Labour inspection after the civil war in Spain.Regulatory interventionism and abstentionistlabour inspection performance

Labour inspection after the civil war in Spain. Regulatory interventionism and abstentionist labour inspection performance Author: Marcial Sánchez-Mosquera Affiliation for each author (university, place): Department of Economics and Economic History, University of Seville, Seville, Spain. Email address: [email protected] Full postal address: Facultad de Ciencias del Trabajo, Enramadilla 18, 41018 – Sevilla (Sevilla). España. Keywords (minimum 4, maximum 7): Fascism, Francoism, Industrial Relations, Labour Inspectorate, Labour institutions, Spain. Abstract This paper focuses on something not previously addressed by the literature, labour inspection in Spain in the first decades of the Franco dictatorship. Despite the Franco dictatorship’s fascist-style approach of regulatory interventionism, this research shows a relapse into an abstentionist conception of labour inspection that led to worker vulnerability. The study has not only found, as was already known, normative similarities with the contemporaneous Italian and German dictatorships, but also similar (although more severe) limitations to the functioning of the inspection service. The slight improvement registered from 1947 onwards and the effort to achieve a limited equivalence with Western democracies also failed to notably improve working conditions, occupational safety and worker protection. The Labour Inspectorate suffered from understaffing and a lack of resources up to the very end of the dictatorship, something which the incipient democracy then inherited. These human and material resource shortages continue to be a problem and are currently debated in Spain. Introduction The current Spanish industrial relations system has high collective bargaining coverage and consolidated trade unions that participate in electoral processes that affect 60% of employees (Alós et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Spain, like other Southern European countries, also has a relatively high level of informal economy. In this context, the role of the Labour Inspectorate (LI) is often referred to as a guarantee of regulatory compliance and worker protection. Less present, although no less important, is its function of promoting fair competition between companies. However, this service currently experiences significant shortcomings, affecting both social and economic actors and public opinion. In recent years, while this research has been in progress, inspectors have negotiated an increase in resource endowment with the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy in order to modernise the service and increase staff and remuneration. There is a notable disproportion between the inspectorate, with 2,000 inspectors and sub-inspectors, and the magnitude of a labour market comprising 18 million (standardised full-time) jobs and 1.3 million companies (Dirección del Organismo Estatal Inspección de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 2022). This chronic deficit of resources has impeded an efficient inspection service, a problem which goes back in time, covering the entire democratic period. This paper addresses this concern through a study of the LI under the dictatorship. It examines how the remote antecedents of this institution may help understand this problem as a legacy of a troubled path initiated during the dictatorship, as was the case with other institutions such as collective bargaining (Sánchez-Mosquera, 2022; Sola, 2014). It could be imagined that labour regulation institutions under dictatorships have a more limited function than in social democracies (Pérez-Espinosa Sánchez, 1977; Symons, 1953). However, on the contrary, fascist-type regimes such as the Spanish dictatorship have demonstrated strong economic interventionism and a notable paternalism committed, at least in propaganda terms, to the protection of workers and their families. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had already set similar precedents (Nützenadel, 2020; Pavanelli & Bianchi, 2020). Taking into account the above and the literature on the LI in the Second Republic (Díaz Rodríguez, 2006; Navarro López & Viloria Fuentes, 2006; Viloria Fuentes, 2023), the main aim of this paper is to examine this institution in the first twenty years of the Franco dictatorship. From 1960, a lack of sources has limited the study to regulatory changes and the composition of the inspectorate. Moreover, this study fits in with the analysis of other Francoist institutions such as the Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo), the Organización Sindical Española (Babiano, 1998) and the dictatorship’s social policy (Pons-Pons & Vilar-Rodríguez, 2012; Vilar-Rodríguez & Pons-Pons, 2020), an analysis which has verified the scant protection afforded to workers by all of these. With this background, the paper examines the design and organisation of the LI, and the practices and efficiency of this institution, and explores institutional and regulatory changes that have taken place. The initial premise contemplates the deterioration of an under-developed service and limited worker protection, but this needs to be analysed and estimated in a critical fashion. This paper argues that the LI, lacking resources, offered little protection for workers. However, it also reveals the use companies made of the LI’s role in economic competition, and compares the Spanish LI with its Italian and German fascist referents, which also had important failings in their inspection services. An insufficient development of the Spanish LI throughout the entire dictatorship is evident, and which was then bequeathed to the ensuing democracy. In fact, labour inspection continued to be governed by Law 228/1963, of 28 December, on integration and modification of labour inspectorate staff, until it was reshaped more than thirty years later by Law 42/1997, of 14 November, regulating labour and social security inspection. To achieve the proposed objectives, this paper subsequently sets out the conceptual and theoretical framework of work and labour inspection. It takes into consideration different political regimes and emphasises fascist institutions, given their regulatory implications for the origins and essence of the Spanish dictatorship. In the next section the sources consulted are indicated, and their limitations. The literature has made it possible to introduce the antecedents of the LI in Spain up to the civil war, which is obviously important in order to assess the changes brought about by the Franco dictatorship. This is followed by an account of the LI in the first twenty years of the dictatorship, whilst also noting the modest regulatory changes, modernisation and enlargement of the inspectorate in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the results obtained are discussed and some conclusions are drawn. Political regimes, work and labour inspection Labour inspection emerged with the explicit recognition of the asymmetry between capital and labour in the capitalist system, an institutional order that especially respects and protects the rights of private property and freedom of contract. The superior bargaining power of capital is potentially detrimental to workers, but also to society as a whole. For this reason, laws regulating entrepreneurial activity and labour were passed, and compliance was made obligatory. However, labour inspection was also promoted for economic reasons, as it prevents unfair competition between enterprises based on non-compliance with labour standards, especially in relation to wages and working hours (Batista Torres, 2021, p. 51). Labour inspection functions as an administrative policy that acts autonomously and motu proprio, without the need for any complaint or request from workers, prosecutor or court. For the sake of the common good, the basic function of the inspection is to limit activities contrary to established regulations and to impose penalties in the event of such activities. More specifically, the functions of the LI are defined by (a) the control of compliance with labour regulations by means of visiting companies, and, related to this, (b) punitive measures that may be legally contested by the company, and (c) prevention and advice to comply with legal dispositions with the dual aim of protecting workers (diffusion of their rights) and employers (compliance with the law). Information and knowledge are essential. Hence, it is necessary to (d) provide useful information for companies and workers with compilations of regulations and good practices and, more importantly, statistical information on the work of labour inspection itself. A final function, related to the above, is (e) to produce knowledge to suggest improvements of deficiencies detected, by means of regulatory and procedural norms (Mendizábal Bermúdez, 2019, pp. 339-340). This is crucial so that the government can promote legislative changes that improve labour protection (Symons, 1953, p. 56). Labour regulation emerged during the nineteenth century in association with the phenomenon of industrialisation. However, from a regulatory point of view, there was a turning point with the so-called ‘social constitutionalism’ present in the Mexican and German constitutions of 1917 and 1919, respectively. In this respect, the experiences of the First World War and the Russian revolution were decisive as they showed that labour and social conflicts could be a threat to peace within countries and also internationally. In fact, the Versailles Treaty and the system of international security fostered the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) with the aim of preventing violence arising from the oppression of labour and unfair competition between nations via labour costs (Mendizábal Bermúdez, 2019, p. 347). The ILO promoted and disseminated labour inspection with Recommendations number 5 (1919) and 20 (1923) and, above all, Convention number 81 (1947) and Recommendations numbers 81 and 82 (1947), which came into force on 7 April 1950. Spain ratified them, ten years later, on 30 May 1960, after its readmittance in 1956 (it was expelled in 1939 as a fascist regime). Nonetheless, the Franco regime continued not to comply with the principles of freedom of association enshrined by the ILO right up to the very end, and likewise with the emblematic Declaration of Philadelphia and Conventions 87 and 98 (Garrido Palacios, 2021, p. 78) From 1947 onwards, these dispositions reflected the general democratic consensus on the need for the protection and welfare of workers, which reinforced the relevance of labour inspection. Regulatory and practical considerations led to democratic countries coinciding on the need to provide the LI with sufficient means in terms of staffing, budget and mobility (Symons, 1953, pp. 54-55). A lack of resources and, associated to this, corruption have been two recurring impediments over time (Mendizábal Bermúdez, 2019), especially in poor countries and/or non-democratic institutional frameworks. From a theoretical perspective, labour inspection fits in with the recognition of labour protection and the collective rights associated to assembly, association, demonstration and strikes acknowledged in social democracies. In this respect, dictatorial and fascist regimes that spread between the two world wars constituted a conceptual, regulatory and judicial exception. This should be taken into consideration as Spain did not join the wave of democratisation and the expansion of social rights that occurred after the Second World War. These dictatorial regimes allowed private property and were, theoretically, notably interventionist. They established far-ranging constraints to individual and, above all, collective freedoms. These were extremely detrimental to the autonomy of workers and their capacity for collective action and defence, creating a situation of vulnerability. This meant that industrial relations in these countries became subject to state control and increasing judicialisation (Pavanelli & Bianchi, 2020). The theoretical increase in intervention would logically entail interference in the workplace, something which was largely rejected by employers (Petri, 1977). In these dictatorships, labour inspection acquired a certain protective role, but it also led to legal and regulatory changes. Theoretically, the conflict between capital and labour was denied. Accordingly, employers and employees were co-participants in national production and in a work community in a broad and all-encompassing sense (Eden, 2020, pp. 209-210). On the one hand, work and labour were reduced to mere economic facts and workers were expected to work responsibly to contribute to economic growth. On the other hand, the contractual conception of work was left to one side, being replaced by discipline and the ennobling of labour as a contribution to the greatness of the fatherland. The aggressive or warmongering orientation of fascism favoured a militaristic conception of work and labour (Hachtmann, 2020, pp. 115-116). The concept of work community favoured the disempowerment of workers. In Germany, the Law on the Organisation of National Labour authorised work leaders (managers and owners) to establish the working conditions in their companies. Despite the community of interests, German employers, the same as Italian employers, were able to continue coordinating their action through self-governing bodies, business groups, defending their interests collectively (Eden, 2020, p. 211). In Germany, a dual structure was established. One element was bureaucratic, centred on the Ministry of Labour, and included the LI. The other was the German Labour Front, with more ideological functions, which was to exercise control over work and workers. In the case of Italy, despite the presence of fascist trade unions, the trend also favoured state intervention. In both of these countries, the LI was to protect workers by guaranteeing compliance with the regulations, but also, at least in theory, it demanded the fulfilment of their duties. The German Labour Front could also exercise a certain protective and supervisory role, but it never reported the poor functioning of the LI, until at the very end of the war, by which time the LI was virtually ineffective (Hachtmann, 2020, p. 129). Employers, however, complained and showed themselves to be very upset with progressive state interference in the working conditions of companies, which affected the independence of their management. The state fixed working conditions, company personnel, who worked, until when, etc. (Eden, 2020, pp. 229-230). In Spain’s case, it was institutionally and legislatively indebted to Italian and German fascism. The Work Charter (Fuero del Trabajo) of 1938 described work as a right, and also as an obligation to increase national production. Workers and employers were considered to be ‘producers’, with the leadership and explicit command of the employers. There was also an attempt to prevent the commercialisation of the employment relationship, establishing, at least fictitiously, a work community in which employment was guaranteed and wages would cover the basic needs of workers and their families (González Murillo, 2021, pp. 208-209). The figure of the employer as the head of the company (Nazi influence) meant that the immediate control of workers, especially any rebellious employees, was exercised in the first instance by the companies themselves (Babiano, 1998). Gangs or teams of workers became known as ‘militias’, military terminology that implied discipline and submission (Pons-Pons & Vilar Rodríguez, 2012, p. 248). Spanish companies, like Italian and German enterprises, showed a great aversion to state interventionism, as has been shown in the field of social welfare (Vilar-Rodríguez & Pons- Pons, 2020). There was already a notable tradition in this respect. Employers had not only opposed laws protecting workers under the Second Republic, but they had also previously shown themselves to be against the state and corporative intervention of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930) (Prat & Molina, 2014). In Germany and Italy, however, the fascist authorities in fact limited economic intervention and control over companies (Feldman, 2002, p. 7). Similarly, despite the theoretical state interference of the Franco regime, the position of unquestionable hierarchy of companies in the workplace guaranteed complete control and independence for Spanish employers in this respect. The Francoist legal system considered anything that hindered or interrupted national production, and especially strikes, to be crimes against the fatherland. The suppression of joint committees for labour matters, known as jurados mixtos, and free, independent trade unions obviously weakened the position of workers. As in other fascist regimes, their functions were assumed by special employment tribunals and by a corporative union structure (so-called ‘vertical unions’), which included all producers, both employers and employees. The Ministry of Labour took on responsibility for industrial relations and for setting wages under a law on labour regulations - the Ley de Reglamentaciones Laborales (1942) - which governed the world of work and employment relations until the promulgation of the law on collective agreements in 1958 (González Murillo, 2021, p. 206). The Organización Sindical Española (‘vertical trade union’), among other functions, were supposed to defend workers, but they proved to be (almost totally) ineffective (Babiano, 1998, pp. 56-69). A law of 1947, the Ley de Jurados de Empresa, was intended, under the auspices of the vertical unions, to offer a means of conciliation between the interests of capital and labour in large companies. However, its implementing regulation, of 1953, was not actually put into practice until 1956. Employers were against the legislation and the Ministry of Labour was afraid that such jurados (tribunals) could become a means of opposition to the regime, despite the fact that the provincial union delegate could close them. The vertical union was always controlled by Falange Tradicionalista Española y las Juntas Ofensivas Nacional Sindicalista, the single party of the dictatorship. All conflicts had to be channelled through this organisation, which effectively meant containment and control of any worker protests (González Murillo, 2021, p. 207; Pons-Pons & Vilar-Rodríguez, 2012, p. 248). The inability of the vertical union to really represent workers’ interests became quite clear from the late 1950s when militants of Comisiones Obreras (a socio-political movement opposed to the dictatorship) held elected positions on the jurados de empresa. Real union action went beyond the vertical union and activated labour and criminal repression in the form of dismissals, arrests, police torture and sentences handed down by the Tribunal de Orden Público (Sánchez-Mosquera, 2008, pp. 181-220). This did not stop Comisiones Obreras from becoming the main opposition force to the dictatorship or, despite the repression, prevent labour and social conflict from growing in the 1960s and 1970s (Tébar Hurtado & Babiano Mora, 2022). In sum, extremely harsh working and wage conditions were established, although laws ‘protecting’ workers were drawn up, enveloped in paternalistic language as corresponded to these types of regimes (Vilar-Rodríguez & Pons-Pons, 2020, p. 507). Furthermore, the poverty arising from the war and subsequent autarky could lead employers to exploit the workforce in order to compensate for the lack of resources of capital, technology and raw materials and reduced demand (Pons-Pons & Vilar Rodríguez, 2012, p. 245-246). Within this context, the protection of workers was left in the hands of the employment tribunals, the vertical unions and the LI, which, with its own power to impose penalties, was interconnected with the other two institutions. In view of the theoretical and institutional approaches analysed, this paper explores the regulatory and operational changes of the LI during the dictatorship and how these affected the actual performance of the inspectorate. It can be initially assumed that only a limited result was achieved in the protection of workers, but nevertheless a critical analysis and a more complete discussion is proposed. Sources (and their limitations) and analytical approach This study is based on four research sources. The first source is the legislation regulating work, the LI and purges of the inspectorate promulgated in the official state gazette (Boletín Oficial del Estado; BOE) by the Francoist regime. The second source comprises the official statistics of the Ministry of Labour. Only the consultation of LI records from 1943 to 1956 has proved to be useful. Undoubtedly, the period 1939-1942 must have been affected by the war and the immediate postwar period. On the other hand, the compilation of LI records for the 1960s and 1970s is in a very poor state, and the contents are often extremely vague. Unfortunately, these records are of no use, thereby failing to perform one of the most basic functions of the LI which is to provide reliable information for workers and employees. The statistical source, moreover, has further limitations. The BOE itself acknowledges the chaotic situation regarding the preparation and provision of statistics in such sensitive matters as industrial accidents (Vilar-Rodríguez & Pons-Pons, 2020, p. 508). Finally, no less important is the problem posed by the quantification of the number of companies. Only 56,461 are recorded for 1951; whereas in 1943 the official chamber of commerce (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación) in Seville estimated that there were between 20,000 and 22,000 commercial and industrial companies in this province alone1. This lack of reliable data has been described by Carreras & Tafunell (2006, p. 718) as one of the greatest shortcomings of Spanish statistical history. In this regard, the statistics of the Ministry of Labour only refer to the LI internally, without taking into account actual figures for aspects such as real production or the workforce. Such figures would obviously have favoured an analysis of the impact of this service on the Spanish economy. The third source of information comprises the individual files and dossiers of inspectors from the historical archive of the Ministry of Labour (numbers 199,360-199,392 and 198,725- 198,730). This has made it possible to develop a database of 211 officials related to the service. Only the officials who ceased working after 1939 and who, therefore, participated in the service during the dictatorship have been taken into consideration. Limitations to this database due to data protection also restrict the scope of this study. The law prohibits consulting those officials who retired after 1978, in other words, those who joined the inspectorate after 1947. The last source of reference is the archive of Seville Chamber of Commerce, which received circulars from the Spanish High Council of Chambers of Commerce (Consejo Superior de Cámaras de España). This archive (AGCOCISNS. CÁMARA) has been consulted to help estimate the effect of labour inspection on companies. Labour inspection in Spain until the civil war Labour inspection in Spain dates back to 1906, linked to the Institute of Social Reforms and with a predominantly advisory role, and extremely limited punitive powers. The system allowed the free designation of inspectors by the government and police control of social conflict and labour disputes under the authority of civil governors (Martín López, 2006; Pérez- Espinosa Sánchez, 1977, p. 77; Rodríguez-Sañudo, 2003, p. 139). The dominant professional profiles were engineers, doctors (many of them military engineers and doctors) and lawyers, who did not have exclusivity, and combined inspection with other professional activities. Despite the fact that penalties were rare, employers raised their voices from the very beginning to denounce what they considered to be an excessive supervisory zeal which posed a threat to industry (Díaz Rodríguez, 2006, p. 155; Navarro López & Viloria Fuentes, 2006, p. 226). The initial self-imposed limit on applying penalties was further exacerbated by a lack of material and human resources. In 1930, the service had a total of 170 employees (Viloria Fuentes, 2023, p. 82). This lack of means actually led to a number of penalties being annulled. A liberal and abstentionist stance, which had been overcome in many other countries, thus persisted in Spain. The poor results of this inspection service also earned it the distrust and contempt of workers and their organisations (Rodríguez-Sañudo, 2003, pp. 136-138). The Republican reforms of 1931 and 1932, promoted by the socialist Largo Caballero as Minister of Labour and Welfare, inaugurated an inspection service that was actually operational, independent and with the power to impose penalties. The post of ‘delegado de trabajo’ was created, who was the maximum provincial authority in all matters related to work and the labour force, above civil governors in this respect, thereby separating labour disputes companies penalised then rose to 20%, with a significant drop in 1953 and 1954 when penalised companies once again accounted for 15% and 16%, respectively, before rising to 21% in 1956. The average amount of penalties ranged from 452 pesetas in 1952 to 520 pesetas in 1956, during an inflationary period. In any case, penalties obviously continued to be very small, and it is sufficient to point out that during this period each five years’ service led to a 500 pesetas salary increase for each inspectorate employee. The data for Social Security settlements register a sharp increase from 1947. Up until then they were fairly modest, although the number of reports was stable and even fell from 1951. This once again points to a concentration of inspection and regulation processes in larger companies which maximised the impact of the LI. The settlements of workers’ mutuals, involving a complex system of insurances inaugurated in 1946-1947 (Pons-Pons & Vilar- Rodríguez, 2014, pp. 145-167), increased until 1953 then fell in the last years of the series (Table 1). In short, some effort was made to increase the inspectorate staff and activity from 1947 which, as the figures show, led to very limited results. The LI undoubtedly suffered from a lack of capacity and effectiveness in the first twenty years of the dictatorship. During this period, labour inspection was not a problem for companies. It was a tradition that Spanish employers opposed any state interference and the presence of unions in the workplace. The prohibition of independent unions, the preeminent position of the ‘head of the company’ and the ineffectiveness of the LI all contributed to preventing such state interference to a large extent, interference that had given rise to frequent complaints during the Second Republic. In fact, in 1943, a circular of the LI requested that chambers of commerce fill in a form with information on companies and their workforces. The High Council of Official Chambers of Commerce recommended putting off the reply. Nonetheless, the excessive regulation and, above all, autarky and the postwar crisis made it necessary to resort to the state. In the 1940s, the LI had to deal with matters which, although they had nothing to do with worker protection, were as delicate and important as the electricity supply (Bosch, 2007) and work shifts (San Miguel Arribas, 1952, p. 163), key elements in company production. The supply of raw materials was another concern. In 1941, industrialists started an initiative in the official chamber of commerce of the province of Seville to request that the Ministry of Labour confirm the present delegado de trabajo for this province in his post to ensure the supply of raw materials to their industries, and also due to his ‘impartiality and justice’ in labour disputes.4 In the 1960s, the dictatorship tried to convince the international community that it was now in line with democratic capitalist countries. To this end it ratified Convention number 81 (1947) and Recommendations numbers 81 and 82 (1947) of the ILO, which had entered into force internationally on 7 April 1950. Subsequently, the inspection service was reformed by the Law of 21 July 1962 regulating labour inspection, which once again restructured the national LI. A year later, the reorganisation continued with the fusion of the Inspección Técnica de Previsión Social (this was the name of the Social Security inspection service as from 1944) with the LI. This was via Law 228/1963, of 28 December, on the integration and modification of the staff of the labour inspectorate. This law established a staff of 464 employees. This was just slightly larger than the one designed thirty years earlier by Largo Caballero during the first years of the Second Republic, with a much smaller working population. In 1971, a new regulation of the national inspectorate was passed, thereby repealing the regulations of the LI of 13 July 1940, and the decrees of 8 November 1946 and 21 July 1950 (Pérez-Espinosa Sánchez, 1977, pp. 100-103). In 1974, the staff comprised a total of 457 employees in provincial offices plus 83 in central services, despite the fact that these services included the undersecretariats and development plans.5 In the meantime, the total number of jobs (full-time employment) had grown to 13.3 million (Prados de la Escosura, 2017). Discussion and conclusions The study undertaken has made it possible to show the scant protective capacity of the LI in the first twenty years of the dictatorship. There was a break with the previous Republican regime which in regulatory terms was notably detrimental to labour, as the protective nature of the LI disappeared in a context of prohibition of the rights and collective autonomy of workers (Pérez-Espinosa Sánchez, 1977). The Delegaciones de Trabajo were not suppressed, but social and labour issues were returned to the control of civil governors, the police, the Civil Guard, and ultimately the criminal justice system. Military justice was applied for socio-political offences (which included those related to workers’ lack of rights to assembly, demonstrate, strike etc.) until the creation of the Juzgado y Tribunales de Orden Público in 1963 (Sánchez- Mosquera, 2008, pp. 75-78). The paternalism and interventionism of fascist-type authoritarian regimes could lead to a certain protection for workers. The work community and Falangist, Catholic Social and Traditionalist doctrines propose a secondary role for workers, but their basic needs and those of their families should be covered. The Ministry of Labour and the ‘vertical trade union’ (Babiano, 1998) were institutions that should have looked out for workers but failed to do so, even heightening their subordinate role, as did the accompanying social policy (Pons-Pons & Vilar-Rodríguez, 2012; Vilar-Rodríguez & Pons-Pons, 2020). The LI also failed to exercise effective worker protection. In this respect, the LI of the Spanish dictatorship achieved even worse results than the analogous services of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which were hardly optimal. Giving precedence, institutionally, to national production (and the national interest) over the private interest of capital did not result in protection and improved circumstances for workers. Furthermore, Italian and German interventionism were quite concessive with the collective autonomy of employers and shielded the business hierarchy in industrial relations, an approach that was mirrored in the Francoist institutions. From an operative point of view, the Spanish LI was radically limited by a lack of staff, laxity in imposing penalties (prioritising information), de-professionalisation (due to compatibility with other activities) and a lack of funding for visits outside the provincial capital. It is notable that, despite the statistics, industrial accidents rose sharply according to the trade union economic council of Biscay (González Murillo, 2021, p. 215). Following this indicator, in fascist Italy industrial accidents were not reduced either, but rather quite the opposite. Italian fascism was practically inaugurated recognising the 8-hour working day, but it soon allowed the 9-hour working day in some sectors and companies. The inspection of piecework, which was not permitted, and the application of such agreements in industry were really controversial and, ultimately, there was such leniency that companies did not have to observe the rules (Preti, 1977). The ‘Ispettorato Corporativo’ dependent on the Ministry of Corporations, created in 1929 and which unified inspection services, was meant to have 401 officials in 1931 and reach 1,000 employees by 1940. In fact, these staff numbers were never attained, but the staff stipulated by the Italian legislation makes evident, by comparison, the lack of ambition of the Spanish regulation. Despite this laxity, the main Italian employers’ organisation, Confindustria, showed unabated hostility towards any kind of inspection (Carnevale & Baldasseroni, 1999). A certain laxity could also been found in Germany in relation to the observance of labour regulations in companies. The start of the Second World War and the consequent war effort did actually lead to an increase in medical inspections, so that production, above all of war material, was not adversely affected. Nevertheless, in general, the capacity of the LI was also limited and its staff had to endure important staff shortages (Hachtmann, 2020, p. 129). In Spain also, the LI did not really give rise to real demand for worker protection or the strict compliance of labour regulations by companies. As in Italy and Germany, Spanish employers were far more concerned about business competition than about industrial relations. In a market with a significantly limited supply of raw materials and machinery and severe energy shortages, the LI exercised a decisive arbitration by choosing whether or not to authorise more than one work shift. This directly affected company profits. With the Second World War having ended with victory for the Allies, from 1947 the Spanish LI registered a very moderate improvement in resources and, according to the official statistics, its performance improved. The incorporation of Spain into international organisations in the mid-1950s, particularly in this case the ILO, improved and modernised the LI, at least in theory. The dictatorship wanted to give the appearance that Spain was changing to favour institutional harmonisation with Western democracies. This alleged change, however, was not real (Sánchez-Mosquera, 2022). Subsequently, the reforms of the early 1960s and the ratification of the ILO conventions on labour inspection also proved to be insufficient, especially due to the ongoing lack of autonomy and collective rights of workers, and the understaffing and inadequate material resources of the inspection service. The total staff of 464 civil servants in 1963, which remained stable until the end of the dictatorship, was not far removed from the 438 officials employed thirty years earlier by the Second Republic. The deficit of the Spanish LI at this time was further aggravated by the fact that the working population, measured in full-time jobs, had grown by around 4 million during the almost forty years of the dictatorship (Prados de la Escosura, 2017). Therefore, with regard to labour protection, the design and practice of labour inspection regressed to a conception of liberal abstentionist state, as had been the case up until the Second Republic. Prat & Molina (2014) have found a line of continuity between the collective bargaining controlled by the state during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and that developed within a democratic framework by the jurados mixtos during the Second Republic until 1935, when the intervention of right-wing governments distorted it by favouring the bargaining power of employers. This is not the place to point out notable differences that could question this line of continuity between collective bargaining with governmental intervention within the framework of a dictatorship and that which occurred within a democratic framework. Nonetheless, this research can affirm that the Second Republic constituted a notable departure from the weak LI which was primarily informative, seldom punitive and lacking in human and material resources, in line with the state’s abstentionist conception of industrial relations which continued during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The shift to more conservative position in 1935 led the way back to this abstentionist orientation that was not at all protective of labour, and which was soon to be confirmed and further exacerbated under the Franco dictatorship. Finally, despite the fact, as indicated above, that the LI improved its staff in the 1960s and 1970s, the service continued to be extremely limited, including a lack of statistical information (which flouts the principle of information and fails to generate knowledge to improve the regulatory framework) and a continued lack of protection of workers in an industrial relations system dominated by the employers (Sola, 2014). The Francoist legacy left to democratic Spain, therefore, was an inspection service that was barely operational and, consequently, with scant protective capacity. It is clear that the democratic regulatory framework, with the recovery of workers' collective rights and independent unions, has indirectly favoured the service provided by the LI, but it is also true that the lack of sufficient human and material resources has persisted to the present as a part of this legacy. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Professor Richard Croucher his helpful suggestions and comments at the beginning of this research. His whole work will always be a source of inspiration in the field of industrial relations. Disclosure statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Funding details: The author received financial support for the research for the research project Los Determinantes Institucionales del Funcionamiento del Mercado de Trabajo en España (1939–2017). Un Estudio en Perspectiva Comparada en el Marco de la Europa del Sur (Ref.: RTI2018-099188-A-I00) funded by MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033/ and FEDER Una manera de hacer Europa. Autobiographical sketch: Marcial Sánchez-Mosquera is an associate professor at the University of Seville. He holds a PhD in Applied Economic Analysis and History and Economic Institutions. His research interests include economic history, economic and labour institutions, labour market, social dialogue, and social and economic actors. He has published the results of his research in European Journal of Industrial Relations, Economic and Industrial Democracy, The Economic and Labour Relations Review, Revista de Historia Industrial/Industrial History Review and Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales, among others. Notes 1. Archivo de Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Sevilla (AGCOCISNS. CÁMARA) 109, 111, 136 and 199. 2. Servicio Central de Inspección del Ministerio de Trabajo, Memorias Estadística de la Labor Realizada por el Cuerpo Nacional de Inspectores de Trabajo, 1943-1956. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo. 3. Archivo Histórico del Ministerio de Trabajo, 199.360-199.392, 198.725-198.730. 4. AGCOCISNS. CÁMARA, 109. 5. Servicio de Inspección de Trabajo, Nómina, escalafón y escalas de la Inspección de Trabajo en 1974. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo. 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