantine 2007; Ishkanian 2005). Women were encouraged to take up technical professions and work in felds traditionally occupied by men – with the result of female engineers, hydrologists, and similar professions being much more common than in other world regions. Many of the women in senior water management positions today were educated and started their professional life in the Soviet Union, and in their perception, gender did not matter: “We weren’t divided back in Soviet times – in female, male. Somehow, we were all of the same sex, somehow taking responsibility for ourselves, maybe even more than we should” (Interview 11, 19 December 2019). Still today, many of them would insist that they are frst and foremost professional experts, and that this counts more than their gender. The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought independence to the Central Asian Republics. It led not only to major rivers becoming transboundary and the subject of negotiation between the states, but also to altered gender relations. In Soviet times, women were expected to contribute to society through work (as a farmer or an academic, for example), whereas the modern Uzbek woman often flls the role of young wife with familial and household responsibilities (Constantine 2007). This interpretation applies to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as much as it does to Uzbekistan and resembles the revival of patriarchal, traditional, and religious norms seen since independence (Kandiyoti 2007; Ishkanian 2005). Several interviewees shared the perception that the relative gender equality of Soviet times has declined in current society. These changing socio-cultural norms impact the professional perspectives of young women, and they are exacerbated by the gendered effects of the economic crisis during the transformation period and the decline of the education system (Sahvaeva n.d.). The following quote from a male Kazakh CTC member illustrates this: Previously, qualifed women used to work in the water sector. They were not inferior to men. Today, there are fewer such women as knowledge is insuffcient because of the education system, which is in decline today. Women have given up a little in Gendered River Basin Institutions 135 terms of knowledge, because there was a downturn in the economy and women were feeding their families by working at the bazaar. And men, where can they go? They can’t do anything else. So men mostly stayed [in the water administration], women fed [their children] and were the keeper of the hearth. (Interview 2, 19 September 2019) The empowerment of women in the Soviet economic sphere was not refected in the political sphere. While there was a quota system, which guaranteed women 33 per cent of seats in political bodies, leadership in the Soviet Union was male and continued to be so in the newly independent states. After independence, “symbolic ‘masculinization’ of national representation” (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 4; see also Franke-Schwenk 2013) became an important element of offcial stateand nation-building discourses – resembled for example in the national heroes (e.g., Manas in Kyrgyzstan, Golden Man in Kazakhstan) that replaced the statues of the male Soviet leaders. In the post-Soviet time, female politicians are a minority; after the elections in 2005, there was not a single woman in the Kyrgyz Parliament. This is perhaps due to the fact that politics is often perceived as something rude and therefore not appropriate for women (Ishkanian 2005). Nevertheless, there are a few notable exceptions, like Roza Otunbaeva, Kyrgyzstan’s president in the transition period after the 2010 uprising, and female relatives of male politicians (like the daughters of Kazakhstan’s frst president). These few female leadership fgures in contemporary times as well as historical fgures were referred to by female interviewees as role models to affrm the scope of agency women had and have in society and show how tradition can be evoked in different ways (see also Beyer & Kojobekova 2019). Representation of Men and Women in the Chu–Talas Commission A frst step to analyse the impacts of gender on the working of CTC is to look at the participation and roles of men and women across levels and thematic areas. At the highest decision-making level, the two Chairpersons have always been men. At the same time, the two directors of the Secretariat have been two (and the same) women since its establishment. In WGs, women constitute about one-third of all members. Among WGs, gender composition differs per group. Interestingly, the share of women is particularly high in the WG on Environmental Protection. In CTC meetings, it is mostly men who speak. This is due to protocol and hierarchy as the Chairs and Head of Delegations, who mainly speak, are men. Women speak in the meetings if given the foor as WG members. However, many women have supporting roles in WGs and the Secretariat that should not be underestimated, and prepare the documents presented and statements made in the meeting. These roles are less visible, but not necessarily less important.