Tax morale, public goods, and politics: Experimental evidence from Mozambique

#671 | 2025 Tax mo ale, public goods, and poli ics: Expe imen al e idence om Mozambique WAYNE AARON SANDHOLTZ, PEDRO C. VICENTE Tax mo ale, public goods, and poli ics: Expe imen al e idence om Mozambique Wayne Aa on Sandhol z*Ped o C. Vicen e† Decembe 7, 2024‡ Abs ac Tax e enue is i al o de elopmen , bu go e nmen s mus balance aising e enues wi h main aining poli ical suppo . Pa ne ing wi h a ci y go e nmen in Mozambique, we expe imen ally a y he p o- ision o in o ma ion highligh ing he ole o municipal ax e enues in 1) local public good p o ision and 2) local poli ical au onomy. We measu e how his in o ma ion a ec s p ope y owne s’ ax mo ale and poli ical suppo o he go e nmen . Public goods in o ma ion aises ax mo ale, especially in a - eas o low baseline public good p o ision, bu has no e ec on o ing. The poli ical message inc eases elec o al suppo gene ally, bu aises ax mo ale only among co-pa isans. These esul s sugges ha communica ion abou he uses o public e enue o e s a poli ically easible way o inc ease ax mo ale. Keywo ds: Tax mo ale, public goods, in o ma ion, poli ical economy, expe imen s, Mozambique JEL Codes: O12, H00, P00, C93 *No a School o Business and Economics, CESi o, IZA, and NOVAFRICA. †No a School o Business and Economics, BREAD, CEPR, and NOVAFRICA. ‡Co esponding au ho : Wayne Aa on Sandhol z, No a School o Business and Economics, Uni e sidade NOVA de Lisboa, Campus de Ca ca elos, 2775-405 Ca ca elos, Po ugal. E-mail: wayne.sandhol z@no asbe.p . Ca olina G ande p o ided s ella esea ch assis ance. IRB app o al was ecei ed om No aSBE (p o ocol #202241). A andomized con olled ial egis y en y, ID # AEARCTR-0010628, is a ailable a : h ps://www.socialscience egis y.o g/ ials/10628. The e alua ion was suppo ed by IGC g an MOZ-22067. This wo k was unded by Fundação pa a a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UIDB/00124/2020, UIDP/00124/2020 and Social Sciences - Da aLab PINFRA/22209/2016), POR Lisboa and POR No e (Social Sciences Da aLab, PINFRA/22209/2016). 1 In oduc ion Raising ax e enue is i al o de elopmen , bu e o s by go e nmen s in low-income coun ies o im- p o e ax collec ion a e cons ained by low s a e capaci y and poli ical opposi ion (Besley & Pe sson,2013, 2014). The esou ces necessa y o e ec i e en o cemen and c edible de e ence a e, pa adoxically, o en ou o each o cash-s apped go e nmen s (Pome anz & Vila-Belda,2019;Besley & Pe sson,2009). E en whe e i is iscally easible, amping up en o cemen can p o oke poli ical esis ance which ulne able go e nmen s p e e o a oid (Bi d e al.,2008;Fues e al.,2024;Fo emny & Riedel,2014). Low-cos , poli ically easible e enue in e en ions a e he e o e o pa icula alue. Tax mo ale — ci izens’ willingness o pay axes olun a ily — ep esen s an impo an ma gin o inc easing e enues in such con ex s. As ypically unde s ood, ax mo ale depends on he ecip oci y inhe en in he social con ac , by which he go e nmen uses ci izens’ con ibu ions o p o ide public goods (Lu me & Singhal,2014;Locke,1689).1In heo y, in o ming ci izens abou he quali y o public goods could aise ax mo ale among hose who upda e hei belie s posi i ely (Besley,2020). Recip oci y also depends on poli ical legi imacy (Le i,1988). In o ming ci izens abou he necessi y o ax e enues o achie ing poli ical objec i es could aise ax mo ale among hose who sha e he objec i es (Cullen e al.,2021). This may be pa icula ly ele an when poli ical ic ions exis be ween local and cen al go e nmen s (B ollo & Nannicini,2012). In his pape , we expe imen ally s udy how in o ma ion abou public good p o ision and/o local poli ical au onomy a ec s ax mo ale and poli ical suppo among p ope y owne s in he ci y o Queli- mane, Mozambique. Quelimane is emblema ic o he challenges aced by local ax-collec ing ju isdic ions a ound he wo ld. I s popula ion is abou 500,000, wi h apid popula ion g ow h pu ing p essu e on he public goods unde i s ju isdic ion ( oads, sani a ion, and d ainage). Au ho i y o collec p ope y axes is decen alized, bu he municipali y has only a weak capaci y o en o cemen . This scena io is ypical in he con inen : o e 60% o A ica’s u ban popula ion li es in agglome a ions o less han a million inhab- i an s (Uni ed Na ions,2018). These go e nmen s usually lack he kind o adminis a i e ax da a used in s udies o la ge and be e - esou ced ju isdic ions (Be ge on e al.,2024;Almunia e al.,2024). A ica’s u ban popula ion is p ojec ed o double by 2050, inc easing p essu e on go e nmen s like Quelimane’s o imp o e in as uc u e and se ices (Saghi & San o o,2018). The poli ics o iscal decen aliza ion in Quelimane also esona e in many local ju isdic ions wo ldwide whe e dependence on ede al ans e s 1This basic concep o social con ac is a iously deno ed in he li e a u e wi h he closely- ela ed e ms “ ecip oci y,” “ iscal exchange,” and “bene i -based axa ion.” 1 limi s iscal and poli ical au onomy. In ou expe imen , all pa icipan s we e p o ided wi h in o ma ion abou p ope y ax a es and he municipal budge p io o he c oss- andomized p esen a ion o wo in o ma ion ea men s. The “public goods” ea men p esen ed he idea o he social con ac as he ecip ocal ela ionship by which ci izens pay axes in exchange o public se ices om he s a e. I also included a lis o ecen in as uc u e buil by he municipal go e nmen — including oads epai ed, d ainage di ches dug, and sani a ion imp o emen s — wi h accompanying pho os o he wo ks. The “local au onomy” ea men highligh ed he municipali y’s budge dependence on he cen al go e nmen and he cons ain s his placed on i s poli ical and iscal au onomy. The message d ew on language used in poli ical speeches by he incumben opposi ion-pa y mayo , and included pho os o him in speeches and allies o highligh he pa isan na u e o he message. In addi ion o measu ing he di ec e ec o each ea men , we also examine hei in e ac ion; eal-wo ld go e nmen s emi many communica ions, bu ew s udies examine how di e en messages migh enhance o in e e e wi h each o he . Responden s cons i u ed a ep esen a i e sample o o e 900 p ope y owne s in he ci y. Because he municipali y’s exis ing ax olls (and adminis a i e da a) include only a small numbe o high- alue p ope ies, ga he ing ep esen a i e da a is necessa y o in o ming e o s o b oaden he ax base. We i s collec ed baseline da a on esponden s’ cha ac e is ics, a i udes, and pas ax paymen s and poli ical beha io . Whe e adminis a i e da a a e a ailable, hey co obo a e hese su ey measu es: esponden s in he ew neighbo hoods p e iously a ge ed by he ax au ho i y a e wice as likely o epo ha ing paid p ope y axes, and h ee imes mo e likely o epo ha ing had hei p ope ies assessed. To educe he isk o expe imen e demand e ec s, we measu e ax mo ale wi h su ey ques ions as well as a beha io al esponse ou come: cos ly con ibu ions o a eal-s akes public goods game. We also include a se ies o ques ions aimed di ec ly a elici ing expe imen e demand e ec s, inding no e ec o any ea men on hese measu es. We show ha in o ma ion abou public good p o ision aised ax mo ale, as measu ed by bo h su ey esponses and eal paymen s in a public goods game (Table 2). In he con ol condi ion, 62% o espon- den s said i was “likely” o “ e y likely” hey would pay he p ope y ax i assesso s came o e alua e hei p ope y. The public goods message aised his by 8.5 pe cen age poin s (14%). In he public goods game, 32% o con ol g oup pa icipan s chose o con ibu e a posi i e amoun o he public good by making a mobile money ans e . The public goods ea men aised his by 9.4 pe cen age poin s, a 29% inc ease. This e ec was en i ely concen a ed among esponden s wi h low baseline expe ience o public 2 good p o ision, sugges ing he e ec is d i en by esponden s who upda e based on he in o ma ion. The local au onomy ea men had no a e age e ec on ax mo ale on i s own, and i a enua ed he posi i e e ec o he public goods ea men when hey we e combined. In ac , measu es o ax mo ale o esponden s who hea d bo h messages we e no s a is ically di e en om he con ol g oup. The excep ion was o s ong pa isans o he opposi ion pa y which go e ns he ci y: among hese esponden s, he local au onomy message inc eased con ibu ions, bo h when p esen ed alone and when combined wi h he public goods message. Taken oge he , hese esul s sugges ha axpaye s espond posi i ely o in o ma ion abou public good p o ision, bu become disillusioned when he message o go e nmen e ec i eness is mixed wi h an o e ly poli ical message wi h which hey do no ag ee. Tu ning o poli ical ou comes, we ind ha he public goods ea men inc eased sa is ac ion wi h go e nmen , bu only he local au onomy ea men changed o ing choices. The public goods message inc eased esponden s’ epo ed sa is ac ion wi h bo h he municipal and na ional go e nmen s, bu had no signi ican e ec on people’s o e choice in a mock ballo exe cise. Meanwhile, he local au onomy mes- sage aised he o e sha e o opposi ion pa ies a a ious le els o go e nmen . This sugges s ha people unde s ood he message, bu esponded di ec ly h ough poli ical a i udes a he han ax a i udes. Ou pape con ibu es o exis ing wo k on how in o ma ion abou public se ice p o ision in luences a ious aspec s o ci izens’ ela ionship wi h he s a e. The e idence on p omp ing axpaye s in low- income coun ies o hink in gene al e ms abou he social con ac is mixed: posi i e e ec s on ax compliance in Tanzania (Collin e al.,2021), wi h null e ec s in Rwanda and Uganda (Mascagni & Nell, 2022;Cohen,2024).2Ou pape shows ha p o iding speci ic in o ma ion abou ecen ly p o ided public goods can aise ax mo ale, o e ing an impo an low-cos ool o poo ju isdic ions o inc ease e enues. We also con ibu e o he li e a u e showing how public good in o ma ion a ec s ci izens’ poli ical a i udes and pe cep ions o go e nmen . In a s udy simila o ou s, Acemoglu e al. (2020) show using a lab expe imen ha in o ma ion abou imp o emen s o cou s in Pakis an aised people’s willingness o use hem. O he wo k documen s elec o al e ec s o in o ma ion abou public se ice quali y in I aly, Chile, and B azil (Kendall e al.,2015;Cox e al.,2024;Dias & Fe az,2020).3Ou pape adds o his b oad body o esea ch by examining ax mo ale and poli ical a i udes wi hin he same con ex , s udying di ec ly how messages abou public goods and poli ics in e ac wi h one ano he on ou comes ela ed 2The li e a u e on gene al “social con ac ” in o ma ion messages in high- and middle-income coun ies is simila ly mixed: posi i e e ec s in he UK and No way (Hallswo h e al.,2017;Bo e al.,2019), null e ec s in A gen ina, Belgium, he Uni ed S a es, and U uguay (Cas o & Sca ascini,2015;De Ne e e al.,2021;Blumen hal e al.,2001;Be golo e al.,2023). 3Ci izen a i udes can be di icul o mo e, howe e : Khan e al. (2021) ind no e ec o in o ma ion on pas s a e e ec i eness in Pakis an on ci izens’ suppo o policy, pe cep ions o s a e capaci y, o us in he s a e. 3 o each. Despi e he na u al ension be ween asking ci izens o mo e axes and hei elec o al suppo (P icha d,2018), we a e no awa e o exis ing s udies which examine e ec s on bo h ou comes in he same con ex .4 We build on he wo k ela ing ax mo ale o decen aliza ion and iscal ede alism. Local au onomy ma e s o g ow h: Enikolopo & Zhu a skaya (2007) ind ha he ou comes o iscal decen aliza ion de e io a e when cen al go e nmen s domina e local go e nmen s, and A zaghi & Hende son (2005) show a posi i e c oss-coun y co ela ion be ween g ow h and iscal decen aliza ion. Recen empi ical wo k also shows ha public se ices imp o e when unded by local axes (Gadenne,2017;Bianchi e al., 2023). To gle e al. (2010) ind a posi i e co ela ion be ween local au onomy and ax mo ale speci ically, and Gü h e al. (2005) ind a posi i e e ec o decen aliza ion on ax mo ale in he lab. Rela ed esea ch unde sco es ha people a e happie o pay axes when hey ag ee wi h wha he e enue is used o (Cullen e al.,2021;Alm e al.,1993;Giaccobasso e al.,2024). All o his e idence, howe e , comes om high- and middle-income coun ies, whe e ax e enues as a sha e o GDP a e al eady ela i ely high. The belie ha appeals o iscal independence can aise ax mo ale has been documen ed among policymake s in he de eloping wo ld (Lu me & Singhal,2014). Ou pape p o ides empi ical e idence o his phenomenon, a leas among pa isans o he local go e nmen . Finally, we add o he body o esea ch on aising e enues in con ex s o low s a e capaci y, summa- ized in a ecen e iew by Okunogbe & Tou ek (2024). E ec i e s a egies ha e included inco po a ing new echnology (Okunogbe & San o o,2023), enlis ing local chie s and inc easing public o e sigh in he DRC (Balán e al.,2022;Henn e al.,2024), and le e aging ading ne wo ks in Uganda (Almunia e al., 2023). Nea ly all exis ing wo k on ax compliance in low-income coun ies in ol es he e enue au ho i ies o na ions o la ge ci ies o o e a million people (Almunia e al.,2024;Mon enb uck,2023;Balán e al., 2022). Howe e , mos A icans (and mos o he wo ld) li e in smalle ci ies o unde a million people (Uni ed Na ions,2018). Because hese ju isdic ions lack sophis ica ed p ope y ax da a sys ems, almos no exis ing economics li e a u e s udies hem — and he lessons om highe -capaci y ju isdic ions may no ca y o e (Allco ,2015). We show ha in o ma ion on public goods and local au onomy can aise ax mo ale and poli ical suppo , o e ing a low-cos way o capaci y-cons ained go e nmen s o expand e enue collec ion and b oaden he ax base. 4A ela ed body o wo k examines how public goods hemsel es a ec bo h ax mo ale and o ing. Va ious kind o public goods ha e been shown o inc ease ax compliance (Ca illo e al.,2017;Blimpo e al.,2018;K esch e al.,2023;Gonzalez-Na a o & Quin ana-Domeque,2015;K ause,2020); B ockmeye e al. (2024)’s null esul is an impo an excep ion. Simila ly, a ious s udies show ha public goods and se ices win o es (Boudo -Reddy & Bu le ,2024;Hue -Vaughn,2023;Le -Ya e e al.,2023;Biasi & Sandhol z,2024), hough o he s ind null o nega i e elec o al e ec s (Goyal,2023;Ga ias e al.,2021;Bueno e al.,2023;Sandhol z, 2023). We show ha public goods in o ma ion alone can be su icien o a ec bo h ax mo ale and poli ical a i udes. 4 2 Con ex The ci y o Quelimane in Mozambique is ypical o many u ban con ex s in A ica in a ious ways. I s popula ion makes i compa able o he sub-million- esiden ci ies home o he majo i y o u ban dwelle s in A ica and he wo ld (Uni ed Na ions,2018). Like many ci ies in de eloping coun ies, Quelimane is g owing apidly: i has mo e han ipled in popula ion since 2000, placing s ess on public se ices (Uni ed Na ions, Depa men o Economic and Social A ai s, Popula ion Di ision,2018). The municipal go e nmen ’s ju isdic ion ex ends o e local oad cons uc ion, sani a ion, and d ainage sys ems — a c ucial de ense agains equen looding caused by opical cyclones (Lee e s,2023). Poli ically, Mozambique is classi ied as an “elec o al au oc acy,” along wi h coun ies ep esen ing 43% o he wo ld’s popula ion: ci izens o e in mul i-pa y elec ions, bu hey lack many sa egua ds o ensu e hey a e ee and ai .5In p ac ice, his means ha he uling pa y FRELIMO domina es elec ions a he na ional le el, bu ha local elec ions ha e been success ully con es ed by opposi ion pa ies in a hand ul o ju isdic ions. A he ime o ou s udy, he mayo o Quelimane was om RENAMO ( he la ges opposi ion pa y), ha ing i s won he municipal elec ion in 2011.6 The as majo i y o he ci y’s budge – a ound 70% – comes om ans e s om he cen al go - e nmen , c ea ing a dependency wi h impo an poli ical ami ica ions gi en ha he ci y is go e ned by an opposi ion pa y. Tax e enues make up less han 5% o he ci y’s budge , wi h p ope y axes con- s i u ing he majo i y o hese. P ope y owne s in Mozambique a e subjec o a Municipal P ope y Tax (Impos o P edial Au á quico o IPRA), equi alen o 0.4% o he assessed alue o he p ope y o esiden ial p ope ies and 0.7% o comme cial p ope ies. The municipal go e nmen ’s capaci y o en o cemen is minimal. In 2020, he mos ecen ull yea o which da a a e a ailable, he Finance Depa men o he municipali y ecei ed p ope y ax paymen s om 515 con ibu o s, o a o al o 6.8 million me icais (USD 105,079). Figu e A.1 in he Appendix shows he sou ces o Quelimane’s e enues o 2015-2020. 5This classi ica ion comes om he V-Dem (Va ie ies o Democ acy) Ins i u e’s “Regimes o he Wo ld (RoW)” classi ica ion, which includes 4 ca ego ies: closed au oc acy, elec o al au oc acy, elec o al democ acy, libe al democ acy (Coppedge e al.,2024). Simila ly, Mozambique is a ed as “pa ly ee” by F eedom House, and an “Open Anoc acy” in he ca ego iza ion o Poli y IV (F eedom House,2023;Ma shall e al.,2023). 6The cu en mayo was i s elec ed in 2011 as a candida e o he MDM, ano he (smalle ) opposi ion pa y, bu joined RENAMO ahead o he 2018 municipal elec ion cycle. 5 3 Da a and Design 3.1 Sampling To build e idence on municipal ax mo ale in Quelimane, we su eyed a ep esen a i e sample o p ope y owne s. The ci y is di ided in o 5 Adminis a i e Pos s (Pos os Adminis a i os), which a e u he subdi- ided in o 51 neighbo hoods (bai os), which in u n a e u he subdi ided in o 558 blocks (qua ei ões). We i s selec ed a andom sample o blocks om which o sample esponden s. We hen placed a leas ou andomly chosen poin s wi hin each block’s bounda ies o indica e which p ope ies we e o be su - eyed. When a poin was no on an iden i iable p ope y, o on a p ope y whe e no owne was a ailable o in e iew, enume a o s ollowed a p e-codi ied andom walk p ocedu e un il a i ing a a p ope y whe e an eligible esponden was a ailable o in e iew. The inal analysis sample, ep esen a i e o he p ope ies in he ci y, consis s o 922 p ope ies in 214 blocks. The sampled esponden s we e su eyed o e he cou se o abou wo weeks in No embe /Decembe o 2022. The su ey ook abou one hou . 3.2 Compa ing su ey and adminis a i e da a Al hough a ailable adminis a i e da a in Quelimane a e minimal, hey can be used o alida e su ey esponses. In 2020, p ope y axpaye s came om only 22 o he ci y’s 51 neighbo hoods, hough only 44% o eco ds can be mapped due o incomple e add ess da a. Among hese axed p ope ies, 82% o e enue (and 66% o con ibu o s) came om jus i e neighbo hoods in he down own a ea. (By con as , jus 13% o ou ep esen a i e sample eside in hese high- ax neighbo hoods.) Acco dingly, ou esponden s in hese neighbo hoods a e wice as likely o epo ha ing paid IPRA in he las yea , and h ee imes as likely o epo ha ing had hei p ope y assessed by municipali y echnicians. Figu e 1maps he sampled blocks and p ope ies, as well as he in ensi y o ax collec ion by neigh- bo hood. 6 Figu e 1: Su eyed p ope ies 21-70 11-20 1-10 0 P ope ies in sample (919) Blocks in sample (214) O he blocks (344) Admin da a: N. axpaye s in neighbo hood Su ey da a Black do s show he loca ions o su eyed p ope ies supe imposed on he ci y o Quelimane, Mozambique. (Th ee espon- den s who consen ed o pa icipa e bu no o ha e hei loca ion eco ded a e excluded om he map.) G ay blocks a e hose andomly selec ed o ha e p ope ies sampled; unsampled blocks a e whi e. The 51 neighbo hoods in he ci y a e shaded acco ding o he numbe o iden i iable indi idual con ibu o s hey con ain in 2020 adminis a i e da a om he Depa men o Finances. 3.3 Su ey Ou su ey p o ides ep esen a i e da a on p ope y owne s, a a e hing in medium-sized ju isdic ions like Quelimane. In addi ion o basic demog aphic cha ac e is ics, he su ey measu ed esponden s’ belie s and a i udes abou he ax sys em – o example, whe he and when hey had been asked o pay p ope y axes, whe he hey hough a es we e ai , how well hey belie ed he sys em wo ked, and how many o hei neighbo s and ellow esiden s hey hough we e paying axes. We also included a ba e y o ques ions abou esponden s’ us in he go e nmen (mos ly d awing on s anda d wo ding om he A oba ome e ), as well as a se o ques ions abou hei expe ience wi h and knowledge abou public se ices ela ing o he social con ac . Table 1p esen s summa y s a is ics. 7 4 Resul s 4.1 E ec s on ax mo ale Ou i s esul is ha in o ma ion on public good p o ision aised esponden s’ ax mo ale. Table 2shows es ima es o he causal e ec o he in o ma ion ea men s on su ey esponses and public goods game con ibu ions. The public goods message inc eased he likelihood esponden s epo ed being “likely” o “ e y likely” o pay he p ope y ax i assesso s came o hei p ope y. F om a con ol g oup mean o 61.8%, his message inc eased he p opo ion by 8.5 pe cen age poin s (pp), o 13.8%.10 Con i ming hese posi i e e ec s on su ey measu es, ea ed esponden s we e also 9.4 pp mo e likely o con ibu e a posi i e amoun in he public goods game – an inc ease o 29.0% o a base o 32.4%. The e ec o his message on he o al amoun esponden s con ibu ed was la ge and posi i e (2.3 me icais om a base o 13.4 in he con ol g oup) bu no s a is ically signi ican . We also show ha he local au onomy message alone had no signi ican e ec on ei he measu e o ax mo ale. Mo eo e , i appea s o ha e coun e ac ed he e ec o he public goods message: he in e ac ion e ec o he wo ea men s is consis en ly nega i e and la ge. Al hough his coe icien i sel is no s a is ically signi ican , he g oup which ecei ed bo h he public goods and local au onomy messages is s a is ically indis inguishable om he con ol g oup on hese ax mo ale ou come measu es. 10Figu e A.2 in he appendix shows ha he public goods ea men p oduced a igh wa d shi in he dis ibu ion o esponses o his ques ion. 14 Table 2: E ec s o ea men on ax paymen in en ions and public goods con ibu ions Likely o pay p ope y ax Public goods game: con ibu ed Public goods game: amoun (me icais) Public goods 0.085∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 2.311 (0.041) (0.039) (2.114) Local au onomy 0.029 0.025 0.289 (0.041) (0.039) (2.110) Public goods ×Local au onomy -0.090 -0.059 -1.998 (0.058) (0.056) (2.985) N 922 922 922 Mean (con ol g oup) 0.618 0.324 13.400 p- al: T1=T2 0.174 0.080 0.335 p- al: T1 + T2 + T1 ×T2 = 0 0.571 0.129 0.776 Coe icien s om he eg ession speci ied in Equa ion 1, wi h s anda d e o s shown in pa en heses. ’Likely o pay p ope y ax’ indica es ha he esponden answe ed ’Ve y likely’ o ’Likely’ o he ques ion ’I assesso s came o e alua e you p ope y, how likely is i ha you would pay you p ope y ax?’ ’Public goods game: con ibu ed’ indica es ha he esponden con ibu ed a posi i e amoun in he public goods game. ’Public goods game amoun : me icais’ deno es he amoun o me icais he esponden con ibu ed in he public goods game. All eg essions include block ixed e ec s. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 4.1.1 He e ogenei y by baseline public good p o ision and pa isan a ilia ion Because people’s eac ion o in o ma ion likely depends on how i in e ac s wi h hei exis ing belie s, we nex es whe he he in o ma ion ea men s a ec s esponden s he e ogeneously along hese dimensions. Ci izens wi h less di ec expe ience o municipal public good p o ision may be mo e likely o upda e based on public good in o ma ion. Ou su ey asked esponden s abou he equency o p o ision o he h ee main public se ices wi hin he municipali y’s pu iew: ga bage collec ion, d ainage, and oad cons uc ion/main enance.11 We build dummies o whe he esponden s answe ed “ne e ” o each o hese a iables, hen c ea e an index based on he i s ac o o he co ela ion ma ix o hese dummies (pai wise co ela ions be ween hese a iables a e qui e high, anging be ween .42 and .65). We hen spli he sample in o “high” and “low” baseline public good p o ision a he median o his index. We eg ess he dummy o con ibu ing in he public goods game on he ull se o ea men condi ion dummies (public goods, local au onomy, o bo h) — sepa a ely o esponden s wi h high and low baseline public goods. Figu e 2a shows ha he posi i e e ec o he public good message on ax mo ale is concen a ed among esponden s who epo low public good p o ision om hei pe sonal expe ience a baseline. 11The wo ding o he ques ion was “When was he las ime someone om he go e nmen [collec ed ash on you s ee ; wo ked on building o cleaning/ epai ing he d ainage di ches on you s ee ; wo ked on building o epai ing he access oads o you home]?” Op ions we e “One week ago o less,” “One mon h ago,” “One yea ago,” “Se e al yea s ago,” “Ne e ,” “Don’ know.” 15 This is consis en wi h axpaye s upda ing hei p io s in esponse o new in o ma ion abou public good p o ision. The local au onomy ea men may be expec ed o be pa icula ly pe suasi e o ci izens whose own poli ical belie s p edispose hem o sha e he goals o he opposi ion pa y which go e ns he municipali y (RENAMO).12 We iden i y as “RENAMO pa isans” he esponden s who epo ha ing o ed o REN- AMO pa y candida es in bo h he 2018 municipal elec ions and he 2019 na ional elec ions. We eg ess he dummy o con ibu ing in he public goods game on he ull se o ea men condi ion indica o s — sepa a ely o RENAMO pa isans and all o he esponden s. Figu e 2b shows ha , among RENAMO pa isans, he e ec o he public goods message is e en la ge han o he gene al popula ion, and ha he e ec o he local au onomy message is posi i e and signi ican as well (p<0.1). Fu he mo e, he local au onomy message appea s no o ha e diminished he e ec o he public goods message as in he o e all sample. This is consis en wi h he local au onomy message being e ec i e o hose whose poli ical goals incline hem owa d g ea e empowe men o he municipal go e nmen . These esul s sugges ha bo h in o ma ion ea men s’ e ec s we e concen a ed among hose whose p io belie s p edisposed hem o be a ec ed by he in o ma ion. 4.2 E ec s on poli ics Table 3shows he ea men e ec s on poli ical ou comes. The public goods message aised esponden s’ le el o sa is ac ion wi h bo h he municipal go e nmen o Quelimane and he na ional go e nmen o Mozambique, by 7.7 and 9.9 pp espec i ely. The ac ha he in o ma ion inc eased sa is ac ion wi h bo h le els o go e nmen is su p ising, gi en ha he municipal go e nmen which was esponsible is con olled by he main opposi ion pa y (RENAMO) while he na ional go e nmen is con olled by FRELIMO. This may e lec he uling pa y’s adep ness a claiming c edi o public goods (Ake e al., 2017;C uz & Schneide ,2017). I may also indica e con usion abou a ibu ion o public goods o he co ec le el o go e nmen , which pe haps helps explain he non-e ec o he local au onomy message on ax mo ale excep among co e RENAMO suppo e s. As wi h he ax mo ale ou comes, he local au onomy message had no impac on go e nmen sa is ac ion i s own, and again nega ed he posi i e e ec o he public goods message. 12E idence om he Uni ed S a es sugges s ha indi idual ci izens’ ax mo ale inc eases when a p esiden om hei own pa y is in powe (Cullen e al.,2021). 16 Figu e 2: E ec s on con ibu ion o public goods (game) -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 Public Goods Local Au onomy Bo h Low public goods (415) High public goods (423) (a) By baseline public good p o ision -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 Public Goods Local Au onomy Bo h RENAMO pa isans (107) O he s (725) (b) By pa isanship Figu e 2a shows coe icien s and co esponding con idence in e als o 95% and 90% om eg essing an indica o o whe he esponden s con ibu ed o he public goods game on ea men g oup dummies, sepa a ely o esponden s sco ing below s. abo e he median on an index o baseline public good p o ision. Figu e 2b shows coe icien s and co esponding con idence in e als om he same eg ession, sepa a ely by whe he esponden s epo ha ing o ed o RENAMO in he 2018 municipal and 2019 na ional elec ions, o no . In bo h panels, dummies a e included o “public goods,” “local au onomy,” and “bo h” a he han plo ing he in e ac ion e m; his is o acili a e compa ing ou comes o each g oup ela i e o he con ol g oup. Ci y block ixed e ec s a e included in all eg essions. The co ela ion be ween he abo e-median baseline public goods dummy and he RENAMO o e dummy is 0.015. 17 We no e howe e ha esponden s’ own s a ed o ing in en ions as measu ed h ough he mock ballo s we e less esponsi e o he public goods message han o he local au onomy message. Local au onomy mo ed hem owa ds RENAMO o MDM ( he na ional-le el opposi ion pa ies), no FRELIMO. No e ha in he con ol g oup, as expec ed, suppo o he opposi ion is highe a he municipal le el (54%) han in he p o incial o na ional le el (47% and 44%, espec i ely). The local au onomy message inc eased sup- po o he opposi ion in bo h p o incial and na ional go e nmen s o he le el enjoyed by he municipal go e nmen . Suppo o he uling pa y ell commensu a ely (see Table A.4). While hese e ec s a e only signi ican o he local au onomy message, poin es ima es a e also posi i e o he public goods message, and no signi ican ly di e en om he local au onomy coe icien s. Table A.3 shows simila esul s on o ing in en ions as measu ed by su ey esponses. Table 3: E ec s o ea men on poli ical ou comes Sa is ac ion wi h go e nmen Vo e o RENAMO o MDM Municipal Na ional Municipal P o incial Na ional Public goods 0.077∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.029 0.061 0.062 (0.038) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) Local au onomy 0.001 -0.003 0.047 0.080∗0.112∗∗ (0.038) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) Public goods ×Local au onomy -0.080 -0.125∗∗ -0.045 -0.084 -0.096 (0.054) (0.061) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) N 922 922 863 856 858 Mean (con ol g oup) 0.707 0.462 0.543 0.466 0.440 p- al: T1=T2 0.043 0.018 0.697 0.675 0.265 p- al: T1 + T2 + T1 ×T2 = 0 0.957 0.515 0.491 0.217 0.088 Coe icien s om he eg ession speci ied in Equa ion 1, wi h s anda d e o s shown in pa en heses. ’Sa is ac ion wi h go e nmen ’ indica es ha he esponden answe ed ’Ve y sa is ied’ o ’Sa is ied’ o he ques ion ’In gene al, a e you sa is ied wi h poli ical go e nance in [ he municipali y o Quelimane / Mozambique]?’ ’Vo e o RENAMO o MDM’ indica es ha he esponden submi ed a ballo on which hey checked he box nex o ’RENAMO’ o ’MDM’ o he s a ed le el o go e nmen (de ined o esponden s who submi ed any ballo ). All eg essions include block ixed e ec s. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 4.3 Tes ing o expe imen e demand e ec s To es whe he ou esul s a e d i en by expe imen e demand e ec s, we included ques ions in he su ey which asked esponden s di ec ly i hey ag eed wi h he hypo heses we we e es ing. A e p esen ing he ea men in o ma ion, we asked esponden s whe he he in o ma ion p o ided was likely o mo i a e hemsel es o hei neighbo s o pay p ope y axes. I esponden s’ answe s we e d i en 18 by hei pe cep ions o expe imen e demand, we would expec ea men o ha e la ge e ec s on hese ques ions. In ac , no ea men had any e ec on any o hese measu es (see Table A.5). 5 Conclusion Inc easing municipal e enues in he de eloping wo ld is o i al impo ance o imp o ing he quali y o public goods and se ices, and ul ima ely o boos ing economic g ow h. Bu go e nmen s ace bo h esou ce and poli ical cons ain s o s eng hening en o cemen , poin ing o he necessi y o inding ways o aise olun a y ax compliance ( ax mo ale). This need is especially p essing o smalle ju isdic ions which lack sophis ica ed da a collec ion in as uc u e. In his pape , we show ha communica ion highligh ing he local go e nmen ’s exis ing e o s a p o iding public goods can engende g ea e p ope y ax mo ale among p ope y owne s, especially hose o whom he in o ma ion upda ed belie s gi en hei own poo expe ience o public good p o ision. The public goods communica ion aises sa is ac ion wi h go e nmen , and may inc ease pa isan suppo , hough hese es ima es a e noisy. Meanwhile, highligh ing local poli ical au onomy inc eases suppo o he opposi ion pa y bu only aises ax mo ale o s ong co-pa isans, e e sing he gains o he public goods message o e e yone else. These esul s ca y impo an policy implica ions o go e nmen s seeking o aise e enue wi hou losing poli ical suppo . E ec i e communica ion abou he go e nmen ’s public goods successes o e s a ela i ely low-cos way o p o ide a posi i e shock o people’s pe cep ions o he social con ac . Ou e- sul s abou he he e ogenei y o e ec s by ci izens’ p io expe ience o public goods sugges ha a ge ing in o ma ion o hose mos likely o upda e hei belie s could make hese in e en ions e en mo e cos - e ec i e. Ideally, his posi i e shock could lead o a i uous cycle, as go e nmen s use inc eased e enues o imp o e he quali y o public goods and se ices, which in u n u he boos s ci izens’ ax mo ale. To- ge he , hese esul s hin ha incumben poli icians may bene i om sepa a ing messages abou he social con ac and poli ics: while public goods ma ke ing can be used o boos ing ax adhe ence in imes o policy-making, unde sco ing poli ical au onomy should p obably be le o he poli ical campaign pe iods. Poli ical communica ion is a . 19 Re e ences Acemoglu, D., Cheema, A., Khwaja, A. I., & Robinson, J. A. (2020). 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Re ie ed 2024-08-06, om h ps://www.camb idge.o g/co e/jou nals/ b i ish-jou nal-o -poli ical-science/a icle/elec o al-compe i i eness- ax-ba gaining -and-poli ical-incen i es-in-de eloping-coun ies-e idence- om-poli ical-budge -cycles -a ec ing- axa ion/2C83B99205AE78B87A710BE3B21E05C2 doi: 10.1017/S0007123415000757 23 A.4 E ec s on he dis ibu ion o likelihood o pay Figu e A.2: His og am o esponses o paymen likelihood ques ion, by ea men 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 F ac ion Don' know Re use No a all likely No e y likely Likely Ve y likely Con ol Public goods Answe s o he ques ion “I assesso s came o e alua e you p ope y, how likely is i ha you would pay you p ope y ax?” o esponden s assigned o con ol and public goods ea men a ms. 30 A.5 E ec s on o he elec o al measu es Table A.3: E ec s on epo ed o ing ou comes Vo e o FRELIMO Vo e o RENAMO o MDM Repo o ing in en ion Municipal Na ional Municipal Na ional Municipal Na ional Public goods -0.003 -0.043 0.028 0.066 -0.011 -0.031 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.025) (0.026) Local au onomy -0.046 -0.097∗∗ 0.036 0.084∗-0.011 -0.010 (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.025) (0.026) Public goods ×Local au onomy 0.047 0.071 -0.032 -0.058 -0.027 0.007 (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.036) (0.037) N 830 822 830 822 922 922 Mean (con ol g oup) 0.413 0.527 0.549 0.439 0.920 0.916 p- al: T1=T2 0.347 0.245 0.868 0.701 0.995 0.405 p- al: T1 + T2 + T1 ×T2 = 0 0.968 0.146 0.511 0.054 0.052 0.184 Coe icien s om he eg ession speci ied in Equa ion 1, wi h s anda d e o s shown in pa en heses. ’Vo e o FRELIMO’ indica es ha he esponden answe ed ’FRELIMO’ o he ques ion ’I he municipal elec ions we e omo ow, which pa y would you o e o ?’ (de ined o esponden s who did no answe Don’ Know o Re use). ’Vo e o RENAMO o MDM’ indica es ha he esponden answe ed ’RENAMO’ o ’MDM’ o his ques ion, wi h he same es ic ion. ’Repo o ing in en ion’ indica es ha he esponden ga e a esponse o his ques ion o he han ’Don’ know’ o ’Re use.’ All eg essions include block ixed e ec s. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 31 Table A.4: E ec s on o he ballo ou comes Vo e o FRELIMO Submi ballo Municipal P o incial Na ional Municipal P o incial Na ional Public goods 0.004 -0.022 -0.015 0.004 0.011 0.011 (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) Local au onomy -0.039 -0.074 -0.090∗0.004 0.012 0.002 (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) Public goods ×Local au onomy 0.023 0.062 0.056 0.000 -0.009 -0.004 (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) N 863 856 858 922 922 922 Mean (con ol g oup) 0.400 0.471 0.488 0.933 0.924 0.929 p- al: T1=T2 0.334 0.253 0.103 0.998 0.983 0.682 p- al: T1 + T2 + T1 ×T2 = 0 0.796 0.474 0.295 0.714 0.530 0.700 Coe icien s om he eg ession speci ied in Equa ion 1, wi h s anda d e o s shown in pa en heses. ’Vo e o FRELIMO’ indica es ha he esponden submi ed a ballo on which hey checked he box nex o ’FRELIMO’ o he s a ed le el o go e nmen (de ined o esponden s who submi ed any ballo ). ’Submi ballo ’ indica es ha he esponden submi ed a ballo . All eg essions include block ixed e ec s. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 32 A.6 Tes ing o expe imen e demand e ec s Table A.5: E ec s on expe imen e demand ques ions In o would inc ease neighbo s’ paymen Public goods would inc ease own paymen Local au onomy would inc ease own paymen Public goods -0.013 0.041 0.019 (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) Local au onomy 0.013 0.035 -0.022 (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) PG ×LA 0.015 -0.056 -0.029 (0.060) (0.058) (0.057) N 922 922 922 Mean (con ol g oup) 0.564 0.560 0.636 p- al: T1=T2 0.540 0.872 0.302 p- al: T1 + T2 + T1 ×T2 = 0 0.713 0.618 0.434 Coe icien s om he eg ession speci ied in Equa ion 1, wi h s anda d e o s shown in pa en heses. The ou come in Column 1 indica es ha he eponden answe ed ’Ve y likely’ o ’Likely’ o he ques ion ’Imagine you ha e a neighbo who doesn’ pay hei p ope y axes. I ha neighbo could hea his in o ma ion, how likely is i ha hey would be mo e mo i a ed o pay IPRA?’ The ou come in Column 2 indica es ha he eponden answe ed ’Ve y likely’ o ’Likely’ o he ques ion ’I he municipali y imp o ed publice se ice p o ision, how likely is i ha you would be mo e mo i a ed o pay IPRA?’ The ou come in Column 3 indica es ha he eponden answe ed ’Ve y likely’ o ’Likely’ o he ques ion ’How likely is i ha he idea o he municipali y ha ing mo e independence ela i e o he cen al go e nmen would make you mo e mo i a ed o pay IPRA?’ All eg essions include block ixed e ec s. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 33 B In o ma ion ea men s B.1 Con ol condi ion The ollowing ex was ead o all pa icipan s: Po uguese English Ago a que emos o nece algumas in o mações ú eis sob e o papel dos impos os no município, pa icula men e o Impos o P edial Au á quico ou IPRA. Pa a p op iedades esidenciais, a axa do IPRA é 0,04% do alo da p op iedade. Is o que dize que se uma p op idade i esse o alo de 1 milhão de me icais, o dono e ia de paga 400 me icais po ano como IPRA. Se o uma p op iedade come cial, o alo é de 0,07% do alo da p op iedade – uma p op iedade come cial com o alo de 1 milhão de me icais e ia de paga 700 me icias po ano como IPRA. Paga o IPRA é necessá io pa a ende a p o- p iedade. Esses impos os, quando o em pagos, con ibuem pa a o o çamen o do município. O o çamen o do município é ap oximadamen e de 500 me icais po munícipe po ano. Now we wan o p o ide some use ul in o ma ion abou he ole o axes in he municipali y, pa ic- ula ly he Municipal P ope y Tax o IPRA. Fo esiden ial p ope ies, he IPRA a e is 0.04% o he p ope y alue. This means ha i a p ope y had a alue o 1 million me icais, he owne would ha e o pay 400 me icais pe yea as IPRA. I i is a comme cial p ope y, he alue is 0.07% o he p ope y alue – a comme cial p ope y wi h a alue o 1 million me icais would ha e o pay 700 me icias pe yea as IPRA. Paying IPRA is necessa y o sell he p ope y. These axes, when paid, con ibu e o he mu- nicipali y’s budge . The municipali y’s budge is a ound 500 me icais pe ci izen pe yea . 34 B.2 Public good condi ion The ollowing ex was ead o all pa icipan s in he “public good” ea men : Po uguese English O “con a o social” signi ica que os cidadãos êm dize sob e como os seus go e nos se compo am. Os cidadãos podem exp essa as suas p eocupações. Eles pagam impos os em oca dos se iços públicos que são o e ecidos pelo go e no. Pa a que o/a S /a enha uma isão mais ampla do compo amen o do go e no, amos aze uma e isão de alguns dos bens públicos o necidos pelo município nos ú limos 10 anos. Vá ias das a é ias c í icas da cidade o am epa adas e os seus bu acos apados, po exemplo as a enidas Edua do Mondlane, Július Nye e e, 7 de Se emb o, Josina Machel, Samo a Michel, Ma ginal, Filipe Samuel Magaia, e 25 de Junho. Vá ias uas o am pa imen adas ou as al adas: Rua Ahmed Sékou Tou é que passa no IFP; a A enida Albe o Cassimo ligando a Sag ada e o me cado de Aquima; e ou as nos bai os Kansa, Vilapi a, Mapiazua, B andão, 17 de Se emb o, San- ga i ei a, e Manhaua, en e ou as. Fo am man idas as uas F ança e Pio Ma os, além da manu enção de o ina de es adas de e a ba ida, bem como o abaulamen o numa ex ensão de mais de 200 kms. Foi cons uída uma ex ensão de 22 kms de alas de d enagem, abe as e echadas. Hou e á ias ou as cons uções públicas, en e elas • 2 Biblio ecas Municipais, • Escola P imá ia Comple a de I agalane, • Me cado de Sanga i ei a. Na á ea de saneamen o, o am cons uídos: • 14 Silos pa a o depósi o dos esíduos sólidos, • 22 poços de água pa a os di e sos bai os, • mais de 100 la inas pa a a população ca enciada. E o am adqui idos ces os, con en o es e camiões de Lixo Também o am a ibuídos mais de 2000 DUATs. Ago a ou mos a algumas o os dos bens públicos do município nos úl imos anos. The “social con ac ” means ha ci izens ha e a say in how hei go e nmen s beha e. Ci izens can exp ess hei conce ns. They pay axes in exchange o public se ices ha a e o e ed by he go e nmen . To gi e you a b oade iew o he go e nmen ’s beha io , le ’s e iew some o he public goods p o ided by he municipali y in he las 10 yea s. Se e al o he ci y’s c i ical a e ies we e epai ed and po holes illed, o example Edua do Mondlane, Július Nye e e, 7 de Se emb o, Josina Machel, Samo a Michel, Ma ginal, Filipe Samuel Magaia, and 25 de Junho a enues. Se e al s ee s we e pa ed o asphal ed: Ahmed Sékou Tou é which passes by IFP; Albe o Cassimo A enue connec ing Sag ada and Aquima ma ke ; and o he s in he neighbo hoods Kansa, Vilapi a, Mapiazua, B andão, 17 de Se emb o, Sanga i ei a, and Manhaua, among o he s. The s ee s F ança and Pio Ma os we e main ained, as well as he ou ine main enance o di oads, and he embankmen in an ex ension o mo e han 200 kms. An ex ension o 22 kms o d ainage di ches, open and closed, was buil . The e we e se e al o he public cons uc ions, among hem • 2 Municipal Lib a ies, • Comple e P ima y School o I agalane, • Sanga i ei a Ma ke . In he a ea o sani a ion, he ollowing we e buil : • 14 Silos o he deposi o solid was e, • 22 wa e wells o he a ious neighbo hoods, • mo e han 100 la ines o he needy popula- ion. And baske s, con aine s and ga bage ucks we e acqui ed. Also mo e han 2000 DUATs we e awa ded. Now I will show you some pho os o he public goods o he municipali y in he las yea s. 35 B.2.1 Public good condi ion pho os Figu e B.1 (a) Roads (b) Fi e igh e s (c) D ains (d) Mo e oads 36 B.3 Local au onomy condi ion The ollowing ex was ead o all pa icipan s in he “local au onomy” ea men : Po uguese English Ago a, o município em que usa o seu o çamen o pa a euni odos os seus gas os, inclusi é os bens públicos que o nece aos munícipes. Ap oximadamen e 70% desse alo em em o ma de ans e ência do go e no cen al. Algumas pessoas dizem que isso c ia uma si uação que p ejudica a independência polí ica e inancei a do município. A ideia é: Quando o município depende do go e no cen al pa a os undos do seu o çamen o, o go e no cen- al exe ce con olo sob e o município a a és do con ole dos undos. Se o município es á a aze coisas que o go e no cen al não gos a, o go e no cen al pode e e ou a asa os pagamen os pa a en a in luencia o compo amen o do município. Se os obje i os do go e no cen al não são os mesmos que os obje i os do município, isso pode diminui a au onomia que o município em de aça o seu p óp io caminho quan o à polí ica. Numa democ acia, os munícipes pagam impos os pa a que o es ado uncione e aja a bem do po o. A inal de con as, os salá ios dos uncioná ios públicos não êm de nenhum pa ido polí ico, mas do po o que abalha pa a pode paga os seus impos os. En ão, uma manei a impo an e de ga an i a au onomia do município é paga impos os pa a que o município enha a capacidade de ealiza os seus planos sem depende do go e no cen al. Ago a ou mos a algumas o os i adas em e en- os do go e no a ual do município. Now, he municipali y has o use i s budge o mee all i s expenses, including he public goods ha i p o ides o he ci izens. A ound 70% o his alue comes in he o m o ans e om he cen al go e nmen . Some people say ha his c ea es a si ua ion ha ha ms he poli ical and inancial independence o he municipali y. The idea is: When he municipali y depends on he cen al go e nmen o he unds o i s budge , he cen al go e nmen exe s con ol o e he mu- nicipali y h ough he con ol o he unds. I he municipali y is doing hings ha he cen al go e nmen does no like, he cen al go e nmen can wi hhold o delay paymen s o y o in luence he beha io o he municipali y. I he goals o he cen al go e nmen a e no he same as he goals o he municipali y, his can diminish he au onomy ha he municipali y has o ace i s own pa h ega ding poli ics. In a democ acy, ci izens pay axes so ha he s a e wo ks and ac s o he good o he people. A e all, he sala ies o public se an s do no come om any poli ical pa y, bu om he people who wo k o be able o pay hei axes. So, an impo an way o gua an ee he au onomy o he municipali y is o pay axes so ha he municipali y has he capaci y o ca y ou i s plans wi hou depending on he cen al go e nmen . Now I will show you some pho os aken a e en s o he cu en go e nmen o he municipali y. 37 B.3.1 Local au onomy condi ion pho os Figu e B.2 (a) Bikes (b) A speech (c) Mo e bikes (d) Ano he speech 38