Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse

Chernega, Oksana (Ed.); Bocharova, Yuliia (Ed.) Book Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse Provided in Cooperation with: PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER, Kharkiv Suggested Citation: Chernega, Oksana (Ed.); Bocharova, Yuliia (Ed.) (2022) : Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse, ISBN 978-617-7319-59-6, PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER, Kharkiv, https://doi.org/10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/302595 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Edited by Oksana Chernega, Yuliia Bocharova 2022 CHALLENGES AND PARADIGM OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OF THE XXI CENTURY: ECONOMIC AND TECHNOGENIC DISCOURSE Monograph UDC 330.43'6:330.101.54 С43 Published in 2022 by PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER Shatylova dacha str., 4, Kharkiv, Ukraine, 61165 Approved by the Academic Council of Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade, Protocol No. 2 of 29.09.2022 Reviewers: Ganna Duginets, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Head of Department of World Economy of State University of Trade and Economics; Iryna Trunina, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Head of Department of Business Administration, Marketing and Tourism of Kremenchuk Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi National University. С43 Authors: Edited by Oksana Chernega, Yuliia Bocharova Oksana Chernega, Maria Kolchuk, Yuliia Bocharova, Oleksandr Ishchenko, Svitlana Revutska, Svitlana Ostapenko, Hanna Udovichenko, Liliia Dmytruk, Tetiana Kozhukhova, Kateryna Khavrova, Lyubov Shevchenko, Olena Nieizviestna, Volodymyr Kotkovskyi, Natalia Ivanova, Yevhenii Tryhubchenko, Nataliia Pryimak, Yuliia Lyzhnyk, Ganna Gorina, Galina Bohatyryova, Olha Nikolaichuk, Oleksandr Romanykha, Valentyn Khorolskyi, Оleksandr Omelchenko, Yurіi Korenets, Liudmyla Tsvirkun, Radion Nykyforov, Olga Simakova, Iuliia Goriainova Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse: monograph / O. Chernega, Yu. Bocharova and others. – Kharkiv: PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER, 2022. – 212 p. The interdisciplinarity, multidimensionality and complexity of the security paradigm in the 21st century are reflected. Theoretical and applied (practical) aspects of ensuring the security of objects of global, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels of security in the conditions of an unprecedented transformation of the world, an increase in the level of turbulence and uncertainty recorded in the global and national contexts of development, the latest challenges, opportunities and threats at the beginning of the 21st century. The theoretical and scientific-applied provisions outlined in the monograph will be useful to scientists, teachers, graduate students, applicants for higher education, as well as decision-makers in the field of ensuring the security of objects at the global, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels. The practical significance of the results obtained in the monograph lies in the fact that the proposed scientific and practical recommendations and conclusions can be used to study, form and implement models and strategies for ensuring and improving the security of objects of different levels. Figures 51, Tables 52, References 252 items. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the authors. This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. DOI: 10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6 ISBN 978-617-7319-59-6 (on-line) Copyright © 2022 O. Chernega, Yu. Bocharova and others authors This is an open access paper under the Creative Commons CC BY license 9786177 319596 iii authors Oksana Chernega Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor Acting Rector Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5659-3808 Maria Kolchuk Associate in the Internal Audit & GRC Department PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftspr ü fungsgesell schaft (PwC Germany) ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9651-7586 Yuliia Bocharova Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of Department Department of Economics and International Economic Relations Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4829-8948 Oleksandr Ishchenko Lead Economist Department of Economic Problems of Social Policy Institute of Industrial Economics of NAS of Ukraine ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0307-557X Svitlana Ostapenko PhD, Associate Professor, Head of Department Department of Foreign Philology, Ukrainian Studies and Social and Law Disciplines Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3915-4854 Svitlana Revutska PhD, Associate Professor Department of Foreign Philology, Ukrainian Studies and Social and Law Disciplines Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8969-1295 Hannah Udovichenko PhD, Associate Professor Department of Foreign Philology, Ukrainian Studies and Social and Law Disciplines Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3731-0857 Liliia Dmytruk Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Associate Professor Department of Foreign Philology, Ukrainian Studies and Social and Law Disciplines Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1850-5130 Natalia Ivanova Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of Department Department of Marketing, Management and Public Administration Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5010-2668 Nataliia Pryimak Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor Department of Marketing, Management and Public Administration Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0313-2581 Tetiana Kozhukhova Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor Vice-rector Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6758-9890 Olena Nieizviestna PhD, Associate Professor Educational and Scientific Institute of Economics, Management and Administration Director Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6135-6524 Kateryna Khavrova Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor Department of Economics and Business Acting Director Educational and Scientific Institute of Business and Hospitality Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9376-0700 Lyubov Shevchenko PhD, Associate Professor, Head of Department Department of Finance, Accounting and Taxation Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2188-1735 iv Yuliia Lyzhnyk Senior Lecturer Department of Economics and International Economic Relations Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3432-7581 Volodymyr Kotkovskyi Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor Department of Socio-Political and Economic Disciplines Kryvyi Rih Faculty National University «Odesa Law Academy» ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5150-1751 Yevhenii Tryhubchenko Postgraduate Student Department of Economics and International Economic Relations Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1368-4814 Ganna Gorina Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Head of Department Department of Tourism and Country Studies Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0900-0640 Galina Bohatyryova PhD, Associate Professor Department of Tourism and Country Studies Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3790-4735 Olha Nikolaichuk PhD, Associate Professor, Head of Department Department of Technology in Restaurant Industry, Hotel and Restaurant Business and Entrepreneurship Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7197-4713 Oleksandr Romanykha PhD, Associate Professor Department of Economics and Business Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4695-3985 Valentyn Khorolskyi Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Department of General Engineering Disciplines and Equipment Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4040-3229 Radion Nykyforov PhD, Associate Professor First Vice-Rector Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9823-9551 Yurii Korenets Senior Lecturer Department of Technology in Restaurant Industry, Hotel and Restaurant Business and Entrepreneurship Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5873-7908 Olga Simakova PhD, Associate Professor Department of Technology in Restaurant Industry, Hotel and Restaurant Business and Entrepreneurship Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4432-8337 Iuliia Goriainova PhD, Associate Professor Department of Technology in Restaurant Industry, Hotel and Restaurant Business and Entrepreneurship Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1228-7793 v The interdisciplinarity, multidimensionality and complexity of the security paradigm in the 21st century are reflected. Theoretical and applied (practical) aspects of ensuring the security of objects of global, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels of security in the conditions of an unprecedented transformation of the world, an increase in the level of turbulence and uncertainty recorded in the global and national contexts of development, the latest challenges, opportunities and threats at the beginning of the 21st century. The development of theoretical aspects of ensuring security has found manifestation in: identification of approaches to understanding the essence of the concept of «security», security paradigms, object-subject, sectoral structure, analytical levels of security; substantiation and presentation of the author’s approaches to understanding the essence of the concepts of «national security», «public administration in the field of security», «financial security», «financial security of sustainable development», «economic security», «security and protection in global tourism», «security enterprises», incl. «economic security of the enterprise»; allocation of components and indicators of national security, incl. national financial and economic security, economic security of enterprises, industries, innovative ecosystems; determining the meaning and role of language and linguistic identity, development of innovative ecosystems, financial and economic security, enterprise security to ensure national security; determining the importance and role of national security and its components, financial security of sustainable development, tourism security to ensure personal and global security; improving the classification of international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development, identifying measures to ensure the financial security of sustainable development at different levels of management; identification of models for ensuring the security of states and their features; substantiation of the architecture of the intellectual control system of food industry enterprises. The development of practical aspects of ensuring security has found expression in: the identification of global threats to national security in the 21st century, the vector of their transformation, the time lag of manifestation and the degree of influence; sound configuration of global financial security of sustainable development, measures to ensure financial security of sustainable development at different levels of government; development of a model for predicting the emergence of threats to the financial condition of Ukraine, a system of corrective measures of economic policy on the part of macroeconomic regulation bodies in order to stop the inertial development of the forecast situation to ensure the financial security of the state; assessment by the taxonomy method of the integral indicator of the economic security of the EU countries; construction of a matrix of transitions of the EU countries between the states of economic security of the pre-covid and covid-periods; building a security profile for Ukraine and the EU; forecasting the losses of the EU countries from military operations on the territory of Ukraine; identification of security parameters abstract Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse vi and efficiency markers of innovative ecosystems; identification of the state and features of the development of innovative ecosystems of the leading countries of innovative development; determining the 10 most and least safe and reliable countries in the world for travel; building a map of the distribution of countries in the world according to the Global Peace Index; determination of the current state and features of the development of hotel and restaurant enterprises in Ukraine; calculation and interpretation of the integral indicator of economic security of hotel and restaurant enterprises using the taxonomy method for 2015–2020; substantiation of the strategy for ensuring the economic security of hotel and restaurant enterprises and management decisions for its implementation for the future period; development of mathematical models for the processes of preparation and improvement of water quality indicators, preparation and dosage of flour, preparation of bread starter, dough, dispersion for dough of functional applications, proofing and baking processes using ultrasonic monitoring and intensification systems; designing local adaptive control systems for relevant processes; substantiation of modern features of intelligent control of complex technological processes for the production of bakery products with digital control algorithms for food industry enterprises in the territories of technogenic load. Keywords Security, security paradigm, national security, public administration in the field of security, threats, risks, national identity, language identity, financial security of the state, economic security of the state, economic security of the enterprise, global financial security of sustainable development, security indicators, integral indicator of security , innovative development, innovative ecosystem, global tourism, hotel and restaurant business, security strategy, intelligent system, technogenic security, food security. vii contents List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... x List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xiii Circle of readers and scope of application ....................................................................... xvi Introduction.......................................................................................................................1 1 Theoretical basis of security in the XXI century ..............................................................3 1.1 The phenomenon of security in scientific discourse ...............................................3 1.2 National security: essence and components .........................................................8 1.3 Threats to national security in the ХХІ century ...................................................18 References..............................................................................................................22 2 Language and national identity as a foreword for ensuring national security ................26 2.1 The role of language in the consolidation of society .............................................26 2.2 Issues of national identification in science ..........................................................28 2.3 Transformation of national identity in the context of national security of Ukraine ....28 References..............................................................................................................40 3 Economic component of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine ...........................43 3.1 Economic component of security and indicators of its determination .....................43 3.2 Methodological tools for the study of economic security .....................................47 3.3 Study of the economic indicators of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine before the war ..............................................................................49 3.4 Threats of losses of the EU countries from military operations on the territory of Ukraine ...............................................................................57 References..............................................................................................................63 4 The global aspect of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development ..........65 4.1 Essence and components of the global system of financial security of sustainable development...............................................................................65 4.2 Institutional support of the system of financial security of sustainable development at the global level .........................................................................73 4.3 Modern trends in the field of financial security of sustainable development at the global level ............................................................................................75 References..............................................................................................................78 Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse viii 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security ..................82 5.1 Essential characteristics of financial security and the need to ensure it ................82 5.2 Justification of the expediency of using the signal approach to determine the level and assess financial security ................................................................84 5.3 The results of using the signal approach to determine the level and assess financial security .............................................................................................87 5.4 Justification of the algorithm and the results of using a regression model with performance indicators in order to predict threats to the financial condition in the future on the example of Ukraine ...........................................................101 References............................................................................................................104 6 Security parameters of the innovative ecosystem .......................................................106 6.1 The innovative ecosystem and its role in ensuring national security .....................106 6.2 Success parameters of innovative ecosystems .................................................113 6.3 Diagnostics of innovative ecosystems of the leading countries of innovative development .................................................................................................115 References............................................................................................................126 7 Assessing security and protection in global tourism ...................................................130 7.1 International SOS Travel Risk Map...................................................................130 7.2 Pillars «Security and Security» and «Health and Hygiene» of The Travel & Tourism Development Index ........................................................................................134 7.3 Global Peace Index: measuring peace in a complex world ...................................140 References............................................................................................................146 8 Strategies for ensuring the economic security of the hotel and restaurant business .....149 8.1 Brief description of the current state of development of hotel and restaurant enterprises in Ukraine ....................................................................................149 8.2 Substantiation of the methodology for assessing the economic security of enterprises in the hotel and restaurant business ..........................................156 8.3 Assessment of the economic security of enterprises in the hotel and restaurant business .......................................................................................159 8.4 Rationale for choosing a strategy to ensure the economic security of enterprises in the hotel and restaurant business ..........................................163 References............................................................................................................167 9 Innovative security technological solutions in the system of manufacturing products for the population of territories with technogenic load ...................................170 9.1 General principles for ensuring food security in areas with technogenic load ........170 list of figures xv 8.6 Integral indicator of the level of economic security of hotel and restaurant enterprises in 2015–2020 162 8.7 Distribution of observations over the value of the integral indicator of economic security of hotel and restaurant enterprises in Ukraine for 2015–2020 165 8.8 Strategy for restoring the economic security of the enterprises of the hotel and restaurant business in Ukraine 167 9.1 Distribution of impurity concentration in liquid medium (ξ0 = 1): 1 – initial distribution of impurity concentration in liquid medium; 2 – stationary distribution of impurity concentration in a liquid medium 177 9.2 The results of calculations of the dependence of the impurity concentration in a liquid medium on distance for different moments of time in the numerical solution of the problem: 1 – τ = 0; 2 – τ = 0.03; 3 – τ = 0.06; 4 – τ = 0.09 178 9.3 Scheme of the experimental unit for preparing dough with ultrasonic intensifiers 180 9.4 Block diagram of a robotic complex for the production of bread 183 9.5 Block diagram of the control of the bread starter production process 187 9.6 Adaptive digital control system for the dough mixing department 188 xvi Circle of readers and scope of application The theoretical and scientific-applied provisions outlined in the monograph will be useful to scientists, teachers, graduate students, applicants for higher education, as well as decisionmakers in the field of ensuring the security of objects at the global, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels. The practical significance of the results obtained in the monograph lies in the fact that the proposed scientific and practical recommendations and conclusions can be used to study, form and implement models and strategies for ensuring and improving the security of objects of different levels. 1 DOI: 10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6.introduction Oksana Chernega, Yuliia Bocharova Introduction Security is one of the basic human needs, one of the most important conditions for the existence of animate and inanimate nature, so it is natural that the phenomenon of security is an integral part of a multidisciplinary scientific discourse. Under the influence of modern unprecedented transformations of the world, the national and global contexts of development, ideas about the risks, threats and opportunities for the further ge nesis of various security objects are changing, which means that the security paradigm requires transformation, updating and further development. We propose a new interdisciplinary approach for solving security issues based on the integral security paradigm, covers the theoretical and practical aspects of ensuring the security of objects at the global, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels of security, focuses on the complementary relationship of the security state of objects at different levels. The theoretical and methodological basis for the interdisciplinary study of the security phenomenon became the provisions of economic theory, macroand microeconomics, international economics and international economic relations, political science, sociology, management, philology, technical sciences, the works of leading domestic and foreign scientists, incl. Ladislav Hofreiter, Ludek Lukas, Matthew Sussex, Michael Clarke, Rory Medcalf, Andrea Monti, Raymond Wacks and others. The paper raises both general questions of the transformation of the security paradigm in the 21st century, and a wide range of issues related to the transformation of approaches to understanding and ensuring the security of individual objects of the global, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels of security, incl. explored the importance of language, linguistic and national identity for ensuring national security; substantiated the importance of innovative ecosystems for ensuring national security and determined their security parameters and development markers; analyzed the global aspect of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development; the level of financial and economic security of Ukraine was studied and measures aimed at their increase were proposed; an assessment of security and security in global tourism was carried out; the state and features of ensuring the security of products and processes in the food industry were studied. To solve a wide range of ambitious tasks, the following research methods and techniques were used in the work: analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparative analysis, graphical and tabular methods; cluster analysis; factor analysis; regression method; method of taxonomic analysis, system analysis, etc. Data processing was carried out using MS Excel modules and STATISTICA 10.0 application software. The monograph is a collective work of the teachers of the Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade named after Mykhailo Tugan-Baranovsky. The authors of the monograph are: Section 1 – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Oksana Chernega; Associate in the Internal Audit & GRC Department PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftspr ü fungsgesellschaft (PwC Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 2 Germany), Maria Kolchuk; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Yuliia Bocharova; Senior Economist (Institute of Industrial Economics, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) Oleksandr Ishchenko; PhD, Svitlana Ostapenko. Section 2 – PhD, Svitlana Revutska; PhD, Svitlana Ostapenko; PhD, Hanna Udovichenko; Doctor of Pedagogical sciences, Liliia Dmytruk. Section 3 – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Natalia Ivanova; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Nataliia Pryimak; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Tetiana Kozhukhova; PhD, Olena Nieizviestna. Section 4 – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Tetiana Kozhukhova; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Kateryna Khavrova; PhD, Lyubov Shevchenko; Senior Lecturer, Yuliia Lyzhnyk. Section 5 – PhD, Olena Nieizviestna; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Volodymyr Kotkovskyi; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Natalia Ivanova; PhD, Lyubov Shevchenko; Postgraduate Student, Yevhenii Tryhubchenko. Section 6 – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Yuliia Bocharova; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Oksana Chernega; Senior Economist (Institute of Industrial Economics, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) Oleksandr Ishchenko; Senior Lecturer, Yuliia Lyzhnyk. Section 7 – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Ganna Gorina; PhD, Galina Bohatyryova; PhD, Olha Nikolaichuk; PhD, Oleksandr Romanykha. Section 8 – PhD, Olha Nikolaichuk; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Ganna Gorina; Doctor of Economic Sciences, Nataliia Pryimak; PhD, Oleksandr Romanykha. Section 9 – Doctor of of Engineering Sciences, Professor, Valentyn Khorolskyi; PhD, Radion Nykyforov; Senior Lecturer, Yurіi Korenets; PhD, Olga Simakova; PhD, Iuliia Goriainova. The theoretical and scientific-applied provisions presented in the monograph will be useful to scientists, teachers, graduate students, applicants for higher education, and all persons interested in security issues. The monograph has been prepared to fulfill the tasks of a set of research works approved by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine: «Effective models of social partnership to ensure sustainable development: state, education, business» (state registration number 0120U101528, 2020–2022); «Automation of technological processes in the food industry» (state registration number 0121U109320, 2021–2023); «Ukraine in the system of international integration processes» (state registration number 0121U110138, 2021–2023); «Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on the market of tourist services in Ukraine and the formation of development models in the post-crisis period» (state registration number 0121U110132, 2021–2023); «Development of the hotel and restaurant industry in Ukraine: organizational and economic aspects» (state registration number 0121U110147, 2021–2023). 3 DOI: 10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6.ch1 Oksana Chernega, Maria Kolchuk, Yuliia Bocharova, Oleksandr Ishchenko, Svitlana Ostapenko 1Theoretical basis of security in the XXI century Abstract The place and role of the security phenomenon in the scientific discourse are studied. Approaches to understanding the essence of the concept of «security» are identified. The stages of evolution of the security concept in the 17th–20th centuries are analyzed. Security paradigms (traditional security paradigm, sectoral security paradigm, human security paradigm, integrated security paradigm) are identified. The types of security in the 21st century are identified and it is substantiated that the variability of types of security is primarily associated with its subject-object structure. Analytical security levels are proposed. It is substantiated that, despite the complexity, interdisciplinarity and multidimensionality of the modern concept of security, the defining place in it is still occupied by the concept of national security. It is substantiated that at the present stage of development of theory and practice, national security is considered as a prerequisite and indicator of the socio-economic development of the state, its competitiveness. Approaches to understanding the concept of «national security» are considered and the author’s approach to understanding the essence of this term is proposed. The components of national security are identified and it is substantiated that the significance and role of different components of security differ significantly from one group of countries to another, which is dictated by the achieved level of socio-economic development, the geo-economic and geopolitical potential of countries’ influence, and their national interests. The essence of the concept of «public administration in the field of security» is revealed. The variability of models for ensuring the security of states and their features are identified. Based on the analysis of the Global Risks Reports, the global threats to national security in the 21st century are systematized and analyzed, the vector of their transformation, the time lag of manifestation and the degree of influence are determined. KEYWORDS Security, security paradigm, national security, security governance, threats. 1.1 The phenomenon of security in scientific discourse Although «the problem of security is relevant in any historical period» [1], «the issue of security has been in the focus of attention of many scientists, historians, lawyers, philosophers, as well as politicians, those in power, the military for hundreds and thousands of years» [2], unprecedented Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 4 transformation of the world, an increase in the level of turbulence and uncertainty, which is recorded in the global and national contexts of development, the development of the international division of labor, internationalization, cooperation, and, at the same time, the escalation of competition in the geo-economic and geopolitical plane, logically cause an increase in the attention of both scientists and practitioners to the problem of security in the XXI century. Actual focus on the theory and practice of security in the context of the transformation of the development context, the picture of the world, incl. scientific, quite logical, because the idea of security, which is one of the basic human needs (according to the theory of the hierarchy of needs by A. Maslow), is also undergoing transformation, requires updating and further development. The etymology of «security» depends on the language in which the term is used. So, according to the Etymological Dictionary of the Ukrainian language, the concept of «security» comes from the Old Slavonic prefix «without» and the noun «pek», associated with the verb «peka». The prefix «pre» is «in the absence, except», and the noun «peck» is «care, worries» [3], so the concept of «security» means without worries, without hassle, which is possible in the absence of threats. At the same time, as noted by Agnieszka Bien-Kacala, Maciej Serowaniec, «the ‘security family’ refers to the Latin insane, which are a combination of two Latin words – blue and space – and it must remain in full. European English languages, including English and French (securite). Sine from Latin is without. Whereas cura means ‘concern’, ‘fear’, ‘anxiety’. This word security is orientally translated as there is no doubt, heaviness or danger» [4]. Lyashenko, E. states that «…Greek contains the first references to security in the broadest sense. The Greek expression «to be safe» means «to control the situation»… In Hebrew, the word «security»… is often… identified with the Hebrew word «shalom», meaning «peace, prosperity» [5]. The first attempts to define the essence of the concept of «security» were made in 1190 [2], however, at the present stage of development of the theory and practice of security, there is no generally accepted approach to understanding the essence of this term, the variability of approaches to its understanding is fixed, because it has evolved over time, formed under the influence of theoretical interpretations of the variability of relations both within the country and outside it (under the influence of the development of international relations), as well as historical events and trends, various sciences and scientific schools, is a very wide, complex phenomenon, has many dimensions, objects and indicators. Ladislav Hofreiter comes to similar conclusions, arguing that «Security itself is complicated, internally structured, multifactor and hierarchized phenomenon. Structuralization and hierarchization of security are given by its internal structuring in subsystems along with their identification in systems of high level» [6]. Today, there are more than 5 different approaches to understanding the essence of the concept of «security»: – security as a state of protection of vital interests, values, properties of someone and/or something; – security as the absence of danger to someone and/or something; 1 Theoretical basis of security in the XXI century 5 – security as a property (attribute) of someone and/or something; – security as a specific activity; – security as a state that contributes to the most complete satisfaction of the needs of someone and/or something; – security as a set of factors that ensure the development of someone and/or something; – security as a cultural and historical phenomenon [1, 2, 7–13]. Thus, it is quite logical that, in accordance with the most general and widespread approach to understanding the essence, the concept of «security» is a state when, for some reason, nothing threatens someone [14] or «…» for extremely stringent requirements – threats that could so endanger core values that those values would be damaged beyond repair if we did not do something to deal with the situation» [15]. At the same time, the content analysis of works [1–29] allows to assert that the concept of «security» acquires a meaningful meaning, provided it is associated with a specific object (state, region, individual, sphere of human activity, etc.), and is also subjective (associated with the subjective perception of threats). The first scientific concept of security appeared in the 17th century. Its formation and development were associated with the works of Locke, J., Rousseau, J.-J., Spinoza, B. the works of Machiavelli, N., Montesquieu, C., Kant, I., Hegel, G. and others [2], in these studies, the idea is gradually formed that security is determined by the ability of individuals, states to resist external (exogenous) threats, mainly due to the power component. Thus, as Kim R. Holmes notes, «Modern concepts of national security arose in the 17th century during the Thirty Years War in Europe and the Civil War in England. In 1648, the Song of Westphalia established the idea that the nation-state had legal control not only of domestic affiliation, like religion, but also of external security...» [18]. In the 20th century, with the development of the international division of labor, internationalization, scientific thought, the very nature of security was rethought, its understanding went beyond the limits of only the power component, exogenous threats, and began to be applied to a wider list of objects, incl. regions, industries and sectors of the economy, ecosystems, enterprises, the world as a whole, took into account the threats of endogenous and exogenous origin. Thus, the genesis of security theory in the 20th century can be represented as a staged process consisting of four stages: Stage 1 (40–50s of the 20th century), asso ciated with the theory of classical realism, which focused on issues of national security, led to the emergence of the term «national interests», ensuring security was understood as ensuring the protection and implementation of the national interests of the state; Stage 2 (60s of the 20th century) – the theory of pluralism, which laid the foundation for the development of the theory of regional and international security; Stage 3 (70s of the 20th century) – the use of the ideas of Marxism in the theory of security, which laid the foundation for the formation of the theory of global security; Stage 4 (90s of the 20th century) – the theory of social constructivism, which laid the foundation for universal security, the introduction of the term «human security», a departure from understanding national security only through the ability to ensure security by military means [5]. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 6 The consequence of the evolution of the concept of security, the development of scienti fic schools of security during the 17th–20th centuries was the formation at the beginning of the 21st century of three security paradigms: – the paradigm of traditional security – the object of security is the state; the object of protection is the integration of state and military security; potential threats – military aggression, nuclear war, etc.; – the paradigm of sectoral security – individuals, groups, groups of states, humanity, civilizations are the object of security; the object of protection is military, political, economic, environmental, social, societal security, etc.; potential threats – two groups of threats: military (power) and non-military; – the paradigm of human security – the object of security is humanity, individuals; the object of protection is human and social rights, freedom from fear, freedom from scarcity; potential threats – violence, crime, poverty, repression, hunger, disease, unemployment, etc. [1–13, 15–29]. Content analysis and systematization of information in works [1–13, 15–29] allows us to state that: 1. At the beginning of the 21st century, the formation of the fourth paradigm is observed – an integral one that unites the ideas and results of the development of the above three paradigms, which is due to the dialectical unity of the functioning and development of man, society and the state. 2. Security theory is closely related to risk theory (basic methodological principle: threat – risk – measurement), crisis theory – solution of security or security event; causality – causes of security or security event [9, 12]. 3. The concept of «security» acquires a meaningful meaning if it is connected with a specific object (state, region, individual, sphere of human activity, etc.) and subject (it is subjective, associated with the subjective perception of threats). 4. Security, regardless of the object, is characterized by both internal and external dimensions (threats are formed both inside the security object and outside it). At the same time, as noted by Agnieszka Bien-Kacala, Maciej Serowaniec, «…on account globalization… The boundary between external and internal secutity threats becomes vague or even dissappear» [4]. 5. In the 21st century, the list of objects and subjects of security is very wide, as a result, there are a large number of varieties of security. At the same time, as noted by Ludek Lukas, Martin Hromada, Luk áš Pavl í k. This usually includes sets of measures that serve to minimize harm. All kinds of security spheres or technical security are implemented as periodic activity, as regulated by the authorities, certain measures and tools… protect before this pathologic phenomenon… Society solve the security or security problems by introduction of security or security in the form of institutionalized children of security or security. These types of security or security are included in certain national territory and provided against certain specific threats» [10]. Thus, Ladislav Hofreiter identifies five varieties: global security, regional security, national security, group security, individual security [6]. 1 Theoretical basis of security in the XXI century 7 Ludek Lukas distinguishes three types of security: international security, physic security, fire security [9]. At the same time, he notes that «Currently, security and security research is realized independently, with all sector addressing its own kind of security or security. Its basis of security or security basically creates its own professional conceptual tool» [9]. At the same time, Ludek Lukas, Martin Hromada, Luk áš Pavl í k note that «From historic perspective, first kinds of security were physical security and international security» [10]. Lyashenko distinguishes six types of security: individual security, local security, regional security, national security, international security, global security [5]. Umaru Ibrahim Yakubu, Mohammed Shuaibu distinguish the following types of security: – international security (development of a general medical system; this is related to the amalgamation of measures by states and international organizations); – human security (this is a particular dimension that focuses on the individual, not in the state. Human protection is about people, centrifugation, multi-disciplinary understanding of security involving a number of search fields including development studies, strategic studies, human rights); – national security (this traditionally implies the physical protection of the territories of the state from municipal attacks on other states); – environmental protection (these threats exams consist of trends in nature, communication and peoples. This type of security includes, among other things, water security, energy security, food security); – transnational security (these practices are taking into account threats such as organized crime, terrorism, trafficking, arms proliferation and other forms of transnational security issues); – reference information (this refers to processes a methodologies which are designed and implemented to protect print, electronic, or any other form of confidential, private and sensitive information or data from unauthorized access, use, misuse, disclosure, destruction, modification, disruption); – financial security (a referee at school is one of the worst, if the stench is not stolen, it is inconvenient to provide their expenses; – economic security (this consists of the principle of security, which is a function of basic needs such as health, education, home, and information, as well as work-related security, which includes job security, income security, et cetera) [12]. Identification, analysis, systematization of author’s approaches to the identification of security varieties made it possible to propose analytical levels of security: global level, sub-global, macro-, mesoand micro-levels of security (Table 1.1). There is a complementary relationship between all levels and varieties of security. So, as Ladislav Hofreiter notes, «It is visible that individual security is part of global security level and individual security will not exist if the global security is no guaranteed» [6]. James C. Hsiung comes to similar conclusions, arguing that «The various components of comprehensive security are intertwined. Global warming may have worldwide economic implications, and epidemics may ravage the physical and economic security of the individual (and society at large). While heading Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 8 in opposite directions, both globalization shift and the opposite shift to individual are ultimately interrelated because the individual is the ultimate beneficiary of both environmental and economic security» [11]. A similar point of view is shared by Lyashenko, A. [5].  Table 1.1 Analytical levels of security in the context of the formation of an integral security paradigm Analytical Level Security A kind of security Security object Security sectors Global level Global Security Noosphere, world community Geopolitics, geoeconomics, environmental, military, informational, technological, etc. Sub-global level Sub-global security Macro-regions, continents, integration blocs, groups of countries, international organizations Military, political, cultural, demographic, social, economic, energy, environmental, scientific and technological, food, healthcare, etc. Macro level (national level) National security States Meso level (subnational level) Regional security, sectoral security, etc. Regions, industries, social groups Microlevel Personal security Individuals, enterprises Social, food, information, cultural, technological, economic, etc. Source: compiled by the author based on these sources [1–13, 15–29] Thus, the phenomenon of security is an integral part of scientific discourse, in the 21st century the concept and phenomenon of «security» is complex, dynamic, interdisciplinary, multidimensional, security theory is developing dynamically, which is reflected in the variability of approaches to understanding the types and levels of security of complementary communication. 1.2 National security: essence and components Despite the complexity, interdisciplinarity and multidimensionality of the modern concept of security, the concept of national security still occupies a decisive place in it. According to Umaru Ibrahim Yakubu, Mohammed Shuaibu, «From the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the concept of security was linked to the state. Hence, the state had exclusive preserve to decide what security meant to it» [12]. As evidenced by a critical analysis of sources [1–13, 15–35], at the present stage of development of the theory and practice of security, it is national security that is considered as an important prerequisite and determinant of the socio-economic development and growth of not only individual states, but also the world community as a whole. Thus, as PwC experts note, «Security and security lie at the heart of any nation’s prosperity» [19]. A similar point of view is shared by OECD experts, arguing that «Security is fundamental to people’s 1 Theoretical basis of security in the XXI century 15 6. Corruption and fraud, which may undermine the resilience of critical infrastructure and potentially create opportunities for malicious actors to obtain physical or digital access to sensitive assets and information. 7. Socio-economic inequality resulting from factors such as economic policies and neoliberal market forces, which may reduce the ability of citizens to provide for themselves, as well as risk social unrest and domestic instability that pose a threat to critical infrastructure, sectors and processes [23]. Megatrends, including: 1. Globalisation and interdependence between critical infrastructure, sectors and processes of one country with others, magnifying risks to an individual country’s national critical infrastructures, which can be affected through cascading effects from developments elsewhere. 2. International economic trends playing a critical role on countries due to increased interconnectedness via economic, business, political and governance structures, as well as the expanded influence of private actors over political processes. 3. The political and economic paradigm of foreign states which, similar to protectionism, considers the risks related to different national economic models and their impact on the competitiveness in the area of critical sectors and processes. 4. Uncertainty in relation to resource security, particularly in relation to reliance on foreign suppliers of energy and the uptake of alternative energy generation, distribution and storage technologies. 5. Potential concerns with regard to information integrity and trustworthiness, which may act as an avenue for malicious actors including private companies to disrupt critical processes – such as elections and democratic decision-making – and gain influence in critical sectors (such as telecommunications or political institutions) [23]. In this way, national security is determined by a great number of exogenous and endogenous officials in various ethiology and nature. Ladislav Hofreiter comes to a similar conclusion, firmly, that «Security margin of the man, social group, state (hereinafter referred to as objects) will be always the result of interaction of external and internal security risks and threats and protective properties, abilities and capabilities of security object» [6]. Critical analysis of sources [1–3, 5, 6, 15–35] shows that the significance and role of various components in ensuring national security varies significantly from one group of countries to another, determined by its achieved level of socio-economic development and its features. At the same time, as evidenced by the content analysis of sources [1–13, 15–35], at the present stage of development of the theory and practice of security in general, national security in particular, economic and political security remain the most important components of ensuring national security. Thus, as Lucia Retter, Erik Frinking, Stijn Hoorens, Alice Lynch, Fook Nederveen and William Phillips argue, «In a context of globalisation and further economic integration in recent decades, the relationship between the economy and national security has become increasingly interlinked [23]. In this context, Lucia Retter, Erik Frinking, Stijn Hoorens, Alice Lynch, Fook Nederveen and William Phillips point out the importance for national security Critical sectors (are sectors whose assets, Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 16 systems and networks (whether physical or virtual) are considered so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on national security, the functioning of the economy and society), Critical infrastructure (is an asset or system that is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions or processes), Critical processes (are those processes that could result in severe social disruption in the event of their failure or disruption) [23]. In turn, Krishtanovich, M., Pushak, Ya., Fleychuk, M., Franchuk, V. argue that «security in the political sphere occupies one of the key places in the national security system and acts as one of its main structural elements. This is due to the comprehensive nature and vital importance of the political sphere for the existence of the state and society, as well as the functioning of the main social institutions and organizations» [8]. At the same time, Krishtanovich, M., Pushak, Ya., Fleychuk, M., Franchuk, V. note that «...political security should be understood as a dynamically structured state that ensures the stability, unity and integrity of the political system, its ability to self-regulate, self-develop and respond to adverse internal and external influences. It is a set of measures aimed at preserving the constitutionally legitimized political system of the state, ensuring the creation of the state and constructive politics» [8]. Taking into account all of the above, as well as the fact that political security cannot be ensured without a military component, each state, in order to ensure its security, must understand and correctly evaluate the existing three strategic alternatives for the model of behavior in the face of an existing or potential military threat: «…to surrender; to prevent the other side from attacking by promising to raise the costs of war to an unaccepted level; and to defend itself when war actually breaks out so as to deny the attacking country its objectives and to turn back or defeat the attacking forces altogether… Therefore, security policy is concerned with preventing war, which is called deterrence and with limiting or ending war, which is called defence» [15]. The alternative behavior of the state in the face of an existing or potential military threat, the presence of a large number of areas in relation to which coordinated and balanced decisions must be determined, necessitates their coordination from a single center, the implementation of state administration in the field of national security. The content analysis of sources [5, 8, 15, 29–37] indicates that public administration in the field of security should be understood as a specific type of public administration that involves the use of the capabilities and resources of the state in order to influence national security objects in order to find and achieve a compromise between human interests, society and the state, and, consequently, the realization of national interests. As noted by Abramov, V., Sytnik, G., Smolyanyuk, V. et al., «The main goal of these managerial influences is forecasting, timely detection, and neutralization of threats… The content and direction of state administration in the field of security depends on the form of government, the political system and the state policy of national security…» [8]. Ludek Lukas, Martin Hromaa, Luk áš Pavl í k distinguish six main models of public administration in the field of security: – regime model (it is based on specification the rules and their following. The regime model is controlled order); 1 Theoretical basis of security in the XXI century 17 – proactive model (it is based on proactive approach, is oriented on future and prediction of events with goal to avoid negative impact. Model is based on management, active work with information, searching and monitoring undesirable events and their solving. This model has 2 types: predictively-security model, minimize collisions model, stress reduction model); – barrier model (flexible barrier model, layer barrier model, filter model); – preparedness model (flexible capabilities model, business continuity model, substitution model, transformational model, redundant model); – model of participation (it is based on creation collective goal and also on type of its attainment); – reactive model (it is based on reactive approach, which is also based on reaction of starting event) [10]. Lyashenko, E. identifies five main models of national security, due to the cultural, historical, socio-economic and political features of the development of countries: – american model (combination of external and internal security); – the Japanese model (focused on ensuring internal social security, maintaining and developing the economic potential of the state); – chinese model (based on the principles of social society); – a model of countries with economies in transition (focusing on current socio-economic efficiency and creating prerequisites for ensuring the implementation of promising innovative projects); – a model of developing countries (focusing on ensuring the maximum effectiveness of the use of economic potential in the shortest possible time) [5]. Since, as the studies of the National Council of Educational Research and Training of India show, at the present stage of development the thesis continues to dominate that «most threats to a country’s security come from outside its borders», Holmes, R. identifies the following three main models through which national security can be ensured: 1) collective defense (collective defense is an official arrangement among nation-states to offer some defense support to other member states if they are attacked); 2) collective security (collective defense involving mutual commitments of member states could be considered a form of collective security, albeit one limited geographically to military defense. Their distinguishing characteristic is their hybrid character between collective action at the international level and the acceptance of nation-states being ultimately responsible for their own security); 3) global security (the world’s security is everybody’s business, the far greater focus is on attempting to eliminate conflict through international law, aid, confidence-building measures, and global governance) [18]. Thus, national security is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, characterized by the variability of dimensions that make up the object-subject structure, management models and ensuring the containment or leveling of threats of various etiologies. The choice of models of public administration in the field of security depends on the characteristics of the historical, cultural and Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 18 political development of states, national interests, threats, etc., and may change over time under the influence of the transformation of the trajectory and context of development. 1.3 Threats to national security in the ХХІ century At the present stage of development of the preservation paradigm, incl. national security, as Ladislav Hofreiter notes, «Security does not mean only absence of security risks and threats but first of all protection against them» [6]. Given this, the success of public administration in the field of security depends on the timeliness of identifying, assessing risks and developing measures aimed at their leveling and/or reduction. At the same time, not only internal risks are taken into account, but also external ones, because in the context of globalization, the boundary between internal and external threats is blurred. Among the institutions that systematically identify and differentiate global threats to global and national security, the World Economic Forum (WEF) conducts the most comprehensive and representative study. According to the results of its research, the World Economic Forum – The Global Risks Report, where risks are differentiated by the sphere of occurrence, as they impact and the horizon of their actualization. Content Analysis of WEF Global Risk Studies 2010–2022 [38–42] allows us to state that in 2010–2022, the risks and threats that affect global and national security have changed significantly – if in 2010 the largest number of the most probable and potentially influential threats were formed in the economic sphere, since 2011 the largest number of security threats with a high level of probability of manifestation (Table 1.2) and potential force of influence (Table 1.3), arose in the social sphere and ecology. Among the risks characterized by a high level of probability and potential impact potential, in 2010–2022: – in the economic area: Fiscal crises; Financial failure; Chronic fiscal imbalances; Unemployment; Asset price collapse; Energy price volatility; Energy price shock; – in the environmental area: Storms and cyclones; Biodiversity loss; Climate change; Flooding; Rising greenhouse gas emissions; Extreme weather events; Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation; Natural disasters; Extreme weather; Human environmental damage; Climate action failure; – in the social area: Chronic disease; Severe income disparity; Large-scale involuntary migration; Livelihood crises; Infectious diseases; Social cohesion erosion; Water crises; Social Cohesion Erosion; – in the technological area: Cyber-attacks; Data fraud or theft; Massive incident of data fraud/theft; Infrastructure breakdown; – in the geopolitical area: Interstate conflict with regional consequences; Corruption; Global governance gaps; State collapse or crisis; Failure of national governance; Large-scale terrorist attacks; Weapons of mass destruction. 19  Table 1.2 Top five risks by probability of occurrence Year Probability of manifestation Risk area 1 2 3 4 5 Economy Ecology Society Technosphere Geopolitics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2010 Asset price collapse Slowing Chinese economy (<6 %) Chronic disease Fiscal crises Global governance gaps 3 0 1 0 1 2011 Storms and cyclones Flooding Corruption Biodiversity loss Climate change 0 4 0 0 1 2012 Severe income disparity Chronic fiscal imbalances Rising greenhouse gas emissions Cyber-attacks Water supply crises 1 2 1 1 0 2013 Severe income disparity Chronic fiscal imbalances Rising greenhouse gas emissions Water supply crises Mismanagement of population 1 2 2 0 0 2014 Income disparity Extreme weather events Unemployment Climate change Cyber-attacks 1 2 1 1 0 2015 Interstate conflict with regional consequences Extreme weather events Failure of national governance State collapse or crisis Unemployment 1 1 0 0 3 2016 Large-scale involuntary migration Extreme weather events Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation Interstate conflict with regional consequences Major natural catastrophes 0 3 1 0 1 2017 Extreme weather events Large-scale involuntary migration Major natural disasters Large-scale terrorist attacks Massive incident of data fraud/theft 0 2 1 1 1 2018 Extreme weather events Natural disasters Cyber-attacks Data fraud or theft Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation 0 3 0 2 0 2019 Extreme weather events Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation Natural disasters Data fraud or theft Cyber-attacks 0 3 0 2 0 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2020 Extreme weather Climate action failure Natural disasters Biodiversity loss Human-made environmental disasters 0 5 0 0 0 2021 Extreme weather Climate action Infectious diseases failure Human environmental damage Infectious diseases Biodiversity loss 0 4 1 0 0 2022 Extreme weather Livelihood crises Climate action failure Social cohesion erosion Infectious diseases 0 2 3 0 0 Total 7 33 11 7 7 Absolute deviation –3 2 2 0 –1 Source: compiled by the author based on data from [38–42]  Table 1.3 Top five risks by impact Year Probability of manifestation Risk area 1 2 3 4 5 Economy Ecology Society Technosphere Geopolitics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2010 Asset price collapse Retrenchment from globalization (developed) Oil price spikes Chronic disease Fiscal crises 4 0 1 0 0 2011 Fiscal crises Climate change Geopolitical conflict Asset price collapse Extreme energy price volatility 3 1 0 0 1 2012 Financial failure Water supply crises Food crises Fiscal imbalances Energy price volatility 3 0 2 0 0 2013 Financial failure Water supply crises Fiscal imbalances Weapons of mass destruction Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation 2 1 1 0 1 2014 Fiscal crises Climate change Water crises Unemployment Infrastructure breakdown 2 1 1 1 0  Continuation of Table 1.2 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2015 Water crises Infectious diseases Weapons of mass destruction Interstate conflict Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation 0 1 2 0 2 2016 Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation Weapons of mass destruction Water crises Involuntary migration Energy price shock 1 1 2 0 1 2017 Weapons of mass destruction Extreme weather Water crises Natural disasters Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation 0 3 1 0 1 2018 Weapons of mass destruction Extreme weather Natural disasters Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation Water crises 0 3 1 0 1 2019 Weapons of mass destruction Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation Extreme weather Water crises Natural disasters 0 3 1 0 1 2020 Climate action failure Weapons of mass destruction Biodiversity loss Extreme weather Water crises 0 3 1 0 1 2021 Infectious diseases Climate action failure Weapons of mass destruction Biodiversity loss Natural resource crises 0 3 1 0 1 2022 Climate Action Failure Extreme Weather Biodiversity Loss Livelihood Crises Social Cohesion Erosion 0 3 2 0 0 Total 15 23 16 1 10 Absolute deviation -4 3 1 0 0 Source: compiled by the author based on data from [38–42]  Continuation of Table 1.3 Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 22 According to The Global Risks Report 2022: – in the next 2 years, the greatest number of threats will arise in the social sphere (4 out of 10 most likely threats). The main threats to national and global security will be: Extreme wea ther (31.3 % of respondents), Livelihood crises (30.4 % of respondents), Climate action failure (27.5 % of respondents), Social cohesion erosion (27.5 % of respondents), Infectious diseases (26.4 % of respondents), Mental health deterioration (26.1 % of respondents), Cybersecurity failure (19.5 % of respondents), Debt crises (19.3 % of respondents), Digital inequality (18.2 % of respondents), Asset bubble burs (14.2 %); – in the next 2–5 years, the greatest number of threats will arise in the field of ecology (4 out of 10 possible threats). The main threats to national and global security will be: Climate action failure (35.7 % of respondents), Extreme weather (34.6 % of respondents), Social cohesion erosion (23 % of respondents), Livelihood crise (20.1 % of respondents), Debt crises (19 % of respondents), Human environmental damage (16.4 % of respondents), Geoeconomic confrontations (14.8 % of respondents), Cybersecurity failure (14.6 % of respondents), Biodiversity loss (13.5 % of respondents), Asset but (12.7 % of respondents); – in the 5–10-year perspective, the greatest number of threats will arise in the field of ecology (5 out of 10 conditional threats). The main threats to national and global security in the 5–10-year perspective will be: Climate action failure (42.1 % of respondents), Extreme weather (32.4 % of respondents), Biodiversity loss (27 % of respondents), Natural resource crises (23 % of respondents), Human environmental damage (21.7 % of respondents), Social cohesion erosion (19.1 % of respondents), Involuntary migration (15 % of respondents), Adverse tech advances (14.9 % of respondents), Geoeconomic confrontations (14,1 %) of respondents), Geopolitical resource contestation (13.5 % of respondents). Taking into account the results of a retrospective analysis of the trajectory of the transformation of global risks in 2010–2022, the results of a study of global risks in 2022 in the development of a national security strategy, the formation and improvement of the state security policy will increase their effectiveness and ensure an increase in the level of national security. References 1. Dzoban, O. P. (Ed.) (2021). 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Available at: https://www.oecd.org/countries/burundi/ securityanddevelopment.htm 2 Language and national identity as a foreword for ensuring national security 31 assumes the answer to the russian language as an autocratic one, where Ukrainian should be the language of everyday communication – 0.8 %, and 3 % of the respondents would give the Ukrainian language only a regional significance! Such figures indicate an extremely low level of formation of national identity, when the distribution of «own»/«foreign» is blurred.  Table 2.1 Results of a sociological study of the status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine (2006–2020), % Answer options 2006 2016 2019 2020 Language of communication russian Language of communication sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes russian Language of communication russian Ukrainian should be the only state and official language, russian can be used at the household level, like the languages of other national minorities 35.0 75.8 46.5 24.9 68.5 66.1 Ukrainian should be the state language, russian may be official in some regions of Ukraine 20.3 16.2 30.7 33.6 15.0 17.9 Both languages must be state languages in Ukraine 37.0 4.1 15.8 32.7 11.5 12.6 Russian should be the state language, Ukrainian may be official in some regions of Ukraine 3.0 0.9 1.3 2.7 – – Russian should be the only state and official language in Ukraine, Ukrainian can be used at the household level 0.8 1.1 0.6 1.8 – – Difficult to answer 3.9 2.0 5.0 4.3 5.0 3.5 Source: compiled by the authors based on [13–16] During the data collection process, a difference was noticed in the figures for 2006. So, in No. 1 of «National Security and Defense» for this year, we have the following comparative indicators: the status of the sole official Ukrainian language, where russian, like other languages, was used only at the household level, in 2006–2007 was supported by 39.2 % of respondents, the full rights of two languages – 31.4 %, russian as official in certain regions – 24.3 % of respondents. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 32 In 2016, the survey was conducted in a different way, the respondents were divided into three groups according to the language of communication. As a result, we have 75 % of Ukrainian speakers for recognizing Ukrainian as the only state language and 46.5 % among bilinguals. The status of a russian as an autocracy in Ukraine was supported by 1.8 % of russian speakers. Another indicator causes concern – the percentage of those who have not decided on the status of the language – from 2 to 5 %. This is an indicator of the blurred linguistic identity of persons for whom the language does not embody the spiritual values of the nation, the ethnic group with which they identify themselves. Often, individuals with blurred identities are easy prey in manipulative socio-political games. It is noteworthy that over 14 years of conscious Ukrainians has increased from 35 % to 66.1 %, the ostentatious equal status of languages has fallen significantly (from 37 % to 12.6 %). The results of the 2019 and 2020 surveys were taken from another source for greater objectivity, however, in these questionnaires, options for the state status for the russian were not offered. Taking into account the analyzed data and the multi-ethnicity of the country, the linguistic identity of the people itself requires a more detailed study. Summary Table 2.2 presents survey data from the Razumkov Center, the Rating Sociological Group, the Gradus Research company, the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, together with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center, from 2006 to the present.  Table 2.2 Results of a sociological study of language identity in 2006–2022, % Question asked by the respondents Years Ukrainian russian Ukrainian and russian Other languages Difficult to answer What is your native language? 2006 52 30.7 15.6 1.1 0.6 2007 51.4 25.7 21.5 0.9 0.5 2011 61 36 2 2012 57 42 2013 62 37 2014 67 32 2015 66 33 2016 68.8 27.0 1.7 2.5 2017 67.7 13.8 17.4 0.7 0.4 2018 71 27 2019 73 26 2020 73.4 22.0 1.7 2.9 2021 78.3 18 1.1 2.6 03.2022 76 20 Source: compiled by the authors based on [13–15, 17, 18] The first thing that catches your eye is the gradual growth of the population, which considers the Ukrainian language native. This indicates that in 14 years a new generation has grown up in an independent state, where, despite all the tolerance towards the languages of national minorities, 2 Language and national identity as a foreword for ensuring national security 33 they consider the state language to be their mother tongue. Research conducted by the Razumkov Center in 2006–2007 showed that 30.7 % of Ukrainians speak russian as their mother tongue. And, although this indicator decreased to 25.7 % over the year, the number of those for whom both russian and Ukrainian are native languages has increased. A simple calculation shows that more than 5 % of those who considered russian as their native language began to doubt the priority of their native language, due to which the percentage of bilinguals increased. In the period 2014–2017, the percentage of respondents for whom Ukrainian is their native language has slight deviations in the range of 1–2.2 %. From 2017 to the present, there is a gradual but stable increase in indicators, the difference is approximately 8–10 % (deviations are due to information obtained from various sources). The results of a survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, together with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center, showed in 2021 that a young generation of 18–29 years old has indeed formed in Ukraine, for 83 % of whom Ukrainian is their native language. The older the respondents, the lower the percentage: 30–39 years old – 78.1 %; 40–49 years old – 80.7 % (the generation of the 90s, when there was the first surge in the formation of national identity, Ukraine gained independence); over 60 years old – 73.6 %, which is also a fairly high figure, given the Soviet restrictions and the persecution of Ukrainian-speaking citizens. We have the greatest fluctuations in the results in relation to respondents who recognize the russian language. Various sources give somewhat drastically different percentages, making it difficult to draw conclusions. Taking into account the figures for 2006 and 2021/22, the downward trend in russian speakers is noticeable – from 30.7 % in 2006 to 18–20 % in 2021/22. This is also observed in the results of the study of the Sociological Group Rating from 2012 to 2022. The percentage of those for whom russian is native in 2012 starts from almost half of the respondents 42 % and is halved in March 2022 to 20 %. The number of those who consider Ukrainian as their native language has also increased by almost 20 %. The indicators of bilingual Ukrainians, for whom both languages are native during 2006–2017, did not change significantly – 15.6 % and 17.4 %, respectively. Special attention should be paid to the indicator of respondents for whom it is difficult to determine which language is their native language. For a conscious citizen, the concept of language is obvious, because it is the language of the clan, the language with which knowledge of the world is connected from childhood, with which you think, with which you feel a spiritual connection, etc. The native language acts as a kind of chain that connects an individual with a group, community, unites the current generation with the past. That is, through the language the basic principles of world perception are formed, the attitude towards oneself as a member of the community, it forms the collective memory, etc. The percentage of such citizens in 2021 was 2.6 %. Losing this connection with the language, the identity of the individual, group and nation as a whole is gradually destroyed. «If the role of language as the main factor in the formation of identity is leveled, ethnic assimilation occurs: losing speech, the people cease to be psychologically aware of their identity, cultural identity and separateness and quantitatively replenish other, majority ethnic groups» [12]. Osnach, S. believes that such citizens, losing their speech, drift towards a decrease in patriotism [19]. Also, the author, using the example of the Crimean Tatars, Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 34 proves that language stamina is indeed the key to the viability of the people. A people who realize the value of language cherishes it much more than those who do not have such a powerful unifying factor. In the past few years, the vector of language policy in Ukraine has changed with the adoption of the Law of Ukraine «On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language» No. 2704-VIII dated April 25, 2019. This law had a significant impact on the distribution of priorities for language communication in various areas. Thus, in 2005 the Ukrainian language was not dominant in many areas: educational, scientific, professional, service sector, information space, etc. Moreover, internal documentation at the enterprises was partly conducted in russian, in particular, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the eastern regions. Knowledge of the Ukrainian language was required but not subject to any control, so the percentage of communication in Ukrainian and russian is almost the same with a slight advantage of russian 30.2 % and 31.7 % respectively. Only 10 % less is the indicator of bilingual speakers, where the speech of communication is determined by the circumstances, or by the language in which the interlocutor speaks. In 2020, the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking communication is growing by 27 %, while russian-speaking and bilingual communication are declining to 24.1 % and 16.2 % [20, 21]. We observe a similar thing in the domestic sphere (Table 2.3). Compared to 2011, in 2020 the Ukrainian language, as a priority in communication at home, increased by 8.5 %, respectively, the indicator of communication in russian decreased by 9 %. Surveys in March and May 2022 conducted by various companies paint an interesting and mixed picture. Thus, the sociological company Rating published information on the results of a survey of respondents over the course of 11 years, the indicators were fixed several times a year. Thus, according to their data, the percentage of russian speakers in everyday life has decreased by more than half: from 40 % to 18 %. At the same time, communication in Ukrainian did not grow so significantly, only by 4 %, but the use of two languages increased significantly from 15 % to 32 % [15].  Table 2.3 Results of a sociological study on the priority of the language of communication (2005–2022), % Question Year Ukrainian russian Ukrainian and russian (according to circumstances) Other languages Difficult to answer What language do you communicate at work? 2005 30.2 31.7 21.8 0.2 7.0 2017 48.7 9.4 23.6 0.1 0.3 2020 57.2 24.1 16.2 1.4 1 What language do you mostly speak at home? 2011 52.4 45.0 – 0.9 1.7 2016 55.4 41.3 – 1.4 1.9 2017 52 10.3 20.5 0.4 0.5 2020 60.9 36 – 1.4 1.6 03.2022 48 18 33 – – Source: compiled by the authors based on [12–16] 2 Language and national identity as a foreword for ensuring national security 35 Surveys conducted by the Gradus Research research company using the self-filling questionnaire method in a mobile application in May 2022 show that before the full-scale invasion, 41 % of respondents spoke Ukrainian and 58 % russian, respectively, 1 % another language, 3 %, 46 % respectively. The percentage of users in other languages is stable. At the same time, the percentage of those who continue to speak russian in everyday life is extremely high – 98 %. It should also be noted that this survey concerns, as the researchers note, the 4th wave of displaced persons, so it is dangerous to regard this indicator as objective [22]. The highest rate of bilingual communication is in March 2022 – 33 %. Polukhtovich, T. calls political processes one of the key factors in the formation of national identity at the present stage, when a significant part of Ukrainians felt the process of changing ideological, cultural, political identification [23]. This fact can be explained by russia’s full-scale invasion of the territory of sovereign Ukraine. Russian-speaking citizens actively began to refuse to communicate in russian, but knowledge of Ukrainian still does not allow to fully replace the language of communication, even at the household level. Ukrainian at home is mainly spoken by young people (18–29 years old) and the middle generation (36–50 years old) 86–87 %. As already noted, for several decades, scientists have been studying issues of national identity in Ukraine and even considering models that are acceptable for Ukrainian society, mainly based on survey data. So, Korostelina, K. identified 6 models of identity «double identity; pro-Soviet existence; struggle for Ukrainian identity; recognition of Ukrainian identity; multicultural civic model; and Crimean Tatars» [24], where the language plays an important role. 28 % of respondents, supporters of dual identity, believe that the russian language is under threat and should take the status of the second state language, while supporters of the 6th model (16 %) believe that the Ukrainian language is under threat, and should not be imposed. The goal of the Ukrainian language policy should not be a ban on russian or other languages of national minorities, but a competitive Ukrainian language in all areas, in particular, in cultural and information [12]. The phenomenon of identity cannot be called permanent; it changes under the influence of various factors, primarily socio-political, spiritual and cultural. The growth of the welfare of citizens leads to an increase in attention to cultural and spiritual heritage and values, on the basis of which the formation and interests take place, the vector of development of the nation as a whole is determined. The process of formation of national identity does not occur at an accelerated pace even under favorable conditions (socio-historical shifts) and «it cannot be easily or quickly instilled in the population using artificial means» [25]. Chupriy, L. believes that at present in Ukrainian society we can talk about three groups of identities that strive to become national: national-patriotic, pro-European identities, pro-russian identities [26], opposing each other and creating extraordinary social and political tension in Ukrainian society. The main threat is posed by those who have assimilated with another people up to identification with it. According to statistics, the role of language in this matter is leading, because «a foreign language has always been an instrument of assimilation, designed to blur, or better, forever erase the national self-identification of the conquered people, to promote its Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 36 self-identification with the invader people. The assimilated people no longer had the ambitions of their own state, and therefore, lost the motive for the struggle for independence and contributed to the development of another state» [27]. For a long time in Ukraine, the concept of «nationalism» had a negative connotation with an aggressive attitude towards representatives of another nation [28, 29], and therefore, to the question «What content do you put into the concept of «Ukrainian nationalism»?» in 2006, the Razumkov Center achieved stunning results. The majority of Ukrainians are still convinced that Ukrainian nationalism «is an ideology that splits society into ethnic Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians and provides for the restriction of the rights of non-Ukrainians» and only 27.3 % understand that this is «a worldview, the main idea of which – the transformation of Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living for citizens» [13]. It is noteworthy that in 10 years the situation is changing. The respondents were divided into three groups according to the language of communication: in Ukrainian, russian and two languages. So, Ukrainian-speakers are 29.7 % inclined to interpret nationalism as the ideology of a strong state, its development and strengthening, and among russian-speakers, 20.2 % more believe that this phenomenon is of a schismatic nature. For several decades, Ukrainians have not put issues of cultural, ethnic and national identity as a priority, and therefore their own understanding of the Ukrainian nation, for the most part, is not associated either with the language, or with national traditions, or with ethnicity – 43.1 % (2006); 38.8 % (2007), determining the citizenship of Ukraine. The process of identification («On what grounds should nationality be determined?») Ukrainians understand as innate, that is, what is determined by the ethnicity of the parent (39 % (2006); 47.4 % (2007)). The role of language is not a key one at all – 8.2 % (2006); 6.8 % (2007). The second city in terms of indicators is the free choice of each person – 25.6 % (2006); 23.3 % (2007), which by itself crosses out the essence of national identity as identification with a certain nation according to common characteristics, culture, values, etc. A clear evidence of how the language of communication affects the identification process is the indicators of 2016, where the highest percentage of identification with Ukrainians was demonstrated by Ukrainian speakers – 97 %, the percentage of bilinguals was 89 % and russian speakers – 66 %. 27 % of russian-speakers and 7 % of bilinguals consider themselves russians [14]. The factor of culture in general is no less important than language preferences and national identity. In 2006–2007 cultural identity gravitates toward Ukrainian 56.3 % (2006) and 57.9 % (2007). The second place is occupied by the Soviet cultural tradition, the pro-European one has only 6.6 % (2006), 6.4 % (2007) [16], which fully confirms the classification of identities by Chupriy, L. However, let us return to the actual processes of identification of the Ukrainian people. Throughout life, a person repeatedly asks himself the question «Who am I?» and at each stage the answer may be different. Why? Depending on what priorities and values are important at the moment, identification (identification) occurs within the age category, gender, social, ethnic, national, territorial, cultural, civil, etc. National identity is a complex process and has its own markers, on the basis of which there is a distinction between «one’s own»/«alien» and awareness of another self [30]: 2 Language and national identity as a foreword for ensuring national security 37 1) historical territory or native land; 2) general myths and historical memory; 3) general mass, public culture; 4) uniform legal rights and obligations for all members; 5) a common economy with the ability to move within the national territory. So, already in 2006, 31 % of Ukrainians admitted that they are not like any other nationality, but more than half – 54.2 % saw similarities with russians. In the study of identity, the answer to the question «Who are we?» is also important, to clarify the criteria of generality. According to the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the criteria for commonality are primarily citizenship 35.9 % (2013) and 52.3 % (2015); secondly, family ties 53.5 % (2013) and 52.9 % (2015); and thirdly, the age factor of 32.2 % (2013) and 30.7 % (2015); and territorial (residents of one city, village) 30.6 % (2013) and 27.8 % (2015). To study changes in society in recent years, let’s also take data from the Razumkov Center for August 2021. Figures are eloquent about what, according to Ukrainians, now unites people in Ukrainian society. So, if in 2002 the primary factor was faith in the future of 38.4 %, then in 2015 41.7 % are patriotic feelings of a citizen of Ukraine, and in 2021 optimism again becomes the dominant factor in uniting society – 35.7 %. Unfortunately, the language of communication in the period 2002–2015 reduces its importance as a unifying factor: 22.7 % (2002) and 7.5 % (2015), and in 2021 it doubles – 14.8 %. The indicator of general political views is growing only by 2015 (4.7 % (2002) and 13.9 % (2015)), which indicates the formation of a socio-political nation, and in 2021 it is already halving – 6.7 %. Dissatisfaction with the authorities is also reduced by 14 %. All this together suggests that by 2021 the peak of the formation of a socio-political nation has occurred (Table 2.4). Table 2.5 reflects the transformation of Ukrainian society from 2006 to 2021. Identification civil during a certain period occupies the first positions. Taking into account the fact that the data sample was made from different sources, the indicators are heterogeneous. So, the period from 2006 to 2016 is taken from one source and there is a gradual increase of 8.5 % over 10 years. In the future, the figures range from 57.2 to 74.9 % depending on the year. Of course, there are many factors influencing identification, and one of the most important are socio-political processes, legislative changes that directly affect the standard of living and self-awareness of the individual. In any case, public identity consistently dominates in Ukraine, which since 2014 has a percentage of more than 50 %. Local or regional identity occupies the second step in the hierarchy of Ukrainian identities. Geographically, Ukrainians identify themselves as residents of a certain village, city 27.7 % (2006), over the years the percentage decreases to 20.8 % in 2021, which indicates changes in the minds of Ukrainians. Interestingly, identification at the larger level of an area or region is well below the 6.6 % percentage (2006) and 1 percent less in 2021. In general, such figures give an understanding of why there is a high level of difference between the regions of Ukraine in all areas. The consolidating factor is citizenship, not ethnicity or nationality, so the fact of the development of a political (civil) nation in Ukraine is also obvious. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 38  Table 2.4 Results of a sociological study of the question «What unites people in Ukrainian society today?», % Answer options for questions Years 2002 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015 2021 Committed to overcoming life’s challenges together 24.1 22.8 22.7 24.0 22.7 35.3 22 Feeling the loss of normalcy 29.1 31.3 24.5 32.3 27.7 34.1 19.1 Faith in a better future 38.4 39.4 43.0 31.2 30.6 35.4 35.7 Joint hardships of life 34.9 40.4 35.6 37.7 33.4 29.3 29.5 Family and social feelings 27.9 25.8 35.9 35.2 23.5 23.9 26.9 Dissatisfaction with the authorities 28.5 39.6 29.5 40.6 34.1 36.3 22.3 Fear of the future 28.9 28.7 19.6 30.4 25.2 21.8 14.9 The language of communication 22.7 22.8 20.7 14.7 10.0 7.5 14.8 Patriotic feelings of a citizen of Ukraine 9.0 9.4 12.1 8.7 8.3 41.7 25.5 Political views 4.7 7.7 12.3 9.3 8.2 13.9 6.7 Religion (religion) 11.8 16.0 19.3 11.9 10.5 10.1 12.0 Nationality 9.9 11.4 13.1 11.6 7.4 12.2 14.0 Other 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 1.4 Nothing unites 4.2 3.3 3.8 7.5 8.1 3.7 8.3 Difficult to answer 10.0 6.7 6.7 5.7 8.3 1.8 4.9 Source: compiled by the authors based on [29, 31]  Table 2.5 Results of a sociological study of the question «Who do you consider yourself?», % Respondents’ answers Years 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 Resident of the village, district or city where you live 27.7 24.5 27.3 29.8 28.7 16.1 23.0 22.1 24.7 – – 20.8 Resident of the region (region or several regions) where you live 6.6 9.3 6.6 7.6 7.9 8.0 6.4 6.9 6.2 18.2 15.6 5.6 Citizen of Ukraine 51.6 51.8 51.3 48.4 50.7 64.6 57.5 60.1 57.2 67.2 74.9 62.6 Representative of their ethnic group, nation 1.8 2.6 3.1 1.8 2.0 2.1 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.2 2.6 2.7 Citizen of the former Soviet Union 7.3 9.0 6.9 8.4 6.6 5.5 3.9 3.9 3.2 2.2 2.7 2.8 European citizen 1.3 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.9 Citizen of the world 2.9 1.7 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.1 4.2 2.6 3.3 1.0 1.5 3.1 Other 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 – 0.1 1.6 Source: compiled by the authors based on [18, 30, 32, 33] 2 Language and national identity as a foreword for ensuring national security 39 It is also possible to feel the gap in identification with Soviet culture and ideology. So, in 2006, 7.3 % of citizens experienced their belonging to a country that no longer exists, and already in 2021 – only 2.8 %. This indicates that the generation of the «Soviet Union» has undergone a significant transformation of consciousness towards the formation of a civil one. In terms of age, the figures on Soviet identity seem even more interesting: in particular, in 2017 we observe that the older the respondents, the higher the percentage of supporters (18–29 years old – 2.8 %, and among those over 60 years old – 18.7 %). However, at the time of the collapse of the USSR, only a small number of three-year-old children could have memories of life in the USSR, respectively, the identification of this age category should be much lower, because this is a conscious identification of oneself with representatives of a certain group, their cultural traditions, history, etc. The percentage of those who consider themselves a citizen of the world has hardly changed – since 2006 it has increased by only 0.2 %. Of course, the influence of European culture in the last two decades has also affected the process of identification, but the growth in the number of people who identify themselves as European citizens has decreased by 0.4 %. All this indicates that Ukrainians are increasingly aware of their strength compared to the first years of independence. Now let’s compare how the language of communication affects national identity (Table 2.6). Identifying themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian nationality, Ukrainians do not always choose Ukrainian for the main language of communication. In 2005, out of 78.8 % of respondents who identify themselves as Ukrainians, only 30.2 % communicate in Ukrainian during working hours. Accordingly, the remaining 48.6 % are either in russian or in two, depending on the situation. In 2017, it is possible to correlate two parameters – the language of communication at work and in everyday life of ethnic Ukrainians, especially since over 12 years the number of ethnic Ukrainians has increased by 13.2 %. The general trend remains similar: 48.7 % communicate in Ukrainian with 92 % at work and 52 % at home, in russian, respectively, 9.4 % at work and 10.3 % at home. The growth of ethnic Ukrainians and the number of those who began to speak Ukrainian in the period of 2005–2022 by almost 20 % is a positive indicator of the formation of a conscious nation. The number of ethnic russians also decreased significantly from 18.1 % to 5 %, while representatives of other nationalities decreased by 0.1 %.  Table 2.6 Results of a sociological study of the national identity of Ukrainians, % Nationality Years 2005 2006 2015 2017 2022 Ukrainian 78.8 77.2 86.3 92.0 98 russian 18.1 18.3 8.9 6.0 5 other nationality 3.1 – 2.8 1.5 3 didn’t answer – 1.3 2 0.6 – Source: compiled by the authors based on [34, 35] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 40 Identifying themselves as Ukrainians in Ukrainian society, unfortunately, they still do not fully understand this concept. Identification occurs at different levels, but partly superficial, external. Over the past few years, there have been more people on the streets who openly demonstrate their identity with Ukrainian culture – they wear vyshyvanka, stylize other elements of national clothing, demonstrate the national emblem, the trident in jewelry and on the body. However, all this is not evidence of a conscious identification of oneself with representatives of a certain nation without a language factor, because speech is an internal core around which national interests and values in the state should develop [36]. In recent years, there has been a clear trend towards a decrease in the level of influence of russian culture on the formation of the political Ukrainian nation. With the start of russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the criteria for the division into «friends» and «foes» became clearer: 12 % of respondents in May 2022 recognize the language problem as serious, that is, posing a threat to Ukraine’s national security. However, for 67 % of the problem still does not exist [15]. A significant part of the assimilated Ukrainians do not realize that the most important criterion in the distribution of «us»/«alien» should not be a superficial recognition of cultural values in national symbols, but the Ukrainian language. Language is a key factor that forms the basis for identification with a particular nation of an individual, affects the security of the nation as a whole. It has been proven that identification with the Ukrainian nation depends entirely on the level of proficiency, use and knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The regions where the indicator was the lowest gave an erroneous identification, that is, a reason for the neighboring state to consider russian-speaking representatives of the russian ethnic group. Three months of full-scale invasion prompted russian-speaking Ukrainians to switch to Ukrainian. And even though this percentage is not high yet, it is evidence that a conscious society is being formed in Ukraine, a nation that identifies itself with one ethnic group has a common territory, national interests and values – everything that is «different» that distinguishes us from a neighbor. The preservation of the language, its development and the return of the proper Ukrainian vocabulary is the key to the safe development of the nation and the state as a whole. References 1. Hnatenko, P. I. (2000). Natsionalna psykholohiia. Dnipropetrovsk: Polihrafist, 213. 2. Pavlenko, D. G., Semenyuk, Yu. V., Lysetsyi, Yu. M. (2021). National security: concept, elements, influencing factors. Scientific Notes of Taurida V.I. Vernadsky University», Series «Public Administration, 3, 102–107. doi: https://doi.org/10.32838/tnu-2663-6468/2021.3/17 3. Busel, V. T. (Ed.) (2005). Velykyi tlumachnyi slovnyk suchasnoi ukrainskoi movy. Kyiv; Irpin: VTF «Perun», 1728. 4. Identychnist hromadian Ukrainy v novykh umovakh: stan, tendentsii, regionalni osoblyvosti (2016). Informatsiino-analitychni materialy. Tsentr Razumkova. Available at: http://www. razumkov.org.ua/upload/Identi-2016.pdf 3 Economic component of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine 47 of the country’s economic security: The Global Competitiveness Index; Index of Economic Freedom; The Global Enabling Trade Index; The Sustainable Society Index; KOF Index of Globalization; Human Development Index; World Happiness; Doing Business; The Worldwide Governance Indicators; The Democracy Index; Corruption Perceptions Index, etc. The disadvantage of this approach is the pre sence of «similar» indicators (calculated from the same initial data), in order to prevent such multicollinearity, the team of authors [13] carried out a correlation analysis of the selected indicators: only those indicators were selected, the correlation coefficient between which does not exceed 0.7, because correlation coefficient greater than 0.7, the relationship between the indicators on the Chaddock scale can be assessed as high [13]. According to the information published on the website European Statistics (Eurostat) [14], it can be concluded that economic security is assessed precisely from the point of view of ensuring the quality of life of the population of the EU countries. In the section «Economic Security» there are 3 indicators: – labour transitions by employment status (Wealth); – arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase) from 2003 onwards (Debt); – inability to face unexpected financial expenses (Income Security). So, the practical part of the presented study of the country’s economic security will be based on the approaches discussed above: Labor transitions by employment status, Arrears from 2003 onwards, Inability to face unexpected financial expenses (EU countries); The Global Competitiveness Index (EU countries, Ukraine); integral indicator of the level of economic security (Ukraine). 3.2 Methodological tools for the study of economic security An analysis of theoretical sources of approaches to assessing the level of economic security of the national economy led to the conclusion that, in general, models for assessing the level of economic security have additive or multiplicative forms, and qualitative and quantitative methods are used to assess the economic security of systems at different levels of the hierarchy [5]. However, despite the fact that qualitative methods are widely used to analyze economic security, their application will bring the greatest effect only in combination with quantitative methods. To assess the level of economic security of economic systems of different levels of the hierarchy, the following approaches are mainly used: 1. Formation of an integral indicator of the level of economic security and assessment. 2. Estimation of economic growth rates and dynamics of their change. 3. Methods of peer review, which serve to describe the quantitative and qualitative features of the studied actions. 4. Monitoring of the main socio-economic indicators and their comparison with the limit values. 5. Formation of generalizing characteristics. 6. Study of the impact of threats. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 48 As noted above, the economic security of a system at any level of the hierarchy is characterized by a significant number of indicators that complicate its analysis and assessment. In order to fully take into account the impact of all indicators involved in the study, without significant loss of information, it is advisable to use the procedures of multivariate statistical analysis to assess the level of economic security. At the stage of formation of an integral indicator of economic security, we propose to apply the taxonomy method, which has positively characterized itself in previous studies [15]. The main purpose of using the taxonomy method is to build a generalized assessment of a complex object or process. The taxonomic indicator is calculated according to the classical taxonomic analysis algorithm, which contains the following steps: – formation of a matrix of observations; – standardization of the values of the elements of the matrix of observations; – identification of the reference vector; – determination of the distance between individual observations and the reference vector; – calculation of the taxonomic coefficient of development. The taxonomy method can be started from the stage of determining the reference vector; for stimulants, the maximum value of the standardized indicator; for destimulators – the minimum value. The distance between individual observations and the reference vector (Ci0) is calculated by the formula: CZ Z iijj i m 00 2 1 =− () = ∑ . (5.1) The taxonomic coefficient of economic security (Ki) is calculated according to the scheme shown in Fig. 3.2.  Fig. 3.2 Scheme for calculating the taxonomic coefficient of economic security (Ki) Average distance: Standard deviation: Total distance between the indicator and the standard: Taxonomic indicator of the coefficient of economic security: Deviation of indicators of the i-th year from the standard: = =∑ 0 0 1 1m i i C C m ( ) = − ∑ 2 0 0 0 1 i S C C m ( ) = + 0 0 0 2C C S = −1 i i K d =0 0 i i C d C 3 Economic component of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine 49 The integral indicator of economic security for different options ranges from 0 to 1, therefore, such characteristics of the level of economic security are proposed that meet the criteria approved in [10] (Table 3.2).  Table 3.2 Characteristics of the economic security of the regions according to the integral indicator Itax Scale State 0–0.2 critical level of economic security 0.2–0.4 dangerous level of economic security 0.4–0.6 unsatisfactory level of security 0.6–0.8 satisfactory level of security 0.8–1 optimal level of economic security The practical application of multidimensional statistical methods for studying the economic security of regions is carried out using the appropriate modules of the STATISTICA 10.0 software product. The algorithm for studying the economic security of the EU countries and Ukraine consists of the following stages: analysis of the integral indicator of the level of economic security of Ukraine, calculated according to [10]; assessment of the level of economic security of the EU countries according to the taxonomic indicator; analysis of The Global Competitiveness Index of Ukraine and EU countries; construction of profiles of economic security of research objects. 3.3 Study of the economic indicators of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine before the war The state of development of the Ukrainian economy over the past decade did not allow ensuring national economic interests. During 2012–2020, the state of economic security was assessed as unsatisfactory, approaching a dangerous level (Fig. 3.3). According to the calculations of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, carried out in accordance with the Methodological recommendations for calculating the level of economic security of Ukraine [10], the average value of the level of economic security for this period was 46 percent – an unsatisfactory level of economic security. The economic security of the 27 EU countries will be assessed according to Labour transitions by employment status (LTES); Arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase) from 2003 onwards (А); Inability to face unexpected financial expenses (IFUFE) for the period 2012–2020, some of the information is presented in Table 3.3. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 50  Fig. 3.3 Dynamics of the integral indicator of the level of economic security of Ukraine, calculated for [10], 2012–2020 47 48 45 48 48 49 41 R2=0.6924 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Danger level Unsatisfactory level 44 43 The level of economic security Year It should be noted that the presented indicators are destimulators, i.e. the lower the indicator value, the better the score; therefore should strive to reduce. According to the EU as a whole, the value of Labor transitions by employment status (Transition to unemployment) during 2020 increased by 28 % to 3.2 %. The lowest value was recorded during the period 2018–2020 Romania (0.02 – 2020), the highest value – Spain (7.8 – 2020, which is 39 % higher than the value of the previous period) (Fig. 3.4). The value of Arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchases) from 2003 onwards in the EU as a whole by the end of 2020 is 8.8 %, during the entire study period it significantly exceeds the average value of Greece (Amax = 36.9 %, which is less than the value of the previous year by 4.5 percentage points); the lowest value is recorded by Czechia (2020 – 3 %). Consequently, there is a significant range between the minimum and maximum values (Δ2018 = 40 percentage points, Δ2019 = 38.6 percentage points, Δ2020 = 33.9 percentage points), which indicates the existence of regional disparities in terms of the state of economic security and the quality of life of the population of the EU countries. As of the end of 2020, the Inability to face unexpected financial expenses value for the EU as a whole is 32.5 %, which is 2.5 percentage points higher than the value of the previous year. The lowest value of the indicator among the EU countries was recorded in Malta (2020 – 16.3 %, which is 1.2 points more than in 2019); the highest value is observed in the following countries: 2018 – Latvia (55.3 %), 2019 – Croatia (51.7 %), 2020 – Greece (50.7 %). That is, certain improvements in the situation can be witnessed, as evidenced by the decrease in disproportions between the EU countries (Δ2018 = 41.4 percentage points, Δ2019 = 36.6 percentage points, Δ2020 = 34.4 percentage points). To assess the economic security of the EU countries, taking into account the values of all three indicators using the taxonomy method (Fig. 3.4), the taxonomy coefficient was calculated – an integral indicator of the economic security of the EU countries (Table 3.4). 3 Economic component of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine 51  Table 3.3 Indicators of economic security of EU countries, 2018–2020 Labour transitions by employment status Arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase) from 2003 onwards Inability to face unexpected financial expenses 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 European Union – 27 countries 2.5 2.5 3.2 8.9 8.2 8.8 32.2 30.9 32.5 Austria 2.8 3.3 4.2 4.9 4.3 5.3 20.1 18.5 17.6 Belgium 1.4 1.5 2.1 6.1 5.5 5.6 24.5 25.3 23.3 Bulgaria 3.3 2.7 4.0 31.9 29.3 23.6 32.1 36.5 43.5 Croatia 3.7 3.2 5.5 18.6 15.7 14.2 52.9 51.7 48.9 Cyprus 3.7 3.8 4.6 21.6 17.6 14.7 49.5 47.5 44.6 Czech Republic 1.2 1.1 1.2 3.0 2.8 3.0 23.7 21.8 19.6 Denmark 2.7 2.6 3.5 8.7 7.3 7.7 25.2 22.9 22.7 Estonia 2.4 2.3 4.0 8.0 8.5 6.0 34.7 31.4 30.5 Finland 2.6 2.5 2.3 10.7 10.5 10.0 27.2 26.4 25.4 France 3.1 3.3 3.6 9.1 8.4 8.9 31.4 30.6 30.4 Germany 1.0 1.4 1.3 4.6 3.7 5.2 28.1 26.0 37.7 Greece 4.7 4.3 5.3 43.0 41.4 36.9 50.4 47.8 50.7 Hungary 2.0 2.4 2.2 12.8 11.2 11.6 33.3 33.0 35.7 Ireland 1.8 2.7 2.6 11.2 11.9 13.9 37.3 38.0 33.7 Italy 3.0 2.4 3.5 6.0 5.9 6.8 35.1 33.8 32.3 Latvia 4.2 4.2 5.8 13.8 9.9 9.7 55.3 49.8 45.6 Lithuania 3.4 3.3 4.0 10.3 8.2 7.1 48.8 46.8 41.8 Luxembourg 2.3 2.3 2.7 – – 4.9 19.7 16.7 22.5 Malta 0.3 0.5 1.2 8.1 7.8 7.0 13.9 15.1 16.3 Netherlands 1.5 1.5 1.8 3.8 4.0 3.2 21.5 21.9 19.1 Poland 1.9 1.6 2.5 7.7 7.4 5.5 31.7 29.3 25.7 Portugal 3.3 3.2 6.0 6.6 5.8 5.4 34.7 33.0 30.8 Romania 0.1 0.1 0.2 16.5 15.4 14.8 45.9 44.3 47.3 Slovakia – 1.1 1.7 9.9 10.2 6.7 31.5 30.0 26.1 Slovenia 2.8 2.2 2.7 13.6 12.2 10.3 33.1 33.0 29.6 Spain 6.2 5.6 7.8 9.4 8.1 13.5 35.9 33.9 35.4 Sweden 1.1 1.8 2.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 20.2 20.5 19.8 Source: compiled by the authors based on data [14] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 52  Fig. 3.4 Dynamics of economic security indicators LTES, A, IFUFE: EU, min, max 2.5 2.5 LTES(EU); 3.2 8.9 8.2 A(EU); 8.8 32.2 30.9 IFUFE(EU); 32.5 0.1 LTESmin; 0.2 6.2 5.6 LTESmax; 7.8 3.0 Amin; 3.0 43.0 41.4 Amax; 36.9 13.9 IFUFEmin; 16.3 55.3 51.7 IFUFEmax; 50.7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2018 2019 2020 IFUFE LTES, A Year  Table 3.4 Dynamics of the taxonomic indicator of the economic security of the EU countries (calculated according to the indicators LTES, A, IFUFE), 2012–2020 EU countries 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2020/2018 2020/2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Austria 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.88 103.7 % 94 % Belgium 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.81 106.1 % 90 % Bulgaria 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.28 0.21 0.16 58.7 % 151 % Croatia 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.15 134.3 % 116 % Cyprus 0.34 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.25 163.9 % 72 % Czech Republic 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.84 0.92 115.6 % 141 % Denmark 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.91 0.81 0.73 0.78 0.79 108.6 % 91 % Estonia 0.58 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.76 0.59 0.55 0.60 0.63 116.0 % 108 % Finland 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.70 0.67 0.68 0.72 106.5 % 85 % France 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.70 0.60 0.61 0.62 102.3 % 80 % Germany 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.47 68.0 % 60 % Greece 0.35 0.20 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 – 0 % Hungary 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.34 0.61 0.54 0.54 0.48 88.9 % 950 % Ireland 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.43 0.50 104.1 % 142 % Italy 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.59 108.5 % 96 % Latvia 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.25 271.3 % 325 % Lithuania 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.32 0.24 0.26 0.36 148.2 % 107 % Luxembourg 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.77 0.81 0.83 107.7 % 90 % Malta 0.87 0.87 0.81 0.88 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.90 100.8 % 104 % 3 Economic component of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine 53 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Netherlands 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.92 110.2 % 95 % Poland 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.76 124.0 % 176 % Portugal 0.71 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.61 111.8 % 86 % Romania 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.19 71.2 % 64 % Slovakia 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.74 124.1 % 100 % Slovenia 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.62 117.0 % 123 % Spain 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.44 87.3 % 72 % Sweden 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.89 102.8 % 94 % AVERAGE 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.57 106.7 % 99 % Max 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.92 103.2 % 95 % Min 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 – 0 % The data in Table 3.4 indicate the presence of disproportions between countries regarding the state of economic security, which is defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum values. The worst state of economic security among the EU countries at the end of 2020 was recorded in Greece (0 points), deterioration has been observed since 2015 and is characterized as a critical level of economic security (Fig. 3.5). According to 2020 data, in addition to Greece, such countries as Croatia (0.15), Bulgaria (0.16), Romania (0.19) are also characterized by a critical state of economic security. The dangerous level of economic security is defined in the following countries: Cyprus (0.25), Latvia (0.25), Lithuania (0.36), in addition, in 2018 Cyprus and Latvia improved their results. Despite the fact that Lithuania also belonged to this group of economic security in 2018, however, there is a significant improvement in the indicator, which approaches the threshold value of the unsatisfactory state of economic security (0.4). The group of countries with an unsatisfactory state of economic security includes: Spain (0.44), Hungary (0.48), Ireland (0.50), Italy (0.59); but if Ireland and Italy improved the value of the integral indicator by the end of 2020, then in Spain and Hungary they are deteriorating. According to the results of 2020, Germany joined this group, the integral indicator of which deteriorated significantly (0.47 – 2020, 0.7 – 2018). In relation to 2018, in 2020 such countries as Slovenia (0.53 – 2018 0.62 – 2020), Estonia (0.55 – 2018, 0.72 – 2020), Portugal (0.55 – 2018, 0.61 – 2020), Slovakia (0.598 – 2018, 0.74 – 2020). In addition, France (0.62), Finland (0.72), Poland (0.76), Denmark (0.79) during 2018–2020 are also characterized by a satisfactory state of economic security with a positive trend towards an increase in the integral indicator. Consequently, as of the end of 2020, 15 EU countries (56 %) are characterized by an optimal or satisfactory state of economic security, most countries have an integral indicator value above its average (Fig. 3.5).  Continuation of Table 3.4 Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 54  Fig. 3.5 Transition between economic security states of EU countries, 2018/2020 (where Greece – the state of economic security has not changed; Latvia – improvement in the state of economic security, transition to a higher level; Bulgaria – deterioration in the state of economic security, transition to a lower level) Optimal security level Satisfactory security level Unsatisfactory security level Dangerous security level Critical security level 2020 2018 (before COVID-19) Netherlands (0.84), Austria (0.85), Sweden (0.86), Malta (0.89) Belgium (0.81), Luxembourg (0.83), Austria (0.88), Sweden (0.89), Malta (0.90), Czechia (0.92), Netherlands (0.92) Ireland (0.48), Spain (0.50), Slovenia (0.53), Hungary (0.54), Italy (0.54), Estonia (0.55), Portugal (0.55), Slovakia (0.598) Spain (0.44), Germany (0.47), Hungary (0.48), Ireland (0.50), Italy (0.59) Lithuania (0.24), Romania (0.27), Bulgaria (0.28) Cyprus (0.25), Latvia (0.25), Lithuania (0.36) Greece (0.00), Latvia (0.09), Croatia (0.11), Cyprus (0.15) Greece (0.00), Croatia (0.15), Bulgaria (0.16), Romania (0.19) France (0.604), Poland (0.61), Finland (0.67), Germany (0.70), Denmark (0.73), Belgium (0.77), Luxembourg (0.77), Czechia (0.79) Portugal (0.61), France (0.62), Slovenia (0.62), Estonia (0.63), Finland (0.72), Slovakia (0.74), Poland (0.76), Denmark (0.79) The next stage of the study of economic security, we determined the assessment of the level of economic security of the EU countries and Ukraine in terms of The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which will give us the opportunity to compare the EU countries and Ukraine. The dynamics of The Global Competitiveness Index and the rating of the EU countries and Ukraine for 2017–2019 are presented in Fig. 3.6. 55  Fig. 3.6 The Global Competitiveness Index of EU countries and Ukraine: a – 2017; b – 2018; c – 2019. Source: built according to [16] Austria; 76.15 Belgium; 76.57 Bulgaria; 62.38 Cyprus; 64.70 Czech Republic; 70.90 Germany; 82.64 Denmark; 79.93 Spain; 73.75 Estonia; 70.77 Finland; 79.77 France; 77.40 Greece; 61.80 Croatia; 60.13 Hungary; 63.43 Ireland; 75.96 Italy; 70.46 Lithuania; 66.43 Luxembourg; 76.04 Latvia; 64.80 Malta; 68.44 Netherlands; 82.22 Poland; 67.92 Portugal; 69.67 Romania; 62.18 Slovak Republic; 66.28 Slovenia; 68.48 Sweden; 81.58 Ukraine; 53.92 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 70.0 75.0 80.0 85.0 AVERAGE(EU)=71.1 AVERAGE(EU)=71.6 Austria; 76.34 Belgium; 76.61 Bulgaria; 63.56 Cyprus; 65.57 Czech Republic; 71.18 Germany; 82.84 Denmark; 80.62 Spain; 74.20 Estonia; 70.75 Finland; 80.26 France; 78.01 Greece; 62.10 Croatia; 60.11 Hungary; 64.31 Ireland; 75.68 Italy; 70.77 Lithuania; 67.12 Luxembourg; 76.63 Latvia; 66.25 Malta; 68.75 Netherlands; 82.38 Poland; 68.18 Portugal; 70.20 Romania; 63.46 Slovak Republic; 66.84 Slovenia; 69.62 Sweden; 81.66 Ukraine; 57.03 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 70.0 75.0 80.0 85.0 a b AVERAGE(EU)=72 Austria; 76.61 Belgium; 76.38 Bulgaria; 64.90 Cyprus; 66.39 Czech Republic; 70.85 Germany; 81.80 Denmark; 81.17 Spain; 75.28 Estonia; 70.91 Finland; 80.25 France; 78.81 Greece; 62.58 Croatia; 61.94 Hungary; 65.08 Ireland; 75.12 Italy; 71.53 Lithuania; 68.36 Luxembourg; 77.03 Latvia; 66.98 Malta; 68.55 Netherlands; 82.39 Poland; 68.89 Portugal; 70.45 Romania; 64.36 Slovak Republic; 66.77 Slovenia; 70.20 Sweden; 81.25 Ukraine; 56.99 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 70.0 75.0 80.0 85.0 c Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 56 Average GCI values according to EU countries for the period 2017–2019 are respectively: 71.1; 71.6; 72. At the end of 2018 and 2019, the lowest GCI value was recorded in Croatia (60.11; 61.94), the highest in the Netherlands (82.93) in 2019 and Germany (82.84) in 2018. According to the results of 2019, 16 EU countries have a GCI value below its average (72): Italy (71.53), Estonia (70.91), Czech Republic (70.85), Portugal (70.45), Slovenia (70.20), Poland (68.89), Malta (68.55), Lithuania (68.35), Latvia (66.98), Slovakia (66.77), Cyprus (66.39), Hungary (65.08), Bulgaria (64.90), Rumania (64.36), Greece (62.58), Croatia (61.94). The data in Fig. 3.6 indicate that the level of GCI value of Ukraine for the period 2017–2019 significantly less than its average values according to the data of the EU countries, this is also evidenced by Fig. 3.7, 3.8.  Fig. 3.7 «GCI-Integral indicator of economic security» map Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Ukraine 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 Integral indicator ofeconomic security GCI  Fig. 3.8 Economic security profiles of EU countries and Ukraine, 2019 Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Ukraine 3 Economic component of the security of the EU countries and Ukraine 63 References 1. 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Pidsumky roboty HMK Ukrainy za 12 misiatsiv 2021 r. (2022). Ukrmetalurhprom. Available at: https://www.ukrmetprom.org/pidsumki-roboti-gmk-ukraini-za-12-misyaci/ Last accessed: 05.06.2022 26. Operatyvni pokaznyky roboty HMK Ukrainy u I kvartali 2022 r. Ukrmetalurhprom. Available at: https://www.ukrmetprom.org/operativni-pokazniki-roboti-gmk-ukra-37/ Last accessed: 05.06.2022 27. Analityka saitu gmk.center. Available at: https://gmk.center/ua/analitycs/ Last accessed: 05.06.2022 65 DOI: 10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6.ch4 Tetiana Kozhukhova, Kateryna Khavrova, Lyubov Shevchenko, Yuliia Lyzhnyk 4The global aspect of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development Abstract The object of the study is the process of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development at the global level. Research methods are based on general scientific principles and fundamental provisions of economic theory, theory of finance, international finance, financial security, the works of leading Ukrainian and foreign scientists. The dialectical method of scientific knowledge, the methods of scientific abstraction, analysis and synthesis (to study the theoretical foundations for solving problems of financial security), systemic generalization (to systematize the categorical apparatus of the study of ensuring financial security of sustainable development at the global level, improve the classification of international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development, determination of measures to ensure the financial security of sustainable development at different levels of management). The classification of international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development has been improved by including such features as: forms of existence, ownership, sources of formation, directions of use, period of use, level of use. The configuration of the global security of sustainable development is justified as a set of elements: subjects, objects, principles and levers of control. Measures to ensure the financial security of sustainable development at different levels of management have been identified. KEYWORDS Global financial security of sustainable development, global system of financing for sustainable development, structural elements of financial security of sustainable development, factors of financial security of sustainable development. 4.1 Essence and components of the global system of financial security of sustainable development In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the final document on the development agenda «Transforming Our World: Agenda for Sustainable Development until 2030» [1], the purpose of which was to eliminate poverty and hunger, ensure sustainable development in its three components through promoting inclusive economic growth, protecting the environment and promoting social inclusion. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 66 Achieving sustainable development depends on the state of economic, socio-cultural, environmental, technological security of countries. The state of financial security as one of the components of economic security is the most important factor in ensuring the implementation of sustainable development goals through the need to meet urgent financing needs, the efficient use of financial resources, the prevention of financial threats in the field of socio-economic development and environmental protection. The global program for financing activities to achieve sustainable development after 2015, aimed at strengthening efforts to mobilize and effectively use financial resources in the field of sustainable development, was determined by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Confe rence on Financing for Development [2]. Along with this, the achievement of sustainable development goals requires not only significant national and international financial support, but also ensuring the sustainability of the global sustainable development financing system against negative impacts. Despite taking into account the risks of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the strengthening of the global financial security net, the creation of new coordination mechanisms and the initiated regulatory reforms, according to The Inter-Agency, the non-financial corporate sector is growing, and international capital flows continue to be very unstable [3]. The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically set back progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and has affected all aspects of financial development. As the UN Secretary-General noted, the world economy is experiencing the worst recession in 90 years, which disproportionately affects the most vulnerable: from 80 to 90 million people are pushed into extreme poverty, 114 million jobs are lost, tax revenues are reduced, foreign direct investment, trade, and remittances, along with rising debt levels, debt vulnerabilities have increased [4]. The global economic outlook remains fragile: in early 2022, the United Nations (UN) predicted that the global economic growth rate, after rising by 5.5 % in 2021, will decrease to 4.0 % in 2022 [5]. Increased global financial instability due to the deregulation of financial markets, labor markets, goods and services, which as a result led to the accumulation of large global imbalances in the world economy (exacerbation of balance of payments problems, an increase in the burden of external debt) that are incompatible with the Sustainable Development Goals [6], the socioeconomic crisis caused by COVID-19, russian aggression against Ukraine has threatened the timely implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Among the priorities identified by the UN in 2022, in addition to fighting the pandemic, overcoming the climate crisis, ensuring peace, there is also the reform of the global financial system, in particular, strengthening financial security [7]. Given the global nature of the above problems affecting the financial system as a whole, as well as the fact that financial security is the state of the financial system, which creates the necessary conditions for stable development, the study of global financial security of sustainable development is one of the pressing issues. The works of many scientists are devoted to the study of problematic issues of financial security at the macro and micro levels. The issue of ensuring the security of international finance 4 The global aspect of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development 67 was considered by Anthony N. Odiadi [8], the origin of the instability inherent in international capital flows, the need to maintain orderliness of the market by government agencies was substantiated by Valpy FitzGerald [9], the relationship between finance and security was studied by Marieke de Goede [10]. Briginets, A. [11], Getmanets, A. [12] paid attention to the issues of legal support of financial security. The works of Dmitriev, E. [13] are devoted to the issues of financial security in the context of globalization. The most significant from the perspective of considering the problem of ensuring financial security at the global level are the works of Ruyu Han to determine the general relationship between financial internationalization and financial security [14], Nina Boy, J. Peter Burgess, Anna Leander to study issues of global security and financial management [15], Nurymova Saule, Yessentay Aigerim to identify threats to the financial security of the national economies of countries during the financial crisis [16]. A detailed analysis of the essence of the global financial security net was carried out by Beatrice Scheubel, Livio Stracca, C é dric Tille [17–19], the issues of expanding the global financial security net in response to COVID-19 were studied by Kevin P. Gallagher, Haihong Gao, William N. Kring, Jos é A. Ocampo, Ulrich Volz [20]. Along with this, given the growing global financial instability and other factors that threaten the timely implementation of the sustainable development agenda, it is necessary to pay special attention to issues related to the financial security of sustainable development in the global aspect. The conceptual apparatus of financial theory and practice, international finance contains a large number of terms, regarding the interpretation of which there is no single point of view among scientists. Therefore, the problem of financial security of sustainable development requires clarification of the content of the concepts used. Starting with a consideration of the general concept of «security», it should be noted that from the point of view of the system approach, security means a property of a system that ensures its stable functioning and development in the face of various types of external and internal threats, that is, this is such a property of the system that can be reduced to minimum, and at best, completely get rid of the negative impact of destabilizing factors of various nature; the conditions in which a complex system is located, when the action of external factors and internal factors does not lead to processes that are considered negative in relation to this complex system in accordance with the needs, knowledge and ideas available at this stage [21]; the state of the system in which it retains its integrity, stability (stability), the ability to function effectively and sustainable development, and on their basis – the possibility of reliable protection of all its elements (subsystems, spheres, objects) from any destructive internal and external actions [22]. Financial security, as you know, is an integral part of economic security and, in turn, has a complex system containing several subsystems (structural elements). In dictionaries, the term «financial security» is defined as the state of the financial, monetary, currency, banking, tax systems, characterized by balance, resistance to internal and external negative influences, the ability to ensure the effective functioning of the economic system and economic growth [21, 22]. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 68 Scientists, considering the structural elements of financial security on a functional basis, distinguish them in different ways, but all of them, of course, relate to the elements of financial security of sustainable development, their generalized characteristics are presented in Table 4.1.  Table 4.1 Elements of financial security for sustainable development Element of financial security Characteristics of the element of financial security Budget Security The level of the state’s budgetary capacity to fulfill all its functions and tasks is drawn up taking into account the balance of all income and expenses, in compliance with the principles of expediency, legality and efficiency in the use of budgetary funds, the level of external and internal debt burden does not threaten either the financial system of the state or its sovereignty Monetary security The state of the monetary system, characterized by the stability of the monetary unit, the availability of credit resources and the level of inflation, which ensures economic growth and an increase in real incomes of the population Currency Security The stability of the national currency, the degree to which the state is provided with foreign exchange funds sufficient to maintain the exchange rate of the national currency, which creates optimal conditions for expanded reproduction and economic growth Banking security The level of financial stability and the state of the resources of the banking system, which allows avoiding risks and threats, contributes to the sustainable development of both the banking system and the national economy Security of the non-banking financial sector The size of capitalization allows to ensure the balanced development of the elements of the economic system and the stable state of all participants (issuers, owners, buyers, traders, intermediaries (brokers), registrars, depositories, custodians, the state, etc.) Tax security The state of the effectiveness of the tax policy pursued by the state. An effective tax policy should reasonably combine the interests of the state (primarily in filling the budgets of all levels) and the interests of taxpayers. The appropriate level of tax security of the state is such a level at which the state receives a sufficient amount of tax revenues to implement all the functions assigned to it Debt security The state of the state’s internal and external debt is sufficient to solve urgent socio-economic needs and only slightly affects the stability of the state’s financial system to internal and external threats. An adequate level of debt security of the state allows to ensure a certain level of relative independence of the state, maintaining an appropriate level of solvency and credit rating Investment security The state of achieving the investment level, which makes it possible to meet the current and future needs of the state economy for certain capital investments, taking into account their effective use and return on invested funds Source: compiled by the authors based on [11, 23] Sytnyk, N., Stefankiv, B. distinguish the following aspects of financial security: the current state – the creation of a state of budgetary, tax, customs, monetary, foreign exchange, banking, investment systems, the main characteristics of which are: balance, resistance to internal and external negative influences, the ability to prevent external financial expansion, to ensure effective 4 The global aspect of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development 69 functioning of the national economic system and economic growth; functional support – protection of the financial interests of subjects at different levels of relations; regulatory support – the creation of the necessary regulatory and legal prerequisites for the functioning of the financial system, allowing to make the direction of financial flows to the shadow or penumbral sphere, as well as to the misuse of financial resources of the state [24]. Briginets, O. defines balance, resistance to internal and external threats, the ability to ensure the effective functioning of the national economy and the economic growth of the state with the characteristic features of financial security [11]. Considering the concepts of «international financial security» and «global financial security», it should be noted that they are closely related to the concept of «global financial security of sustainable development». Thus, the concept of international financial security is interpreted by scientists as a set of international conditions for the coexistence of agreements and institutional structures, under which each member state of the world community is provided with the opportunity to freely choose and implement its strategy of social, economic and financial development, without being subject to external pressure and counting on non-intervention, understanding and mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial cooperation on the part of other states [21]. According to Dmitriev, E., international financial security should be considered from several points of view: 1) through the prism of international economic relations as an interconnected system of the following elements: foreign economic and financial security of a separate national economy; financial security of large economic and legal groups and unions; financial security as a response to the main current trends and threats at the global global level; 2) through ensuring global financial stability, since only a stable international financial system effectively allocates resources, assesses and manages financial risks, maintains employment at a level close to natural, and also manages the movement of prices for real and financial assets in order to prevent destabilization of financial and real markets [13]. Nurymova Saule, Yessentay Aigerim, considering the financial security of countries and regions, distinguish the following main segments: budget and taxes; monetary; credit and banking; extra-budgetary fund [16]. Regarding the definition of the concept of global financial security, it should be noted that scientists interpret it as a state of international, economic and financial relations of the world economy, in which sustainable economic development of countries is ensured and conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation are created, stability and balanced development of the economies and financial systems of states are ensured, growth the level of well-being of the world’s population [23]. Hetmanenko, O. notes that global financial security contributes to maintaining the stability of the world economy and allows creating conditions conducive to the growth of production, science and welfare of the countries of the world, and also limits spontaneous fluctuations in the global market, including the financial one, and prevents them from developing into a global financial crisis [23]. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 70 According to Briginets, A., «now the main task of global financial security is to counter the destabilization of international relations and provide opportunities for stable financial growth of all states» [11]. A study on ensuring the monetary security of sustainable development at the global level necessitates determining the configuration of its system as a set of parts: subjects, objects, principles and control levers. The subjects of monetary security of sustainable development at the global level include countries, international financial universities (International Monetary Fund, international and regional development banks), UN agencies, stabilization funds. The objects of global financial security of sustainable development are financial interests (determining financial needs, the satisfaction of which will contribute to the achievement of sustainable development, ensuring the financial stability of the world community, strengthening the global financial system, the effective use of international financial resources to ensure the implementation of sustainable development programs), international financial resources, involved in the field of sustainable development; global system of financing sustainable development. Concretizing the concepts of international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development, it is necessary to define them as the financial resources of countries, international financial organizations aimed at achieving sustainable development goals at the international and global levels. The classification of international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development provides a clearer definition of the specifics of the interpretation of this concept (Table 4.2). It should be noted that international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development have specific functions to eradicate poverty, achieve sustainable development goals, finance the provision of regional and global public goods, maintain macroeconomic stability in the context of a broader global favorable environment, channel funds for the purpose of long-term investments, the use of funds along with private capital with the distribution of risks and profits [25]. As for the definition of the essence of the global sustainable development financing system, this term should be understood as a set of interrelated elements of the national, international and world levels: subjects (countries, international financial organizations, UN agencies, global funds) and objects by areas of financing (social, economic, production, infrastructure, food security, environmental protection, global public goods), which should interact on the basis of the principles of synergy, differentiation of sources of financial support, subordination to certain goals of sustainable development, efficiency, optimality through the use of economic and administrative levers for managing sustainable development [25]. Consideration of the essence of the financial security of sustainable development also requires the identification of factors that lead to financial risks and create threats to its provision at the national and global levels. 4 The global aspect of ensuring the financial security of sustainable development 71  Table 4.2 Classification of international financial resources involved in the field of sustainable development Criterion Types According to the forms of existence Cash Securities Debentures Grants Loans Investments By affiliation Own Loan Attracted (international financial assistance) According to the sources of formation State Private Financial resources of international financial organizations By directions of use For sustainable development Complementary Climate Finance (Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Finance) To finance global public goods (communicable disease control and treatment, ecosystem services and biodiversity, technology development) By period of use Short-term (up to 1 year) Medium-term (from 1 to 3 years) Long-term (from 3 to 10 years) By level of use Micro level (national) Meso level (regional) Macro level (international) Mega level (global) Source: compiled by the authors based on [25] Speaking about financial security at the national level, it should be noted that its condition as a whole depends on the factors of both the internal and external financial and credit policy of the state, the political situation in the state, the perfection of legislative support for the functioning of the financial system, as well as international obligations of the state [26]. The factors of threats to the financial security of sustainable development at the global level include global factors that impede or pose a threat to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, the implementation of which is associated with the financial support of programs in this area. The analysis of sources [14, 26, 27] made it possible to clarify the classification of risk factors and threats to the financial security of sustainable development at the national, international and global levels of formation (Table 4.3) and identify global factors that have a negative impact on it, namely: the debt of countries liquidity shortage in developing countries, capital Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 72 volatility, financial market instability, problems of financial regulation, problems of international financial institutions.  Table 4.3 Classification of risk factors and threats to the financial security of sustainable development by the level of formation Level Factors National Instability and imperfection of legal regulation in the financial sector Uneven distribution of the tax burden on business entities, which leads to tax evasion and capital outflow abroad Outflow of capital abroad as a result of the deterioration of the investment climate Low level of budgetary discipline and imbalance of the budgetary system Increase in public debt Shadowing the economy Insufficient level of gold and foreign exchange reserves Significant level of dollarization of the economy Insufficient level of capitalization of the financial system International Limited access to international financial markets Deterioration of foreign trade Growing balance of payments deficit Significant dependence on external creditors The impact of global financial crises on the financial system of the state Global Developing country debt Liquidity shortage in developing countries Capital volatility Financial market instability Problems of financial regulation Problems of activity of international financial institutions Source: сompiled by the authors based on [14, 26, 27] The configuration of the system of monetary security of sustainable development at the global level is shown in Fig. 4.1. Thus, based on the consideration of the characteristics of the elements of general financial security, the essence of the global sustainable development financing system, taking into account the analysis of the interpretation of scientists regarding the essence of financial security at different levels, it is necessary to understand the financial security of sustainable development at the global level as the state of the global sustainable development financing system characterized by balance, resistance to internal and external negative impacts, the ability to ensure socio-economic development, which involves the interaction of economic growth, social development and environmental protection in order to meet existing needs, as well as future generations of the population of all countries of the world. 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Rethinking the global financial safety net. Available at: https://www.bis. org/speeches/sp211012a.pdf 82 DOI: 10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6.ch5 Olena Nieizviestna, Volodymyr Kotkovskyi, Natalia Ivanova, Lyubov Shevchenko, Yevhenii Tryhubchenko 5Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security Abstract Dedicated to the study of the possibility of using the signal approach to determine the level and assess financial security. It is noted that early warning systems based on qualitative analysis, econometric modeling and non-parametric models based on the approach are called upon to identify threats, identify accumulated and possible imbalances, in order to further level the effect of factors that can undermine the financial security of the country. To predict the emergence of threats to the financial condition of Ukraine, a regression model of the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine (as an indicator of the public finances of Ukraine) was developed and proposed, which reflects the dependence of the probability of a decrease in this indicator on a number of security indicators, and its approbation was carried out for the conditions of Ukraine. The selected set of indicators for identifying threats to the financial security of Ukraine provided the basis for building and forming a base of scenarios for the possible behavior of the economy under the influence of external factors for 2022–2023. The authors have identified corrective measures of economic policy on the part of macroeconomic regulation bodies in order to stop the inertial development of the forecast situation. KEYWORDS Financial security, financial impact, financial system, threat to the financial security of the state, causes of threats to the financial security of the state, indicator for assessing the level of financial security, signal approach, regression model. 5.1 Essential characteristics of financial security and the need to ensure it The key link in the economic security of any country in the world is its financial security. This is of particular importance in the context of the globalization of economic imbalances, because external control and the use of financial means of penetration can provide violent pressure on the elected state. Financial security is the key to conducting an independent financial and economic policy of the country. At the macro level, financial security is the ability of the state in peacetime and in emergency situations to adequately respond to internal and external negative financial influences [1]. Financial security reflects the readiness of the country’s financial system for timely and reliable financial 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 83 support of economic needs in amounts sufficient to maintain the necessary level of economic and military security of the country. However, the emergence of modern economies inevitably leads to an increase in threats to financial security. Even with the achievement of sustainable development goals in many countries, financial crises have become systematic. That is why the search for tools for forecasting and assessing the level of threats to the financial security of the country, and if they occur, for further response measures, is becoming of great relevance. The threat to financial security implies the potential for such a development of events in which, under the influence of various factors (or their combination), there is a danger of destruction of key parts of the financial system, its management system, damage to national wealth and, as a result, the danger of loss of sovereignty. Studies [2, 3] are devoted to attempts to classify threats to the financial security of the country. In the Table 5.1, the authors attempted to generalize the classification of financial security threats.  Table 5.1 Classification of threats to the financial security of the country Classification sign Elements of a classification feature Depending on residency Internal External Depending on the action in time Permanent Temporary Depending on the degree of impact on financial security Main Minor Depending on recognition capabilities Explicit Hidden Depending on the attitude to threats Objective Subjective Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [2, 3] Let’s agree with the opinion [4–7] that among the main causes of threats to the financial security of the state, the following should be singled out (Table 5.2). The issue of determining the components of financial security remains relevant. Modern scientific opinion [3, 7] identifies the following components of the financial security of the state: budgetary, tax, debt, financial security of the banking system, currency, monetary security, investment security and security of the non-banking financial sector. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 84  Table 5.2 The main causes of threats to the financial security of the state The main causes of threats to the financial security of the state the rapid development of the process of globalization of the world economy the rapid development of the process of interpenetration of foreign policy into the domestic policy of states dependent on world finance a constant increase in the huge mass of capital both in individual states and in international organizations, the mobility of which creates a tense situation the growing influence of transnational banks and companies on the national economies of individual countries high mobility of financial markets as a result of the rapid development of information technology high dependence of the public sector of countries on foreign short-term speculative capital, which increases their vulnerability inability of international financial institutions to effectively control the emergence of threats in the financial sector Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [4–7] It is possible to investigate the nature and causes of threats to the financial security of the country and obtain a risk prevention mechanism using model testing. 5.2 Justification of the expediency of using the signal approach to determine the level and assess financial security Early warning systems based on qualitative analysis, econometric modeling and non-parametric models based on the signal approach are called upon to identify threats, identify accumulated and possible imbalances, in order to further level the effect of factors that can undermine the financial security of the country. The main advantage of the signaling approach lies in the ability of the predictive power of each predictor indicator to individually assess the level of threat to the country’s financial security [8]. In this case, it is important to identify and justify a set of indicators that are hypersensitive to sudden changes – this is what requires a qualitative analysis. The signal approach makes it possible to determine the indicative limits of fluctuations that characterize resistance to threats to financial security. Econometric modeling based on regression models allows comparison between countries and highlights potential risks. Within the framework of this approach, it is possible to build a model for diagnosing the danger of monetary security (Fig. 5.1). The structural-logical model presented by the authors has three components: – a mechanism for the formation of space for the study of the level of financial security; – a table of indicators and their threshold values used to identify external and internal imbalances; 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 85 – a thorough review with the calculation of an integral indicator, the purpose of which is to determine the status of a potential imbalance – adjustable at an early stage or problematic – and developing measures for further response to the results. The metrics/indicators selected for the Scoreboard (table/dashboard) were selected based on the following principles: 1) certain indicators are grouped according to the areas of occurrence of threats to financial security; 2) certain indicators provide reliable signals about potential imbalances and threats to financial stability; 3) certain indicators are intuitive, have a clear economic interpretation, which makes them the most suitable for use by responsible persons in the field of financial security management; 4) certain indicators can be calculated on the basis of statistical data for different countries, which ensures the comparability of the results obtained; 5) certain indicators are able to reflect both short-term negative changes and the gradual accumulation of such changes in the long term.  Fig. 5.1 Structural-logical model (scheme) for diagnosing a threat to the financial security of the state Source: developed by the authors Formation of the sample for the study Objects of study Indicator Study period Formation of an array of analytical data І Stage Development of criteria for selecting indicators Calculation of indicator values Assessment of the level of occurrence of a threat to financial security IІ Stage Calculation of the integral indicator of the threat to financial security Determining the likelihood of a threat to financial security Further response to the findings IIІ Stage Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 86 The classification of indicators – harbingers of financial instability can be presented in the following categories (Table 5.3). The indicators indicated in Table 5.3 and their threshold limits, of course, cannot fully reflect all the threats to the country’s financial security.  Table 5.3 Scoreboard (table/dashboard) for assessing the level of financial security of the state Components of the financial security of the state Indicators Threshold limits for indicator changes Fiscal security Government budget deficit/surplus ratio to GDP, % no more than 3 Level of GDP redistribution through the consolidated budget, % no more than 25 The ratio of the volume of aggregate payments for servicing and repayment of the public debt to the state budget revenues, % no more than 6 Debt security Ratio of total government debt to GDP, % no more than 60 Ratio of total external debt to GDP, % no more than 25 Ratio of domestic debt to GDP, % no more than 30 Monetary security Level of monetization of the economy, % no more than 50 Inflation rate (until December of the previous year), % no more than 107 Volume of cash, % no more than 4 The level of the average interest rate of loans of banking institutions in relation to inflation, % no more than 5 Currency security Ratio of volumes of deposits in foreign currency to total volumes of deposits, % no more than 25 The rate of change of the index of the official exchange rate of the hryvnia to the dollar USA to the indicators of the previous period, % no more than 6 Ratio of loans in foreign currency to total loans, % no more than 25 Coverage ratio of international reserves of the state of the monetary base, % at least 100 Investment security Ratio of investment growth rates to GDP growth rates, times 2–32 Volume of foreign direct investment, % of GDP at least 5 Expenses for scientific and technical activities, % of GDP at least 2 Banking security Share of foreign banking capital in total banking capital, % no more than 30 The volume of lending by banks to the real sector of the economy, % of GDP at least 30 The level of doubtful debts in the loan portfolio, % no more than 10 Security of the non-banking financial sector Share of long-term insurance in the total volume of collected insurance premiums, % at least 30 Level of insurance payments, % at least 30 Yield of domestic government bonds, % 3-4 Share of coverage of domestic public debt by government securities, % no more than 80 Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [3, 9, 10] 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 87 This gives us the opportunity to assert that there is no universally recognized list of the main macroeconomic indicators for assessing the level of financial security of the state, and issues related to the algorithm for diagnosing and regulating the level of financial security of the country are insufficiently covered. In this regard, there is a need to search for the existing positive practice of building early warning indicators in order to assess the feasibility of using them for making managerial decisions. 5.3 The results of using the signal approach to determine the level and assess financial security Tables 5.4–5.10 present the indicators of the given indicators in order to determine macroeconomic imbalances in Ukraine and Poland (calculations were made on the basis of official data from the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the NBU, the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the Central Statistical Office of Poland, the People’s Bank of Poland, the Ministry of Finance of Poland).  Table 5.4 Indicators of fiscal security of Ukraine and Poland, % of GDP Years The ratio of the state budget deficit/surplus to GDP, % (threshold value – no more than 3) The ratio of redistribution through the consolidated budget, % (threshold value – no more than 25) Ukraine Poland Ukraine Poland 2006 –0.7 –3.5 24.8 39.3 2007 –1.1 –1.9 23.0 40.8 2008 –1.3 –3.6 24.5 40.1 2009 –3.9 –7.3 22.9 39.3 2010 –5.9 –7.4 22.2 38.1 2011 –1.8 –5.0 23.9 38.7 2012 –3.8 –3.8 24.6 39.8 2013 –4.5 –4.2 23.3 39.3 2014 –5.0 –3.6 22.8 39.5 2015 –2.3 –2.6 27.0 38.2 2016 –2.9 –2.4 25.7 37.7 2017 –1.6 –1.5 26.6 39.0 2018 –1.7 –0.2 26.1 40.8 2019 –1.9 –0.7 25.1 40.3 2020 –5.2 –6.9 25.7 44.2 2021 –3.6 –1.9 23.8 42.4 Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [11–13] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 88 Data in Table 5.4 shows that the ratio of the state budget deficit to Ukraine’s GDP in 2009–2014 exceeded the optimal value by up to 3 percentage points, while in 2015–2019 this indicator stabilized. This indicates that in recent years the volume of GDP has grown significantly with an almost unchanged level of the budget deficit. In the Republic of Poland, we observe a similar situation in terms of this indicator of fiscal security: after the aggravation of problems in 2008–2014, when the deficit imbalance increased to a dangerous level, during 2015–2021 the value of the indicator corresponded to the threshold value (Fig. 5.2).  Fig. 5.2 Dynamics of the indicator of the ratio of the state budget deficit to GDP in 2006–2021 in Ukraine and Poland, % –8 –7 –6 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland The indicator of the ratio of the state budget deficit to GDP, % During the entire period under study, there is a balancing on the verge of the limiting value of such an indicator of budgetary security as the level of redistribution of Ukraine’s GDP through the consolidated budget. The level of redistribution of Ukraine’s GDP through the consolidated budget for 2015–2020 remains at the level as exceeding the limit. During this period, the indicator fluctuated between 25–27 % (Fig. 5.3). However, in Poland, on the contrary, this indicator did not meet the threshold during 2006–2021. This indicates the presence of certain problems in the fiscal sphere both in Ukraine and in Poland, which have accumulated in recent years and are of a systemic nature, lead to a decrease in the stimulating and social function of the tax system, as well as exacerbation of problems in customs and tax administration. The analyzed indicators testify to the insufficient stability of public finances and, as a result, threats to financial security. Debt security indicators speak about the level of public debt (Table 5.5). 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 95  Fig. 5.9 Dynamics of the indicator of the ratio of the volume of deposits in foreign currency to the total volume of deposits in Ukraine and Poland in 2006–2021, % 48.32 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland The indicator of the ratio of the volume of deposits in foreign currency to the total volume of deposits, %  Table 5.8 Main indicators of investment security of Ukraine and Poland, % of GDP Years The volume of foreign direct investment, % of GDP (threshold value – at least 5) Expenditure on scientific and technical activities, % of GDP (threshold value – at least 2) Ukraine Poland Ukraine Poland 2006 5.2 15.5 0.98 0.56 2007 6.9 15.3 0.93 0.62 2008 6.1 15.2 0.90 0.63 2009 4.1 15.0 0.85 0.64 2010 4.8 14.8 0.75 0.72 2011 4.4 14.9 0.65 0.75 2012 4.8 14.6 0.67 0.88 2013 2.5 14.0 0.70 0.87 2014 0.3 14.7 0.60 0.94 2015 –0.5 15.1 0.55 1.00 2016 4.1 13.1 0.48 0.96 2017 3.3 13.0 0.45 1.03 2018 3.4 14.3 0.47 1.09 2019 3.8 14.0 0.43 1.16 2020 –0.6 13.2 0.41 1.22 2021 3.2 12.8 0.40 1.29 Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [11, 12] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 96 Investment security indicators characterize the degree of manifestation of the corresponding threats. One of the most important indicators characterizing the degree of development of the country is the volume of foreign direct investment in GDP. During the analyzed period, this indicator of Ukraine had a «safe» value only in 2006–2008 – 5.2–6.9 % and tends to decrease, which indicates insufficient investment in fixed assets and the inability to provide the necessary material and technical base for needs of the economy In contrast to Ukraine, in Poland this indicator adhered to the threshold value (Fig. 5.10).  Fig. 5.10 Dynamics of the volume of foreign direct investment in the GDP of Ukraine and Poland in 2006–2021, % -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland The volume of foreign direct investment in the GDP, % Speaking about the costs of scientific and technical activities in Ukraine and Poland (Fig. 5.11), we observe deviations from the threshold value of the indicator, and the lack of funds to finance the state order for the most important scientific and technical (experimental) developments and putting the country’s scientific and technical products in dependence on imports of advanced technologies from countries such as China, the United States of America, Japan. Let’s assess banking security as a component of the country’s financial security (Table 5.9). Analytical data in Table 5.9 testify to a significant part of foreign banking capital in the total volume of Poland’s banking capital, which in this case is a positive moment and indicates the active integration of the banking sector into the European space. However, for Ukraine, which is not a member of the European Union, the presence in the banking market of a significant share of banks with foreign capital may carry various risks and threats. These risks are associated with insufficient competition of domestic banks compared to foreign ones, which have cheap resources of parent banks and much greater opportunities to use them, as well as exchange rate fluctuations 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 97 both in the world and in Ukraine, with the possibility of potential influence of non-residents on decision-making, for example, on the choice of lending facilities in Ukraine (Fig. 5.12).  Fig. 5.11 Dynamics of expenditures of Ukraine and Poland on scientific and technical activities to GDP 2006–2021, % 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland The expenditures on scientific and technical activities to GDP, %  Table 5.9 Main indicators of banking security in Ukraine and Poland, % of GDP Years The share of foreign bank capital in the total volume of bank capital, % (threshold value – no more than 30) The volume of lending by banks to the real sector of the economy, % of GDP (threshold value – at least 30) Ukraine Poland Ukraine Poland 2006 27.6 69.5 30.8 30.5 2007 35.0 71.1 38.3 36.3 2008 36.7 72.3 49.8 22.0 2009 35.8 70.5 52.0 22.1 2010 40.6 68.4 47.1 22.0 2011 41.9 65.0 44.4 21.6 2012 39.5 63.6 43.4 23.5 2013 34.0 63.2 49.2 25.3 2014 32.5 61.5 51.6 26.5 2015 43.3 59.0 40.8 28.2 2016 37.8 56.6 35.1 17.9 2017 29.2 55.1 28.3 17.8 2018 28.2 51.9 24.6 17.9 2019 28.7 48.9 19.2 16.9 2020 28.1 47.3 17.6 16.3 2021 28.0 46.2 14.2 14.7 Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [11, 12, 15–18] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 98 By the end of 2021 The National Bank of Ukraine has created an optimal share of banks with foreign capital in the structure of the banking system, which reduces the risk of the state’s financial security. However, such actions by the regulator limited the volume of resources for lending to the real sector of the national economy, and since 2017, the activity of Ukrainian banks in ensuring economic growth has been declining. A similar situation is taking place in the Republic of Poland: since 2008, the volume of lending by banks to the real sector of the economy has tended to decrease (Fig. 5.13). However, this situation is caused by the significant activity of transnational groups, developing the real sector of the Polish economy at their own expense.  Fig. 5.12 Dynamics of the share of foreign banking capital in the total banking capital of Ukraine and Poland in 2006–2021, % 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland The share of foreign banking capital in the total banking capital, % Let’s assess the security of the non-banking financial sector as a component of the country’s financial security (Table 5.10). The insurance market, along with the banking market, is the most developed in all countries of the world. This situation is due to the accumulation of significant financial flows through insurance premiums and the socio-economic role played by insurance companies in society and the economy. However, we see that the insurance market in Ukraine is underdeveloped, as evidenced by the low levels of insurance payments during the analyzed periods (Fig. 5.14). This means a high probability of the transfer of compensation for insured events, especially in the healthcare sector, at the expense of public funds, which does not create conditions for improving the country’s budgetary security. However, as we see from the example of Poland, the development of the insurance market does not pose a threat to the financial security of the country. 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 99  Fig. 5.13 Dynamics of lending by banks to the real sector of the economy of Ukraine and Poland in GDP 2006–2021, % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland Lending by banks to the real sector of the economy in GDP, % Years  Table 5.10 Main security indicators of the non-banking financial sector of Ukraine and Poland, % Years Level of insurance payments, % (threshold value – not less than 30) Yield of an internal government loan bond, % (threshold value – 3–4) Ukraine Poland Ukraine Poland 2006 18.8 44.8 9.26 4.20 2007 23.4 44.9 6.71 5.30 2008 29.4 49.9 11.86 6.25 2009 32.9 78.2 12.21 4.75 2010 26.4 67.8 10.39 4.00 2011 21.4 69.7 9.17 4.50 2012 23.9 63.8 12.94 3.90 2013 16.2 63.6 13.13 3.00 2014 18.9 62.2 13.98 2.20 2015 27.2 63.6 13.07 2.00 2016 25.1 65.6 9.16 2.00 2017 24.3 63.9 10.47 2.10 2018 24.8 67.0 17.79 2.10 2019 27.5 64.3 16.93 2.10 2020 33.5 62.5 10.20 1.00 2021 37.9 59.7 11.34 1.00 Source: compiled by the authors based on these sources [11, 12, 15, 18, 19] The high level of social responsibility of the state leads to an increase in the state budget deficit and requires the search for resources to cover it and ensure financing of the necessary state Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 100 budget expenditures. As a result, Ukraine is forced to attract the necessary financial resources in the domestic market, stimulating the activity of economic entities with a high level of profitability, which we observe during the analyzed periods (Fig. 5.15). This situation creates additional threats to the debt security of the state. At that time, Poland, which has the opportunity to use the resources of the European Union, ensuring a high economic level of growth, during the periods under review, optimized the cost of raising funds in the domestic market.  Fig. 5.14 Dynamics of the level of insurance payments in Ukraine and Poland in 2006–2021, % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years The level of insurance payments, % 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland  Fig. 5.15 Yield dynamics of domestic government bonds of Ukraine and Poland in 2006–2021, % 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Years Yield of domestic government bonds, % 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Ukraine Poland 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 101 Thus, based on the foregoing, it can be stated that the level of security of the non-banking financial sector of Ukraine is critical. In general, during 2006–2021, in Ukraine, at the same time, four out of fourteen indicators assessing the components of the level of financial security signaled the presence of threats (Tables 5.5, 5.7, 5.8, 5.10). The rest with different duration of periods showed deviations from the optimal values. More often, periods of such deviations occurred in the period 2014–2020, which were associated with the crisis of the russian invasion in the spring of 2014 and the subsequent post-crisis period. The NBU did not achieve the stability of the national currency, which undermined its credibility and provoked an increase in the dollarization of the national economy. There was an increase in external debt. The country’s financial system is not capable of protecting national interests and is dependent on external influence. 5.4 Justification of the algorithm and the results of using a regression model with performance indicators in order to predict threats to the financial condition in the future on the example of Ukraine In order to foresee threats to the financial condition of Ukraine, a regression model has been developed for the dependence of the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine (as an indicator of Ukraine’s public finances) on such factors as the deficit/surplus ratio of the state budget; the ratio of the total public debt; inflation rate; coverage ratio by the international reserves of the state of the monetary base; the amount of lending by banks to this sector of the economy (5.1). YCBGR = –165.65+0.129XSBDSR–0.22XRTPB+0.979XІR+0.529XCMB+0.998XBLRSE. (5.1) The selected set of indicators for identifying threats to the financial security of Ukraine provides the basis for building and forming a base of scenarios for the possible behavior of the economy under the influence of external factors. In fact, the value of these indicators by the end of the period, in the absence of other corrective influences (in particular, the government’s macroprudential policy), determines the response and stability of public finances during a crisis. The authors predicted the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine, which makes it possible to assess the process of the spread of crisis phenomena for the public finances of Ukraine over the next two years after the analyzed period. Let’s calculate a certain regression model (5.1) for Ukraine using Microsoft Excel tools. The data for calculations are presented in Table 5.11 (the values of the indicators that exceeded the corresponding threshold values are shaded). The presented model (5.1) has rather high indicators of its evaluation: Multiple R = 0.92, R2 = 0.84. The results of the implementation of model (5.1) are shown in Fig. 5.16. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 102  Table 5.11 Initial data for calculating the regression model with performance indicators reflecting the dependence of Ukraine’s public finances on a number of security indicators Indicator Government budget deficit/surplus ratio The ratio of total public debt Inflation rate Coverage ratio by the international reserves of the state of the monetary base The volume of lending by banks to the real sector of the economy Growth rate of the Consolidated budget Presentation format % of GDP % of GDP % % % of GDP annual growth, in % Conventions SBDSR RTPB IR CMB BLRSE CBGR Thresholds no more than 3 no more than 60 no more than 107 at least 100 at least 30 2012 –3.8 36.7 99.8 76.83 43.4 11.8 2013 –4.5 40.1 100.5 53.11 49.2 –0.6 2014 –5.0 70.2 124.9 26.89 51.6 3.0 2015 –2.3 79.4 143.3 86.49 40.8 43.0 2016 –2.9 81.0 112.4 104.05 35.1 20.0 2017 –1.6 71.8 113.7 125.38 28.3 29.9 2018 –1.7 60.9 109.8 131.39 24.6 16.5 2019 –1.9 50.3 104.1 136.98 19.2 8.9 2020 –5.2 60.8 105.0 131.79 17.6 6.7 2021 –3.6 48.9 110.0 127.45 14.2 20.7 Source: developed by the authors  Fig. 5.16 Results of the implementation of the model (5.1), variants of the CBGR forecast 9.1 – by threshold endings 16.0 – average 24.8 – on average 2014 – 2015 (in conditions of active occupation of part of the country) -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Years 2018 2019 2020 2021 Forecast Factual data Predictive model Annual growth, % 5 Signal approach for determining the level and assessing financial security 103 There are three forecast options: 1. All indicators of the model (Хі) will be equal to their threshold values, namely: XSBDSR = 3; XRTPB = 60; XІR = 107; XCMB = 100; XBLRSE = 30; in this case, the forecast value of the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine will be 9.1 (+/–8 %). 2. Model indicators (Xi) will be equal to their average values for the study period 2012–2021, namely: XSBDSR = –3.25; XRTPB = 60.01; XІR = 112.35; XCMB = 100.036; XBLRSE = 32.4; in this case, the forecast value of the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine will be 16 (+/–8 %). 3. This version of the forecast is based on the assumption of a repetition of the behavior of the financial system during the active occupation of part of the country’s territory by the russian aggressor in 2014–2015. Therefore, the indicators of the model (4.1) will be equal to their average values for the period 2014–2015, namely: XSBDSR = –3.65; XRTPB = 74.8; XІR = 134.1; XCMB = 56.69; XBLRSE = 46.2; in this case, the forecast value of the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine will be 24.8 (+/–8 %). The forecasting results for 2022 (Fig. 5.16) make it possible to determine the scenarios for the movement of the trajectory of the growth rates of the Consolidated State Budget of Ukraine. Taking into account the situation, starting from February 24, 2022, martial law has been in effect on the territory of Ukraine related to the military aggression of the russian Federation, one should take into account the forecast option based on the assumption of a repetition of the behavior of the financial system during the active occupation of part of the country’s territory by the russian aggressor in 2014–2015 According to forecasts, in 2022 Ukraine will improve the growth rate of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine, however, its growth will be caused by the need to cover significant defense spending, devaluation of the national currency. This situation will continue to put pressure on the national currency, causing devaluation processes, reducing the volume of bank lending to the real sector of the economy, the ability of the private sector to act as a source of investment in the economy, including through financial intermediaries, and increasing the need for additional resources from international financial organizations and international assistance. However, the inertial development of the forecast situation can be stopped by corrective measures of economic policy on the part of macroeconomic regulation bodies, namely: – resumption of cooperation with the IMF and EBRD; – development of measures aimed at ensuring the protection of the national interests of Ukraine in the conditions of increased protectionism of other countries, as well as in emergency situations; – development of a common Ukraine-EU roadmap for the further development of trade and economic ties; – carrying out further reforms in the field of tax and land policy, active transition to new production standards (in order to increase the competitiveness of domestic products in the context of the need to develop the markets of the European Union); Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 104 – use of various forms of public-private partnership in the context of a significant increase in investment activity, which, among other things, will improve the situation on the labor market; – rapid implementation of the relocation program (transfer to safer territories) of production facilities. References 1. Griaznovaia, A. G. (Ed.) (2004). Finansovo-kreditnyi entciklopedicheskii slovar. Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1168. 2. Kravchuk, N. Ya., Kolisnyk, O. Ya., Melykh, O. Yu. (2010). Finansova bezpeka. Ternopil: Vektor, 277. 3. Ladiuk, O. D. (2016). Financial security: the description of components. Efektyvna ekonomika, 11. Available at: http://www.economy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=5280 4. Trandafil, A. K. (2001). Finansovaia bezopasnost gosudarstva v usloviiakh globalizatcii. Kultura narodov Prichernomoria, 16, 97–100. Available at: http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/ 123456789/92114 5. Hryvkivska, O., Kotvytska, N., Ivanova, N., Pryimak, N., Salkova, I. (2021). Economic Security Formation of Enterprise Under the Conditions of Steady Development. European Journal of Sustainable Development, 10 (1), 561–570. doi: https://doi.org/10.14207/ ejsd.2021.v10n1p561 6. Yermoshenko, M. M., Horiacheva, K. S. (2010). Finansova skladova ekonomichnoi bezpeky: derzhava i pidpryiemstvo. Kyiv: Natsionalna akademiia upravlinnia, 232. 7. Melykh, O. (2013). Finansova bezpeka derzhavy: sutnist, kryterii otsinky ta preventyvni zakhody zmitsnennia. Ekonomichnyi analiz, 12 (2), 266–272. 8. Nieizviestna, O., Ivanova, N., Koverza, V., Kotkovskyi, V., Tryhubchenko, Ye.; Ivanova, N., Kozhukhova, T. (Eds.) (2021). Quantitative crisis analysis: identifying and defining imbalances. Econometric modeling of managerial decisions at the macro and micro levels. Kharkiv: РС ТЕСHNOLOGY СЕNTЕR, 22–43. doi: http://doi.org/10.15587/978-617-7319-37-4.ch2 9. Kotkovskyi, V., Drobchak, A., Leskova-Hodlevska, Y. (2020). Otsiniuvannia rivnia finansovoi bezpeky Ukrainy v umovakh finansovoi hlobalizatsii. Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 11-1, 94–101. doi: https://doi.org/10.37320/2415-3583/11.14 10. Momotiuk, L. Ye. (2015). Theoretical Approaches To Statistical Evaluation Of The Financial Stability Of The State. Financial Space, 3 (19), 129–134. 11. TOV «MinfinMedia». Available at: https://index.minfin.com.ua/ua/economy/gdp 12. Bank Danych Makroekonomicznych: G łó wny Urz ą d Statystyczny Polskiej. Available at: https:// bdm.stat.gov.pl 13. Poltorak, A. S. (2019). Finansova bezpeka derzhavy v umovakh hlobalizatsii: teoriia, metodolohiia ta praktyka. Mykolaiv: MNAU, 463. 6 Security parameters of the innovative ecosystem 111 As noted by Smorodinskaya, N., Russell, M., Katukov, D., Still, K. «...national or regional innovative systems were seen as static structures regulated by government bodies, with successful performance depending on a critical mass of involved actors and intentional infrastructure. As a departure, innovative ecosystems …are considered dynamic and agile collaborative structures that enjoyтself-governance as a necessary prerequisite for interactive innovation… an innovation-conducive environment, comprised of ecosystems and networks, can increase the likelihood that «softer» innovation takes place [14]. At the same time, Pooya Namaayande, Behrouz Zarei emphasize that «An innovative ecosystem models the economic rather than the energy dynamics of the complex relationships that are formed between actors or entities whose functional goal is to enable technology development and innovation. These innovative ecosystems highlight the dynamic nature of innovation in order to create innovative results and innovation performance» [15]. The analysis of sources [26–43] also shows that in scientific, business and political circles there is no consensus not only regarding the understanding of the essence of the concept of «innovative ecosystem», but also its components and varieties, life cycle. Most often, the life cycle of an innovative ecosystem is presented as a phasic process containing 4 main stages of development: birth (there is a shared understanding among the actors on what are the common objectives, thus assuring the collaboration among them and the delivery of value), expansion (the relationships between the actors are strengthened and the ecosystem grows. The growing ecosystem starts to be competitive and to compete against other ecosystems), leadership (the ecosystem is a leader in one or more features, being more and richer in networks and generating value, as the competitiveness and complexity grow, the issues related to the coordination of the ecosystem improve simultaneously), and self-renewal or death (the ecosystem must explore new knowledge to invigorate or be terminated due to not being competitive anymore) [20, 31]. In this case Bo Liu, Yun-Fei Sha, Guowei Li, and Debing Ni. They stated that «Ecosystems arise when there is a balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces, that is, when there are benefits of coordination as well as benefits of autonomy» [22]. Anmar Kamalaldin, David Sj din, Dusana Hullova, Vinit Parida argue that ecosystems in general, including the innovative ecosystem, include 4 main elements: 1) аctivities, which specify the discrete actions to be undertaken in order for the value proposition to materialize; 2) аctors, which are the entities that undertake the activities (а single actor may undertake multiple activities; conversely, multiple actors may undertake a single activity); 3) рositions, which specify where in the flow of activities across the system actors are located and characterize who hands off to whom; 4) links, which specify transfers across actors (The content of these transfers can vary-mat é riel, information, influence, funds. Critically, these links need not have any direct connection to the focal actor) [25]. Gouthanan Pushpananthan, Maria Elmquist come to similar conclusions, noting that «…the term «innovative ecosystem» includes all value creating activities performed by an evolving network of actors Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 112 integrating their products and services on a technology platform. In such collaborative networks, interaction among firms is both complex and critical, and combines cooperation and competition» [31]. So, the main elements of innovative ecosystems are actors and their roles, connections between actors. The diversity of innovative ecosystems is explained by the plurality of approaches for scientists to understand the essence of the concept of «innovative ecosystem», the plurality of criteria for their differentiation. So, Pidoricheva, I. identifies four types of innovative ecosystems: ecosystems organized around a focal (central) firm; ecosystems as «structures» built around a focal value proposition (focus innovation); ecosystems as certain environments (spaces) formed at different levels – from local to global; ecosystems as platforms around which the activities of various stakeholders are organized» [24]. Gouthanan Pushpananthan, Maria Elmquist note that the varieties of innovative ecosystems depend on who is its founder, noting that «an ecosystem comprises of a set of actors with varying degrees of multilateral, non-generic complementarities that are not fully hierarchically controlled». The activities of the actors within an ecosystem are orchestrated by the ecosystem leader(s) or keystone firm(s). A keystone firm is responsible for the ecosystem’s overall ‘health’ and ensures that value is shared amongst the ecosystem participants… Typically, the interactions in an innovative ecosystem are organized around a technology platform with a modular architecture» [31]. Higgins, A. distinguishes 3 types of innovative ecosystems: City innovative ecosystem, Industry innovative ecosystem, Corporate innovative ecosystem [23]. Komorowski Marlen notes that «…innovative ecosystems are highly divers and there are no clear archetypes of innovative ecosystems, but rather a multitude combining very divers criteria» [18]. In this regard, the author proposes to differentiate innovative ecosystems based on 9 criteria (Number of innovative ecosystem actors, Types of actors involved, Expertise and industry sectors, Development stage, Scale of operation, Central entity (organised or unorganised), Leading/initiating actor(s), Actions/goals), but notes that these 9 criteria, although they are basic, are not exhaustive [18]. Komorowski Marlen notes that «...innovative ecosystems are often built around technology parks and integrate research organisations and public agencies. Innovative ecosystems in medium-sized cities have often large enterprises involved, municipalities and are larger small ecosystems of less than 50 actors. Large cities often host innovative ecosystems that are built around formal networks, which involve formal networks and integrate more than 1000 actors. Innovative ecosystems in very large cities integrate actors like universities and more often also venture capital and banks are involved. Cluster organisations are in place. These four archetypes are just highlighting which kind of combinations of the criteria of the model developed above are found often together» [18]. MTS experts identify varieties of innovative ecosystems by specialization, noting that the most important and influential today are innovative ecosystems specializing in ICT development, digital innovative ecosystems [8]. The team of authors of [21] proposes to differentiate innovative ecosystems according to specific models and/or strategies of state regulation [21]. As noted by Santos, G. and 6 Security parameters of the innovative ecosystem 113 Zen, A., Bittencourt, B. «The simplest mode is shared governance, where a group of organizations collectively works as a network despite not possessing a structure of exclusive and formal management. The second mode is the lead organization-governance, which typically occurs in relationships formed by a bigger, more powerful organization and a set of lesser, weaker firms (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The third mode is the network administrative organization (NAO), where an administrative entity is created, especially to manage thenetwork and its activities» [28]. Consequently, innovative ecosystems can be differentiated by: size and spatial position, level of development, structure-forming institution, specialization, etc. Depending on the approach to understanding the essence of the concept of «innovative ecosystem», its varieties, approaches to understanding the key actors and stakeholders in the scientific literature differ significantly. Thus, MTS identifies the following stakeholders of the innovative ecosystem: Academia, Entrepreneurs, Entrepreneurial support networks, Financiers, Private sector, Public sector [8]. At the same time, Pooya Namaayande, Behrouz Zarei single out such «...the four key actors of an innovative ecosystem are: equipment providers; network operators; content and app providers, and end users. Except for the vertical relationships between the actors that determine the overall shape of the ecosystem, horizontal relationships in each layer of the ecosystem are of special importance» [15]. Rissola, G., Haberleithner, J. note that the actors of innovative ecosystems depend on the ecosystem itself. They divide the actors of the innovative ecosystem into the following groups: the four key actors of an innovative ecosystem are: equipment providers; network operators; content and app providers, and end users. Except for the vertical relationships between the actors that determine the overall shape of the ecosystem, horizontal relationships in each layer of the ecosystem are of special importance» [15]. Thus, most researchers define the actors of the innovative ecosystem based on the Quadruple Helix Model and argue that the relationships between the actors within the innovative ecosystem are symbiotic. 6.2 Success parameters of innovative ecosystems Despite the fact that innovative ecosystems in one form or another have been formed and are functioning in all countries of the world, they differ significantly in terms of efficiency, which affects their ability to ensure the achievement of national interests and, consequently, ensure national security. As WEF experts note, «Over the past 20 years, large cross-country innovation divides have not diminished. Just five countries today produce together over 70 % of global patent activity, and the top 10 countries generate over 85 % of global patent shares. These levels of concentration have remained in place for the past 20 years, with the exception of China and Korea» [7]. As the WEF experts note, «This adds to the widening of the productivity divide between top companies and the rest – and leading to economies that are increasingly polarized and unequal» [7]. Merhaba, A., Thuriaux-Alem á n, B., Ghanem, E., Aebi, T., Takchi, Y., Alsalloum, N. come to similar conclusions, arguing that «Innovation is key in driving social and economic development and bridging the wealth gap between emerging and developed countries. Over the last 50 years, only a few Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 114 countries, such as South Korea and Singapore, have succeeded in unlocking the full benefits of nation-wide innovation. Instrumental to their success is a systematic approach tackling innovation in a holistic manner that captures policy, governance, innovation engines and innovation enablers to shape their innovative ecosystem and bridge systemic and market gaps» [26]. Content analysis of sources [8, 15, 18, 25, 26, 30, 42] suggests that the performance or efficiency parameters of innovative ecosystems are quite different. Proponents of a dynamic approach to understanding the essence of the concept of «innovative ecosystem» propose to evaluate the effectiveness of an innovative ecosystem based on the breadth of the ecosystem itself, the number of participants in it, supporters of a static approach – based on its ability to create value, innovation. At the same time, MTS experts emphasize that «Out of the estimated 300 million start-ups in the world, very few of them will become high-growth firms because their ecosystems are missing essential elements for success» [8]. They are convinced that in order to ensure competitiveness, any ecosystem, including innovation, must ensure the effectiveness of four main elements: (a) governance; (b) linkages; (c) capacity and (d) focus [8]. Komorowski Marlen notes that «Innovative ecosystems are highly complex structures. A one size fits all strategy for ecosystem development does not exist» [18], but it convincingly proves that ecosystems characterized by a certain set of parameters are relatively more successful than others. According to the results of a comparative study by Komorowski Marlen, the most successful are: innovative ecosystems that operate on a national or international level (around 70 % of experts); innovative ecosystems that have an incubator as central entity (around 80 % of experts); innovative ecosystems that were initiated by a single leading individual (100 % of experts); innovative ecosystems focusse its actions and goals on innovation and technology development, industry growth and firm creation, or provision of education and training (more than 60 % of ecosystems) [18]. At the same time, Komorowski Marlen notes the need to use the 7 P framework (Place, Proximity, Population, Profile, Path-dependency, Policy, Performance) [18] in the analysis of innovative ecosystems [18]. Erkko Autio, Llewellyn D. W. Thomas note that «A healthy ecosystem is productive, in that it consistently transforms technology and other inputs to innovation into lower costs and new markets, and robust, i.e., capable of surviving disruptions such as unforeseen technological change and able to create niches to increase meaningful diversity» [42]. Experts from The International Development Innovation Alliance (IDIA) argue that successful innovative ecosystems are those that have been able to achieve the following nine goals: 1. Building informed human capital. 2. Ensuring accessibility of finance for innovation processes. 3. Establishing supportive research, markets, energy, transport, and communications infrastructure. 4. Creating enabling policies and regulations. 5. Nurturing a culture supportive of innovation and entrepreneurship. 6. Supporting networking assets that enable productive relationships between different actors. 7. Ensuring equal and inclusive ecosystem governance and participation. 6 Security parameters of the innovative ecosystem 115 8. Creating smoother pathways to scale for specific innovations. 9. Mobilising a collective ecosystem approach to address a particular development challenge» [11]. Analysis and systematization of the parameters of the success of innovative ecosystems allows us to state that they are manifested in the indicators and results of the innovative development of countries, the parameters of the functioning and development of the innovative ecosystems themselves, incl. the number of enterprises engaged in innovative activities included in the innovation process, the volume of innovative export/import, the volume of production and sales of innovative products, etc. 6.3 Diagnostics of innovative ecosystems of the leading countries of innovative development An analysis of works [8, 11, 14, 18, 24, 26, 30–42] shows that today the most representative and authoritative indicator that can be used to assess the effectiveness of innovative ecosystems, determine their safe parameters, is the Global Innovation Index (GII). According to the Global Innovation Index ratings, at the present stage of development, the most effective innovative ecosystems are countries such as: Switzerland, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, Great Britain, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Finland, Singapore, Denmark, Germany, France, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Israel. Almost all (the exception is China) leading countries in the development and efficiency of the innovative ecosystem are countries with high per capita incomes, most of them are European countries (Table 6.1).  Table 6.1 Leading countries Global Innovation Index ratings Rank 2015 2021 Leading countries in 2015–2021 1 Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Netherlands, United States of America, Finland, Singapore, Denmark, Hong Kong, Germany, Republic of Korea 2 United Kingdom Sweden 3 Sweden United States of America 4 Netherlands United Kingdom 5 United States of America Republic of Korea 6 Finland Netherlands 7 Singapore Finland 8 Ireland Singapore 9 Luxembourg Denmark 10 Denmark Germany 11 Hong Kong France 12 Germany China 13 Iceland Japan 14 Republic of Korea Hong Kong, China 15 New Zealand Israel Source: compiled by the author based on data [43] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 116 The leading countries of innovative development, despite the specific features of the formation and development of innovative ecosystems, are characterized by relative similarity. Thus, in all these countries, relatively high indicators of the effectiveness of the institutional conditions for the development of innovative ecosystems are recorded (Table 6.2). The average value for this indicator for the leading countries of innovative development is 84.8 (100-point scale, 0 is the minimum value, 100 is the maximum), the coefficient of variation of the parameter value within the specified group of countries is 9.1 %, which indicates an insignificant level variations in country estimates for the specified parameter. As evidenced by the analysis of the institutional environment of the leading countries of innovative development, these countries are characterized by a stable political environment and favorable to innovative transformations (business environment). Thus, the average indicator for the «Political and operational stability» (Government effectiveness) parameter for the leading countries of innovative development is 85 (100-point scale, 0 is the minimum value, 100 is the maximum), the coefficient of variation of the parameter value is within the specified group of countries 9.8 %, which indicates an insignificant level of variation in the estimates of countries for this parameter (Table 6.3). The average indicator for the parameter «Business environment» (Ease of starting a business; Ease of resolving insolvency) for the leading countries of innovative development is 84.6 (100-point scale, 0-minimum value, 100-maximum), coefficient of variation of the value parameter within the specified group of countries is 6.7 %, which indicates an insignificant level of variation in country estimates for this parameter. At the same time, attention should be paid to the fact that the leading countries in innovative development are characterized by relative variability in the regulatory environment. Thus, the average indicator for the «Regulatory environment» parameter (Regulatory quality; Rule of law; Cost of redundancy dismissal) for the leading countries of innovative development is 84.8 (100-point scale, 0-minimum value, 100-maximum), coefficient variation in the value of the parameter within the specified group of countries is 15.6 %, which indicates an average level of variation in the estimates of countries for the specified parameter. In addition, the leading countries in innovative development are characterized by a relatively high average score for the Market sophistication parameter. Thus, the average value for this indicator for the leading countries of innovative development is 65.1 (100-point scale, 0 is the minimum value, 100 is the maximum), the coefficient of variation of the parameter value within the specified group of countries is 12 %, which indicates an average level variations in country estimates for the specified parameter. A detailed analysis of the components of the «Market sophistication» parameter of the leading countries of innovative development suggests that these countries are characterized by comparative efficiency and similarity in terms of the «Trade, diversification, and market scale» parameter (Applied tariff rate, weighted avg., %; Domestic industry diversification; Domestic market scale, bn PPP$). Thus, the average rating of the leading countries in innovative development for the above parameter is 82.4, the coefficient of variation is 8.1 %, which indicates a low level of variation in the assessments of these countries (Table 6.4). 117  Table 6.2 Features of the functioning of innovative ecosystems of the leading countries in innovative development in 2021 Countries Institutions Human capital and research Infrastructure Market sophistication Business sophistication Knowledge and technology outputs Creative outputs grade place grade place grade place grade place grade place grade place grade place Switzerland 87.3 13 60.7 6 62.7 271.5 662.6 463.9 160.2 2 Sweden 88.8 9 64.1 2 62.6 3 64.6 11 68.1 1 60.3 252.9 5 UAE 78.4 30 49.9 22 58.1 14 56.7 26 47.2 22 22.2 59 33.8 40 Great Britain 86.6 15 58.2 10 59.7 10 78.1 449.7 21 52.3 10 54.4 4 The Republic of Korea 79.5 28 67.4 1 59.2 12 60 18 60.1 754.5 852.1 8 Netherlands 88.9 6 55.9 14 57.7 16 55.2 31 61 5 54.8 752.2 7 Finland 93.3 262.4 259.5 11 58.7 19 61 656.5 542.9 16 Singapore 95.1 158.7 957.8 15 75.9 562.7 348.1 13 42.9 17 Denmark 88.8 8 62.3 5 60.8 568 755.2 11 47.6 14 47.7 13 Germany 84.3 17 62.7 3 55.6 21 57.8 20 54.5 12 53.3 950 11 France 83.4 19 55.4 15 57.1 17 61 17 50.4 19 44.3 16 52.6 6 China 64.4 61 50.3 21 54.6 24 61.5 16 54.3 13 58.5 446.5 14 Japan 88.8 7 50.8 20 59.8 962.1 15 57.3 10 48.3 11 42.1 18 Hong Kong 88.1 11 48.6 25 60.3 6 78.7 3 45.2 24 21.6 62 64.7 1 Israel 76.2 34 51.6 19 50.2 40 66.8 858.7 855.9 636.3 30 Mean 84.8 17.4 57.3 11.6 58.4 13.7 65.1 13.7 56.5 11.1 49.5 15.1 48.8 12.8 Variation coefficient 9.1 89.8 10.5 71.9 5.5 70.5 12.0 61.0 11.4 66.5 24.9 125.0 17.1 83.3 Source: compiled by the author based on data [43] Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 118  Table 6.3 Features of innovate ecosystems of the leading countries in innovative development in 2021 («Institutions» parameter) Countries Institutions Political environment Regulatory environment Business environment grade place grade place grade place grade place Switzerland 87.3 13 92.4 3 93.9 7 75.5 47 Sweden 88.8 9 89.4 8 90.5 13 86.3 16 UAE 78.4 30 78.6 24 84.5 21 72 61 Great Britain 86.6 15 80 21 92.4 9 87.4 12 The Republic of Korea 79.5 28 82.1 18 68.2 57 88.1 10 Netherlands 88.9 6 88.4 9 88.9 14 89.4 5 Finland 93.3 2 90.9 5 95.9 5 93.1 1 Singapore 95.1 1 100 1 99.1 1 86.3 17 Denmark 88.8 8 92.8 2 84.6 20 88.9 6 Germany 84.3 17 85.2 14 81.1 29 86.7 14 France 83.4 19 79.9 22 86.3 17 83.9 22 China 64.4 61 65.3 47 49.9 106 78.1 39 Japan 88.8 7 87 11 91.4 11 88.2 9 Hong Kong 88.1 11 86.3 12 96.1 4 81.9 28 Israel 76.2 34 76.6 28 68.6 53 83.4 24 Mean 84.8 17.4 85.0 15.0 84.8 24.5 84.6 20.7 Variation coefficient 9.1 89.8 9.8 81.4 15.6 114.3 6.7 81.3 Source: compiled by the author based on data [43] At the same time, according to such parameters as «Credit» (Ease of getting credit; Domestic credit to private sector, % GDP; Microfinance gross loans, % GDP) and «Investment» (Ease of protecting minority investors, Market capitalization, % GDP; Venture capital investors, deals/bn PPP$ GDP; Venture capital recipients, deals/bn PPP$ GDP), the assessments of the leading countries in innovative development vary significantly and are not characterized by a high level of efficiency – the average assessment of this group of countries is 58.7 and 54.2, respectively, the coefficients of variation are 19.9 % and 35.4 %, respectively. Thus, the assessments of countries vary the most in the Investment parameter. Leading countries in innovative development have comparative success in infrastructure development, which contributes to innovative development. Thus, the average rating of the leading countries in terms of the Infrastructure parameter is 58.4, the coefficient of variation is 5.5 %. 6 Security parameters of the innovative ecosystem 119  Table 6.4 Features of innovative ecosystems of the leading countries innovative development in 2021 (parameter «Market sophistication») Countries Market sophistication Credit Investment Trade diversification and market scale grade place grade place grade place grade place Switzerland 71.5 6 69.2 7 70.6 10 74.6 46 Sweden 64.6 11 57.6 17 54.8 16 81.4 24 UAE 56.7 26 50.6 28 41.1 34 78.4 34 Great Britain 78.1 4 65.3 10 80 5 89.1 3 The Republic of Korea 60 18 64.2 12 31.5 65 84.2 16 Netherlands 55.2 31 43 57 39.5 37 83 20 Finland 58.7 19 49.4 34 48.2 22 78.5 32 Singapore 75.9 5 62.5 13 88.4 1 76.6 39 Denmark 68 7 68.5 8 58.6 13 76.9 37 Germany 57.8 20 51.2 27 32.5 60 89.8 2 France 61 17 47.2 43 48.2 21 87.6 8 China 61.5 16 51.7 26 35.9 44 96.9 1 Japan 62.1 15 64.2 11 34.3 51 87.9 5 Hong Kong 78.7 3 87.5 2 75.2 6 73.5 51 Israel 66.8 8 48 39 74.4 7 77.9 36 Mean 65.1 13.7 58.7 22.3 54.2 26.1 82.4 23.6 Variation coefficient 12.0 61.0 19.9 70.7 35.4 80.6 8.1 72.2 Source: compiled by the author based on data [43] The leading countries of innovative development in terms of infrastructure have achieved the greatest success in the development of information and telecommunications infrastructure, which is quite logical, because in order to ensure effective interaction between the elements of the innovative ecosystem, advanced information and telecommunications technologies are needed. Thus, the average score of the leading countries in innovative development in the parameter «Information and communication technologies technologies «ICTs» (ICT access; ICT use; Government’s online service; E-participation) is 87.5, the coefficient of variation is 5.9 % (Table 6.5). Despite the comparative effectiveness of measures aimed at the development of innovationfriendly infrastructure, the infrastructure in the leading countries of innovative development still requires significant attention, first of all it concerns the «General infrastructure» (Electricity output, GWh/mn pop.; Logistics performance; Gross capital formation, % GDP). Thus, the average Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 120 assessment of the leading countries in terms of the General infrastructure parameter is 44.3, while the assessments of countries are characterized by an average level of variability in these parameters – the coefficient of variation is 15.2 %. As for «Ecological sustainability» (GDP/unit of energy use; Environmental performance; ISO 14001 environmental certificates/bn PPP$ GDP), the leading countries should also pay attention to it. The average assessment of the leading countries in innovative development in this parameter is 43.3 %, the coefficient of variation is 19.5 %. The next feature of the innovative ecosystems of the leading countries in innovative development is their comparative efficiency in terms of the «Human capital and research» parameter. The average rating of the leading countries in innovative development for this parameter is 57.3, the coefficient of variation is 10.5 % (Table 6.6).  Table 6.5 Features of innovative ecosystems of the leading countries innovative development in 2021 (Infrastructure parameter) Countries Infrastructure Information and communication technologies (ICTs) General infrastructure Ecological sustainability grade place grade place grade place grade place Switzerland 62.7 2 87.8 15 42.1 24 58.1 2 Sweden 62.6 3 84.8 22 53.3 6 49.6 17 UAE 58.1 14 88.8 12 52.9 7 32.7 51 Great Britain 59.7 10 93.4 2 34.7 40 50.9 14 The Republic of Korea 59.2 12 94.8 1 49.4 11 33.4 50 Netherlands 57.7 16 90.8 4 41.1 29 41.3 34 Finland 59.5 11 86.8 17 48.8 12 42.9 30 Singapore 57.8 15 90.5 7 46.7 15 36.3 42 Denmark 60.8 5 91 3 39.6 31 51.7 11 Germany 55.6 21 80.2 32 44.2 20 42.3 32 France 57.1 17 87.7 16 42.2 23 41.4 33 China 54.6 24 79.4 34 54.4 5 29.9 59 Japan 59.8 9 90.1 8 46 16 43.2 28 Hong Kong 60.3 6 89.6 10 35.4 39 55.7 4 Israel 50.2 40 76.6 45 33.7 45 40.3 35 Mean 58.4 13.7 87.5 15.2 44.3 21.5 43.3 29.5 Variation coefficient 5.5 70.5 5.9 85.8 15.2 60.2 19.5 58.3 Source: compiled by the author based on data [43] 6 Security parameters of the innovative ecosystem 127 11. 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Available at: https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/ en/2021/ 130 DOI: 10.15587/978-617-7319-59-6.ch7 Ganna Gorina, Galina Bohatyryova, Olha Nikolaichuk, Oleksandr Romanykha 7Assessing security and protection in global tourism Abstract The methodologies and approaches to measuring security and security in global tourism, proposed by the international organizations International SOS and the World Economic Forum, as well as The Institute for Economics & Peace, are considered. 4 rating scales of the countries of the world by the international organization International SOS were highlighted using the interactive Travel Risk Map on risks to the health and security of tourists and travelers, namely: «COVID-19 domestic operations impact scale», «COVID-19 inbound travel impact scale», «Medical risk ratings scale», «Security risk rating scale». The calculation methodology, full descriptions and sources of indicators of pilars «Security and Security» and «Health and Hygiene» of Travel & Tourism Development Index are given. Identified and analyzed the 10 most and least safe and reliable countries in the world to travel on pillars «Security and Security» and «Health and Hygiene» in the Travel & Tourism Development Index. The distribution of the sub-regions of the world according to the indicated components has been carried out. The Global Peace Index framework and the methodology for its calculation are given. A map of the distribution of the countries of the world according to the Global Peace Index has been constructed. To assess the security of a tourist trip and conduct a tourism business in a particular state of the world, the criteria for evaluating and determining indicators are described that allow calculating the «Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict» and «Societal Security and Security» domains by Global Peace Index. 10 most and least peaceful countries were identified and analyzed by «Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict» and «Societal Security and Security» domains. KEYWORDS Security, protection, global tourism, international tourism, rating of countries of the world, rating of countries of the world, COVID-19, risks. 7.1 International SOS Travel Risk Map «Security and protection are vital to the quality of tourism. More than any other economic activity, the success or failure of a tourist destination depends on the ability to provide a safe and secure environment for visitors» [1]. 7 Assessing security and protection in global tourism 131 Hence, security and security are critical factors in determining the success of the tourism and travel sector in a country. Existing approaches to measuring security and security in global tourism make it possible to determine the extent to which local residents, tourists and businesses are affected by diverse risks and security threats. In addition to creating barriers to investment in the tourism and travel sector, countries with a high level of crime, violence, and epidemiological threat scare away visitors, making these places less attractive for the development of the tourism industry [2]. A comprehensive tool for assessing and measuring a wide range of security risks and threats in tourism are international interactive platforms such as the International SOS Travel Risk Map and international ratings compiled by international organizations [3] based on generally recognized indices that serve as a reliable source of global comparable data. In addition, a number of reports from international organizations reveal certain problematic issues of security and protection in international tourism. Key among them are: «Tourist security and security: practical measures for destinations» [1], «Global guidelines for safe & seamless traveler journey» [4], «Tourism as a Driver of Peace» [5], «Safe and seamless travel and improved traveler experience» [6], International Code for the Protection of Tourists [7], and a number of World Travel & Tourism Council protocols to support the sector in achieving an effective recovery from COVID-19 by developing meaningful action plans that optimize efforts for sector-wide recovery [8–18]. The international organization International SOS provides access to an interactive Travel Risk Map [19] to help organizations and individual travelers better understand the risks in the tourism markets of the countries where they work and travel. International SOS Travel Risk Map is providing 4 underlying health and security risk ratings for each location: 1) COVID-19 home operations impact stroke represents the potential overall impact of disease on operating within a certain location1. This is in recognition that the advent of the pandemic has introduced a new variable to all operations – including both office and site-based work. An algorithm that defines a stroke analyzes the underlying health and security threat environment, the recent COVID-19 case active as well as trends of new cases, local travel restrictions, mitigation measures in place [19]. According to the COVID-19 domestic operations impact scale, countries are ranked according to the following scale, each interval of which corresponds to a color-coded interactive map: Very low – health and security constraints to business operations are broadly similar to pre-COVID-19. Low – COVID-related precautions and restrictions causing some inconvenience to business operations. Most businesses are operating. Medium – COVID-related impacts posing routine challenges to business operations. High – essential businesses operational but with significant disruption. Very high – business operations are severely restricted with only essential services operating. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 132 2) The COVID-19 inbound travel impact scale represents the logistical impact of the disease in travelling to a certain location (i.e. inbound travel). The algorithm which defines the scale analyses the inbound travel restrictions such that locations with a higher score will have progressively more restrictive entry requirements [19]. According to the COVID-19 inbound travel impact scale, countries are ranked according to the following scale, each interval of which corresponds to a color-coded interactive map: Very low – no restrictions on inbound travel. Low – inbound travel is broadly possible with some inconvenience. Restrictions affect a limited range of travelers. Medium – inbound travel is possible, but with no inconvenience; restrictions affect a wide range of travelers. High – inbound travel significantly restricted for most travelers. Very high – inbound travel is generally not possible. Government authorities may grant exceptions to specific travelers. 3) International SOS assigns medical risk ratings based on the evolution of the pandemic. The rating must be interpreted in conjunction with the COVID-19 domestic operations scale and the COVID-19 cases status. For locations in outbreak status, even the best healthcare systems may be overwhelmed, limiting access to medical care, and the risk of infection in the general community is increased [19]. The medical risk ratings are based on a range of health risks and mitigating factors, including but not limited to: COVID-19 complexity of accessing and provisioning healthcare, infectious disease, environmental factors linked to climate change, security risk rating, medical evacuation data, standard of emergency medical services, outpatient and inpatient medical care, access to quality pharmaceutical supplies, and cultural, language or administrative barriers. An overall single rating is given for a location; however, the medical landscape can vary widely. For example, major cities may have better access to quality medical care; whereas remote or rural locations may have limited availability of health facilities and specialist care [19]. According to medical risk ratings, countries are ranked according to the following scale, each interval of which corresponds to an interactive map of a certain color: Low medical risk – quality medical care is available throughout the country. Specialist care, emergency and dental services, and quality prescription drugs are widely available. Low risk of infectious diseases. Medium medical risk – quality medical care is available from selected providers. Reliable emergency services, limited specialist and dental care are usually available. Some risk of food or water-borne diseases. Potentially life-threatening infectious diseases such as malaria and typhoid may be present. 7 Assessing security and protection in global tourism 133 Variable medical risk – significant variation of travel medical risk: Quality medical care, emergency services, and dental care is available from selected providers in major cities, including prescription drugs. Elsewhere: availability of these services may be limited. Similarly, exposure to food, water-borne or potentially life-threatening infectious diseases may vary. High medical risk – basic emergency services, medical and dental care may be available. Specialist care is limited even in major cities. A wide range of quality prescription drugs may not be available. Food and water-borne infections are common. Potentially life-threatening infectious diseases such as malaria, typhoid and cholera may persistently pose a threat. Very high medical risk – healthcare is almost non-existent or severely overtaxed. There may be very limited or no primary care, emergency care or dental services. Quality prescription drugs are frequently unavailable. Food and water-borne infections are common. Potentially life-threatening infectious diseases such as malaria and cholera may be persistently present and large outbreaks may occur. 4) The security risk rating evaluates the threat posed to employees by political violence (including terrorism, insurgency, politically motivated unrest and war), social unrest (including sectarian, communal and ethnic violence) as well as violent and petty crime. Other factors, such as the robustness of the transport infrastructure, the state of industrial relations, the effectiveness of the security and emergency services and the countr y’s susceptibility to natural disasters are also considered where they are of sufficient magnitude to impact the overall risk environment for employees [19]. According to the security risk rating, countries are ranked according to the following scale, each interval of which responds to interactive and maps of a certain color: Insignificant security risk – rates of violent crime are very low. There is no significant political violence or civil unrest and little sectarian, communal, racial or targeted violence against foreigners. Security and emergency services are effective and infrastructure is sound. Transport services are of a high standard with good security records and only occasional travel disruption. Industrial action affecting essential services is rare. Low security risk – violent crime rates are low and racial, sectarian or political violence or civil unrest is uncommon. If terrorism is a threat, groups have limited operational capabilities, and acts of terrorism are rare. Security and emergency services are effective and infrastructure is sound. Industrial action and transport disruption are infrequent. Medium security risk – periodic political unrest, violent protests, insurgency and/or sporadic acts of terrorism occur. Travelers and international assignees may face risk from communal, sectarian or racial violence and violent crime. Capacity of security and emergency services and infrastructure varies. Industrial action can disrupt travel. Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 134 High security risk – protests are frequently violent and may target or disrupt foreigners; they may be exacerbated by governance issues, including security or law and order capacity. Violent crime and terrorism pose significant direct or incidental risks to travelers and international assignees. Communal, sectarian or racial violence is common and foreigners may be directly targeted. Certain parts of the country are inaccessible or off-limits to the traveler. Extreme security risk – government control and law and order may be minimal or non-existent across large areas. Serious threat of violent attacks by armed groups targeting travelers and international assignees. Government and transport services are barely functional. Large parts of the country are inaccessible to foreigners. The combination of these rating results in a comprehensive overview of health, security and COVID-19 risks in a destination, determination of the amount of travel risk mitigation or mitigation efforts required, assessment of tourism business opportunities in a country, etc. 7.2 Pillars «Security and Security» and «Health and Hygiene» of The Travel & Tourism Development Index The Travel & Tourism Development Index (TTDI) is an evolution of the 15-year-old Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Index (TTCI) series, a flagship index of the World Economic Forum’s Platform for Shaping the Future of Mobility. The index provides a strategic benchmarking tool for business, governments, international organizations and others to develop the T&T sector. By allowing cross-country comparison and by benchmarking countries’ progress on the drivers of T&T development, it informs policies and investment decisions related to the development of T&T businesses and the sector as a whole. The index provides unique insights into the strengths and areas for development of each country to support their efforts to enhance the long-term growth of their T&T sector in a sustainable and resilient manner. Furthermore, it provides a valuable platform for multistakeholder dialogue to formulate appropriate policies and actions at local, national, regional and global levels [20]. The index is comprised of five subindexes, 17 pillars and 112 individual indicators, distributed among the different pillars (Fig. 7.1). However, the five subindexes are not factored into the calculation of the index and are used only for presentation and categorization purposes [21]. These 17 pillars are comprised of 112 indicators that are calculated on the basis of data derived from the Executive Opinion Survey (the Survey) as well as quantitative data from other sources. The survey data is derived from responses to the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey and ranges in value from 1 (worst) to 7 (best). The TTDI is calculated as an average (arithmetic mean) of the 17 component pillar averages (arithmetic means). While figures for the five subindexes are provided, they are used for 7 Assessing security and protection in global tourism 135 categorization and presentation purposes only. Each of the pillars is calculated as an unweighted average of the individual component variables.  Fig. 7.1 Travel & Tourism Development Index framework [21] Enabling Environment Travel and Tourism Policy and Enabling Conditions Travel and Tourism Sustainability Travel and Tourism Demand Drivers Infrastructure Travel & Tourism Development Index framework Business environment Human resources and labor market ICT readiness Safety and Security Health and Hygiene Prioritization of travel and tourism International openness Price competitiveness Air transport infrastructure Tourist service infrastructure Ground and port infrastructure Natural resources Cultural resources Non-leisure resources Environmental sustainability Socioeconomic resilience and conditions Travel and tourism demand pressure and impact – index – subindexes – pillars The components by which it is possible to assess the safety of a tourist trip to a particular country are Pillars «Security and Security» and «Health and Hygiene» of the «Enabling Environment» sub-index. Pillar «Security and Security» (6 indicators). Security and security are critical factors in determining the success of a country’s T&T sector. This pillar measures the extent to which a country exposes locals, tourists and businesses to security risks. In addition to creating barriers to T&T investment, countries with a high incidence of crime or violence are likely to deter visitors, making it less attractive to develop the T&T sector in those places. Here, the costliness and occurrence of common crime and violence, police reliability, and terrorism and armed conflict are considered [21]. Pillar «Security and Security» is calculated as an unweighted average of 6 indicators (Fig. 7.2). The data used in the calculation of the pillars includes data derived from the Executive Opinion Survey as well as statistical data from other organizations. In the case of indicators derived from the Executive Opinion Survey (the Survey), the full question and associated answers are provided. Research has shown that a sustainable and open tourism sector can be resilient to violence and conflict and that it can contribute to positive peace, namely the relationships, institutions and Challenges and paradigm of national and international security of the XXI century: economic and technogenic discourse 136 structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. More precisely, the mechanisms by which tourism can achieve this include cultural and information exchange, the promotion of tolerance, better functioning of government, the development of human capital, and local and cross-border economic benefits, which can reduce risks to the world [5].  Fig. 7.2 Pillar «Security and Security» framework Source: compiled by the authors according to the data [21] Business costs of crime and violence Safety walking alone at night Reliability of police services Organized violence, deaths Global Terrorism Index – survey data – quantitative data Homicide rate The Travel & Tourism Development Index data, namely Pillars «Security and Security», shows that the Top 10 countries for this component include countries with high-income economies with a diversified regional location. The Asia-Pacific region is represented by Singapore (1st place in the rating; 6.7 points). Middle East and North Africa is represented by United Arab Emirates (2nd place in the rating; 6.5 points) and Qatar (5th place in the rating; 6.4 points). Europe and Eurasia is represented by Iceland (3rd place in the rating; 6.5 points), Switzerland (4th place in the rating; 6.4 points), Finland (6th place in the rating; 6.4 points), Luxembourg (7th place in the rating; 6.3 points), Austria (8th place in the rating; 6.3 points), Slovenia (9th place in the rating; 6.3 points) and Estonia (10th place in the rating; 6.3 points) (Table 7.1). TTDI data for 2021 shows that the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia tend to have the lowest security and security scores, creating an additional hurdle for the future development of the tourism and travel sector in these destinations. The less developed economies of the regions require significant investment in mobility and infrastructure services, especially for land transport, as well as a marked need for increased international openness. Moving up 3 places in the ratings compared to 2020 and being at the bottom of the ratings, Mexico was rated 2.39 points out of 7 possible. 116 place Nigeria with 2.85 points (position change in the rating (+1)). By a margin of 0.29 points ahead of Mali (3.14 points; –3 in the ratings). 114th place – Venezuela (3.15 points; +1 in the rating), 113th place – Yemen (3.18 points; +3 in the rating), 112th place – South Africa (3.51 points; +1 in the rating), 111th place – Colombia (3.77 points; no change in rating),