Revisiting Italian mediterranean policy in the 1950s: Internal or externally-driven? The interplay of external pressures and domestic constraints

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 RSCAS 2017/38 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Revisiting Italian Mediterranean Policy in the 1950s: Internal or Externally-driven? The Interplay of External Pressures and Domestic Constraints Maria do Céu Pinto Arena Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Revisiting Italian Mediterranean Policy in the 1950s: Internally or Externally-driven? The Interplay of Domestic Constraints and External Pressures Maria do Céu Pinto Arena EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2017/38 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. 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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Abstract This article aims to explore Italy´s “Neo-Atlanticist” foreign policy (FP) strand in the mid-1950s to highlight the complex interplay of external and internal political dynamics. It corresponded to the third circle of Rome´s FP loadstars - the Mediterranean and Arab world – with Rome intending to conduct an autonomous policy that was often seen as clashing with its Atlanticist commitments. Italian foreign policy was tightly constrained by its integration in Euro-Atlantic alliances, but it was also able to cut for itself a margin of independent maneuver in pursuit of a more autonomous policy in the Mediterranean. Keywords Neo-Atlanticism, Italy, foreign policy making, Mediterranean, domestic politics, external determinants Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 1 Introduction Within the constraints imposed by its defeat in World War II, the post-war Republican governments tried to pursue a more independent FP by focusing on the southern Mediterranean. This paper speaks to broader themes in International Relations, namely the conditions in which foreign policies are made: how do states formulate their FP? How do decision-makers and key domestic institutions actually influence or determine the content of their FP, or merely its style? Is it the international environment, or, rather, internal conditions, that drive the shaping of FP? Our analysis is based on a re-interpretation of secondary sources, mostly a batch of recent publications evaluating the First Republic Italian foreign policy 1 (Varsori 2015). Those publications originate from the field of historiography, and diplomatic history, but also of Political Science and International Relations. This paper aims to weave most recent research on Rome´s “Neo-Atlanticist” FP into an argument within the broader literature that examines processes of foreign policy making, a subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis that is still developing (Alden and Aran, 2012: 92). Much work has been done to unravel the interaction of domestic and international determinants of foreign policy (Allison, 1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972). 2 We consider worthwhile explaining, in particular, whether Italian foreign policy was conducted within the narrow margins of subordination to Euro-Atlantic allegiances, or whether it was able to promote an autonomous policy in the Mediterranean, as well as the nature of the interplay of external and internal political dynamics within those dynamics (Brighi 2013, 107). Italian Post-war Foreign Policy: External Determinants In the aftermath of World War II, the drive for new diplomatic moves in the Mediterranean was determined, firstly, by the natural Mediterranean “vocation” of the country, that is, its geopolitical location and history (Brogi 2011, 332; Di Camerana 1992, 56; Leonardis 2003, 65). Within the constraints imposed by the Yalta partition, the post-war Italian Republican governments tried to advance their interests in the Middle East and in the southern Mediterranean regions. In order to understand why the Mediterranean assumed such importance for Italy in the post-war years, one must consider the traumatic experience of the war, from which Italy emerged frustrated, and as a humiliated power. Before long, however, the Italian government realized that the historical and diplomatic conditions would not allow it to achieve this goal. Between 1947 and 1949, Italy was denied the possibility of taking back its colonial territories in Africa and the Mediterranean, as a consequence of the peace treaty clauses, and of the failure of a proposed agreement between foreign ministers, Ernest Bevin and Carlo Sforza. However, the growing Arab nationalism, the obvious difficulties France and Britain faced with their Mediterranean possessions, and the apprehensions regarding a possible expansion of Soviet influence, kept Rome´s interest for what was happening in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1 Foreign policy can be defined as “a set of goals, directives or intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policymakers” (Cohen and Harris 1975, 383). 2 Often explanations take as a useful point of departure Putnam´s contribution from foreign policy analysis, the two-level game theory, applied to international negotiations (1988). It lays out a framework for understanding the interaction of domestic and international determinants of foreign policy. It posits national-level policymakers face two separate constituencies when making decisions - domestic-level groups and international-level groups -, and must juggle their conflicting interests. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Maria do Céu Pinto Arena 8 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers alliance with Italy - a sort of special relationship in the Mediterranean and in the Near East. In the letter, Gronchi proposed a closer bilateral Italian-U.S. relationship in order to conduct a common policy towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Wollenberg 1983, 52-61, 583-89; Ferraris 1996, 109). Eventually, Gronchi´s letter was intercepted by Foreign Minister Martino, who opposed the former´s attempts to conduct a foreign policy of his own. In September 1957, Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella, offered Washington a sort of Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The “Pella Plan” envisioned a common fund managed by OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation) member states, to finance economic development projects in Middle Eastern countries. The fund would be fed by the sums due to the European countries benefitting from the Marshall Plan, provided by the United States (Bagnato 2005, 127-28; Brogi 1996, 280 and ff; Romano 2002, 121). Washington´s reaction to the Italian proposal was positive in words, but actual facts, was rather mild: the project was studied in some detail, but did not come to fruition, largely because resources would still have to be provided by the United States, which was not willing to sustain a new significant financial effort, and because the aid could be depicted as neocolonialism. The plan also got little support from European countries. After the summer of 1958, the fact that Fanfani occupied simultaneously the positions of prime minister, foreign minister, and party secretary, enabled him to pursue more adventurous foreign policy initiatives. The chain of events that began with the 1958 coup d´état in Iraq, home to the Baghdad Pact, 11 underscored just how marginal the Italian role in the region was. This pushed Fanfani to react, openly showing his disagreement with the efforts of the governments in London and Washington, which the new Chairman of the Council accused of acting, once again, without showing any regard for the role of Italy, in an area that he considered of special interest. Between late July and early August, Fanfani visited France, the United States and several European capitals, with the intent of stressing Italy´s contribution to the formulation of Western policy towards the Middle East. Fanfani hoped to be able to obtain the recognition of his country as a Mediterranean power, in order to allay the growing voices of dissent within his party against his foreign policy, and the risk of annoying the United States. Fanfani´s policy was considered dangerous by some Italian diplomatic quarters, and would prove to be a “risky” undertaking that would test the limits of American tolerance (Romano 2002, 122). Romano described this as practicing “towards the United States a policy on a tightrope, trying to conciliate the maximum of loyalty with the maximum of independence” (Romano 2002, 122; see Giovagnoli and Tosi 2010). In other words, it was a position of “equidistance” with strong pro-Arab undertones (Di Nolfo 1992, 426). When the new Iraqi government allied itself with the United Arab Republic, 12 the fear of spreading instability in the region led Eisenhower to send troops to Lebanon. Fanfani allowed Washington to use the Capodichino airport for the troops´ projection. Almost immediately, he flew to Washington to talk with Eisenhower and Foster Dulles and expose an ambitious economic plan, a sort of Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean. The U.S. administration gave a cold reception to the plan, especially after it became clear that Rome intended to obtain a sort of mandate to deal with the Arabs on behalf of the United States. The plan was seen as an attempt to build a special relationship with Washington, undercutting the integrity of the NATO compact. At a time, Mattei was extending his action range in competition and at odds with the American oil multinationals (Mammarella and Cacace 2008, 211). The concern of seeing Italy excluded from mediation efforts by the major powers, led Fanfani to proceed independently. In January 1959, he paid an official visit to Cairo, with the intention of proving that a policy of dialogue and openness towards the progressive and nationalist regimes in the Arab world was far more rewarding than an attitude of condemnation and closure (Galante 1992, 189). Sinning, perhaps, for being overly optimistic, Fanfani hoped to convince the U.S. that he was able to 11 The monarchy was replaced by Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim, a reputed Nasserite. 12 The United Arab Republic was a short-lived political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 until 1961. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Revisiting Italian Mediterranean Policy in the 1950s European University Institute 9 “persuade Nasser that we will accept him for what he is and we will help him to achieve his legitimate objectives, while continuing insistently to push him to sit down and discuss face to face with Ben Gurion”. He believed that “real secret negotiations [were] possible” and that Italy was ready “to assume a leadership role in organizing such direct negotiations, taking advantage of the widespread desire in the Arab world of accepting this service, which would play in favour of the Western alliance” (quoted in Brogi 1996, 328). No Italian leader had ever expressed itself in such a daring tone in speaking to a U.S. official about a possible Italian role in the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Tonini 2002, 14-5). Fanfani further developed the Arab and Middle Eastern politics, by visiting Morocco on occasion of the conclusion of an oil agreement signed by ENI, by receiving the Shah of Iran, by supporting Matteis initiatives, and by chairing, with Gronchi, the opening session of the first Mediterranean Colloquia organized by La Pira in 1958. 13 Enrico Mattei was a key driving force behind this orientation. He developed a “parallel external policy” until 1962, when he died in a still obscure plane crash. The President of ENI aimed at extending the influence of the state oil industry in the Mediterranean, in order to assure Italy´s energy autonomy (Coticchia 2011, 179). Italy´s reconstruction was heavily constrained by the scarcity of raw materials, such as coal, iron and oil, which the country needed to import in order to boost its economic growth. To that end, he did not hesitate to use controversial means and to defy the “Seven Sisters”. The election of Gronchi as President of the Council greatly boosted Mattei´s opportunities. With Amintore Fanfani as DC´s General-Secretary, Mattei consolidated his edge over ENIs parallel international policy (Bonnani 1967, 813-4). He developed his strategy of penetration in the Middle East due to the similarity of views on issues, such as the U.S., the Atlantic Alliance, and Italy´s neutralism (Coticchia 2011, 180). The energy diplomacy Mattei developed was a delicate exercise in transatlantic relations, as he concluded energy deals with the URSS and Iran that clashed with the country´s postwar FP cornerstones (Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori 2011, 179-180; Votaw 1965; Perrone 1995; Maugeri, 1994; Tonini 2002, 20). The famous “Mattei formula” assigned to the producer country 75% of the profit, instead of 50%, granted by the Western oil companies until then (Solia 2016, 86-87). It boldly attacked Iran´s monopoly on crude, by making a partnership with the National Iranian Oil Company. The agreement was signed in 1957 in Tehran, with Shah Reza Pahlavi, an event attended by President Gronchi, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pella. The agreement broke the 50-50 ratio laid down after the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953: “The Seven (or eight) Sisters that controlled the global oil market at the time, and were represented in the Iranian consortium, were furious and tried in all possible ways to stop the agreement… But they failed, and the agreement contributed to Mattei´s fame as a protagonist of change in the global oil industry and a paladin of Arab nationalism” (Luciani 2012, 837-838). Fanfani´s meeting with Nasser in January 1959, was the last Mediterranean initiative of his government, and, in some ways, represented its apex: he was the first top Western statesman to visit Cairo in a two-year period. After a lively discussion in Parliament, the Democrat leader was forced to resign from all positions. The political season inaugurated in February 1959 marked a return to the lines of Italian diplomacy, which not only recovered its more Atlanticist and pro-American features, but also ceased to be one of the main topics of confrontation and political debate. 13 He authorized the presence of one of the leaders of the anti-colonial movement, Ahmed Boumendjel, a high official of the Algerian National Liberation Front, and Adda Bouguettat, another member of the anti-colonial movement. This caused a diplomatic rift with France (Bagnato 2005, 116). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Maria do Céu Pinto Arena 10 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers Conclusion The main aim of this article was to determine how the international environment and domestic actors actually influence or determine the content of a state´s FP. The empirical case analyzed was Italy´s policy of Neo-Atlanticism, especially its initiatives towards Arab countries in the 1950s. To fully account for the gist of Italian FP in this period, we accepted the premise that systemic factors and domestic politics interact in the creation of a state´s FP: it will always reflect both national security interests and systemic/structural imperatives. In the case of Italy, international bipolar conditions and domestic politics interacted in a complex way. Both levels actually interplayed in determining Italy´s foreign policy behavior. Arguably, the international security environment was determinant in shaping Rome´s options, in particular, the imperatives of Cold War alignments and bipolarism. In keeping with systemic realism, Italy responded to the uncertainties of international anarchy, by abiding by the dominant imperatives imposed by the system of alliances to which it belonged: it had little room for maneuver in the external decision making process, and had to operate within the constraints set by its main ally. Indeed, Italy found it difficult to reconcile its international commitments with the pursuit of its national interests, by asserting its influence in the world. In fact, Rome also sought to control and shape its external environment. It tried to pursue such influence, largely due to internal concerns, to the extent that it was able to do so. As many scholars have argued, Italy´s distinctive political system entails, at times, the articulation - if not, at times, actual subordination - of its foreign policy to domestic concerns. Internal aspects were brought to bear on Italian FP due to the nature of the Italian political system, in particular the existence of a hegemonic party, which was permanently wary, due to the role of an opposition that could question Italy´s Western and Atlantic orientation. Complex domestic political processes did mediate and direct Italian policy outputs in response to international pressures. Thus, Italy factored in systemic pressures, but also pursued policy opportunities in the Mediterranean. The interplay of foreign and domestic issues is an enduring characteristic of Italy´s post-war political system. A reflection on the period under consideration allows us to conclude that, in certain respects, the terms of the peace treaty and Cold War conditions - although posing considerable constraints -, involuntarily favored a quite original evolution of Italian politics, especially in the Mediterranean. The Cold War stalemate allowed Rome to pursue a heterodox foreign policy that was tolerated, as long as it did not become at odds with the transatlantic orientation. A constant line of Italian foreign policy in the post-war period was to make Italy a more central player in the Mediterranean by performing a bridging role, as well as by requesting to be associated to the initiatives of its allies. Italy also pursued its own obvious, immediate national interest in the Mediterranean, in the search for reliable energy supplies and export markets. Simultaneously, its range of action in the Mediterranean offered the opportunity to prove its “added value” in the area, thus reinforcing another design: a post-war comeback in the realm of “high” international politics, and a place amongst the great powers. By and large, in the Arab world and particularly regarding Egypt, Iran and North Africa, Rome maintained on the surface a consistent position, in line with the obligations of Atlantic solidarity. However, it took every possible opportunity to take advantage of openings and channels to approach Arab leaders, even those who opposed the West, such as Nasser or Arab nationalists. The limits of Italian influence often made it impossible to express it openly. Rome often treaded a fine line between refraining from openly supporting certain nationalist Arab regimes, and maintaining the support of its Western allies. Economic circumstances dictated that Italy should espouse a pro-Arab policy, but that policy had different nuances, according to the political players of the moment. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Revisiting Italian Mediterranean Policy in the 1950s European University Institute 11 References Allison, Graham T. (1971). 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L”Eni e Mattei (Milano: Feltrinelli). Zakaria, Fareed (1998). From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America´s World´s Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Wollenberg, L. (1983). Stelle, striscie e tricolore. Trent´anni di vicende politiche tra Roma e Washington (Milano: Mondadori). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626 Maria do Céu Pinto Arena 16 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers Author contacts: Maria do Céu Pinto Arena Department of International Relations and PA, EEG University of Minho Gualtar Campus, 4710-057 Braga Portugal Email: [email protected] / [email protected] Maria do Céu Pinto Arena (University of Minho) was a Visiting Fellow at the RSCAS during the academic year 2016 – 2017. This study was conducted with the support of the Research Center in Political Science (UID/CPO/00758/2013), University of Minho and supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Tecnology (FCT) and the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science through national funds. It also benefitted from the financial support of FCT through the programme POPH. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009626