More Money, More Problems? Resource Dependence and Professionalization of Non-governmental Social Services Organizations in Southern Spain

1 This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review, and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect postacceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-020-00256-z, with the following reference: Maya-Jariego, I., Holgado, D., González-Tinoco, E., Muñoz-Alvis, A. & Ortega, M. (2020). More money, more problems? Resource dependence and professionalization of nongovernmental social services organizations in Andalusia. VOLUNTAS. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(6), 1212–1225. DOI: 10.1007/s11266-020-00256-z More money, more problems? Resource dependence and professionalization of non-governmental social services organizations in Southern Spain Isidro Maya Jariego, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain Daniel Holgado Ramos, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain Elena González-Tinoco, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain Andrés Muñoz Alvis, Universidad del Norte, Colombia Manuela Ortega, Universidad de Cádiz, Spain Abstract. This study analyzes the strategies displayed by non-governmental organizations in the social services sector to face the resource dependence on public administration in Southern Spain. We focus on the reorganization of the public subsidies system in Spain and its specific impact on the entities registered in Andalusia. In 2017, the Autonomous Communities assumed the management of a proportion of the subsidies with a charge to the Personal Income Tax for “social purposes”, which was previously managed by the General State Administration in its entirety. The case study combines the description of (a) the process of transferring the management of a line of subsidies from the state to the regional level, (b) the strategies of nongovernmental organizations to face the context of instability and financial uncertainty, and (c) the impact of the regulatory bases of grant calls on programs implementation. First, the database with all the applications submitted in the calls of 2017 and 2018 is analyzed (n = 11,610 applications). Second, we describe the perception of the change in the management system, from the point of view of the third sector social services entities. The combination of both strategies allows us to examine in detail the response of social service organizations to ensure the continuity of the budget and the continuity of services. The results show that the change in the management system gave rise to a wide debate among non-governmental social services organizations about the calls for grants managed by the regional government. However, the qualitative case study showed that the reaction of the entities has more to do with the needs of adaptation to an unstable, uncertain and highly competitive financial environment, than with specific characteristics of grant calls. Key words: Nongovernmental organizations, Funding, Social Services, Management system, Spain. 2 Introduction Non-governmental organizations have traditionally been conceived as entities that identify and cover social needs that the government does not reach (Weisbrod, 1997). However, at the same time, government funding is one of the paramount ways of fundraising among non-profit organizations (Blackwood, Roeger & Pettijohn, 2012). This paradox has been analyzed in-depth by the resource dependence theory, which has explored how external financing may reduce the autonomy of the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Specifically, entities with high dependence on a funding source are under a standing risk of income volatility and, consequently, are more vulnerable to external pressures (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). This has direct implications on organizational functioning. On the one hand, resource dependence may condition the goals of the organization, so that in part, they are displaced or even replaced in their entirety by donor priorities (Khieng & Dahles, 2015). On the other hand, it also appears to reduce innovation, while contributing to the development of a more bureaucratic structure and increasing competition with other entities to attract scarce resources (Mitchell, 2014). These effects are enhanced in economic crisis circumstances, in which excessive dependence on public funding makes entities more vulnerable (Hodge & Piccolo, 2005). In fact, it may jeopardize the continuity of services or, in the most extreme cases, the survival of the organization. Nonetheless, there is also evidence that nonprofits can maintain efficient operations despite financial dependence on the government (Lu & Zhao, 2019), and may depend in part on patterns of collaboration between organizations (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2018). This causes some debate about the limits of resource dependency theory. In this article we analyze the strategies displayed by non-governmental organizations in the social services sector to face resource dependence on public administration. For it, we focus on a case of reorganization of the public subsidies system in Spain and its specific impact on the entities registered in Andalusia. This allows us to explore how organizations respond to an environment of change and uncertainty. In the second instance, it also serves to describe how the financial context conditions the implementation of the programs. Between professionalization and the search for alternative funding sources Not all organizations have the same capacity to obtain resources. Larger entities have a higher probability of receiving state funding, while having a bureaucratic structure, a consensus orientation towards government entities and a broader history of government financing (Lu, 2015). To ensure the flow of state funding, non-governmental organizations often face the dilemma of adjusting to the requirements established by a specific donor or diversifying the funding sources (Mitchell, 2014). On the one hand, professionalization is the preferential strategy of adaptation to donor requirements. Entities managed by professional staff are more rational when planning projects, managing the economy, and evaluating practices (Hwang & Powell, 2009), which increases the probability of fulfilling the government requirements for funding (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000). To the extent that an organization is perceived as more legitimate, it is more likely to enjoy greater credibility and stability and receive more resources (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This has translated into the fact that many non-governmental organizations have 3 enhanced the service provision component to the detriment of claiming actions and community participation. Equally, the contents of the projects have been adjusted to the preferences of the funding source. In contrast to the above, diversification of income sources is the most widespread strategy to avoid resource dependence (Mitchell, 2014). Access to multiple sources helps entities minimize the financial vulnerability risk and protect their autonomy (Lu, 2015). To achieve this, some entities resort to expanding their geographic coverage or seek partnership with local organizations to maximize fundraising. In other cases they try to specialize in a type of project that is not provided by their competitors, or become more selective in the type of programs they develop. They could also resort to donor education, or negotiation and commitment strategies with the Administration, but these types of strategies seem to be comparatively less frequent (Mitchell, 2014). Funding management and program sustainability The funding context can also influence the contents and implementation of the programs. Specifically, it seems to have a direct impact on the duration and continuity of the intervention. First, public entities and funding agencies often structure the financing of social programs around short budget cycles, usually with a finalist nature, through the subsidy of closed activities and projects with a limited execution period. This has resulted in implementation and impact with time restrictions between calls, usually yearly (Rhoades, Bumbarger & Moore, 2012). Second, impact and long-term viability have been a latent, though seldom explicit, concern (Shediac-Rizkallah & Bone, 1998). Short-term subsidies seem to be among the factors that introduce difficulties for the institutionalization of a program in the organization. Despite these difficulties, results-based management is one of the strategies with significant potential to improve services and meet the community needs (Julian, 2001). However, resultsbased accountability requires a context of continued technical assistance to entities. For example, the lack of resources to perform a needs assessment or outcome evaluation can negatively affect the quality of the service and the accountability process itself (Swerissen & Crisp, 2004). In addition, certain prevention or promotion actions are more difficult to operationalize in terms of results. On the other hand, administrative issues such as lack of staff with training and expertise in assessment or lack of financial resources to carry it out may be relevant, especially when we compare large organizations with small ones (Dorius, 2011). Case study: the change in management of 0.7 percent of Personal Income Tax in Andalusia Third sector organizations in Europe have generally been resistant to both the financial crisis and regulatory changes (Pape et al., 2020). In Spain, subsidies, agreements or contracts are typically used by both state and regional governments to support social action third sector organizations. However, during the economic recession, between 2008 and 2013, the availability of public funds was significantly reduced. Consequently, third sector entities were under strong pressure, not only due to a decrease in financing but also to the increasingly demanding requirements for acquiring and justify such funding (Chaves-Avila & Savall-Morera, 2019). The marketization of services has been more frequent, which has also led to more market-based hybrid organizations. In 2017, the Autonomous Communities in Spain assumed the management of a proportion of the subsidies with a charge to the raising of 0.7 percent of the Personal Income Tax for “social purposes”. Specifically, they assumed the management of 80 percent of the budget collected, 4 which was previously managed by the General State Administration in its entirety. This change was aroused by a lawsuit of the regional government of Catalonia, for invading, in its view, the competences of the Autonomous Communities. The reorganization of funding counted on the opposition of the Third Sector Platform, which predicted a negative impact on state-level programs. In Spain, the management of social services has a high degree of decentralization. The powers correspond to each region (or "Autonomous Community"), which in each case have enacted regional social service laws. Nevertheless, the territorial structure of the State has recently been the subject of great political controversy, with strong competition between regions to maintain a differential status or achieve more powers (Keating & Wilson, 2009). The new model of distribution and management of 0.7 of the Personal Income Tax led to a significant reorganization of the subsidy system concerning social services. For the Autonomous Communities, this change not only meant an increase in the amount of available resources, but also a greater complexity in the management of subsidies, especially due to the workload in the processing of applications and the duplication of calls. For example, in the case of Andalusia, since 2017 two lines of subsidies have lived together, which coincide with a high degree in the type of projects and in the action areas they finance: the general call for aid and the call for Personal Income Tax 1 . Both fosters social inclusion programs, projects aimed at children, families and young people; and actions to meet the needs of the elderly and people with disabilities. The two calls also overlap in the intervention modalities, which cover prevention programs, food banks, summer schools, residential services, volunteer programs and actions to improve the accessibility to public services, among others. Among the few differences considered between both lines of subsidies, it should be noted that the Personal Income Tax call (unlike the general call) considers investment projects and does not include trade unions or business associations among potential applicant entities. Otherwise, the regulatory bases are largely matching. Based on this background, in the present study we compare the applications submitted by the Non-Governmental Organizations in both calls, in the first two editions after the change in aid management was implemented: that is, those corresponding to 2017 and 2018. Also, we explore the perception of the Third Sector representatives about the impact of this change, both in the maintenance and the regular functioning of non-profit organizations and in the implementation of social programs. Therefore, this case study combines the description of (a) the process of transferring the management of a line of subsidies from the state to the regional level, (b) the strategies of nongovernmental organizations to face the context of instability and financial uncertainty, and (c) the impact of the regulatory bases of grant calls on program implementation. First, it is a reorganization in the subsidies management system. In Spain, the competence of social services corresponds to the Autonomous Communities, even with state-level regulations that claim to establish cross-cutting issues in the service delivery. Second, changes in the financial ecosystem introduce a factor of instability, which may jeopardize the continuity of services or even the 1 In Regional Government of Andalusia 2008 calls, it is, respectively, the “Order of April 25, 2018, which approves the regulatory bases for subsidies granting, awarded on a competitive basis, in matters dealing with elderly people, people with disabilities, training of young people in vulnerable situations, gypsy community, migrants, homeless people, attention in the area of addictions, equal treatment and nondiscrimination of LGTBI people, social action and volunteerism, in the field of competences of the Ministry of Equality and Social Policies ”and the“ Order of July 19, 2018, which approves the regulatory bases for subsidies granting awarded on a competitive basis aimed at private entities for the performance of general interest measures to meet social purposes under the tax assignment of 0.7% of the Personal Income Tax, in the context of the competences of the Ministry of Equality and Social Policies”. 5 survival of non-governmental organizations in some case. Thirdly, the specific way in which subsidies are regulated is not just a regulatory element, but it may condition the program implementation process itself. The present study With this case study we describe the first two years in which the Regional Government of Andalusia took charge of the management of 80 percent of the budget of 0.7 of the Personal Income Tax. Firstly, we analyze the database with all the applications submitted in these calls, compared to the applications registered in the general call for aid. Secondly, we describe the perception of such change by the social services entities of the third sector. The first quantitative phase serves as a context to systematically explore the point of view of the representatives of the field. The combination of both strategies allows us to examine in detail the response of social service organizations to ensure the continuity of the budget and the continuity of services. Therefore, taking as a reference the partial transfer of 0.7 to the Autonomous Communities, the objective of the study is twofold: first, to describe the perception of non-governmental organizations about the reorganization of the subsidy management system; and second, to explore its impact both in the strategies of adaptation to the instability of the financial environment, and in the implementation and continuity of the programs. Method The first phase of the study consisted of a comparative analysis of the applications submitted to the two lines of subsidies: the general call for aid and the call for Personal Income Tax. In the second phase, we conducted semi-structured interviews with managers and technical staff from a selection of non-governmental organizations in the field of social services in Andalusia. Quantitative phase The descriptive study of the applications provides information on the number of projects submitted by each entity, the requested budget, the budget allocated, and the score obtained with the application of the scale in each case. In this first stage, we perform a systematic comparative analysis of all the indicators available in both calls. Databases. The comparative study is based on the register of applications from the Ministry of Equality, Social Policies and Conciliation of the Regional Government of Andalusia, concerning the general call for grants and the call with a charge to 0.7% of the Personal Income Tax, both in the field of social services. Specifically, we analyze all the applications submitted in the 2017 and 2018 calls, registered in the Integrated Social Services System (ISSS). In total, we examined 11,610 applications: 8,665 of the general call for aid and 2,945 of the call with a charge to 0.7% of the Personal Income Tax. In the case of the general call, subsidies from the Andalusian Regional Strategy for Cohesion and Social Inclusion, aimed at intervention in disadvantaged areas, are not included. In the case of the call with a charge to 0.7%, all the files in which there is a single applicant organization and a single eligible action were included. To facilitate information processing, when the applicant organization submitted two or more eligible actions, just the first one was considered. This reduced the study universe by 53 records in 2017 and 36 records in 2018. Qualitative phase 6 The qualitative component of the study consisted of conducting interviews with 21 informants of the third sector in Andalusia. It was based on the description made during the quantitative phase to explore the point of view of the applicant organizations. Together with the open interview, systematic information was collected on the relationships between nongovernmental social services organizations in the region. Participants. The 21 interviewees represent a small selection of relevant social services entities in the sector, following the suggestions made by the General Directorate of Social Services of the Regional Government of Andalusia. The informants were the president, the manager, the secretary or the person responsible for the finances of the entity. In some cases, social intervention technicians, or technicians in fundraising and subsidies participated. Participating entities cover the diversity of areas of intervention of social services: intellectual disability, physical disability, elderly, social inclusion, volunteerism, self-help, drug addiction, immigration and international cooperation, among others. The interviewees participated voluntarily. Participants signed an informed consent, indicating that the data would be used anonymously, for research purposes only. Semi-structured interview. The interview guide consisted of the formulation of open questions about the evolution of fundraising, the key sources of funding for each entity and the comparison of the two calls for research. Complementary, the participants responded to ten possible changes to be introduced in the subsidy regulatory bases, with a Likert scale format from 1 to 5. The interviews lasted approximately one hour. In total 1,187 minutes of conversation were recorded. The interviews were transcribed in their entirety and subsequently analyzed by the team of five interviewers. One of the researchers wrote the list of most common topics and ideas mentioned in a cross-sectional way in all interviews. Then an iterative process of analysis and group discussion was carried out, following a consensus-evaluation dynamic. In parallel to our study, the Regional Government of Andalusia conducted a public consultation on the regulatory basis of grant calls, in which it received 47 contributions from social service entities. The information obtained through the public consultation was used as an element of contrast and validation of the interviews. Data analysis In the descriptive study of the database we use the comparisons of means and the analysis of correlations. For this, we use the number of applications submitted, the budget (requested and allocated), the date of presentation of the project, and the score obtained with the scale of the call as basic indicators. After a general description, for the whole database, we conducted a systematic comparison in all the indicators between the two lines of subsidies. For the qualitative analysis, a consensus-evaluation process was followed. The interviewers made the transcripts of the interviews and participated in several meetings to discuss and interpret the results. Results Descriptive analysis of the database The type of actions and services developed in the field of social services in Andalusia is very diverse. However, four categories give an account of 62.39 percent of the budget granted in subsidies and, therefore, shape the core of the activities financed. These are urgency and social inclusion; elderly people; children, family and youngsters; and people with disabilities. 7 In the period analyzed, the entities presented a total of 4.67 applications on average (DT = 7.25) and obtained a subsidy for approximately half of the applications submitted (49,63%). The average budget per project is 5,575 euros (DT = 18.771’6). Between 2017 and 2018 they captured an average cumulative budget of 50,490’5 euros per entity (DT = 416,129’8). The added summary is presented in Table 1. When disaggregating the information according to the processing body, it is observed that at the provincial level the approved projects received an average of 3,948 euros (DT = 10,015'02), while in the central services they reach an average of 24,885'1 euros (DT = 53.084'1). HERE TABLE 1 However, the distribution is very variable among the different entities, as Figure 1 illustrates. More than two-thirds of the participants submit 4 or fewer applications in the analyzed period (n = 1,691, 68.1%). That is, the most usual is to present the equivalent of one application per call (or less). However, there are a small number of very active applicants. Specifically, 2 percent of applicants have submitted 20 or more projects in these calls. That is, just 58 applicants give an account of 2,215 applications, which represents 19.07% of the total. HERE FIGURE 1 Some data seem to indicate that submitting a greater number of projects is an effective strategy to maximize the raising of resources. On the one hand, there is a statistically significant correlation between the number of applications submitted and the number of applications granted (r = 0.914, p < 0.01). In fact, the amount requested, and the amount granted are strongly correlated (r = 0.657, p < 0.01). On the other hand, there is also a correlation between the number of applications granted and the total cumulative budget obtained by each entity in both calls (r = 0.621, p < 0.0001). To complete the descriptive analysis, in Table 2 we have summarized the correlations existing between the date of submission of the application, the ratio between the requested budget and the one finally obtained, and the score achieved in the valuation of the file. The date of submission of the application has a slight positive correlation with the amount requested (r = 0.067, p < 0.01) and with the amount granted (r = 0.029, p < 0.01). Better results were achieved by those who submit the application on a date closer to the end of the call. In the same vein, the assessment of the file has a positive association with the date of submission of the application (r = 0.122, p < 0.01). Also, a positive rating of the file is also reflected in the achievement of a higher proportion of the requested budget (r = 0.424, p < 0.01). HERE TABLE 2 Comparative analysis of the two lines of subsidies: general call and call for 0.7 of Personal Income Tax The subsidy database is composed of a total of 11,610 applications, of which 74.6% correspond to the general call and 25.4% to the Personal Income Tax call. However, in the analyzed period, the difference in the number of applications between the two calls is reduced by 24.3%, due to the relative increase of the applicants in the Personal Income Tax call. Specifically, while in 2017 there were four times more requests in the general call than in the Personal Income Tax one, in 2018 the difference is reduced by only slightly more than double. The systematic comparison of both calls is summarized in Table 3. 8 As a whole, the amount requested is more than four times higher than what is finally obtained. According to lines of subsidies, the relationship between the requested budget and the one finally allocated is lower in the Personal Income Tax call than in the general call for aid. The ratio for the set of projects shows that the entities finally gain an average of 20.94% of the requested budget (DT = 0.25). In the general call the ratio is slightly above average while in the Personal Income Tax call it is below. In the opposite sense, the project score is higher in the Personal Income Tax call than in the general call (F = 98.048, p < 0.01), and it is also higher in 2018 than in 2017 (t = -4.392, p < 0.01). As regards the modalities of projects, through the Personal Income Tax call, investment projects have been channeled (representing 23.2% of the total projects). This call has included, for example, the acquisition of adapted vehicles, the equipment of centers and services, or social emergency assistance. In any case, the differences between the two calls seem to be derived from administrative decisions, about the management of subsidies, but cover a type of projects and entities which are fundamentally similar. HERE TABLE 3 Perception of the reorganization of the subsidy management system Despite the diversification of fundraising strategies after the 2008 crisis, the functioning of nongovernmental organizations in the field of social services remains fundamentally dependent on the funding of public administrations. This makes third sector entities especially sensitive to any change in the institutional or regulatory environment of grant calls. Instability and uncertainty in the financial environment may jeopardize the continuity of social entities. Both the delay in the resolution of the calls and the lack of specific resources for the maintenance of the entities involve continuous financial challenges. In this context, the transfer of the management of resources of 0.7% of the Personal Income Tax to the Autonomous Communities supposed a reorganization of the calls for subsidies, which had a different impact on the entities of the sector and, consequently, generated a debate on subsidies management. The dilemma occurs mainly between the entities that already obtained resources in the state-level call and those that were incorporated with the regional-level grants (which overlaps in part with the distinction between the largest and smallest entities). Besides that, the interviewees are open to the incorporation of results-based management mechanisms and the implementation of evidence-based practices. In Table 4, we have summarized some of the keys in the perception of the entities, which we will develop below. Evolution of fund-raising The financial crisis of 2008 put the issue of funding of social services entities at the center of the debate on the third sector and became among the main concerns of social organizations. The focus on the financial issue is a natural reaction to survival needs, to the extent that many entities faced difficulties to ensure the continuity of their activities, and in other cases, they disappeared. On the other hand, it reflects the reorientation of the sector towards the provision of services. “The world of non-profit entities has accepted in a too natural way to enter into a dynamic where the whole debate is how entities are funded. Concerns about social transformation discussion have been reduced, of incidence in public policies and we have entered into a dynamic in which the concern is how much money the 9 administration will give us. This without denying the legitimacy and the need for such financing…” [I35, immigration] The need to receive more funds is expressed by practically all the entities interviewed, regardless of whether they are the smallest organizations or those entities that have collected more public funds in the last calls. The dominant perception is to affirm that there has been a reduction in the number of economic resources available in social policies, and therefore, in the fundraising by non-governmental organizations. However, this perception may mask some significant processes of the reorganization of the third sector, along with the change in the public funding management system, as indicated by some key informant: “What I have perceived is the economic crisis has meant an increase in the funding of many entities, especially those of a larger size, because funds that were previously directly managed by the administration are derived ... to finance social entities, to cover the gaps to which the administration does not reach. This means that there are entities that have grown a lot. Then there have been situations, such as the refugee crisis, which have involved special funds ... and I think that this increase in funding has been assumed uncritically, forgetting the role that social entities also play in holding Administration accountable…” [I35, immigration] Consequently, in the third sector the service delivery component has been reinforced, at the expense of other profiles related to political incidence and the detection of new social needs. In the opinion of some interviewees, the focus on raising funds for the implementation of programs seems to have had a lesser orientation towards community participation and the social claim. On the other hand, the role of advancing the social initiative to social needs is less frequent, before they are covered by the public administration. “For example, in the 1990s, with the Spanish lessons for foreigners, it was achieved that this was absorbed by adult education centers, which is where they should be. It is a very nice process because, first, it was assumed by social entities through volunteerism, then it was taken over by social entities with public funding, and finally, it was understood that this was a need for a part of society and there were adult education schools to cover that ... The crisis has also served to remove that, but that should be a regular process when talking about the contribution of organized civil society”. [I35, immigration] This process overlaps with a tightening of the management system and monitoring of the subsidies. The requirements for obtaining a grant are more demanding. The accounting and justification processes are more complex. In general, bureaucratic controls have increased throughout the process: “In parallel, the administration has introduced a change in the way of managing grant funds, so that the concept of “subsidy” has been somewhat distorted. In theory, with subsidies the administration diverts a number of funds to the organized civil society, which is what has established what projects they would like to carry out... However, now they are increasingly confused with subcontracting, so that the terms of the calls are similar to the contract specifications, or a tender, so that the state needs a certain public service to be carried out and takes it out through social entities... There are very clear cases in which we are already going to price/place, as if it was a public contract, and they already value you according to how much it costs you to provide the service one day…” [I35, immigration] 16 Compliance with ethical standards Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Participants signed an informed consent, indicating that the data would be used anonymously, for research purposes only. References Almog-Bar, M., & Schmid, H. (2018). 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The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise and Government. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16(4), 541–55. Yanacopulos, H. (2005). The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence. Global Networks, 5(1), 93-110. 19 Table 1. Accumulated data of the requests made, and the budget obtained in 2017 and 2018. M DT Mín. Máx. Number of applications submitted 4.67 7.25 1 159 Number of applications granted 2.68 4.54 0 93 Number of applications not granted 1.98 3.61 0 81 Success rate 49.63 39.96 0 100 Average budget per project 5,575.95 18,771.63 113 452,762 Budget granted accumulated 50,490.46 416,129.81 0 17,057,488 20 Table 2. Correlations of date of submission, ratio and scale. 1 2 3 4 5 1. Budget requested - .657** .012 .118** .067** 2. Budget granted - .233** .189** .029** 3. Budget ratio - .424** -.037** 4. Score on the scale - .122** 5. Date of submission - **p<.01 21 Table 3. Comparison of the general call for subsidies with the call for 0.7 of the Personal Income Tax. Number of applications submitted per call General Personal Income Tax Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 2017 4,541 80.90% 1,072 19.09% 2018 4,124 68.77% 1,873 31.23% Average amount requested and granted per call General Personal Income Tax M SD M SD Requested 2017 21,746.7 48,499.1 157,698.4 399,651.7 2018 19,707.9 369,564.7 118,898.6 264,570.8 Granted 2017 5,581.3 16,927.4 36,625.1 12,2320.7 2018 4,958.3 368,496.2 21,672.6 84,292.6 Budget requested/granted ratio and score on the scale per call General Personal Income Tax M SD M SD Ratio 2017 0.2294 0.26 0.2054 0.27 2018 0.2258 0.29 0.1265 0.18 Scale 2017 57.49 12.54 63.79 9.65 2018 58.54 12.60 64.02 9.70 22 Table 4. The point of view of social entities on the calls for subsidies. Third Sector Transformation  Concern about the financial environment of public policies of social services.  Orientation towards the provision of services.  Hardening of the conditions of the subsidies.  Precarization of work conditions in the field of social services. Evolution of fund raising  The financial crisis is a milestone that establishes a before and after, (…)  (…) that led to the implementation of strategies to diversify the funding sources.  Public administrations are the main funding sources. Perceived problems  Delay in the resolution of the call and in the effective income of the subsidy.  Both the maintenance of the headquarters and the sustainability of the entity constitute a permanent challenge.  Fear that changes in management will mask a reduction in the budget. Comparison of the general call for aid and the call for personal income tax  Entities do not perceive significant differences between both calls.  The reorganization of the grants has differentially affected the entities of the sector, (…)  (…) which has translated into a debate on the concentration of resources in a small number of entities of greater size and management capacity.  The volume of applications has been above the management capacity of the Regional Government of Andalusia. Suggestions for improvement  Introduce results-based management mechanisms.  Promote the theoretical formulation of projects and the implementation of evidence-based practices.  Increase the feedback they receive after the resolution, following the model of peer review. 23 Table 5. Assessment of possible changes to introduce in the call. M SD That the granting of subsidies depends in part on the results obtained in the implementation of the program in a previous edition, that is, on its proven impact. 4.3 0.95 That the theoretical formulation of the project is positively valued. 4.0 1.05 Propose a specific funding line for small entities. 3.9 1.24 That collaboration with local social services is positively valued in the formulation of the project. 3.8 1.20 That the presentation of projects with coalitions of different entities is positively scored. 3.4 1.53 Set a limit on the number of projects that each entity can submit. 3.1 1.84 Incorporate small entities with consolidated organizations. 3 1.28 Increase the relative weight of the project assessment and reduce the relative weight of the entity's experience and capacity. 2.9 1.45 Integrate the personal income tax and the general call in a single call. 2.1 1.35 That the eligible expenses in the maintenance modality are included in the programs modality. 2.1 1.48 24 Figure 1. Count of the number of applications per entity in the two calls (2017-2018).