From Hegel to Adorno: On the philosophical understandig of art

23 FROM HEGEL TO ADORNO. ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF ART Antonio Gutiérrez Pozo l. The Philosophical Relevance of Art In this piece of work we seek to present Adorno’s aesthetic theory like an appropriate proposal to specify the nature and the current philosophical status of aesthetics, beyond the aesthetic approaches of Hegel and of -recognizing the impropriety of the use of the term ‘aesthetics’- Heidegger, although in fact recognizing that Adorno’s aesthetic conception is precisely beginning to take definite shape in the debate with them, especially with the Hegelian position. Nevertheless, Adorno’s aesthetic theory joins in principle with the fundamental thesis of Hegel and of Heidegger in the sense of affirming the philosophical/epistemological and ontological relevance of art, opposite to the other perspective that has largely configured the modern understanding of the aesthetics, the one that starting from Kant and that passing to Kierkegaard, culminates in the Positivism. The compartmentalization of Kant about knowledge finally granted the rights of the knowledge and the truth to the science exclusively, affirming that the aesthetic judgement -the art – does not contribute any knowledge about their objects 1 . Art would rather have to do with the feeling of life. In any case, evicting it of the knowledge, Kant inaugurated the understanding of art like game, gratuitous and disinterested activity, understanding that culminated in the positivism of Spencer and Taine, where art –already constituted in mere vital tonic, irrational matter left to the wild arbitrariness of the fantasybecomes pure game, nothing serious, secondary activity opposite to science, that is configured as the only truly serious activity for having in property the rights of the knowledge. For this reason it is not strange that the modern thought has mainly put to bed the philosophy on the side of the science (Descartes, Kant or Husserl), nor that when the inadequacy of the scientific/rational thought has been recognized philosophy had come closer to religion (Kierkegaard) than to art 2 . Fedro, Revista de estética y teoría de las artes. Número 1, marzo 2004. ISSN 1697 - 8072 24 Hegel and Heidegger -saving the enormous differences between one and other - reacted against this positivist understanding of art. Hegel affirms that art is worthy of scientific/philosophical treatment and, if it is so, it is due to that is not neither simple vital tonic, nor an arbitrary game without rules 3 ; the art is not the field of irrationality but rather, together with religion and philosophy, they are “ways of expressing and of making conscious the divine thing, the most universal truth in the human spirit” 4 . They are manifestations of the spirit, that is to say, ways of making conscious its supreme interests, and each one of them makes it according to their particular nature 5 . In short, art represents for Hegel the “sensitive manifestation of the Idea (sinnliche Scheinen der Idee)” 6 . Certainly Hegel, in contrast to Kant, when making of art an expression of the spirit, an spirit whose essence is the thought, he linked it to the knowledge and the truth, so that he perceived and underlined the philosophical relevance of aesthetics. And Heidegger, on the other hand, conceived that the essence of art is this: “The truth of beings setting itself to work (sich-insWerk-Setzen der Wahrheit des Seienden)”, “the becoming and the happening of truth”, that is to say, of the being 7 . Definitely Hegel and Heidegger reaffirm the seriousness of art, its epistemological and ontological reach. Adorno also sustains -especially with Hegelthat art, far from being the place of the irrationality, it is rather a “complexion of the truth (Komplexion der Wahrheit)” 8 , and only for that reason he considers possible -and he carries out according to the same title of his workan ‘aesthetic theory’, a ‘theory’ (rational) on the aesthetic thing, what it would evidently be impossible if art were an irrational field. The art thinks, as Adorno underlines, although –in factit thinks/judges “without words (wortlos)”; its thought, its logic is neither conceptual nor judicative 9 . So that art is not mere vital or emotional stimulant, it not only makes us to laugh or to cry, according to the journalistic-positivist topic that understands art from the point of view of the emotions: above all, art makes us think. Now then, to this the resemblance of the Adorno´s aesthetics is limited with those of Hegel and Heidegger. Starting from here, it is to see the peculiarity of the Adornian understanding of aesthetics opposite to those that Hegel and Heidegger expose. That peculiarity is beginning to take shape in the relationship between art and philosophy, a relationship that, in definite, is the one that underlies to all truly philosophical understanding of aesthetics. The status and the nature of aesthetics are in fact elucidated to the edge of the relationship between art and philosophy. Be it said 25 otherwise: all aesthetics contains like an essential feature a certain way to understand the relationship art-philosophy, and from now it comes off that it is the first thing that we should profile when we come closer to the aesthetics of any author. It represents the key that opens us the aesthetic building. Hegel and Heidegger save art, they legitimate its seriousness, they underline its epistemological and ontological competence. But their proposals outline some inconveniences, around which the Adorno´s aesthetic theory is drawn. Let us consider the Hegelian aesthetic program especially. Hegel esteems the art as much as less game and vital tonic, and the more knowledge and serious activity he believes that it is, paradoxically he considers it more inessential opposite to the philosophy, up to the point to finally dissolve it into philosophy, and to transform it into “a past (ein Vergangenes)” 10 –an operation that has been later denominated ‘death of art’. But this paradox stops being and becomes something of the most natural thing if we bear in mind that Hegel, far from defending the peculiarity of the artistic knowledge in contrast to the philosophical one, he measures art from the pattern of the philosophy already configured in model and goal of art. Hegel has so much put to bed art on the side of the philosophical knowledge – conceptual-, and he has defended so little its specificity that the outcome could not be another than the overcoming of art through philosophy, of the intuition through concept. Certainly, when the purpose is to manifest ideas, that is to say, to express the spirit, that the spirit takes self-conscience -and this is the key point, the element that as we will see Adorno will in fact put in question starting from Hegel himself-, when this is the fact, art - that will truly represent another thing - is in disadvantage regarding the philosophical concept, and this is so because the form of artistic expression is sensitive and not all spiritual content can be ‘sensitised’, so that the sensitive character of art forces it to be limited to manifest a certain stadium of the truth, of the self-conscience of the spirit. What art does –a manifestation of the spirit, an expression of ideasthe philosophy -better, more appropriatelydoes too, the concept. Apart from that sensitive understanding of the truth, Hegel affirms the existence of a deeper understanding of the truth, the one of the reflexive thought, the philosophical one, without any relationship already with the sensitive and that you can not express it sensibly in an appropriate way 11 . Then, the art for Hegel can not longer be the “supreme and absolute form of expression of the spirit”, “the supreme form in 26 that the truth becomes existent”, the self-conscience of the spirit 12 . Art is finally overcome through thought and reflection. Art, then, turns to be something superfluous, unnecessary, being overcome by philosophy. Art, according to Hegel, dies for superfluity 13 . From the moment philosophical that Hegel conceived the work of art more as symbol of an idea it was dictated its sentence of death. In definitive, Hegel saves the epistemological relevance of art ‘philosophising’ about it, that is to say, transforming it into philosophy, in imitation of philosophical knowledge. The recovery of the epistemological value of art practiced by Hegel ends up in the most natural way in the statement that the aesthetics, the science of art, is worth more than the own art. The Hegelian authentication of the seriousness of art through philosophy ends up costing to art its own life. The case of Hegel teaches to Adorno – he teaches him to a modernized aestheticsthat the salvation of art can not be made without the own art, that is to say, the salvation has to come from the statement of the peculiarity of its non-discursive knowledge and it can not be imported from philosophy. The opposite to Hegel we find in Heidegger. If in Hegel the philosophy finally substituted art overcoming it, in Heidegger it is art which -using a term not completely appropriate- ‘overcomes’ the philosophy. In the Heideggerian thought, philosophy finishes constituting on the pattern of art. After the crisis of reason and of the scientific/rational culture, in sum, after the crisis of the metaphysical/humanist culture, philosophy does not find another possible way of survival -according to Heideggerbut to imitate art, already transformed into essential model of the philosophy 14 . The rational or conceptual knowledge of philosophy is abandoned by the poetic knowledge of art previously dehumanised and conceived as the being’s word. Philosophy, conceptualizing thought, in opinion of Heidegger, is the “enemy of thinking” 15 , of the poetic thinking of art still hidden but that it will finish supplanting the objectifying thought of the concept. In last term this is the reason of the Heideggerian sentence of aesthetics, since this consists on the -from the point of view of Heideggerimpossible desire of thinking art conceptually, a desire that represents one more form in the humanist/metaphysical way for him. Aesthetics is the humanist/metaphysical way of treating the phenomenon of art, that is to say, a humanization of a proper ontological phenomenon as art, that it is a poem written by the being; and the aesthetics of Hegel is its last and more accomplished exponent 16 . That is the way how Heidegger grants ontological and epistemological relevance -used this last term 27 with many reservationsto art, dehumanising it, separating it -better: antagonizing itof philosophy understood as discursive knowledge. However, Adorno sustains in favour of the maintenance of the separation of spheres, that art is not -neither it can be, nor it should bea “model of philosophy (philosophisches Maβ)” 17 . A philosophy that imitates the art –he adds – it eliminates itself because philosophy is conceptual, the concept is its organ 18 . Philosophy can not survive outside of the circles of the concept, its natural habitat. The case of Heidegger teaches to Adorno and in general to a contemporary aesthetics that it is not enough to affirm the peculiarity of the artistic knowledge in contrast to the conceptual one, what Heidegger does without doubt, but rather it is also necessary to avoid that the statement takes with itself the suppression of the discursive knowledge of philosophy. However, on purpose of the interpretation that Adorno does of Heidegger it is necessary to think rationally about the doubt of if that supposed elimination of the philosophy that Heidegger would practice when forcing it to imitate the art, would not rather respond to the project of achieving a new philosophy, a ‘poetic’ philosophy that would not really be mounted on the annihilation of the rational thinking –a thesis of base of Adorno-, but rather on its replacement or rooting form in its original womb, the logos mitopoiético. Only the pattern of rationality ‘modern’ and the philosophy and the technique that accompany it, that have forgotten their poiético origin, that is to say, that they have forgotten that they are functions of the alethéia, of the revealing of the truth/being, they are only the enemies of thinking. Then it is not to suppress them, but of returning them to their original source. The Heideggerian proposal would suppose the suppression of the division between art and philosophy, and its result would be the poetic thinking, a thinking where reason and poetry would reach a peaceful coexistence, and where the romantic ideal of the intellectual intuition would take body again. This interpretation of Heidegger nevertheless would collide again head-on with the position of Adorno, for whom the separation between art and philosophy -something irrevertiblebases on the same structure of the conscience, divided in two different and irreducible dimensions: a mimetic/expressive, ‘artistic’ one, and another conceptual one, ‘philosophical’. From there that Adorno underrates in principle any philosophical project that is sustained about the hope of finding in the conscience hidden sources that liberate us of the objectifying or conceptualizing thinking which is prevailing up to now, and that they open the possibility of a new and different 28 thinking for us 19 . Definitively, -and always from the perspective proposed by Adorno-, Hegel overvalued the rational or conceptual knowledge in detriment of the epistemological particularity of art; Heidegger does the same thing with the poetic knowledge in detriment of the philosophical/discursive one. What both, Hegel and Heidegger, teach to aesthetics is that this has to be mounted on the base of the avoidance of the confusion of spheres among art and philosophy, of the reduction or absorption of one for another. This is the direction that Adorno follows. Therefore, and in summary, the elements of departure of the Adornian foundation of aesthetics are the following. First, art has epistemological relevance, it is a knowledge linked to the truth; second, it is a peculiar knowledge, not discursive; and in third place, that knowledge exists beside the philosophical knowledge. In fact, the determination on the part of Adorno of the status of aesthetics is forged on the explanation of this last element, the relationship among art and philosophy, true touchstone of the nature of aesthetics. 2. Art, Dialectics and Identity Adorno finds in the Hegelian aesthetic the central piece around which aesthetics is as much profiled, the understanding of the relationship between art and philosophy, as the own philosophy. Hegel has understood the essence (dialectical) of the aesthetic thing, but far from developing it and from displaying his aesthetics and his philosophy all in agreement with it, he has drowned it and betrayed it with another philosophical impulse of a contrary nature (the principle of identity), leaving it as something onty initiated, a tendency, that certainly Adorno recovers and that he takes as central element of his aesthetic/philosophic thought 20 . From there the importance of deepening in the Hegelian aesthetic theory, main referent of the perspective of Adorno. The phenomenology of art that Hegel practiced, and that it had served him as base to develop a truly dialectical thought, it was subjected at the philosophical principle of the identity, and so what miscarried that dialectical possibility denaturalising it in a positive dialectics, being founded on the principle of identity, just the opposite to the dialectical thing. A dialectics founded about the identity is not dialectical. Indeed, Hegel has conceived art, the same thing as religion or philosophy, above all, like forms of the conscience, like positions of the subject/thought before the object/reality (Stellungen des Gedankens zur Objektivität) 20 . 29 Adorno will later insist on the same thing, he will say that “the aesthetics is not a theory of art, but, in words of Hegel, a certain position of the thought before objectivity” 22 . In short, the “aesthetic moment of the conscience” consists according to Hegel on the alienation [of the spirit] toward the sensible thing (Entfremdung zum Sinnlichen) 23 . The art is born of the spirit and it is of spiritual nature, but in the work of art the spirit reaches the non spiritual thing, the sensible/material thing. If we bear in mind that Hegel affirms that the essence of the spirit is the thought, we can assure that in the aesthetic experience the thought thinks what is not thought, the thing itself, the reality other. The aesthetic experience is dialectical, in it the spirit comes out of itself and finds its other one, it penetrates in the matter. Adorno will also echo that dialectics, therefore, does not represent a method to come closer to art but something that is immanent for it 24 . What is immanent to art, therefore, dialectics, it is but the statement of the permanent tension among fellow and object, spirit and matter, thought and real thing, irreducible one to other, but also inseparable, existing in constant reciprocal reference. Neither dualism nor absorption or identification: dialectics. However, the dialectics as long as opposed principle to the pure static duality -that does not arrive to the other thing - and to the identity -that does not leave from itself-, and as statement of the other thing, it is what allows philosophy to truly be philosophy, that is, thought of the concrete thing, of the thing itself, phenomenology. Here it is pointed the philosophical transcendency of the aesthetics discovered by Adorno: aesthetics is the characteristic field of the dialecticity. On the other hand, if we start from considering that art is already spiritual activity in its origin, what Adorno finds as essential nucleus -dialecticalof the Hegelian aesthetic it is that it affirms -at least in a tendency formthat “the art is a cell of materialism” 25 , that is to say, principle of statement - salvationof the other, of the non spiritual thing. Therefore, in art the spirit exists in permanent excursion toward what is not itself. Adorno has referred to this dialectical activity that characterizes art under the name of ‘mimesis’: “The spiritual moment of the art is not what idealism calls spirit, Adorno has written, but rather the proscribed mimetic impulse (mimetische Impuls)” 26 . This is the way art ‘thinks’, mimetically or immediately, and not by means of the concept. It does not think using words but with mimesis, without 30 mediations. For this reason Adorno sustains that the “linguistic moment (Sprachähnliche Moment)” of art is its “mimetic moment (Mimetisches)” 27 . However, the idealistic Hegel does not assume but rather he denies this mimetic/dialectical character of the spirit, and with it he suspends the dialectical possibility for the philosophy discovered by himself in the aesthetic experience. In the philosophy of Hegel it weighs more the imperative of identity than the dialectical principle. Hegel has recognized, moved by a phenomenological impulse that the characteristic of the aesthetic experience consists in that in it the spirit reaches and penetrates in the other, in what is not spirit. But this dialectical moment of aesthetics -centre of interest for Adornois disconnected by Hegel himself when sustaining that “the power of the thinking spirit is in that, it is not only captured itself in its peculiar form as thought, but rather it is also recognized to itself in its exteriorisation by means of the sensation and the sensibility, it is understood in the other thing of itself, as soon as turned into thought the alienated thing and with which it leads again to itself” 28 . Hegel annuls dialectics in which the spirit (subject, thought) recognized the other sensible/material thing (object, reality) to exist in constant and irreducible tension, and he transmutes dialectics in identity: “The subject-object of Hegel, Adorno affirms, is a subject” 29 . The own Hegel sustains -against the dialectical nature in principle hintedthe identity of the spiritual and sensitive moments of art 30 . The alienation is only a moment overcome by the impulse of self-acknowledgement characteristic of the spirit, for Versöhnung. The spirit that Adorno has discovered in the art, the spirit in general, is mimesis, alienation, dialectics; the Hegelian spirit, on the other hand, is self-conscience. But to say that in Hegel the spirit is self-conscience is equal to say that it tends to be recognized itself in the seemingly other thing, annihilating the strangeness of the world with respect to it, which reveals in last term like only appearance. The world is not essentially strange for the spirit; the final relationship between the spirit and the world is not of strangeness but of familiarity. The Hegelian spirit feels everywhere like at home. The Hegelian statement of the spirit like self-conscience is a correlate of its philosophy of the identity. However, Adorno has written that the identity “devours everything (alles Verschlingende)”, “it always looks for the totality” 31 . And so Hegel overcomes the injustices to which it seems to be subjected the world of the concrete reality, the whole blood spilled for the long-suffering individual reality. Elaborated from 31 the point of view of the spirit whose nature is the thought, the reason, transformed now into substance of the real thing, the philosophy, Hegel writes, “it remedies the apparent injustice (das Unrecht scheint) and reconciles (versöhnt) it with the rational thing” 32 . The rational spirit, that legitimates all the real thing when understanding it like an external reality of itself, does not deny -logicallythe pain nor the blood; what it denies is that they are unjust. They will be able to be from the individual's point of view, but not certainly understood in big, sub specie aeternitatis. Be it said otherwise, from the point of view of the reason -no of the understandingeverything is like it should be, the real thing (wirklich) and the rational thing (vernünftig) are only one thing 33 . In a first moment, the one that interests to Adorno, the Hegelian aesthetic is phenomenological: open to art, liberated to the aesthetic experience, it discovers the alienation, the dialectics that constitutes it essentially. But then it turns its back on this artistic peculiarity, it stops to meditate assisting to the own aesthetic experience, and it finds in it what it has already established a priori, in a purely conceptual way: that the aesthetic experience is pure manifestation of the spirit, so that in it the spirit does not really reach the other thing, it does not alienate, but rather it recognizes itself in the other thing, it alienates for self-recognising. It is the systematic moment of the Hegelian aesthetics, the one that finishes determining it. For this reason it can be said that the aesthetics of Hegel is made from outside of the own art, without meditating about the same aesthetic experience, turned its back on the dialectical specificity that this last one represents, to the alienation of the spirit toward the other that happens in it, and it is so in spite of ‘having seen it’. Such is the force of the imperative of Hegelian identity. Logically, if what is about in art is of symbolizing ideas, that is to say, that the spirit is to be recognized itself and not to be alienated, and philosophy does it in a more appropriate way, then Hegel can consider with all property the question ‘for what art’. The crash of the dialectical peculiarity of the art before the principle of identity transforms art into something superfluous. After the death - or supersedingof the art it is found the philosophy of the identity. What Adorno underlines is that Hegel himself, in the dialectical essence of the aesthetics, had discovered the antidote against this philosophy of the identity that legitimated the wounds of the concrete reality healing them up in false. In the work of art the spirit is mimesis. In the logic of the work of art there is only spirit when “it is subjected 38 1. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, her. v. K. Vorländer (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), p. 32. 2. Vide Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947), Gesammelte Schriften, her. v. G. Adorno und R. Tiedemann, Band 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 36. What Adorno also condemns is that when philosophy has come closer to art and not to religion -like in the case of Schelling or Heideggerit has made it in an inappropriate way, as if the art and the intuition possessed some preference type with regard to the science and to the concept, and therefore in detriment -as we will seeof philosophy like conceptual thought. Another thing is represented by Hegel, whose valuation and recovery of the artistic thing have been done previous subordination to the philosophical thing, to the conceptual thing. Therefore Hegel has not been located very far from the predominant attitude in the modernity that favours the primacy of science. 3. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik (1820-1829), I, Werke, Band 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), pp. 14-16. 4. Ibidem, pp. 20-21. 5. Ibidem, pp. 23-24, 28-29. 6. Ibidem, p. 151. 7. Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935), Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe, Band 5 (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1977), pp. 25, 58-59, 64, 67. 8. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie (1969), GS, Band 7, p. 391. 9. Ibidem, pp. 152, 264. 10. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, I, p. 25. 11. Ibidem, pp. 23-24. 12. Ibídem, pp. 23 s, 140 s (ed. esp., pp. 16,94). 13. Vide Eugenio Trías, “Arte y estética en el otoño de la modernidad”, Letras de Deusto, vol. 47 (1990), pp. 37-39. 14. Vide Adorno, Negative Dialektik (1966), GS, Band 6, p. 37. 15. Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1947), GA, Band 13, p. 79. 16. Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, pp. 68-69. Vide Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (1935), GA, Band 40, p. 140; Die Zeit des Weltbildes (1938), Holzwege, GA, Band 5, p. 69. 17. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, pp. 26-27; Philosophische Terminologie. Zur Einleitung (1962/63), I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), p. 167. 18. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 27. 19. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie, I, p. 81; Negative Dialektik, p. 26. 20. This is the leitmotiv that presides over the understanding of the aesthetics of Adorno carried out by Albrecht Wellmer (vide Verdad, apariencia, reconciliación, en Sobre la dialéctica de modernidad y postmodernidad, trans. José Luis Arantegui (Madrid: Visor, 1993), pp. 15-18) and Vicente Gómez (vide El pensamiento estético de Th. W. Adorno (Madrid: Cátedra/Universidad de Valencia, 1998), passim). 21. Hegel, Enziklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817-30), I, Werke, Band 8, § 2-4, 25-26, 74, pp. 41-45, 90 ss, 163 s. 22. Adorno, Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen (1931), GS, Band 2, p. 262 (Notiz). 23. Hege1, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, p. 28. 24. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 211. 25. Adorno, Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen, p. 186. 26. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 305. 27. Ibidem, p. 139. 28. Hege1, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, p. 28. 29. Adorno, Drei Studien zu Hegel (1956/63), GS, Band 5, p. 261. 30. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, p. 28. 31. Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (1962/64), GS, Band 6, p. 506. 32. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (1822-28), her. v. J. Hoffmeister, I (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955), p. 78. 33. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), Werke, Band 7, p. 24. 34. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 180. 35. Ibidem, pp. 35, 286, 387. 36. Ibidem, p. 179. 39 37. Ibidem, p. 140. 38. Ibidem, p. 524. 39. Ibidem, p. 513. 40. Ibidem. 41. Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben (1944/51), GS, Band 4, p. 253. 42. Ibidem. 43. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 518. 44. Ibidem, p. 510. 45. Ibidem, p. 191. 46. Ibidem, pp. 193, 524. 47. Ibidem, p. 197. 48. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 27; Drei Studien zu Hegel, pp. 284-285. 49. Adorno, Die Aktualität der Philosophie (1931), GS, Band 1, p. 325; Der Essay als Form (1954), GS, Band 11, p. 17. 50. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 17. Adorno has sustained in several places the “primacy (Vorrang) of the object” (Negative Dialektik, pp. 184-186; Ästhetische Theorie, p. 384), but not for dissolving the thought but for forcing it -against all idealismto assist to the other thing, to the real and concrete, to what is not thought. The primacy of the object is a call to the ‘negative dialectics’, a dialectics that does not finalise in identity, opposite to the ‘Hegelian positive dialectics’, idealistic, that finishes overcoming the difference between thought/thing in identity, in false reconciliation. 51. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 191. 52. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 62. 53. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie, I, p. 56; Negative Dialektik, pp. 21, 159. 54. Adorno, Drei Studien zu Hegel, p. 354; Philosophische Terminologie, I, p. 81.