Family oblige: the link between CSR and succession intention in small and medium family firms

Stübner, Andrea; Jarchow, Svenja Article — Published Version Family oblige: the link between CSR and succession intention in small and medium family firms Journal of Business Economics Provided in Cooperation with: Springer Nature Suggested Citation: Stübner, Andrea; Jarchow, Svenja (2022) : Family oblige: the link between CSR and succession intention in small and medium family firms, Journal of Business Economics, ISSN 1861-8928, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, Vol. 93, Iss. 3, pp. 389-431, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-022-01113-9 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313394 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Vol.:(0123456789) Journal of Business Economics (2023) 93:389–431 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-022-01113-9 1 3 ORIGINAL PAPER Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention insmall andmedium family firms AndreaStübner1 · SvenjaJarchow2 Accepted: 15 August 2022 / Published online: 29 November 2022 © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract This study investigates how family continuation, namely family tradition and succession intention, alter the socially responsible behavior of small and medium sized (SME) family firms. Using a unique dataset, we have conducted multiple regressions on survey data from German family SMEs and show a statistically and economically significant increase in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) alongside the planning of family succession. However, when analyzing the different facets of CSR, we have found strong variances: While succession intention goes along with an increased community, market, and supply chain engagement this is not the case for CSR directed towards employees, or the environment. Family tradition didn’t correlate with a change in CSR behaviour to a relevant extent. In our theoretical embedding we employed socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory to explain our findings. Thereby, our study fills a gap in the literature adding the perspective of SME family firms on the use of CSR in the context of family succession and also adding to the theoretical understanding of SEW. Keywords CSR· SME· SEW· Family firm succession Both authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation and data collection were performed by Andrea Stübner, and analysis by both authors. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Andrea Stübner and both authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript. The datasets analysed during the current study are not publicly available due to confidential company data but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. * Andrea Stübner [email protected] Svenja Jarchow jarcho[email protected] 1 Chair ofManagement Accounting, Technical University ofMunich, Arcisstr. 21, 80333Munich, Germany 2 Center forEntrepreneurial andFinancial Studies (CEFS), Technical University ofMunich, Arcisstr. 21, 80333Munich, Germany 390 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 JEL Classification M14· G32· D22· D64 1 Introduction Small business social responsibility (Wickert etal. 2016) differs from CSR in large multi-national organizations (MNOs) (Spence 2016; Gray and Jones 2016), as a growing body of literature shows (Jenkins 2006, 2009; Spence 2016; Murillo and Lozano 2006; Hammann et al. 2009): Feeling lower institutional pressure to act responsibly (Jenkins 2004), SMEs seem to be driven by values and beliefs instead of strategic considerations or formal codes of conduct (Woods and Joyce 2003; Laguir etal. 2016; Jenkins 2004; Wickert etal. 2016). However, they often struggle with scarce financial and time resources as well as a lack of knowledge when confronted with stakeholder demands (Perrini etal. 2007; Graafland etal. 2003). This reduces the probability that SMEs adopt CSR out of a mere “me too” attitude. Instead, reputation (e.g., Soundararajan etal. 2017; Murillo and Lozano 2006; Jenkins 2006; Fuller and Tian 2006), personal values and conviction (e.g., Spence et al. 2003; Murillo and Lozano 2006; Hammann etal. 2009) play a crucial role. Furthermore, advantages such as increased sales (Jenkins 2006) and cost reduction (Gadenne etal. 2009) as well as employer attractiveness (Jenkins 2006; Perrini etal. 2007; Worthington etal. 2006), higher organizational commitment (Farooq etal. 2014; Hofman and Newman 2014) and weaker turnover intentions (e.g., Ghosh and Gurunathan 2014) all factor in. A defining characteristic of family firms is their intention to preserve the influential role of the founding family—namely their succession intention (e.g., Berrone etal. 2012). Literature indicates, but does not confirm, that succession intention has a positive effect on CSR activities (Meier and Schier 2021). Our study goes into depth, investigating this relationship. So far, literature on CSR in family firms has shown differences in the amount of CSR applied over time (Nason etal. 2018). An obvious reason could be a succession event (McGuire etal. 2012). Since the event itself is easily measurable, it became the focus of prior studies. Pan etal. (2018) observed an increase in CSR-related activities shortly after a succession event, explaining it as the strategic intention to enhance visibility of the successor. However, despite their observation, it remains unclear why this happens at that particular point in time—businesses might, for example, be too caught up in the preparation of the succession, somehow losing track of their CSR beforehand. However, Pan etal. (2018) only focus on the philanthropic side of CSR, not taking into account other aspects such as employees, environmental concerns, or fair market behavior. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that it is not the event itself but rather the intention for succession that influences CSR activities in SME family firms (Li etal. 2015). Our study fills this gap, by bringing succession intention to the center of the investigation of CSR activities. Germany is a good example, with the main part of its SMEs belonging to the family-led “Mittelstand” (IfM 2020). Thereby, it represents a context of succession exemplary for many other countries worldwide. For our investigation, we adapted the approach of Zellweger etal. (2012) to show how intra-family succession 391 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… intention influences CSR behavior. By taking the organizational as well as the individual level of the owner-manager into account, we additionally follow a call by Soundararajan et al. (2017) for multi-level research. Research centered on family firms describes heterogeneity in leadership as an important source of differing CSR performance (e.g., Labelle etal. 2018; Campopiano etal. 2014). One reason for this heterogeneity is the intention to succeed business within the family, often related to the theory of socio-emotional wealth (SEW). With CSR being driven at least partly by non-financial motivation and the theory of SEW presuming family firm peculiarities to increase the importance of non-financial goals, SEW is supposed to increase the firm’s social responsibility (e.g., Zellweger etal. 2013; Cruz etal. 2014). From this background we argue that family businesses not only react to the looming CEO succession, but it might also be their foremost intention to keep business within the family that goes along with a differing CSR behavior. By showing that it is indeed this intention for intra-family firm succession that correlates with an increase of overall CSR, our study gives indication that family firms act less strategically than the findings of Pan etal. (2018) demonstrate. We underline this by dividing CSR into differing aspects that depict the main stakeholders: CSR related to employees, the environment, the community as well as the market (ElAkremi etal. 2018). Splitting up CSR confirms the influence of succession intention on CSR directed towards the community. Regarding other fields, this effect cannot be confirmed completely, which opens new questions on the social responsibility of family SMEs. In contrast to our approach most empirical studies researching CSR and employing SEW focus on large, listed family firms (Cruz etal. 2014; Dyer and Whetten 2006; Garcia-Sanchez etal. 2020; Yu etal. 2015): They mainly use the extent of ownership and control to assess SEW (Cruz etal. 2014; Labelle et al. 2018; Yu etal. 2015). However, choosing continuation of the family dynasty out of the various dimensions of SEW (Berrone etal. 2012) has several advantages: First, firm succession is seen as an important facet of SEW. Berrone etal. (2012) even state that family firms without transgenerational control resemble non-family firms. Second, the context of SME family firms allows keeping the other dimensions of SEW rather constant: Family control and influence is often high among SMEs with the sample at hand containing around 97% of owner-managed firms. Therefore, the identification of the family members with the firm can be assumed to be high as well. With respect to Audretsch (2002), Jenkins (2006), Soundararajan etal. (2017) we can expect close and intensive relationships with various internal and external stakeholders (Kuttner etal. 2019). Altogether, our setting offers a unique opportunity to gather primary data on the SEW setting in German family SMEs. Therefore, this study asks: Do succession intention and family tradition correlate with a general as well as differentiated increase in CSR of small and medium sized family firms? Our study makes three contributions to the literature: First, it shows that the mere intention to succeed within the family correlates with family SMEs’ CSR behavior. Therefore, it confirms that succession intention accumulates SEW as proposed by Schulze and Kellermanns (2015). Second, it finds that the intention to hand over within the family selectively increases the consideration of external stakeholder needs, complementing existing work on family firm’s CSR in these situations (Pan 392 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 etal. 2018). Thereby, the study is not limited to cash donations but includes nonfinancial engagement of the firms as well. Third, it shows that SEW works differently in SME family firms than in their larger counterparts: While Cruz etal. (2014) observed that SEW reduces the consideration of employee needs, this is not the case in our SME setting. The paper proceeds as followed: Sect. 2 provides an overview of the literature and deduces the hypotheses. Section3 gives insight into the research design and the methodology applied while Sect.4 presents our results. Finally Sect.5 discusses our findings before summing up in Sect.6. 2 Theoretical framework andhypothesis development 2.1 CSR infamily firms Research on CSR is increasingly concentrating on the peculiarities of family firms. According to Mariani etal. (2021) more than half of the papers on CSR in family firms were published within the last decade. The authors thereby identify three main topics: First, the role of family involvement on CSR, addressing the role of ownership, control, and influence of the family as well as the structure of the family firm. A second stream in the literature focuses on aspects of corporate governance, such as the role of family vs. independent directors and managers on CSR. Finally, they identify a third stream in the literature, focusing on CSR practices in family firms (Mariani etal. 2021). Comparing the CSR performance of (mostly listed) family and non-family firms, several authors have found higher social as well as environmental responsibility in family firms than in non-family firms (e.g., Garcia-Sanchez etal. 2020; Madden etal. 2020). In addition, Kashmiri and Mahajan (2014) found family firms more likely to maintain their corporate social performance in times of recession. SEW is thereby considered to be among the major drivers for CSR in family firms, together with firm features (such as firm size and name), corporate governance (e.g., the involvement of family members on boards of directors) and ethics respectively religion (Mariani etal. 2021). Several studies also found an increasing level of CSR with higher family involvement; however, as this is often seen as one aspect of SEW itself, we discuss this in Sect.2.3. All in all, apart from a few exceptions (e.g., Britzelmaier etal. 2015), these studies investigated larger, often listed companies. 2.2 CSR andfirm succession While research found a correlation between CSR and survival of family firms across various cultural contexts (e.g., Ahmad etal. 2020), various arguments have been made as for what really drives CSR in family firms. Among the few papers targeting this issue, most concentrate on larger, listed companies. As succession is a major characteristic of family firms and often marks a turning point, it has also been the center of attention with regard to its influence on CSR. Sarfraz etal. (2020) 393 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… investigated the influence of CEO succession and the hierarchical order disturbances this event can cause among the board of directors, reducing CSR performance of Chinese listed companies. Regarding research on family firms, dynastic succession is seen as one aspect of high family involvement, whereas high family involvement is found to be linked to higher CSR activity as well (Marques etal. 2014). Meier and Schier (2021) state that the age of the family-firm CEO moderates the effect of the founder/non-founder generation on corporate social performance. While they see their findings as an indication that family CEOs adapt their CSR over time, they do not take alternative explanations into account, such as a motivation to keep business within the family. Altogether, research establishes a close link between family firm succession and CSR performance. However, to date we lack insight on the mechanisms leading to this link or whether it applies for SMEs in the same way. 2.3 Socio‑emotional wealth (SEW) Gómez-Mejía etal. (2007) initially define SEW as the non-economic utilities a family derives from its business. For these non-financial utilities, persistence, identity, or positive image and reputation (e.g., Berrone etal. 2010; Zellweger etal. 2012) count. Most of the studies thereby focus on family ownership and the extent of family control (Mariani etal. 2021). One exception is Zellweger etal. (2012), who took the aspect of firm continuation into account, meaning the intention to keep business within the family. They researched the owner’s firm value perception, finding a strong increase of SEW with transgenerational control (the intention to keep business within the family) and a weak increase with a longer firm tradition. SEW as a “key feature distinguishing family firms from non-family firms” (Schulze and Kellermanns 2015,p. 449) is found to cause various effects, among them the will to preserve family control (Gómez-Mejía etal. 2007) or to engage in environmentally responsible behavior to avoid reputational risks (Berrone et al. 2010). As reputational concerns are found to be one of the main drivers for CSR as well (see e.g., Windolph etal. 2014), one would expect CSR to rise with higher levels of SEW. However, research is divided on the effects of SEW on CSR activities. Some state that family firms try to preserve and enhance their SEW through proactive stakeholder engagement (Cennamo etal. 2012; Berrone etal. 2012). Others oppose this view, arguing that family firms might overlook the needs of others when, driven by high SEW, they focus heavily on their own concerns (e.g., Kellermanns etal. 2012). Cruz etal. (2014) researched the influence of the extent of family control on CSR. They found a contradictory behavior: while family firms with high SEW increase their efforts towards external stakeholders, they tend to neglect internal stakeholder interests. This study adds the perspective of small and medium family firms to the literature. Presuming firm tradition and transgenerational intentions as an indicator for higher SEW, we not only investigate their effect on CSR in total but also their effect on different factors of CSR. In the following, we present four hypotheses on this subject. 394 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 2.4 Hypotheses development regardingfamily firm CSR While SEW is supposed to accumulate in correlation with the family history, research is divided as to how this might happen. One stream in the literature thereby focuses on a long firm tradition. Porter and Kramer (2011) point to the socially responsible role companies traditionally played in a business environment less dominated by governmental institutions, ensuring a respect for the needs of the community: “The best companies once took on a broad range of roles in meeting the needs of workers, communities, and supporting businesses.” (Porter and Kramer 2011,p. 6). Family firms with a long tradition might have preserved this attitude in a set of family values. Zellweger etal. argue that the non-financial SEW builds up in family firms with a longer duration of control. They justify this with emotional attachment to long-term possessions (Zellweger etal. 2012). Additionally, stakeholder relationships themselves grow and intensify over time (Cennamo etal. 2012), making stakeholder demands even more present in firms with a long-grown stakeholder network worth preserving. As higher levels of SEW are found to increase CSR (Cruz etal. 2014), longer tradition as a family firm should lead to higher overall CSR engagement if family tradition accumulates SEW. This leads to our first hypothesis: H1: Firms with longer family tradition show a higher overall CSR activity. Other authors argue that it is less the extent of family tradition but rather the peculiarities of family firm stages that cause varying levels of SEW. Miller and LeBreton-Miller (2014) propose that the founder generation gives priority to sound business practices, avoiding unnecessary risk for the firm. If CEOs in this first stage put financial firm interest before personal reputational needs and, moreover, resources are scarce, CSR activity should be limited. Later stages would then reveal higher levels of SEW due to rising reputational concerns, lower liabilities, lower financial constraints (LeBreton-Miller and Miller 2013) as well as more opportunities and higher pressure for social responsibility when firms become more visible in the community (Miller etal. 2013). Therefore we expect the following: H2a: Firms beyond the founder stage show a higher level of overall CSR. However, Gómez-Mejía etal. (2007) propose a peak of SEW in the founder generation, diminishing with further generations as the owning family grows and the owner family does not comprise just parents and siblings. With a larger and more complex network of family members less closely related, identification with the firm diminishes and individual interests gain weight (LeBreton-Miller and Miller 2013). Martinez-Martinez etal. (2017) empirically confirmed that the founder’s participation increases CSR in family firms. This leads to the opposing hypothesis: H2b: With surpassing the founder generation SMEs show a lower level of overall CSR. 395 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… 2.5 Hypotheses development regardingtheinfluence ofsuccession intention After investigating whether family tradition or family stage influence CSR behavior, we focus on the aspect of transgenerational control, meaning the intention to succeed business within the family. Various studies see family firms as predestined for taking a long-term perspective oriented on the needs of future generations (e.g., Laguir etal. 2016). The intention of transgenerational control is seen as an important aspect of SEW (Chrisman etal. 2012; Zellweger etal. 2012). Zellweger etal. (2013) point to an increasing concern for the corporate reputation going along with a strong intention to hand over the business within the family. Thus, the intention to keep business in the family should lead to a rising CSR activity, especially in SMEs, where the family plays a particularly important role (Spence 2016): H3: The intention to succeed business within the family leads to a higher level of overall CSR activities. 2.6 Hypotheses development regardingdifferent dimensions ofCSR Firms follow different patterns when reacting to the various stakeholder claims: They might follow a strategic, holistic approach to reach a balanced CSR, taking contradictory stakeholder claims into account. Or they might act in a more selective way, aiming at specific goals but neglecting the possible downturn of their action (Zientara 2017). The question now is whether succession intention correlates with the more strategic, balanced approach or rather with the selective, instrumental way. How holistic should a strategic approach for SMEs be? Which stakeholders are of relevance in an SME context? As a matter of fact, this question is to be answered by each firm according to its specific situation. However, there are indications that a consideration of all stakeholders seems indeed appropriate: Regarding their employees, the literature finds family firms to take internal stakeholders more into account than non-family firms (Stavrou and Swiercz 1998; Mayo etal. 2016). They often maintain trustful and empathetic relationships with them (Miller and LeBreton-Miller 2005), provide stable employment (Block 2010; Stavrou etal. 2007) and more “care-oriented” contracts (Cruz et al. 2010; Uhlaner etal. 2004; Cennamo etal. 2012). This underlines the high relevance of employees as stakeholders. Another aspect when considering employee needs is the backfiring effect of an imbalanced CSR observed by Scheidler et al. (2019): Considering external stakeholder needs while at the same time neglecting internal stakeholder might even demotivate employees. To avoid such negative impact, balancing an increase in external stakeholder consideration with a rise in internal CSR would be a critical aspect of a strategic CSR approach. Coming to the consideration of external aspects, such as the environment, the community, suppliers, and customers (see e.g., ElAkremi etal. 2018), Cruz etal. (2014) are in accord with other authors that SEW in general, and thus succession intention in our setting should increases their consideration (e.g., Gómez-Mejía etal. 2011; Carney 2005). In times of increasing concerns about climate change and rising demand for “green” products, taking 396 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 environmental aspects into account seems reasonable. Furthermore, negative environmental incidents might reflect on the general image of the firm, harming its reputation which in turn is of high importance in the family firm context. For a balanced CSR increase, one would therefore expect to see a rise in environmental CSR as well. Firm philanthropy is a CSR factor in which family firms are found to be very active in general (Cruz etal. 2014; Dou etal. 2014; Pan etal. 2018; StiftungFamilienunternehmen 2020; Feliu and Botero 2016). Pan etal. (2018) found that family firms in a succession context do more philanthropy to improve reputation as well as to increase the visibility of the successor. Therefore, succession intention should increase the social CSR of family firms. An objection by Klein etal. (2018) and Block and Wager (2014) that families might gain reputation and social status from engaging directly, not through the firm, seems less relevant in an SME context: small firms often lack the financial resources to maintain their own family foundation and owner-managers keep direct control even when engaging through the firm. Regarding CSR directed towards the supply chain, family SMEs are often obliged to consider CSR aspects when B2B customers explicitly demand them to do so. In this case, one would not expect a rise due to higher SEW. However, responsible behavior in this field can also be a source of reputation, for example if B2C customers appreciate the use of environmental friendly materials or a procurement from local suppliers. It might also be part of their environmental strategy if firms seek to achieve a lower carbon footprint through regional supply. For a balanced approach, one would therefore expect it to rise as well. Finally, CSR directed to customers comprises aspects such as answering reclamations promptly and systematically, giving exhausting information about products or designing products along customers’ needs. Many SMEs exhibit a very intense and personal contact with their clients (Spence 2016). A strong dependence on word of mouth further intensifies customer orientation. Customers therefore seem to be a rich source of reputation in an SME context. If succession intention spurs reputational concerns among family firms, it should increase its customer-oriented CSR as well. Taking the above arguments, we therefore state: H4a: Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards employees. H4b: Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards the environment. H4c: Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards society. H4d: Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards suppliers. 403 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… significant effect for the development stage of the family, supporting neither hypothesis 2a nor 2b. However, a power analysis assuming a power of 0.8 and an expected R2 of 0.1 revealed that the regression would have detected an effect size of more than 0.0337.5 This questions whether there is an economically relevant difference at all between the CSR behavior of the founder and later generations. As we find neither influence of Table 3 Regression CSR vs. family tradition and succession intention p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (1) (2) (3) CSRtotal CSRtotal CSRtotal Succession 2.34** (0.00) 2.21** (0.00) Firm age − 0.00 (0.91) − 0.00 (0.69) − 0.00 (0.87) lnEmp 1.82*** (0.00) 1.60*** (0.00) 1.06* (0.01) Revenue = steady − 1.29 (0.20) − 1.01 (0.34) − 1.15 (0.28) Revenue = increase − 0.80 (0.50) − 0.80 (0.52) − 0.95 (0.45) Invest = steady 0.60 (0.55) − 0.02 (0.98) − 0.06 (0.95) Invest = increase 1.88 (0.15) 1.44 (0.28) 1.32 (0.32) Construction − 0.78 (0.43) − 0.71 (0.49) − 0.98 (0.34) Health services − 1.04 (0.65) − 0.50 (0.83) − 0.75 (0.74) Automotive 0.03 (0.98) 0.27 (0.84) − 0.53 (0.70) Food, beverages − 0.33 (0.85) − 0.15 (0.93) 0.31 (0.87) Industrial needs − 0.44 (0.72) − 0.59 (0.62) − 0.77 (0.51) Personal needs 0.65 (0.54) 0.85 (0.45) 0.76 (0.49) Gender − 0.31 (0.81) − 0.44 (0.74) − 0.30 (0.82) CEO age 0.04 (0.31) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.33) CEO education = 1 1.23 (0.40) 0.71 (0.63) 1.06 (0.47) CEO education = 2 2.78 (0.32) 2.63 (0.34) 2.89 (0.30) CEO motives Religion 1.35 (0.19) 1.39 (0.19) 1.50 (0.15) Social motives 3.56*** (0.00) 3.57*** (0.00) 2.92*** (0.00) Cost reduction − 0.94 (0.19) Competitors − 0.61 (0.68) Subsidies 0.60 (0.67) Image 1.10 (0.13) Employee retention 1.64* (0.04) Conviction 2.11* (0.05) Constant 35.65*** (0.00) 35.09*** (0.00) 33.87*** (0.00) Adj. R2 0.16 0.19 0.21 N 299 286 286 5 With a sample size of 289. 404 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 family tradition nor of being the founder generation, we keep family tradition as a control variable in our further analysis following Zellweger etal. (2012). Effect of succession intention on CSR in general Succession intention shows an economically and statistically significant positive effect on CSR behavior for both models (2) and (3), which supports hypothesis 3 (see Table3). Like in the study of Pan etal. (2018) the influence of CEO social motives is significantly positive. Table 4 Regression CSR vs. founder generation and succession intention p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (1) (2) (3) CSRtotal CSRtotal CSRtotal Succession 2.289** (0.002) 2.188** (0.003) Founder − 0.986 (0.207) − 0.903 (0.257) − 1.135 (0.153) ln_emp 1.988*** (0.000) 1.737*** (0.000) 1.233** (0.005) Revenue = steady − 1.381 (0.173) − 1.118 (0.294) − 1.270 (0.231) Revenue = increase − 0.851 (0.477) − 0.850 (0.499) − 1.035 (0.406) Invest = steady 0.604 (0.544) 0.052 (0.960) − 0.016 (0.987) Invest = increase 1.848 (0.152) 1.439 (0.280) 1.312 (0.321) Construction − 0.807 (0.415) − 0.729 (0.478) − 1.008 (0.325) Health Services − 1.428 (0.534) − 0.842 (0.716) − 1.193 (0.601) Automotive − 0.011 (0.994) 0.241 (0.859) − 0.626 (0.650) Food, beverages − 0.078 (0.962) − 0.089 (0.957) 0.540 (0.756) Industrial needs − 0.561 (0.638) − 0.702 (0.558) − 0.916 (0.440) Personal needs 0.652 (0.539) 0.860 (0.443) 0.812 (0.463) Gender female − 0.474 (0.712) − 0.545 (0.681) − 0.484 (0.712) CEO age 0.040 (0.282) 0.048 (0.216) 0.040 (0.297) CEO education = 1 1.152 (0.425) 0.725 (0.619) 1.009 (0.485) CEO education = 2 2.995 (0.279) 2.773 (0.317) 3.056 (0.268) CEO motives Religion 1.486 (0.147) 1.504 (0.153) 1.680 (0.108) Social motives 3.700*** (0.000) 3.677*** (0.000) 3.057*** (0.000) Cost reduction − 0.987 (0.165) Competitors − 0.572 (0.701) Subsidies 0.650 (0.637) Image 1.235 + (0.092) Employee retention 1.687* (0.036) Conviction 2.028 (0.057) Constant 35.380*** (0.000) 34.671*** (0.000) 33.630*** (0.000) Adj. R2 0.164 0.191 0.220 N 299.000 286.000 286.000 405 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… Controlling for additional personal motives of the owner-manager in the final model (3) reveals further significant effects of employee retention and personal conviction. An intention for intra-family succession turned out to be a powerful driver for responsible behavior when regarding the firms’ overall CSR score. But does this really mean that firms act in a comprehensive and balanced way, considering all relevant stakeholders? Or is the effect rather driven by strong engagement in some realms only? Effect of family tradition and succession intention on CSR factors With CSR being a multidimensional construct, we apply the extended model (3) on different CSR factors. Exploratory factor analysis (Table 13 in the appendix) revealed five factors with eigenvalues > 1 (see Table13 in the appendix) namely CSR directed towards employees (CSRemp), towards the environment (CSRenv), towards the community (CSRsoc), the market and supply chain (CSRsupply) as well as towards customers (CSRclient). A scree plot indicated five factors as well (see Fig.4 in the appendix). The correlation matrix shows various correlations of statistical significance (see Table12 in the appendix). As we expected possible correlation between the factors, we used oblique oblimin rotation, controlled for matching with the theoretical assumptions and dropped items with factor loadings of less than .35 or relevant cross-loadings (Hinkin 1998). We further checked the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin values, finding only values above 0.67 with a mean of 0.75 (see Table 14 in the appendix). Regarding Cronbachs 𝛼 we yielded poor results for CSRsupply and CSRclients, so we didn’t consider them for further analyses. As a result Table5 shows significant positive effects of succession intention on social CSR (6) - which coincides with the findings of (Pan et al. 2018). Neither succession intention nor family tradition can be related to a significant increase in employee oriented CSR (Model 4). In hindsight of the importance employees play for the firm and the negative effects that succession can have on employees, this finding seems rather surprising. It points to an imbalanced increase of CSR in small and medium family firms under the influence of elevated socio-emotional wealth. However, the analysis does not confirm the findings of Cruz etal. (2014) that SEW reduces internal CSR.6 Unfortunately, in this analysis our model shows indication for misspecification in the RESET-test. However, repeating the analysis with the reduced motivational drivers (only social motives and religion as Cruz etal. (2014) do it in their analysis) cured the misspecification while still not showing any significant effect for family tradition or transgenerational intention (see Table15 in the appendix). Regarding CSR directed towards the environment in model (5), neither succession intention nor firm tradition do show significant influence. Engagement in this realm seems to be driven mainly by personal conviction, but not affected by SEW. Overall, the results support only H4c—SEW seems to fuel responsible behavior in a selective way. As mentioned in Sect.3, we didn’t take CSR directed towards clients and the supply chain into account due to low values of Cronbach’s 𝛼 . As we 6 Cruz etal. (2014) measure SEW analysing the extend of control the family holds while we indicate it through firm tradition and succession intention. 406 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 found indication for heteroscedasticity in model (4) and (5), we repeated the analyses with a robust methodology, obtaining similar results. 4.1 Robustness CEO age imputed Unfortunately the variable Age of CEO yielded a high percentage of more than 18 % missings in the sample. To avoid possible bias we imputed missing ages with mvn regression. The results in Tables6 and 7 show a bit lower Table 5 Regression CSR factors vs. succession intention p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (4) (5) (6) CSRemp CSRenv CSRsoc Succession 0.282 (0.28) 0.241 (0.32) 0.392* (0.01) Firm age − 0.001 (0.75) 0.001 (0.74) 0.003 (0.13) ln_emp 0.356* (0.03) − 0.266 (0.06) 0.441*** (0.00) Revenue = steady − 0.170 (0.64) 0.193 (0.57) − 0.111 (0.62) Revenue = increase − 0.023 (0.96) 0.204 (0.61) 0.167 (0.52) Invest = steady − 0.144 (0.69) − 0.598 (0.08) − 0.051 (0.82) Invest = increase 0.185 (0.68) − 0.340 (0.43) − 0.178 (0.52) Construction − 0.475 (0.17) − 0.875** (0.01) 0.094 (0.66) Health services − 0.147 (0.84) − 0.769 (0.29) 0.328 (0.49) Automotive − 0.302 (0.51) − 0.337 (0.45) 0.154 (0.59) Food, beverages − 0.770 (0.20) − 0.420 (0.47) 0.370 (0.33) Industrial needs 0.027 (0.95) − 0.106 (0.78) 0.034 (0.89) Personal needs − 0.195 (0.62) − 0.081 (0.82) 0.173 (0.46) Gender 0.366 (0.43) 0.292 (0.49) − 0.468 (0.09) CEO age − 0.039** (0.01) 0.031* (0.02) 0.001 (0.95) CEO education = 1 0.317 (0.55) 0.087 (0.85) 0.372 (0.22) CEO education = 2 0.023 (0.98) 0.223 (0.80) 0.968 (0.09) CEO motives Cost reduction − 0.217 (0.38) 0.237 (0.30) − 0.289 (0.05) Competitors 0.365 (0.49) 0.101 (0.83) − 0.437 (0.16) Social motives 0.329 (0.21) 0.260 (0.29) 0.569*** (0.00) Subsidies 0.271 (0.56) − 0.012 (0.98) − 0.109 (0.71) Image 0.247 (0.32) 0.337 (0.15) 0.179 (0.24) Employee retention 0.634* (0.02) 0.110 (0.67) 0.080 (0.63) Conviction 0.165 (0.66) 0.852* (0.01) 0.243 (0.28) Religion 0.398 (0.28) − 0.005 (0.99) 0.861*** (0.00) Constant 9.434*** (0.00) 6.931*** (0.00) 3.385*** (0.00)  Adj. R2 0.074 0.043 0.332 N 262 286 286 407 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… coefficients for succession intention, but still on a statistically and economically significant level. Apart from that they are quite similar to the reduced sample with CEO age not imputed. Founder generation on CSR factors In the regression on the total CSR score, family tradition doesn’t reveal a positive significant effect on any of the factors. Table 6 Regression CSR with CEO age missings imputed p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (1) (2) (3) CSRtotal CSRtotal CSRtotal Succession 1.870** (0.01) 1.738* (0.01) Firm age 0.002 (0.80) − 0.001 (0.92) 0.001 (0.87) ln_emp 1.724*** (0.00) 1.498*** (0.00) 0.886* (0.03) Revenue = steady − 1.252 (0.18) − 1.113 (0.26) − 1.135 (0.25) Revenue = increase − 0.784 (0.48) − 0.868 (0.46) − 0.871 (0.46) Invest = steady 1.153 (0.19) 0.820 (0.38) 0.648 (0.48) Invest = increase 2.204 (0.06) 2.033 (0.09) 1.721 (0.15) Construction − 0.627 (0.50) − 0.329 (0.74) − 0.461 (0.63) Health services − 1.212 (0.56) − 0.699 (0.74) − 0.662 (0.75) Automotive − 0.016 (0.99) 0.278 (0.83) 0.026 (0.98) Food, beverages 0.030 (0.98) 0.487 (0.76) 1.527 (0.34) Industrial needs 0.260 (0.82) 0.285 (0.80) 0.264 (0.81) Personal needs 1.130 (0.25) 1.306 (0.21) 1.330 (0.20) Gender − 0.358 (0.74) − 0.230 (0.84) − 0.497 (0.65) CEO age 0.042 (0.29) 0.048 (0.26) 0.038 (0.35) CEO education = 1 1.545 (0.24) 1.217 (0.37) 1.527 (0.25) CEO education = 2 2.990 (0.28) 2.893 (0.30) 3.338 (0.23) CEO motives Religion 1.512 (0.12) 1.639 (0.10) 1.706 + (0.09) Social motives 4.020*** (0.00) 4.108*** (0.00) 3.242*** (0.00) Cost reduction − 0.764 (0.24) Competitors − 2.691 + (0.05) Subsidies 0.728 (0.57) Image 1.118 + (0.09) Employee retention 1.752* (0.02) Conviction 2.170* (0.02) Constant 34.248*** (0.00) 33.675*** (0.00) 32.970*** (0.00) N 364 346 346 408 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 However, since we obtained such a diverse picture when distinguishing between the different CSR factors in hypotheses H4a to c, we repeated this analysis with founder generation instead of family tradition. This yields a slightly significant negative effect on the factor environment oriented CSR at a 10 % level (see Table8). U-shaped form of regression One might argue that the influence CEO age exerts on the company’s CSR behavior might follow a U-shaped rather than a linear function Table 7 Regression of CSR factors with CEO age imputed p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (4) (5) (6) CSRemp CSRenv CSRsoc Succession 0.197 (0.42) 0.185 (0.42) 0.285* (0.05) Firm age − 0.001 (0.71) 0.002 (0.53) 0.002 (0.21) ln_emp 0.291 (0.06) − 0.260* (0.05) 0.393*** (0.00) Revenue = steady − 0.292 (0.40) 0.052 (0.87) − 0.101 (0.61) Revenue = increase − 0.073 (0.86) − 0.114 (0.77) 0.277 (0.24) Invest = steady 0.011 (0.97) − 0.314 (0.30) 0.018 (0.92) Invest = increase 0.362 (0.38) 0.171 (0.66) − 0.265 (0.27) Construction − 0.341 (0.31) − 0.580 (0.07) 0.056 (0.78) Health services 0.110 (0.87) − 0.828 (0.23) 0.196 (0.65) Automotive − 0.179 (0.67) − 0.151 (0.72) 0.265 (0.31) Food, beverages − 0.188 (0.72) − 0.311 (0.55) 0.525 (0.11) Industrial needs 0.193 (0.61) − 0.128 (0.73) 0.133 (0.56) Personal needs 0.045 (0.90) 0.253 (0.45) 0.075 (0.72) Gender 0.162 (0.68) 0.368 (0.30) − 0.307 (0.16) CEO age − 0.031* (0.02) 0.027* (0.04) 0.000 (0.96) CEO education = 1 0.399 (0.43) 0.294 (0.50) 0.385 (0.16) CEO education = 2 0.126 (0.90) 0.169 (0.85) 1.138* (0.04) CEO motives Religion 0.472 (0.18) 0.110 (0.73) 0.865*** (0.00) Social motives 0.516* (0.04) 0.346 (0.14) 0.611*** (0.00) Cost reduction − 0.031 (0.89) 0.026 (0.90) − 0.250 (0.06) Competitors − 0.037 (0.94) − 0.543 (0.23) − 0.424 (0.13) Subsidies 0.391 (0.37) 0.213 (0.61) − 0.177 (0.50) Image 0.270 (0.24) 0.361 (0.10) 0.148 (0.28) Employee retention 0.768** (0.00) 0.105 (0.67) 0.097 (0.53) Conviction 0.313 (0.37) 0.704* (0.02) 0.340 (0.08) _cons 8.780*** (0.00) 6.797*** (0.00) 3.217*** (0.00) N 301 346 346 409 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… with lower levels of CSR among younger CEOs struggling to keep the business going and among older CEOs being too busy preparing their succession. We therefore tested for such a relation including a quadratic term of CEO age. However, our analysis did not confirm a U-shaped relationship. Further research might build on this, taking into account the time the CEO actually holds the position. This would be a more exact specification as some CEOs might succeed into the position in a medium or higher age. Table 8 Regression CSR factors vs. founder generation and succession intention p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (4) (5) (6) CSRemp CSRenv CSRsoc Succession 0.269 (0.293) 0.248 (0.297) 0.424** (0.007) Founder − 0.377 (0.162) − 0.437 + (0.087) 0.146 (0.383) ln_emp 0.414* (0.015) − 0.185 (0.193) 0.444*** (0.000) Revenue = steady − 0.213 (0.559) 0.154 (0.651) − 0.079 (0.722) Revenue = increase − 0.045 (0.916) 0.164 (0.682) 0.169 (0.518) Invest = steady − 0.120 (0.736) − 0.598 (0.076) − 0.090 (0.681) Invest = increase 0.186 (0.679) − 0.348 (0.414) − 0.188 (0.499) Construction − 0.488 (0.160) − 0.879** (0.008) 0.108 (0.618) Health services − 0.308 (0.682) − 0.948 (0.197) 0.373 (0.437) Automotive − 0.340 (0.456) − 0.377 (0.395) 0.163 (0.575) Food, beverages − 0.732 (0.207) − 0.240 (0.669) 0.501 (0.172) Industrial needs − 0.037 (0.926) − 0.160 (0.676) 0.055 (0.827) Personal needs − 0.212 (0.588) − 0.044 (0.902) 0.200 (0.390) Gender 0.337 (0.469) 0.197 (0.641) − 0.488 + (0.078) CEO age − 0.038** (0.004) 0.033** (0.009) 0.003 (0.709) CEO education = 1 0.331 (0.525) 0.034 (0.942) 0.319 (0.295) CEO education = 2 0.118 (0.908) 0.305 (0.731) 0.977 + (0.093) CEOmotives Cost reduction − 0.231 (0.344) 0.217 (0.343) − 0.285 + (0.057) Competitors 0.384 (0.465) 0.113 (0.813) − 0.449 (0.153) Social motives 0.376 (0.155) 0.312 (0.204) 0.553*** (0.001) Subsidies 0.275 (0.556) − 0.015 (0.972) − 0.157 (0.588) Image 0.301 (0.232) 0.400 (0.090) 0.178 (0.249) Employee retention 0.648* (0.017) 0.118 (0.649) 0.053 (0.756) Conviction 0.142 (0.704) 0.802* (0.019) 0.224 (0.316) Religion 0.449 (0.226) 0.081 (0.809) 0.869*** (0.000) Constant 9.451*** (0.000) 7.048*** (0.000) 3.399*** (0.000)  Adj. R2 0.082 0.054 0.328 N 262 286 286 410 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 Moderating effects Instead of exerting direct influence, succession intention might act as a mediator or moderator on other correlations, such as the link between firm CSR and CEO age or firm CSR and firm age. We therefore conducted a series of tests, checking for interaction effects, for example among founder generation and succession intention (see Table18 in the appendix). However, we didn’t find statistically significant results. Industry adjusted CSR Following Pan etal. (2018) we analyse for robustness reasons the influence of tradition and succession intention on industry-adjusted CSR. Industry-adjusted thereby means the individual firm CSR level minus the mean CSR level of the respective industry. The results of the analysis of industry adjusted CSR are very similar to the not industry-adjusted models (see Tables16 and 17 in the appendix). 5 Discussion andlimitations ofthestudy We found significant positive effects of succession intention on CSR in general as well as on community directed responsible behavior. Table9 provides an overview over the results. This supports our notion that specific family characteristics, such as transgenerational intentions, indeed change a firm’s attitude towards CSR, supporting the theory of SEW. The analysis furthermore confirms that a distinction between the different facets of CSR needs to be made. We found social CSR to rise with succession intention. Obviously the realms affected by SEW are related to external stakeholders, which confirms the findings by Vardaman and Gondo (2014) who suppose non-financial goals to be driven to a high extend by reputation concerns. Comparing the CSR engagement of listed family Table 9 Sum up of results Hypothesis Content Result H1 Firms with longer family tradition show a higher overall CSR activity No significant effect H2a/b Firms beyond the founder stage show a higher/lower level of overall CSR No significant effect H3 The intention to succeed business within the family leads to a higher level of overall CSR activity Significant effect: confirmed H4a Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards employees No significant effect H4b Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards the environment No significant effect H4c Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards society Significant effect: confirmed H4d Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards suppliers No analysis H4e Succession intention leads to an increase in CSR activity directed towards customers No analysis 411 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… firms Cruz etal. (2014) even find higher levels of SEW7 to reduce the consideration of employees’ needs. They come to the conclusion that SEW might fuel intentions to keep control over the firm within the family, thus depriving internal stakeholders (Cruz etal. 2014). Our findings do not support their observation of a reduction of internal CSR with rising SEW. The reason might be the they measure SEW through the owning family’s share in ownership and management. As our sample contains more than 97% of owner-led firms, flat hierarchies and high concentration of power (as typical in smaller family firms) should give few reason for struggle about internal control. However, the results confirm their observation of an imbalanced CSR approach in a context of elevated SEW. Thus it is likely that the findings of Cruz etal. (2014) apply for the private phase of a family firm life cycle as well, as questioned by Wright etal. (2014). Furthermore, Ernst et al. (2022) find SME sustainability to be highly influenced in general by employees’ expectations. This might explain why employee oriented CSR rises to a lower extent under the influence of succession intention. However, even if our results support Zientara (2017) as well as Cruz etal. (2014), the cross-sectional design of this study cannot prove causality. Future research could apply different research designs such as field experiments or long-term studies to check for causality as well as to identify possible reverse or dual causality in this context (Bascle 2008). We find no increase in environmental engagement with succession intention present. This fits with the observation in the literature that family firms often focus less on environmental issues than non-family firms (Miroshnychenko etal. 2022; Dekker and Hasso 2014). While we can only speculate on the reasons thereof, this coincidence makes it less likely that mere resource constrictions—which non-family firms might face as well—are the reason. Institutional pressure might indeed be strong in a country with high environmental standards (Campbel 2007) such as Germany, leaving little space for additional initiatives for SMEs to improve environmental performance. However, this would not explain the international trend observed by Miroshnychenko etal. (2022) that family firms exhibit a lower performance in environmental aspects. Instead the findings point to SEW having indeed contradictory effects on the different facets of CSR. This underlines even more the importance to treat CSR as a multidimensional construct in a differentiated way. Analysing CSR in a more differentiated way might help explain contradictory results, such as Fehre and Weber (2019) who find no increase in CSR awareness of top management with family involvement. In the case of environmental performance, SMEs might come to the conclusion that their environmental efforts are not visible enough to yield reputational gain. If this is the case, we expect to see a turn in environmental performance of small and medium family firms with the debate on climate change gaining momentum. Interestingly, our analysis of the correlation between firm tradition and CSR yields no significant effects, neither on total CSR nor on the CSR dimensions. This adds to the contradictory debate on the effect of family tradition in the literature: On the one hand, Zellweger etal. (2012) find slightly positive results, indicating an increase in SEW with longer family tradition. This correlates with the idea of 7 They measure SEW through the owning family’s share in ownership and management. 412 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 Schulze and Kellermanns (2015) that SEW accumulates over time. On the other hand, Gómez-Mejía etal. (2007) argue that SEW decreases when the family firm passes the founding owner stage. The fact that we find a slightly negative effect on one CSR dimension when exchanging firm tradition by family stage adds to this contradictory pictures. This could be an indication that firm tradition overlaps with other dimensions of SEW, such as identification or emotional attachment: Depending on how much the managing family member identifies with the strategic approach of preceding generations, firm tradition might factor in or not, as Dieguez-Soto etal. (2021) observe in their qualitative study. We therefore propose future research to investigate the phenomenon more in depth to identify possible moderating or mediating effects in the interplay of family firm tradition and SEW. Due to the complex nature of the construct, emotional attachment is a dimension we cannot control for in our setting. However, with the families’ livelihood and heritage often depending on the firm (Mitchell etal. 2011; Uhlaner etal. 2004), it can be expected to be rather high. Another aspect we can’t control for is the difference between a vague intention to succeed business within the family and actual plans including the nomination of a successor. With a denominated successor and concrete plans for the succession, the focus of the CEO might be deterred from the company’s social responsibility towards organizational issues related to the succession. On the other hand, CEOs might care even more about responsible behavior to hand over the company in a solid state and achieve a reasonable price. To specify further how succession actually influences CSR, future research might focus on this issue. Two aspects restrict the generalizability of our findings. Legal framework, economic development and cultural or social orientation are found to be influencing factors on family firm performance and behavior (e.g., Wright etal. 2014; Farooq etal. 2017; Fitzgerald etal. 2010) often varying cross-nationally (Matten and Moon 2008; Perrini 2006). Restricting our inquiry to one single country therefore bypasses a possible source of bias. However, it might reduce the transferability of the findings. Although, there are indications for comparability among developed countries such as central Europe and the U.S. (Hauck etal. 2016), we expect numerous differences in developed and even more in developing countries. Thus, more research is needed to confirm the results. One further has to keep in mind the high percentage of owner-managers in our sample. Cui etal. (2018) find family CEOs to act more socially responsible, even though family firms with non-family CEOs use longterm incentives to compensate for it. While being well representative for smaller enterprises, one has to be careful when generalizing to larger firms often lead by non-family CEOs. Furthermore, one should take the peculiarities of our sample into account: It contains mainly of small or even micro family firms with a high percentage of family members in management and director positions. Recent literature found a higher level of CSR respectively less underperformance in environmental responsibility in family firms with high family involvement (Mariani etal. 2021). One shortcoming of the study is that it measures CSR only implicitly. As an intangible theoretical concept, it is rather difficult to measure CSR directly, making the use of indirect indicators acceptable (Margolis and Walsh 2003). As we 419 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… Table 14 Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy Factor KMO Suppliers 0.7976 Information 0.7063 Reclamation 0.7834 EF technology investment 0.8208 Save ressources 0.7602 Reduce waste 0.7028 EF materials 0.7689 Donations 0.6785 Other engagement 0.6966 Associations 0.7796 Local supplier 0.7442 Training 0.8347 Flextime 0.7350 Autonomous work 0.7234 Participation 0.7080 Disadvantaged 0.8247 Overall 0.7502 420 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 Table 15 Regression CSR factors (social motives and religion only) p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (4) (5) (6) CSRemp CSRenv CSRsoc Succession 0.296 (0.26) 0.230 (0.34) 0.424** (0.01) Firm age − 0.001 (0.63) 0.000 (0.87) 0.003 (0.13) ln_emp 0.499** (0.00) − 0.196 (0.12) 0.486*** (0.00) Revenue = steady − 0.055 (0.88) 0.171 (0.62) − 0.126 (0.57) Revenue = increase 0.075 (0.86) 0.158 (0.69) 0.179 (0.49) Invest = steady − 0.134 (0.71) − 0.519 (0.13) − 0.084 (0.70) Invest = increase 0.191 (0.67) − 0.186 (0.66) − 0.201 (0.47) Construction − 0.386 (0.27) − 0.783* (0.02) 0.078 (0.71) Health services − 0.177 (0.81) − 0.621 (0.40) 0.386 (0.42) Automotive − 0.036 (0.94) − 0.228 (0.60) 0.221 (0.43) Food, beverages − 0.705 (0.22) − 0.310 (0.58) 0.141 (0.70) Industrial needs 0.085 (0.83) − 0.005 (0.99) 0.012 (0.96) Personal needs − 0.241 (0.54) − 0.038(0.92) 0.201 (0.39) Gender 0.359 (0.44) 0.333 (0.43) − 0.509 (0.07) CEO age − 0.035** (0.01) 0.031* (0.02) 0.003 (0.74) CEO education = 1 0.253 (0.63) − 0.017 (0.97) 0.323 (0.29) CEO education = 2 0.079 (0.94) 0.282 (0.75) 0.883 (0.13) CEO motives Social motives 0.430 + (0.09) 0.399 + (0.09) 0.680*** (0.00) Religion 0.359 (0.33) − 0.099 (0.77) 0.882*** (0.00) Constant 9.513*** (0.00) 7.791*** (0.00) 3.404*** (0.00)  Adj. R2 0.064 0.026 0.322 N 262 286 286 421 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… Table 16 Regression CSRtotal (industry centered) p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (1) (2) (3) CSR_indcent CSR_indcent CSR_indcent Succession 2.38** (0.00) 2.26** (0.00) Firm age − 0.01 (0.52) − 0.01 (0.38) − 0.00 (0.65) ln_emp 1.69*** (0.00) 1.43*** (0.00) 0.95* (0.02) Invest = steady − 0.02 (0.98) − 0.56 (0.54) − 0.55 (0.55) Invest = increse 1.20 (0.26) 0.77 (0.49) 0.64 (0.56) CEO education = 1 0.74 (0.60) 0.17 (0.91) 0.53 (0.71) CEO education = 2 3.08 (0.26) 3.05 (0.26) 3.30 (0.22) CEO age 0.04 (0.32) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.35) Gender − 0.01 (0.99) − 0.09 (0.94) 0.06 (0.96) Religion 0.92 (0.36) 0.96 (0.35) 1.10 (0.28) Social motives 3.56*** (0.00) 3.65*** (0.00) 2.94*** (0.00) Cost reduction − 0.92 (0.19) Competitors − 1.48 (0.29) Subsidies 0.31 (0.82) Image 1.09 (0.13) Employee retention 1.45 + (0.07) Conviction 1.96 + (0.06) Constant − 8.01** (0.01) − 8.45** (0.01) − 9.75** (0.00) Adj. R2 0.15 0.18 0.21 N 299 286 286 422 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 Table 17 Regression CSR factors (industry centered) p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (4) (5) (6) CSRemp_indcent CSRenv_indcent CSRsoc_indcent Succession 0.339 (0.18) 0.318 (0.18) 0.364* (0.02) Firmage − 0.002 (0.43) 0.001 (0.78) 0.002 (0.26) ln_emp 0.299 + (0.06) − 0.236 + (0.08) 0.366*** (0.00) Revenue = steady − 0.189 (0.60) 0.146 (0.66) − 0.071 (0.75) Revenue = increase − 0.070 (0.86) 0.146 (0.71) 0.203 (0.43) Invest = steady − 0.111 (0.75) − 0.518 (0.12) − 0.091 (0.68) Invest = increase 0.179 (0.68) − 0.270 (0.52) − 0.265 (0.34) CEO education = 1 0.259 (0.61) 0.284 (0.53) 0.144 (0.63) CEO education = 2 0.078 (0.94) 0.059 (0.95) 1.171* (0.05) CEO age − 0.038** (0.01) 0.031* (0.02) 0.001 (0.95) Gender 0.261 (0.53) 0.005 (0.99) − 0.268 (0.29) Cost reduction − 0.226 (0.35) 0.270 (0.23) − 0.307* (0.04) Competitors 0.095 (0.85) 0.126(0.78) − 0.708* (0.02) Social motives 0.334 (0.19) 0.227 (0.35) 0.614*** (0.00) Subsidies 0.162 (0.73) − 0.031 (0.94) − 0.206 (0.48) Image 0.222 (0.37) 0.323 (0.17) 0.171 (0.27) Employee retention 0.638* (0.02) 0.123 (0.63) 0.055 (0.74) Conviction 0.104 (0.78) 0.819* (0.02) 0.216 (0.34) Religion 0.288 (0.42) 0.052 (0.88) 0.722*** (0.00) Constant 0.116 (0.92) − 2.721* (0.01) − 1.289 + (0.07) Adj. R2 0.080 0.024 0.275 N 262 286 286 423 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… Table 18 Regression CSR vs. founder generation and succession intention - interaction effect p values in parentheses +p < 0.10 , * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , *** p < 0.001 (4) CSRtotal Succession 2.329* (0.019) Founder − 0.941 (0.432) Founder##Succession − 0.321 (0.828) ln_emp 1.242** (0.005) Revenue = steady − 1.254 (0.239) Revenue = increase − 1.045 (0.403) Invest = steady − 0.026 (0.981) Invest = increase 1.328 (0.317) Construction − 0.995 (0.333) Health services − 1.154 (0.614) Automotive − 0.596 (0.668) Food, beverages 0.566 (0.746) Industrial needs − 0.920 (0.439) Personal needs 0.830 (0.455) Gender female − 0.495 (0.706) CEO age 0.040 (0.304) CEO education = 1 1.038 (0.475) CEO education = 2 3.025 (0.274) CEO motives Religion 1.636 (0.125) Social motives 3.064*** (0.000) Cost reduction − 0.980 (0.169) Competitors − 0.573 (0.701) Subsidies 0.691(0.620) Image 1.218 + (0.099) Employee retention 1.665* (0.041) Conviction 2.052 (0.055) Constant 33.517*** (0.000)  Adj. R2 0.217 N 286.000 424 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 Table 19 Questionnaire (translated) Section1: General information Main profession Postal code Foundation year of the firm Number of employees Number of apprentices Family firm yes/no (Members of the owning family in the executive board) For how many generations does the family hold the firm? Is a succession within the family intended? If yes, when? Age of the CEO Development of revenue within the last 3 years? Development of investments within the last 3 years? Customer structure (private/public/B2B) How large is the range your customers come from? Section2: Market and customers We consider social and environmental aspects in the selection of our suppliers We react on customer complaints immediately and systematically We inform our clients on product use, security and environmental aspects above the legally required level Did stakeholder approach you regarding these points? Which ones? Further remarks Section3: Environment and natural resources We invested in environmental friendly technology within the last 5 years (in €) We actively save resources (such as water, material use etc.) We actively reduce waste and/or recycle materials (e.g., packaging) We use environmental friendly production means (e.g., for cleaning) Did stakeholder approach you regarding these points? Which ones? Further remarks Section4: Social engagement and local community How many € do you donate every year for charitable, social or religious purposes How high is the yearly non-financial engagement of the firm for these purposes (please try to estimate the equivalent in €) We do engage in professional organisations such as associations, guilds, examination boards etc. We supply regional products/services Did stakeholder approach you regarding these points? Which ones? Further remarks Section5: Employees We support our employees with training and education We offer flexible working time/work from home We enable autonomous work (our employees can structure their work independently) We involve our employees in decision making processes We employ people from socially disadvantaged groups (e.g., migration background, long-term unemployed people etc) Did stakeholder approach you regarding these points? Which ones? Further remarks 425 1 3 Family oblige: thelink betweenCSR andsuccession intention… Acknowledgements We want to thank Mr. Gunther Friedl for his continuous support and advice, Mrs. Hanna Hottenrott and Mrs. Andrea Greilinger for their valuable feedback as well as the colleagues from LFI and Jan Dannenbring from the ZDH for technical feedback and sharing their contacts. Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Data availability On request. Code availability On request. 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To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/. Table 19 (continued) Section6: Motivational factors Cost reduction Competitors offer comparable standards Social motives Subsidies Image of the company Employee retention Personal conviction Religion Further remarks Section7: Hindering factors Scarce resources (time, financial, knowledge etc.) We didn’t know about further options to act sustainably Our company is too small to further engage It’s not our role to further engage We do not consider it necessary Further remarks 426 A.Stübner, S.Jarchow 1 3 References Aguilera RV, Rupp DE, Williams CA etal (2007) Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of social change in organizations. Acad Manag Rev 32(3):836–863. https:// doi. org/ 10. 2307/ 20159 338 Aguinis H, Glavas A (2012) What we know and don’t know about corporate social responsibility: a review and research agenda. 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