Athens/Sparta bipolarity in Xenophon’s Hellenika

Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 Athens/Sparta bipolarity in Xenophon’s Hellenika La bipolaridad Atenas/Esparta en las Helénicas de Jenofonte Cinzia Bearzot1 Università Cattolica di Sacro Cuore di Milano (Italia) ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4414-7963 Recibido: 01-06-2024 Aceptado: 02-07-2024 Abstract The article traces the reflections found in the Hellenika on the theme of Athens/Sparta bipolarity, with the intention of illustrating Xenophon's interest in this international arrangement of the Greek world and of emphasizing its repercussions in Xenophon’s historiographical project. Keywords: Xenophon’s Hellenika, Greece, Fourth-century BC, balance of power. Resumen El artículo rastrea las reflexiones encontradas en las Helénicas sobre el tema de la bipolaridad Atenas/Esparta, con la intención de ilustrar el interés de Jenofonte por esta disposición internacional del mundo griego y de subrayar sus repercusiones en el proyecto historiográfico de Jenofonte. Palabras-clave: Helénicas de Jenofonte, Grecia, siglo IV a.C., balance de poder. 1 ([email protected]). Full Professor of Greek History at the Catholic University of Milan and member of the Istituto Lombardo – Accademia di Scienze e Lettere. Her interests are in the political and institutional history of Greece in the Classical Age, the history of political thought, and the history of ancient historiography. She has published several monographs, including Alcibiade, Roma, Salerno, 2021, and Storiografia greca. Un’introduzione, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2022, and about 200 minor essays. She is editor of the journal “Erga/Logoi. Rivista di storia, letteratura, diritto e culture dell’antichità”. Address for correspondence: Dipartimento di Filologia classica, Papirologia e Linguistica storica, Università Cattolica, Largo Gemelli 1, 2013 Milano (Italia). 166 Cinzia Bearzot Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 Bipolarity, that is, the division of spheres of influence between Sparta and Athens on the basis of the nature of the two powers, one land-based and the other sea-oriented, had been the criterion by which in the course of the Pentecontaetia the Greek world had sought to secure a stable international balance. The adoption of this criterion, which began in 478 (not without some resistance in those who continued to aspire to a full hegemony for their city), was successful, despite some moments of crisis. The most significant was the diplomatic incident that led Athens, at the time of the Third Messenian War, to abandon its alliance with Sparta in order to conclude one with Argives and Thessalians (Thuc. 1.102)2. Argives and Thessalians were continental Greeks, and therefore Athens should have kept away from them. But after several years of creeping conflict, in 447/6 the so-called Peace of Thirty Years reintroduced the bipolar perspective: that it worked for a few years is shown by the refusal of the Corinthians, though great enemies of Athens, to support intervention on behalf of rebellious Samos in 441, on the argument that each had a right to punish its own allies (Thuc. 1.40.5)3. Such a perspective was supported in Athens by Kimon, in Sparta by Hetoimaridas4. It was not shared, in Athens, by the democrats, oriented toward opposition to Sparta, such as Themistocles; in Sparta, by those who did not intend to support the idea of a Sparta abandoning the struggle for hegemony, such as the regent Pausanias5. The division of spheres of influence was, however, an overall successful choice. This is precisely why the model remained very relevant, even when the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the unique hegemony of Sparta and the rise of the so-called “third forces” such as Argos, Corinth and Thebes made it anachronistic6. Among those who strove to reenact the bipolar model, believing it still relevant, were politicians, such as Kallistratos of Aphidna7, and intellectuals, such as Xenophon. There is a red thread running through the Hellenika that testifies to Xenophon’s great interest in this solution of international politics: he was so convinced he could reactualize it, that he did not grasp new perspectives as the role of Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, which no longer allowed for the imagination of a bipolar Greece. 2 See Hornblower 1991: 158-160. 3 See Hornblower 1991: 83-84. 4 On Kimon see Zaccarini 2017; on Hetoimaridas, Vattuone 2008: 131-152. 5 On the politics of Pausanias and Themistocles, see Sordi, 2002 = 1976: 341-360. On Pausanias, see Nafissi, 2004: 53-90. On Themistocles, see Piccirilli 1987; Piccirilli 1996. 6 On the concept of “third forces”, see Sordi 2002 = 1991. 7 On Kallistratos, see Hochschulz 2007, with previous bibliography. 167 Athens/Sparta bipolarity in Xenophon’s Hellenika Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 1. The speech of the Theban ambassadors in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.5.8-15), intended to gain Athens’ adherence to the anti-Spartan alliance that was being formed in view of the Corinthian War, emphasizes a full opposition between Athens and Sparta8. The Thebans flash to the Athenians the recovery of hegemony from an anti-Spartan perspective: We all know, Athenians, that you would like to recover the empire (arche) you once possessed. (Hell. 3.5.10)9. The enterprise might succeed, say the Thebans, if the Athenians came to the aid of the Greeks suffering injustice by the Spartans (adikoumenoi, Hell. 3.5.10 and 14). Even, the Thebans foreshadow for Athens a hegemony encompassing not only the maritime sector, but also the Peloponnese and even Persia: Is it not clear that if you returned to the leadership of the cities openly suffering injustice, you would become more powerful than ever before? Why, when you ruled, your hegemony extended only to the maritime cities, whereas now it would include everyone: us, the Peloponnesians, those who were already subject to you in the past, and even the King with his immense power (Hell.5.5.14). This is clearly not a proposal for a return to bipolarity, quite the contrary: such a solution would have ruled out Thebes, and hatred for Sparta was too deeply rooted in the Thebans (or rather in the faction in power in 395, i.e. that of Ismenias10, which was pro-Athenian) to allow them to imagine a Greece divided between Athens and Sparta. It is likely that Xenophon considered this as opportunistic as other contents of the Thebans’ speech. It is enough to prove it that there is a certain irony in the justification that Xenophon puts in the mouth of the Theban ambassador, at the opening of the speech (Hell. 3.5.8), regarding Thebes’ behavior toward the Athenians defeated in 404: he splits the responsibilities of the Thebans, who refused to intervene alongside the Spartans on behalf of the Thirty Tyrants, from those of the individual Theban delegate in the Peloponnesian League’s synedrion, who called for the destruction of Athens; the argument is very similar to that which Thucydides (3.62.3-4) attributes to the Theban orators who in the “Platæan debate” justify 8 On speeches in Xenophon, see Pontier 2001; Baragwanath 2017. On Theban ambassadors’ speech, see V. Gray 1989: 107-112; Krentz (ed.)1995: 198-200; Tuci 2019: 35, 38, 40 -44, 48. 9 Cf. 3.5.2, a corrupt passage in which Xenophon seems to attribute to the Athenians the desire to recover the arche: see Krentz (ed.) 1995: 98 and 199. 10 On Ismenias’ party, see Bearzot 2008: 206-213. On the testimony offered by the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia on the internal situation in Thebes in the early fourth century, see the recent annotated edition of Occhipinti 2022. 168 Cinzia Bearzot Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 themselves to the Spartans about Thebes’ medism11. However, the recovery of naval hegemony by Athens was a necessary precondition for imagining a possible bipolar balance: the subject is well found, and Xenophon could not ignore it. 2. The first episode of rapprochement between Athens and Sparta of which Xenophon informs us is the peace of 375 (Xen. Hell. 6.2.1). It was, for Xenophon, a bilateral (and not a “common”) peace12: Athens, concerned about the growth of Thebes’ power and financial problems, wished to end the war, and sent an embassy to Sparta and concluded peace13. The treaty, which Nepos (Tim. 2.2), unlike Xenophon, traces back to a Spartan, not an Athenian, initiative, according to the biographer ratified Athenian hegemony over the sea: The Spartans ceased the continual contention and of their own volition granted the Athenians the primacy of maritime empire (imperii maritimi principatum) and established peace on the condition that the Athenians were masters of the sea. Therefore, specifically, Sparta recognized the existence of the Second Naval League founded in 377, and set the stage for a return to the criterion of the division of spheres of influence. This division is expressly referred to by Diodorus (15.38.4): The Spartans and the Athenians, constantly fighting for hegemony, yielded one to the other, one being deemed worthy of comanding the other on land, the other on the sea (οἱ μὲν τῆς κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ τῆς κατὰ θάλλαταν ἀρχῆς ἄξιοι κρινόμενοι)14. Due to the recognition of Athens’ role that it entailed, peace was celebrated with the erection of the Altar of Peace and the statue of Eirene in the agora, made by Kephisodotos (Isocr. Antid. 109-110; Philoc. FGrHist 328 F151; Nep. Tim. 2.2)15. According to Diodoros (15.38.1-2) the peace of 375 was instead the first renewal of the common peace of 387/6. The initiative is traced back to 11 As noted by Krentz (ed.) 1995: 198-199. 12 On Xenophon’s testimony on the peace of 375/4, see Sordi 2022 = 1951: 324-326. 13 See Momigliano 1966 = 1936; Jehne 1994: 57-64. 14 See Stylianou 1998: 328. 15 See Monaco 2008. For the debate on commissioning see Bianco 2007: 24; Marginesu 2016: 45-52. 169 Athens/Sparta bipolarity in Xenophon’s Hellenika Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 King Artaxerxes, who intended to wage war against Egypt and counted on the availability of Greek mercenaries once the Greeks were free from internal wars. He therefore sent ambassadors to Greece to invite the cities to conclude a common peace (koine eirene). Diodoros then underlines the enthusiastic reception of the proposal by the Greeks (ἀσμένως), the terms of the agreement, the speeches of Kallistratos and Epaminondas, and the exclusion of the Thebans from the peace; in 15.39 he adds a series of remarks on the valor of the Thebans, their aspiration for hegemony, and the ability of their leaders, among whom Pelopidas, Gorgidas, and Epaminondas are mentioned; the latter’s personal qualities, in particular, are warmly praised (followed by the mention of the resounding victory at Leuktra against Kleombrotos’ army). The attidographer Philochoros also refers to King’s initiative (Philoc. FGrHist 328 F151: δύναιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἑτέρας ἀπὸ βασιλέως εἰρήνης, ἣν ἀσμένως προσήκαντο οἱ ᾽Αθηναῖοι), we find here the same adverb ἀσμένως used by Diodorus to signal the enthusiasm, not so much of the Greeks as of the Athenians16. The piece of information regarding the King’s involvement seems to be confirmed by the fact that the following year Artaxerxes actually began the war against Egypt (Diod. 15.41), assuming that Diodoros’ distribution of facts is correct. But something, in fact, does not add up in Diodoros’ account: the mention of a speech by Kallistratos, the exclusion of the Thebans from the peace, and the praise of the Boeotians refer to the peace of 371, the outcome of a congress held in Sparta, to which we shall return. The fact that Diodoros (15.50.4) recounts the events of 375 and 371 in very similar terms, including lexically as well as in terms of overall framing, raises the doubt that we are dealing with one of the usual Diodoros’ duplicates and that there is therefore confusion, with regard to some details, between the peace of 375 and the peace of 37117. Diodoros himself seems to realize of problem constituted by the perfect overlapping of the two accounts: in 15.39.3 he refers to the later treatment and seems to regard the account of 15.38-39 as a kind of anticipation, while in 15.50.4 seems to regard the peace of 371 as a repetition of the previous one (“seeing the Greeks in turmoil again”; “according to the agreements already made”; “remaining excluded from the agreements as before”). This could underline Diodoros’ awareness of the anomaly constituted by the entirely similar presentation of the two diplomatic phases. Xenophon’s silence would lead one to place the King’s initiative among these confusions: the presence of this piece of information in Philochoros could trace the confusion back to Diodoros’ source (Ephoros?)18? However, the question remains open. 16 See the commentary on the fragment by Jones 2016. 17 Lauffer 1959. Stylianou 1998: 321-326, think rather of a clumsy synthesis of Ephoros account. 18 On the involvement of the King in 375/4, admitted by Sordi 1951: 320-321. On Ephoros and his relation to Diodoros, see Parmeggiani 2011: 349-394. 170 Cinzia Bearzot Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 The agreement quickly foundered because of Timotheos’ intervention in Zakynthos in favor of the democrats (Xen. Hell. 6.2.2ff.; Diod. 15.45.2)19. The complex affair of the peace of 375 brings up the issue of responsibility for the initiative (attributed to Athens by Xenophon, to Sparta by Nepos, to the King of Persia by Diodoros); the issue of the division of spheres of influence emerges clearly from Diodoros and Nepos (although in partially different form)20,but is not as evident in Xenophon, although a trace of this issue is found in the consideration of the agreement as a bilateral peace and in the emphasis on Athens’ anti-Theban sentiments21.These sentiments appear to be shared by Athens and Sparta in Diodoros’ account (15.38.4), which closes mentioning their intolerance toward Thebes as a “third force”22: As a result, they [Athens and Sparta] resented the claim of hegemony by a third contender, and sought to detach the Boeotian cities from the Theban confederation. 3. In the summer of 371 a congress was held in Sparta to negotiate general peace23. There is no doubt that this was a common peace: Diodoros (15.50-51) speaks insistently of koine eirene. The King’s initiative, recalled by Diodoros (15.50.4), has not convinced all interpreters24. However, it should be noted that Kallistratos, in his speech (Xen. Hell. 6.3.12), says that at the time of the congress of 371 Antalkidas was in Persia dealing with the King. The royal initiative also seems confirmed by Dionysios of Halicarnassos (Lys. 12), who places under the archon Alkisthenes (372/1) a peace sworn by the Athenians, the Spartans and the King. Xenophon’s account devotes some space to these negotiations, bringing out especially the role of Athens. The city, by breaking away from Thebes, was on its way to rapprochement with Sparta, as desired by moderate circles and Xenophon himself; moreover, it was preparing to replace its former rival as guarantor of peace and, therefore, as potential hegemon of Greece25. Xenophon 19 Bianco 2007: 23-29. 20 Although Lauffer 1959: 336 ff. considers the issue of the division of spheres of influence still inactual at this time. 21 See Riedinger 1991: 152-154; for Xenophon’s overall attitude toward Thebes, see pp. 172-190. See also Sordi 1951: 303 ff.; Riedinger 1989: 5-8. For Xenophon’s sources on Thebes Riedinger 1993: 523-533. 22 The converging interests of Sparta and Athens in this regard are underscored by Mosley 1972: 312-318. 23 See Jehne 1994: 65-74; Bearzot 2004: 93-107. 24 See Ryder 1965: 126-130. Contra Stylianou 1998: 382-384. 25 On Xenophon’s position on this issue see Sordi 1951: 316-320; Gray 1989: 123-131; Riedinger 1991: 197-206; Tuplin 1993: 101-110; Dillery 1995: 241-249. 171 Athens/Sparta bipolarity in Xenophon’s Hellenika Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 focuses on the debate among the Athenian ambassadors, reporting the opposing speeches of Autokles, a member of the pro-Theban democratic faction led by Aristophon26, and Kallistratos (Hell. 6.3.1 ff.), to which must be added that of Kallias, of lesser political interest because of its generically conciliatory, panhellenic, and pacifist tones27. Autokles’ speech28, which is very harsh toward the Spartans, accuses them of being in patent contradiction on the issue of autonomy: You always say, ‘Cities must be autonomous,’ but you are the greatest obstacle to autonomy, because you require your allied cities first and foremost to follow you on whatever expedition you lead them on. Well, how do you reconcile this with autonomy? You make enemies without even consulting your allies, whom you then claim to lead against them. Thus these whom you call autonomous are often forced to march against cities with which they are on excellent terms (Hell. 6.3.7). Autokles reiterates the validity of the anti-Spartan and pro-Theban policy followed by Athens in recent years. Instead, Kallistratos delivers a speech urging both Athens and Sparta to self-criticism toward their imperialistic tendencies and the exercise of restraint, and concludes in favor of a return to the division of spheres of influence: All the cities are either on your side or ours; in every city, some side with Sparta and others with Athens. If, therefore, we become friends, on whose side should we expect danger? By land who would be able to harm us, if you are our friends? And by sea who would be able to harm you, if we are in your favor? (Hell. 6.3.14). By asserting that Sparta and Athens must become friends in order to return “to be greater in Greece than in the past” (Hell. 6.3.17), Kallistratos re-proposes the idea of Kimon, who had identified in the division of power spheres a guarantee of sufficient prosperity for the two cities that constituted a point of reference for continental and conservative Greece on the one hand and maritime and democratic Greece on the other29. Xenophon thus focuses his account exclusively on the relationship between Sparta and Athens, which is what interests him most. But other issues were also discussed at the congress: in particular, the status of the Boeotian cities. Sources other than Xenophon, such as Diodoros (15.38.3: as mentioned above, the passage refers to the peace of 375 but also contains aspects referable 26 On Aristophon see. Whitehead 1986. 27 See Mosley 1962: 41-46; Ryder 1963; Gray 1989: 123-131; Schepens 2001. 28 On Autokles’ speech see Gray 1989: 123-131; Riedinger 1991: 149-152. 29 On Kallistratos’ speech, see Gray 1989: 123-131. 172 Cinzia Bearzot Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 to 371) and Plutarch (Ages. 27.4 – 28.1-2), inform us of a bitter clash between Agesilaos and Epaminondas on the issue of autonomy30. Both accounts come from a tradition alternative to Xenophon, more interested in Thebes, probably to be identified with Kallisthenes of Olynthos: his Hellenika were characterized by a consistent anti-Spartan tendency and antipathy for Agesilaos, use of Boeotian sources and had a significant interest in the federal states and were used both by Ephoros, Diodoros’ source, and by Theopompos, quoted along with Kallisthenes by Plutarch31. In fact, the Thebans tried to took advantage of the Panhellenic congress to insistently demand recognition of the legitimacy of the Boeotian koinon as far as it pertained to respect for autonomy; but they met with firm resistance from Agesilaos. At the time of the ratification of the treaty the contrast latent between Sparta and Thebes since 386 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.32-33) exploded in all its gravity (Hell. 6.3.18-20). The Spartans swore for themselves and their allies; the Athenians, consistently with Aristotle’s decree, swore only for themselves, leaving the allies to do so separately. The Thebans asked to sign as Boeotians, thus representing the entire Boeotian League. Agesilaos refused and the Thebans remained excluded from the common peace32. Xenophon’s account gives the impression of being somewhat reticent and is mainly concerned with emphasizing the fairness of the Athenians. As far as the Thebans are concerned, the historian merely reports the consequence of the clash with Agesilaos, namely the exclusion from the peace, but gives no details about the content of the debate between Agesilaos and the Thebans, represented on this occasion by Epaminondas33. This is well understood in light of the fact that Xenophon focuses the entire debate, from the Athenian perspective, on overcoming the contrasts between Sparta and Athens and discussing the parties’ faults in the context of the problem of poleic imperialism, obscuring other aspects34. It is perhaps worth briefly recovering from alternative sources some aspect of the 371 debate. Diodoros (15.38.3) recalls the “marvelous” speech given by Epaminondas on behalf of the Thebans35; this speech returns in Plutarch (Ages. 30 For the different approach of Xenophon and Diodoros on the period 375-371 see Gray 1980; Fauber 1999; Parker 2001. 31 See Prandi 1985: 69 ff. (for Kallisthenes’ bias), 127 ff. (for the reception); see also pp. 36-37 (on FGrHist 124 F17), 40 ff. (on FF 11-18), for interest in Boeotian traditions; 37 ff. (on F 9), 50-51 (on F 26), 59-60 (on F 51), for hostility towards Sparta and Agesilaos. For traces of the tradition dating back to Kallisthenes in Diodoros and Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas (in which he is cited at 17.4) and Life of Agesilaos (in which he is cited at 34.4), see Westlake 1939; Fuscagni, 1975; Sordi 2002 = 1986; Sordi 2002 = 1995; Georgiadou 1996; Georgiadou 1997: 15-28. 32 See Beck: 1997: 99 and 240-244. 33 On Xenophon’s lack of interest for Epaminondas, see Westlake, 1969 = 1966: 213 ff.; Westlake 1975. 34 See Cartledge 1987: 379-380; Hamilton 1991: 199-202; Jehne 1994: 72; Zahrnt 2000. 35 On Epaminondas’ speech see Keen, 1996, versus Hansen 1995; Hansen 1995; Tuci 2019: 36 173 Athens/Sparta bipolarity in Xenophon’s Hellenika Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 165-182. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.08 27.4 – 28.1-2), in the context of negotiations for an unspecified general peace that provides the cue for a clash between Epaminondas and Agesilaos over their mutual demand for non-interference in the issue of the autonomy of Boeotia and Laconia36. Plutarch’s piece of information would fit with the negotiations of 375/4 (the battle of Tegira, as recorded in Diod. 15.37.1-2 predates those negotiations) as well as those of 371. In favor of the latter date goes the fact that the mutual request for non-interference returns in Diodorus (15.51.4) under 371, not in the context of the peace talks, but in that of an embassy sent by the Spartans to Thebes just before Leuttra. Diodoros and Plutarch, in contrast to Xenophon, ignore the Athenian side, focusing their account on the debate that opposed Agesilaos to Epaminondas. The latter actually asked for recognition of the federal character of the Boeotian state, which allowed for a different interpretation of the principle of autonomy and empowered Thebes to stand as the legitimate representative of the federal government: in Plutarch, however, it is said that he spoke “for the koinon of the Greeks” (Ages. 27.4), with panhellenic intonation, posing a problem that concerned everyone. Epaminondas provoked Sparta on the issue of the autonomy of the cities of the perioeci in Laconia, showing that the contradictions on the issue of autonomy were first and foremost Spartan37. But Sparta appeared well determined to deny the requested recognition; Athens, interested in agreement with Sparta, aligned itself; the Thebans departed disappointed, in a serious position of isolation. As Diodoros expressly attests, Athens and Sparta appear to have agreed to recoil from Thebes’ ambitions (15.38.4). This agreement constitutes the prerequisite for the rapprochement between the two powers, to which Xenophon looks with much interest, to the point of almost completely obnubilating the “Theban question,” one of the fundamental issues discussed at the congress of 371. 4. Agesilaos believed that the time had come to crush Theban ambitions38. However, the mobilization against Thebes ended with the defeat at Leuktra, which ended Spartan hegemony. and 46-47. 36 See Shipley1997: 310-315. 37 See also Nep. Epam. 6.4 and Paus. 9.13.2I. Epaminondas’ effective speech coram frequentissimo conventu in Nep. Epam. 6.4 clearly corresponds to that delivered “wonderfully” ἐν τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ by the Theban in Diod. 15.38.3: the synedrion is thus the one assembled in Sparta for peace, not the synedrion of the Second Athenian League, as well as some have believed (see Stylianou 1998: 326- 328). 38 See Hamilton 1994. 180 Cinzia Bearzot Araucaria. 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