Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign poticies

SUMARIO I. INTRODUCTION. II. EU'S FOREIGN POLICY. III. THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE EU AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT. IV ECONOMIC FINANCIALISATION AND LEGITIMATION. V. THE EU'S RESPONSE TO THE ARAB SPRING. VI . CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS. DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, FINANCIALISATION AND EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES 1 JAVIER RAMOS DÍAZ Universidad Complutense JUAN LOMBA Universiteit Leiden JAVIER PADILLA MORENO - TORRES London School of Economics and Political Science Resumen: Analizamos el difuso marco institucional de la Unión Europea y su inherente déficit democrático, junto a la hegemonía de las prescripciones neoliberales en sus instituciones, siguiendo el concepto de "financiarización", para estudiar las Abstract: We analyse how the European Union's rather undefined institutional framework, the democratic deficit inherent in its institutions and the hegemony of neoliberal prescriptions expressed in the concept of "financialisation" are limiting 1.  Javier Ramos Díaz ([email protected] ) Research Associate at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICE') of Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Juan Lomba ([email protected] ) Researcher at Universiteit Leiden. Javier Padilla ([email protected] ) Researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). 305 911 CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lomba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres EU's capacity of external action. These limitations are becoming the European foreign policy into a weak, uncoordinated and instrumental (WUI) policy instrument. This is particularly observable in the MENA region, especially during and after the so called "Arab Spring", which constitutes a powerful analytical framework to validate the WUI hypothesis. In order to understand the EU's democratic deficit and financialisation, we look at the sources of direct and indirect legitimation that leave European citizenship in a secondary and subordinate position, undermining the sources of democratic legitimacy in the EU. Palabras Clave: Política exterior europea, déficit democrático, financiarización, Primavera Árabe Fecha de recepción: 10 de septiembre de 2018 Fecha de admisión: 10 de octubre de 2018 I. INTRODUCTION It is undisputable that the determination to manage globalisation has been a driver of many major European policies in the last years, from the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) and the subsequent Europe-2020 to EU's commercial policies and the changes in external relations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It is also true that the EU has been gaining in internal and external coherence in the last two decades. Yet, these policies have resulted insufficiently able to consolidate a coordinated position to project upon global institutions in favour of a coherent externa' policy in favour of a more inclusive globalisation as proposed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives of The Maastricht Treaty: • To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the Union. • To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways. • To preserve peace and strengthen international security • To promote international cooperation • To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (article J.1)". 306 On the contrary, what defines EU's foreign policy nowadays is basically its weak, uncoordinated and instrumental nature (WUI), which results in a rather ineffective foreign policy. Two main reasons justify this perception: the institutional structure of the EU and its democratic deficit that reduce the legitimacy of EU's foreign policies and the hegemonic neo-liberalism that preserve the interests of markets as a EU's foreign priority. The WUI hypothesis suggests that these two combined factors are highly responsible for the lack of coherence and effectiveness in EU's foreign policy. The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region constitutes a powerful analytical framework to validate the weak-uncoordinated-instrumental EU's foreign policy and the complex democratic deficit that nourishes it. From our standpoint, the civilian power' rhetoric applied in foreign affairs does not work properly since foreign issues are mainly in the hands of the Member States —with its nuances-, impeding a strictly "civilian power" strategy committed to defend democracy and human rights, while it is not backed by European citizens in a truly democratic parliament. It is true that the EU is a union of states, but also of citizens who directly elect the European Parliament and the Council representing the states. Yet the European Parliament does not fulfil the typical functions of what we understand as a Parliament in a Montesquieu's sense. This democratic deficit, typical of the EU institutions, frequently transforms crucial issues that would require citizens' legitimation, i.e. foreign policy, in States issues, which partially explain why accountability within the EU is diffuse, without clearly defining who oversees what. The aforementioned results in poor external coordination, which not only reinforces the internal tensions in the implementation of national foreign policies, but aboye all, leaves the most powerful member states as the only actors in the design and implementation of foreign policy, which conditions its effectiveness and coherence. This is aggravated by the hegemonic influence of neoliberal prescriptions in EU foreign policies. Not only is the lack of lofty agreements regarding accountability within the EU that is weakening its international role as a one-voice global power. The rise and establishment of neoliberal narratives —"market first"— have favoured the instrumentalist character of EU foreign policy, putting financial and oligarchist interests groups in the forefront of foreign policy priorities, minimizing the "civilian power" character attributed to the international role of the EU in the world. The separation between citizens and institutions, as well as the institutional determinacy to favour market liberalisation, have the effect of being counterproductive for EU's interest, and nourishes a self-defeating narrative within its Member States that a coherent (one-voice) European foreign policy is not possible. We explore the idea of a "post-sovereign" Europe through the analysis of the EU's foreign policy, a traditional "Weberian" policy retained by nation-states, which at least partially explains the WUI hypothesis. Undoubtedly, the vision of Habermas is certainly inspiring. He has insistently presented the EU as an innovative "post-national 307 limitaciones de la Unión en materia de política exterior. Estas limitaciones convierten la capacidad exterior de la UE en un instrument politico débil, descoordinado e instrumental (WUI). Esto es particularmente relevante en la region del Oriente Próximo y el Norte de África, que constituye un marco analítico para estudiar la hipótesis WUI. Para entender el déficit democrático de la Unión y la financiarización, estudiamos las fuentes de legitimación directa e indirecta que dejan a la ciudadanía europea en una posición secundaria y subordinada, socavando la legitimación democrática en la UE. Keywords: European foreign policy, Democratic deficit, Financialisation, Arab Spring. Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lambo y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019 Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies constellation" with a coherent constitutional structure —although still insufficiently democratic— that exceeds classic characteristics of national sovereignty 2 . But contrary to Habermas, who considers that the EU cannot be disassociated from its nation-state foundations —as they act as a legitimate source of democracy, solidarity and power control—, we think that this disassociation from national sovereignty is feasible and desirable. This justification of the Weberian nation-state that worked when Europe was in its formative stage is no longer sufficed. Even if the integration process has been primarily driven by endogenous development, the situation has reversed today and exogenous factors — globalisation, migration, climate change, digitalisation — are now the principal drivers of the EU. In a world where some authoritarian regimes are gaining international economic and political influence, where different rising regional powers worldwide are deliberately searching increased military power and counting on a marked polarisation in the international relations sphere, the current EU system is too weak and divided to play a leading role in globalisation. In this context, one of the most urgent questions Europeans face today is whether the EU can be realistically restructured into a more efficient, unified and democratic system. This question goes beyond rhetoric exercises of intellectual reflection to adopt a concrete demanding form: how does the EU need to be reshaped to overcome the current economic crisis and to play a leading role in favouring inclusiveness inside and outside Europe? A post-sovereign Europe that is not able to address its own foreign policy priorities cannot play any international role. The alternative is to remain an uncoordinated and weak political entity, where no single nation has sufficient power to be taken seriously on the international stage, and where the United States has an effective veto power over the basic decisions that Europeans might want to take to protect their own interest. It is not about assuming the prerogatives of the nation states in a Morgan's sense of constituting the United States of Europe' in a seeming way to that of the United States of America or other nation states typical of the nineteenth century 3 (Morgan, 2005), but rather those of a new political entity decidedly democratic, prosperous and cosmopolitan in the Beck's sense. The main purpose of this paper is to provide insights on the negative consequences of this strategy and to provide arguments in favour of a much more democratic, coherent and one-voice foreign policy. For achieving such coherence, much more determinacy and cohesion are needed. In this paper, we will analyse this lack of determinacy and cohesion in the Arab Spring context. For that, we will explain first the democratic deficit as one of the main factors which explains this lack of cohesion and determinacy in the EU foreign policy. 2. J. HABERMAS, The crisis of the European Union: A response, Polity, Cambridge, 2012. 3. G. MORGAN, The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005. 308 II. EU'S FOREIGN POLICY The EU's foreign policy is multifaceted and multi-method 4 , frequently described as a "superpower", "normative power" or "civilian power" which offers a "compelling set of alternatives" 5 to influence other countries in a more advanced way than other superpowers such as the United States, China or Russia. Yet, foreign affairs were never conceived for retaining domestic foreign policy competences in exclusivity. Although most international problems are solved more efficiently with a common policy 6 , the Union has not such exclusivity, and Member States have incentives to free ride 7 . Furthermore, the EU lacks the necessary coherence and effectiveness to consolidate an integrated-common foreign policy. Coherence in foreign affairs is determined by policy determinacy and political cohesion, namely how clearly a policy adopted by the EU articulates the Union's goals and how narrowly it specifies the behaviours incumbent upon EU Member States and institutions to achieve those goals 8 . The EU shows serious limitations in determinacy and cohesion. Responsibilities and accountability are diffuse at the European level, not being clear who oversees what in external policy decisions. This situation of lack of accountability leads to a scarce determinacy at a European level. Moreover, domestic politicians tend to use the EU as an excuse to avoid any national accountability on the international relations. Member States which have been taking a single foreign policy approach use the EU as an excuse to not comply with minimum standard?. National governments have been using the EU in order to explain why they do not govern on the way they would desire. This undermines the objective of providing effective external policy outputs which Member States could not deliver individually, in accordance with the subsidiarity principie, and become a kind of self-absorbed structure without real commitment to ensure international security and the values of the EU'''. It follows from all the aboye that the lack of legitimation is already a critical issue, with most European citizens (aboye 70%) in favour of acting jointly with other member states to solve some of the most important challenges that the EU is dealing with, given the new geopolitical scenario nowadays. They support stronger coordination in external policies and more determined action plans to ensure democracy outside Europe (73%, a significant increase regarding 68% in 2015). 4. S. KEUKELEIRE & T. DELREUX, The Foreign Policy..., ob. cit. 5. K.E. SMITH, European Union foreign policy in a changing world, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 2013. 6. C. BICKERTON, European Union foreign policy: from effectiveness to functionalily, Springer, Berlin, 2015. 7. S. KEUKELEIRE & T. DELREUX, The Foreign Policy..., ob. cit. 8. D. C. THOMAS, "Still Punching Below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy", Journal of Common Market Studies, 50, 3 (2012) pp. 457-474. 9. S. KEUKELEIRE & T. DELREUX, The Foreign  ob. cit. 10. C. BLANCO StO-LOPEZ, Designing scenarios on Inclusive Globalisation: Europe 2020 and the Social Dimension of EU's External Policy, Peter Lang, Bélgica, 2017. 309 11 72 1111 14 23 III ti • By acting yointly yirth  By acting indwidually  Oont know the other Member States Eurobarometer 2017 s Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lamba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres Q4  Severa' important events have taken place in the world in recent months. For each of them, tell me whether the interests of (OUR COUNTRY) would be better taken into account by acting jointly with the other EU Member States or by acting individually. (96) The grovong instability in the Arab-Mushm world The increasmg power and influence of Chrna CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies than in 2015) declare that their country's voice is important in the EU 12 . However, while 93% of the Germans declare that, only 17% of the Greeks agree. This difference may influence the degree in which Europeans desire a more active role of the EU. Only 22% of the Greeks tend to trust EU institutions and merely 48% of them feel that they are a citizen of the EU 13 . Improving these percentages on the countries whose population feel underrepresented may improve the trustiness on the EU and the desire of a single voice which represents every country. These differences among countries are also observable in the desire of interventionism of the EU in foreign policy. Only 35% of the Danish population want a more active role of EU foreign policy, whereas 75% of the Spaniards desire it 14 . While some differences are explained by cultural values, others may be explained by the feeling that the EU represents their national interests and not only the interest of some powerful countries. Q12.3 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? The inc reassng power and intluenceot Russia  The election of the new President of the United States, Donaid Trump  64  Brekit  63 Figure 1 Moreover, EU Member States do not share common interests per se, and some of them use the EU to enforce a self-interested foreign policy, which results in the imposition of powerful States' interests over the rest. The "logic of diversity" within the EU" could block agreements which were not fitting with the interests of the superpowers. At a European level, a logic of interdependence exists that limits collective actions, or creates collective actions that punish the least influential European countries. It is not surprising then that Europeans are divided on how important their countries are in influencing European issues. 63% of Europeans (a 2% higher percentage (OUR COUNTRY)'s voice counts in the EU (%) 110% 70% 44441c,111 Ato. .. 44 1 n1.11 '111,49,4 4 4 4 0nn't firmw 61 61 60% SO% 40% 34 34 30 11 30% 20% 10% in«  Sr tris  'dar 2M. , ,3¿4 Eurobarometer 2017 Figure 2 Traditionally, the most common and integrated instrument for the EU's foreign policy had been the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), an instrument that was focused on the more for more' approach: fostering the allowance of funding to the okk Jone 201.19  May211 r) 12. EUROBAROMETER, European Commission, 2017. 13. EUROBAROMETER, European Commission, 2017. 14. EUROBAROMETER, European Commission, 2017. 11. K.E. SMITH, European Union foreign... ob.cit. Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lomba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres C .  CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies strategic partners of the European Union, but also facilitating the provision of visas and trade opportunities in exchange of democratic reforms 15 . This more for more' approach, lacking a fundamental aspect as is the one regarding security, and specifically, regional security, is an illustrative point of the soft approach that the European Union has had towards its neighbours. The European foreign policy is scarcely backed by a real agreement among several European powers 16 , or a wider agreement among their citizens because of the democratic deficit that reduces the necessary European coordination and legitimacy to face the various international challenges, such as the "Arab Spring" or the refugee crisis in the last decade. All these constraints and limitations based upon the lack of determinacy and cohesion have been dramatically present in the last refugee crisis, in which almost every State has tried to free ride. This has been the situation in spite of a majority of European citizens thinking that the EU should play a more important role on improving democracy in the Arab-Muslim world. Most of the EU countries have played roles managing the crisis without attending public opinion. This situation has been paradigmatic in two countries, Germany and Spain, but has also been present in all EU Member States, and responds to the incentives created by the weak institutional framework of the EU. European policies diverged from voter preferences in many circumstances 17 , and the EU foreign policy is one of the most dramatic examples. Specifically, 73% of the Europeans think that a coordinated action of the EU could be more effective than an individual action 18 . Although the Arab Spring has been a complex process which is difficultly understood by European public opinion, there is a core belief that more can be done. Meanwhile, the European Union is seen generally favorably by the world, except by Arab population 19 . A more comprehensive approach to the Arab-Muslim world may improve this wide perception. All these things suggest that the EU's foreign policy does not reflect the interest of the European citizens nor the consensual interest of the member states, which result in a Weak, Uncoordinated and Inefficient foreign policy (WUI Hypothesis). These three concepts reinforce each other in the context of a rather undefined institutional nature of the EU, taking into account its democratic deficit and the context of neoliberal hegemony. 15. J. HAHN, "Stronger Neighbourhood, Stronger Partnerships: A Revised European Neighbourhood Policy", European Foreign Affairs Review, 21, 1 (2016), págs. 1-4. 16. R. KAGAN, "Power and weakness", Policy Review, 113 (2007), págs. 1-10. 17. K. D. AZMAN, "The problem of "democratic deficit" in the European Union", International lournal of Humanities and Social Science, 1, 5 (2011), págs. 242-250. 18. EUROBAROMETER, European Commission, 2017. 19. M. ISANI & D. SILVERMAN, "Foreign Policy Attitudes toward Islamic Actors: An Experimental Approach", Political Research Quarterly, 69, 3 (2016), págs. 571-582. III. THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE EU AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT The debate on the institutional nature of the EU has been present since its beginning, and it is closely related with a perceived democratic deficit. For most researchers, it is clear that the EU is more than a standard International Organisation, but less than a European super-state' (such as could be the proclaimed United States of Europe). However, between these two points there are many possibilities, and there is no consensus on how the nature of the EU should be defined 20 . For most of the researchers, it is clear that the EU is not a federal state, even though it has many of the attributes of those kind 21 (Méndez, 2014). The EU lacks fundamental mechanisms and competencies to be considered a federal state, such as the non-existence of a substantial common European budget and the difficulties to change the EU constitutional rules. The Lisbon Treaty transferred some competences to the EU institutions, achieving greater level of cohesion, but it failed to reach all the potentialities of the EU, which is still an "Unidentified Political Object" for many researchers and politicians 22 . Therefore, although frequently presented as a case of non-state supranational political system, the EU is not yet the "Super-state or European Nation State" proposed by Morgan 23 (2005), the Post-national stateless system of Habermas or the Cosmopolitan Europe of Beck 24 . It is closer to a "club of nations" highly tied to the political and emotional relationship with the end of the Second World War, projecting the European Union as an aggregation of nations to guarantee peace and cooperation. It is true that the EU is a system of supranational institutions like the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament or the European Central Bank, which have supremacy over the national legal systems 25 . This supremacy of European Law and its associated rule-making processes are granted without the traditional coercive means of Weberian " legitimate-use-of-violence" type. These coercive means are retained by member states in a cooperative manner and decoupled from rule-making processes since national courts implement European Law. Then, the intergovernmental cooperation scheme highlights the national parliament's role in the EU, seeking to reinforce the sovereignty of the member states. From 20. J. MCCORMICK, Understanding the European Union: a concise introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014. 21. F. MENDEZ, M. MENDEZ, & V. TRIGA, Referendums and the European Union: A comparative inquiry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. 22. J. ZIELONKA, Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 23. G. MORGAN, The Idea of a European Superstate..., ob.cit. 24. U. BECK, "Reinventing Europe-a cosmopolitan vision", in Cosmopolitanism and Europe (C. RUMFORD), Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2007. 25. J. HASIC, The role of fecleralist structure of the European Union in facilitating the elimination of the EU democratic deficit (Doctoral dissertation, Masarykova univerzita, Fakulta sociálních studií), Brno, 2011. Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lamba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres this perspective, the indirect legitimacy provided by national governments would be enough to legitimate EU decisions. This situation of "supremacy through indirect legitimation" that remains Schmidt's formulation that the European Union makes "policy without politics"" creates a situation in which supremacy is exercised without traditional means of control and legitimation. This supremacy via indirect legitimation is what explains why the EU in its current stage cannot substitute national political institutions. It does need the indirect legitimation of the Weberian Member States to keep operating in institutional contexts with no clear division of competentes, which explains why democratisation is difficult to achieve. This lack of democratisation is relevant for the perceived democratic deficit that many researchers find in the EU. For some researchers, the debate on the European Democratic Deficit is misplaced". They think that the appearance of EU administration's illegitimacy is due to the activities it carries out and the complexities of the process of integration 28 . However, from our point of view the EU Democratic Deficit exists and it is mainly focused on several axes such as the absence of accountability of the European Commission, the weakness of the European Parliament", the lack of a mechanism to democratically monitor the policy making of the European Union" and the lack of communication and transparency with European citizenship 31 . European elections repeatedly prove that they have been increasingly taken as "second-order national contests"". Turnout in European Parliament election is lower than in national elections, and voting has traditionally been made on national issues". Generally, there is scarce knowledge of the different organs, functions and responsibilities of the European Union, which partially fuels the lack of accountability. This democratic deficit has consequences for the EU's foreign policy. There is a demand of information on different subjects related with foreign policy. EU citizens declare to need more information on the fight against terrorism, the issue of migration, the security and defense policy and the promotion of democracy and peace in CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies the world. However, many of those Europeans think that their voice does not count in the EU. More worryingly, 50% of the Europeans declare that "things are going in the wrong direction" 34 . Traditionally, Europeans have demanded a more coordinated and united foreign policy. Therefore, the goodness of an EU-united-foreign policy is backed by the public opinion. This lack of coordination may be one of the most pernicious consequences of the EU's democratic deficit. When Europeans have been asked whether they support a common foreign policy or not, they have clearly said that they are for it. Also, they have stated an expectation for a more interventionist approach. It can be seen in the next graph: Q2.3 And for each of the following, would you like the European Union to intervene Iess than at present or more than at present? More than at present (%) .2 • 1 -5 " 1 •3 *3 *A 4 4 .* 1111111111111111111 1111' 1111 : 11 =  mmilis ti= 4- tr. = me I I I I N II In 1 ro :: = .. me = = os SE h. I: ES ( Y  SI  , I  11 tL  11  45  II  4.. LU 1r  SE f40 LUIS MI DI  It  9G Sl  «I P. VI hl ...i 11 U« lt L« (Evolution April 2016 / Mardi 2017) Eurobarometer 2017 26. V.A. SCHMIDT, Democracy in Europe: The EU and national polities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 27. A. MORAVCSIK, "Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union", Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 4 (2002), págs. 603-624. 28. A. FOLLESDAL & S. HIX, "Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik", Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 3 (2006), págs. 533-562. 29. S. HIX, What's Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix it, Polity Press, Malden, 2013. 30. K. D. AZMAN, The problem of "democratic deficit"..., ob.cit., págs. 242-250. 31. J. H. KAMLAGE & P. NANZ, "Crisis and participation in the European Union: energy policy as a test bed for a new politics of citizen participation", Global Society, 31, 1 (2017), págs. 65-82. 32. P. NORRIS & K. REIF, "Second-order elections", European Journal of Political Research, 31, 1 (1997), págs. 109-124. 33. H. G. BOOMGAARDEN, D. JOHANN, & S. KRITZINGER, "Voting at national versus European elections: An individual level test of the second order paradigm for the 2014 European Parliament elections", Politics and Governance, 4, 1 (2016), págs. 130-144. Figure 3 As it can be seen, European common policies diverged from voters' preferences 35 . This is clear in foreign policy. There is no real communication, transparency and thus accountability in the European foreign policy decision-making. The States are divided, and the approach of acting individually without consulting EU institutions is usual. The inability of the European Neighborhood Policy for bringing democracy to neighboring countries proves the limited effectiveness of following up conflicting goals 36 . This 34. EUROBAROMETER, European Commision, 2017 35. K. D. AZMAN, The problem of "democratic deficit"..., ob.cit., págs. 242-250. 36. T. A. BORZEL, & V. VAN HÜLLEN, "One voice, one message...", ob. cit., págs. 1033-1049. 314  315 Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lomba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres could be improved if the European Parliament strengthens its powers, providing a real accountability to the decision-making process. If the European Parliament can act as a real parliament, the incentives of the national actors in foreign policy could change. So as to advancing toward the one-voice external policy, a more robust sense of ownership over EU foreign policy among Member States should be promoted. As an example, the High Representative could commission group of ministers of foreign affairs for carrying on missions on EU's behalf 37 . Moreover, civil society should play a bigger role for improving at the same time the democratic deficit and the common foreign policy. A more comprehensive debate between the High Representative and member states over the role of EU's foreign policy should be launched. As additional measures, an improvement of European governance could provide some advancements on this subject. An increase of the budget, which could go along with the improvement of the accountability processes, could also be desirable to comply with foreign policy objectives. Some authors have stated that if the EU has a single voice but conflicting goals, the foreign policy will neither be cohesive nor consistent 3 e. For that reason, it would be necessary to increase cooperation in all the different levels, to avoid any possible conflict of interest between Member States. While these reforms are not introduced and EU foreign policy does not follow up the public opinion and its proclaimed objectives, it will be incapable to act decisively and coordinately in world affairs". The single voice scheme has been used in international trade agreements within World Trade Organisation, but not in foreign policy 40 . The EU's democratic deficit undermines not only EU's legitimacy but also the possibilities of acting as a single actor in its international relations 41 . IV. ECONOMIC FINANCIALISATION AND LEGITIMATION The end of the Cold War and the triumph of neo-liberalism have reinforced the idea that the consolidation of the Single Market is the most practical and ultimate European political project. Although the process of European integration was driven by the thought that Europe needed a large single market, the EU has always followed a distinctively tradition often referred to as the "Social Model". Yet, the last decades have seen the expansion of commodification and a sharp asymmetry in favour of policies promoting "market-building" over "market-correcting" in line with mainstream neo-liberal prescriptions. 37. S. LEHNE, EU-Actor or Toolbox? How Member States Perceive the EU's Foreign Policy, Carnegie Europe, Brussels, 2013. 38. T. A. BÓRZEL, & V. VAN HÜLLEN, "One voice, one message, but conflicting goals: cohesiveness and consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy", Journal of European Public Policy 21 (2014), págs. 1033-1049. 39. C. BICKERTON, European Union foreign policy..., ob. cit. 40. M. CARBONE, & J. ORBIE, "Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: the European Union and the trade-development nexus", Contemporary Politics, 20, 1 (2014), págs. 1-9. 41. T. A. BORZEL, & V. VAN HÜLLEN, "One voice, one message...", art.cit.. CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies This preference for "market-building" over "market-correcting" policies is conditioning the EU's position in the international organisation of global governance. EU's external actions are increasingly coherent, not necessarily coherent in favour of social objectives: "it seems that other preoccupations, in particular market enhancing approaches, are clearly influential in the EU's external policies" 42 . In the same vein, economic integration is the main concern of EU's enlargement in 2004 and the social objectives have been frequently subjected to domestic interpretation. Even if the EU's socio-economic model and ILO's "Core Labour Standards", "Decent Work Agenda" and "Social Floor Agenda" are mutually reinforcing, the observance of these agendas tend to be undermined by requirements to enhance market and trade provision under the Lisbon Treaty and under agreements with WTO, WB or IMF. The compliance of EU with ILO collective bargaining standards is undermined by the priority given to individual market freedoms and market integration inside the EU and in preference agreements with third countries. Other issues such as gender equality are widely accepted and promoted internal and externally because it is consistent with the productivity logic of the internal market and the competitive agendas. This is why the EU also exerts "supremacy through direct legitimation". It is the legitimation that steams from the financial and other multinational companies' interests. From the standpoint of Ramos 43 , the oil crises in the 70s, the end of the Cold War in the 80s, the hegemony of neo-liberal doctrines during the 90s and the 2007 financial crisis have consolidated large-scale commodification, financial liberalisation, and the entrenchment of pro-capital distribution policies as the foundation of a new economic order. This new order has also changed the relations of power. A new ruling class has emerged with enough power to launch a "there-is-no-alternative" narrative that imposes two apparently contradictory demands on governments: "laissez faire" to expand and consolidate competitive free markets, but also strong state intervention to compensate for the risk of default. This rhetoric of "there is no alternative to capitalism" has easily penetrated the EU. In fact, the European Council is already acting as the central steering body to impose austerity policies by threatening sanctions, pressuring disempowered national parliaments, and compelling governments to impose any manner of pro-capital reforms against the resistance of their citizens. This combination of financial crisis and authoritarian austerity is seriously damaging the legitimacy of the EU. Following Habermas' explanation scheme of original crisis of legitimation, Streeck 44 (2014) suggests that the current crisis in the EU consists of four interrelated 42. M. CARBONE, & J. ORBIE, Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements..., ob. cit., págs. 1-9. 43. J. RAMOS, "The EU Facing Globalisation and the Financial Crisis. The Europe 2020 Strategy and the Definitive Triumph of Commodification in Europe", in J. RAMOS and E. DEL CAMPO (eds.), Austerity and the Implementation of the E-2020 Strategy in Spain, Peter Lang Eds, Bélgica, 2017. 44. W. STREECK, Buying time: The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism, Verso Books, London, 2014. Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lamba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres crises: a banking crisis, a state fiscal crisis, a real economic crisis, and a legitimation crisis. Similarly, 0ffe 45 y 46 puf forward three interrelated components that help to explain the current situation of the EU, namely the political economy of the Eurozone and its dynamics, an inadequate institutional shell of EU polity and its democratic quality, and a widespread public disenchantment with the narratives about what Europe is good for and the purposes that would make further integration intrinsically desirable. This is the real dilemma, or to be precise, trilemma the EU is coping with. European institutions exert supremacy in various key economic and political spheres through the direct legitimation of the financial sector and the indirect legitimation of the member states, with European citizens playing a minor and secondary role. This is the real handicap of the European Integration Process, namely how to reinforce the democratic role of the EU by transforming the source of direct legitimation from the financial sector to the European citizens. Such a situation has a significant effect on the European Foreign policy as well as the lack of an active-one-voice in globalisation. Although the determination of the EU to manage globalisation is undisputable, it is also clear that the current European foreign policies have resulted insufficiently able to consolidate a coordinated position to project upon global institutions in favour of an inclusive globalisation. On the contrary the increasing coherence observed in the last decades has been to the detriment of the social dimension of globalisation. Even if the EU socio-economic model and ILO "Core Labour Standards", "Decent Work Agenda" and "Social Floor Agenda" are mutually reinforcing, the observante of these agendas tend to be undermined by requirements to enhance market and trade freedom in agreements with WTO, WB or IMF, or in preference agreements with third countries. What characterised the EU's external policy is the absence of a coherent and coordinated action plan, the lack of a unitary EU representative role in the global arena and the priority given to free trade agreements, which decisively acts as a distancing policy-making device from the EU's founding principies of solidarity and socioeconomic cohesion 47 . Blanco suggests converting the Europe-2020 Strategy to a key flagship of EU's foreign policy to impact on the applicability of a social dimension of globalisation. Indeed, EU's externa! dimension cannot be separated from the European Integration Process because our key domestic problems have only global solutions. V. THE EU'S RESPONSE TO THE ARAB SPRING Although the EU has historically promoted the empowerment of democracy and civil rights as one of its most recognisable features in its foreign policy, it has failed 45. C. OFFE, Ungovemability. In Fragile Stabilitát-stabile Fragilitát, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Suiza, 2013, págs. 77-87. 46. C. OFFE, "Europe entrapped", European Law Joumal, 19, 5 (2013), págs. 595-611. 47. C. BLANCO SfO-LOPEZ, Designing scenarios on Inclusive Globalisation..., ob.cit. CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies to address the regional crises in its doorstep in the last years. The EU's foreign policy has been uncoordinated, instrumental and weak, with Member States taking totally different decisions and pursuing domestic interests instead of plural, common ones. The EU has yet to prove its legitimacy as a cohesive actor in the midst of fundamental transformations and in the wake of increasingly complex and challenging external political contexts, such as that of the Middle East and Northern Africa region (MENA), where the superpowers of the Sykes-Picot order (1916) —France and the United Kingdom— have acted according to their unilateral interests and priorities and not those of the 28 Member States, even if such interventions or actions have not been in line with the principies that the EU has historically raised, leading to an uncoherent, uncoordinated and undetermined EU approach. The so-called Arab Spring portrays the European approach to some of the most notable crises in the neighbouring countries as weak, uncoordinated and instrumental. In the outburst of the revolts, when the civil societies of countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria or Libya stood up against their autocratic leaders demanding more civil liberties and an improvement of their life conditions, the EU as a whole played —and is still playing— a role of irrelevance. The EU's initial response to the Arab Spring has demonstrated the usual cacophony among EU Member States and the weak, uncoordinated and instrumental (WUI) characters of EU external policies. The predominante of acquiescence, disguised as neutrality' in some cases, is responsible of the current irrelevant role of the EU in the zone, by putting the necessary action in accordance with the local civil demands in the hands of the most powerful member states of the EU, who in turn have acted according to their unilateral interests regarding the region 48 . In all the referred cases, specific security and economic interests, special' ties and considerations pertaining to domestic politics motivated the Member States' reactions to the Arab Spring 49 , and not the defence of civil rights or democratic demands. From our standpoint, the capacity of some of the most powerful States in the European Union to impose their foreign policy priorities against the logic of the European Union's values responds to two main factors. Firstly, the support that comes from the financial system being the most notable one, since the actions and attitudes that have been shown from these superpowers in countries such as Libya or Tunisia respond to a subordination of democracy and civil rights, favouring the long-lasting economic and financial interests of national or regional corporations and interest groups. Secondly, the power balances in the European Council favour the attitudes of regional superpowers imposing or pursuing their unilateral interests and priorities, subsequently undermining the defence, promotion and consolidation of the democratic values that have been the flagship of EU's external action. 48. T. HENOKL & A. STEMBERGER, "EU Policies in the Arab World: Update and Critical Assessment", European Foreign Affairs Review, 21, 2 (2016), págs. 227-249. 49. R. DEL SARTO, "Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the Arab Spring", Journal of Common Market Studies, 54, 2 (2015), págs. 215-232. Javier Ramos Díaz, Juan Lomba y Javier Padilla Moreno-Torres CJH 16-17 • 2018-2019  Democratic deficit, financialisation and european foreign policies These two factors enforce the hypothesis of the lack of a supranational coherent and coordinated logic in the EU. The financial system backing the unilateral interventions promoted in the MENA in the last decade by countries such as France and the U.K. portray a financial backing of national coherence —according to long-standing historical interests in the region-. The power balances in the European Council only reinforce the national coherence that these States have historically built. This leads to an uncoordinated logic in the European Council and an array of institutions where the national interests are primarily sought, leading to a state of weakness, incoordination and instrumentality in EU foreign policies, who ultimately sees itself as an unable manager in the crisis at its doorstep. In addition, the lines of action pursued by the powerful States also reinforce the perceived democratic deficit, insofar it follows neoliberal stances and not that of the majority of their citizenship. These citizens show themselves as openly favourable to the defence of enforcing democracy and civil rights in the countries that underwent the revolts of the Arab Spring. Yet, citizenship plays a minor, secondary role in favour of the economic and financial sector that have ultimately served as the direct legitimation source for foreign policy making. Moreover, the lack of a security dimension in instruments such as the Neighbourhood Policy —until its revision in 2015— illustrates how the European External Action Service of the Union has historically been following a naive, soft and uncoordinated approach regarding its neighbours. By contrast, domestic foreign policies carried out by Member States with historical ties and interests in the region were diametrically different from the supra-national, soft point of view 50 . The EU has historically focused on the establishment of stronger economic relations in exchange of democratic reforms, lacking a multipolar approach that needed to take the socio-political circumstances into account. The EU, with its focus on developing economic ties in its neighbouring countries, and its inability to move from the national to the coordinated supranational course of action, has failed to address the Northern African crises. The immediate aftermath of the first revolts constitute a very symbolic picture of how some of the most powerful EU members behaved in favour of the authoritarian regimes, in accordance to their national interests and disregarding the common, integrated scope that the EU should strive for. Mohammed Bouazizi's immolation in Ben Arous, Tunisia in 2011, on January the 4th, unleashed a regional movement of protests within the Muslim-Arab world, commanded by new political actors that demanded socio-economic improvements and civil rights reforms to pave the way to democracy in their countries. Tunisia triggered what would be a domino effect' in the region: after its citizens stood up to Ben Ali, other societies in the region would follow up. In the awe of the social protests in Tunisia, Nicolas Sarkozy and part of his cabinet showed an openly favourable attitude towards the dictator Zine el —Abidine Ben Ali and his repressive regime. The French Republic behaved in a unilateral way in accordance to French long-standing economic and political interests, regardless of the EU's attempt to agree on a "one-voice" response against the repression that Tunisian and international civil and human rights organisations were denouncing with powerful evidences, following the national logic and reinforcing the WUI hypothesis. In Libya, acceptable living standards were provided to its citizens prior to the dismantling of the Muammar al-Qaddafi dictatorship, a leader that Europe could rely on for strategical matters. After a France and UK-led intervention to take the dictator down, and as a result of the conflict, with the assassination of Qaddafi in Sirte, 20th October 2011, the country has drown in a climate of political and economic mayhem, without a foreseeable end of the civil war that would allow Libya return to the status of a functional state 51 . The current political climate of Libya is that of a failed state. Nowadays, the country itself is a challenge for the European Union, firstly because it has turned into a hotbed for terrorism and destabilisation, and secondly because of the establishment of human trafficking routes that worsen the refugee and migrants' crisis that has affected the MENA and the bordering countries of Europe for the last years 52 . The actions commanded by the UK and France through the NATO mechanisms for intervening in Libya show how the EU has been unable to provide a coordinated cohesive, plural and strong stance regarding the issue, where the domestic interests of the regional superpowers have prevailed instead of those of the 28 Member States. Furthermore, the creation of European solid efforts for solving the crisis in Libya have been eclipsed by the intervention of the French Republic's President, Emmanuel Macron. Resolute to put the Libyan crisis to an end and bring the country to the status of a functional state, France has put all of its efforts in solving the crisis in a unilateral way, leading the diplomatic talks for national reconciliation, instead of considering the empowerment of a 28-State diplomatic approach led by the European External Action Service (FEAS). In Egypt, when Mohammed Mursi —a democratically elected leader— was thrown out of power by a military coup d'État commanded by Abdelfatah al-Sisi on the 3rd of July, 2012, the lack of a "one-voice" European policy allowed third parties, such as the Russian Federation, to play a much more active role in the region, becoming the main support for the dictatorial figure of Al-Sisi. Moreover, and despite being historically outspoken in favour of democratic transitions, after the removal of a democratically elected leader in Egypt, the EU did not cease to cooperate with the al-Sisi regime in different matters, keeping its economic 51. J. HAHN, "Stronger Neighbourhood, Stronger Partnerships..... 50. J. HAHN, "Stronger Neighbourhood, Stronger Partnerships...", ob.cit.  52. T. HENOKL & A. STEMBERGER, "EU Policies in the Arab World: Update and Critical Assessment "