Philosophical Mindfulness. An Essay about the Art of Philosophizing

HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS AN ESSAY ABOUT THE ART OF PHILOSOPHIZING MINDFULNESS FILOSÓFICO UN ENSAYO SOBRE EL ARTE DE FILOSOFAR MICHAEL NOAH WEISS Norwegian Society for Philosophical Practice [email protected] RECIBIDO: 17 DE JULIO DE 2016 ACEPTADO: 14 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2016 Abstract: What skills or qualities with a philosophical practitioner are required in order to perform and facilitate good philosophical dialogues? Is good dialogue facilitation only a question of respective techniques or is the ethical attitude of the philosophical practitioner also of significant relevance? These questions are further investigated in this essay, and – as some sort of result – pointed out that the development of so-called phronesis (practical wisdom or mindfulness) with the philosophical practitioner plays a decisive role when he or she is facilitating dialogues and is a key feature in the art of philosophizing. Key words: Philosophical practice, phronesis, mindfulness, dialogue facilitation. Resumen: ¿Qué habilidades o cualidades, además de las inherentes a la práctica filosófica, son necesarias para llevar a cabo y facilitar buenos diálogos filosóficos? ¿Consiste la facilitación de un diálogo exclusivamente en un asunto de técnicas o se requiere una actitud ética también significativa? Estas cuestiones serán minuciuosamente investigadas en este trabajo y, como una suerte de resultado, se señalará que el desarrollo de la, así denominada, phronesis (sabiduría práctica o visión completa (mindfulness)) juega un rol decisivo en el orientador filosófico cuando facilita diálogos y, asimismo, constituye una característica clave en el arte de filosofar. Palabras clave: Filosofía Aplicada, phronesis, mindfulness, facilitación de diálogos. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 92 On the guiding question of this essay Quite early after it came into existence, the field of philosophical practice was marked by a great variety of approaches and concepts 1 . And with this diversity in terms of approaches, concepts and practices, an intense discussion about the essence of this new discipline came along 2 . Up until today, this discussion never came to a final answer or common conclusion. And maybe this is not even necessary, since different points of view allow for the discovery of new potentials and developments within the field. However, what all philosophical practices seem to have in common – and this is one of the basic assumption of this essay – is that they strive to offer ways to create, facilitate and perform dialogues 3 . What methodological structures, formats or even purposes these dialogue practices have, is of course another question. But a philosophical practice that manages without the performance of a dialogue (and one can also have a dialogue with oneself 4 ) would be the ‘black swan’ among the philosophical practices currently available, so to say. Therefore, it appears that there is one feature in particular that all philosophical practitioners tacitly share (no matter, whether they work at schools, with counseling, in hospitals, prisons, at universities etc.): They all want to facilitate and perform good (philosophical) dialogues. And it is this aspect that this essay is dealing with – the performance of good philosophical dialogues. However, the intention behind this essay is 1 see LAHAV, Ran & DA VENZA TILLMANNS, Maria (eds.): Essays on Philosophical Counseling, Plymbridge Distributors Ltd., Gloucester, 1995. 2 RAABE, Peter: Philosophical Counseling. Theory and Practice, Praeger Publishers, Santa Barbara, CA, 2001, p. 120f. 3 see WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. 4 see AMIR, Lydia: “The Tragic Sense of the Good Life“ or NIEHAUS, Michael: “Philosophy as a Way of Life. Exercises in Self-Care”, in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 93 not to evaluate and critically reflect the different methods and formats within philosophical practice, since as a format or method they all have ‘a right to exist’. Rather, the guiding question of investigation focuses more on the philosophical practitioner, who performs and facilitates dialogues and it reads: What skills or qualities with the philosophical practitioner are required in order to perform and facilitate a good dialogue? In a certain respect, this question is a normative one. But before going into it, a closer look at the term ‘good dialogue’ is necessary. The good life – an analogy It is of course – at least to a certain extent – a sheer presupposition that all philosophical practitioners want to perform good dialogues. On the other hand, however, intending to perform a ‘weak’ or ‘poor’ dialogue would simply make no sense. But even if one agrees that intending to perform poor or weak dialogues makes no sense, the question remains, what then is a good dialogue? Here an analogy to the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle seems to be useful in which he argues that the highest goal in life – shared by all human beings – is to live a good life 5 . However, even if we assume that Aristotle is right, the idea of what the good life is would differ from individual to individual. This seems to be similar with philosophical practitioners and their supposedly intention to perform good dialogues. However, even if we cannot give a common answer to what a good (philosophical) dialogue is, it can be a kind of guideline or normative idea, just like the good life is. 5 see ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, 1097a. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 94 The metaphor of the guitar players In order to further outline the direction in which I intend to go in this essay, I would like to use a metaphor – the metaphor of the guitar players: Obviously, there are guitar players, and there are great guitar players. There are those “Smoke on the Water” 6 - players, who just began practicing, and then there are those who virtuously master their instruments (and there are of course also many in between). Then there are those who are well trained as well as those not so well trained, but who somehow inspire the listener with their playing. Then there are guitar players who play by notes, and others who improvise. In fact, there are incredibly many different ways of playing a guitar, both in terms of style and quality. And here the question comes up, how to improve one’s style and quality in order to become a great guitar player? Regular practice and years of experience seem to be important in this respect – but even if you are an experienced guitar player who practices frequently, then this is still no guarantee that your playing will become outstanding in style and quality. Maybe you too have once heard guitar players who possessed extraordinary playing techniques and skills to master their instrument while something was ‘still missing’ in order to call their playing inspiring – everything was ‘done right’, but still their playing did not sound very inspired. In other words, great guitar playing is not only a question of skills. There is more to it than the mastery of playing techniques that make music sound great. 6 “Smoke on the Water” is a song by the band Deep Purple. Its hook line is both an attracting Rock ‘n Roll tune as well as simple to play. Probably millions of youngsters began their guitar playing with this song. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 95 Reframing the metaphor of the guitar players One could now ask what kind of qualities a guitar player needs in addition to experience and skills in order to become a great guitar player. For the moment, I would like to leave this question unanswered. Rather, I would like to reframe this metaphor of the guitar players into the context of dialoguing. Techné For Aristotle the ability to play the lyre (a kind of Ancient guitar) fell within the realm of so-called techné 7 . Techné can be translated with technical knowledge or craftsmanship and even art. At first sight, it might not appear logical why Aristotle associates art with technical knowledge. But what he means is that art is both the knowledge and the skills to put an idea into reality, i.e. to proceed from an image that a painter has in his or her mind to the finished painting. The decisive point here is that already in the beginning of the ‘production process’ there is an idea of what the product in the end should ‘look like’ – and that idea is guiding the whole development process. In this sense Aristotle differed techné from episteme (theoretical knowledge) and phronesis (practical wisdom or moral knowledge) – on the latter we will have a closer look later. In a sense, techné represents not only know-how but also the capability to properly apply this know-how. In other words, technè is not only concerned with the knowledge of how to do or produce something (i.e. a vase or a house) but also with the acquisition of the skills and techniques necessary for doing that. The question now is, again, whether playing music or making art, is only a question of techné – or, to come back to the topic of dialoguing, 7 see ARISTOTLE: Magna Moralia, 1197a 33. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 96 whether facilitating and performing a dialogue is simply a question of craftsmanship in the sense of techné. Dialogues are unpredictable The short answer to the last question is ‘no’: It needs more than a skilled dialogue-facilitator – in our case, a philosophical practitioner – in order to have a good dialogue. If a good dialogue would solely depend on skills, techniques and methods and their proper application then it would not only be ‘predictable’ what a philosophical practitioner has to do in order to ‘produce’ a good dialogue, but also the result and outcome of a dialogue would be, at least in certain respects, predictable. However, isn’t it one of the key-features of a philosophical dialogue that its outcome is not predictable, and furthermore, that most (if not all) dialogue methods in philosophical practice rely to a great extent on improvisation, simply because they are dialogical 8 ? A good dialogue is like a good jazz performance A good dialogue might be comparable with a good jazz performance: The key-feature of such a performance lies in the spontaneous interaction – the improvisation – between the musicians. And though jazz musicians in general have brilliant playing skills, the skillful capability of playing an instrument cannot account alone for good improvisation. And this appears to be the same in a dialogue, which also can be understood as a 8 LINDSETH, Anders: “Being Ill as an Inevitable Life Topic. Possibilities of Philosophical Practice in Health Care and Psychotherapy“, in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 97 spontaneous form of interaction between the dialogue participants: A philosophical practitioner might have extraordinary knowledge in philosophy as well as expertise and knowledge of different dialogue methods, but this gives little predictive value as to whether the dialogue that he or she is facilitating will be inspiring and giving. The Art of Improvisation One of the reasons why knowledge in philosophy, as well as expertise in dialogue practices, cannot account alone for a giving and inspiring dialogue is because the ‘art’ of improvisation cannot be taught. If it would be, then it would not be improvisation. Improvisation – at least to a certain degree – can be understood as the way in which one deals with unexpected situations. There are certainly situations that we are unexpectedly confronted with, which simply make us scared – and then we would go into ‘fight-, flight- or freeze’-mode. The ‘art’ of improvisation on the other hand would mean that we would try to ‘make the best out of the situation’. This already indicates that there are two principal attitudes towards unexpected situations: On the one side of the spectrum we find the more ‘negative’ attitude, meaning that one is trying to ‘get out of this situation’. On the other side there is the more ‘positive’ attitude, meaning that one is trying to embrace and value the unexpected situation by seeing its chances and potentials by trying to deal with it more actively. To call this ‘positive’, improvising attitude an ‘art’ seems to be far fetched, however. First, because it seems to have little to do with Aristotle’s techné, in the sense of craftsmanship and art – especially if we understand art in the previously suggested way where already in the beginning of the ‘production’ there is an idea of the ‘product’ that guides the whole process. On the contrary, the absence of such an idea of the MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 98 ‘end product’ seems to be an inherent aspect of the nature of improvisation. Secondly, because it seems to be sheer nonsense to call improvisation an art form, like visual arts, decorative arts, digital arts, performing arts etc. However, if one takes a closer look at the etymological roots of the term ‘art’, then one will find that it traces back to the Sanskrit word rtih, which is translated with ‘manner’ or ‘mode’ 9 . In German, for example, the term Art still means ‘manner’ and ‘mode’. And also the Old English expression of thou art (‘you are’) 10 relates to a mode of being. With this in mind it seems to be legitimate to speak of the art of improvisation in the sense of a mode of improvisation. And now we are eventually getting a better understanding of what jazz musicians are doing in a jazz performance: They are getting into a ‘mode’ – a ‘mode of improvisation’. The Art of Philosophizing With the translation of the term ‘art’ in the sense of a mode, we can now continue and see whether we can use this concept of art also in the context of philosophical dialogues. The activity primarily done in a philosophical dialogue is the activity of philosophizing. And now we can ask, what do we actually understand by the term ‘philosophizing’? This seems to be a delicate question. Some might say that philosophizing is a (reflective) activity in which one goes from the concrete to the more general and abstract (a movement in the thinking process that one can find in the Socratic method after Leonard Nelson, for example 11 ). Others would say that 9 ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY: “art” available in HUhttp://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=artUH (last access July 11th 2016) 10 DICT.CC: “thou art” available in HUhttps://www.dict.cc/?s=thou+artUH (last access July 11th 2016) 11 see WEISS, Michael N. (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 99 philosophizing means to investigate general aspects of the human condition, like freedom, responsibility, meaning etc. 12 For the purpose of this essay however, I suggest a more literal understanding of the term ‘philosophizing’. Philo-sophia Philosophy in its literal translation means the love of wisdom (philo-sophia). A philosopher is a friend of wisdom. And to philosophize would then simply mean to love or to be fond of wisdom (as an aside it can be noted that all these three terms – philosophy, philosopher, philosophizing – suggest a positive emotional disposition towards wisdom, rather than its ownership or acquisition). However, what wisdom (sophia) is and what it is not, is again, a challenging question. Intuition tells us what it is not: knowledge – if wisdom would simply be mere knowledge then it can be acquired and ‘owned’ (and then philosophers would be called sophists), but it does not seem to be that easy with wisdom. And also, a person who has great knowledge of something is not necessarily a wise person. Further help can be found with Aristotle who offers some valuable categorization. He differed between theoretical wisdom (sophia) 13 and practical wisdom (phronesis) 14 . While theoretical wisdom – in short and simple terms – is rather concerned with the understanding of the cosmos 15 , practical wisdom is concerned with a proper, that is, virtuous understanding of a given situation qua action 16 . In other words, sophia is a wisdom related to the general, while phronesis is a wisdom related 12 TEICHMANN, Jenny & EVANS, Kathrine C., Philosophy – A Beginner’s Guide, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, p. 1. 13 see ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, 1141. 14 see ibidem, 1140. 15 see ibidem, 1141. 16 see ibidem, 1140. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 106 dimension with Socrates in a dialogue with Protagoras, for example: Protagoras: I don’t think it is quite so simple, Socrates, so that I should grant that justice is holy and holiness just. It seems to me there is a distinction here. But what difference does it make? If you wish, let us agree that justice is holy and holiness just. Socrates: Oh, no! I don’t want t examine this ‘If you like’ or ‘If you think’ but to examine you and me. When I say ‘you and me’ I mean that one can best examine the issue by taking away the ‘ifs’. 32 With this passage it is pointed out that Socrates was not interested in ‘logical games’ or in hypothetical ‘ifs’. On the contrary, he was interested and concerned with the topic under investigation as well as with the person he is investigating this topic with. In this way, mindfulness appears to have little to do with mere theorizing, rather it seems to be a certain kind of awareness – a fundamental attitude towards the given situation and towards the people who are involved. With reference to this passage in the dialogue Protagoras, Seeskin states that What is at stake in a Socratic dialogue is not, at least not primarily, the logical relations between propositions but the interaction of moral agents. That is what Socrates means when he refuses to allow Protagoras to use hypotheticals and claims that what he really wants to examine are ‘you and me’.” 33 At this point, one might interpose that phronesis is not only about an attitude towards or an awareness of the given situation in the sense of knowing how to act good and virtuously in that respective situation. Phronesis as introduced in the Socratic dialogues of 32 see PLATO: Protagoras, 331c. 33 SEESKIN, Kenneth: Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method, State University of New York Press, New York, 1987, p. 3. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 107 Plato 34 or in the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle 35 is also concerned with living a good and virtuous life overall. How is this eudaimonic characteristic of phronesis ‘echoed’ in the term mindfulness? The answer seems to be rather simple and it was already outlined in the remarks about the phronetic attitude of Socrates: The fundamental reason why the figure of Socrates can be called mindful (in the sense as described here) is because he truly cared about life and how to live it. Until the end of his life he was driven to figure that out, which is also reflected in his famous proverb “The unexamined life is not worth living” 36 . In other words, his concern to live a good and virtuous live overall – that is, to pursue eudaimonia in a ‘sustainable’ way, as it were – was the reason why he employed (or better, could employ) a mindful attitude in the first place. Therefore, in terms of phronesis the philosophical mindfulness as presented here, can be seen as being intimately linked with an eudaimonic perspective or dimension – it represents the motivational framework for being mindful in the concrete and given situation. With that, it seems to be this eudaimonic perspective, which is the ‘trigger’ when having or facilitating a philosophical dialogue, for example. Without that perspective a true and authentic concern for the topic and its investigation may vaporize in the long run. The art of philosophizing as a phronetic mode of being With these remarks on the phronetic attitude of Socrates, one can conclude that: If one speaks of the art of philosophizing in the sense of a mode of philosophizing (as it was previously suggested), then this mode has to be a phronetic mode – a phronetic mode of 34 see PLATO: Meno 87d–89a. 35 see ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, 1097a. 36 PLATO: Apology, 38a. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 108 being in a dialogue. The decisive question now is, are philosophical practitioners always in this phronetic mode when being in a dialogue? Are they always mindful (as described above), when facilitating dialogues? An important remark in this respect seems to be Aristotle’s notion that phronesis is a question of experience and “experience is the fruit of years” 37 . Related to a phronetic art of philosophizing (to call it like that), this would mean that the phronetic capacity of a philosophical practitioner would develop due to his or her experience, and over time. But is this true? Can younger or more inexperienced practitioners not adopt a phronetic attitude in their dialogues? And, as a consequence, would that mean that the dialogues they facilitate are rather ‘poor’ and ‘weak’ and of less quality? No, by far not. Experience is an advantage, for sure, but what seems to be of even greater importance is the intention of whether one is willing to be mindful in the dialogue facilitation. For example, one of the key features of the figure of Socrates in this respect, was his knowing of not knowing – this awareness of his unawareness which did not keep him from being curious, wondering, critical and interested in the topics under investigation. On the contrary, it even seems that this awareness of his unawareness was the reason why he could keep on having such a mindful attitude. In other words, Socrates knew his limitations, but in the writings of Plato it appears that this was not a problem for him. It does not seem that he was lacking confidence. And this awareness of his unawareness seem to have sparked his philosophical investigations and the way he performed dialogues. And here we come back to the actual art of philosophizing, which seems to be deeply rooted in the wisdom of ignorance. Only due to this wisdom of ignorance, Socrates could keep on being curious, wondering, critical, but also authentic and humble. It kept him investigating, questioning and reflecting. In other words, an 37 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a 6-7. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 109 authentic concern for the topic – for the issue at stake – as well as for dialogue participants appears to be decisive in order to perform and facilitate good dialogues 38 . Of course, as the facilitator of a philosophical group dialogue – performed for example by means of the Socratic method after Nelson 39 – one’s role is not to engage in the dialogue like other group participants, in terms of sharing personal stories, ideas or opinions. Nevertheless, an authentic concern and interest for the topic is still of high relevance for the dialogue facilitator too, since it makes it easier for him or her to ‘keep an ear to the ground’. That is, to listen carefully to what is expressed in the course of a dialogue, to sense important aspects, which can be further investigated, to pose helpful questions and of course to take care of the dialogue process as a whole etc. If a young or rather inexperienced philosophical practitioner has this authentic concern for the topic and the participants of a dialogue, and if he or she is aware of his or her not-knowing position, then these are important preconditions for that practitioner to perform the art of philosophizing (as presented here) too. On the other hand, if an experienced philosophical practitioner lacks an authentic concern for the topic under investigation, as well as for his or her ‘co-investigators’ and is rather ‘bored’ with one of the two, or with both, then it might be hard to sense this phronetic mode of being in a dialogue with him or her. The lack of concern and interest can be a result of routine. Philosophical investigations, like Socratic dialogues, Philo Cafés, Philosophical Counseling etc. might be performed and facilitated by a philosophical practitioner on a daily basis in order to earn a living. Philosophical topics or questions like ‘What is freedom?’, ‘Has life meaning?’, ‘How to live life in a responsible way?’ etc. might be – though by different people – 38 see GALLAGHER, Shaun: Hermeneutics and Education, Suny Press, Albany, NY, 1992, p. 198. 39 see WEISS, Michael Noah: The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015, p. 215. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 110 investigated in a practitioner’s praxis regularly. If a practitioner then looses his or her interest in the actual philosophizing process and instead solely resorts to applying certain techniques, methods and standardized procedures, then the activity performed by this practitioner rather resembles some sort of technè than praxis – philosophical practice, in this case. Of course, no practitioner is immune from falling prey to such a situation caused by everyday work routines. But why such a situation is far from the art of philosophizing appears to be obvious. Another trap in this respect can be a philosophical practitioner’s own experience. Though Aristotle assumed that phronesis is a question of experience and that “experience is the fruit of years” 40 , it can be precisely because of these years of experience, which a practitioner might have with philosophical investigations that he or she becomes overconfident and forgets about his or her knowing of not-knowing. And that, again, would counter the art of philosophizing, since such a selfconfident attitude with a practitioner would rather resemble the attitude one finds with some of Socrates’ interlocutors, who were convinced they were wise – whereas in fact they were not. Poiesis vs. praxis With these remarks on the art of philosophizing in terms of a phronetic mode of being in a dialogue, I intended to approach the essence of philosophical practice. And this essence seems to have something to do with the facilitation and the performance of dialogues – not only because more or less all philosophical practitioners are concerned with dialogue facilitation when doing philosophical practice, but also because the facilitation of dialogues seem to be a central feature when comparing philosophical practice 40 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a 6-7. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 111 with other approaches like psychotherapy or coaching 41 . To make this point more clear, a distinction from Aristotle seems to be useful. He differed between two kinds of concepts of action: The first he called poiesis and the other praxis 42 . Poiesis is the activity that is performed, when the goal of this activity is beyond the activity itself. An example here would be to build a house – the building process is not the goal but it is the finishing of the house. Praxis on the other hand is an activity done for its own sake. An example here would be to go for a walk, to relax, to listen to music – or to philosophize 43 . As a consequence, if the activity of philosophizing is assigned to praxis and if philosophical practice is assumed to be concerned with philosophizing then a philosophical practitioner’s main concern is – or should be – the facilitation of philosophical investigations and dialogues (because what else could it be then?) At first sight this might appear to be problematic, since it makes it rather impossible to assign philosophical practice to the field of counseling professions: Though the field of counseling (including life counseling, business coaching etc.) is quite diverse by today, its general intention – as its name suggest – is to give counsel. And with that the activity of counseling has its goal beyond itself and resembles a poietic activiy. On the other hand, it is precisely this point that makes it possible to differ philosophical practice from psychotherapy, coaching and counseling: While psychotherapy is rather about healing and curing scars of the heart, and coaching is about improving or resolving a problematic situation, for example (which means that both approaches have their goals beyond the actual activities of treating or coaching, and with that rather resemble poiesis), philosophical 41 see SVARE, Helge: “Behandling eller dialog”, in Impuls – tidsskrift for psykologi, Nr. 2, 2004, p. 59 – 65. 42 see STAUDE, Detlef: “The Path of Consideration. Philosophical Practice in Dialogic Life Accompaniment”, in WEISS, Michael Noah: The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015, p. 43. 43 see ibidem. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 112 practice has its goal within itself, that is, the goal of philosophizing is to philosophize, to investigate the mind. And with that philosophical practice rather resembles praxis 44 . Whether philosophical practice indeed has its goal within itself, is heavily debated 45 . For example, what if a guest visits a philosophical practitioner because she currently suffers from a lack of meaning in her life? Cannot a philosophical practitioner help her? The point is that this question is simply the wrong one. If philosophical practice is about solving existential problems, then it has to be assigned to poiesis and not to praxis. As a consequence, philosophical practice, strictly speaking, would not deserve to be called a practice then. Of course, it would answer several questions at once, if philosophical practice would indeed be about problem-solving and the like: First, it would be much easier to market it towards potential customers because they would know in advance what kind of ‘product’ or benefit they can expect (i.e. answers to urging existential questions, or improved performances in business companies). Second, and with regards to the assumption that all philosophical practitioners want to perform good dialogues (as described in the very beginning of this essay), it would also be much easier to conclude what it takes in order to have a good dialogue – it would be its results, for example, that a solution to the problem under investigation can been found. Good dialogues could then be differed from ‘weak’ or ‘poor’ dialogues in terms of their outcomes. And good philosophical practitioners would then be those who can ‘deliver’ a needed solution for a problem in a simple, fast and comprehensible way. But, in order to stay true to what philosophical practice claims to be, namely to be a practice, we have to refrain from these tempting interpretations in terms of poiesis. However, if one agrees 44 see ibidem. 45 see RAABE, Peter: Philosophical Counseling. Theory and Practice, Praeger Publishers, Santa Barbara, CA, 2001, p. 120f. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 113 with this distinction between poiesis and praxis, and that the assignment of philosophical practice should fall into the realm of the latter, then the question is more than legitimate to ask why one should visit a philosophical practitioner, if one cannot expect any concrete outcome from such a visitation (since philosophical practice is not a poietic activity). In this respect the philosophical practitioner Detlef Staude states that he is pleading to take Aristotle seriously, as he points at a deep difficulty in today’s society, where we find it hard to get to rest, because we are constantly trying to reach aims. Perhaps the true power of philosophy lies in its being centered in itself. This could be the power so many people nowadays are looking for. Philosophical practice is a dialogue, which brings nearer to freedom and closer to oneself. It is not a tool for success nor is it a tool for anything else. To be human does not just mean to be a homo faber, to be someone who only pursues purposes and uses the power of thinking for reaching these purposes. Purposes are always ambivalent, have different aspects and implications. So one shouldn’t say that philosophical practice is ‘the application of philosophy’, because saying so suggests that philosophy is a tool for a purpose, but the purpose itself has nothing to do with philosophy. However, philosophizing is deeply human, it is not the poiesis of something, but the praxis of a free human being. And as it is this free praxis, to exercise it can bring us to become even more free 46 Learning self-knowledge If philosophical practice is not a poietic activity, as i.e. psychotherapy or coaching in fact are, but rather a dialogical praxis then the question is, what are the competences of a philosophical practitioner in this respect – if he or she has any competences at 46 STAUDE, Detlef: “The Path of Consideration. Philosophical Practice in Dialogic Life Accompaniment”, in WEISS, Michael Noah: The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015, p. 43. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 114 all? This question seems to be legitimate, since philosophical practice in one way or another understands itself as a profession (for example, when comparing itself with psychotherapy or coaching, as documented in the respective literature 47 ). And in order to pursue a certain profession, one has to have respective competences. One could now come to the conclusion that philosophical practitioners are some sort of dialogue experts and that they have the formal competence to facilitate dialogues on a professional level. This understanding would keep philosophical practice still within the scope of praxis and not ‘delivering’ it to poiesis. At the same time however, one can ask what this dialogical competence is about, if it is not a matter of techniques, methods and tools – in short, a matter of know-how or techné. And here we return to what has been discussed previously under The Art of Improvisation. There, art has rather been defined in the sense of a mode of being than in the sense of craftsmanship. And if we now take this understanding of art as well as Aristotle’s distinction between poiesis and praxis (and with that the distinction between techné and phronesis) into account, then we can conclude that the dialogical competences of a philosophical practitioner are not so much concerned with know-how and technical knowledge nor with problem-solving skills, but rather with an attitude – a phronetic attitude. In other words, the art of philosophizing is not simply a matter of dialogue techniques and communication skills – and that by learning these skills and techniques it would make one into a good philosophical practitioner. Rather, learning phronesis (or mindfulness, as it was translated previously) is a matter of selfknowledge, as Shaun Gallagher points out, when investigating the passage in the Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno reflect on how one can learn phronesis, if it is not teachable. In this respect, Gallagher states that, 47 RAABE, Peter: Philosophical Counseling. Theory and Practice, Praeger Publishers, Santa Barbara, CA, 2001, p. 79. PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 115 Self-knowledge, which is intimately linked with phronesis and thinking for oneself, is clearly contrasted, not only to Meno’s reliance on memorized definitions, but to the type of knowledge offered by the Sophists. Even those Sophists, like Gorgias, who, through clever technique, could compose fine-sounding and memorable definitions do not represent for Plato the ideal of education. Education is more than rhetorical technique, as characterized by Plato. Rhetoric, as practiced by Sophists such as Gorgias, is a collection of purely formal techniques used to impress those who listen. As a formal technique is does not manifest moral involvement and concern for student, subject matter, or truth. If we define art (a term that in English once signified “learning”) as a practice that manifests such moral concern, then for Plato education has more to do with art than with formal, unconcerned techné. The notion that art or learning involves moral concern would not be irrelevant to the concept of virtue (areté) or phronesis under discussion in the Meno 48 These remarks of Gallagher offer valuable clues on what has been called the phronetic mode of being in a dialogue in this essay. First, Gallagher clearly dismisses the teaching of rhetorical techniques or communication skills (which he here attributes to the Sophists) as being sufficient for the learning of phronesis. Learning phronesis is a different type of education, so to say. It has to do with gaining self-knowledge, and only through self-knowledge a true moral involvement and concern “for student, subject matter, or truth” 49 is possible. In other words and seen from Gallagher’s point of view, the phronetic attitude required by a philosophical practitioner in the facilitation of dialogues fundamentally relies on his or her will to gain self-knowledge. If it would only be about acquiring formal techniques then this would “not manifest moral involvement and concern” 50 . The second important remark that Gallagher makes here can be found at the end of his quote, where he states that, “If 48 GALLAGHER, Shaun: Hermeneutics and Education, Suny Press, Albany, NY, 1992, p. 198f. 49 ibidem. 50 ibidem. MICHAEL NOAH WEISS HASER. 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