Mystery religions and Philosophy in Proclus
Full text
MYSTERY RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY IN PROCLUS JESÚS DE GARAY University of Sevilla (Spain) 1. Ritual, myth and philosophy We owe the development of a pagan rational theology to Proclus (412- 485). Traditional Greek religion had undergone various transformations, both because it had assimilated religious rites from other cultures over the course of the centuries, and because of the pressure from the Empire once it had adopted Christianity as its exclusive confessional identity. Proclus is a religious author1 who took regular part in the traditional pagan worship2 of the Greeks and other peoples3, and who dedicated considerable efforts to providing a philosophical grounding for the pagan religion. In a way, he represents a reply to the systematic theological frameworks that already existed in the Christianity of his day. The concept of “mystery religions” implies a certain ambiguity4. Also, in the time of Proclus many of these cults had lost public relevance5. 1 A. J. Festugière 1971: 577: “la religion civique de Proclus est très sincère et très profonde”. 2 Marinus, Vita Procli, 29-33. 3 Marinus, Vita Procli, 19, 26-30: “This most pious man was always prepared, and said that it was not right that a philosopher should be a servant (șİȡĮʌİȣIJȞ) of a single city, or of the traditional worship of a few towns, but rather he should be a hierophant (İȡȠijȞIJȘȞ) universally for the entire world”. The term ‘hierophant’ applies to those who reveal sacred realities during mystery rituals (see Saffrey 2001: 133-4). 4 Burker 2005: 23-26. The term “mystery” in modern languages is connected to that of “secret,” a use that can be traced back to the New Testament. Secrets had certainly been characteristic of the ancient mystery religions, although not all secret cults were mysteries. In addition, it would be mistaken to associate the mysteries with what today we understand as mysticism: The term mystikos is used in this sense, beginning associated primarily with Pseudo Dionysius. The Latin translation of mysteria, myein, myesis as initia, initiare, initiatio better reflects the
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 150 Nevertheless, Proclus shows a special interest in Orphism6, in the Chaldean Oracles7, as well as in the theology of Homer and Hesiod8, even when he shares with his masters Plutarch and Syrianus the conviction that there exists a basic agreement between all religions and philosophie 9 s . With respect to religion, Proclus is above all a theologian. That is, his attention is not directed towards exhorting people to participate in religious practice, nor to describing the many religious rituals, nor to explaining traditional myths in a detailed manner: this is a kind of knowledge that he takes for granted in those who read his writings or listen to his oral discourses. His efforts, rather, are focused on rationally justifying both rites and myths. Furthermore, he holds —in accordance with the Neoplatonic tradition— that religious progress demands philosophical reflection: For we do possess, inasmuch as we rank as souls, images of the primal causes (IJȞ ʌȡȠIJıIJȦȞ ĮIJȦȞ İțંȞĮȢ), and we participate in both the whole Soul and the plane of Intellect and the divine Henad; and we must stir up the powers of those entities within us (IJȢ Ȟ ȝȞ țİȞȦȞ įȣȞȝİȚȢ ȞİȖİȡİȚȞ) for the comprehension of the present subject matter. Or how else are we to become nearer to the One, if we do not rouse up the One of the soul (IJઁ Ȟ IJઁ IJોȢ ȥȣȤોȢ ʌȡȠĮȞİȖİȡĮȞIJİȢ), which is in us as a kind of image of the One (ȠȠȞ İțઅȞ IJȠ૨ ȞંȢ), by virtue of which the most accurate of authorities (Ƞ țȡȚȕıIJİȡȠȚ IJȞ ȜંȖȦȞ) declare that the divine possession most especially comes about? And how are we to make this One and flower of the soul (IJઁ ȞșȠȢ IJોȢ ȥȣȤોȢ) shine forth unless we first of all activate our intellect? For the activity of the intellect leads the soul towards a state and an activity of calm. And how are we to achieve perfect intellectual activity if we do not travel there by means of logical conceptions, using composite intellections prior to more simple ones? So then, we need demonstrative power in our preliminary assumptions, whereas we need intellectual activity in our investigations of being (for the orders of being are denied of the One), and we need inspired impulse in our consciousness of that which transcends all beings (ȞșİĮıIJȚțોȢ į ȡȝોȢ Ȟ IJૌ ıȣȞĮȚıșıİȚ IJȠ૨ ʌȞIJȦȞ ȟૉȡȘȝȞȠȣ IJȞ ȞIJȦȞ). […] Let meaning of the ancient mysteries, i.e. as initiation ceremonies that were optional rites within the polytheist religion as a whole. 5 Burkert 2005: 138-9: Eleusis had been destroyed fifteen years before Proclus was born. In addition, pagan sacrifices were prohibited. 6 Brisson 1987. 7 Marinus, Vita Procli, 26-28. 8 Festugière 1971: 576: “Il est donc clair que Marinos établit un lien entre la théurgie et la religion traditionnelle”. 9 Saffrey 1992: 35-50: “Acorder entre elles les traditions théologiques: Une caractéristique du néoplatonisme athénien.
Jesús de Garay 151 this, then, be the manner of our discourse, logical, intellectual, and inspired (ȜȠȖȚțંȢ, ȞȠİȡંȢ, ȞșİĮıIJȚțંȢ)10. In order to rise to the One, the human being needs inspiration. But in order to attain the inspiration that makes the approach to the One possible, he or she must have previously awakened the “flower of the soul” by means of philosophy. Without philosophy, without science, without intelligence, inspiration is confused, equivocal and trapped in the imagination11. Therefore, Proclus calls for a rational critique of the various religions, in order to separate what is fecund from what is sterile. Proclus easily saw the entirety of Hellenic and foreign theology, even that which was obscured by mythical representations, and he brought it into the light for those who wanted and were able to comprehend it, interpreting everything with greater inspiration (ȞșȠȣıȚĮıIJȚțઆIJİȡȠȞ) and bringing it all into harmony. Studying all the works of the ancients, he accepted with a critical spirit (ȝİIJૃ ʌȚțȡıİȦȢ) everything that was fecund in them (ȖંȞȚȝȠȞ), and if he encountered anything empty (ȞİȝȚĮȠȞ), he maintained himself totally separated from it, as something worthy of disdain (Ȣ ȝȝȠȞ)12. Nevertheless, religious cult precedes philosophy chronologically. Rituals and myths exist before philosophy begins its quest for a rational explanation of them. Moreover, the first thing is the rite, ritual action, with myth appearing later, as a narrative representation of the force of the ritual13; philosophy only begins once rituals and myths have been developed. 10 In Prm. VI. 1071.15-1072.13. 11 Saffrey and Westerinck 2003: LXXI-LXXII: “Ainsi, dans la mensure où la théologie comme science a supplanté la théologie symbolique ou mythologique, qui était la théologie traditionnelle depuis les origines de la pensée grecque, on peut dire que cette nouvelle théologie scientifique a opéré une sorte de «démythologisation». Mais il est évident que cette «démythologisation» atteint son achèvement complet, lorsque les dieux du panthéon olympien sont devenus les hénades divines. Lorsque Proclus nous dit que la propriété qui définit la déesse Hestia, c’est «être en soi-même», et celle qui définit la déesse Héra, c’est «être en autre», nous sommes devant un cas de «démythologisation» compléte. Mais, parce que Proclus était un génie, il savait garder conjoints l’ordre de la théologie scientifique et celui de la piété populaire qui n’est autre que la devotion du coeur.” 12 Marinus, Vita Procli, XXII, 16-27. 13 Trouillard 1977: 23: “Entre mythe et théurgie le rapport est étroit. Le rite est premier, il est le mythe en acte. Quand le mythe s’écarte du rite et devient conscient comme tel, il transforme en représentation une partie de sa force primitive.”
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 152 The priority of ritual action is justified, according to Proclus, because the gods have filled the universe with divine symbols, symbols that demonstrate their efficacy in ritual action14. Thus, the strongly rationalist character of Proclus’s philosophy has clearly-delimited frontiers: prior to philosophy there comes ritual and myth; and where philosophy ends there is, once again, ritual and myth. 2. Initiation myths and educational myths Perhaps one of the greatest surprises on reading Proclus—as opposed to Plato—is his view of the importance of Homer and Hesiod. The reader will be even more surprised when Proclus presents this philosophical rehabilitation as being the true intention of Plato. It is hard to believe that this exegesis of Plato could be correct; I will not, however, enter into this question here. In any case, the 6th dissertation of Proclus’s Commentary on the Republic represents a systematic attempt to reinterpret Plato’s doctrine concerning poets. Proclus establishes a distinction that is at the centre of his entire exegesis. The Platonic myths, he notes, are of two types: initiatory and educational: We must distinguish between the two, classifying myths as more philosophical (ijȚȜȠıȠijȦIJȡȠȣȢ) and the other sort as more fitting for hieratic customs (IJȠȢ İȡĮIJȚțȠȢ șİıȝȠȢ), the former as appropriate for the young to hear, but Homer is appropriate for those who have been correctly guided through, so to speak, the whole of the required education15. That is, according to Proclus, Plato criticized the poets only to the degree that they present myths that are inappropriate for the education of the young, who lack sufficient instruction to understand the hidden message of these myths. The Platonic proposal, then, would consist of creating myths that are “more philosophical,” more rational, which have educational benefit, and which can thus be understood correctly by the youth. The myths of Homer and Hesiod, on the other hand, although they derive from divine inspiration, are nonetheless inappropriate for the education of the young, just as Plato indicated. This is why, according to 14 Trouillard 1977: 22: “Cette doctrine implique que, sous certains conditions, l’action va plus loin que la pensée. Proclos l’accueille dans son propre contexte. Puisque la divinité emplit le monde de ses signes et symboles, puisque chacun de ces chiffres est un charge de puissance, leur mise en oeuvre investit le fidèle d’un pouvoir divin, qui doit avant tout le transfigurer lui-même.” 15In R. VI, 79.13-16.
Jesús de Garay 153 Proclus, Plato normally expresses his theology in a scientific way, and always uses myths which have an educational character. He only occasionally has recourse to initiation myths, which he recounts in a veiled and enigmatic fashion: Let us distinguish the modes according to which Plato explains the concepts found in the myths (IJ ȝȣıIJȚț ȞȠȝĮIJĮ) concerning divine reality. For it is clear that he does not always teach the divine realities in an identical fashion, but instead will sometimes teach them in a divinely inspired manner (ȞșİĮıIJȚțȢ), while at other times he will develop his teachings about the truth of these realities dialectically (įȚĮȜİțIJȚțȢ ȞİȜIJIJȦȞ); again, at times he will teach in a symbolic fashion (ıȣȝȕȠȜȚțȢ) about their innately unsayable character (IJȢ ȡȡIJȠȣȢ ĮIJȞ įȚંIJȘIJĮȢ), yet at other times teaching on the basis of images (ʌઁ IJȞ İțંȞȦȞ) in order to climb towards these divine realities, and discovering in them the primary active causes of the universe16. In the Phaedrus, for example, Socrates, possessed by a divine delirium, presents various secret doctrines (ʌંȡȡȘIJĮ įંȖȝĮIJĮ) concerning the gods, while in the Sophist and in the Parmenides he speaks in dialectical terms about the One, which transcends all other beings. In the Symposium and in the Protagoras, on the other hand, he uses a symbolic method (IJંȞ ıȣȝȕȠȜȚțઁȞ IJȡંʌȠȞ); in this way he only reveals the ineffable divine realities via mere allusions (ȥȚȜોȢ ȞįİȟİȦȢ). Finally, in the Timaeus and in the Statesman he teaches about the gods by way of images (įȚ IJȞ İțંȞȦȞ), that is, through the similarity (įȚૃ ȝȠȚંIJȘIJȠȢ) that our world has with the divine realm: for example, the politician is compared to the celestial demiurge, and the divisions of the human soul correspond to the order of the gods, etc17. Discourse by way of images is also only allusive (įȚૃ ȞįİȟİȦȢ), as opposed to inspired and scientific discourses, which reveal divine realities openly (ʌĮȡĮțĮȜʌIJȦȢ)18. Orpheus, on the other hand, has preferred the use of a symbolic mode (įȚ IJȞ ıȣȝȕંȜȦȞ), as those who have written myths about the gods have also done. The writer of myths makes use of the symbol in order to express what is unsayable in a narrative modality. Pythagoras, for his part, made use of images, showing how numbers and geometric figures correspond with divine realities. The inspired mode (ȞșİĮıIJȚțȢ) is preferred by those who enjoy the highest rank in the celebration of the mysteries (ʌĮȡ IJȠȢ țȡȠIJIJȠȚȢ IJઅȞ IJİȜİıIJȞ); this is especially true 16 See Theol. Plat. I-4.17.16-24. 17 See Theol. Plat. I-4.17.25-19.22. 18 See ibid. 20.2-3.
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 154 among the Chaldean theurgists. Finally, the scientific mode (țĮIJૃ ʌȚıIJȝȘȞ) is characteristic of the philosophy of Plato19. Platonic attacks on the poets should be understood in this philosophical and educational context. Plato rejected the entirety of the dramaturgy of mythological fictions because he wanted to show, philosophically, how everything in reality—including the gods—is oriented to the good and the beautiful (IJȠ૨ țĮȜȠ૨ ıIJȠȤȗİIJĮȚ țĮ IJȠ૨ ȖĮșȠ૨), and therefore he rejected everything that distracted or led away from this approach, both the immoral actions attributed to the gods and the images and sensible appearances that seek to represent some kind of similarity with the divine realm. And for the same reason, Plato created certain myths which were in agreement with the habit of philosophy (ijȚȜંıȠijȠȞ ȟȚȞ ȠțİȚંIJİȡȠȞ), redirecting the criminality, irrationality and disorderliness characteristic of the mythical towards order and definition, towards the good and the beautiful20. The imagination plays the role of a nexus between the inspiration received from the gods, one the one hand, and human knowledge, on the other21. There is nothing strange in seeing incorporeal beings bearing a corporeal aspect (IJ ıઆȝĮIJĮ ıȦȝĮIJȠİȚįો șİȦȡİȞ), or to see what is beyond any place as existing in a particular place (Ȟ IJંʌ) and having spatial extension (įȚĮıIJȝĮIJȚ), and to grasp what is beyond movement by means of a movement (įȚ țȚȞıİȦȢ). From time immemorial the theurgists (ʌȜĮȚ țĮ IJȞ șİȠȣȡȖȞ) have taught us that in their self-revelations (IJȢ ĮIJȠijĮȞİĮȢ) the gods without form reveal themselves as gifted with form (ȝİȝȠȡijȦȝȞĮȢ) and the gods without any figure or shape self-present as having shape and figure (ıȤȘȝĮIJȚıȝȞĮȢ), since the simple and immobile apparitions of the god are received by the soul in accordance with its own nature, in a divided way (ȝİȡȚıIJȢ); on this basis, and employing imagination (ȝİIJ ijĮȞIJĮıĮȢ), the soul inserts figure and form (ıȤȝĮ țĮ ȝȠȡijȞ) into these spectacles22. The inspired poets receive revelations from the gods and, by way of the imagination, they translate these inspirations into a figurative language. The author of myths communicates these revelations through a temporal and plastic narration. In general, one and the same reality can 19 See ibid. 20.6-25. 20 See ibid. 21.3-22.7. 21 See Trouillard 1977: 40-51. 22 In R. II 241.19-27.
Jesús de Garay 155 present itself in a different way according to the type of knowledge in question. Let us rather think that the manner of knowing (IJોȢ ȖȞઆıİȦȢ IJȡંʌȠȢ) differs according to the diversity of the knowers. For the very same object is known by God unitarily (ȞȦȝȞȦȢ), by intellect holistically (ȜȚțȢ), by reason (ȜંȖȠȢ) universally (țĮșȠȜȚțȢ), by imagination figuratively (ȝȠȡijȦIJȚțȢ) and by sense-perception passively (ʌĮșȘIJȚțȢ)23. The inspired poet receives the divine inspiration in his imagination, perhaps without understanding its meaning, and may represent his inspirations in the form of myths. The philosopher, via dialectical reason, understands the meaning of the myths in an abstract way, and is able to express them by way of systematic logic: he thus translates the myths, first into opinion and later into rational explanation.24 The wise man grasps, via intellectual intuition, the unity that structures the divine realities. Finally, only the gods themselves are able know themselves as they are in themselves. 3. Myth and the natural order Nevertheless, as Proclus reminds us, in the Phaedrus25 Plato teaches that one should never mix or confuse myths with physical explanations (IJȢ ijȣıȚțȢ ʌȠįંıİȚȢ), since the divine transcends all nature (IJઁ șİȠȞ ȟȡȘIJĮȚ IJȢ ȜȘȢ ijıİȦȢ). “As a consequence, it is, without a doubt, proper that theological discourses be entirely purified from all issues related to nature (ȠIJȦ įʌȠȣ țĮ IJȠઃȢ ʌİȡ șİȞ ȜંȖȠȣȢ țĮșĮȡİİȚȞ ʌȞIJૉ ʌȡȠıțİȚ IJોȢ ʌİȡ IJȞ ijıȚȞ ʌȡĮȖȝĮIJİĮȢ)”26. That is to say, although the divine possesses some kind of similarity with the physical world—inasmuch as it is the cause of the latter—, nevertheless there is always something in the divine realities that is beyond the natural order, and which lacks any similarity with the natural order. Thus, in the mythological narrations there are always hidden meanings that are holier (ıİȝȞȠIJȡĮȢ) than the superficial meaning27. In part, the divine has a certain similitude with the order of our natural world, and in part it is completely foreign to that natural order. Therefore the 23 In Ti. II 352.15-19. 24 See In Cra. 67.24-68.9. 25 See Pl. Phdr. 229b4-230a6. 26 Theol. Plat. I-4.22.11-17. 27 See ibid. 23.1-3.
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 156 approach to the divine can be achieved in these two modalities: either showing the relation of the divine with the natural order, or else alluding to that divine realm which does not belong to the order of nature28 (and which, in the eyes of the young inquirers, can appear to be irrational or even scandalous). It must be kept in mind that, according to Proclus, in any principle (and therefore, in all the gods) there is something that is absolutely impossible to participate in. That is, the being of the cause—insofar as it does indeed cause anything—is in its effects; but there is something of the being of the cause—insofar as it is not a cause—that exists independently of causal activity. To put it another way, the cause does not pour all of its being into its effects, but rather only its being qua cause. In this sense Proclus always distinguishes three different aspects of a principle: in itself the principle cannot be shared (IJઁ ȝșİțIJȠȞ), that is, there is something of the principle that is not open to participation; second, there is something in the principle which is open to participation (IJઁ ȝİIJİȤંȝİȞȠȞ) by all those individuals who participate in it; third, there is the participant (IJઁ ȝİIJȤȠȞ), who participates in a particular manner (different in each individual) in the process of participation29. When this doctrine is applied to the gods, it implies that there is something in the gods that cannot be shared and which will always remain beyond the physical world and the human order. We humans can elevate ourselves—thanks to philosophy—towards the universal that is participated in by the entire natural world. But in order to refer to that aspect of the gods that cannot be participated in, we must abandon the similarities that always exist between cause and effect, and instead we must have recourse to theurgy. More concretely, any reference to the One in itself—insofar as it something in which participation is not possible—implies not only abandoning the order of nature, but also the intelligible order, since there are aspects of the One that cannot be reduced to intelligibility. It is not only that human intelligence is limited and unable to achieve the understanding of the One (which is certain), but in addition there is the fact that the One in itself includes characteristics that are distinct from intelligibility, which can appear to human eyes as either absurd or illogical. This is evident when we turn to Matter, which is caused directly by the One. That is, the One is not only the cause of intelligibility; rather, it is also the cause of Matter, which in itself is not intelligible. Matter presents 28 See Trouillard 1982: 119-142. 29 See Inst. 24.
Jesús de Garay 157 certain irrational and disordered traits, which are also caused by the One. The One is more than intelligibility. And in a similar manner, Intelligence is not the cause of the beings of the mineral and plant kingdom, nor of the kingdom of irrational animals, to the degree that they are neither intelligible nor intelligent, but rather they depend directly on the causality of the One. Speaking paradoxically, in the One there is something of matter, of stone, of plants and of irrational animal life, which is irreducible to intelligence. In this way, Proclus justifies the fact that in the stories about the gods scandalous behaviour may appear, these being contrary to the natural order and rationality of virtue. The issue is not that Proclus approves of such behaviour, but rather that he believes that—in a way which is clearly opposed to virtue and reason—one can come to glimpse the transcendence of the gods with regard to the order of human nature. 4. One, Night and Time The philosophy of Proclus connects directly with mystery religions, insofar as his entire doctrine culminates in a One that is hidden, unknowable and ineffable, and which can only be approached by means of a certain initiation process. Not every class of gods, however, is nameable. For Parmenides too had reminded us that He who is beyond the things as a whole is ineffable. Indeed, there are neither names of him, he says, nor any speech (Parm. 142A2). Of the intelligible gods the foremost genera, which are both united to the One itself and are called occult, have a high degree of unknowability and ineffability30. Therefore—and in accordance with the tradition inaugurated by Iamblichus—access to the One and to the gods requires an initiation process. Proclus himself had received these teachings, had learned the invocations and their various uses (IJȢ țijȦȞıİȚȢ țĮ IJȞ ȜȜȘȞ ȤȡોıȚȞ) from Asclepigenia, the daughter of Plutarch; for in her, and only in her, were conserved—handed down from the epoch of the great Nestorius—the mysteries and the entire theurgic doctrine (ȡȖȚĮ țĮ ıȝʌĮıĮ șİȠȣȡȖȚț ȖȦȖ) that were transmitted to her thanks to the mediation of her father31. 30In Cra. 32.18-23. 31 Marinus, Vita Procli, 28.10-15.
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 164 Beginning with each one of these first gods there arises a series or chain (ıİȚȡ)57: “Every order (IJȟȚȢ) has its beginning in a monad and proceeds to a manifold co-ordinate therewith; and the manifold in any order may be carried back to a single monad”58. All that is real is structured into series that proceed from the first unities. Each series, therefore, constitutes a unity, insofar as all the beings of the chain are united to the henad. The entire chain or series is marked by the imprint of the corresponding god. “The originative cause of each series communicates its distinctive property (IJોȢ ĮȣIJȠ૨ įȚંIJȘIJȠȢ) to the entire series”59. That is, each being, each stone, each animal, each individual, each region of the cosmos... belongs to one of these series and brings with it the character of that god. Their properties, their power, depend on the character and strength of the god, and, in the final analysis, on the One60. Thus, all things are full of gods: Things on earth are full of heavenly gods; things in heaven are full of supercelestials; and each chain continues abounding as far as its final members (ʌȡંİȚıȚȞ țıIJȘ ʌȜȘșȣȠȝȞȘ ıİȚȡ ȝȤȡȚ IJȞ ıȤIJȦȞ). For what is in the One-before-all makes its appearance in all, in which are also found communications between souls set beneath one god or another61. 7. Symbols Any given reality can be considered in very diverse ways: as the effect of a cause, as participation in a paradigm, as the image of a model, as the manifestation of a hidden principle, etc. But it can also be considered as a symbol (ıȝȕȠȜȠȞ), a sign (ıȞșȘȝĮ), which represents that which it signifies. The effect, in a manner of speaking, signifies and symbolizes the cause. Concretely, every reality is a symbol of a god: an indicator, a sign of the god. The symbols are indicators that are given—presented, donated—by a god to each being of the series that is ruled by that god. And in the final analysis, they are signs that the One presents to every reality. Proclus emphasizes that the imprint of god in every reality—the symbol—is not something that is added to a being, but rather that it is the very ground of 57 Proclus states that he himself belongs to the chain of Hermes: see Marinus, Vita Procli 28.34-35. 58 Inst. 21. 59 Inst. 97. 60 See Inst. 100. 61 De sacrificio 40-43.
Jesús de Garay 165 its reality. It is not the case that something is real and, in addition, signifies; rather, it is real insofar as it signifies: it is real insofar as it is a divine symbol. And in particular, it is real to the degree that it is a symbol of a god and of the One, i.e. to the degree to which the god is causing that reality. The symbolic character of something is its reality. The divine symbols are not merely names or merely intelligible meanings, but rather they are the force or power corresponding rightly to each thing. This potency corresponding to the symbol depends on nothing other than the god, and therefore it does not act through human volition but by its own divine reality62. The unintelligibility or intelligibility of the symbols is irrelevant. Its efficacy does not depend on whether we understand or whether we give consent. Among the many symbols, one case of particular importance for the theurgist is that of the names of the gods, to the degree that these names are employed in sacred actions (invocations, consecrations...). In commenting on Plato’s Cratylus, Proclus says that the position of Socrates is intermediate between that of Cratylus and Hermogenes. That is to say, Proclus holds that the names are in part conventional (șıİȚ) and in part by nature (ijıİȚ). But it is of interest to Proclus to emphasize that there are names that belong by nature to each god. And when we humans do not know these divine names, we turn to convention. The gods have revealed, and continue to reveal, their names, but to recognize them is a difficult task, one for which the theurgists are responsible. As with all symbols, there is a force and an efficacy imprinted on the materiality of each natural name. The power of each divine name can even be transmitted to material realities, for example, to a consecrated statue or to stones and plants. This would explain why specific objects can perform miraculous actions, such as curing illnesses. Proclus distinguishes the symbol from the copy. The symbol does not express analogies between the divine and the material. The notion of symbol remains very distant from the Platonic notions of image, copy and imitation, etc. 62 Cf. Iamblichus, De mysteriis, II.1.96.13-97.2: “It is not the act of thinking ( ȞȞȠȚĮ) which unites the theurgists to the gods. For what would impede those who philosophize in a theoretical manner from attaining theurgic union with the gods? Rather, the truth is different: it is the performance of ineffable actions (IJȞ ȡȖȦȞ IJȞ ȡȡIJȦȞ) that go beyond all intellection, and exercised in a manner that is appropriate to the gods (șİȠʌȡİʌȢ), as well as the power of mute symbols (ıȣȝȕંȜȦȞ ijșțIJȦȞ), understood only by the gods, that make the theurgic union become a reality”.
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 166 For symbols (ıȝȕȠȜĮ) are not imitations (ȝȚȝȝĮIJĮ) of those things they symbolize. Things could never be imitations of their opposites (good imitating bad, natural imitating unnatural), but the symbolic mode ( į ıȣȝȕȠȜȚț șİȦȡĮ) indicates the nature of things even by means of their complete opposites (įȚ IJȞ ȞĮȞIJȚȦIJIJȦȞ). Therefore, if a poet is inspired and reveals to us through symbols (įȚ IJȞ ıȣȞșȘȝIJȦȞ) the truth about the things that are, or if he uses systematic knowledge to reveal to us the order of things, this poet is not an imitator and cannot be found wanting by the arguments we are discussing63. Symbols are signs of the gods insofar as it is not possible to participate in the gods, and therefore they signify the gods in that divine reality that is similar neither to intelligible, nor to the human or to the natural. Of the cause, however, which is ineffable and beyond the intelligible realm, everything that exists even down to the lowest region possesses a sign (ıȞșȘȝĮ), through which all things are attached (ȞȡIJȘȞIJĮȚ) to that cause—some further away, some closer, according to the distinctness and the obscurity of the sign (ıȣȞșȝĮIJȠȢ) in them. And this is what moves everything to the longing for the Good (IJȠ૨IJં ıIJȚȞ IJઁ ʌȞIJĮ țȚȞȠ૨Ȟ İȢ IJઁȞ IJȠ૨ ȖĮșȠ૨ ʌંșȠȞ) and presents beings with this desire which cannot be quenched (ıȕİıIJȠȞ IJઁȞ ȡȦIJĮ). While the sign is unknowable (for it has come down even to those who are unable to know it), it is greater than life (for it is present even to things without souls) and does not have the power of intellect (for it is innate in objects not endowed with thinking)”64. The symbol of the One or of the henads is not something intelligible. It is prior to all logic. It is unknowable in itself, because it precedes knowledge. But it exercises its power on any reality, since it is the cause of the good and of the desire for the good in that reality. Therefore, the symbol is the cause of the conversion (ʌȚıIJȡȠij). The desire for unity and for the good that exists in everything real depends directly on the symbol of the One in each thing. The same thing happens in the human soul: we seek to unify the diversity of our actions and representations because there is a desire for unity in us. That desire for unity—which moves dialectical reasoning, for example, to unify oppositions—proceeds from the symbol of the One in us. Human thought displays itself on the basis of the desire for unification inscribed in “the one in us,” which is precisely the symbol of the One. 63 In R. VI.198.15-24. 64 In Cra. 30.19-29.
Jesús de Garay 167 Thus, just as Nature, the demiurgic Monad, and the absolute Father who is removed from all things (ʌȞIJȦȞ ȟૉȡȘȝȞȠȢ ʌĮIJȡ) sowed signs of their proper identity (IJોȢ ȠțİĮȢ ıȣȞșȝĮIJĮ) in beings subsequent to them, and through these signs turn everything back to themselves (țĮ įȚૃțİȞȦȞ ʌȚıIJȡijȠȣıȚ ʌȞIJĮ ʌȡઁȢ ĮȣIJȠȢ), so too do all the gods instil in the entities produced from themselves symbols (ıȝȕȠȜĮ) of their cause, and through these they set (įȡȗȠȣıȚ) all creatures in themselves. Therefore, the signs of the existence of the higher beings which are sown into subsequent ones (IJ ȝȞ ȠȞ IJોȢ ʌȡȟİȦȢ IJȞ ʌİȡIJȡȦȞ ȞıʌİȚȡંȝİȞĮ IJȠȢ įİȣIJȡȠȚȢ ıȣȞșȝĮIJĮ) are ineffable and unknowable, and their active and kinetic force surpasses all intellection (țĮ IJઁ įȡĮıIJȡȚȠȞ ĮIJȞ țĮ țȚȞIJȚțઁȞ ʌİȡĮȡİȚ ʌ઼ıĮȞ ȞંȘıȚȞ)65. All the gods provide symbols of themselves to each reality, especially to the beings that belong to their chain. And these symbols of the gods, in a way that is similar to the symbols of the One, are unknowable. These symbols are, in addition, active: on the one hand, they are the foundation of every reality, i.e. a being constitutes itself as such a being on the basis of the force of these divine symbols; on the other hand, the power of the symbol is the cause of the return (ʌȚıIJȡȠij) towards the gods and towards the One. That is to say, the force for the self-constitution of a being, as well as the strength to seek unity, resides in the divine symbols. Such, then, are the characteristics of the light through which the gods appear to their own spring […] and reach us in a particular and shaped mode (ȝİȡȚıIJȢ į țĮ ȝȠȡijȦIJȚțȢ). […] Such are the so-called symbols of the gods. They are uniform in the superior orders, but multiform in the inferior. Imitating these symbols, theurgy too produces them through uttered, though inarticulate, expressions66. The human being, like any other reality, subsists on the basis of a divine symbol, which Proclus calls the “one of the soul,” the “one in us,” the “flower of the soul.” And insofar as human beings occupy an intermediate place in the totality of the real, they include within themselves the symbolic diversity of the real. The soul is all things, but not just all the intellective forms; rather, it is also all the symbols. The soul is constituted from intellectual reasons and divine symbols (ıȣȞıIJȘțİ Ȗȡ ȥȣȤ ʌઁ IJઅȞ İȡȞ ȜંȖȦȞ țĮ IJȞ șİȦȞ ıȣȝȕંȜȦȞ), of which the former proceed from the intellectual species, but the latter from the divine unities: and we are images of the intellectual essences 65 In Cra. 30.29-31.8. 66 In Cra. 31.8-28.
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 168 (ıȝȞ İțંȞİȢ ȝȞ IJȞ ȞȠİȡȞ ȠıȚઅȞ), but statues of the unknown symbols (ȖȜȝĮIJĮ į IJȞ ȖȞઆıIJȦȞ ıȣȞșȘȝIJȦȞ). And just as every soul is a fullness of forms (ʌȜȡȦȝĮ IJȞ İįȞ), but subsists wholly or simply according to one cause, thus also it indeed participates in all symbols (ʌȞIJȦȞ ȝȞ ȝİIJȤİȚ IJȞ ıȣȞșİȝIJȦȞ), through which it is united to divine things (IJ șİ)67. Among men, it corresponds to the theurgists, and especially to the priestly authorities (Ƞ IJȢ İȡĮIJȚțોȢ ȖİȝંȞİȢ)68 to recognize the divine symbols in the material realities, until the priestly science is reached (IJȞ ʌȚıIJȝȘȞ IJȞ İȡĮIJȚțȞ)69, which will permit them to perform the initiations (IJİȜİIJĮȢ) with knowledge of the appropriate symbols (İȢ IJȞ IJȞ ȠțİȦȞ ıȣȝȕંȜȦȞ ʌȞȠȚĮȞ)70. 67 Phil.Chal. V.211.21-212.2. 68 See De sacrificio 61. 69 ibid. 4. 70 ibid. 78-84.
Jesús de Garay 169 BIBLIOGRAPHY ÁLVAREZ RUIZ, J.M. and J.M. GARCÍA RUIZ, transls. and eds. 1999. Marino de Neápolis. Proclo o de la felicidad. Irún: Iralka. ÁLVAREZ, J. M., A. GABILONDO and J.M. GARCÍA eds. 1999. Lecturas del Crátilo de Platón. Madrid: Akal. BALTZLY, D., ed. and transl. 2009. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BERNABÉ, A. 2003. Hieros logos. Poesía órfica sobre los dioses, el alma y el más allá. Madrid: Akal. —.2008 “Teogonías órficas.” In Orfeo y la tradición órfica: un reencuentro, eds. A. Bernabé and F. Casadesús, 291-324. Madrid: Akal. BRISSON, L. 1987. “Proclus et l’orphisme.” In Proclus, lecteur et interpréte des anciens, eds. J. Pepin and H.D. Saffrey, 42-103. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. BURKERT, W. 2005. Cultos mistéricos antiguos. Madrid: Trotta. COPENHAVER, B. 1988. “Hermes Trismegistus, Proclus, and the Question of a Philosophy of Magic in the Renaissance.” In Hermeticism and the Renaissance: intellectual history and the occult in early modern Europe, eds. I. Merkel and A.G. Debus, 79-110. Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library. DES PLACES, É. 1966. Jamblique. Les mystères d’Égypte. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. —.transl. and ed. 2003. Oracles Chaldaïques. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. DIEHL, E., ed. 1903-1906. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentarii. Vol. I 1903. Vol. II 1904. Vol. III 1906. Leipzig: Teubner. DODDS, E.R. transl. and ed. 1963. Proclus. The Elements of Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DUVICK, B. and H. TARRANT, transls. and eds. 2007. Proclus. On Plato’s Cratylus. Ithaca/ New York: Cornell University Press. FESTUGIÈRE, A.J. 1971. “Proclus et la religion traditionnelle.” In Études de philosophie grecque, 551-74. Paris: Vrin. —. trans. 1970. Proclus. Commentaire sur la République. Paris: Vrin. —. trans. and ed. 1966-1968. Proclus. Commentaire sur la Timée, Paris: Vrin. JOHNSON, T.M., transl. 1988. “Excerpts from the Commentary of Proclus on the Chaldean Oracles.” In Iamblichus. The Exhortation to Philosophy, 123-128. Grands Rapids: Phanes Press. KROLL, W., ed. 1899-1901. Proclus, In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii. Vol. I 1899, Vol. II 1901. Leipzig: Teubner.
Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus 170 LAMBERTON, R., com. and trans. 2012. Proclus the Successor on Poetics and the Homeric Poems: Essays 5 and 6 of His Commentary on the Republic of Plato. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. MORROW, G.R. and J.M. Dillon. 1987. Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, transls. R. Lenn and J.M. Dillon. Princeton: Princeton University Press. PASQUALI, G., transl. 1908. Platonis Cratylum commentarii (In Cra.). Leipzig: Teubner. PROCLUS, Eclogae de philosophia Chaldaica (Phil.Chal.). PROCLUS, Institutio Theologica (Inst.). RUNIA, D.T. and M. SHARE, eds. and transls. 2008. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press SAFFREY, H. D. 1992. “Acorder entre elles les traditions théologiques: Une caractéristique du néoplatonisme athénien.” In On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy, eds. E.P. Bos and P.A. Meijier, 35- 50. Leiden: Brill. SAFFREY H.D. and A.Ph. SEGONDS, transls. and eds. 2001. Marinus, Proclus ou sur le bonheur (Vita Procli). Paris: Les Belles Lettres. SAFFREY H.D. and L.G. WESTERINK, transls. and eds. 2003. Proclus, Théologie platonicienne 6 vols. (Theol. Plat.). Paris: Les Belles Lettres. STEEL, C., ed. 2007-2009. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. TARRANT, H., ed. and transl. 2007. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. TROUILLARD, J. 1977. “Les fondements du mythe chez Proclos.” In Le mythe et le symbole de la connaissance figurative de Dieu, ed. S. Breton et alii, 11-37. Paris: Beauchesne. —.1982. La mystagogie de Proclos. Paris: Les Belles Lettres,