Modes of discourse: Ways for thinking actual debates in socio-cultural studies

Philosophica 55 (1995, 1) pp. 69-85 MODES OF DISCQURSEWAYS FOR THINKING ACTUAL DEBATES IN SOCIa-CULTURAL STUDIES Juan D. Ramfrez A1ercedes (7ubero ABSTRACT The aim of the present paper is to analyze the various types of discourse and the different modes of thinking linked to them. The paper defends the heterogeneous nature of thinking, both in the same culture as in just one individual, linking the differences in thinking more to the different activity setting in which the subjects carry out their actions than to the culture in itself. To demonstrate this, the paper presents a series of episodes which contain different ways of justifying the way in which a task had been carried out. The information was obtained through the observation of Adult Education Students carrying out everyday and fonnal tasks. The analysis is based on the discoursive fonns used by the subjects and the ways of thinking that these rcflect. In trod uction It may well be that for sociocultural studies in psychology, the 1990's signal the time for the development of an overall reflection of the work of Vygotsky and the different paths of research his ideas gave rise to. This revision is conditioned by several motives: firstly, Vygotsky's work and the troika was recovered by a series of academics who not only reflected theoretically on his work, but also developed interesting empirical studies based on his main hypotheses (Cole, Scribner, Diaz, ... Rogoff, Wertsch). Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet Union during the 1980's enabled us to gain a better understanding of the philosophical, psychological and even literary (literary criticism and theory) foundations which supported the work of Vygotsky to begin with and thereafter his followers. 70 JUAN RAMIREZ & MERCEDES CUBERO Interest in the sociocultural or historical-cultural perspective grew due to a certain fatigue with rationalist and solipsistic psychology which represented the two main tendencies in Western psychology. These were, firstly, the genetic psychology of Jean Piaget and the Geneva school; and secondly, the human processing of information developed in the United States using the metaphor of the computer. This crisis in psychology also happened to coincide with a world in which interethnic and intercultural contact' was increasing rapidly creating new problems and demanding new solutions. Psychology seemed to be ignoring the increasing social complexity of recent decades as if problems with a social or cultural origin questionned too fundamentally the solipsistic base on which it was grounded. But the sociocultural perspective has not just been based around the work of Vygotsky and his followers despite the importance of their legacy. In the 1980's there was an opening up of this perspective which brought in other authors and cultural theorists who either complemented and enriched this theoretical base or laid bare some of its contradictions and limitations. Of vital importance has been the incorporation of the main ideas of the Bakhtin circle, mainly by James V. Wertsch (Wertsch, 1991), with the opening up towards symbolic interactionism, etc. This vision, distanced from the work of Vygotsky by the perspective gained from other authors, allows us to uncover some of the contradictions in his work that may coincide with contradictions existing in other social sciences such as anthropology, sociology or pedagogy. The two faces of the Vygotskian theory The most important aspect to highlight here is that of the notion of development and the changes that occurred in this throughout the life of Vygotsky himself. Two conflicting visions of human development can be observed here: the evolutionist and sociogenetic vision linked to the idea of progress and the vision combining development and heterogeneity. The first draws on the traditions of 19th Century thinking which saw historical development moving from one great stage to another through which humanity passed unerringly. Each stage represented a step forward in progress thereby making the previous stage redundant. Let us take, for example, Fourier's Four Movements theory based on Utopian Socialism MODES OF DISCOURSE 71 in which the development of human and natural phenomenon followed the development of phases of savagery, patriarchal state, barbarism, and civilization. Marx saw history as a process of overcoming, in which the capitalist phase was destined to perish, giving way to a new period in the history of humanity, namely socialism. The theories of psychology and education that have emerged in the 20th Century could be framed within the same vision of human development. Perhaps one case that bests represents this is Jean Piaget's, in whose theory epigenetic cognitive development goes through a series of periods characterized by a point of departure -the sensorymotor period :- and a finishing point - a period of formal operations -. In most of his work Vygotsky is no exception. This idea -Marxist in origin - of a progression in which the development of human thinking, having passed through several phases, culminates in scientific thinking was what motivated the famous research in Uzbekistan which is so well known we need not go into now (Luria, 1980). We could call this approach neo-illustrated, given that in human development rationality inevitably triumphs. Perhaps where this vision can best be seen is in the analysis of education. It could be said that even today's sociocultural theorys consider the school to be a worthy child of illustration. All of this is basically conditioned by the search for practical rationality and the development of supposedly superior forms of understanding. A second vision which differs considerably from the first appears to have its origin in Vygotsky's book "thinking and Speech", published a few months after the author's death only to be withdrawn later as a result of Stalinist censorship. In this book, while not abandoning the idea that there are superior forms of verbal thinking acquired after rudimentary ones, Vygotsky defends the coexistence of these heterogeneous forms of verbal thinking in the same individual psyche. The reason why this vision seems to have been sidelined for so long from sociocultural and Vygotskian studies can be found in the limitations affecting its publication which meant that it was published at the end of the 1950's, then first translated into English, and then later into Spanish in the 1970's (1962; 1973). In the first version the censors left out key parts of the book. The definitive copy, which came from Vygtosky's original scripts, did not come out in Europe and the U.S until 1985. In the final version, while explaining the development of the word meaning via the study of the 72 JUAN RAMIREZ & MERCEDES CUBERO formation of concepts, Vygotsky opts for the non-disappearance of the most primitive forms of verbal thought, represented by thought in complexes, with the rise of more developed forms of verbal thinking - concepts -. He understands that these distinct forms differ qualitatively in the intellectual operations that they involve, they even differ in the way they are acquired, but they are equal functionally. Vygotsky put it eloquently: "the different developmental forms coexist, in the same way that strata from different geological eras coexist on the earth's surface" (1993, p.171). Neither the child, nor the adult discard their elementary forms of thinking once they have mastered higher forms. Even in the context of everyday life, these more elementary forms of verbal thought can and usually do dominate. These ideas are well reflected in the thesis on the heterogeneity of verbal thought so clearly put forward by Tulviste (1982, 1987, 1991, ... ), for whom new forms of verbal thinking do not replace the already existing ones, but instead correspond functionally with another type of activity and problems. In the same way as other authors before him have done (Bruner, 1986; Levy-Bruhl, 1975; Vygotsky, 1985) Tulviste defends the heterogeneity of verbal thinking depending on the context of activity. By this we mean that depending on the demands -the needs and the motives prevailing in activity setting -we will develop a way of resolving problems and we will use the necessary tools for that end. Therefore, the existence of different types of verbal thinking must owe itself to the wide variety of activities an individual undertakes in his/her social setting. In this sense, Tulviste comments: The tendency to make a global opposition between the thinking of people in one culture with that of people in another is misguided. Types of thinking correspond not with different cultures but with different forms of activity. It is not reasonable to speak of primitive and civilized thinking; instead it is reasonable to speak of common sensical (everday, practical thinking), scientific thinking, artistic thinking, and so forth. The basis for such a division is the functional correspondence between certain types of thinking on the one hand, and certain types of activity and the tasks that emerge and must be solved in the course of carrying out these activities on the other (cit. in Wertsch, 1991; p.102). MODES OF DISCOURSE 73 The interest of this quotation lies in that it justifies not only the fact that individuals who participate in different activities may have different ways of resolving the problems they are faced with. In addition to this it is precisely because the ways of thinking correspond to different types of activity that in the same individual we may find these different forms of thinking depending on the type of activity they are carrying out. Therefore, a subject who is able to perform different activities will apply different forms of thinking depending on the nature of the activity. We should remember thatboth Vygotsky and Tulviste focused on the study of verbal thinking. Most of the research carried out by the Soviet school approached the study of the "word meaning" through tests into the formation of concepts. However, we ought notforget that the choice of the word meaning as a unit of anal ysis has been one of the points of Vygotsky's work that has received most criticism from both outside and inside the sociocultural perspective. Despite the many advantages that the word meaning has for the study of semiotic instruments that measure higher psychological processes, it is insufficient and erroneous as a unit of analysis of psychological functioning as a whole (Wertsch, 1985). Given this and other limitations, the theorists of the socia-historical approach have opted for a unit of analysis that allows working with Vygotskian hypotheses, something for which his own unit of analysis was insufficient, while also being able to extend them to other areas and problems. We are talking about mediated action as a unit of anlysis, formulated initially by Leontiev (1981, 1983) and developed later mainly by Zinchenko (1985) and Wertsch (1981, 1985). Owing to the far-reach- ing implications that any decision taken over the unit of analysis has, let us now go over, albeit briefly, the discussion that has arisen around this topic. Action mediated by tools as a unit of analysis It seems obvious that a theoretical focus of the greatest proportions is stripped of meaning if it does not have an object or unit of study that enables its constitution and development. The unit of analysis chosen is therefore of great importance given that whatever decision is taken will shape the theoretical framework as a whole. So it should not come as a surprise that in the history of psychology a great variety of units have 74 JUAN RAMIREZ & MERCEDES CUBERO been established, almost as many as actual paths developed in psychology. Sensations, shape and form, the reflex, behavior, the inconscious, cognitive processes, etc could be given as examples that, according to Zinchenko (1985), confirm this plurality. However, Vygotsky specified that not every phenomenon can be considered an adequate unit for psychological study. It must meet certain requirements that guarantee its validity as a representative of "everything psychological" and through which an understanding of this everything may be derived. These requirements have been drawn up by authors like Davydov & Radzikhovsky (1985), Zinchenko (1985), etc. It could be said that the underlying idea is of a holistic vision of the unit of study. First and foremost, it is understood that the unit should maintain and reflect all the basic properties of the consciousness, itself thus becoming the smallest unified and integrated system with its own meaning and capable of changing and developing. For Vygotsky the word meaning not only met these requirements but also enabled one to penetrate into the close relation existing between thinking and language. The word, by implying a process of generalization, belongs simultaneously and inseparably to the domain of language and to that of thinking. These and other characteristics of the word meaning made it a good candidate for the unit of analysis of psychological functioning. However, Vygotsky could not make the unit of analysis he proposed meet the requirements he himself had imposed (Davydov & Radsikhovskii 1985; Wertsch, 1981, 1988; Zinchenko, 1985). Thus, it does not seem as if it can function like a microcosm of consciousness as it does not include aspects such as the affective and volitive. Nor does it seem that this unit is suitable for looking at the relation between the natural and cultural lines of development as the word meaning only allows the analysis of functions that are semiotically mediated, higher functions that are developed culturally. In this context, with his interest centred on establishing a unit of analysis of consciousness coherent with the Vygotskian system, V.P. Zinchenko (1985) points to action mediated by tools as a unit of psychological functioning. In a first approach towards the concept of action we could state that this is a segment of human functioning directed towards the reaching of a conscious goal or object (KQzulin, 1986; Wertsch, 1979). This unit is perfectly compatible both with the theory of activity MODES OF DISCOURSE 75 developed by Leontiev from where the notion of action was taken, and with Vygotsky's theoretical approach from which he assumed the idea of mediation (Cubero, 1994). Its constance with respect to the theory of activity is clear if we consider that this already included action as one of the levels of analysis. The coherence of Zinchenko's notion with the Vygotskian propositions may be seen on two fronts. Firstly, it meets the requirements imposed by Vygotsky himself for an unit to be considered as such; in other words, it works as a microcosm where all the psychological functions and the relations between them are reflected (Wertsch, 1985). The performance of an action, unlike the word meaning, means that the individual has to bring into play simultaneously functions such as attention, perception, memory, reasoning ... reflecting the relations between them. The second aspect refers to the importance attributed to signs in the determination of the existence of social and psychological processes. The notion of action encapsulates the instrumental value of the word meaning, by being seen as a process mediated by instruments (materials and signs). This last point integrates the units of analysis proposed by Vygotsky (the word meaning and other semiotic phenomena) within his system by assigning them the function of mediators of the action (Wertsch, 1985; Wertsch & Sammarco,1985). According to Wertsch (1985), the action has the additional advantage in that it "transcends ... the boundery between the individual and the social" (p. 215). Similarly to the unit proposed by Vygotsky, action does not just refer to intra or interpsychological functioning, instead both are an inherent part of the actual concept of action. Put another way, the action simultaneously encapsulates individual and sociocultural aspects of human life. Individual because it is carried out through the particular behavior of a person. It is also social in two senses; social to the extent that it reflects forms of behavior that are historically organized and defined, and also social because they are acquired through participation in collective groups, through interaction. So action allows us to observe simultaneously the functioning of psychological processes and the projection of culture on these (Ramirez, 1988; Ramirez, Cubero & Santamaria, 1990; Wertsch, Minick & Arns, 1984). In the characterization of an action it is crucial to consider one last aspect: it is comprised of "external" and "internal" components which therefore makes the distinction of actions along these criteria artificial. It is neither valid, nor of any use to merely reduce human actions to one of 76 JUAN RAMIREZ & MERCEDES CUBERO the components of each association, in each action both aspects co-exist, they are the two sides of a coin, two aspects of the same dimension. It is not easy to defend this point of view if, as Rubinstein (1974) claims, we continue to state that internal and individual actions arise as a result of the interiorization of external and social actions. Recognising the social origin of actions does not necessarily mean accepting the existence of purely external or purely internal actions, instead one may understand that a process occurs in which psychological actions of a certain level of complexity (linked more to a specific and present reality) are transformed into actions on a higher level (more generalized, abbreviated and verbalized). It is this process which is referred to as interiorization. The concept stemming from this consideration is, according to Zinchenko (1985), equivalent to the concept of action mediated by tools, in which an action is seen as a process mediated by tools (materials and signs) regardless of the way they are carried out (external or internal). From what we have been outlining above, the action has become an ideal instrument for studying the relationship between the individual and sociocultural setting (Wertsch, 1991). This reflects the tension between the instruments of mediation that are present and given priority by the culture and the personalized use that the individual makes of them. By analyzing mediated action, therefore, we will free ourselves from the psychological reductionism that individualistic psychology based on the study of an isolated individual ties us to. In addition, we will also be liberated from the sociological reductionism that Vygotsky criticised so insistently for conceiving the individual as reduced to a mere social being. The break-up of both types of reductionism, Vygotsky's main aim, has been one of the fundamental objectives of the historical-cultural approach. Considering a unit of analysis that denies the separation between the individual and his context is of great importance in the attempt to overcome these types of recluctionisms. Action and verbal thinking If we take the action as the unit of analysis, verbal thinking must be considered in terms of mental actions carried out through the use of language. So the word meaning may either be understood as actions in themselves, when these are purely verbal, or as instruments that mediate MODES OF DISCOURSE 77 the actions. Thischangeofperspectiyewouldimplythat the experimental study of the word meaning would: demand the creation· of situations enabling subjects to exteriorize the actions tllatreflect the concept or meaning of the term studied. Returning to the study of verbal thinking connected to the proposed unit of analysis, we should point out the importance of studying the different types of verbal thinking through actions (verbal and non-verbal) that the individual puts into play. Aspects that until now had been marginalized from the study of verbal thinking may be brought back from the new unit of analysis, as may be the case of the use of narrations in the framework of the problem solving. Let us now take a brief look at this. Bruner, an American theoretician inspired initially by Vygotsky, has approached the idea of different ways of thinking in a similar way in his recent studies about narratives. He defends the existence of two forms of thinking, two different ways of understanding that may complement each other mutually. Bruner says about this: "These two ways of understanding have their own functions and their own criteria of correction. They differ fundamentally in their verification procedure. A good story and a good argument have different nature. The two may be used as a way for convincing the other. But which they are convincing are very different: the arguments convince of its true and the storys convince of the similarity with the reality, with everyday life. In one of then, the verification is made by procedures which let us formal and empirical tests. In the other one, the most importan aspect in not the true but the similarity (Bruner, 1986; p.23)". We believe that both forms of proceeding (form of argumentative thinking and form of narrative thinking) may help to understand problems that have not been resolved in the psychology of reasoning, an area of psychological research which has been closely linked in the past to the exclusive relationship between formal logic and psychology. A good example of this are the studies into processes of categorization and problem solving that are being carried out at the moment in our Laboratorio de Actividad Humana (Cubero, in press) which we are now going to discuss. 84 JUAN RAMIREZ & MERCEDES CUBERO different ways of solving the problem. This perspective makes it possible for psychology to enter into a field of study that it had previously been barred from: the study of culture. Culture that will be interpreted in terms of a set of activity setting in which individuals develop. And it is precisely these settings that are responsible for the ditferences and equalities of ways of thinking. Settings that, on the one hand, limit the acting of the subject by giving him/her certain tools and resources and not others, and that on the other hand, is influenced by the particular uses that individuals make of these tools that the culture, the institutions and history have given them. Universidad de Sevilla REFERENCES Bruner 1. (1986), Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Cubero M. (1994), Algunas derivaciones de la teoria de la Actividad. IIlJancia y Aprendizaje, 67-68, pag. 3-19. Cubero M. (en preparaci6n). Escenarios de Actividad y Modos de Pensamiento: un estudio sobre la heterogeneidad del pensamiento. Tesis Doctoral. Davydov V. V. and Radzikhovskii L. A. (1985), Vygotsky's theory and the activity-oriented approach in psychology. Comp., J. W. Wertsch. Culture, Comunicatioll and Cognition: Vygotskiall perspectives. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press. Kozulin A. (1986), The concept of activity in Soviet Psychology. Vygotsky, his disciples and critics. Alnerican Psychologist, (41) 3, 264-274. Levy-Bruhl L. (1975), The notesbooks Oil Prirnitive Mentality. New York: Harper & Row. Luria A.R. (1980), Los procesos cognitivos. Analisis sociohistorico. Barcelona: Fontanella. Ramirez J. D. (1988), Cultura y Actividad Humana: una perspectiva sociohist6rica. Comp., L. A. H. Educacioll y procesos cogllitivos. Un enJoque sociocultural. Sevilla: Junta de Andalucia Ramirez J. D., Cubero M. & Santamaria A. (1990), Cambio sociocognitivo y organizaci6n de las acciones: una aproximaci6n sociocultural a la educaci6n de adultos. InJancia y Aprendizaje, 51-52, 169-190. Rubinstein S. L. (1974), El desarrollo de la Psicologfa. Principios y Metodos. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pueblos Unidos. MODES OF DISCOURSE 85 Tulviste P. (1982), Is there a form of verbal thought specific to childhood? Soviet Psychology XXI, nO 1, 3-17. Tul viste P. (1987), L. Levy-Bruhl and problems of the historical development of thoughLSoviet Psychology XXV, 11 0 3, 3-21. Tulviste P. (1991), The cultural-historical development of verbal thinking. New y ork: Nova Science Publishers. Vygotski L. S. (1988), 171inking and Speech. New York: Plenum. (N. Minick translator) . Wertsch J. V. (1979), The regulation of human action and the given-new organization of private speech. Comp., G. Zivin. 171e development of selfregulation through private speech. N. Y.: Wiley. Wertsch J. V. (1981), 171e Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology. Armonk, N. Y.: Sharpe, M. E. Wertsch J. V. (1985), Vygotsky the socialformation ofmind. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wertsch J. V. (1991). Voices of the mind. : Harvester Wheatsheaf. Wertsch J. V. & Sammarco, J. G. (1985), Social precursors to individual functioning: the problem of unit of analysis. Comp., R. A. Hinde y A. N. Perret-Clermont. Interindividual Relations and Cognitive Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wertsch J. V., Minick, N. & Ams F. (1984), The creation of context in joint problem-solving. Comp., B. Rogoff y J. Lave. Evelyday cognition. Its development ill social context. Cambridge, Mass: H.U.P. Zinchenko V. P. (1985), Vygotsky's ideas about units for analysis of mind. Comp., J. V. Wertsch. Culture, Comunicatioll and Cognition: Vygotskian perspectives. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.