British and German military planning in World War II regarding the ‘long-haul neutrals’

141 Copyright: © 2025 ULPGC. Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivar (by-nc-nd) Spain 3.0. Vegueta. Anuario de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia 25 (1), 2025, 141-163 eISSN: 2341-1112 https://doi.org/10.51349/veg.2025.1.06 British and German military planning in World War II regarding the ‘long-haul neutrals’ Planificación militar británica y alemana en la Segunda Guerra Mundial sobre los neutrales «a largo plazo» Juan José Díaz Benítez Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3563-1326 [email protected] Recibido: 20/10/2023; Revisado: 04/10/2024; Aceptado: 13/10/2024 Abstract The main objective of this study is to compare the military planning of the United Kingdom and the Third Reich regarding Spain and other European neutral countries (Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey) throughout each of the phases of the Second World War. This required a systematic compilation of plans from primary sources in The National Archives in the United Kingdom and the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Germany. The main conclusion is that Spain’s nonbelligerent position was a key differentiating factor influencing the strategy adopted by each side towards the other European neutral countries. Keywords: Neutrality, Non-Belligerence, International Relations, World War II, Spain. Resumen El objetivo principal es realizar un análisis comparado entre la planificación militar del Reino Unido y el Tercer Reich sobre España y la que elaboraron con respecto a otros neutrales europeos (Irlanda, Portugal, Suecia, Suiza y Turquía) en cada una de las fases de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Con este fin se ha realizado una recopilación sistemática de estos planes a partir de las fuentes primarias disponibles en The National Archives (Reino Unido) y el Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Alemania). Como conclusión principal destaca que la no beligerancia española fue un factor diferenciador en la estrategia que siguieron ambos bandos hacia los neutrales europeos. Palabras clave: neutralidad, no beligerancia, relaciones internacionales, Segunda Guerra Mundial, España. Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 British and German military planning in World War II... 142 1. INTRODUCTION The vast amount of literature on World War II includes research on the relations between belligerents and neutrals. It is nonetheless a subject that has received less attention than others, frequently approached from national perspectives and devoid of a global comparative approach to the group of neutral states. One of the main overviews of the subject is the collective monograph edited by Louis-Edouard Roulet with general overviews of British (Watt, 1985) and German (Martin, 1985) policies about the European neutrals. More recently it’s to be noted the collective monograph edited by Neville Wylie (2002) which describes the situation of the ‘long-haul neutrals’ (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland), among other neutral countries. The book edited by Wylie is one of the few that offers a broad vision of the neutral states. Yet a veritable comparative analysis of this subject still lacks as each country in Wylie’s monograph is examined independently in separate chapters authored by renowned specialists. Christian Leitz a few years earlier addressed the issue of ‘long-haul neutrals’ (excluding Ireland but adding Turkey) through a comparative analysis of their links with the belligerents. While each country is analysed in a specific chapter, the comparative aspects are relegated to the conclusions (leitz, 2000: 175-191). More recently H. R. reginbogin (2009) delved into the question of Swiss neutrality by comparing it to that of other countries. Another interesting comparative studies are the articles by Roberto russell and Juan Gabriel tokatlian (2001), and Uğur serçe (2022). The study of neutrality in Europe during the Second World War suffers from several research gaps. One of them is that none the numerous studies focusing on each individual neutral country has culminated in a comprehensive comparative analysis yielding a more complete perspective of their situation and actions during the conflict. There are many subjects to be compared, but in this article the issue is limited to a specific aspect: the military planning of the belligerents with respect to the ‘long-haul neutrals’, a topic that has received less attention than others such as economic relations. However, this subject likewise offers a broader vision of the strategy, beyond diplomatic relations, of the belligerents towards neutrals and paves the way to a clearer definition of the threats to neutrals. Hence the main objective of this article is to compare the military planning by the great powers with regard to the ‘long-haul neutrals’. This is not an unknown question. German plans to occupy Switzerland have been widely studied by Ernst uhlMann (1949), Hans Rudolf kurz (1957 and 1972) and Klaus urner (1990), among others. The more detailed study about German military planning about the Iberian Peninsula is the book by Charles B. burdick (1968), an old but essential reference for this subject. Other German plans have received less attention, but they have been traced by other researchers: the project for landing in Ireland has been discussed by Peter FleMing (1957) and Robert Fisk (1985); the study to invade Sweden is commented by John gilMour (2011); a plan for Turkey have been mentioned by Michael kerrigan (2012). British military planning on these neutrals has been studied by a wide number of researchers: Robert Fisk (1985) and Eunan o’halpin Juan José Díaz Benítez Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 143 (1999) for Ireland; José António telo (1987, 1991 and 1993) and díaz benítez (2023) for Portugal; Jukka nevakivi (1976) and Patrick salMon (1997) for Sweden; Luis Pascual sánchez-gijón (1984), Denis sMyth (1986), Antonio Marquina barrio (1986), Víctor Morales lezcano (1995), Enrique Moradiellos (2005), Pablo cuevas (2023), and Juan José díaz benítez (2024a), among others for Spain. It is not a question, therefore, of exploring a topic of prior research or solving all the gaps with respect to European neutrality during the Second World War and, more specifically, that of Spanish non-belligerence but to respond to a specific research gap on this issue: the lack of a comparative perspective. It thus focuses on an issue, the military planning of belligerents with respect to neutrals, up to now treated in an isolated manner for each country, an approach that facilitates research stemming from prior findings but lacking comparative analyses to contextualise them into a broader interpretive framework. The interest of this objective stems from the need to resolve two historiographic gaps regarding European neutrality during the Second World War. The first is to settle the lack of comparative research on the different military plans of the belligerents regarding neutral countries. The second is to reconsider Spanish non-belligerence in a European context, avoiding the clichés of Spain as an anomaly in European history, while simultaneously identifying its specificities within a broader framework. The investigation stems from a premise established by historiography, notably that neutrality did not prevent these countries from becoming targets of belligerent military planning. This threat, obvious in the cases of the neutrals that were ultimately invaded, was likewise extended to those that managed to stay out of the war. The current article, based on this standpoint, therefore attempts to demonstrate that the factor in the case of Spain that had the greatest influence on the military planning of the belligerents was the possibility that it enters the war alongside the Axis powers. To carry this out we analysed a series of primary documents housed in The National Archives (TNA) in the United Kingdom and the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) in Germany that record the main plans drawn up by the main actors of the events, the Allies and Axis powers. Many of these documents have been consulted by other researchers: this article doesn’t pretend to discover new documents, but just support this research and to show where to find more information from primary sources, that it’s not possible to describe in detail in these pages. The work of other authors served to gather information about other initiatives such as the North American plan to seize the Azores (telo, 1993: 339-340), and the Italian plans to overrun Switzerland (rovighi, 1987: 177-188). To develop the comparative perspective, the following pages will focus on two questions. First, the necessity of military planning on neutral countries, and the distinction between defensive and offensive projects: sometimes to outmatch the enemy, and other times to counter enemy’s moves. Second, the viability of the military planning on the ‘long-haul neutrals’: some operations were to be carried on, but others were just a theorical exercise or an excuse to avoid a heavy commitment. To make the analysis easier, the military planning will be classified in three sections: the first one for British planning on the most of the ‘long-haul Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112144 British and German military planning in World War II... neutrals’, the second one for British projects about Spain and Portugal, and the third one for German planning. The comparative between British and German planning will be developed in the Conclusions, completed by a final consideration about the military planning on each neutral country. Along the analysis, the main two sections include a short description of this planning: the high number of projects doesn’t allow a more detailed view of each one, and there are more extensive studies on them. Finally, this military planning is related to projects for the deployment of military forces: operations by intelligence services, as the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Abwehr/Ausland, have been studied in other articles, so they haven’t been included in these pages as part of the military planning. 2. BRITISH MILITARY PROJECTS ON THE ‘LONG-HAUL NEUTRALS’ One of the reasons for military planning on neutral countries was the possibility to outmatch the enemy or indeed to force its defeat. That was the motive behind Allied planning on Sweden, a ‘long-haul neutral’ country that received the most attention from British military planning during the initial phase of the war. Support for Norway and Sweden in the event of a Soviet aggression was initially ruled out by the British Joint Planning Staff (JPS) due to lack of means1. But the start of hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union encouraged the hopes of the War Cabinet (CAB), and especially Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, to interrupt shipments of Swedish iron ore to the Third Reich through Norwegian ports. The Royal Navy for this purpose deliberated between 1937 and 1939 options of mining operations and disrupting communications (salMon, 1997: 340-344). Churchill in September advanced Operation Catherine which would place a naval force to prevent German imports of Swedish iron (roberts, 2019: 630-631). However, it was not until December 1939 that preparations for an expeditionary force to Sweden began to prevent these exports under the pretext of guaranteeing its defence against the Red Army (gilMour, 2011: 41-43; levine, 2002: 316-317). This intervention would have been triggered by a request of these Scandinavian countries. The Swedes nonetheless did not opt for this solution as it implied involvement in the war (nevakivi, 1976: 74, 104-107). The Allies prepared two operations, Stratford and Avonmouth, to intervene in Norway and Sweden in February 1940 but discarded due to Finland’s defeat.2 The mining of Norwegian waters by the Royal Navy began that year on April 8. The Avonmouth operation was nonetheless pre-empted by the Wehrmacht as it invaded Norway the next day (nevakivi 1976: 153-158). Between September and October 1941, and after German invasion of Soviet Union, the JPS examined Operation Ajax whose objective was to seize the 1 The National Archives (TNA), CAB 84/8, report JP (29) 70, 27 October 1939. 2 TNA, CAB 84/2, JP (40) 2nd Mtg., 23 January 1940, and JP (40) 5th Mtg., 7 February 1940; CAB 65/12, WM (40) 68th Conclusions, Minute 4, Confidential Annex, 14 March 1940. Juan José Díaz Benítez Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 145 Norwegian port of Trondheim and whose execution required, besides the great difficulties in carrying it out, that Sweden join the war effort against the Third Reich.3 This operation was intended to promote a Norwegian uprising and to attract German forces from other sceneries, a less ambitious objective than Avonmouth and Stratford, intended to stop or at least decelerate German industry. Ajax was propelled by Churchill, but the view from the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and the JPS were less optimistic: the operation required too many forces and shipping to be detracted from other projects and commitments, and it had few chances to be successful. So, Ajax just remained on paper and didn’t go further due to poor viability. The reasons for the cancellation of Avonmouth and Stratford were different: the Allied forces and commanders were designed for this task, but the lack of Swedish and Norwegian consent didn’t let to implement these operations, finally surpassed by German operation Weserübung to conquer Denmark and Norway. The Apostle I and Apostle II projects were drafted in the case of a total German surrender, or a surrender limited exclusively to Norway in which Sweden could intervene without the Allies having to re-equip their armed forces.4 Between 1943 and 1945 the Scandinavian country recruited, armed, and trained paramilitary forces among Danish and Norwegian refugees to implement order in their countries after the German surrender (gilMour, 2011: 101-103). Aside from the Fortitude North and Graffham deceptions to divert German attention from the Normandy landings (gilMour, 2011: 106), the JPS on November 30, 1944, prepared a draft on the advisability of involving Sweden in the war on the side of the Allies highlighting as the main drawback the limited capacity of the Swedish Army, its need of excessive air support and the absence of great repercussions on the German war effort. Despite these drawbacks it recommended initiating an unofficial approach to the Swedish Government.5 In fact, the reports of January and February 1945 ruled out enrolling Sweden into the war effort against Germany due to the disadvantages outweighing the advantages. Sweden, in fact, could only enter the war on the condition of military aid that could only be provided by the Soviet Union that the JPS, for political reasons, preferred not to solicit.6 The Swedish Government eventually agreed to initiate military talks in April to act against the German garrison in Norway (gilMour, 2011: 108-111). The JPS thus recommended on May 2, 1945, that the Allied mission to Sweden include Norwegian participation and the acceptance that the Allies not be obliged to reequip the Swedish Armed Forces. This mission was not pursued as a few days later the war in Europe came to a halt.7 Although less ambitious than Ajax, and moreover Stratford and Avonmouth, Apostle I and Apostle II were aimed to take advantage on the last days of Third Reich and before Soviet Union could come 3 TNA, CAB 84/35, reports JP (41) 798, 29 September 1941, and JP (41) 847, 14 October 1941. 4 TNA, CAB 121/475, JP (45) 43 (Final), 20 March 1945 5 TNA, CAB 84/67, report JP (44) 284 (S) (Draft), 30 November 1944. 6 TNA, CAB 84/69, report JP (45) 27 (Final), 25 January 1945; TNA, CAB 121/475, report JP (45) (Final), 19 February 1945. 7 TNA, CAB 121/475, report JP (45) 109 (Final), 2 May 1945. Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 British and German military planning in World War II... into Norway. These last military projects for Sweeden were not simple exercises: the beginning of military talks between the Allies and the Scandinavian country suggests a real intention to implement these operations, finally cancelled by the end of the war. Another interesting area for the Allies at the beginning of the war was the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey that had signed a treaty of mutual aid with the Allies against the Axis in the Balkans and the Mediterranean (leitz, 2000: 85-87) that from October 1939 (and still in effect in May 1940) gave rise to a series of reports by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee (JPSC) on the assistance it would require in the event of an Axis aggression.8 Allied defeats in France and Italian belligerence in June 1940 advised against Turkish belligerence: it would be impossible to assist Turkey in a war against the Axis. In November 1940 the JPS recommended in a report approved by the COS that Turkey join the Allies, even though the United Kingdom was in no position to assist it in repelling a German attack,9 but the CAB didn’t go ahead. Only since 1943, Great Britain tried to bring Turkey into the war, to stop Turkish chrome exports to the Third Reich, to distract German forces, and to menace German oil wells in Romania. Operation Hardihood in mid-1943 in fact aimed at strengthening Turkey’s defences against an Axis attack and install air bases to bomb southeastern Europe.10 British diplomatic efforts on Turkey continued until to get the Turkish belligerence against the Third Reich at the beginning of 1945 (vanderlippe, 2001: 69-80; dockter, 2021: 882-889). Like Stratford and Avonmouth, Hardihood was intended to obstruct German war effort, although they were not directed against the neutral countries, and they did not suppose a menace against them or their neutral rights. On the other hand, bringing Turkey into the war implied a so heavy commitment on Allied resources that made it inviable in the first years of the war. However, this consideration changed since 1943, when the course of the war changed against the Axis, despite it implied a considerable effort for Great Britain. Finally, it wasn’t realized because Turkish belligerence was declared in a short time before the end of the war and when there was no immediate German menace against Turkey. These offensive plans were made to outmatch the enemy, but the Allies prepared defensive projects against a German move on neutral countries. One of the first examples is French collaboration with the Swiss Army between June and October 1939 to defend the alpine country against a German aggression in their potential attempt to outflank the French Army (kurz, 1957: 19-24). There is no record of the signing of any military agreement (chevallaz, 1995: 145152), although there is evidence of military contacts in the winter of 1939-40 in documents captured by the German Army.11 Switzerland wasn’t an objective for British military planners, although the SOE studied sabotage operations 8 TNA, CAB 84/8, report JP (39) 65, 21 October 1939, and CAB 84/13, report JP (40) 143, 7 May 1940. 9 TNA, CAB 84/22, report JP (40) 622, 13 November 1940, and CAB 84/2, JP (40) 131st Mtg, 13 November 1940. 10 TNA, CAB 84/54, report JP (43) 218 (Final), 21 June 1943, and note JP (43) 240 (Final), 20 July 1943. 11 Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA), RH 2/465, OKH, note by Fremde Heere West/IV to Operation Abteilung, 3 September 1940. 146 Juan José Díaz Benítez Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 (Wylie, 2003: 181-194). The unique report prepared by the JPS for an invasion of Switzerland was in January 1945, as a theoretical exercise: it foresaw the military drawbacks (without entering political considerations) that could arise from violating its neutrality. The objective of the Allies in invading Switzerland was to force a German withdrawal from the Upper Rhine to facilitate their advance into the Third Reich. However, this invasion would have provoked a reaction from the Helvetians who at that time could confront the Allies with nine divisions and twelve well-trained and equipped infantry brigades on a type of terrain more favourable for defence than attack. The same was true of southern Germany where an advance would have required between 40 and 50 infantry divisions, as well as a great logistics to maintain such as large force while the Wehrmacht could hold out with fewer numbers of troops to carry out attacks in other sectors of the Western Front.12 This was an offensive plan, but too an inviable one, just to discard this idea from Allied strategy. Ireland was the object of British military planning as even before the war had explored (albeit discarded) occupying Berehaven (o’halpin, 1999: 172-173). At the end of May 1940, after the defeat of the Allies in Europe, the CAB agreed to initiate a rapprochement with the Irish Government for access to Berehaven to protect its navigation and coordinate the defence against a potential German invasion, which represented a threat to Great Britain.13 The need to expand the number of its allies to counter the Axis Alliance led the British planning committees during this period to considered enlisting several European neutrals as belligerents. What was more worrying was a potential German invasion of Ireland which led to conversations with the Government of Eire in June 1940 (Fisk, 1985: 186-219)14 and preparations that same month of an operation to deploy British forces to Ireland to counter the invasion (Fisk, 1985: 233-244).15 Preparations continued throughout the second half of that year until at the end of 1942 when the JPS recommended reducing the forces concentrated in Northern Ireland as a German attack was deemed unlikely (Fisk, 1985: 271-275).16 Unlike Allied plans on Sweeden and Turkey, British planning about Ireland didn’t try to outmatch the Axis but to combat a possible German invasion of Ireland that could be a direct menace against Britain. So, military planning about Sweeden and Turkey could be convenient, but military planning about Ireland in 1940 and 1941 was necessary, at least until German menace of invasion disappeared. The defensive nature of the British project to deploy forces in Ireland was completed by its viability: it wasn’t a theoretical exercise, but a plan to be implemented with forces and commander assigned, and with a clear air and naval superiority against German forces. However, the main handicap against the viability of this operation wasn’t military, but political: British forces could only entry into Ireland 12 TNA, CAB 84/69, report JP (45) 3 (Final), 19 January 1945. 13 TNA, CAB 66/7, WM (40) 141st Conclusions, 25 May 1940; CAB 65/7, WM (40) 141st Conclusions, 27 May 1940; JP (40) 45th Mtg, 24 May 1940. 14 TNA, CAB 123/196, notes on the conversations between De Valera and MacDonald, June-July 1940. 15 TNA, CAB 84/15, report JP (40) 268, 22 June 1940. 16 TNA, CAB 84/50, report JP (42) 968, 26 November 1942. 147 Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112148 British and German military planning in World War II... when Irish Government ask for help or after the landing of German troops, but not before (Table 1). table 1. british Military projects on ireland, sWeeden, sWitzerland, and turkey, 1939-1945 Country Codename Dates Objective Nature Viability Ireland --- 1940-1942 To combat a German invasion of the island Defensive Military viability, but political uncertainty Sweeden Avonmouth 1939-1940 To interrupt shipments of Swedish iron ore to the Third Reich Offensive Military viability, but political unviability Ajax 1941 To size the Norwegian port of Trondheim Offensive Military and political unviability Apostle I and II 1945 To disarm German forces in Norway Offensive Military and political viability Switzerland --- 1945 Invasion of the country to force the German withdrawal from Upper Rhin Offensive Unviable: theoretical exercise Turkey Hardihood 1943 To defend the country, after bringing Turkey into the war against the Third Reich Offensive Military viability, but political uncertainty Source: Own elaboration based on the sources cited in the article. 3. AN AMBIGUOUS PLANNING: BRITISH MILITARY PROJECTS FOR THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND THE ATLANTIC ISLANDS Ireland received attention in British planning for a longer time than Switzerland, but less than the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic islands, where it presented an ambiguous nature: some projects were to give military assistance to these countries, but others were to fight against Portuguese or Spanish forces. To understand this apparently confusing view it’s necessary to let attention to the risk of Spanish belligerence since June 1940 and the subsequently menace on Gibraltar. The risk of the Third Reich taking Gibraltar with Spanish Government collaboration and the risk of a German occupation of the Atlantic islands led the British planning committees to draw up various preventive operations or at least actions to counteract the serious potential consequences on British strategic communications in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Analyses and preparation began in the summer of 1940 to occupy the Canary Islands (Bugler/Chutney/Puma/ Pilgrim), the Azores (Alloy/Brisk, Paradox/Fanweise, Truck and Thruster/Sparklet), Madeira (Springboard) and the islands of Cabo Verde (Shrapnel/Baseball). These Juan José Díaz Benítez Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 149 would serve as alternatives to Gibraltar if it were to be lost or subjected to bombardment. This gave rise to plans persisting until 1943 contemplating both the conquest of these islands or their occupation by invitation (telo, 1993: 308315, 327, 331-332; díaz benítez, 2008: 70-86, 157-184)17. While they prepared for an occupation of the Atlantic islands by force, the British Government began talks with the Portuguese to collaborate in its defence against a German attack (telo, 1987: 325-328).18 The British in the autumn of 1940 also contemplated the possibility of collaborating with part of the Spanish Armed Forces against a hypothetical attack on Gibraltar by the Germans, which meant planning operations in the south of the Peninsula and in Spanish Morocco. These were nonetheless discarded by early 1941 (Moradiellos, 2005: 188-195, 212-215; sMyth, 1986: 104-105, 150-165, 176-177; sánchez-gijón, 1984: 67-88).19 The United States, concerned about the defence of the western hemisphere, prepared in May 1941 an operation called Gray to occupy the Azores which was later postponed when the Germans invaded of the Soviet Union (telo, 1993: 339-340). After German invasion of the Soviet Union, planning among the British continued its focus on the Portuguese Atlantic islands (telo, 1993: 343-356) despite that the Canary Islands was its main objective (díaz benítez, 2008: 219252). Currently the British continued military talks with Portugal (telo, 1991: 82). Allied plans to seize both the Portuguese (Ringcraft and Pressgang)20 and Spanish (Tonic, Breezy and Adroit) Atlantic islands (díaz benítez, 2008: 281-310) continued after the United States came into the war and even after the Allied landings in northwestern Africa. The preparations of this last operation contemplated the possibility of Spain being hostile or allowing German forces passage through its territory to attack Gibraltar. This led to planning for a new operation called Backbone to occupy the Spanish protectorate of Morocco21 and attack mainland Spain around Gibraltar.22 Moreover, the British, in anticipation of an invasion of Spain by the Axis powers, contemplated the creating of a bridgehead in the south of the Peninsula made up of Allied and Spanish forces (Marquina barrio, 1986: 64-68).23 Finally, the JPS in mid-1942 planned for the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to interrupt exports of iron to Germany without counting on assistance from Sweden. Furthermore, at the end of that year it reflected on how to induce Turkey into the war on the side of the Allies.24 In 1943 the Allies permanently cancelled certain plans they had set in motion over the years while simultaneously introducing new ones. British schemes to 17 TNA, CAB 84/15, report JP (40) 257, 20 June 1940. 18 TNA, CAB 84/26, report JP (41) 27, 1 January 1941, and CAB 84/28, notes JP (41) 193 (E), 9 March 1941, and JP (41) 194 (E), 10 March 1941. 19 TNA, CAB 84/22-28, JPS reports on several operations, 1940-1941. 20 TNA, WO 106/3060, report JP (42) 343 (E) (Revised Draft), 19 April 1942, and CAB 84/49, report JP (42) 855, 1 October 1942. 21 TNA, WO 106/2737, report JP (42) 770, 1 September 1942, and CAB 121/495, report JP (42) 887 (E). 22 TNA, CAB 84/49, note JP (42) 856, 1 October 1942. 23 TNA, CAB 84/51, report JP (42) 1941, 31 December 1942. 24 TNA, CAB 84/46, report JP (42) 568, 3 June 1942, and CAB 84/51, report JP (42) 1030, 23 December 1942. Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112156 British and German military planning in World War II... Spanish military authorities, and a dozen of German naval guns were delivered for the defence of the main islands (díaz benítez, 2024b). Felix was an offensive operation, that considered too the possibility of British counterattack in the Atlantic islands and the Iberian Peninsula. Although in March 1941 the plan was to execute the last version of the project against Gibraltar, Operation Felix-Heinrich on October 14, 1941, the date when the Soviet campaign was scheduled to end, Hitler ordered from May to prepare Operation Isabella to expel the British forces that could disembark in the Peninsula (burdick, 1968: 131137).38 There were two versions of Operation Isabella for Spain in August of that year depending on whether it received prior notice of a British landing (burdick, 1968: 143-149).39 Unlike Felix, Isabella didn’t pretend to outmatch Allied forces, but to avoid their presence in the Peninsula, and was a viable operation assigned to German forces in occupied France. However, the attrition in the Eastern Front made it inviable, so in 1942 Isabella was replaced by Ilona, later called Gisela. The aim was to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees and the ports of northern Spain in the event of an Allied landing (burdick, 1968: 148-177).40 The objective of Ilona/ Gisela was less ambitious than the task intended for Isabella, but the growing attrition against the Red Army made it non-viable, so it was replaced in January 1944 by Nürnberg, a less ambitious scheme as it was limited to preventing the Allies from crossing the Pyrenees (burdick, 1968: 191-193). The Kriegsmarine in April of that year was still contemplating Operation Gisela.41 The expulsion of the Wehrmacht from France in August 1944 ultimately ended Germany’s military plans for the Peninsula initiated in 1940. The importance and viability of the planning against an Allied landing in the Peninsula decreased during 1941-1944: at the beginning it was a necessary plan with forces available against an imminent menace; since 1942 there weren’t enough forces and, in the next years, the risk wasn’t urgent, but a possibility, every time less important than Allied moves in other fronts (Table 4). The plans drawn up by the Third Reich for Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden, and Switzerland were aimed at total or partial occupations, which did not prevent the sale of arms to certain (Portugal and Turkey) or maintaining key commercial relations, especially for the Third Reich, with all except Ireland. In fact, it was precisely the economic interests that discouraged the Third Reich from invading them. Other factors also played decisive roles in the Third Reich’s preference for respecting their neutrality rather than occupying them as it had done with other nations in the first phase of the war. These included factors of strategic nature such as the transit of two million German soldiers through Sweden or the need to not jeopardise the safety of the Alpine passes connecting the Third Reich with Italy through Switzerland. Ireland was perhaps the least economically interesting target whose occupation was less viable as British air, 38 BA-MA, RH 2/452, Operation Isabella, 1941. 39 BA-MA, RH 20-1/126, RH 20-7/75-100 y RH 24-80/30. 40 BA-MA, RH 2/450, RH 20-1/117, 123, 126, 127, 133-144 y RW 4/574, Operation Illona/Gisela, 19421943. 41 BA-MA, RM 7/1007 and RM 7/2335, Operation Gisela, 1943-1944. Juan José Díaz Benítez Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 157 and naval superiority rendered its invasion practically impossible. The only exception in this regard was Spain as the German plans did not contemplate its invasion but a collaboration to attack Gibraltar or to repel an Allied landing in the Peninsula. This is a key difference with respect to the other neutral states as the Spanish Armed Forces in the German plans did not appear as an enemy but an ally. But the most crucial difference with respect to the other neutrals is that Spain was the only neutral nation that attempted to enter the war alongside the Axis, specifically in the summer and autumn of 1940, when, after proclaiming itself non-belligerent, it offered and fruitlessly negotiated its entry into the war with the Third Reich abandoning its position of non-belligerence (díaz benítez, 2024c: 103-123). table 4. gerMan Military projects on the ‘long-haul neutrals’, 1940-1944 Country Codename Dates Objective Nature Viability Ireland Grünn 19401942 Invasion of the island Offensive Military uncertainty Turkey --- 19401941 Invasion of Turkey Offensive Military viability Gertrude 1942 Invasion of Turkey Offensive Military viability Switzerland Tannenbaum, Zimmermann, Warthegau 19401944 Invasion of Switzerland Offensive Military viability Sweeden --- 1943 Invasion of Sweeden Offensive Theoretical exercise: military unviability Spain and Portugal Dwarsläufer 1940 Seizure of the Azores Offensive Military unviability Felix 19401941 Seizure of Gibraltar and the Portuguese Atlantic islands, and support the Spanish forces in the Canary Islands Offensive Military viability Isabella 19411942 Defence of the Iberian Peninsula against an Allied landing, and the German-Spanish invasion of Portugal Defensive in Spain and offensive in Portugal Military viability until 1942 Illona, Gisela 19421944 Defence of the coast of northern Spain against an Allied landing Defensive Military viability until 1944 Nürnberg 1944 Defence of the Pyrenees against the Allies Defensive Military viability Source: Own elaboration based on the sources cited in the article. Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112158 British and German military planning in World War II... 5. CONCLUSIONS Military planning by the belligerents about the ‘long-haul neutrals’ presents significative differences in two key questions: the necessity and the viability of the different projects. Sweeden was the object of military projects from the beginning of the war until the end, but this strategic value was very different for the belligerents. The Third Reich only studied the occupation of this country in 1943, just in the event of a Swedish belligerence, and with an operation that wasn’t viable because of the lack of forces for the attrition war in the Eastern Front. Instead, the Allied military projects about Sweeden were intended to outmatch the Third Reich or at least to waken it. At the beginning of the war, Franco-British operations to stop Swedish iron exports to Germany were militarily viable, but the slow planning and the lack of Swedish and Norwegian collaboration made them to be cancelled. British Ajax in 1941 was less ambitious, like Apostle I and Apostle II, but the last ones were viable: instead, the cost of Ajax and its limited chances of success made it not recommendable. Anyway, there is another relevant difference between German and Allied planning about Sweeden. The German plan was designed to conquer the Scandinavian country, but the Allied plans didn’t try to combat against the Swedish armed forces. In fact, the Allies tried to get Swedish consent for Avonmouth and Stratford, and at the end of the war, started military contacts for Apostle I and Apostle II. Switzerland was another country that received an unequal attention by both belligerents. France tried a military collaboration before the defeat of 1940: it was to fight with the Swiss against a German invasion, but there wasn’t any military agreement, and the contacts ended after the French defeat. In 1945, at the end of the war British military planners studied the invasion of the Alpine country only as a theoretical exercise to avoid any action in this area. However, between 1940 and 1944, the Third Reich prepared a series of plans to conquer Switzerland. The risk was imminent in June 1940, when German High Command thought it could be necessary to force French surrender. The planning continued after French armistice, but the necessity of a plan to conquer Switzerland decreased, so these Tannenbaum plans have been discussed as a real menace or just a theoretical exercise, especially the last plans in 1943-1944. The viability of German projects about Switzerland was decreasing too. The conquer of the Alpine country required a great number of forces, sometimes too many for the German High Command. These forces could be available in 1940 and at least in the first half of 1941. However, after the invasion of the Soviet Union this availability decreased too, while Swiss defences were strengthened, and the risk of heavy casualties became higher. Switzerland received more attention from German planners than Sweden, and, in both cases, the objective was to conquer these countries. Nevertheless, the necessity of this planning diminished above all because of the growing attrition in the Eastern Front. The occupation of Ireland was a project more interesting than Sweeden and, during some months, Switzerland. The control of this island could let the Wehrmacht to deploy forces against Great Britain. The nature of the Operation Juan José Díaz Benítez Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112 159 Grün has been discussed as a distraction or a real menace: the allocation of forces for this project and the training exercises suggests a real menace. However, the question was the viability of the operation: for Hitler were possible, but for Admiral Raeder was a high risk and had few chances of success because of British naval and air mastery. In other words, it wasn’t considered impossible, but the balance of costs, high risk and few chances of success made it undesirable. On the other hand, the British plan to avoid German landing in Ireland was a defensive necessity, above all since June 1940 y during the last half of that year and during 1941: only at the end of 1942, after Axis defeats in every war front, the German invasion of Ireland was considered improbable. The British plan was militarily viable, but the main obstacle was politic: it wasn’t intended against Irish Government, but to help Irish Army to defeat the German forces landed in the island. Like Allied planning about Sweden, Great Britain didn’t try to conquer of fight against Ireland, but to get its acquiescence against the Axis. Turkey was a neutral country until February 1945, when came into the war against the Third Reich. One of the reasons for keeping the neutrality for a long time was that the belligerents, mainly Great Britain and the Third Reich, didn’t consider Turkish belligerence as an essential question, but just a possibility in some moment to outmatch the enemy. At the beginning of the war the Allies and Turkey had signed an agreement with military commitments for everyone, but, after Franco-German armistice, Great Britain didn’t force Turkish belligerence: only since 1943 sought it and studied Operation Hardihood to strengthen Turkish defences and to menace Axis southeast Europe. However, German military planning about Turkey had an offensive nature: the objective was to pass through the country towards the Near East and the Caucasus. German projects on this country were considered between late 1940 and 1942: they could seem viable, but the attrition on the Eastern Front made them non-viable, like German planning about other neutral countries. Moreover, German occupation of Turkey wouldn’t outbalance the advantages of Turkish neutrality as chromo imports. British aid was considered a difficult task at the beginning, but not an impossible one, and was viable too in Hardihood project in 1943. Nevertheless, the question was that British planning needed Turkish acquiescence: it wasn’t addressed against this country. The Iberian countries received more attention in the belligerent’s military planning than any other ‘long haul neutral’, and during a long time: since 1940 to 1943. However, there are some differences about the nature and the viability of the military projects on the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic Islands. German Operation Felix, aimed to conquer Gibraltar, was designed to outmatch Great Britain: it was viable, and the Wehrmacht was ready to accomplish it, but the Third Reich needed the Spanish belligerence for this task like British planning on Sweeden, Ireland and Turkey required the acquiescence or the belligerence for these operations, and this political condition made it non-viable. The rest of the German projects for Spain and Portugal had a different nature: they were intended against any Allied force that could land in the Iberian Peninsula (Isabella, Ilona/ Gisela and Nürnberg) or to prevent the Allied seizure of the Portuguese Atlantic Vegueta, 25 (1), 2025, 141-163. eISSN: 2341-1112160 British and German military planning in World War II... islands (Dwarsläufer). Their viability was a different question: the occupation of the Portuguese islands for a long time was considered too expensive and impossible by the Skl, while the attrition of the Wehrmacht in the Eastern Front made the German planning on the Iberian Peninsula non-viable and led to less ambitious operations until 1944. British projects about these countries weren’t studied to weaken the Third Reich, but to counter a German action, mainly the attack on Gibraltar. For this reason, British operations were conceived to support Portuguese or Spanish troops in the Iberian Peninsula or the Spanish Morocco, and to the occupation or the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic islands as alternative to Gibraltar. The viability of these projects was reverse to the German ones in these countries: for British planners the operations to take the Atlantic islands were viable, but the plans on the Iberian Peninsula were more expensive and highly risky. Moreover, there were British forces assigned and ready to take the Portuguese Atlantic islands in 1940 and the Canaries in 1941. Most of British and German planning about the Iberian countries was conceived to counter an enemy action, but there were significative differences between both belligerents. German planning about Portugal was addressed against Portuguese and Allied forces, but British planning on this country was a more ambiguous question: there were plans to cooperate with the Portuguese Army in the Iberian Peninsula, but there were too other projects to occupy the Portuguese Atlantic Islands with or without Portuguese acquiescence. This ambiguity was a difference with British planning about Ireland, Sweeden or Turkey, but it was more evident in the military projects in Spain. The Spanish nonbelligerence provoked uncertainty about Spanish neutrality, so there were plans to cooperate with the Spanish most neutralist officers against a German entry in the Iberian Peninsula, and other plans to conquer the Canary Islands and Spanish Morocco, and to defend Gibraltar. Plans for cooperation with neutralist officers were considered above all in the second half of 1940 and the beginning of 1941, but at the same time there were others against the Spanish Morocco and through this year there were developed plans to conquer the Canaries (Puma/Pilgrim); at late 1942 and the beginning of 1943 it was considered too the seizure of the Spanish Morocco (Backbone). The plans to cooperate and to fight the Spanish Army could be simultaneous: in 1942 and 1943 British planners studied operations to occupy the Canary Islands with (Adroit) or without (Tonic) Spanish acquiescence. This is a significative difference with the rest of the ‘long haul neutrals’: the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Planning Staff considered them as neutrals and sometimes expected a belligerence against the Axis, but they didn’t regard them as potential enemies. 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