Human capital and urbanization in the People's Republic of China

Xing, Chunbing Working Paper Human capital and urbanization in the People's Republic of China ADBI Working Paper, No. 603 Provided in Cooperation with: Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo Suggested Citation: Xing, Chunbing (2016) : Human capital and urbanization in the People's Republic of China, ADBI Working Paper, No. 603, Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/163102 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ ADBI Working Paper Series HUMAN CAPITAL AND URBANIZATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Chunbing Xing No. 603 October 2016 Asian Development Bank Institute The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI’s working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. Suggested citation: Xing, C. 2016. Human Capital and Urbanization in the People’s Republic of China. ADBI Working Paper 603. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available: https://www.adb.org/publications/human-capital-and-urbanization-prc/ Please contact the author for information about this paper. Email: [email protected] ADB recognizes “China” as the People’s Republic of China. Chunbing Xing is a professor at Beijing Normal University, with concentrations in labor economics, income distribution, development economics, and education. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms. Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published. Asian Development Bank Institute Kasumigaseki Building 8F 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-6008, Japan Tel: +81-3-3593-5500 Fax: +81-3-3593-5571 URL: www.adbi.org E-mail: [email protected] © 2016 Asian Development Bank Institute ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Abstract The relationship between human capital development and urbanization in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is explored, highlighting the institutional factors of the hukou system and decentralized fiscal system. Educated workers disproportionately reside in urban areas and in large cities, and the returns to education are significantly higher in urban areas relative to those in rural areas, and in large, educated cities relative to small, less-educated cities. In addition, the external returns to education in urban areas are at least comparable to the magnitude of private returns. Rural areas are the major reservoir for urban population growth, and the more educated have a higher chance of moving to cities and obtaining urban hukou. Relaxing the hukou restriction, increasing education levels of rural residents, providing training for rural–urban migrants, and guaranteeing equal opportunity for all residents are necessary for a sustainable urbanization process in the PRC. In terms of health, rural–urban migration is selective in that healthy rural residents choose to migrate. Occupational choices and living conditions are detrimental to migrants’ health, however. While migration has a positive effect on migrant children, its effect on “left-behind” children is unclear. JEL Classification: J24, I12, R23 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 2 3. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE URBANIZATION PROCESS ........................ 3 3.1 Human Capital Development .............................................................................. 3 3.2 Returns to Education .........................................................................................10 3.3 Externalities of Human Capital ...........................................................................18 4. HUMAN CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ........................................................19 4.1 Selectivity of Rural–Urban Migration ..................................................................19 4.2 Higher Education Expansion Promotes Urbanization .........................................21 5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL ISSUES IN URBANIZATION ..................................................22 6. HEALTH AND URBANIZATION .....................................................................................23 6.1 Health Facilities and Inelastic Supplies ..............................................................24 6.2 Urbanization, Migration, and Health ...................................................................25 7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ...............................................................................................29 REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................30 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing 1. INTRODUCTION Human capital, which plays an essential role in economic development and the urbanization process, refers to the knowledge, skills, and strength accumulated by an individual to enhance his or her productivity. Indeed, today’s economic sector has a greater demand for labor with more human capital, and urban areas—with large populations and high population densities—are ideal places for people to accumulate human capital. Cities provide places for knowledge, skills, and ideas to influence individuals informally, creating large spillover (i.e., external) effects. In developing countries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), human capital also facilitates the process of population shifts from rural to urban areas, and the interaction between human capital development and urbanization is influenced by institutional arrangements and government policies. In the PRC, the decentralized fiscal system and hukou (i.e., household registration system) system have major impacts on this relationship. This study examines how attainment of education performs in the urbanization process in the PRC, by noting changes in education levels for rural and urban areas and for different provinces and/or cities. Second, how returns to education vary between rural and urban areas, and across different provinces and/or cities, is assessed. This study then examines if the labor force with different education levels moves freely to meet the demand of cities of different sizes, particularly the responsiveness of the labor force with different education levels to regional labor demand shocks. The distribution of human capital and human capital returns in rural and urban PRC and across cities provides hints for evaluating and reforming policies affecting labor mobility. As most of the population growth in urban PRC comes from rural–urban migration, the characteristics of rural–urban migrants in comparison to rural and urban residents are also analyzed to find if selection effects, in terms of education levels, exist in the urbanization process. Finally, migrant households’ problems regarding education and health are noted, as well how to improve efficiency and equality in these areas. The institutional background of the relationship between human capital and institutions is analyzed, such as the role played by governments at various levels in allocating educational resources as well as that of the hukou system in determining migrants’ access to education and health care. Then, educational attainment is discussed in the context of rapid urbanization, especially regarding developments in rural and urban PRC and across different regions. Health issues and their relationship with urbanization, which certainly impact human capital development, are also analyzed, while policy implications are discussed in the last section. Overall, this study finds that cities provide higher returns to education and attract more educated workers, but the hukou system still impedes sufficient labor mobility, which is especially true for educated workers, implying that the returns to education in cities are not fully realized. In addition, significant external returns to education exist in urban areas, and rural–urban migration is positively selected in terms of human capital levels. 1 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND In the PRC, labor mobility is controlled by the hukou system, which has greatly influenced the pace and pattern of urbanization (Au and Henderson 2006). Traditionally, a person’s hukou status is categorized by both socioeconomic eligibility (i.e., agricultural and nonagricultural) and registered residential location (i.e., local and nonlocal) (Chan and Buckingham 2008).1 Hukou status is primarily determined by birth and is passed from one generation to the next (Wu and Treiman 2004). Thus, by controlling migration, the hukou system has been an essential factor in the rural–urban divide (Knight and Song 1999, Zhao 2000; Lu 2003). Today, urban hukou is associated with better-paid, more secure jobs; access to better public services; and more subsidies. Only a small number of rural residents with special achievements can obtain urban hukou; as such, going to university or a professional school has been a major channel of hukou conversion (i.e., rural to urban). Other channels that increase the probability of hukou conversion include joining the military, being promoted as a cadre (Wu and Treiman 2004, Fan 2008), purchasing urban housing (Deng and Gustafsson 2006), and converting land as a result of city expansion (Wong and Huen 1998). The hukou system has been undergoing reform since the 1980s, and one major change has been the localization of hukou management, with many local governments receiving full power to determine their own criteria and number of new local permanent hukou registrations that they grant. It has also become easier for workers and households to transfer their hukou registrations to other locations—in particular, to smallto medium-sized cities—and temporary residence permits are being granted more often. Moreover, it has become possible for some with rural hukou to migrate to urban areas and be hired without valid permits. However, many migrants without urban hukou are still excluded from formal urban sectors and earn significantly less than native urban hukou workers (Meng and Zhang 2001; Meng 2001; Maurer-Fazio and Dinh 2004; Gagnon, Xenogiani, Xing 2014; Démurger et al. 2009). If they do migrate to urban areas, these workers are not covered by urban social security systems and are thus not entitled to local welfare programs, subsidies, and public services, including education (Gagnon, Xenogiani, Xing 2014). In the PRC, primary school education (i.e., ages 6–11 years) and lower middle school (ages 12–14 years) have been compulsory since the late 1980s. As a public service, local governments have mostly financed the operation of these schools. Before 2000, local governments in rural areas could collect agricultural taxes or fees for education expenditures, but these taxes and fees were cancelled in later years, putting financial stress on many local governments to adequately finance education. In urban areas, the schools are usually not funded to take migrant children. This decentralized feature, combined with the hukou system, has caused several problems regarding the allocation of educational resources. First, a large gap in educational resources has emerged not only between rural and urban areas but also across different regions, and even across different districts within a city. Second, with a large amount of migrant workers, many children were left behind in their parents’ home province to attend school, but today, more children are migrating with their parents, attending schools at 1 The first classification determines entitlement to state-subsidized food grain and other prerogatives. The second classification defines one's rights for many activities in a specific locality 2 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing their destination location. However, they are still required to take the university entrance examinations at their registered hukou province. Universities are mainly located in cities, especially in municipalities and provincial capitals. Under the earlier central planning regime, higher education was heavily subsidized. With economic reforms and the enlargement of the scale of higher education, the government has gradually lowered subsidies for higher education. In fact, in 1993 guidelines on education reform and development, the central government emphasized that higher education is noncompulsory, and that students should pay tuition (Government of the PRC, State Council 1993). Thus, from 1995 to 2004, tuition fees increased from CNY800 per person per year to CNY5,000 per person per year on average (Yang 2006). Expenditures on education ranked first in total household expenditure in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 2001–2005 (CYCRC 2007). Another major reform of higher education in the 1990s was to cancel the planning system for allocating university graduates throughout the country. The new system is effectively a two-sided market. Graduates find jobs based on mutual agreement with employers, with much less intervention from the government. University graduates now face more competition, putting pressure on the labor market, especially in urban areas. Universities are administered by different levels of government. Elite universities are generally funded by both the central government (through the Ministry of Education) and provincial governments, while many other local universities are mainly funded by provincial governments. There are very few privately run universities in the PRC. Universities admit students from all over the country, but usually the admission quota is higher for the province of location than for other provinces, which is true even for elite universities. In the last 2 decades, the central government has initiated two major projects (i.e., the 211 Project and 985 Project), aiming to improve the quality of universities. Their objective is to promote the quality of teaching and research by building first-class universities. These projects have mainly focused on the elite universities. Higher education is closely related to the urbanization process because it not only produces graduates with higher human capital levels but also has been a major channel through which rural individuals can obtain urban local hukou. 3. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE URBANIZATION PROCESS 3.1 Human Capital Development 3.1.1 Education Expansion The PRC has experienced tremendous education expansion in recent decades. From 1990 to 2012, the PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual rate of 10%, and the amount of fiscal expenditure on education also grew rapidly. In the mid-1990s, the share of fiscal expenditure on education in GDP was below 2.5%, and by 2011, it reached 4.0% (Figure 1). 3 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Figure 1: Share of Fiscal Expenditure on Education in Gross Domestic Product (%) GDP = gross domestic product. Source: Author. Figure 2 shows that local governments are responsible for around 90% of the fiscal expenditure on education. Figure 2: Share of Fiscal Expenditure on Education by Central and Local Governments (%) Source: Author. Figure 3 shows the share of fiscal expenditure on different education levels in total education expenditure. The share of primary education has declined continuously from around 35% to 30%, while that of tertiary education has increased significantly in recent years. 4 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Table 4: Returns to Education in Rural and Urban People’s Republic of China (coefficients on years of schooling in wage equations) 1995 2002 2005 2007 (1) (2) (4) (3) Urban 0.049*** 0.094*** 0.125*** 0.111*** (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) Rural 0.020* 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.027*** (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) Notes: 1. Experience, experience squared, gender, and provincial dummies in the ordinary least squares regressions are controlled for. 2. The sample is restricted to those aged 22–54 years, who are able to work and are not in school. 3. *, **, and *** are significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sources: Risken, Renwei, and Shin (1995); Shi (2002); China Institute for Income Distribution (2007).were used for the 1995, 2002, and 2007 results, respectively, and NBS (2005) was used for the 2005 data. The dependent variable is log of hourly wage, except for 2007, for which annual wage was used. There are two important, related aspects that need to be emphasized. First, the returns to education in rural areas do not take into consideration the role of education in increasing the probability of rural people migrating to urban areas. Chen and Xing (2006) showed that the probability of having a nonfarm job increases significantly with education level. More importantly, as mentioned earlier, going to university has been a major channel of converting one’s hukou status from rural to urban. 3.2.2 University Premiums Within urban areas, education expansion was accompanied by a continuous increase in the returns to higher education. Figure 9 summarizes several studies and shows that the university premium increased dramatically in the 1990s. Figure 9: Returns to University, 1988 to 2008 (%) Note: The reference group is high school graduates. Sources: Zhang et al. (2005); Meng, Shen, Xie (2010); Li and Ding (2003). 11 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing As indicated in Figure 9, by the end of the 1990s, the returns to university education reached 30%–50%. Possibly due to the expansion policy, the increasing trend stopped after 2003, but university premiums were still approaching 40% (Meng, Shen, Xie 2010).4 Recent research has also shown that the unemployment rate increased for young university graduates. Even with an unemployment rate of 20%, the expected returns from a university education could still be as high as 30%. Moreover, the unemployment rate for university graduates of older ages was much lower than for those of other education levels. 3.2.3 Returns to Education across Regions and Cities Given the considerable effort devoted to estimating the returns to education, the extension to include a regional dimension is a natural next step. As a large developing country in economic transition, the PRC’s various regions have different levels of economic development. Possible reasons for regional dispersion in returns to education include institutional factors such as different shares of the private sector across regions, different degrees of openness (in terms of trade activity and foreign direct investment), and sets of “place-based” policies.5 Evidence from CHIP Data, 1995, 2002, and 2007. The returns to years of schooling and to various levels of education were estimated for a number of provinces using two different models: (1) (2) In model 1, SCHOOLING is years of formal schooling, and in model 2, EDUi are dummies for various education levels. X controls for the same factors as in model 1. Results for these models are reported in columns 4–9 of Table 5. For the earlier period (1995–2002, columns 4–5), the returns to years of schooling increased sharply across all regions. There was also large variation across regions in the returns to education. In 1995, the returns to years of schooling varied by around 3%–4%. In 2002, Guangdong had the highest returns to schooling (8.4%), while Hubei and Yunnan had the lowest returns (4.6%–4.7%). Between 2002 and 2007 (columns 5–6), returns to education stopped rising or even declined in the central and western provinces. For coastal regions, the returns to education kept rising, however; in some cases, the increase was dramatic (e.g., 6% to 11% in Beijing). The regional dispersion in the returns to education became larger. The university premium shows similar patterns, but its dispersion increased only slightly (columns 7–9). Due to the limitation of space, the returns to other education levels are not reported, although some features of these returns are worth noting. First, most of the increases in the returns to education were concentrated in higher levels of education, especially university education. Second, coastal regions witnessed rising returns for almost every 4 These results were obtained using employed observations. 5 For a more detailed discussion, see Whalley and Xing (2014). ( ) 01 ln * γXWAGE SCHOOLING ββ ε =+ ++ ( ) 0 ln * γX ii i WAGE EDU βγ ε =+ ++ ∑ 12 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing tertiary education level. Finally, the returns to high school decreased between 1995 and 2007. Table 5: Returns to Education and University Premium in Urban People’s Republic of China, by Province, 1995–2007 Province Skilled Workers’ Share Returns to Years of Schooling College Premium (college vs. high school) 1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Beijing* 51.6 47.7 61.2 0.026 0.059 0.114 0.207 0.414 0.618 Shanxi 43.4 44.0 49.9 0.037 0.059 0.066 0.193 0.315 0.470 Liaoning* 39.2 41.0 48.6 0.048 0.075 0.078 0.333 0.602 0.510 Shanghai* 46.8 0.135 0.895 Jiangsu* 32.9 36.4 45.4 0.034 0.058 0.117 0.057 0.537 0.657 Zhejiang* 43.7 0.114 0.574 Anhui 34.0 41.8 47.0 0.031 0.072 0.053 0.248 0.401 0.345 Fujian* 51.9 0.091 0.442 Henan 38.8 42.2 62.6 0.039 0.056 0.066 0.325 0.445 0.504 Hubei 41.3 51.3 55.3 0.027 0.046 0.080 0.334 0.365 0.499 Hunan 53.0 0.077 0.513 Guangdong* 36.3 41.2 52.7 0.037 0.084 0.117 0.433 0.684 0.700 Chongqing 42.8 40.3 48.4 0.039 0.056 0.066 0.164 0.559 0.587 Sichuan 41.6 36.9 51.4 0.028 0.058 0.089 0.199 0.495 0.640 Yunnan 45.6 51.7 52.3 0.027 0.047 0.090 0.219 0.332 0.566 Gansu 37.4 43.1 48.7 0.039 0.074 0.072 0.367 0.504 0.457 Standard Dev. 40.2 43.4 51.6 (52.4) 0.007 0.012 0.024 (0.022) 0.104 0.113 0.127 (0.101) Notes: 1. For each province, an ordinary least squares regression of wage equations was run to obtain returns to education. 2. Experience, experience squared, gender, industry, and ownership dummies were controlled for. 3. In the first three columns, skilled labor includes those with university degrees (3 or 4 years) or above and technical school graduates. Those with high school degrees or below are classified as unskilled workers. 4. Numbers in parentheses are calculated by excluding the newly added provinces in 2007. 5. Coastal provinces are marked with “*”. Source: Author. The estimate wage equations were also estimated for 62, 61, and 91 cities for 1995, 2002, and 2007, respectively, using the same specification as in model 1. After calculating the returns to education, their yearly kernel densities were estimated nonparametrically, each city being treated as an observation without using city population or employment as weight. The Epanechnikov kernel function was used, and the bandwidth was set at 0.02. The distributions are reported in Figure 10.6 6 Kernel densities of the returns to education were also estimated across cities using cities that were covered in all three surveys. While only 33 cities remained, and the estimates became less accurate, the regional distribution evolved in a similar pattern. It is not reported here due to space constraints. 13 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Figure 10: Distribution of Return to Years of Schooling at the City Level Source: Author. Apparently, they are nondegenerate in all 3 years. The distribution moves to the right and becomes more dispersed between 1995 and 2002. In the second period (2002–2007), it moves slightly to the right. A fatter right tail is observed in the 2007 distribution, which is likely due to the fairly high returns to education of some coastal cities. Evidence from the 1% population survey in 2005. Using the 1% population survey of 2005, the returns to education for all prefecture-level cities were estimated. Using the sample for each city (i.e., individuals aged 22–55 years and out of school), regressions of the individual income in log terms on years of schooling, age, age squared, and gender were run. The estimated returns (i.e., the coefficients on years of schooling) show a large regional variation, with the returns for most cities ranging from 5% to 15%. The correlation between the returns to education and city size and the education level of the city population are particularly interesting. Figure 11 shows that the returns to years of schooling are positively correlated with city population; larger cities had higher returns. Of course, there is large heterogeneity in cities of similar size. Figure 11: Returns to Education and Population, 2005 Source: Author. 14 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Figure 12 also shows a positive correlation between the returns to years of schooling and the share of university graduates in a city. Figure 12: Returns to Education and Share of University Graduates, 2005 Source: Author. The fact that the returns to education have not been equalized across provinces and cities indicates that across-region mobility of skilled labor is insufficient to meet the regional demand shocks. Figure 13 provides further evidence supporting this conclusion. The left panel of Figure 13 shows that around one-third of skilled workers were migrants in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, and over 10% of skilled workers in 23 provinces were migrants; these shares are much lower than those for unskilled workers, especially in coastal regions (i.e., right panel of Figure 13). Taking into consideration the large difference in the number of skilled and unskilled workers, skilled migrants were much lower in number than unskilled migrants.7 Figure 13 also reports the relationship between these shares and the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. The results suggest that skilled workers were less responsive to regional income differentials than unskilled workers. While wage differences were much larger for skilled workers, their migrant share differences were lower than the share for unskilled workers.8 These results point to how university graduates should be allocated, favoring coastal regions over noncoastal regions. As it still poses high costs for a large proportion of skilled workers, relaxing the hukou system could also help facilitate the migration of skilled workers. Indeed, skilled workers seem to have a greater potential to move than unskilled workers. By 2007, they had larger regional wage differentials than unskilled workers. The expanded wage differentials mainly reflect local wage increases among 7 According to the calculation based on the 2005 1% population survey, the ratio of unskilled to skilled migrants is 5.8 to 1.0 in the urban labor market. 8 Regressing provincial incomes of skilled workers on migrant shares of skilled urban workers, a coefficient of 0.00017(0.000015) was obtained, which is much smaller than the results for unskilled workers, 0.00068(0.00008). Dropping Yunnan Province produced the results 0.00017(0.000014) and 0.00072(0.000080), respectively. 15 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing skilled workers in coastal regions, suggesting a lower geographic mobility among skilled workers.9 Figure 13: Relationship between Real Wages and Migrant Share of Skilled and Unskilled Workers Notes: 1. Wages are deflated using provincial-level urban consumer price indexes. 2. The price levels for all provinces are normalized to one in 1995. 3. Skilled workers are those having degrees higher than high school and with positive wage income. 4. Migrants are those who have left their hukou registration location and have been working in another city for more than half of a year. Sources: NBS (2005); China Statistical Yearbook (1997–2006). Further, the results in Table 6 indicate that skilled migrant households had a stronger preference for permanent housing, social security, and public services that are closely related to hukou status.10 Panel A in Table 6 shows that skilled migrant households were more likely to purchase permanent housing rather than rent an apartment or live in construction site dormitories. Around 54% of the skilled migrant households purchased permanent housing, while only 24% of unskilled migrant households had. In 9 This is consistent with Topel (1986), which showed that the largest local wage adjustments occur among workers who exhibit the least geographic mobility. 10 Panel A uses the 2005 1% population survey; panels B and C use the floating population monitoring data for 2012 compiled by the National Health and Family Planning Commission. 16 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing large cities, the percentages for both skilled and unskilled migrant households were significantly lower than in smalland medium-sized cities, perhaps due to high housing prices and discrimination against migrant households. Table 6: Migrants’ Propensity to Purchase Housing and Willingness to Settle Down and Change Hukou (%) Top 10 Largest 11th–50th Remaining Total A: share of migrant household purchasing permanent housing (2005 1% population survey) Unskilled 17.54 24.05 30.80 23.92 Skilled 48.96 57.75 58.14 53.63 Total 24.53 30.07 35.27 29.61 B: share of migrant household willing to stay for 5+ years (2012 migrant survey data) Unskilled 64.49 57.28 57.23 59.34 Skilled 72.35 60.57 56.99 64.48 Total 66.11 57.74 57.20 60.13 C: share of migrant household willing to change hukou (2012 migrant survey data) Unskilled 60.37 45.64 41.55 48.48 Skilled 72.66 51.36 43.50 58.07 Total 62.90 46.44 41.78 49.95 Note: The skilled are households whose household heads have professional degrees or above. Source: Author. Panel B shows that 64% of the skilled migrant households were willing to stay in cities for over 5 years, while 59% of unskilled migrant households were willing to do so. Skilled migrant households had an even stronger willingness to stay in the top 10 largest cities relative to unskilled migrant households (72% versus 64%). For small cities, the percentages were roughly the same for both household types. Panel C shows that skilled migrant households were more willing to change hukou registration than the unskilled. In the top 10 largest cities, 73% of skilled households wanted to change their hukou registration, and the percentage for the unskilled was 60%. The percentages were much lower in smalland medium-sized cities for both skilled and unskilled migrant households, and the difference between skilled and unskilled households became smaller as the city size decreases. The difference in the willingness to settle down or convert hukou status may be due to the fact that migrants with higher education levels are better treated in destination cities. In some big cities, for example, migrants with university degrees are more likely to get an urban local hukou, perhaps providing an explanation for their greater willingness to settle down near their workplaces. If this is true, educated workers without local urban hukou would be willing to accept a job with lower wages in exchange for chances of converting their hukou in the future. However, the results in Gagnon, Xenogiani, and Xing (2014) indicated that urban migrants (i.e., migrants with urban hukou) earn significantly more than urban native workers. One explanation is that urban residents who usually have higher education levels often need to sacrifice hukou-related benefits in their origin hukou registration locations to move to other places. They must thus be compensated in monetary terms 17 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing to make a move. An alternative explanation is that workers must earn significantly more than local workers to pay for local hukou-related services, but this latter explanation is less likely to hold because a wage premium for rural migrants was not observed. Either explanation means that the wage premium for urban migrants actually indicates high opportunity costs for educated workers in migration. Finally, the fact that there are many skilled migrants without local hukou suggests that the hukou system restricts the mobility of skilled migrants. These results again suggest that relaxing the hukou system, particularly the hukou restriction in large cities, would encourage more skilled rather than unskilled workers to move to cities with high skill premium. Such reforms will not only let skilled workers respond to regional demand changes but also help reduce inequality in high-premium cities. This, of course, does not mean that the mobility of unskilled workers should be restricted, nor does it mean that the current restriction on the mobility of unskilled workers needs not be reformed. On the contrary, given the complementarity between skilled and unskilled workers and the shortage of migrant workers, hukou restrictions should also be relaxed for unskilled workers. 3.3 Externalities of Human Capital Although there is more recent literature on estimating external returns to education, little is known about this aspect of human capital in the PRC, except through studies like Liu (2007) and Glaeser and Lu (2013). Both studies found that external returns to education in cities are significantly high. Liu (2007) used CHIP data from 1988 and 1995 and found that the external returns are at least as high as private returns to education. In particular, OLS estimates of the external returns ranged from 4.9% to 6.7%. He also used the compulsory education law as an instrumental variable. The two-stage least square estimates indicated that a 1-year increase in city average education could increase individual earnings by between 11% and 13%. Glaeser and Lu (2013) utilized more recent data and employed another strategy to address the endogeneity issue. Using university relocation in the 1950s as an instrumental variable, they found that the external returns to education in urban PRC are large—the OLS regressions showed that 1 more year in city-level education leads to a 11.9% increase in hourly wage. After using IV, the human capital externality rose to 21.9%, almost twice of the OLS estimates. The change in the estimate of human capital externality is greater for the most skilled workers. Thus, given large external returns to education, governments should subsidize human capital investment. Whether local (i.e., provincial) or central governments should fund this subsidy depends on the mobility of educated workers. If the educated workers are highly mobile (similar to many developed countries like the United States), the central government should take more responsibility in subsidizing higher education. If, on the other hand, highly educated workers tend to stay where they obtain their education, local governments should share more responsibility. Disregarding the financing of higher education, local governments should create measures to attract educated workers. Such measures include relaxing hukou restrictions to reduce the cost of moving, industrial policies that can create jobs for educated workers, and also efforts to provide more amenities valued by educated workers (e.g., cleaner air, quality education, museums, and libraries). 18 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing 4. HUMAN CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 4.1 Selectivity of Rural–Urban Migration In the 2002 urban survey of CHIPS, urban residents were asked when they received urban hukou. Those who answered with a specific year were, of course, former rural residents who had successfully obtained urban hukou, helping identify permanent migrants. As shown in Table 7, around 20% of urban residents were not born with urban hukou, among whom over one-half obtained urban hukou within the last 2 decades, a figure consistent with the fact that the hukou system has become less restrictive. Table 7: Permanent Migrants (%) Time of Obtaining Urban Hukou Ways Former Rural Residents Get Urban Hukou (%) Education Cadre Promotion Join Army Lose Land Buy Housing Others Missing Total Born urban 16,278 – – – – – – – – –1950 133 18.05 8.27 15.79 2.26 9.02 37.59 9.02 100 1951–60 509 28.29 4.91 13.36 0.59 3.93 40.86 8.06 100 1961–70 484 18.18 3.93 31.82 1.45 2.27 33.88 8.47 100 1971–80 839 23.60 4.53 14.18 2.86 1.91 49.70 3.22 100 1981–90 1,312 33.16 1.45 5.34 8.08 3.96 43.45 4.57 100 1991– 884 16.52 0.68 2.71 12.44 7.81 53.05 6.79 100 Missing 193 – – – – – – – – Total 20,632 Source: Author. Table 7 also describes channels through which rural residents obtained urban hukou. The largest share obtained it through formal education, and the second-largest share through joining the military. Other channels take up a relatively small share of the permanent migrant population. Different channels of hukou conversion play different roles in different time periods.11 Among those who obtained urban hukou in the 1980s, more than 30% did so through education. Even during the 1960s, when joining the military was the major channel, more than 18% of permanent migrants still obtained their hukou via education. Membership in a cadre and joining the military both played smaller roles. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the number of rural residents who gained urban hukou after having their lands occupied or after purchasing housing in urban areas grew significantly, from less than 5% to more than 20%. In the next analysis, data were restricted to individuals aged 18–60 years12 who were not in school. The share of the rural and urban samples remained almost unchanged. To avoid the endogeneity problem of education, permanent migrants who obtained urban hukou under the age of 16 years were dropped. Next, the subsamples were compared with the first two (i.e., urban natives and permanent migrants) having 11 Nearly one-half of the permanent migrants did not report how they obtained their urban hukou. Here, only those who reported this information were considered. 12 The results were unaffected by increasing the cut-off age to 22 years. When using per capita income, all dependents were included in the calculations. 19 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing urban hukou and the last two (i.e., rural residents and temporary migrants)13 having rural hukou. Table 8: Rural and Urban Residents and Migrants Aged 18–60 Years A: Male B: Female Urban Residents Rural Residents w/o Migrants Migrant w/o Hukou Urban Residents Rural Residents w/o Migrants Migrant w/o Hukou Natives Migrant w/ Hukou Natives Migrant w/ Hukou Years of schooling 11.14 11.67 7.67 8.18 10.65 9.9 6.33 7.52 By education level Primary and below 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.50 0.31 Middle school 0.29 0.20 0.53 0.60 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.55 High school 0.39 0.31 0.18 0.19 0.42 0.35 0.10 0.13 College and above 0.29 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.19 0.01 0.01 Note: High school includes professional schools. Source: Author. Panel A of Table 8 presents statistics for men. Urban natives and rural residents (without migrants) are first compared. The urban natives were better educated than rural residents, with the average number of years of schooling for the two groups being 11.1 and 7.7, respectively. In terms of age, ethnicity, and political status, urban natives were older, less likely to be minorities, and more likely to have party memberships. Finally, around 81% of urban natives had wage incomes in 2002, while this percentage was only 42% for rural residents. Migrants without local urban hukou were slightly more educated than rural residents, much younger, and less likely to have party memberships. Among permanent migrants, more than 40% had an education above a university degree—a figure much higher than that for urban natives. Permanent migrants’ share of party memberships was also much higher than that of urban natives. The dissimilarities are more significant when comparing permanent migrants with rural residents. These characteristics indicate that permanent migrants were positively selected, and that the selection effect was larger for permanent migrants than for temporary migrants. Panel B of Table 8 presents the statistics for women. The contrasts between rural women and urban women are similar to those between rural and urban men. Urban women had higher levels of education, were less likely to be minorities, and were more likely to be party members and wage earners. However, for female urban residents, the differential patterns for natives and migrants were dissimilar to those for men. Both the migrants’ education level and labor participation rate were slightly lower than those of their urban native counterparts, and their likelihood of being party members was almost the same as that of the natives. Table 9 gives summary statistics for wage earners (workers). Wage earners had slightly higher levels of education than the whole sample, especially women. The contrasts between urban and rural residents, and between urban natives and permanent migrants, are similar to those presented in Table 8. Because the labor participation rate was relatively high for urban residents and migrants, statistics for wage earners are similar to those in Table 8. 13 The rural resident sample did not include migrants. 20 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Table 13: Share of People with Health Insurance, 2005 (%) Total Employees with Formal Contract Self-Employed Employees without Contract Urban residents 54 59 19 48 Rural migrants 15 29 6 7 Urban migrants 36 52 16 17 Source: NBS (2005). Table 14 shows that fewer than 20% of rural migrant workers had health insurance in urban areas, and the situation improved only slightly in recent years. Table 14: Share of Rural Migrants with Health Insurance, 2008–2012 (%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Urban medical insurance 13.1 12.2 14.3 16.7 16.9 Urban insurance for injuries 24.1 21.8 24.1 23.6 24.0 Source: NBS (2013). A major issue is that insurance is largely confined within the locality of the workplace. By 2010, most rural residents were covered by the New Rural Cooperative Medical scheme, and migrants were covered in their respective hukou registration places. If a migrant must visit a hospital in another county, he or she must pay first. The cost is later reimbursed by the insurance from his or her hukou registration place, but the process is usually complicated and time-consuming. 6.2.3 Health Consequences of Migration Health and migration behavior are closely related. Empirically, researchers have examined the effect of migration on health by comparing the health conditions of migrant workers and urban residents or rural nonmigrant residents. Zhou and Lu (2014) found that migrant workers’ health is significantly better than that of urban natives (Table 15). Table 15: Self-Reported Health of Migrant Workers and Urban Natives Whole Sample N = 3,439 Rural Migrant Workers N = 668 Urban Native Workers N = 2,771 Self-reported health 3.99 (0.94) 4.12 (0.89) 3.96 (0.94) Notes: 1. Rural migrant workers are those with rural hukou, but are working outside or have returned temporarily. 2. Urban native workers are those with urban hukou who are working. 3. Self-reported health takes values from 1 to 5, representing poor health, fairly poor, so-so, fairly good, and excellent. 4. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Source: Zhou and Lu (2014). This, however, is a selection effect; rural people migrating to cities tend to be younger and healthier. This is clearer in Table 16, where health conditions are reported by age group. In most of the cases, self-reported health was actually better for rural migrants than for urban native workers. 27 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing Table 16: Self-Reported Health of Migrant Workers and Urban Natives by Age Group Age Migrant Workers Urban Native Workers No. Health No. Health <=30 230 4.42 (0.77) 589 4.31 (0.81) 31–40 209 4.06 (0.85) 843 4.10 (0.85) 41–50 152 3.91 (0.93) 796 3.86 (0.94) 51–60 62 3.74 (1.04) 418 3.60 (1.03) >=61 15 4.07 (0.96) 123 3.24 (0.95) Notes: 1. Rural migrant workers are those with rural hukou, but are working outside or have returned temporarily. 2. Urban native workers are those with urban hukou who are working. 3. Self-reported health takes values from 1 to 5, representing poor health, fairly poor, so-so, fairly good, and excellent. 4. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Source: Zhou and Lu (2014). The selection process happened not only at the beginning but also after migrants arrived in urban areas. Among migrants, those suffering from poor health who tended to return home (early) after spending some time in urban areas. Table 17 shows that over 80% of migrant workers in bad health returned home; this share was around 50% for those in good health. Table 17: Health and Return Migration No. Share of Return Migrants Healthy 532 0.49 Fairly healthy 565 0.56 So-so 315 0.64 Fairly poor 170 0.81 Poor 36 0.92 Notes: Migrants are defined as those working outside of hukou registration, those who return temporarily to their place of hukou registration, and those who return permanently to their place of hukou registration. The last category is regarded as returnees. Source: Zhou and Lu (2014). In addition to the selection effect, working conditions in specific industries in urban areas tend to have negative effects on the health of migrant workers. Zhou and Lu (2014) found that the health of those working in the construction industry tends to deteriorate more rapidly than that of urban residents. Niu (2013) also found that the migration experience can be detrimental to migrants’ health. Thus, if health is thought of as another type of human capital, the depreciation rate is higher for migrant workers. More literature has examined the effect of migration on the health of two groups of children (i.e., migrant and “left-behind” children). Xu and Xie (2013) investigated the effect of migration on children’s well-being, finding that migration may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, migration to cities exposes children to an urban environment that is characterized by new ideas, more permissive social norms, expanded peer networks, quality schools, nutrition-rich food, and modern hospitals. In these respects, migration can be an empowering experience for children. On the other hand, migrant children are confronted with the challenge of assimilating into a new social environment, which is somewhat alien to and perhaps even discriminatory toward them The study also pooled origin–destination child samples to form 28 ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing appropriate comparisons and applied propensity score-matching methods to estimate the average treatment effects, finding significant positive effects of child migration on their objective well-being but no negative effects on their subjective well-being. It also found little difference between the left-behind and nonmigrant children across multiple life domains, highlighting the important role of migration in narrowing the long-standing rural–urban gap in child development in the PRC. Ren and Treiman (2013) looked at the effect of migration on left-behind children’s emotional well-being. While the expected effect was negative, the empirical results suggested that migration did not affect the health of “left-behind” children. 7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS Human capital is an important factor in the urbanization process. Policies and institutional arrangements during this process also influence the human capital of both rural and urban residents. According to the analysis, several policy implications emerge: (i) The hukou system is still a major barrier to the mobility of the labor force and needs to be reformed. Both rural and urban migrant workers seem to be hindered by this system, as it seems that the system has higher costs for unskilled workers. (ii) The provision of both educational and health services are inelastic to the emerging demand in cities, especially large cities. Institutional reforms (including hukou) are needed to make the supply more elastic to surging demand. Private investment should be encouraged, and the government should subsidize and supervise such investment. (iii) The central government should take more responsibility in financing education at various levels, because education has externalities, and educated workers are highly mobile across regions. Education and health resources should also be allocated more equally across regions. 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