On economic rationality in Xenophon’s Economics

Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 On economic rationality in Xenophon’s Economics Sobre la racionalidad económica en el Económico de Jenofonte Etienne Helmer1 Universidad de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico) ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8565-6698 Recibido: 19-04-2024 Aceptado: 17-06-2024 Resumen El Económico de Jenofonte es un escrito controvertido. Algunos lectores lo consideran un texto carente de toda racionalidad en el ámbito económico, mientras que otros detectan en él una racionalidad precapitalista basada en la búsqueda de la maximización de la utilidad. Este artículo plantea la hipótesis de una tercera vía: el objeto del Económico de Jenofonte es reflexionar sobre cómo las prácticas económicas ponen en juego, por un lado, una racionalidad instrumental que implica procedimientos de elección que comparan riesgos y beneficios con vistas a maximizar la ganancia, y, por otro, una racionalidad práctica que sondea el valor de los medios y los fines, y limita la posibilidad de autonomía de la razón instrumental, i.e., su tendencia a volverse irracional. Examino en detalle cómo se expresan, ejercen y articulan estos dos usos de la razón en el Económico, y muestro que Jenofonte formula una cuestión decisiva de epistemología económica, con implicaciones prácticas y materiales muy tangibles. Palabras-clave: Economía, oikonomia, racionalidad instrumental, racionalidad económica, Jenofonte. 1 ([email protected]) Professor of Philosophy at the University of Puerto Rico and specialist in the economic and political thought of Ancient Greece. His fundamental interests focus on Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Cynics, as well as on the topic of poverty and mendicity. He has recently published Oikonomia. Ancient Greek Philosophers on the Meaning of Economic Life (The University of Chicago Press, 2024) and Mendier peut-être (Verdier, 2023). Address for correspondence: 9 rue Linné; 75005 Paris; France. 228 Etienne Helmer Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 Abstract Xenophon’s Economics is a controversial writing. Some readers consider it a text devoid of any rationality in the economic field while others detect in it a precapitalist rationality based on the search for the maximization of utility. This article hypothesizes a third way: the object of Xenophon’s Economics is to reflect on how economic practices engage, on the one hand, an instrumental rationality involving procedures of choice comparing risks and benefits with a view to maximizing gain, and, on the other hand, a practical rationality probing the value of means and ends, and limiting the possibility of the autonomy of instrumental reason, i.e., its tendency to become irrational. I examine in detail how these two uses of reason are expressed, exercised, and articulated in the Economics, and I show that Xenophon formulates a decisive question of economic epistemology, with very tangible practical and material implications. Keywords: Economics, oikonomia, instrumental rationality, economic rationality, Xenophon. Introduction The theses put forward by M.I. Finley in The Ancient Economy and taken up by others2 have given rise over the past forty years to numerous objections anxious to undermine his reductionist and primitivist vision of ancient economy and economic thought. In their critical approach to Finley’s theses, historians have highlighted the existence of forms of rationality at work in economic decisions. While some have pointed out the presence of profit-oriented entrepreneurial behaviors in specific contexts3, others have recently gone further by arguing for the existence in ancient Greece of a properly economic rationality, comparable to that of contemporary game theories widely used by current economic science. Such a rationality consists in choosing means with a view to an end in such a way that this choice goes “in the direction of the maximization of gain, cost reduction, risk minimization – regardless of any other factors, be it social, political, or cultural, etc.”4.For example, contrary to the long-held idea that the Greeks had a common practice and mentality of hoarding cash due to a lack of outlets for productive investment, Michael Leese5 shows that such a practice was in fact only occasional in a general context of economic rationality focused on the search for the most profitable monetary 2 Millet 1991; Meikle 1995. 3 Thompson 1982; Christesen 2003. 4 Andreau, Maucourant, 1999: 50. 5 2023. 229 On economic rationality in Xenophon’s Economics Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 investment, based on a combined calculation of risks and rewards. In the same vein, in an article devoted to merchants (kapêloi), the same author explains that the “[k]apêloi are described in a broad range of sources as consistently aiming to maximize their profits, which is the clearest sign of economic rationality in modern economic theory. Beyond merely resembling profit-maximization in a general way, however, kapêloi also exhibit the behavioral traits of more complex modern economic behavioral models at a remarkable level of detail [...]”6. In short, the homo politicus with whom a long tradition was used to identify “the Greek man”, was also already a homo economicus. The boundary between modern and pre-modern behaviors in economic matters would therefore make little sense7. Taking Xenophon’s Economics as a case study, this contribution does not aim at denying the existence of a calculating or instrumental rationality in the economic field in ancient Greece but, by relying on the above-mentioned recent scholarship, at questioning the meaning of such a rationality. Is the fact that a search for profit maximization, involving a strategic and complex arrangement of decision-making means and procedures, was at work and, to a certain extent, thought out and formulated as such in the sources – is this fact enough to say that the Greeks were implementing a properly “economic” rationality? To be called “economic”, did not this rationality have to be independent from any other form of rationality, in particular that which takes into account the value and nature of the ends aimed at, as well as those of the means employed, i.e., a practical rationality, omnipresent in the ancient passages devoted to economic subjects? I claim that between Finley’s exaggerated reductionism, that reduces the Economics to a mere treatise on ethics8, and the “modernist” position of the most recent studies tending to autonomize economic rationality in ancient Greece, there is room for a third way to better identify the specific character of the economic rationality in ancient Greece: some Greek philosophers or thinkers considered economic practices and institutions in the light of a complex rationality combining instrumental rationality and practical rationality, a combination whose articulation was at the center of their concerns, without them arriving at a unitary conception of this rationality. To support my claim, I will show first that while the economic dimension of Xenophon’s Economics has certainly been reassessed in a positive sense with respect to Finley’s unappealable judgment9, for example in the work of Figueira10, the richness of 6 Leese 2017: 42. See also Leese 2023. 7 Leese 2023. 8 Finley 1973: 18. 9 “In Xenophon, however, there is not one sentence that expresses an economic principle or offers any economic analysis, nothing on efficiency of production, ‘rational’ choice, the marketing of crops”, Finley (1973, 19). 10 2012. 230 Etienne Helmer Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 the instrumental rationality focused on the maximization of gain that manifests itself in this writing has not been sufficiently emphasized in detail, in the fields of domestic administration and agriculture. Second, I will also show that in the Economics, such an instrumental rationality is not autonomous: it is admissible or thinkable as a form of rationality only on the condition that it is always articulated with a practical rationality linked to social, political, ethical, and religious values or norms. These two rationalities do not fit into a single one, but rather form a composite architecture, that reveals the two-sided character of economy: economic practices and phenomena have to do with material causality, which arises from our needs insofar as they are necessary, and they also have to do with free causality, which involves the ends we give to our actions and practices insofar as we are also unconditioned beings. Before showing how these two aspects are presented and articulated in Xenophon’s Economics, it is necessary to specify the way in which I envisage this Socratic dialogue, which has lent itself to very different readings. Some believe that its dialogical dimension is a purely formal device: the character of Ischomachus, Socrates’ interlocutor in the second part of the work, would only be the mask of Xenophon himself, to whom Socrates would then only serve as a foil11. Others, on the contrary, see in this text a genuine Socratic dialogue with an educational aim12, but sometimes at the cost of its economic significance, which some readers deem purely allegorical or ironic13. Others still, without deciding on its form, tend to read it as a prescriptive text providing advice on domestic administration and agriculture14, to the detriment of its speculative or reflexive dimension. In this hermeneutic context, it seems to me that the dialogical dimension of the text, far from being a formal artifice, is on the contrary a sign of the speculative value of the text, the scope of which is not so much to give practical advice, as to invite the reader to ask himself a certain number of questions on economic subjects that Socrates himself takes seriously15. Such is the case, as I propose to show, regarding the issue of rationality at work in economic practices. Instrumental Rationality In his recent book The Greek and the Rational. The Discovery of Practical Reason, Josiah Ober argues that the practical rationality of the Greeks includes, 11 Delebecque 1951: 38; Zaragoza 1993: 205. 12 Danzig 2003; Kronenberg 2009. 13 Kronenberg 2009. 14 Figueira 2012: 668; Saller 2007: 87. 15 Chantraine 1949; Natali 2001; Dorion 2008. 231 On economic rationality in Xenophon’s Economics Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 but is not limited to, an element of instrumental rationality16, “identified as a core human capacity, capable of being refined as a powerful and versatile tool for making strategic choices among feasible options under conditions of social constraint and uncertainty”17. This quotation clarifies the idea of instrumental rationality, commonly understood as the articulation or arrangement of means to an end, by emphasizing that this arrangement can be “strategic”: it does not imply only the organization of a sequence of means to an end – for example, ploughing, then sowing, then watering, in order to harvest – but it implies to engage in these operations by making choices deemed optimal in a range of possible choices with a view to the most gainful result – ploughing at one specific moment of the year rather than at another, using one fertilizer rather than another, then sowing one type of seeds rather than another, and then using one watering or irrigation technique rather than another, in order to harvest more fruit, of better quality, or growing more quickly. Such a strategic use of means takes place in a given context, i.e., in a cultural, technical, and social context that defines the nature and extent of the available options, and which never completely eliminates the elements of contingency linked not only to a form of metaphysical or ontological uncertainty – like an unexpected climatic hazard (Econ. 5.18) – but also and above all to the range of possibilities inherent to this very context – for example, employing slaves goes hand in hand with the possibility of their revolt. Ober’s proposal is critical: he intends to distance himself both from Finley’s thesis that the Greeks approached economics outside of any kind of rationality, and from the narrow identification of Greek rationality with its ethical version initiated and defined by Socrates as the choice of means in all domains in the name of a certain idea of the Good18. But Ober’s proposal is also heuristic: it allows a new reading of classical texts by revealing this instrumental rationality in different practical areas, and in the economic field in particular. Following on from the few lines he briefly devotes to Xenophon’s Economics19, let’s identify more precisely how such rationality is deployed in this text. Its first mention appears at the beginning of the work when Critobulus, Socrates’ first interlocutor, says the purpose of oikonomia or household management is to the increase the oikos: “[the expert in oikonomia] would get a good salary if, after taking over an estate, he continued to pay all outgoings, and to increase the estate (αὔξειν τὸν οἶκον) by constituting a surplus (περιουσίαν ποιῶν)” (1.4). The recurrence in the Economics of the verbs auxein and auxanein – to grow, to increase – as well as the marked opposition between the concern 16 Ober 2022: 2. 17 Ober 2022: 3. 18 Frede 2002: 1-28, in Frede and Striker 2002. 19 Ober 2022: 327. 232 Etienne Helmer Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 for gain and profit (kerdos) and the fact that loss (zemia) should be avoided20, demonstrate that the book does more than simply proposing techniques for meeting the needs of the oikos: its agents are confronted with choices that weigh on its economic future, which implies the exercise of instrumental rationality. Repeated several times by Critobulus (1.16; 2.1) and then adopted by Socrates himself (3.15; 6.4), it is this same purpose of growth of the oikos that, under a formulation that is sometimes similar (11.12), sometimes distinct, Socrates’ second interlocutor, Ischomachus, assigns to oikonomia too. For instance, he addresses his wife in the following terms: moderation both in a man and a woman means acting in such a manner that their possessions shall be in the best condition possible, and that as much as possible shall be added to them (ὅτι πλεῖστα… προσγενήσεται) by fair and honourable means. (7.15) Similarly, when he sums up his way of life to Socrates: I begin by worshipping the gods and try to conduct myself in such a way that I may have health and strength in answer to my prayers, the respect of my fellowcitizens, the affection of my friends, safety with honor in war, and wealth increased (πλούτου καλῶς αὐξομένου) by honest means. (11.8) Under the term “wealth” it is certainly possible to understand the search for money (“making money”)21, as the two following points make clear. On the one hand, Xenophon refers to the method of “making a surplus (ποιῶν περιουσίαν)” (1.4). Mentioned several times in the work (2.10; 11.13; 20.21; 21.9)22, this expression refers to a very specific economic process, if we refer to the use Thucydides makes of it at the beginning of the History of the Peloponnesian War. According to R. Descat, who sees a strong relationship, on this point, between Thucydides’ narrative and the “oikonomic” texts of the fourth century, “[the] history of the Greeks [as narrated by Thucydides] is not marked in a banal way by the passage from poverty to wealth, as one would at first sight have the impression when reading it, but by more precise mechanisms: it is the emergence of a surplus, periousia chrèmatôn”23. The making of a surplus of money, which is then used for expenditures, makes it possible to preserve the capital. This method is implemented by Pericles in his own household or oikos, albeit in a specific way: “Pericles adopted a mode of management which allowed him not to spend more than he produced. By selling all his agricultural production at once on the market, the strategos could know exactly how much 20 Leese 2021: 28. 21 Leese 2021: 30. 22 See also Poroi 6.1; and Plato, Rep. 8.554a. 23 Descat 2010: 404. 233 On economic rationality in Xenophon’s Economics Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 capital he had and make purchases accordingly. From then on, he was able to calculate his expenses as accurately as possible to meet both his private needs and public demands such as liturgies, without damaging his patrimony or having to go into debt”24. Although the strictly rational nature of selling one’s entire harvest at once is questionable in economic terms, since Pericles deprives himself of the possibility of modulating his sales to take advantage of the upward variation in prices25, we can retain here the practice of making a surplus, that Xenophon’s characters also recommend applying. This method of making a surplus is also found in the passage where Ischomachus explains to his wife the purpose of their union and distinguishes between what seems to be the capital (τά τε ὄντα), which is to be preserved (ὅπως τά τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἕξει), and “the remainder” which is to be increased (καὶ ἄλλα […] προσγενήσεται, Econ. 7.15), i.e., the surplus to be constituted. On the other hand, in a passage from the second part of the Economics, Ischomachus explains to Socrates how his father used to buy abandoned lands, improved them, sold them at a higher price, and reinvested this money in the purchase of other lands to be improved (Econ. 20:22-29). This is both a form of diversification of activity, commercial practice being associated with domestic administration, and a way of accumulating money, as suggested by Socrates’ comparison between Ischomachus’ father and merchants speculating on the value of wheat “when they need money” (ὅταν δεηθῶσιν ἀργυρίου, Econ. 20.28). But the increase of the oikos is probably not limited to the accumulation of money, which, as we shall see below, is rather seen as a means. The growth in question concerns more broadly the increase of the value of the capital. It is in this sense that we can understand the passage in which Ischomachus invites his wife to instruct the slaves so that, from being incompetent or ignorant of the tasks they must perform, she may make them competent, analogously to the enhancement that Ischomachus’ father practices on the land he bought or when he trains horses (On Horsemanship 11.13): It is delightful to teach spinning to a maid who had no knowledge of it when you received her, and to double her worth to you (διπλασίου σοι ἀξία γένηται): to take in hand a girl who is ignorant of housekeeping and service, and after teaching her and making her trustworthy and serviceable to find her worth any amount (παντὸς ἀξίαν). (Econ. 7.41) The “worth” mentioned twice in this passage can certainly be understood in the sense of exchange value26, in a context where slaves are goods to be 24 Azoulay 2010: 119. 25 Azoulay 2010: 121. 26 Bevilacqua 2024. 234 Etienne Helmer Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 bought and sold: a competent slave has more value on the market than a slave without skills (Pomeroy 1994, 285). But insofar as the text does not mention the sale of slaves, this concern for education can also be seen as a way of increasing their value as an element of the domestic capital. By becoming competent from ignorant that they were, the value of these slaves rises from 1 to 2, thus increasing the value of the oikos as productive capital. This instrumental rationality at work in the way of conceiving the end of domestic administration consists in determining the most appropriate means to achieve it. Xenophon’s Economics invites to distinguish between two kinds of means: one is principal to the end aimed at (the increase of the oikos), while the others are means to this principal means, which is their end. This main means is the acquisition of wealth and money: this is what Ischomachus will indicate to Socrates by telling him that one must know a lucrative art (τέχνην χρηματοποιὸν, 20.15), and this is what Socrates himself points out from the outset to Critobulus, his first interlocutor. Eager to know how to “increase his oikos” (Econ. 2.1), Critobulus is nevertheless very negligent in financial matters, as Socrates reproaches him for: Moreover, I observe that already the state is exacting heavy payments (μεγάλα τελεῖν)27 from you: you must needs keep horses, pay for choruses and gymnastic competitions, and accept presidencies; and if war breaks out, I know they will require you to maintain a ship and pay taxes that will nearly crush you. Whenever you seem to fall short of what is expected of you, the Athenians will certainly punish you as though they had caught you robbing them. [7] Besides all this, I notice that you imagine yourself to be a rich man; you are indifferent to money (ὁρῶ σε οἰόμενον πλουτεῖν, καὶ ἀμελῶς μὲν ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸ μηχανᾶσθαι χρήματα), and yet go courting minions, as though the cost were nothing to you. And that is why I pity you, and fear that you may come to grief and find yourself reduced to a huge penury (εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν). (Econ. 2.6-7; my emphasis) Socrates’ argument certainly has a moral dimension in the sense that he sees in Critobulus’ passions a financial abyss, the young man clearly lacking enkrateia, i.e., control over his own passions28. But it also has an instrumental rational dimension: Socrates relates this lack of enkrateia to a form of calculation, in the form of the enormous differential between the heavy civic contributions expected from Critobulus on the one hand, and the obstacle that this young man’s passions represent in relation to this necessity, on the other. Critobulus does not only need to take control of himself, but he also needs to grasp the relationship between heavy expenses and the risk of extreme poverty (εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν). This is quite an unusual Socrates, who 27 On the meaning of telein, see Waanders 1983: 121-122. 28 Dorion 2008: 263. 235 On economic rationality in Xenophon’s Economics Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 invites his interlocutor to worry about becoming rich and finding ways to do so (μηχανᾶσθαι): we are in presence of an “oikonomikos” Socrates (Dorion 2008), not only in the sense that he manifests his interest in economic questions, but in the sense that he manifests it in a way that is not only a matter of moral reason but also of instrumental reason. This is confirmed by the following paragraphs of Chapter 2 of the Economics, which points to the rational framework through which Socrates analyzes the difference between those who succeed and those who fail in economic matters: For observing once that the same pursuits lead in one case to great poverty and in another to great riches (τοὺς μὲν πάνυ ἀπόρους ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πλουσίους), I was filled with amazement, and thought it worthwhile to consider what this could mean. And on consideration I found that these things happen quite naturally. [18] For I saw that those who follow these pursuits at random (εἰκῇ) suffer loss (ζημιουμένους), and I discovered that those who care about them exerting their judgment (τοὺς δὲ γνώμῃ συντεταμένῃ ἐπιμελουμένους) accomplish them more quickly, more easily and with more profit (καὶ θᾶττον καὶ ῥᾷον καὶ κερδαλεώτερον κατέγνων πράττοντας). I think that if you would elect to learn from these, you too with God’s favor would turn out a clever man of business (δεινὸν χρηματιστὴν). (Econ. 2.17-18) The exercise of oikonomia that is done “randomly” (εἰκῇ) is opposed to that which mobilizes thought (γνώμῃ) 29. The criteria for comparing them indicate a clear concern for maximizing gain – faster, easier, and bringing additional gain30 – in the name of a clearly stated goal: to become a “skilled businessman”. The expression of this difference between the two ways of exercising oikonomia even gives rise to a quantitative evaluation in two other passages. In the first one, Ischomachus reminds Socrates that it is important for the steward of crops to show care (epimeleia) by ensuring the work of slaves: otherwise, Ischomachus estimates the loss of productivity at “easily half”, if the agricultural workers do not devote themselves fully to their task (ῥᾳδίως τὸ ἥμισυ διαφέρει τοῦ ἔργου παντός, 20.17). This is followed by an analogy with two groups of walkers, one of whom travels 200 stadia and the other only 100 because they have wandered along the way (20.18). In a second passage, Ischomachus compares a well-directed trireme that travels its route in one day, to one that is handed over to an incompetent oarsman leader and needs “more than double the time” (πλέον ἢ ἐν διπλασίῳ χρόνῳ, 21.3). Although limited, 29 Most translations of the expression τοὺς δὲ γνώμῃ συντεταμένῃ ἐπιμελουμένους completely obscure the part of the exercise of reason carried by the term γνώμῃ, either by making it a psychological disposition (“attention”, Chantraine), or by erasing it and retaining only the idea of care carried by ἐπιμελουμένους (Pomeroy, Merchant). 30 Cf. Rep. 2.370c: ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον. 242 Etienne Helmer Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 26, nº 57. Tercer cuatrimestre de 2024. Pp. 227-244. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2024.i57.11 References Alon Amit N., 2016: “Xenophon’s Virtue Personified”. Kentron 32, 137-150. Doi: https://doi.org/10.4000/kentron.855 Andreau J., Maucourant J., 1999: “À propos de la rationalité économique dans l’Antiquité gréco-romaine. Une interprétation des thèses de D. Rathbone (1991)”. Topoi 9 (1), 47-102. 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