Political Islam and Social Polarization in Turkey

FACULDADE DE LETRAS U N I V E RSI D A D E D O PO R T O Giray Halıcıoğlu 2º Ciclo de Estudos em História, Relações Internacionais e Cooperação Political Islam and Social Polarization in Turkey 2013 Orientador: Isabel Maria Galhano Rodrigues Coorientador: José Maciel Honrado Morais Santos Classificação: Ciclo de Estudos: Dissertação: Versão Definitiva i ABSTRACT In the last years Turkish society has gone under major transformations. Since the Ottomans acknowledged that their Muslim identity was the main reason of their backwardness, the social compromise was never maintained again. As a result of Ottoman Empire‟s numerous defeats by the West which it always despised, Ottoman authorities had to make a choice by acknowledging either the issue was Islam itself or the believers. Thus, Ottoman authorities defined that the issue was Islam and accepted that its dominance on the administration should be reduced. This way Ottomans got under an extensive modernization period which extended their life remarkably. Following the fall of Ottoman Empire, young Turkey was founded from its ashes and carried on the westernized reforms. Atatürk also saw the issue with Islam and implemented a series of reforms in the lead of Republican People‟s Party to eliminate Islam from all spheres of social and political life. However, this was not welcomed by the majority of the society and in the first free elections in 1950; society showed its desire for a change and elected the opposing Democrat Party with an overwhelming majority which followed a moderate policy towards religion. In the following years, as the welfare state declined, Islamist parties were able to gain a remarkable ground in Turkish politics. The most important of those was Welfare Party as it was the first Islamist party that was elected with the majority vote. During its 15 years of existence Welfare Party was the main actor in social polarization. Even though it was a party which was elected by majority, its acts that praised Islamic values were perceived as anti-laic by the governing elite and the party was closed in 1998. However, its social base never gave up their fight. In 2002, this time Justice and Development Party became the address of Islamist circles by receiving the approval of almost half of the population. Since then the party is being the voice of the society which rises against status-quo. However, party‟s radical acts in the recent years also drew a contra-opposition against itself which blames the party with being dishonest in its acts, having a secret agenda of Islamizing the country and gradually heading for a civil dictatorship by suppressing the opposite voices. This thesis presents an overview on Islamism, politicization of Islam, Turkish democracy, social polarization starting from the Turkish acceptance of Islam until the present day in the first two parts and argues the effects of political Islam on Turkish society on the basis of social polarization at the last part through using empirical data from primary and secondary sources. Keywords: Political Islam, Islamism, Moderate Islam, Islam, Turkey, Muslim, Ataturk, Welfare party, Justice and Development Party, Democrat Party, People‟s Republican Party, Polarization, Ottoman Empire, Identity, Ideology, Social Uprising, Turban, Gulen Movement, Public Space, Military Coup, Coup d‟Etat, Modernism, Postmodernism, Secularism, Laicism, Laic, Green Belt Project, Greater Middle East Project ii RESUMO Nos últimos anos, a sociedade Turca teve as suas maiores transformações. Desde que os Otomanos reconheceram que a sua identidade Muçulmana era a principal razão da sua relutância, o compromisso social nunca mais foi mantido de novo. Como o resultado das numerosas derrotas do Império Otomano pelo Oeste, que sempre foram despresadas, as autoridades Otomanas tiveram que fazer uma escolha; ou o reconhecimento do próprio Islão, ou os seus crentes. Então, as autoridades Otomanas decidiram que o Islão e o seu dominio naadministração deverião ser reduzidos.Esta decisão dos Otomanos conseguiu um longo período de modernização, que alargou consideravelmente a sua existência. Após a queda do Império Otomano, a jovem Turquia foi fundada sobre as suas cinzas e trouxe consigo reformas ocidentalizadas. Ataturk também viu a saída com o Islamismo e implementou uma serie de reformas no governo do Partido Republicano do Povo, para eliminar o Islão de todas as esferas da vida social e politica. Contudo, isto não foi bem visto pela maioria da sociedade e, nas primeiras eleições livres em 1950, a sociedade mostrou o desejo de uma mudança e elegeu na oposição o Partido Democrático com uma preponderante maioria, que seguiu uma politica moderada na religião. Nos anos seguintes, como o estado de bem-estar declinou. Os partidos Islamistas conseguiram ganhar um remarcável terreno na politica Turca. O mais importante de todos, foi o Partido do Bem-Estar, que foi o primeiro partido Islamista que foi eleito com maioria de votos. Durante os seus 15 anos de existência, o Partido do Bem-Estar foi o principal portagonista na polarização social. Ainda que fosse um partido eleito com maioria , os seus actos que pregavam os valores Islamicos foram entendidos pela elite do governo como anti-laicos, e o partido foi encerrado em 1998. Contudo, as suas bases sociais nunca deixaram de lutar. Em 2002, nesta altura Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento , tornou-se o lugar dos circulos Islamistas, pois receberam a aprovação de quase metade da população. Desde então o partido está a ser a voz da sociedadecujas origens são contra o status-quo. No entanto, os actos radicais do partido nos últimos anos também delinearam uma contra-oposição contra si próprios com os erros dos seus actos desonestos, tendo uma agenda secreta de Islamização do país e, gradualmente encabeçando uma ditadura civil para supressão das vozes da oposição. Esta dissertação apresenta uma visão do Islamismo, politização do Islão, democracia Turca, polarização social partindo da aceitação do Islão pelos Turcos desde os presentes dias, nas primeiras duas partes e argumentos dos efeitos da politica Islamica na sociedade turca, com base na polarização social, na última parte, atraves de dados empiricos de fontes primárias e secundárias. Palavras-chave: Islão Político, Islamismo, Islão Moderado, Islão, Turquia, Muçulmano, Ataturk, Partido do Bem-estar, Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento, Partido Democrata, Partido Repúblicano do Povo, Polarização, Império Otomano, Identidade, Ideologia, Manifestação Social, Turbante, Movimento Gulen, Espaço Público, Golpe Militar, Golpe de Estado, Modernismo, Pós-modernismo, Secularismo, Laicismo, Projeto do Cinto Verde, Projeto do Grande Médio Oriente iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Number ABSTRACT i RESUMO ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iii TABLES AND IMAGES vi ABBREVIATIONS vii INTRODUCTION 1 1. METHODOLOGY 9 2. ISLAMISM FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 14 2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF TURKISH PERCEPTION OF ISLAM 14 2.2. EVOLUTION OF ISLAMISM 20 2.2.1. Developments which Paved the Way to Islamism 20 2.2.2. Islamism as an Ideology and Politicization of Islam 24 2.3. WESTERN NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAMISM 26 2.4. THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ISLAM 28 2.4.1. Modernism 28 2.4.2. Radicalism 30 2.4.3. Postmodern Identity Politics and Development Concept 31 3. POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY DURING THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD 35 3.1. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKISH POLITICS AND POLITICAL ISLAM 35 3.1.1. Nationalist Modernization: Kemalism 38 3.1.2. Islamic Opposition to Kemalist Modernization 43 3.1.3. Place of Islamist Parties in Turkish Politics 45 3.1.3.1. DP and AP Period 46 3.1.3.2. MNP and MSP Period 49 3.1.3.3. RP Period 51 3.2. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF TURKEY 55 3.2.1. Geostrategy of Islamism 56 iv 3.2.2. Islam in Global Politics 57 3.2.3. Turkish Political Islam in the Globalizing World 58 3.2.4. USA‟s Islam Policy 60 3.2.5. Islam in Cold War Politics 64 3.3. 1980 MILITARY COUP 66 3.4. TURKISH DEMOCRACY CULTURE AND PLACE OF RP IN TURKISH POLITICS 68 3.4.1. Turkish Democracy Culture and RP 68 3.4.2. RP‟s Legal Pluralist Model 69 3.4.3. RP‟s Double Standard Policy 72 3.4.4. Lack of Democracy in Turkey and Totalitarian Tendencies 73 3.4.5. Republic, Public Space and Political Islam 77 3.4.6. Islamists‟ Discovery of Public Space 82 3.5. AKP ERA IN TURKISH POLITICS 83 3.6. GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS 92 4. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN TURKEY 97 4.1. POLITICS AND POLARIZATION 97 4.1.1. Focuses of Polarization 100 4.1.1.1. Turban Conflict 100 4.1.1.2. Education 113 4.1.1.3. Urban Life and Migration 131 4.1.2. Political Parties and Politics 139 4.2. POLITICAL DISPUTES 144 4.2.1. Public Opinion about Political Disputes 144 4.2.2. Recent Political Disputes 145 4.2.2.1. Amendments on Constitution 146 4.2.2.2. Corruption in Politics 150 4.2.2.3. Ergenekon Case 152 4.2.2.4. Other Disputes 160 4.2.3. An Evaluation of Politicization 161 4.2.4. Expectations from Life and Perceptions 162 4.3. CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLUSTERS TO POLARIZATION 163 4.3.1. Social Clusters 165 v 4.3.1.1. Moderns 165 4.3.1.2. Traditional Conservatives 166 4.3.1.3. Religious Conservatives 166 4.3.2. Political Agenda and Polarization 167 4.4. BASES OF SOCIAL POLARIZATION 169 4.4.1. An Overview of Different Identities 169 4.4.2. State Governance 173 4.4.3. Debates on Religion and Laicism 174 4.4.4. Debates on Political Islam 178 4.4.5. Social Habits and Lifestyles 182 4.4.6. Polarization Axes 183 4.5. SOCIAL UPRISING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 188 4.5.1. Freedom of Opinion 188 4.5.2. Women Rights 189 4.5.3. Social Uprising and Results of Social Polarization 191 CONCLUSIONS 195 SOURCES 205 ANNEXES 216 Glossary 216 Study A 222 Study B 236 Study C 248 vi TABLES AND IMAGES Page Number Table 1: Allegations on AKP’s Case of Closure 89 Table 2: Facts about Turkish Education 114 Table 3: Turkish Gender Inequality on Education 115 Table 4: Schooling Ratio by Education Year and Level of Education 115 Table 5: University Preferences of İmam-Hatip Graduates in 1988 119 Table 6: Number of Students Attended İmam-Hatip High Schools by Years 120 Image 1: Headscarf Style 104 Image 2: Turban Style 104 Image 3: Criticized type of Veiling 112 vii ABBREVIATIONS Acc. Accessed on AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Homeland Party) AP Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) BDP Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People‟s Party) CIA Central Intelligence Agency ÇYDD Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (The Association for Supporting Contemporary Life) DP Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party) DSP Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) DYP Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) Ed. Edition ECHR European Court of Human Rights EU European Union FP Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) ibid. ibidem İP İşçi Partisi (Workers‟ Party) Is. Issue loc. cit. loco citato MGK Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council) MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) MİT Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization) MNP Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) MÜSİAD Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association) MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference op. cit. opere citato Prof. Professor RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) SME Small and Medium Size Enterprises SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) TDH Türkiye Değişim Hareketi (Movement for Change in Turkey) TÜSİAD Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association) UN United Nations USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vol. Volume 1 INTRODUCTION Development of the western society through the geographical expeditions and industrialization between 15th and 19th centuries gradually led to the nationalist movements. Modernized and socialized communities of the West started to raise their voices against their repressive kings and followingly completed their experience through several revolutions that promoted the indispensability of equality, freedom and people‟s sovereignty all over the world. Thus, these claims became the most important element of social and political life in the West following the 19th century. These ideas resulted with the decline of the empires based on land and promoted the national consciousness which led to the rise of different national elements and people‟s claim of their rights from their rulers. The claims gradually caused the empires to decline and the nation states to rise. One of the most affected empires from the nationalist ideology was Ottoman Empire. As a result of the unstoppable decline of Ottoman Empire which possessed the Caliphate institution as the representative of the Islam world; Ottoman authorities desperately put the intellectuals in charge of finding the reason of their backwardness and a solution in order to come over their frustration about it. This situation divided the intellectuals in two as of the ones that justified the reason of regression by relating it to Islam itself and the ones that justified the reason with the Muslims. This disaccord reflected to the society in time and has taken the shape of a social conflict. The authorities used their preference to the side that considered Islam itself as the problem and decided to implement a series of reforms in order to meliorate the empire. Deciding the nature of reforms was not easy for an empire which had such a diverse society under its command as the reforms should appeal to all segments of the society. Because the reforms aimed to transform and westernize the society step by step in order to find a solution which could be a cure for the regression, Islamist circles which have always strived for reliving the bright times of Islam during the united Islam state period and were expecting to retain the status-quo to this end got disappointed with the decision. Thus, sultan‟s modernization efforts resulted with disaccord of the society on Islamism and westernism axes. While these ideologies were puny voices under Ottoman Empire rule, they gradually transformed into the voice of millions. 8 definition during the Cold War period, global decline of nationalist social democrat ideologies, persistent attitude of the Islamist political parties and showing all the opposers as Islam‟s enemy while not hesitating to reflect this in any condition brought the Turkish society to a dead-end in our day. In the light of all this information, this thesis aims to provide an understanding of Turkish Islamist perception by providing an overview of Islamist history, arguing the Turkish democratic system and its weaknesses and finally making an analysis of the polarization that long Islamist history caused in Turkey through evaluating the empirical data that was collected. 9 CHAPTER 1 METHODOLOGY This thesis is the result of a three-year investigation period, initiated in September 2010, as part of the Masters program in History, International Affairs and Cooperation, held at the University of Porto. Main purpose of this thesis is to provide information on evolution of political Islam in Turkey along with its consequences on the society. In the recent years Turkish society polarized more than any time before. This thesis expects to find answers to why there is a social compromise problem in Turkish society, how political Islam contributes to polarization, what the contributions of political parties to this polarization are and what should be done for reaching social compromise. Theme of the thesis is “Political Islam and Social Polarization in Turkey”. Political Islam has always been a prominent ideology among Turkish society since 1950‟s. However, prominence of Islamism has gradually polarized the society. Polarization of the society is not a new thing; polarization of Turkish society has its roots back in the 19th century. Modernization efforts of Ottoman Empire divided the society in two as ones blamed Islam for their backwardness and ones blamed Muslim society. But, as Ottoman authorities also found blaming Islam completely and importing innovations from the West immediately easier rather than blaming Muslims and get involved in a never-ending sociological project in a pragmatic attitude was a breaking point for Turkish Islam as this attitude became definitive on deciding the official ideology of Republic of Turkey. Second wave of Islamism is the period starting with 1950‟s and reaching the present day. However last 10 years of this period is more important than the rest. In 2002 AKP was elected through obtaining majority of the votes with a liberal rhetoric, but this liberal identity was forgotten following the elections and AKP embarked to implement its biased democracy which was basically provided for its own partisans. In this sense, the society was polarized more and more since 2002 and in the recent years this transformed into an uprising. Main objectives of the thesis are providing a better understanding on cosmopolite demography of Turkey, identifying conflicts of the society in Turkey, providing a better understanding of political Islam, investigating rise of political Islam 10 and perception of people, providing an overview of Turkish politics, inspecting the effects of globalization on spread of conservative thought, discussing effects of political Islam in Turkish society by taking immigration, education, cultural conflict and women rights variants into consideration. While some of the specific objectives are providing a better understanding of the cosmopolite demography of Turkey, identifying characteristics of the low culture and high culture, questioning role of politics on the conflict, questioning effects of internal immigration, discussing moderate Islam and arguing if Turkey is forced to be an example for region countries, investigating vernacular networks and their contribution to political Islam. In this thesis, above-mentioned issues will be the main subjects to be explained. This thesis has four chapters. First chapter is methodology part where the theme, purposes and methodology will be explained. No data will be used in methodology. Second chapter provides a historical perspective over Islamism which handles the period since Turkish acceptance of Islam until the present day. Political development theories are used in order to explain the historical perspective. No data will be used in second chapter. Third chapter provides an overview about political Islam in Turkey during republican period. As it is understood from its title, this chapter covers a history starting with declaration of republic in 1923 and ending with closure case of AKP in 2008. This chapter is quite important as it provides an overview of steps that led to polarization of Turkish society and will be reviewed in six parts providing information about Turkish Islamist parties, Turkish nationalism, effects of globalization, 1980 coup d‟etat, Turkish democracy culture, AKP period and Gülen Movement. Data from newspaper articles and magazines will be used in this chapter. Fourth and last chapter constitutes the main idea of this thesis. This chapter will handle research questions as what is social polarization, why there is social polarization, what is the extent of polarization, what is the source of polarization, what are the consequences of polarization. Empiric, qualitative and quantitative data will be used from primary and secondary sources in this chapter. Newspaper articles about the main incidents will be analyzed. Study A that consists of the results of a public poll in Turkey 11 about polarization, Study B that consists of a survey that was organized by the author about political attitudes and Study C that consists of two interviews that were done with two Turkish females which represents either of the poles. Now information about empiric data sources will be provided: Study A Authored by Bekir Ağırdır, this report is based on the data and findings of a survey conducted in April 2010. It aims to take a snapshot of polarization. Turkey is going through by elaborating on differing values and viewpoints that various electoral groups and social clusters have with regard to daily political debates and to make sense of this snapshot. Survey report was published as a series in the daily Radikal Newspaper between June 13 and 17, 2010. A total of 6482 interviews were conducted in 41 provinces, 328 districts and 1116 villages of Turkey. Survey report is available at http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar.php Study B The survey consists of 24 multiple choice questions on various topics related to demographic features of the participants and political Islam. All data collected was processed by www.esurveyspro.com. Even though basic statistical data of the participants was collected and processed, a crosstab report could not be provided as the free account did not allow retrieving such kind of information. Considering the survey was conducted between 13.07.2012 and 02.08.2012, some data may have altered due to the social changes in Turkey during the last one year. The response option of survey was set to anonymous multiple answers in order to protect participant‟s privacy and provide convenience for those who respond in a multi-user environment. Survey was responded by 160 people that allow us to analyze the Turkish society roughly through a 10 % standard deviation if solely the quantity of participants is taken into consideration.1 The survey was prepared and run only in Turkish and later translated to English. All questions were designed as mandatory; therefore none of the 24 questions were skipped by participants. As this report was submitted through social media and emails, the prerequisites to respond were having access to a computer, having internet connection, owning 1 Türker Baş, Anket Nasıl Hazırlanır, Nasıl Uygulanır, Nasıl Değerlendirilir (How is a Survey Prepared, Applied and Evaluated), Ankara: Seçkin, 2002 12 account on social media or having email address as well as being literate. Besides, participants who shared their opinion were mainly the group which is dissatisfied with the political environment in Turkey and mainly the people that identify themselves as laic social democrats whose political preference is predominantly CHP. Therefore, this report cannot be considered as 100 % accurate to the reality of Turkish society. It is believed it is also important to state that before the survey website was discovered, this survey was attempted to be conducted in paper format based on one-onone meetings. However, approximately only 20 % of the people which were asked a one-on-one meeting accepted to meet. As there was not enough data to use from the meetings that were intended to be done, an online poll was seen as more trustworthy. Therefore, it can be assumed that 80 % of the participants in a small seaside holiday village that consists of 83 housings and approximately 166 individuals (if it is supposed that each house has 2 inhabitants) in northwestern Turkey where the majority of population are holidaymakers from different regions preferred not to share their political opinion with an alien. Moreover, their attitude also may be related to their reluctance for discussing politics during their holiday season. Majority of the participants in the survey consist of middle aged, urban, democrat, Muslim males between 45 and 59 who are graduated from a public higher education institution on social sciences and work as employees. Almost three quarters of the participants are CHP electorates that are not satisfied with the current AKP government. Majority believe that religion should be under control of the state. A major part of the participants consider that political Islam is a system that politicians implemented in order to orient the society in their interest. More than three fourths of participants think that Islam in politics does not assure freedoms while more than half of the participants do not want to see religious items in public space. A major part of the participants think that Islamism is a threat for Turkey. Majority have never participated in political activities. Almost all participants say that they make friends from different opinions, but in the meanwhile they think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish society. Half of the participants think that media does not assist liberal thought. Majority partially practices their religion, thinks that their freedom is restricted by the society which is not tolerant. A major part of the participants think that social environment is the most important factor in influencing lifestyles. 13 Full information of the survey is available in the annexes. Study C Study C is based on the interviews conducted in Istanbul during July of 2012. No video was taken, only voice recorder was used. Authorization form was signed by both participants. Both participants are females. Participant 1 represents laic circles; participant 2 represents religious conservative circles. Both interviews were done at cafes for comfort of the participants. Subject 1 participated to the research alone while Subject 2 was accompanied with her sister. Overall atmosphere was positive. Subject 1 was much more relaxed while providing answers compared to Subject 2. Off the record, Subject 2 mentioned that she was a member of AKP‟s youth branch while Subject 1 was not affiliated with nowhere at the moment. Subject 1 26 years old, lives in Istanbul, master‟s student, born in Istanbul, attended school in Istanbul, no imam-hatip background, Turkish, and Caucasian. Subject 2 27 years old, lives in Istanbul, German teacher, attended school in Istanbul, no imamhatip background, Turkish, and Caucasian. Full information of the interviews is available in the annexes. 14 CHAPTER 2 ISLAMISM FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF TURKISH PERCEPTION OF ISLAM Religion, which is as old as humankind, is an important determiner in construction of a culture according to Durkheim sociology. Turkish believed in variety of religions in different locations since beginning of their history in Central Asia. Yet, changing religions often based on their location played an important role on their social life. Eventually, Islam became one of the most important values of Turkish society. As a matter of fact, there are historical, cultural and actual dimensions that should be studied to understand importance of religion in Turkish history. All religions which affected Turkish history should be taken into account on the basis of social structure. There are two opinions about Turkish pre-Islamic religious beliefs; one defends that Turkish were Shamans while the opposing supports that Turkish always had a monotheistic belief. However, both of them are far from exhibiting a certainty. Yet, another opinion which defended that Turkish adopted Islam without resistance was refuted by recent researches. According to this false statement, non-Sunni beliefs were claims to disintegrate Turkish society.2 Islamic world strives for returning back to its glamorous days. Therefore, an investigation of Turkish history should be done to understand where the mistake was done. Turkish were the protectors of Islam until their decline against the West. Ottomans realized that something was wrong following their technological, cultural decline and several military defeats and implemented western style alterations; however they never considered Muslim identity as the problem.3 It was 19th century when Ottomans realized that the issue was actually their identity. While some intellectuals saw the fault in Islam itself, some others blamed followers. This was how two ideologies came into question for the first time: Westernism and Islamism. Those ideologies manifested basis for laicism versus Islamism debates. Eventually, modern Turkish republic was founded by ones seeing Islam as the issue. Even though 2 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam (Turks, Turkey and Islam), Ed. 10, İstanbul: İletişim, 1999, p. 20 3 ibid., p. 24 15 westernists were overwhelming ones, aggression never ended between two groups. At the present time, Turkey seems to be uncomfortable with representation of Islam by some fanatic circles and hopes this identity would get weaker through its admission to the EU.4 However, because of inadequate education about Islam, debates can only carry on limited to certain aspects. It is widely accepted that Turkish adopted Islam starting from 900 A.D for its mystic character. Neither Turkish accepted Islam under pressure nor transition process have been without issues. This transition was consequence of a complex social structure. Islam spread among Turkish step by step and eventually it was adopted as state religion by Karakhanids for the first time. Adoption of Islam by Seljuqs, who were successors of Karakhanids, marked a milestone in the Turkish history. According to ancient documents, Islam spread very superficially among nomads, Arabic tradesmen and Sufis; but they had a great impact on conversion of Turkish.5 Sunni-Seljuq evolution has been a constituent for Sunni canon law, ulema religiousness and Sufism.6 Sufism was used for society‟s embracement of Islam and it was assumed that Sufism complemented Quran and Shari‟a.7 As Sufism evolved, range of unknown in religion was broadened and extent of science shrank. This narrowed the area of political science and fostered society not to question. Seljuqs passed through great transformations after accepting Islam in Transoxiana at 11th century which assured Turkish possession in Middle East and proved their power to claim caliphate for Sunni Muslims. This incident marked state building era of the Western Turkish. Following Karakhanids and Seljuqs, Sunni Islam was also acknowledged as official state religion of Ottomans. Ottoman sultan became the highest representative of Islam through possession of caliphate and thus state and religion were integrated. There are two aspects that should be considered on Turkish religious perception; Sunni and non-Sunni Islam. In time, Transoxiana became the center of Sunni Islam and accordingly it became official religion of all Turkish states following Karakhanids.8 However, nomad communities started to follow flexible heterodox Islam on the 4 ibid., p. 20 5 ibid., p.p. 30-36 6 Anthony Black, Siyasal İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi: Peygamberden Bugüne, (The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present), Ankara: Dost, 2001, p. 191 7 ibid, p. 195 8 op. cit. Ocak, p. 41 16 contrary of settled communities as it was more suitable to their lifestyle. Heterodox Islam did not arise systematically as Sunni Islam did; it originated from a mixture of pre-Islamic religions, Islam and social conditions which explains its non-systematic nature. One of the most important features of heterodox Islam was its harmony that integrated many different beliefs. Because of its flexibility, it was even suitable to use for spreading Islam in the West. Sunnism evolved as equal partner of militarist political power and it integrated with society and sociopolitical system.9 In course of this integration, Shari‟a was used as a guideline to transform society in an ethical way. It was seen as moral law which was believed that its orders were set by God and were not debatable.10 Sunni Islam was always dominant in the structure of Turkish states because of its systematical frame. Naturally Islam itself has a political character as being evolved as a political theory during the Abbasid reign. Turkish states pursued this structure as it was seen as a legitimacy source on governmental and international relations and acknowledged domination of Islam in reconciliation with a traditional understanding.11 Sunni Islam‟s systematical structure and rationality directed Turkish to accept this sect officially. It lived its brightest period during the Ottoman reign, however advance in religion was only limited to needs of the empire. Ottomans remained tolerant to all kinds of beliefs until Safavids converted to Shi‟ism officially and became rival of Ottomans. In the following years, Ottoman Empire applied strict policy against nonSunni beliefs. Nevertheless, non-Sunni popular Islam has always been present unofficially among the people. Maverdi was the first person to declare that worldly and spiritual powers were different from each other. Also he formed the legal basis of sultan-caliph idea by defending that the spiritual tasks also could be managed by the actual ruler instead of the caliph.12 As there was only one caliph, there was also only one sultan who was military and political leader of Islam.13 This idea caused extensive effects that were seen in 9 op. cit., Black, p. 128 10 op. cit., Ocak p. 131 11 ibid., p.p. 61-68 12 op. cit., Black, p. 139 13 Bernard Lewis, Historians in the Middle East, London: Oxford University, 1962, p. 52 17 Ottoman sultan‟s claim of caliphate along with his political and military leadership.14 In that respect, religion was sunk into politics in Turkish states. Consequently, because religion scholars and sultans were in close relationship; Islam did not experience a conflict between religion and politics like in Europe. According to Islam, all emperors were subject to Shari‟a which clearly was abused by the Ottoman Empire; moreover loyalty to the dynasty was seen equal to loyalty to Islam. Vassal‟s desire of engaging to their emperor was a typical Ottoman tradition, because it was considered that state would collapse if emperor failed. Therefore, reformists tied their hopes to a reformist sultan which explains how the Turkish revolution established the most laic state in the Islam world. One of the most important reforms in the Ottoman state was the introduction of laic customary constitution known as Ottoman Constitution of 1876. This way, two sources of law were introduced by integrating laic and Shari‟a laws which were both applied by same courts. Multi-ethnic nature of Ottoman Empire has been effective on introduction of new laws as the entire society was subject to them on the contrary of religious laws. There is no other example of introduction and consolidation of laic laws under a code of law by sultan‟s advice in Islamic world. The law aimed decreasing pressure on society and penalizing crime effectively. Some historians state that Ottoman law was fair and liberal compared to the feudal laws in Europe at the period.15 Albeit law and Shari‟a were integrated to be a unique system, actually law contradicted with Shari‟a in many ways. Therefore, Heyd stated that “many religion scholars were against the laic law as a principle”.16 Ottomans made a synthesis of religion and politics at their brightest times; once they started to have failures, this synthesis started to get criticized and tension between religious and laic elements emerged at this point for the first time.17 Some religious scholars advised that Ottoman state should attach itself to Shari‟a in order to gain its former power. Moreover, an anonymous author stated: “who believes that sultan has the right to ban what is permitted and to permit what is banned in religion is faithless, because God is the only 14 op. cit., Black, p. 145 15 ibid., p.p. 295-299 16 Ulrich Heyd, The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II, Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. 9, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1973, p. 203 17 op. cit., Black p.p. 303 24 2.2.2. Islamism as an Ideology and Politicization of Islam Different opinions get into relation once different layers of society communicate at a point in history and different opinions are first steps in forming ideologies. When the limits of human mind and acts are questioned, ideology emerges. Ideology is the idea of modern times and an outcome of industrialism. According to Geertz, ideology is a system of symbols or symbolic maps created for people to explain their socio-political environments. Religion also contains the same symbolization system with ideology and both provide a social integration mechanism. Although Ottoman Empire did not go through same processes as the West, its geographical position and cultural proximity caused it to be influenced by modern thought and create individual ideologies. This process is called acculturation which means transformation of original cultural patterns of different societies through their excessive interaction with each other. Effects of acculturation can be seen in both interacting cultures. When different layers that are isolated from each other get into touch through globalism, two cultures influence each other and they both start to transform.39 Islamism is considered to date back to the beginnings of 2nd Constitutional Era of Ottoman Empire, but modern Islamist idea emerged especially after 1930‟s as a reaction against aggression of imperialist states. A legitimacy issue arose with the arrival of western ideologies to Islamic societies. People‟s desire of contributing to decision making process has weakened monarchy which was acknowledged by traditional Islam. The biggest reason of this manifestation was advance of media and rise of intellectual society. Islamism was a socio-political theory that arose at the point where legitimization efforts turned to be unsuccessful. It referred to reorganization of Muslim society, foundation of modern structures and ideas adequate to needs of the age by Ottoman Empire. However, it became a negative synthesizer at colonized Islamic communities by being identified with antiimperialism. Even though Islamism is an outcome of traditional Islamic society‟s confrontation with ideology, traditional Islam still exists in context of religious values. 39 op. cit., Gülalp, p. 33 25 Main difference between Islamism and traditional Islam is the change in legitimacy type of religion as a result of acculturation. In Islamist ideology, Islam is acknowledged as a world view like in western ideologies which resulted with its perception according to the needs of modern era and transformation into a more concrete frame.40 Traditional Islam adopts traditional values of religion which defends the idea of God and sacred laws that its followers can only practice but not discuss, while in Islamism main elements of Islam can be discussed and even transformed according to the needs of era.41 There is a God centered explanation in Islam, as Islamism is based on human nature.42 Distinctively from traditional Islam, Islamism competes with philosophical thoughts instead of other religions. While it competes, it absorbs useful sides of them, because the acceptance of Islam as a philosophical reference provides a political movement formed in national identity frame to be in touch with other dominant movements. According to Islamists, Islamization of society should be the outcome of a social and political activity. 43 Many social scientists still believe that modernism‟s outcome should be laicism. According to this thought, modernism period decreases effect of religion all around the world; but rise of Islamism proves that this is not accurate.44 Even though it is believed that Islam is not suitable for modernization, Turkey makes an exception in the Islamic world by embracing modernism and Islamic elements together. Though, it should be stated that laicism is not a model particular to Judaism or Christianity, because substantially religion and social life should not be considered as independent from each other. Only the different methods that some societies adopted were effective on decrease of religion in social life. However such kind of a break point was not realized yet. Even though Turkey is the most suitable Muslim country for the Western model, laicism was implemented by force because of the social nonconformity. Thus, it is possible to see also a great social opposition against this system that is still considered to be eliminated by urbanization and industrialization. In the meanwhile 40 op. cit., Türköne, p. 30 41 Reinhard Bendix, The Age of Ideology, Edited by David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 296 42 Seyyid Hossein Nasr, Modern Dünyada Geleneksel İslam (Traditional Islam in the Modern World), İstanbul: İnsan, 1989, p. 110 43 Olivier Roy, Siyasal İslam’ın İflası (L’Echec de l’Islam Politique), Ed. 3, İstanbul: Metis, 1994, p. 56 44 op. cit., Gülalp, p. 24 26 Turkey still suffers from its anti-laic society. Nevertheless, Ernest Gellner states that “Islam is unique among other religions and Turkey is unique in the Muslim world”.45 Islamism‟s political interpretation currently represents an ideology that was studied by many Islamist intellectuals. But usage of Islam as an ideology is not something particular to our time, thus Islamist modernists also made such attempts in the 19th century. The most important of those was neo-Ottomans. But Kemalist regime‟s oppressive nature, strived for taking Islam under control. Islamism could open a space for itself only after 1950‟s when nationalism lost its significance. These efforts resulted with Islamists‟ possibility to have a voice in politics increasingly after 1980‟s. 2.3. WESTERN NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAMISM Ottoman intellectuals found nationalism idea based on race inappropriate for their society. 19th century Ottoman intellectuals tried to form an Ottoman nation that could meet their demands. Once felt this necessity, they discovered Islam nation and started to form an Ottoman nation around homeland idea they have taken from the West. Western nationalism is an idea that was formed as a result of transformation experienced on religious principles following enlightenment which makes it a laic idea as other ideologies. But as Ottoman state never passed through enlightenment, religion was transformed into a nationalist ideology and permuted the space that enlightenment covered up in the West with Islamic idea. Intellectuals applied to Islam brotherhood when they understood that they needed to take approval of the society. Nationalist idea in Islamist nationalism is an acculturative ideology; however it does not have any discrepancy from western nationalism. Ottomans differ from other Muslim societies with not ascribing other missions to Islam such as jihad.46 Nevertheless, it can be said that Islamism evolved under pressure of laicism in Ottoman society. Islam‟s use as a political ideology in1979 Iran Revolution drew international attention. This was beginning of a period when Islam was started to be identified with 45 Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni., 1981, p. 186 46 op. cit., Türköne, p.p. 282-284 27 state and politics concepts in today‟s world.47 Another feature of this revolution was start of an “Islamic revival” period. Another idea emerged at the same time was “defiance to the West”. This idea resulted with a quest for “Islamic state” which turned to a totalitarian politic ideology. Under those circumstances Turkey has a significant importance by having the closest relations with the West. Muslimhood in Turkey carries marks of a journey from East to West and has a diverse historical root. Turkish Muslims have always been vulnerable against cultural influence from either the West or the East for being close to both. Western influences forced Turkey into a westernization process and exposed to major socio-cultural transformations. Identity dispute became more apparent again in republican era by strict laic ideology. Islam was pushed out of public sphere as a result of this. A new type of Muslimhood left to personal conscience that can be called as “Kemalist Muslimhood” emerged at the end of this process and caused a new identity depression. Result of Islam‟s withdrawal from public space resulted with introvertion of religious understanding and formation of a parochial Islam. Parochial sheiks started to teach religion secretly in this period. But these people who were trying to teach religion had an obvious disinterest towards knowing in what kind of a world they lived in. In 1950, because of DP‟s soft attitude and migration to cities, urbanization started. However migrants carried out the village Muslimhood to city instead of adapting to urban life. As a result of this, neighborhood culture was transformed into religious communities. This urbanized community got into touch with other Muslims and criticized traditional Islam understanding. As a result of that, they contradicted with traditional Islamist community. New generation Islamists have seen Islam not only as a religion but also as a political, economic and social model and were labeled as puritanical. This Islamic revival that was disconnected from its past, have entered under command of ideological inclinations. The weakest points of Turkish Muslim intellectuals are lack of historical consciousness and insufficient knowledge of Western civilization.48 Challenging tests are waiting for Muslims in Turkey which intend to be westernized. Muslims should be aware that paralyzed ideologies would not serve to 47 op. cit., Ocak, p. 130 48 ibid., p.p. 137-138 28 escape from this situation. Turkish Muslimhood became the slave of its past for not facing it yet and seeks consolation in dream of living Islam‟s golden age. Complex and jealousy against the West turned into hostility as a result of that. Muslims can only put their advantages forward once they overcome their complex. 2.4. THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ISLAM Theories of political development have a significant importance in terms of evolution of Islamism. In this thesis, evolution of Islamism is being explained in three theories which are modernism, radicalism and postmodernism. First, modernism will be handled. 2.4.1. Modernism Between Ottoman Reorganization Period and World War I, Muslim intellectuals started to be interested in Europe. In the meanwhile, European states started colonialism and the states that were affected from nationalism started to split from Ottoman Empire. Modernism in Ottoman Empire started as an outcome of its westernization desire and it was the only Muslim state that made reforms for this purpose at the time. Reforms that were carried out created a synthesis between traditional and modern states. Some intellectuals saw European laic laws and modern technology as the main point to reach success and many reforms were conducted one after another. In this sense, 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization has been the most comprehensive reform movement and Islamic world faced a reform movement which adopted European political thought for the first time. The main purpose of this reform was to show motivation of liberalization to Christian minorities and request assistance from the West for the ongoing rebellion in Egypt. Another reform which was important regarding rights of minorities was 1856 Imperial Reform Edict. This edict assured limitation of Shari‟a with individual space by reforms made in legal structure. These reforms resulted with emergence of an equal Ottoman society and a social system based on citizenship was adopted. However, the group, which objected laicism and defended that state could not exist if religion‟s importance would decrease, opposed 29 reforms.49 Nevertheless, some other intellectuals did not ignore that Islam was also important for unity, but they defended that main important element is Turkish nation considering that state existed before Islam.50 On the other hand, Ottoman officials and sultan defended that reforms were licit as future of the state was in question. Ottoman Empire pioneered the first great scale movement in Islamic world by integrating West‟s individualism, constitutional governance and representative democracy principles with Islamist idealism. Islamic political thought and western political thought got into interaction and became systematical starting with neoOttomans period.51 Neo-Ottomans defended that spreading ideas was a basic human right and the only way to strengthen people through education was political newspapers.52 Freedom became a main value for this generation. Islam‟s diplomatic language and West‟s diplomatic language were considered as the same by neo-Ottomans. Moreover, neo-Ottomans also used Quran and hadith scripts to support the idea of constitutional democracy. For example, “”Difference of opinion is God‟s favor in my society.” hadith of Mohammed and “Then, forgive your people and take their opinion in all affairs.” sentence from Al-Imran section of Quran were introduced as arguments that backed up parliamentary system.53 Those incidents caused political values of the past to be questioned. Considering that basic aim of neoOttomans was to adopt parliamentary system that was ordered by Islam, they can be considered as first true Islamic modernists. Neo-Ottomans were defending that Shari‟a rules also could be altered according to the needs of time54 and that God did not plan everything in advance.55 However, neo-Ottomans broke away from western style laicism, because their homeland idea was significant to an Islamic multi-ethnic society rather than the ethnic society understanding in Western idea.56 But nevertheless they still defended that state and religious affairs should get separated, religion is not the 49 op. cit., Mardin, p.p. 199-200 50 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909, London: Tauris, 1998, p.p. 169-170 51 op. cit., Black, p. 406 52 op. cit., Lewis, p. 147 53 op. cit., Black, p. 407 54 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal: McGill, 1964, p. 213 55 op. cit. Mardin, p. 407 56 Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Vol 2., Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni., 1977, p. 132 30 determiner of laws and religion would become corrupted if it interacts with state affairs.57 People‟s struggle in class and nation identities frame throughout modern period resulted with welfare state model in central countries, socialism in semi-periphery countries and progressive state model in periphery countries. This way, class identities were dominated by national identities and national development was seen as the common target.58 Nation states strived for legitimatizing national unity for economical benefit and commitment of citizens to the state. Eventually failure of this system accelerated passage to postmodern state concurrently with globalization. National economies lost their domestic integrity with advance of globalization and this caused deterioration of worker class and emergence of an outsourced production system. 2.4.2. Radicalism In order to integrate society against separatist ideas, Abdülhamid 2nd tried to use caliphate. However, because this strategy failed against non-Muslim communities, Turkism was promoted and Islam lost its importance in politics. Turkism later transformed into a bold nationalism by Kemalist ideology which became official policy of modern Turkish republic. World War I revealed the perception which considers the West as superior on social and political aspects is incorrect.59 Turkish Revolution that took place between 1920 and 1924 was important at least as much as 1917-1921 Russian Revolution even though Western researchers did not show much attention to it. A state that calls itself laic was formed for the first time in Islamic world through this revolution.60 Groups such as Young Turks and Committee of Union and Progress, which were against autocracy in Ottoman Empire, emerged in Abdülhamid 2nd term. Those groups forced Abdülhamid 2nd to carry out reforms in order to found a Turkish nation-state. Abdülhamid 2nd and his supporters defended that liberalism can only be based on Islamic values.61 57 op. cit., Berkes, p. 208 58 op. cit., Gülalp, p. 122 59 op. cit., Black, p. 425 60 ibid., p. 430 61 op. cit., Berkes, p. 369 31 In any case, a strong link between nationalism and laicism was established in this term. However many intellectuals defended that Islam was also a very important aspect in the formation of Turkish national conscious. As the result of failure of Ottoman leaders, Ottoman Empire fell and roots of new Turkish nation-state were laid in Atatürk‟s leadership. Passage of sovereignty unconditionally to Turkish nation brought the end of caliphate institution. However surprisingly Sunni cannon law complies with European revolution doctrine at this point; both sources mention obtainment of sovereignty by force. In this situation Turkish nation took their sovereignty by rebellion.62 Even though Atatürk abolished sultanate by declaring republic, he remained indecisive about abolishing caliphate institution. But when Islamist circles started to push caliph to hinder reforms, this institution was also abolished. Atatürk tried to fill the social gap left from Islam through his implementations, but this failed and created the risk of emergence of two conflicting societies as laic and conservative.63 Nevertheless, Atatürk‟s aim was not to eliminate Islam as a religion; what he strived for was redefining relation between religion and state in frame of Islam.64 Eliminating Islamic values from state governance through reforms brought Turkey closer with Western civilization. Religion was declared as a personal space and was entirely excluded from governmental structure. Moreover, army implemented strict measures on prevention of Islamist parties to participate in politics. 2.4.3. Postmodern Identity Politics and Development Concept Relation between decrease of class conflict and postmodern life formed distinction cultural identities and new social movements.65 Classes lost their significance and left their place to status conflict which became main anxiety of society. Therefore race, gender, ethnicity and religion were the main elements of identity politics. Identity politics is basically a formation beyond classes. In this sense, Islamism should be also considered as an identity politic. 62 op. cit., Black, p. 432 63 op. cit., Ocak, p.p. 75-79 64 op. cit., Black, p. 433 65 op. cit., Gülalp, p. 125 32 Because Islamism is an ideology which defines itself as anti-Eurocentric, it arose as a criticism of Western civilization in Turkey as well as in the world. It is possible to see the effect of underdevelopment in Turkey. Thus, an impatient revolutionism followed reformist optimism and a submissive atmosphere dominated when it was felt there was no hope for revolution.66 Although, there was a possibility to break off from global system through socialism before 1980, this possibility was eliminated in pos1980. Global system theory proved that it was impossible for national units to escape from capitalism on their own. The ones attributed attention to post development rather than development itself, refused modernism theory and this tendency emerged as Islamism in Turkey. According to “cadre school” which arose in 1930‟s, obtaining national independence from capitalist order and state‟s undertaking of development were accepted as conditions of development. Another aspect of this school was its opposition to Islamism. Western civilization gets criticized because of its ambition for economic growth and resisting to West is taken in a cultural frame in Islamist literature. While industrialism was accepted as the main circumstance of development in Islamism, Islamist literature defends that taking industrialism concept as granted is an indicator of surrendering to the West‟s cultural imposition. Islamism accords with postmodernist idea in this sense. Another point that they accord is about not accepting what is told unconditionally. Postmodernism does not consider wisdom as a trusted source of information the same way as Islamism does. Truth can be relative according to both ideologies. In this sense, both of them accept that what is unknown can only be explained by faith. Islamist authors emphasize that Islamism is not conservatism or traditionalism. Islamism is a response given to modern issues.67 Therefore, modernism and laicism get criticized by Islamists for not actualizing what they promised. Islamist author İsmet Özel correlates capitalism and consumption with idolatry, because people started to worship money and politics even though they quitted 66 ibid., p. 128 67 op. cit., Gülalp, 136 33 worshipping idols.68 Besides, he asserts that technology is influenced by Western corporations which determine the trends on technological progress to make profit for a certain group in society.69 Islamists also criticize the West for their ambition to seize nature by forgetting that human being is also a part of it. In this context, increasing popularity of Islamism can be explained with crisis of modernism. If Islamism derived from crisis of modernism, the reason of its popularity especially among intellectuals is the critic against modernist values such as industrialism, materialism and laicism.70 In this context, Islamism asserts that materiality is not the only purpose in life and social issues would diminish by decrease of consumption through adoption of Islamic lifestyle. Considering this, it can be said that postmodernism was an outcome of periphery‟s uprising against center. Islamist critic assumes that humanitarian values are abandoned only in rational societies and defends that standard of value should shift from materialism to virtue. Therefore, it bases excess consumption and environmental pollution on rational society and suggests virtue as antidote of consumption mentality. However, it is also an incorrect assumption to believe that Islamic state promises wealth; this is based on an incorrect hypothesis which suggests that it is possible to reach the objective that was promised by capitalism through Islam.71 Differently from Marxism and capitalism, Islamism refuses development paradigm completely and isolates itself from elements as the West and capitalism. In fact, Islamist ideology is not against entrepreneurship, profit and market economy; it is only against monopoly capitalism. According to this, real conflict in the market is between liberalism and monopoly. Islamism gives the same struggle against any inequality on economical, social and cultural issues.72 In this sense, as in consideration of liberal market the same as with equality and freedom, there is the idea of protecting citizens against suppressive state policies in criticizing modern state to support civil society. 68 İsmet Özel, Üç Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet ve Yabancılaşma (Three Issues, Technic, Civilization and Alienation), Istanbul: Çıdam, 1992, p.p. 31-32 69 ibid., p.p. 43-46 70 op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 140-142 71 Abdurrahman Dilipak, Savaş, Barış, İktidar (Warfare, Peace, Power), İstanbul: İşaret/Ferşat, 1991, p. 20 72 op. cit., Özel, p. 20 40 brought improvements to comply with this. But this suggestion divided society into two as westernists that aimed to copy the West and Islamists who were thinking that returning back to basics of Islam would resolve the situation. These fiery debates were carried to the republic with fall of Ottoman Empire. Turkey selected an identity according to desire of westernists in republican period and this situation disappointed Islamists. Cadre that carried on national struggle by using Islamist ideology until 1924 adopted a new radical westernist ideology and closed era of one thousand years which was driven by Islam. This implies that Republic of Turkey clearly adopted a regime that Islam did not have an active role. However, Kemalism could not avoid transforming to enlightenment despotism. This transformation is the most important milestone in Turkish history after Turkish adoption of Islam.86 Turkish state irreversibly adopted western identity with foundation of republic and radical alterations in the system were made. This was something that was never seen before in history. As part of this transformation these alterations were implemented;  Sultanate was abolished in 1922,  Republic was declared in 1923,  Caliphate was abolished in 1924,  Madrasahs were closed to comply with Code on Unification of Education and all education institutions were transferred to Ministry of National Education in 1924,  Islam was officially taken under state control by foundation of Presidency of Religious Affairs in 1924,  Sufism was pushed underground by closure of dervish lodges in 1925,  The article “Official religion of Turkish state is Islam.” was eliminated from the constitution in 1928,  Resources that served for Islamic foundations were blocked by transfer of foundations under state control in 1936.87 A great part of reforms were done between 1922 and 1925. As a result of these reforms, Islam was limited to private life and gained a more conscientious aspect. Islam‟s individualization resulted with its withdrawal also from politicians‟ lives.88 86 ibid., p. 117 87 op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 17 41 Besides, state did not settle with this and made efforts to transform perception of religion into a Western Muslimhood by interfering to its confidential and cultural areas; it tried to form a reformed and civilized Muslimhood project which fit into westernized Turkey. In this context, state embarked upon forming religion up to its will by ordering projects to professors at Faculty of Theology of Istanbul University to shape mosques in a way that look alike with western churches, investigations on implementing azan in Turkish and organizing Quran recitals in Turkish.89 As a result of all these reforms, conflict which existed since Ottoman period between laic nationalist state, laic elite and Muslim majority reached to a hate extent. Society lost its trust upon state and leaned to conservative parties that had an Islamic rhetoric. That‟s the main reason for DP‟s accedence to power. Following DP‟s election, usage of Islam for political interests became one of the most debated topics. But even though Kemalist elite lost its place in power, it has always kept state under strict control through army which caused a negative effect on democratization. On the other hand, Islam‟s repression to underground by the closure of dervish lodges caused arbitrary practices on Islamic education. This legislation caused Islamist circles to realize that how much they were lagging behind. Main reason of this lagging was their perception of the Western civilization only with its imperialistic side. However, even though they realized their backwardness, they started to yearn for good old times of Islamic state rather than improving themselves. As the matter of this fact, new communities and tariqahs emerged and a puritanical community Muslimhood was adopted. Another result was ignition of radical Islam by radical laicism. These movements took their power from Kemalism‟s oppressive environment. Ethnocentric separatist movements and fears for possible Islamist movements were also based on this environment. One of the most desperate results of this action have been transformation of Islam, which produced its own political, cultural, social, legal, artistic and economic institutions and values that built a high urban culture during imperial period, to a popular Islam perception which demonstrated superstitious features and lacked a refined 88 op. cit., Ocak, p. 119 89 ibid., p. 120 42 manner through Islam‟s deprival of its supporting institutions with declaration of republic which eventually caused rustication of Islam in time.90 Turkish identity and nationalist idea started to develop against separatist acts of Arabs and Balkan nations. Turkish nationalism also emerged as a reaction to decline of Ottoman Empire against imperialism like other ideologies. This new ideology replaced Turkish and Muslim elements with non-Muslim elements. Nationalist idea started with Young Turks movement and kept on during Independence War. As a result of this ideology, a new Muslim middle class emerged. Kemalism identifies Turkish nationalism as an ideology based on land. In its official definition, Turkey stands for geographical land and Turkish people stands for people living on this land.91 This definition is significantly different from a classical definition of nationalism and moreover it shows similarity with previous Ottomanism concept. Both of them are outcomes of an effort to unify different ethnical elements. The most important difference of Kemalism versus Ottomanism is the exclusion of nonMuslims. Even though emergence of nation-state is a result of 19th century Ottoman modernization; Kemalism realized establishment of Republic of Turkey as a radical disengagement from Ottoman Empire. In this context, state was reestablished by taking its power from Turkish nation. Kemalist ideology is anti-imperialist and western. The reason that it was disengaged from its Ottoman past was Ottoman Empire‟s failure as a puppet to imperialism. Therefore this disengagement is an anti-imperialist act according to Kemalism. Islam was quitted to be used as a political tool after Kemalist revolution. Kemalist administration perceived Islam as a threat and placed it under control of laic state. Following Sheikh Said rebellion against integrity of state, reforms accelerated, any separatist factor was eliminated and Turkey transformed into a unified nation which strived for reaching level of Western civilization. According to Kemalist idea, crucial element of modernization was westernization and Islam was desired to be taken under control of the state because it was involving contradistinction against some values of modernism.92 90 ibid., p. 125 91 ibid., p.p. 31-33 92 loc. cit. 43 Main target of both Islamism and Kemalism has always been to reach the level of Western civilization. Besides, all those ideologies contain a Turkish centralism. According to this thought, Turkish states and Islam always had same values as the West and it was important to readopt what belonged to Turkish. The extreme thesis in Kemalist historiography helped legitimating westernization by attributions made to pre-Islamic Turkish elements. This situation is actually a common characteristic of third world countries. Thus, western and nonwestern elements conflict with capitalism‟s globalist tendencies which show themselves in existence of both globalist and relativist elements together in Western culture. It is expected to westernize from non-Western countries while they are considered that they do not have necessary qualification to be Western. This creates confusion in third world countries and they usually tend to protect their self-respect and authenticity claims while getting westernized. The same situation is also in question for Turkey. Turkey has obliterated its Ottoman and Islam past, completely entered into global civilization but defended that this civilization was not enforcement.93 But Turkey‟s westernization could not reach a complete success due to unequal evolution of capitalism worldwide. This situation caused emergence of critical movements and a new type of Islamism has risen among those. 3.1.2. Islamic Opposition to Kemalist Modernism Even though Islamist opposition shares same modernist assumptions with Kemalism, the method it follows became an alternative to secular nationalism. Differing from Kemalist laicism‟s rhetoric that defends suppression of Islam, Islamist modernists assumed that Muslim communities can also get modernized. Islamist modernists assume that acceptance of modern values would not spoil authenticity as elements of Western civilization originate from Muslim world. Islamist MSP‟s and its then leader Necmettin Erbakan‟s opinions confirm that. Also MSP refused to see modernism and westernization as the same like other modernist Islamists. Even though Turkish nation lost its connection to Islam, they continued to consider Turkish society as Muslim which resulted with Islam‟s inclusion 93 ibid., p.p. 33-35 44 to the ideology that legitimized political power after settlement of the regime. Extreme nationalist rhetoric was also refused at that period. Therefore, an uncertainty emerged. Radical Islamist movement that was formed in 1980‟s questioned modernism itself altogether. That started arguments on what kind of an attitude should be adopted towards modernism in Turkish political life and authenticity arose as an alternative against western modernity in the aftermath of this period. Reason of RP‟s success was its possibility to merge two concepts of Islam, which are the concept that suggests an alternative to Kemalism and the concept that refuses modernism and hence Kemalism, in the same movement. The factor that brought these two movements together was their opposition against Kemalism. This opposition took its power from Kemalism‟s decline in an environment that globalization rose and nation-state lost its significance.94 Kemalism‟s decline is a result of globalization. Marxism and nationalism have universalized the experience of Europe, but western protective ideologies lost their validity due to globalization. Therefore, also Kemalism lost its validity as it was accepting Western civilization as a universal model. But, Islamism on the other hand refused Western ideologies as they were ignoring authentic identity and projected itself as local, authentic and anti-imperialist. In this sense while modernist Islamism in 19th and 20th centuries was aiming to unite western modernity and Islamist authenticity in the same frame, current critical Islamism refuses supremacy of Western civilization. However it is also a fact that putting an authentic identity claiming to be different from the West causes regeneration of Western orientalism. It does not matter which ideology is adopted, ideology of the weak is always obliged to progress in the frame that the strong set.95 Masses, which live in rural areas or in slums of cities, manifest their political and social demands with an Islamic identity in today‟s Turkey take their power from this rustic popular Islam.96 These circles bring popular Islam out as an opposing identity against the ruling elite. Popular Islam ideology, which was produced by periphery against laic understanding, was used by the right wing political parties which were in expectation of 94 ibid., p.p. 36-37 95 ibid., p. 40 96 op. cit., Ocak, p. 125 45 political power and this way religion was made an instrument of politics by making concessions from laicism in Turkey. Besides, by access of 2nd or 3rd generations that migrated from rural and settled in cities into leadership positions in education, politics, and bureaucracy; Islam that was eliminated by reforms again gained ground in public space. This is the situation that laic circles characterize as political reaction. Majority that was not heard since the single-party period demand their rights now. Their struggle with laic circles is for not losing benefits they gained since now; if this struggle would be conducted in a democratic frame, its contribution in democratization process of Turkey is inevitable. Even though this opponent society is not as qualified as Ottoman period, it started to reproduce popular Islamic culture at the present day. Popular Islam which demonstrated a rustic feature for a long time, entered in a re-scientification process by the rising education levels of Islamist circles. At the present day, there is still a society that wants to keep Islam out of scope in modernization programs intended for the future of Turkey; mistake of Kemalist elite lies herein. Even though Kemalism became successful in the period it emerged, it could not keep this success and lost its sustainability in changing global conditions. Kemalism rightfully kept Islam responsible of what devastated Ottoman Empire became; founded the republic which adopted positive values by terminating Islam‟s political, social and cultural existence and declared itself as the official ideology. However its precluding attitude against Islam‟s conservative manner, transformed into an ideological struggle that necessitates reconciliation of both sides. At the end of this struggle it will be possible to see a Turkey that absorbed democratic values. 3.1.3. Place of Islamist Parties in Turkish Politics Islam‟s revival is one of the most important events occupying world agenda recently. Especially 1979 Iran Revolution is the most important incident that symbolizes this revival. This incident also accelerated researches made by the West in order to understand about its effects to themselves. Revolution has also attracted attention to Turkey and conceived different results according to attribute of the societies which it was discussed. While this incident turned 46 to an anti-reactive Islamophobia in laic society, it conduced to various initiatives to redevelop Islam and expose their identity in conservative society. Starting with establishment of republic, Islamic idea has stayed under strict control of the state until 1950. That‟s why; conservative society endeavored to live their religion in secret. As a result of pressure of the new regime, this disappointment turned into indignation. Conservative society tried to preserve traditional structure rather than improving popular Islam under this pressure. Today‟s conservative intellectuals are mostly individuals who took Islamic education in the country side as a result of traditions being more untouched there. Kemalism‟s strict policy over religion reduced following admittance of political opposition to the parliament in 1940‟s. Following this period, Islamism and nationalism integrated and became an official policy. Giving Islam the place it deserved in political regime came into question in 1947. CHP took steps that could be considered as appeasements to its policy such as supplying exchange for pilgrims, implementation of religion lessons in primary level, introduction of imam-hatip schools and opening a faculty of theology in Ankara University.97 As it was stated several times in the study, transition to multi-party period in Turkey has a significant importance as it enabled desperate circles to raise their voice for the first time. In this part of the study, a closer look will be taken into implementations of different parties in the Turkish history between 1950‟s until the present day. 3.1.3.1. DP and AP Period 1950 elections brought DP, which was using Islamic rhetoric, to the power. Besides DP, many conservative organizations were formed at that period. Thus, people started to show their discontent against imposed reforms by Islam. DP followed a strategy to satisfy both laic and conservative circles and did not refuse laicism even though it embraced a different laicism perception. Not following such kind of a policy has been a disadvantage for CHP. 97 op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 19 47 DP did not adopt Islamism as an ideology but it anticipated to construct an identity integrated with Islam instead of imposed laicism during single-party period. Islamists did not get satisfied with DP‟s steps in this matter, but these steps that DP took, lead to transformation to an era that left a mark in Turkish politic history by extending Islam‟s mobility. Islamic circles formed their social base through some organizations thanks to flexible policies of DP. In this sense, Islamic circles had the possibility to guide their youth through imam-hatip schools, state dormitories and study rooms. This situation shows importance of civil society in politics. ÇYDD, which is considered to be pioneer in this topic and aims to raise laic persons, only started its practices in 1990. This situation proves how early Islamist circles acted to organize. Traditional values remained warm because no other ideology emerged that changed cultural values of the society during republican period. Desired transformation was imposed through reforms and education system following foundation of republic. Different circles in society showed different reactions to those innovations and circles that could not keep up with evolving society developed a conservative worldview.98 Economic and social problems have a great role in this opinion. Economic, social and political issues that anti-Islamist Marxist intellectuals brought up in agenda have shown that moral based Islam is insufficient in those issues. Therewith conservative intellectuals started to develop themselves and discuss those issues. The most important of those was the political dimension of Islam. Eventually as a result of giving a high importance on this subject, Islamist intellectuals neglected other aspects of Islam; perceived and influenced society to perceive Islam as only a political regime. This generates an obstacle on evolution of an healthy Islamic thought. Along with that, Islamic idea still could not evade from a defensive psychology towards laic society in Turkey and that is why it could not prompt its creative side yet.99 The most important reason of that is inexistence of a settled freedom of opinion and a quality Islamic idea breakthrough where Ottoman Empire‟s central militarist structure was influent. Attempts to evolve Islamic idea have been obstructed by traditional conservative society. Same kind of obstruction also keeps going in modern Turkey. Today, Kemalism which is formed of five basic principles is accepted. Laicism, which is one of those values, means surrounding daily practices by state and ignorance 98 ibid., p. 21 99 op. cit., Ocak, p. 105 48 of regional differences in Kemalist ideology. However, while French laicism has an anti-religious nature, Anglo-American style secularism aims to protect religions from state and approves organization of social relations based on religion to encourage social solidarity. According to Yavuz and Esposito, laicism and nationalism project played a great role in Islam attain an opponent language and ideological dimension. On the other hand, Islamic revival was an internal dialectic of Kemalist ideology. Avoiding differences have always been a principle of Kemalist state. The thought lying under this system was imposing the idea that state knew what the best was for its people and CHP would protect Islam from foreign effect.100 However, with transition to multi-party period in Turkey state policy against religion was moderated. As a part of this transition, religion lessons entered in curriculum of public schools, azan that was sung in Turkish until then started to be sung in Arabic, limitations on theological education in public schools and worshipping were removed, construction of new mosques was approved. However, DP opposed to political Islam and any objection against state‟s laic nature. DP supported the change on 163rd clause of penal code. Previous form of the code was proposing a penalty for acts which were aiming to change social, economic, political and judicial system based on religious principles and beliefs. Objective of this code was to maintain state control on religion and to prevent any kind of Islamic movement to loosen this control. DP approved the change as “punishment of any group or subject that uses religion for political or personal benefit” in 1953. As a result of this change, state‟s control over religion increased and religion based protests became subject to suppression by the state.101 DP was closed by 1960 military coup and AP was opened followingly. AP also tried to maintain a synthesis between laicism and conservativism as its pioneer DP and followed an anti-leftist policy that aimed to integrate nationalism with religion. Policies that were followed during Cold War period strengthened conservative nationalist ideology. Islamist intellectual Necmettin Erbakan wanted to enter the parliament from AP quota, but his request was rejected by Süleyman Demirel which postponed his 100 Helen Rose Ebaugh, Gülen Hareketi,: İnanç Tabanlı Bir Sivil Toplumsal Hareketin Sosyolojik Analizi (The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam), Istanbul: Mega, 2010, p.p. 3739 101 loc. cit. 49 admittance to the parliament to 1969. He was considered as a person defining Islam‟s role in Turkish politics. Necmettin Erbakan hoped to change and benefit from election system by gathering all religious movements and communities under his leadership.102 His attempt resulted with his prohibition from politics for 5 years according to the 163rd clause of penal code. He always mentioned that he was against the format of laicism in Turkey, defended that current system was governing with arbitrary practices on Islam and suggested that laicism should assure religious freedom and alterations should be done on constitution to that end. In 1965 elections Süleyman Demirel, who was a sympathetic name for conservative society, was elected as a prime-minister from AP. 3.1.3.2. MNP and MSP Period Islam got politicized especially in some certain periods after 1970‟s. This situation was grounded both on political developments in the Middle East and reactions that laicism caused.103 Thus, because laicism prevented Islamist circles to join mainstream party organizations and express their opinions there, these circles had to establish parties that eventually politicized Islam‟s representation. Thus, political Islamist movement which had to perform politics under the roof of central right parties such as DP in 1950‟s and AP in 1960‟s as an outcome of strict laic system of Turkish state was able to establish its own political party, MNP, in 1970 as a result of changing global conditions, decline of nation-state idea and weakening of Turkish state‟s central authority. Quest of forming a new party started as an outcome of the competition between industry magnates and SMEs in 1968. Following rejection of his application for presidency to Union of Chambers by AP, Necmettin Erbakan established MNP as a reaction.104 SMEs had possibility to get organized as a result of this process. Party was stating these opinions in its declaration of establishment: “Our glorious nation! Today is the day that missile is launched to settle our great nation which was walking through the most supreme orbit of human history with its faithful and adherent identity to God which upheld the right and ignored the evil, back to its supreme 102 ibid., p. 40 103 op. cit.., Ocak, p. 122 104 op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 22 56 of Islamism, Turkish political Islam in the globalizing world and Islam in Cold War politics will be handled. 3.2.1. Geostrategy of Islamism Evolution of Islamism also depends on geostrategic factors besides ideological factors. Iran Islamic Revolution forms an example on failure of the Islamist model.117 Even though this incident was seen with different expectations by the Islamic world, the result has been a somewhat autocratic and so called democratic regime. Therefore the revolution was perceived as a threat by the Arab nationalists and laic circles in Turkey. These states condoned Sunni fundamentalism in order to fight against the revolution but they became the victim of this policy. Islamism played a separatist role rather than a unitive role in the Muslim societies. If the socio-cultural relations are taken into consideration, these relations are relatively individual in Turkey than other states in the region. There were no movements which were capable to transform into social movements in Turkey until 1980‟s, but after this period networks got more organized and formed mass movements such as RP. States adopted a dichotomic attitude towards Islamist movements in 1980‟s. While the state tried to establish control over Islamist movements, on the other hand the duty to Islamize the society was given to the state itself. This situation occurred by the trial of a moderate Islamist party to get integrated with the political system in Turkey and religion was defragged with the state by appointing Islamists to key positions. This transformation gets evident with Islamist rhetoric and increase of Islamic elements in the legal system. In this context, compulsory religious education lessons were taken into academic program for primary and secondary education in 1972 and Turkey became a member of OIC in 1980. However because of the article regarding laicism in the constitution, only partial compromises could be given in Turkey. For instance some universities allowed 117 op. cit., Roy, p. 145 57 the use of turban while some others did not and only Islamic worldview was taken into consideration in religious education books.118 Islamism‟s transformation is also realized through political and social activities organized by the state. RP‟s and AKP‟s social base are good examples to prove that. But eventually Islamism is far from providing an economic or social solution to the societies. 3.2.2. Islam in Global Politics Nationalist and Islamist politics that USA supported in the global politics continued following the fall of USSR. The global politics of USA after the fall of USSR was determined by the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis of Samuel Huntington. It was estimated that USA could only get stronger against a competitor. Therefore, new competitors were created namely the Islamic world and far eastern civilization. Attacks of September 11 were the perfect opportunity for USA to start implementing its plan. Huntington did not want the rise of liberal thoughts and especially laicism in Islamic world. Only a limited democracy understanding was desired as it was appropriate for the interests of USA. Thus, as Muslim populated countries could not object western imperialism, they also would not be able to escape from western domination. However, Turkey was presenting a threat against the project as it embraced laicism and liberal thoughts. Therefore, Huntington desired Turkey to leave the western values that Atatürk created and cooperate with the Islamic world. This anxiety was based on the thought of Turkey‟s risk of constituting a role model for the region countries and decrease western hegemony in the region as it embraced laic and democratic regime model based on sovereignty and independence principles. Clinton saw Turkey as one of the most influential countries of 21st century and stated that it was necessary to preserve its laic and democratic structure in order to use Turkey as a defensive post if Islamic world would surrender to radicalism. However, this policy was changed at the presidency of George W. Bush and Turkey started to be seen as an assault base rather than a defense post. Turkey, which 118 ibid., p. 171 58 USA wanted to use as a weapon against radical Islam, was desired to get transformed into a moderate Islamic model to draw less attention from the Islamic world. Thus, a moderate, West supported model was implemented against the radical political Islam which was dominant in the region countries and considered USA as the devil. Of course Turkey needed to step back from its laic and democratic values in order to implement this model in Turkey along with the countries such as Egypt and Iraq. This model was successfully imposed in Turkey through the alliance of some political groups and support of some tariqahs and Islamist groups.119 However, as this model completely contradicted with laicism, it also caused Turkey to get isolated as the result of reactions it took from the Islamic world because of its alliance with the West. In this sense, even though moderate political Islam was functional for the Islamic world, it did not create expected results in Turkey. 3.2.3. Turkish Political Islam in the Globalizing World The authors seeing center-periphery relationship as the main secession axis in Turkey dwell on the elements such as lifestyles, culture and ideology in their studies. Those authors consider that center is represented by Kemalism; therefore the society opposing this ideology has been isolated in cultural and political level and was pushed to the periphery. According to this theory, Islam is a contra-elitist movement which tries to rise against Kemalist elite. The power battle between republican elitists and Islamists is also visible in habitat, cultural codes and lifestyles. Actually, RP really presented itself as civil society‟s party against the state. Nation states declined all around the world and states just organized their economies lost power against globalization at the end of 20th century. Effects of globalization led to ethnical separatist movements and religious revival movements worldwide. Political Islam can be understood based on globalization and post-modernism. This approach rejects religious regression contra economic growth thesis and defends that Islam is not against globalization. Thus, globalization has a big role on Islamist revival in Turkey as Islamism promises different things to the people from different categories. RP was in the appropriate structure for populism which means action against 119 Emre Kongar, ABD’nin Siyasal İslam’la Dansı (USA’s Dance with Political Islam), Istanbul: Remzi, 2012, p. 52 59 status quo by some parts of indigent, middle class and wealthy population.120 RP was successful in uniting those classes against Kemalism by Islamist movement. Turkey experienced an economic growth dependent on import substitution for industrialization in pos-1960. Islamist opposition represented small and independent business owners which were under extinction in this period. Also electorate of the first conservative party, MSP, was formed from tariqah supporter conservative people and owners of small businesses. According to the authors that see Islamism as a conservative political movement, Islam functions as an ideology which utters the reaction of small enterprises after Turkey‟s integration to worldwide market. However, this situation lost its effect in current Islamist platform; on the contrary, conservative investors grew and opened up to the world by using potential of globalism. Political Islam caught an efficient ground with decline of classical worker class and rise of entrepreneurship in Turkey. Nevertheless, small entrepreneurs complain about lack of support from the state accompanied with an anti-statist discourse, but they mention that any kind of support would be accepted gladly.121 Majority of Islamist employers rise among small-scale entrepreneurs. Apart from the small entrepreneurs, division of capital class as center and periphery is visible between the two businessman associations in Turkey. While TÜSİAD, which is supported by inveterate, modern and laic society, appeals to the large-scale enterprises that are supported by the state; MÜSİAD appeals to small and medium scale enterprises arose with free market which did not find support from the state. Especially MÜSİAD represents the new part of capital circle which supports political Islam and rises from the periphery. According to the speech of Islamist circles, interests of rentier capital that is close to political power and small-scale entrepreneurs are conflicting. So that, RP blamed rentier circles for being overthrown despite its success in 1995 elections. The same way, also MÜSİAD hold rentier circles, which clamored laic regime was under threat, responsible of RP‟s take down and interruption of democracy in its economy report. According to Islamist economist Mustafa Özel, the rentier circle formed a monopoly by sheltering under Kemalism and exploited domestic market. He also 120 op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 4144 121 ibid., p.p. 45-47 60 denotes that competitive and export oriented industrialists object to Kemalist ideology and support RP‟s Islamic liberalism.122 This statement clarifies the support that RP took from workers class. The statement, which defined supporters of Kemalist ideology as exploiters, could unite the winners and losers of neo-liberalist structure after 1980 with the advantage of globalization under a common identity poliics.123 Populist rhetoric of political Islam especially attracted small-scale businessmen just immigrated to cities which were searching opportunities to climb up in social hierarchy. According to a research made in 1993, small-scale entrepreneurs combined Islamic trends and liberal manners under government policy in social subjects. The same way, grassroots opposition was also supporting Islamist party rather than social democrats.124 RP was encouraged by this and aimed to unite workers and small-scale entrepreneurs under a common roof. 3.2.4. USA’s Islam Policy USA‟s politics on the Middle East region has always affected Turkish politics in large scale as Turkey was a very important ally. USA‟s Islamic world strategy was a plan which was called “Green Belt” and was developed for anti-communist propaganda, but this strategy was not abandoned after post Cold War period. Even though moderate Islam attribution was considered as incorrect and separatist by the political scientists, this strategy was significant to the countries that did not support terrorism, but carried out a democratic Islamic model in USA‟s point of view. Therefore, USA continued to support Islamic parties in Turkey and the world. But ironically even though the parties came into power by elections, they were still seen as terror sympathizers by USA. Thus, there is no other country that passed through the same kind of political experience. But eventually USA‟s insistence on such a system for Turkey led to corruption in Turkish politics rather than improving democracy in other countries.125 Actually this process should be seen as Islam‟s democratization rather than defining it with moulds as “moderate Islam”. 122 ibid., p. 52 123 ibid., p. 53 124 loc. cit. 125 op. cit., Kongar, p. 54 61 The incident that revealed moderate Islam paradox was the terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda. Following the incidents, USA felt the necessity of distinguishing Islamist groups and the groups that organized terrorist attacks in the name of Islam. Attacks of September 11th marked a milestone in history of Islam and paradoxical moderate Islam attribution was one of the suggested solutions against increasing fanaticism. USA formed many commissions contra terrorism. Reports of the commissions indicated that a comprehensive approach was adopted towards Islamic world and the main objective was to democratize them. This formed the basis of USA‟s Great Middle East Project.126 USA‟s global policy is defined mainly by the deep state and incidents in different regions. In this sense, USA also designates its policy towards Turkey in the light of these elements. Most recent Middle East policy of USA is the Arab Spring. However this strategy is quite risky for the region. According to author Emre Kongar, political Islam signifies both the ones of performing politics according to Islamic principles and the ones use any means including terror in order to seize state structure and reorganize it based on their will. This hypothesis is also valid for Turkey. Thus, current AKP government aims to reorganize the state according to its benefit. Their insistence on a new constitution, urge to set the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan free and sideline the people that do not share their opinion by oppressive policies clearly show this tendency. Besides all, because Turkey is the only Muslim populated country that has a democratic regime, it always is used as an experimental subject. Even though the dictatorships in Muslim countries are overthrown, they cannot get replaced by democratic regimes, because democracy cannot exist without a certain level of industrialization, labor class and freedom of media. For that reason, the domestic pressure of international intervention always resulted with replacing current regimes with new dictatorships. Moreover, election of representatives of political Islam which are the most significant organized powers in Arab Spring countries is quite suspicious. It is clearly seen that USA shapes Arab Spring movement according to its needs. While full support for Islamic dictatorships like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is given and political Islam is not even in question for these countries, fall of non-Islamic 126 ibid., p. 61 62 dictatorships and their replacement with Islamic regimes is supported.127 Under these circumstances, political Islam imposition to Turkey, which is the only laic and democratic country in the region, is insensible. But, Samuel Huntington‟s thesis has a significant importance for preparing the base of this imposition. USA, which sees itself as the unrivalled leader of world, was shocked by the September 11th attacks and twisted the situation into its benefit by declaring war to the Muslim populated countries in the Middle East for guaranteeing its resources and security. But this pragmatism of USA may often affect its long-term plans. Now, USA evidently suggests Turkey‟s imposed “moderate Islam” regime and looks for Turkey‟s economical, political and military assistance in this project. This can be understood if Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s visit to the three countries that experienced Arab Spring manifestations and his support in favor of Islamist circles are considered. Even though suggestion of the Turkish regime as a model is an ornament, the perception of that regime suggested under the name “moderate Islam” as “democratic Shari‟a” would result with a totalitarian regime even if it is accepted through the public vote.128 In this case Islamic world‟s only democratic and laic country would get affected from this totalitarianism. Turkey‟s consideration as a model for Islamic world was suggested by Samuel Huntington. But Atatürk‟s abnegate for that purpose as Huntington suggests would also eliminate the desired aspects of Turkey. After all, the model that Huntington suggests is a dependent regime practicing a so called moderate Islam democracy integrated with central capitalism. Moreover, not being an Arabic country is the main obstacle for Turkey on setting an example to the Arab world. In this sense, Barack Obama clarified the model country arguments when he visited Turkey in 2009 and underlined that the intended model is the laic and democratic Turkey which was founded by Atatürk while he especially avoided moderate Islam definition.129 It is a fact that Islamic world still could not maintain the political conditions to be able to discuss about democracy and laicism. Disapproval of the laicism and democracy messages that Erdoğan has given in his visits to Muslim populated countries proves that. But what is even more surprising was Erdoğan‟s message in favor of 127 ibid., p. 100 128 ibid., p.p. 112-113 129 ibid., p.p. 151-159 63 laicism considering that he is the representative of an idea that defends laicism should be eliminated if people want. Groups that support Erdoğan were confused as a result of this unexpected discourse and delayed to praise this political posture. The reason of this confusion was Erdoğan‟s frequently changing discourse depending on USA‟s pragmatic policies. In this case it is possible to accept Erdoğan‟s laicism discourse as a part of American foreign policy. However, the same political approach was repeated also by Abdullah Gül in his visit to Tunisia in 2012. It is true that there are efforts to adjust the developments in Turkey among Islamic world, but it is unclear if this effort is in favor of a system that is transformed by AKP or a laic Turkish model. As Prof. Bernard Lewis indicates, Turkey is getting increasingly Islamized and AKP gains control of various institutions one after another. Besides the institutions that are already seized such as economy, business world, universities and media; the next step is to gain control over judicial system.130 It is a fact that Turkey is more advantageous as it started the development activities in 1920 which its neighbors could only start in 1950 and this is one of the reasons that it is presented as a model. In this context, along with Turkey‟s domestic and foreign policies, USA‟s approach is also a determiner for the possible Turkish model. Gülen Community has a significant importance because of its alliance with AKP and its strategy plays a determining role for the future of Turkey. EU also has an important role in determining Turkish political system. As the recession of democratic and laic system would not be desirable for EU, they can protest any attempts in this respect. Because EU can influence Turkey in the current system and it would lose this privilege if the democratic system in Turkey fails. As a result, it is very important that if USA expects a Turkey which is laic and democratic or a country that lost these features by getting defeated to the Shari‟a. However, USA‟s requirement of a laic Turkey in order to realize its project to democratize Islamic world is inevitable. 130 ibid., p. 177 64 3.2.5. Islam in Cold War Politics World War I caused elimination of the agricultural empires based on religion. Followingly, USSR and USA which suffered relatively less from the World War II arose as the new global rival powers. In this context, political Islam came into question as an ideological tool in international politics in the competitive environment of two great powers. There were three elements of this new type of war: armament, economics, politics and ideology. Even though economy and armament were the main factors for determining the strong; ideological and political aspect was more important for Turkey as it was directly affected by the political and ideological decisions of both powers. USSR considered religion and nationalism as discriminatory and defended that the real democracy was the equality which was realized in context of class dictatorship while USA highlighted religious and nationalist elements in context of democracy and human rights. USSR was claiming that it was aiming something beyond the religious and nationalist states, it would create a classless society and it would realize the transformation through a temporary proletarian dictatorship.131 USA and the West decided to support Islamist and nationalist ideologies globally against this model. In many countries communist and socialist ideologies were banned, parties were closed and the intellectuals that were defending these ideologies were sentenced; nationalism and religionism were praised in this respect. Political and ideological war was applied in all aspects of social life, especially the legal system. Legal system was executed against the people were pro-Soviet ideology and sometimes only to be libertarian was considered as a crime. While the approaches such as socialism, social classes and exploitation were banned, religion and nationalism were praised in this ideological war. Special efforts were made to emphasize Islam more than other religions, due to many Muslims living in USSR borders. In the pos-1945 period, Islamist and nationalist ideologies ascended also in Turkey and as a part of the global trend, the parties that strived for freedom and peace 131 ibid., p.p. 15-17 65 were also closed down; many leftist intellectuals, journalists, students and politicians were imprisoned; many publications were confiscated and restricted. Stalin threatened Turkey with occupying its three Eastern provinces in 1945. Turkey preferred to make a part of the western camp rather than adopting the ideology of USSR which it had a problematic history. Therefore, Turkish president İsmet İnönü, asked for assistance to USA accordingly. USA started assistance through Truman Doctrine; but it asked for implementation of free elections, closure of village institutions which were founded in 1940 to educate teachers for rural schools and augment literacy rate and termination of development plans which aimed industrialization of Turkey in exchange. Following this, some opponent deputies from CHP, who were against Atatürk‟s reforms and reluctant about the land reform to protect their own interest, formed DP and pushed the government to execute the plan of USA. DP embraced values of the society which were based on religion and agriculture. However, because its only reference was the single-party period, it adopted an authoritarian regime; restricted the freedom of opposition, speech and press along with worker unions. Thus, the path was paved for Islamist and nationalist fascism.132 DP tolerated Arab imperialism, got into alliance with tariqahs and disseminated the imam-hatip schools. Even though a slight effort was shown to maintain democracy, the society could not transform into an industrialist and democratic society, because the state was deprived of democratic institutions except elections. People could not escape the servitude of feudal landlords, sheiks; worker class was not formed properly and people could not transform from vassalage to citizenship. It was still a society based on agriculture and religion. Moreover, DP‟s orientation to anticommunist nationalist and religious ideologies by taking the support of USA with the excuse of Cold War caused Turkey to get an extremely undemocratic form between 1950 and 1960. Turkey was neutral in the World War II, but it declared war symbolically against Axis forces at the very last minute to be able to join UN. But still it was anxious about the threats of USSR, therefore it struggled to be accepted to NATO for a long time. USA, which understood the importance of Turkey, accepted it as a part of the western defense system and decided to assist it through the Marshall Plan. This way Turkey was able to have a place in the western defense system. 132 ibid., p. 22 72 secular circles defend is expressed in a phrase from Quran: “There is no pressure in religion.” In this aspect, author Haldun Gülalp criticizes the pluralist legal system Islamism suggests;  Person‟s identity and the legal system that they will belong are unclear. Besides, if alteration between systems would not be possible, a totalitarian regime can arise.  A non-democratic repressive system can arise in case the legal systems get authoritarian within themselves.  It is also unclear how the relations between people from different legal systems will be organized.147 It can be clearly seen pluralism and democracy are not the same thing in this context. Legal pluralist model is not ipso facto democratic, because there are no suggestions in regards to participation and collective responsibility in this model. Therefore, as pluralism and democracy cannot be directly associated, it is also impertinent to expect that it will definitely strengthen democracy. The sidelining of social groups for making part of a certain identity lies beneath their struggle to obtain some rights. Then, if subjects get identified independent than their group identities in the frame of universal rights, a big step would be taken for a resolution. As the state has a binding nature in terms of citizenship, democracy can only be performed by the state rather than the civil society. In the end, the monopoly to entitle rights is under state‟s control. 3.4.3. RP’s Double Standard Policy Following the resign of Erbakan in June of 1997, a new government was formed in the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz of ANAP. RP officials resorted to the method of blaming left wing, which became a tradition in the right wing parties over the history, for the situation that they experienced. They claimed that the army was leftist because its biggest supporter was İP about seizing the control over the government. They also claimed that the newly constituted government was leftist for the reason that the so 147 op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 169-171 73 called leftist DSP was among the associates of the coalition and the government was supported by the social democrat CHP. Even though it is pointless to claim that Turkish Armed Forces had a tendency to left, RP and Islamists immediately collaborated and asserted that whatever befell to Turkey was because of the left-wing. However, when they saw that the government was supporting Islamists‟ opinion about the veiling issue in the public space, a few months later they instantly made a u-turn as they did before.148 New government started implementing the guidelines that were advised by the Turkish Armed Forces. The initial alteration was the increase of mandatory primary education to eight years. This way the middle part of the imam-hatip schools which were founded in 1940‟s to educate clerics, but later became the focus of Islamist ideology. Islamist circles this time complained that the aim of this policy was to spread state‟s official ideology rather than assuring quality in education. However, Islamist MSP had followed the same method when it seized control over Ministry of National Education between 1974 and 1980 and raised the number of imam-hatip schools. In this context, incoherence of Islamists is clearly seen which clearly shows the habit of Islamists to interpret the incidents as they serve their interests. Imam-hatip schools were considered as the stronghold of Islamist ideology. As a matter of fact, many important Islamist politicians and intellectuals such as Tayyip Erdoğan and Ali Bulaç were graduated from these schools. In January 1998, constitutional court came to a decision to close RP and to ban its executive board from politics for five years. Even though RP launched a democratization campaign in the political arena before the decision came into effect, the other parties did not approach RP as they knew the real aim was not democracy. 3.4.4. Lack of Democracy in Turkey and Totalitarian Tendencies Some authors suggest that Islamic politics refer to the rise of civil society against the state; therefore it contributes the improvement of democracy in Turkey. However, the totalitarian tendency of the Islamists or Islamist parties is ignored. For instance, if RP was elected with a majority vote, its execution of a totalitarian program was 148 ibid., p. 109 74 inevitable that current AKP governance is the most significant example of this situation. However, it is also a fact that the laic circles or institutions also did not follow a democratic path in their struggle Islamist parties and this was what kindled the political Islam debate. Another fact that proves the totalitarianism of religion is objection of Islamist circles to democracy claiming that it contradicts with God‟s dominance. In this sense, author Abdurrahman Dilipak expressed his ideas with these words: “Democracy has transformed into the Trojan Horse of the West.”149 During the period of his candidature to Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality‟s mayoralty Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arose as the new face of Islamist movement and proceeded to the agenda with saying that democracy was only a tool. He mentioned his opinion with these words in an interview: “Democracy was sometimes seen as a tool and sometimes as an objective up until now. There were also people construed it both as a tool and an objective at the same time. It is a tool for choosing a system depending on the one you want to head for. I mean, systems come and systems go with democracy. Of course realization of this through democracy and by the manifestation of people‟s willpower is a good thing. At this point we can define democracy as the manifestation of people‟s willpower. But, today democracy is interpreted as an objective in our country and the democracy which is seen as an objective, keeps a totalitarian order in agenda. Today we see a dictate regime in Turkey in the name of democracy. Unfortunately democracy concept is not settled in our country yet.”150 The meaning that could be deduced from the interview is “people can overthrow democracy if they want.” It is true that there are deficiencies in Turkish democracy, but overthrowing democracy is not the method to resolve this. In this context it is clearly seen that Erdoğan wanted democracy until he reached the political power. The interviewer asked what if the people elect a totalitarian regime which used democracy only to constitute its political power upon this answer. Erdoğan had difficulties in giving a satisfactory answer to this question: “If people want a totalitarian regime, we have to respect that. But if they would not be satisfied with the new regime, the ones to change it are again the people.”151 149 ibid., p. 94 150 loc. cit. 151 ibid., p. 95 75 Another question the interviewer asked was how such a regime would be changed. Erdoğan answered: “The people again... None of the regimes can exist despite the people.”152 However Erdoğan could not clarify how the dictate regime that he wanted to overthrow could stay in power for seventy years. So as this regime was also elected by the people, what did Erdoğan complain for? As a matter of fact, he gave the signals of his objective at a meeting which he held a speech to the crowds on December 12th, 1997 in Siirt. During his speech he read a poem of a Turkish intellectual, Ziya Gökalp, by rewriting some parts of it. The poem was as in the following: “The minarets are bayonets, the domes are helmets / Mosques are our barracks, (Muslim) believers are soldiers / This holy army guards my religion / God is mighty, God is mighty. Our objective is the holy war, its sequel is martyrdom / Our religion requires service with trustfulness / Homeland is our mother, nation153 is our father / Oh Lord, may you assure prosperity of the homeland / Oh Lord, may you assure elatedness of the nation. My pennon is oneness, my flag is the crescent / One is green154, the other is red / Deplore for Islam, take revenge from the enemy / Oh Lord, may you assure prosperity of Islam / Oh Lord, may you assure misery of the enemy. Many brave comrades in the battle zone / Martyred for religion and the homeland / May the ideal stay alive, may not the hopes disappear / Oh Lord, do not let the martyr be mournful / Oh Lord do not let the posterity be miserable.”155 Besides, Erdoğan skipped five verses of the poem which were: “Our commander, officer fathers / Our sergeant, noncom brothers / Order and respect are our laws / Oh Lord, may you assure steadiness of the army / Oh Lord, may you assure the superiority of the pennon.” Through this speech Erdoğan praised the religious values, attempted to disintegrate the society, differentiated between different segments of the society and implied that there is an army which was formed of Islamist believers at the mosques. Moreover, he pointed laic society and the army as a target to his followers by stating that each period had Pharaohs and Nimrods and the Moses and Abrahams would 152 loc. cit. 153 In Turkish there are two ways of saying nation. One is “millet” and the other is “ulus”. “Millet” signifies to the people living under the ownership of a state and share the same religion while “ulus” means a legal ownership under the citizenship of a state. The stated word here is “millet”. 154 Green is the color of Islam. 155 Murat Bardakçı, “Şiiri Böyle Montajlamışlar” (They Montaged the Poem Like This), 22.09.2002, Hürriyet, Acc. 05.04.2013 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=99109&yazarid=28 76 overcome the obstacles and clean the ways which were full of sordidness.156 Erdoğan also proved his hostility against the army by consciously skipping the verses of the poem about it. Erdoğan is still alleged by the laic circles with already having a hostile agenda against the army and the laic society since 1997. As a result of his speech, he received a penalty of imprisonment for a year and a fine according to the article 312/2 of Turkish Penal Code which regulates the crimes on provoking the society to hatred and hostility. However his penalty was decreased to four months. On the other hand, Erdoğan stated that the poem was not an altered version of Ziya Gökalp‟s poem; it was cited from a different source named “Türk ve Türklük” which was advised as a school book in his defense.157 Same kinds of thoughts were also mentioned by the leader of RP, Erbakan. Erbakan mentioned that the objective was not democracy, it was returning back to the golden age at the beginning of Islam. Necmettin Erbakan criticized democracy for paying importance to the votes of ordinary people rather than the divine commands.158 Erbakan also paid attention to the freedoms, but only to the freedoms of Islamists. Ali Bulaç stated that what Muslims understand from freedom is nothing more than the elimination of different obstacles while they practice their religion freely.159 The exclusive attitude of Erbakan can be found in a speech he held for his supporters on May 13th, 1990. He stated that: “If you do not serve for RP, none of your prayers would be accepted. […] We will obey the commands of RP as the whole community and believers; we will make a part of this army. The ones which avoid from that, belong to the potato religion. […] RP is this army and you will work for the evolution of this army. If you do not, you belong to the potato religion. It is a must to obey the jihad.”160 A frightening and authoritarian austereness is sensed in that speech. Totalitarian tendency was also distinctive in RP‟s organization method. It is notable that 4 million of its 6 million electors were official members of the party in 1995. Erbakan mentioned that soon they would have a great number of members that no elections would be thrown, the only thing to be done would be going to the notary in order to register 156 “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟ın Şiir Davası Hükmü” (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Poem Case Decision), Last Updated 23.04.2009, WikiSource, Acc.. 05.04.2012 http://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Recep_Tayyip_Erdo%C4%9Fan%27%C4%B1n_%C5%9Fiir_davas%C4%B1_h%C3% BCkm%C3%BC 157 ibid. 158 op. cit., Gülalp, p. 97 159 op. cit., Bulaç, p. 268 160 op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 97-98 77 party‟s rulership. Erbakan cared so much about integrating with the society that he claimed that he represented the interests of whole 60 million. This totalitarian approach derived from the same hypothesis as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned in his speech: “We believe that almost the entire Turkish population is already Muslim due to their existence, the geography they live in and their historical mission. But practicing their characteristics was obstructed by force. If we eliminate the captivity in their minds, they will again choose Islam; because they have faith in their essence.”161 The austereness of Islamists also shows itself in terms of the racist tendencies. Even though the West is not approved, Zionism is seen as the source of all perversities. Erbakan refused to enter the EU as he considered that it would be possessed by Israel sooner or later.162 Likewise, he considered the UN as a Zionist organization for pioneering the foundation of Israel.163 This Islamist austereness unfortunately caused terrible consequences. Madımak Hotel in Sivas where the Alevi citizens were staying for a festival was set to fire on July 2nd, 1993 by the Islamists and approximately 40 people were burnt to death. Ironically, many lawyers that defended the criminals were elected as deputies of the parliament and were assigned as ministers. 3.4.5. Republic, Public Space and Political Islam Public signifies to “which is open to everyone”. According to Habermas, “Public, presents itself as a private space that distinguishes itself from the public space and sometimes as a space which is the opposite of public power; a space of public opinion. Depending on the situation, sometimes state agencies or sometimes media channels which serve for the state can be considered as public space.”164 However, the “open to everyone” meaning of public space is seen in Arendt‟s conceptualization more. According to Arend, public space has two dimensions, one is the space of appearance and the other is a space which keeps the people altogether. In Arend‟s thought, public space is directly related to power. If a space arises as a space of common act, this space 161 ibid., p. 99 162 loc. cit. 163 loc. cit. 164 Jürgen Habermas, Kamusallığın Yapısal Dönüşümü (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere), Istanbul: İletişim, 2012, p. 59 78 can be a public space. It means that a city square is not a public space if there is not a common act while a hall which people come together to listen to a presentation may be.165 While the limits of public space and private space were defined more clearly in the past, as a result of the transformation that market economy caused on the society, society gradually became the subject of public opinion and developed in off the limits of political authorities. This way, private space of the governing elite was transformed into the public space.166 Public space is usually handled in two axes. One of them is the public space which is not the personal space. In terms of the liberal regimes, personal rights and freedoms are perceived as the private space while the rest is defined as public space. The second and more debated axis is the public space which signifies to the institutions that are financed through the taxes. This second definition forms the main argument of the Islamist circles in terms of turban conflict and political power. On the other hand, republic signifies “which belongs to the public” in respect of its meaning. In this sense state‟s attribution to the public is equal to public‟s possession of the state. The fact which legitimated this situation has been the limitation of personal benefits for the common good.167 However the method of determining common good by limitation of personal benefits is a matter of discussion. The determiner of this situation is citizenship according to the classical understanding. Citizenship necessitates being a part of a society which is called the nation and state is the base of this unity. State has a public characteristic because it represents the unity which forms the base of republic idea. As a result of the increasing elitism of state and public space, civil society was formed but public space still could not evade the monotypic frame. With the transition from monarchy to republic, community perception was transformed into individualism. In this sense, members of the society were transformed into individuals from being vassals. However this individual mentality has never fully functioned in Turkey, because the state itself was perceived as the community as it undertook a protective role upon society. Therefore, the citizenship was not perceived as a right but a duty and the state could not get through its totalitarian and autocratic structure. State‟s prediction of only a unifying publicity prevented the individualism to develop. 165 Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space, Cogito, Is. 8, 1996, p. 242 166 Jürgen Habermas, Kamusal Alan: Ansiklopedik bir Makale (Public Space: An Encyclopedic Article), Birikim, Is. 70, 1995, p. 64 167 op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 17 79 In this context, laicism could not form a boundary between the state and the society which resulted with state‟s suppression on society to impose only one type of belief rather than assuring freedom of thought. This was while laicism became a new political religion, civil society became politicized.168 The circles that aim to legitimate their truth as the only truth through this path became communitized by using political Islam. After the foundation of republic, the protective and monotype policies implemented by the state disaffected the society from the state. Islam got eventually politicized upon the vote competition between parties following the transformation to multi-party system.169 Because of the vote competition, CHP started to legitimize the Islamic values against DP‟s success in elections. Also DP adjusted some arrangements on protecting laicism to address a greater electorate audience while sustaining its moderate Islamic rhetoric. These incidents resulted with Islam‟s adoption as a party policy. The reason for attributing that much importance to Islam was its comprehension as a political legitimacy source as a settled political culture did not exist in Turkey. The reason of DP‟s success was based on its good organization in the rural areas. As a result of the lack of a political culture, democracy-Islam relation was not shaped entirely. In this sense Kemalism‟s emergence as the dominant ideology, resulted with the regime opposers to adopt Islam and create an us-them distinction. Turkey‟s bureaucratic-authoritarian governance understanding caused the both parties to see Islam as a legitimacy source. As CHP had difficulties legitimizing its own policies, it possessed its competitor‟s source by using an Islamic rhetoric.170 Because of this bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality, Islam was politicized. DP blamed CHP with betraying the society and CHP blamed DP with betraying the state. While doing this, both sides were in the asseveration of doing the most realistic interpretation of Kemalism. But in reality, these were the practices that were done with desire to shape the state, society and politics in a bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality.171 168 ibid., p. 21 169 Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye (The Turkish Experiment in Democracy), İstanbul: Hil, 1996, p. 441 170 op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 23 171 loc. cit. 80 Kemalism‟s usage to legitimize two opposite attitudes got possible by sanctifying it. This policy which CHP already had was also carried on in the term of DP. This way Islam became uncriticizable. Islam‟s compliance with Kemalism instead of with democracy was taken as a base in transformation to the multi-party period.172 In this context, 1960 military junta leader Cemal Gürsel, who took DP down by blaming it with betrayal against Kemalism and giving credit to the Islamic circles, stated that Islam, as being the most sacred and the most dynamic religion, ca not be the reason of lagging behind; the real reason of retardation was the incorrect introduction of religion which proves that situation.173 1960 military junta restored the bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality according to the needs of the modern society; provided more pluralism and freedom in the society by a new constitution and revitalized the religious opposition. Pluralism in the modernism process broke down the power of central elites and provided more opportunities to the periphery elites to affect the state politics. Thus, Islamic opposition rose in the political life with its own elite cadre and socio-economic base. Islam became the politics itself rather than being a political tool in the political line of MNP, MSP and RP. Many social services started to get designed in a conservative way. Also the communalization movements were started to be conducted through modern propaganda tools rather than notification.174 MNP and MSP headed for legitimizing Islam as an element of the modern political life. Kemalist laicism understanding was not seeing the involvement of an Islamic political party into the political system as legitimate. That‟s why MNP and MSP strived for showing that also Islam can be a legitimate element of the political process by being a part of it and they aimed to make a political definition of Islam. The idea of being as much legitimate as the demand seen from the society lies beneath RP‟s propaganda to the masses by using political tools idea. RP‟s this opinion was equal to DP‟s and CHP‟s attitudes of seeing Islam as a tool in the transition process to democracy, only this time the democracy was the element that was seen as a tool. In this context, according to RP‟s understanding in a country of which 99 % is Muslims, the decision of the majority was to be done. 172 loc. cit. 173 op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 21 174 Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi (Neither Shari’a nor Democracy), İstanbul: Metis, 1994, p.p. 81-82 81 This majoritarian understanding rose as religious nationalism; strived for settling the belief that ummah is core of the nation and the benefit of ummah should be above everything. Thus, an alternative was formed against secular nationalism and a nominal detach from modernism was realized. RP put forward the idea that Islamic opposition got smothered because of the lack of democracy culture. RP‟s democracy perception was only composed of quantitative majority. „Tout votes no matter how‟ understanding is equal to “opportunism” which puts the values aside. One other point is RP‟s desire to seize the state‟s political power to satisfy its electorates. In this context, RP always handled the issues in respect of the state‟s interests instead of democratic necessities. Thus, as much as the demands of RP‟s base increased, strategic importance of the political power increased and RP kept on following a stringent attitude in its politics. In that frame, a political culture devoid of trust, tolerance and ethical values was emerged in the public space. In terms of the democracy culture, RP included some features of the single-party mentality. For example, its desire to politicize the society entirely was an indicator of this. It clearly strived for destroying the limit between the state and the society. RP‟s use of Islam as a political tool in every opportunity was a part of its totalitarian mentality. Its stringent devotion to the ideology caused a monopoly control desire over the society and anxiety of losing its political power. Democracy cannot be discussed under these circumstances. As democracy is a regime that enables the expression of differences, this also includes the freedom to express different versions of a religion in public space. In this context, religion should not be the source of a political power that would establish an absolute control over the society; different forms and religious pluralism should be seen as legitimate.175 Civil society emerged as a structure that was based on religious expression of the people at the beginning, but as the religions attained a shape that limited religious freedoms in the frame of unique truth, civil society changed its meaning in time. However the existence of sects and tariqahs proves that all religions have different interpretations within. Although, the unique truth perception of political Islam stresses 175 op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 25 88 Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoğlu, made this statement about religious understanding on January 15th, 2010: “Each society and individual reduces the religion from top to down their own personal world and reflect their religious perception to practice in the frame of their inner world‟s capacity… There is no reform in religion itself, only innovation in our religious perception is the case, a constant innovation… We should not accept the religious interpretations verbatim as a model, except the main religious resources. Each period has religious perception according to that period and the conditions of that period; we can produce ideas and gain experience from those.”194 It is seen that there was also an innovation and liberalization in the perspective of Department of Religious Affairs at the beginning of AKP‟s term. The evolution of this new Islamic approach in Turkey can be explained with the factors such as expansion of Turkey to the world in terms of modernization and democratization, orientation of Islamists to new quests due to Kemalist repressive approach and Turkey‟s isolation from the tendency between the West and Islamic world through its social and geopolitical location. However, even though AKP adopted a moderate policy, it also could not avoid from experiencing a closure case as its pioneers. However, it was luckier than the previous Islamist parties. A closure case was presented against the party by Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, the attorney general of the High Court of Appeals, in 2008 with the allegation of becoming the focus of anti-laic acts. The indictment was inherited to the Constitutional Court soliciting closure of AKP and banishment of 71 politicians from politics including President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on March 14th, 2008. Indictment stated that the principles which political parties should respect as being in relation with the state and civil services as a part of democratic life were defined by the constitution, alignment of their practices with current codes and the constitution was inspected according to the laws and it was Public Prosecution Office of the High Court of Appeals‟ responsibility to request closure of a party considering social requirement and the frequency of its acts that did not accord with democratic mentality if it became focus of the mentioned acts. 194 “Bardakoğlu: Ateist de Özgürce Yaşasın” (Also Atheists Should Live Freely), 15.01.2010, Ntvmsnbc, Acc. 11.07.2013 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25044563/ 89 Table 1: Allegations on AKP’s Case of Closure Crime Element Examples Intending to set the ground which would change the basic principles of Republic of Turkey.  Proposals to change the constitution and Code of Higher Education  Attempt to eliminate laicism principle through the amendments of constitution on turban freedom  Practices on filling the civil services with AKP adherents and persons who are known to be inclined to political Islam  Support given to Gülen Movement by Abdullah Gül at the time of his membership of the cabinet  Some speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Using religious elements with political concerns.  Erdoğan‟s “Think that even if turban is used as a political symbol. Can you accept that wearing a political symbol is a crime?” speech during his visit to Spain  Employment of veiled doctors at some public hospitals  Enforcement of the enterprises bearing alcohol license to move to the outskirts of the city  Censor of some explicit banners in Istanbul Dividing the society as religious and nonreligious.  Speeches which stated a determination to transform the laic republic into a new lifestyle and order  Mortal attacks to the Council of State upon its decision on unlawfulness of a teacher‟s veiling at school Attempting gradually to reconfigure the laic legal order and manipulate.  Erdoğan‟s “the right to utter about veiling is ulema‟s duty, not the jurisdiction” speech was highlighted and it was defended that the party was giving religious statutes according to Shari‟a purpose  Erdoğan‟s advisor Egemen Bağış‟s “turban freedom should be valid also for the parliament beside universities and the other public space” statement  Cüneyt Zapsu‟s “forcing a woman to unveil is indifferent from forcing a woman to take her underwear off in the street” statement Opening future of the regime in discussion.  It was stated that AKP did not cease its link to closed FP and RP, AKP‟s ultimate objective is the Shari‟a order  It was stated that AKP‟s tendency was political Islam, its political principle was Shari‟a and AKP was using taqiyyah (dissimulation) which was based on Shari‟a as it aspired after Shari‟a Source: “İşte Başsavcı‟nın İddianamesi” (Here is the Allegation of Attorney General), 17.06.2008, Ntvmsnbc, narrated by Wikipedia, Acc. 13.05.2013: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adalet_ve_Kalk%C4%B1nma_Partisinin_kapat%C4%B1lma_davas%C4%B1 Becoming the focus of anti-laic acts is defined in the 68th and 69th articles of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey. These articles state that the acts and programs of political parties cannot be against the democratic and laic principles of the state and they hold High Court of Appeals responsible of detecting anti-laic acts of the political parties and take necessary actions. It was also stated that objective of the laic system which targets impartiality of the state towards all religions, does not mean the indefiniteness of religious liberties, it only aims organization of the state in a rational and scientific way. It was mentioned that religious rules were completely different from state 90 administration and principles.195 It was mentioned that the prime minister, the president, several deputies and many members from AKP‟s body made statements against laicism principle. The closure case was highly debated at the parliament and it was stated that urge of closure of a party which is the government at the parliament by the Constitutional Court was arousing suspicions; it was defended that a party which was elected should leave through elections196 and closure of a party with motivation of laicism was intervention to democracy.197 Some highlights from the bill can be seen on Table1. Murat Yetkin stated on his article at Radikal dated March 19th, 2008 that finding the attitude of the general attorney politically incorrect would not mean the prosecution was not legal. Election of a party by obtaining 47 % of the votes would not make a difference legally; there was a specific weight which was political, not legal. Therefore what had been debated was the alignment of the prosecution with politics, not the laws. The one that had seized the power with majority would use its power on rewriting the laws, but dominance of the political power would not depend on simple majority vote. It was AKP‟s political preference to place its ideology into the political agenda. As this attempt was restricted by the judiciary, the boundaries of both politics and the judiciary should be redefined. Therefore, as the prosecution in course, everybody should wait the results of it.198 In addition, CHP stated that if there was a crime, attorney general should do what was necessary as constitution was concerning also the political parties.199 Attorney general defended that the prosecution was based on legal enforcements and stated the legal bases in his allegation. However, Bülent Arınç from AKP deputies claimed that the case was prepared with inadequate proofs and it was an outcome of hate and grudge while another deputy stated that the coups had transformed and judges had taken the place of tanks and guns, the allegations were entirely ridiculous and 195 “İste Başsavcının İddianamesi” (Here is the Bill of Indictment of Attorney General) Acc. 18.05.2013 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/439362.asp 196 “Sarıgül: Seçimle Gelen Seçimle Gitmeli” (Sarıgül: An Elected Should Leave through Elections), 14.03.2008, Haber 7, Acc. 12.05.2013: http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/306388-sarigul-secimle-gelen-secimle-gitmeli 197 “Erkan Mumcu: Bu Demokrasiye Müdahaledir” (Erkan Mumcu: This is an Intervention to Democracy), 15.03.2008, Haber Aktüel, Acc. 12.05.2013: http://www.haberaktuel.com/erkan-mumcu-bu-demokrasiyemudahaledir-haberi-116775.html 198 Murat Yetkin, “Kapatma Davası Ergenekon Soruşturmasına Engel mi?” (Is the Closure Case an Obstacle in Front of the Ergenekon Case?), 19.03.2008, Radikal, Acc. 12.05.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno= 250559 199 “CHP Başsavcı ile Aynı Fikirde” (CHP Shares the Same Opinion with Attorney General), 14.03.2008, Zaman, Acc.. 12.05.2013: http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_chp-bassavci-ile-ayni-fikirde_664787.html 91 nonsensical.200 These statements actually show that AKP was uncomfortable with the situation and was anxious about the outcome. Some politicians from different parties also defended that the prosecution was not democratic and stated that political parties should be closed only for giving support to acts of violence.201 Also Newsweek stated that it was a judicial coup d‟etat.202 Minister Ertuğrul Günay claimed that the real reason of the closure case was to prevent to prosecution of Ergenekon Case which was a pending action to reveal so called connections of the deep state.203 Constitutional Court announced that it was decided not to close the party but to deprive it from financial aid on July 30th, 2008 by six votes against five where the approval of at least seven members was required for closure.204 This way AKP had the possibility to stabilize its power once more and received the majority once more at the elections on June 13th, 2011 by raising the rate of its votes by 3.17 %. It is seen that even though AKP claimed that it changed and it did not have a secret agenda, laic circles clearly did not share the same opinion, consequently a closure case was opened. While the righteousness or alignment with democracy could be debated, it is obviously seen that the case was not entirely insubstantial. It is possible to see that AKP accepted the religion rhetoric as its primary political agenda and showed that it still bears some of the features which caused the closure of its pioneers. This mostly relates to corruption of the political system with certain ideologies. As it is stated, religion was used as a political tool starting from the 1950‟s, so it was not a new thing; but this incident clearly shows that not much things were changed in Turkish politics during the last sixty years. Therefore, this understanding is the main responsible of the polarization in society. 200 Oktay Ekşi, “Davacı Kim, Davalı Kim?” (Who is the Prosecuted, Who is the Prosecuter?), 20.03.2008, Hürriyet, Acc. 13.05.2013: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/8500140_p.asp 201 “Yazıcıoğlu: Demokratik Değil” (Yazıcıoğlu: It is not Democratic), 14.03.2008, Zaman, Acc. 13.05.2013: http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_yazicioglu-demokratik-degil_664813.html 202 Morton Abramowitz, “Turkey‟s Judicial Coup D‟etat”, 05.03.2008, Newsweek, Acc. 13.05.2013: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/04/05/turkey-s-judicial-coup-d-etat.html 203 “İlginç İma: Davayı Ergenekon Açtırdı” (Interesting Implication: Ergenekon Forced to Present the Case), 18.03.2008, Radikal, Acc. 13.05.2008 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/ilginc_ima_davayi_ergenekon_actirdi843307 204 “AKP Kapatılmadı Hazine Yardımı Kesiyor” (AKP was not Closed , the Treasury Funds are Cut) , 30.07.2008, CNNTürk, Acc. 18.05.20136 http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/07/30/akp.kapatilmadi.hazine.yardimi.kisiliyor/ 486570.0/index.html 92 3.6. GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS As stated before, Gülen Movement was one of the most important outcomes of the Islamist mobilization of Turkey. Gülen Movement has become a social phenomenon first in Turkey in the late 1980‟s and later in a wide range around the world by the beginning of the 21st century. The enlargement of this community‟s radius was not a coincidence. Because of the political conflicts between young people in the early 1980‟s as an aftershock of 1968 generation, communism was a threat for Turkish Military. That is why the military paved the way for Islamic movements trying to influence and ward off young people. This so called non-political movement which was initiated by a Turkish preacher called Fethullah Gülen aims to give a peaceful, moderate, tolerant message to the entire world and to clear up the prejudices about Islam. It receives a great support from numerous conservative; rich Turkish and foreign businessmen, thus has a great financial potential. By the help of this financial power, the movement naturally sees it very logical to find a place for itself in the private educational system in Turkey in order to carry out its mission connected with moderate Islam. Even though the Gülen Movement seems to be apolitical, it has the ability to affect Turkish politics indirectly. The movement originates from the Nur Movement which emerged at the last years of Ottoman Empire and is seen as one of the most important socio-religious movements of the 20th century. The movement was born through the economical and emotional depressions at the decadence epoch of Ottoman Empire in the lead of Islamist modernist intellectual Bediüzzaman Said Nursi.205 Said Nursi spent his life to prove that Islamic values are effective in coping with the problems of modern world. Gülen Movement was inspired by the Nur Movement. Whether or not political, community‟s area of influence was wider with the governmental support especially during Turgut Özal era and then it was time for them to train their own men in order to fulfill the necessities of their cause. By the end of the same decade Gülen Movement was the most powerful Islamic organization in Turkey. Fethullah Gülen left to USA in 205 op. cit., Ebaugh, p. 114 93 1999 because of the political atmosphere in Turkey following the February 28 period and sustains his life in USA since then; he is accepted as one of the most important Turkish Islam intellectuals as an outcome of the success of his movement. Considering USA‟s Greater Middle East Project, its support to the movement which is identified with moderate Islam makes sense. Fethullah Gülen is often blamed to be a secret agent by the laic circles upon the fact that he never came to Turkey since 1999. Especially after September 11, he is one of the most important Turkish and probably Muslim person that give speeches about Islam being a modest, tolerant and loving religion. His indestructible connection with the current government in Turkey is evident. Besides, how he became one of the most powerful persons from being a simple preacher at a mosque is a complete mystery. Moreover, he was sentenced to death by Saudi Arabia because of announcing himself a sheikh and his activities to attract followers. The movement operates through organizations, schools and foundations in many countries. Even though it strives for spreading Turkish-Islamic identity, it has an international reputation through his schools which provide quality education. Gülen Movement is characterized with integrating national sensation with Islam in a certain way.206 The movement intends to transform Turkish society by spreading the propaganda of Islamic values in the social level. It has a centralist and communal aspect. Even though Fethullah Gülen endeavors for not conflicting with the state, he is usually criticized on being dishonest, hiding his real aim and tending to seize control over the laic state and declare Shari‟a by especially the laic circles in Turkey. Even though the movement glorifies the traditional values, it bears a modernist approach. It pays attention to education, but a biased education, to transform the society; it defends that comprehension of religion and progress of society is only possible through religion. Therefore, Gülen Movement formed an education network which covers more than a hundred countries. The financial resources of the organization come from the businessmen that are members of movement and the donations made by the society. However, there are suspects that the movement is also supported by the official institutions and state funds in some countries including Turkey and USA. As a matter of fact, if USA‟s moderate Islam project towards Turkey is taken into account, it 206 ibid., p. 115 94 can be considered as possible. But there are no official evidents to prove this relation. Even though official Turkish education curriculum is applied in the schools, which are accessible to anyone, it is known that the schools have secret practices to impose religious values. The recent incidents in Uzbekistan which resulted with closure of the schools and deportation of the responsibles prove that.207 Teachers are directly recruited within the Gülen community and the movement provides dormitories for the students upon request. Laic circles accuse the movement with imposing religious doctrines by brainwashing the students which are not completely impertinent.208 It is also known that Gülen encourages publication of biased sources by cooperating with some academicians. The movement disapproves any kind of violence and defends that these kinds of acts do not correspond with the message of Islam. Therefore, Gülen undertakes the responsibility of reconciliation between different religions, sects and religious communities. However, because it is Sunni Islam oriented, ironically it precludes sects such as Alevism. Gülen Movement is extremely successful on promoting itself through media channels. It also spreads its propaganda through the member media institutions beside the social media. Zaman Newspaper serves as the voice of the movement. Gülen Movement avoids being directly involved into politics and it is against foundation of political parties based on religion as they could cause conflict and damage the reputation of religion among society. Even though, it cannot escape from being criticized by some circles on not being involved in a political organization because it does not want to limit itself with the Code of Political Parties. Moreover, many intellectuals agree that Gülen Movement is definitely not apolitical. Its studies to transform the society usually bear political features. Even though the movement does not participate in the process as an institution, it is indeed a political movement in terms of carrying out political activities indirectly. Despite the movement is excluded by the laic circles and the army, it has a great impact on the police force. This situation is considered as threatening by some circles. As a matter of fact, there are doubts about movement‟s desire on overthrowing the laic and Kemalist system. The 207 Bayram Balcı, Fethullah Gülen’s Missonary Schools in Central Asia and Their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam, Religion, State, Society, Vol. 31, Is. 2, 2003, p. 153 208 ibid., p. 160 95 movement was appreciated by the Turkish politicians in the scope of Turkish-Islam synthesis project that was supported by USA during the Cold War period. It is seen as a nationalist value that can fight with the leftist ideologies by the Islamist circles. Gülen Movement works in the scope of Turkish society, not as part of a panIslamist movement.209 Therefore, it is compatible with the values of Turkish nationalism. As it does not fantasize about supranational Islamism, it operates in context of a local cultural form that could be called as Turkish Islam. As a matter of fact, both because of the multi-ethnic society and religious tolerance of Turkish states along the history and not passing under the yoke of anybody else, it is true that there is a different perception of religion in Turkey. The movement considers that religion, modernity and state are compatible to each other. As a principle, Gülen Movement suggests an Islam perception which admits different national expression styles but does not deny Islam‟s universal character.210 In this context, it is not acknowledged by the supporters of Islamic union who has a radical Islamist ideology. This segment acknowledges the Arab form of Islam as the true Islam. Gülen Movement accepts legitimacy of the state, but it is persistent on more religious freedom. That‟s why it is seen as a threat by the laic circles, because laic elites and Islamist elite compete to gain control over the state. However, it is not possible to talk about a strong governmental structure when NGO‟s or civil associations are this much powerful. This community is gathers millions of dollar every year and it claims that this money is spent for poor people, uneducated people and whoever needs it. For example, a charitable institution called Deniz Feneri which is renowned by its close relations to the community has been charged with fraud. Millions of dollars and assets vanished; still the media is not posing any accusations towards them. Ironically Gülen Movement also cannot get along with the Islamist parties, because political activities of Islamists draw attention over it. However, since AKP started to follow a more moderate policy, they are in a harmony with the movement. This relationship creates a strong perception in society that the movement and AKP collaborate closely to appoint people close to the movement in key positions at the state level in order to realize the desired state model. Henceforth AKP is seen as the component of Gülen Movement in the political arena. 209 op. cit., Fuller, p. 121 210 ibid., p. 124 96 The movement organized Abant Platform211 in 1998 and 1999 which targeted social reconciliation and is considered to be an important step in terms of social and political structure of Turkey. Platform defends a government model which is based on popular sovereignty; modern, democratic, pluralist, centralist and tolerant.212 However, how much of the society shares the opinions of the platform is debatable. Acknowledgement of the opinions of the platform by Islamist parties is promising. But majority of the society is doubtful about honest application of principles. However it is clearly seen that the definition of laicism is in an evolution process. It is not possible to talk about a strong governmental structure when NGO‟s or civil associations are this much powerful. This community gathers millions of dollars every year and it claims that this money is spent for poor people, uneducated people and whoever needs it. However very recently in Turkey, a charitable institution called Deniz Feneri which is renowned by its close relations to the community has been charged with fraud. Millions of dollars and assets vanished; still the media is not posing any accusations towards them. 211 See Also: Glossary 212 ibid., p. 131 97 CHAPTER 4 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN TURKEY 4.1. POLITICS AND POLARIZATION Anatolia has been home to many civilizations throughout history, such as the Persians, Greeks, Urartians, Armenians, Romans, Georgians, Circassians, Kurds, Sel juq Turks and Ottomans. Each of these civilizations left their cultural, social and political marks on Anatolian society one after another which formed the present Turkish traditions. During the long Turkish history in Anatolia, society underwent many great transformations, as it does at the present. Because society is like an organism, changing life conditions transform it. Relatively tolerant Ottoman rule which lasted longer than six centuries was successful in melting many cultures in the same pot and forming a unique Ottoman society. However, this significant harmony was spoiled as a result of poor administration skills of the sultans, decrease of central authority and increasing arbitrary practices on Islam as well as Ottomans‟ failure of adjusting global transformations and industrialism. Turkish, who were seen as the protectors of Islamic world, started to question themselves for their deterioration and thought that they would regain their power by importing innovations of the West; but they never considered that it might be the religion until some clerics realized that the real issue might be the Muslim identity at the end of 19th century. In the process of overcoming this problem, clerics disaccorded and they were divided into two concepts as the ones that perceived the problem in Islam religion and the others perceived in Muslims. The reforms which were desperately implemented to reorganize the society caused even a greater polarization in Turkish society. At the present day, Turkey subsists with a society that is almost divided in two as of the one take its identity from traditional values and the one embraces western values. Dissolution of those two identities especially derived from the laic policies that Kemalism imposed. Thus, Kemalism fell behind replenishing the space that was opened by the elimination of Islam from the social life and Turkey encountered the danger of polarization. 104 The modern turban was imported from Lebanon. It was created by an Iranian Shiite cleric who lived in Lebanon in order to protect women from Palestinian Sunni guerillas in 1970‟s.225 Even though the styles are different, ban was extended gradually to all types of veiling as a result of politicization of the topic. Nevertheless, restrictions are not too heavy for the women that preferred traditional style of veiling as it is not perceived as a political tool. However, it is possible to say that number of the women who wear a headscarf decreased in the last years as an outcome of the partisanship that current social polarization caused. The conflict forces the society to choose a side, either laic or conservative. The religious conservatives claim that turban is a requirement of their religious faith, and wearing it, is a democratic right while it is perceived as a symbol of political Islam. Image 1: Headscarf Style Image 2: Turban Style 225 Murat Bardakçı, “Türbanın Bu Çeşidi Lübnan‟dan İthaldir” (This Type of Turban was Imported from Lebanon), 23.05.2004, Hürriyet, Acc. 25.06.2013 http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=227729 105 As indicated at the beginning, one of the major conflicts is experienced in educational institutions. Any kind of veiling is prohibited in primary and secondary education according to the 4th article of the dress code of Ministry of National Education.226 However, some alterations were done recently in the dress code of public schools which can be considered as steps for transition to an absolute liberty.227 The imam-hatip students were allowed to veil themselves only during the lessons related to Quran through the 12th article of the dress code which was accepted in 1981.228 According to the code, students have to attend other lessons unveiled. However, as these schools are relatively homogenous regarding the type of the student, imam-hatip school administrators were conniving at the situation. Especially during the AKP term, the code was mostly ignored. Through the latest amendments in the education system which is known as 4+4+4 system, elective Quran lesson was implemented at public schools and veiling was set free for this lesson through the 3rd article of the new dress code which was accepted in 2012.229 This way, students were allowed to attend a lesson veiled for the first time at public schools while uniform obligation was also eliminated. These alterations were criticized by the circles which were concerned about extension of this practice to all lessons. The same dress code also allowed imam-hatip school students to veil in all lessons as it was only limited to the lessons related to Quran before which was set by the 1981 dress code. The middle part of imam-hatip schools were reopened through the 4+4+4 education system which meant that a student who attended imam-hatip school at the age of ten could be influenced to veil herself at a minor age. These alterations were heavily criticized by the laic circles who were concerned that a gradual transformation to Shari‟a state was in question. Cumhuriyet Newspaper columnist Sinan Tartanoğlu states that students of some public schools started to attend all lessons with turban unlawfully following the change in dress code which was obviously not practiced by the school administration. The columnist also criticizes that the students were wearing jeans 226 “Milli Eğitim Bakanlığına Bağlı Okul Öğrencilerin Kılık ve Kıyafetlerine Dair Yönetmelik” (Dressing Code of the Students Registered to Public Schools that Function under Ministry of National Education), 27.11.2012, Official Gazette, Acc. 04.06.2013 http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/k%C4%B1l%C4%B1kk%C4%B1yafet/kilikkiyafet.html 227 “Turkey Embarks on Free Dress Code Era in Schools”, 28.11.2012, Sabah, Acc. 02.06.2013 http://english.sabah.com.tr/National/2012/11/28/the-era-of-free-dresscode-in-schools 228 “Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ile Diğer Bakanlıklara Bağlı Okullardaki Görevlilerle Öğrencilerin Kılık Kıyafetlerine İlişkin Yönetmelik” (Dressing Code of the Students and Employees of the Public Schools that Function under National Ministry of Education and Other Ministries), 07.12.1981, Official Gazette, Acc. 02.06.2013 http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/52.html 229 loc. cit., “Milli Eğitim Bakanlığına Bağlı Okul Öğrencilerin...” 106 under which proved that they were not wearing the turban for religious purposes.230 Columnist Saygı Öztürk states in his article on Sözcü Newspaper dated November 28th, 2012 that real aim of the alterations in the education system and dress code is to allow turban gradually in all schools. He adds that turban liberty for the imam-hatip school students can be perceived as a matter of inequality and the liberty can be extended to all schools followingly.231 Following this regulation, it was detected that teachers were also entering the classes with turban in some schools despite there was no change in the code for civil servants. For instance, Radikal Newspaper‟s article states that a newly assigned teacher to a school in Western Turkey was detected wearing burqa at school. Parents were extremely dissatisfied with the situation and reported the situation to the Ministry of National Education while the teacher defended that she was wearing a topcoat. Ministry stated that they were investigating the situation.232 According to the 5th article of 1982 Dress Code of Civil Servants which is currently in force, teachers are obliged to unveil at their workplace unless there is a special type of uniform which should be used by the directive of school administration. Consequently, considering that turban is not a special uniform and the school administers do not interfere, there is violence against the law. On the other hand, even though admitting veiled students in education institutions contradicts with laic ideals; forcing veiled students to unveil at classrooms may cause a human rights violation according to the international law.233 However, it is also a dilemma if veiling of a minor is a human right or not as it clearly cannot be her free will to use turban at a minor age. Turban is also forbidden at universities according to the additional 17th article of Code of Higher Education that took effect on October 25th, 1990 which states that there is a liberty of dress only if not against the laws in effect. The mentioned laws in effect are the 10th and 42nd articles of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey. In the period before 1980 military coup there was not a centralized authority for the orientation of the universities. Therefore, dress code was defined by each university and some of the 230 Sinan Tartanoğlu, “Her Derste Türban” (Turban in All Lessons), 30.12.2012, Cumhuriyet, Acc. 05.07.2013 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=389188 231 Saygı Öztürk, “İmam-Hatipler Tamam, Sıra Diğer Okullarda” (İmam-Hatips are Done, the Next are Other Schools), 28.11.2012, Sözcü, Acc. 05.07.2013 http://sozcu.com.tr/2012/yazarlar/saygi-ozturk/imam-hatipler-tamamsira-diger-okullarda-132010/ 232 “Balıkesir‟de Tesettürle Ders İddiasına Soruşturma” (Prosecution for Veiled Course), 19.09.2013, Radikal, Acc. 19.09.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/balikesirde_tesetturlu_ogretmen_tartismasi-1151569 233 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, Acc. 09.06.2013 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 107 articles at the constitution. Upon the mortal incidents and increasing religious reactionism the military coup was done in September 12th, 1980. Following the coup, due to the normalization efforts in politics, military regime prepared 1982 constitution and its subsidiary regulations. Ascendance of turban conflict and move to the front lines of Turkish political agenda was a result of the Council of Higher Education‟s turban ban through the alterations in its dress code for students. Since January 10th, 1983, when the amendments took effect, turban debates never finished at the universities. However, the rule was moderated through the initiatives of ANAP. As the atmosphere was more tempered, ANAP attempted to pass a law package which was accepting turban liberty at the universities in 1984. This attempt was not welcomed by the generals and President Kenan Evren carried the case into the Constitutional Court. Council of Higher Education started to call any kind of veiling as turban as a protest against ANAP‟s initiative in order to specify that the issue was political.234 The student protests at universities which started in late 1960‟s had been a propellant power for the turban conflict. The first incident about veiling at universities was Hatice Babacan Case. Babacan was a student at Faculty of Theology of Ankara University in 1967 that did not want to unveil and insisted on her decision. As a result of her insistence she was dismissed from the class and thus Hatice Babacan became the leading actor of a campaign that was started by a part of the press. Following the incident, the first turban boycott ever was initiated and many other students started to enter the university with turban. As a result of the unpleasant events, Babacan was expelled from the school to menace the others.235 Thus, turban issue became a political symbol. Nesrin Konukçu was a student at the Faculty of Medicine in Ege University who sued the school to be able to attend the lectures veiled. However the case was rejected by the Council of State with this decision: “Our girls who are not educated adequately cover their heads without significant reasons under influence of their social environment and traditions. Regarding this matter, it is known that some of our girls and women who took enough education not surrender to the influence of their social environment or traditions cover their heads exclusively in order to protest the laic principles of our republic and indicate that they embrace the religion based government system. Headscarf becomes the symbol of an ideology which is against 234 loc. cit. İşleyen… 235Reha Muhtar, “Hey Sen Başörtülü Kız” (Hey You Veiled Girl), 18.09.2007, Vatan, Acc. 27.06.2013 http://haber.gazetevatan.com/0/137315/4/yazarlar 108 freedom of women and our republic‟s basic principles rather than being a harmless habit for these people.”236 This decision later based the justification of annulment of the law on turban liberty at universities by Constitutional Court in 1989. For the first time, a legal justification defined polarization of the society on turban basis. Another incident was Leyla Şahin Case. While Şahin was a student at Medicine Faculty of Istanbul University in 1998, she got a disciplinary penalty from the school as she insisted on attending the lectures with her turban. Şahin sued Turkey at ECHR, but lost the case. ECHR decided that Turkey‟s sanction had a legitimate basis upon Turkish constitution; Turkish dress code was clearly defining the rules and laicism was an indispensable condition of democracy.237 This case bears a great importance as it became a binding prejudication precedent in ECHR.238 On February 9th, 2008 long debated amendment in the constitution for turban freedom at universities was approved by President Abdullah Gül. Veiled students attempted to enter the courses at universities before the law was ratified by President Abdullah Gül, but they faced reactions by the university authorities as the code was still not published at the Official Gazette.239 The code came into effect by the changes on 10th and 42nd articles of Turkish constitution on February 23th, 2008. Alteration added new lines to the articles which stated that everybody was equal before the law on enjoying any kind of civil services and assured that nobody should be deprived of using their higher education liberty for any reason which was not enacted by law.240 Under those circumstances, additional 17th article of Code of Higher Education was neutralized as the 42nd and 10th articles of the constitution were changed. The legislation was roughly criticized by some rectors who stated that they would not let veiled students in courses until an alteration made in the Code of Higher Education.241 Thereupon, many 236 loc. cit. İşleyen… 237 “AİHM Leyla Şahin‟in Türbanla İlgili İtirazını Reddetti” (EHCR Rejected Leyla Şahin‟s Objection about Turban), 10.11.2005, Hürriyet, Acc. 06.07.2013 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3504033&tarih=2005-11-10 238 “Leyla Şahin Davası AİHM‟de Emsal oldu” (Leyla Şahin Case Became Binding Prejudication Precedent in EHCR), 15.02.2006, Hürriyet, Acc. 06.07.2013 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3504033&tarih=2005-11-10 239 “Türbanlı Öğrenciler Üniversiteye Girdi” (Students Entered in the Universities with Turban), 11.02.2008, Acc. 16.06.2013 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/egitim/anasayfa/8208361.asp 240 “Türban Yasası Yürürlükte” (Turban Package is in Enforcement), 23.02.2008, Acc. Hürriyet http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/8295679.asp 241 “17. Madde Değişmeden Türbanla Öğrenci Almayız” (We do not Accept Veiled Students without a Change on the 17th Article), 23.02.2008, Hürriyet, Acc. 16.08.2013 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/8293568.asp?gid=71&sz=16425 109 journalists warned the authorities not to make any changes on additional 17th article as it would create the necessity of defining the tying style of the veil which would result with a democracy scandal.242 However, CHP carried the legislation to the Constitutional Court and requested annulment of the amendments about turban with allegation of being against the laic principles of Republic of Turkey. Thus, the legislation was annulled on June 6th, 2008 through decision number 2008/116 of Constitutional Court and turban ban got into effect once more at universities.243 Many veiled students cannot continue education because of the turban issue. However, some students which do not persist on being obstinate with the laws attend their courses unveiled or wearing a hat or a wig instead.244 Even though the professors are obliged to comply with the dress code because of their positions as civil servants, following this date many universities agreed on veiling is a democratic right and moderated their attitude towards university students as an outcome of the democratization process alongside with the assignment of rectors who were known of their adherence to AKP. The 13th article of Code of Higher Education that regulates the assignment of rectors by the President of Republic of Turkey causes inequality, damages independence of universities and causes their politicization. According to the law, rectors are elected by the universities, but if the president does not approve a candidate, he can choose one other from the list of candidates. As a result, the rectors who are known with their proximity to the political power can be assigned. Engin Ören‟s article dated August 11th, 2008 on Milliyet Newspaper states that the rector assignments which were performed on August 8th, 2008 witnessed the debates which reflected the polarization in Turkey. Therefore, his attitude left an impression as he acted with political motivations. The columnist also states that one of the candidates that could not show success in elections was assigned by the president. This raised the perception that the president had undertaken an ideological cleanup mission at the universities. Moreover the columnist 242 Hayrettin Karaman, “17. Maddeye Dokunmayın” (Don‟t Touch the 17th Article), 17.02.2008, Yeni Şafak, Acc. 05.06.2013 http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/HayrettinKaraman/17-maddeye-dokunmayin/9378 243 “Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı” (Constitutional Court Decision), 22.10.2008, Official Razette, Acc. 16.06.2013 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/10/20081022-15.htm 244 “Türban Yerine Peruk” (Wig Instead of Turban), 08.10.1997, Hürriyet, Acc. 17.06.2013 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=-267901 110 criticizes the president for assigning a candidate who was a former deputy candidate from AKP.245 Following the positive political atmosphere after the 2009 Local Elections, steps had started to be taken for democratization by AKP. A referendum was held for constitutional amendments in 2010 in order to rule the undemocratic effects of 1982 Constitution out which was prepared by the coup generals. The constitution was extremely repressive and had prohibited the responsible generals from being accused for their practices. Majority of the people voted in favor of the amendments and thus the constitution was changed. Next step for democratization of the country was seen as the turban liberty by AKP. As execution of the 2010 law package stopped, turban was still a matter of conflict at universities and other public space. In the meanwhile, election propagandas had started for the 2011 General Elections at the time and parties were handling their election speeches. Unexpectedly CHP released a turban report in lead of its new moderate chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and opted for admittance of the students at universities with turban claiming that it was a democratic right; however it was still strictly disapproved for civil servants. Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that AKP should show its sincerity by not using turban conflict for political reasons.246 CHP proved its terms by passing the warning of Council of Higher Education to Istanbul University not to dismiss veiled students from lectures off. Even though the alterations on dress code for schools placated the religious conservatives, turban issue still remains in the public institutions. Recent alterations in dress code of schools raised turban liberty also for the civil servants into question. Guidelines of the dress code for civil servants were determined by Dress Code of Civil Servants which came into effect on October 25th, 1982. 5th article of the code brings the obligation of unveiling at their workplace for all civil servants. One of the most known incidents is the case of Merve Kavakçı. Kavakçı was a Turkish politician who was elected as a deputy from FP in 1999 General Elections. When she entered the parliament with her turban in order to swear her oath, she was protested by the DSP deputies and dismissed from the parliament. Followingly she was 245Engin Önen, “Rektör Atamaları” (Rector Assignments), 11.08.2008, Milliyet, Acc. 11.08.2013 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-/engin-onen/ege/yazardetay/12.08.2008/977415/default.htm 246 “CHP‟nin Türban Raporu Hazır” (CHP‟s Turban Report is Ready), 08.10.2010, Radikal, Acc. 07.07.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/chpnin_turban_raporu_hazir-1022708 111 denationalized as she did not inform the authorities about her dual citizenship. According to the bill of indictment of High Court of Appeal dated June 4th, 1999 for FP‟s closure case, incident was organized by FP‟s executive cadre in advance.247 Also some statements of the party executives were indicated in the indictment. She rejects the claims about turban being a harbinger and she defends that it is a part of the Turkish culture and states that 60 % of the Turkish women are veiled. She also claims that there was no restriction of Turban when she entered with her turban in the parliament. However this is not correct; deputies at the parliament are also subject to the 1982 Dress Code of Civil Servants through the Discipline Regulation of National Assembly dated July 13th, 1984. Kavakçı stated that her denationalization was only a pretext for the government to expel her from the Turkish politics.248 However, indictment stated that FP was the successor of Islamist RP and Kavakçı was striving for the declaration of an Islamic regime by showing a speech she held at a conference that was organized by Islamic Association of Palestine in USA.249 Kavakçı applied to ECHR and won the case against Turkey for the oath incident, but could not pursue politics as she was not regranted with her Turkish nationality.250 One of the other persons who rekindled the turban conflict was Lawyer Emine Aykenar. She was protested by her colleagues upon her decision to attend the trials with her turban in 1970‟s. The bar association decided that it was impossible to reconcile the religious veil with modern dressing and professional appearance and discarded Aykenar from the association. Aykenar extended the debate by carrying her case into the Council of State. Her lawyer also was a deputy of Islamist MSP. As she was also found guilty by the Council of State, she could not return back to her occupation.251 Even though veiling is seen as a requirement of religion, it is also a fact that many conservative women also prefer it as a dressing style. This perception also arises as a matter of conflict. At this point, conservative women who see turban as a dressing style are roughly criticized by radical Islamist and laic circles for emptying the meaning of religion by preferring unsuitable ways of veiling which do not fit in the Islamic style. 247 “Fazilet Davası” (Fazilet Case), 04.06.1999, Hürriyet, Acc. 08.06.2013 http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/dosya/fazilet/ekiddianame.htm 248 Merve Kavakçı, “Turkey‟s Fashion Police”, Foreign Policy, 145, Nov-Dec 2004, Washingtonpost Newsweek Interactive LLC, pp. 16-17 249 loc. cit., “Fazilet Davası”... 250 “AİHM‟den Merve Kavakçı Kararı” (Merve Kavakçı Decision from EHCR), 01.04.2007, HaberTürk, Acc. 06.07.2013 http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/18962-aihmden-merve-kavakci-karari 251 loc. cit. İşleyen... 112 In an Islamic style of veiling all parts of the women body should be covered with nontransparent, unattractive loose dresses which do not fit on the body. Therefore under normal circumstances wearing jeans, short skirts, close-fit shirts or lurid colors are not approved as a correct way of veiling.252 On Image 3, an example of the disapproved style of veiling is seen. Thus, turban conflict arises as a political and sociological fact in Turkish society. As religion holds an important place in rural/conservative lifestyle, imposition of veiling to the young women at a very early age by their patriarchic and conservative families, discloses the idea of being veiled no matter how understanding. However, it is also a fact that in real democratic systems these kinds of discriminative attitudes should not exist. Image 3: Criticized type of Veiling In the light of the information above, it is asked what the subjects that participated in Study C think about the people fitting religious values according to themselves such as veiling and wearing revealing dresses at the same time. While Subject 1answered as “After a point, religious values transformed into political tools and values lost their significance. Promotion of religious values by a political party is bothersome”; Subject 2 answered the same question as “I think dressing is also a preference; everyone has the right to dress according to their taste regardless being veiled or not. That is why; I tolerate and do not feel uncomfortable about it.” The answers show that the attitude against veiling depends mostly on the political opinion. It 252 Hasan Çalışkan, “Müslüman Hanımın Kıyafetinin Özellikleri” (Features of the Dressing of a Muslim Lady), September 2006, Vol. 69, Acc. 15.08.2013 http://www.gulistandergisi.com/dergi_oku.php?id=277 113 is seen that while the subject that has a relatively laic opinion was against turban‟s prominence, the other subject who is relatively more conservative mentioned that she tolerates. Therefore, social polarization shows itself in the responses of this question. On the other hand, as the second subject mentioned that she is tolerant to any kind of lifestyle; reflects the liberal values of Subject 2. This variation will be analyzed more detailed below.253 In the final analysis, as the legal basis of this issue is still not set, turban issue in education seems to remain unresolved in the near future. In the next parts of the thesis opinions of Turkish society about the turban conflict will be reviewed. Before moving to the opinions, polarization in education will be handled. 4.1.1.2. Education One of the major spheres that suffer polarization is education. Education has a special importance in politics for being the main institution to impose official state policy on the young brains. Therefore along the Turkish history especially starting from the transition to multi-party period, it was seen as a policy tool by the supporters of both ideologies. As we saw in the third chapter, especially starting with the 1950‟s education was politicized gradually. As a result of the arbitrary practices on education, main issues of Turkish education are turban issue, gender disparity in education, status of imamhatip schools, compulsory religion education at schools and role of religious communities on education at the present day. Even though colleges and minority schools are usually preferred by the modern elite and laic circles, urbanized religious conservative elites also started to prefer private schools as a result of the increasing number of Gülen Movement institutions. On the other hand, the lower layers of both segments attend the same public schools where usually the conflicts on conservative-modern axis arise as a result of the current practices. İmam-hatip schools which are the schools to educate required clerics provide very limited education and they are under control of religious conservative or Islamist parties as well as religious communities such as Gülen Movement together with some 253 See Below: Polarization Axes 120 This decision was highly influenced by the TÜSİAD report of 1990.Therefore, AKP‟s progress towards the political power was seen as a hope by imam-hatip schools as many politicians from its cadre were imam-hatip graduates. Table 6 shows us the evolution of numbers of imam-hatip schools and students. According to Table 6, while imam-hatip schools had only 71,100 students in 450 schools at the beginning of AKP term in 2002, number of the students quintupled and school number grew up to 708 in ten years. It is seen that while the number of schools and students remained stable until 2009-2010 term, they started to rise after then. The reason of this increase is the melioration of university admittance process by changing the coefficient rates in Student Examination System. Coefficient system was a measure to limit higher education alternatives of imam-hatip graduates with theology faculties which was presented after the February 28 period. In 2009, the coefficients were attempted to be overruled by the pro-government president of Council of Higher Table 6: Number of Students that Attended İmam-Hatip High Schools by Years Academic Year Number of Students Number of Schools 2002-2003 71.100 450 2003-2004 90.606 452 2004-2005 96.851 452 2005-2006 108.064 453 2006-2007 120.668 455 2007-2008 129.274 456 2008-2009 143.637 458 2009-2010 198.581 465 2010-2011 235.639 493 2011-2012 268.245 537 2012-2013 380.771 708 Source: Ministry of National Education Formal Education Data, Edited by Eğitim-Sen Education Union www.egitimsen.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=20064&sube=0#.UjNnM8ZdCuA Education, but the decision was precluded by the Council of State.267 Nevertheless, the constant increase in number of the schools and students has been a worrying development for laic circles. Also, Eğitim-Sen mentions that positive discrimination of AKP government towards imam-hatip schools in every aspect is seen 267“Katsayı Mağdurlarına Tazminat Yolu Açıldı” (Compensation Option Has Been Provided for Sufferers of Coefficients), 25.07.2013, Radikal, Acc. 18.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/katsayi_magdurlarina_tazminat_yolu_acildi-1143252 121 at every step of the process; while state schools suffer inadequacy of funds, imam-hatip schools never face such kind of an issue. In the last two periods of the chart, it is seen that number of the schools drastically rose from 493 to 537 and then to 708 while the students grew up more than 150,000 in the last two years.268 The article of CNNTurk dated August 10th, 2013 states that while imam-hatip high schools were placing only 25 % of their students to non-theology university programs during the period that coefficient was in question, the number rose up to 35 % after the elimination of the rule.269 The changes can be considered as an outcome of army‟s deteriorated Kemalist authority over politics and covert efforts of Islamist movement to reinforce its rulership through education of approved generations. AKP introduced the new education system which was called 4+4+4 on March 30th, 2012 that basically raised compulsory education to twelve years and divided it to four equal parts allowing circulation between all types of academic and vocational schools including imam-hatips. Thus, middle parts of imam-hatip schools were reopened.270 Moreover, legislation also abolished the coefficient system; previous system was multiplying the final grades with 0.15 if imam-hatip graduates wanted to proceed to theology faculties and with 0.12 for all others. As an outcome of this abolishment, imam-hatip graduates became entitled to have the same rights to proceed to any higher education institution they wish according to their rank at the exam results.271 Even though the previous system was an equity constraint, it is clear that the amendments were made for benefit of a certain society. Unfortunately Turkish education system at the pos-1980 period was constantly seen as a political tool and changed frequently according to the ideology of the ruling parties which left the students in a difficult situation. This amendment is also one of many other alterations, but yet the most extensive one. 268 “MEB, Ortaöğretime Geçiş Sisteminde Öğrencilere Kırk Katır mı Kırk Satır mı Dayatması Yapıyor” (Ministry of National Education Imposes the New System on Students whether They Like or Not), 15.08.2013, EğitimSen, Acc. 19.08.2013 www.egitimsen.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=20064&sube=0#.UjNnM8ZdCuA 269 “İmam-Hatip Okulları Tekrar Yükselişe Geçiyor” (İmam-Hatip Schools Rise Again), 10.08.2012, CNNTürk, Acc. 12.07.2013 http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/08/10/imam.hatip.okullari.tekrar.yukselise.geciyor/672480.0 270 “12 Yıllık Zorunlu Eğitime Yönelik Genelge” (Circular for 12 Years Compulsory Education), Acc. 17.07.2013 http://www.meb.gov.tr/haberler/2012/12YillikZorunluEgitimeYonelikGenelge.pdf 271 “Coefficients in Turkish University Exam Lifted”, 01.12.2011, Hürriyet Daily News, Acc. 17.07.2013 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/coefficients--in-turkish-university-exam-lifted.aspx?pageID=238 &nID=8288& NewsCatID=341 122 This education system was subject to rough critics with the accusation that it would drop the number of students which would attend school and it was seen as a focus of religious reactionary and an anti-laic act as it was giving the option of transferring to imam-hatip schools. Thus, CHP took the amendment to the Constitutional Court and pressed a charge for annulment of regulation and suspension of execution with the allegation of unconstitutionality of the regulation regarding the articles which reduce the schooling age to five, implement elective religion lessons such as Quran and Prophet Mohammed‟s Life in addition to the compulsory one while still maintaining the religion lesson as compulsory, disintegrate continuous education to three chapters of four years that would increase drop-outs, re-implement imam-hatip middle schools and reduce their admission level to eleven years. CHP considered all those alterations as against the children rights according to the 7th and 10th articles of Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child which was ratified by Turkey and 2nd, 10th and 24tharticles of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey which takes the laicism as an irreversible right in every aspect of administration and life; also forbid mixing state and religious affairs. In this sense, prosecutor CHP deputy Emine Ülker Tarhan stated that there is an imposition in question through the establishment of imamhatip middle schools and implementation of compulsory lessons such as Quran and Prophet Mohammed‟s Life.272 She continued her words as in the following: “Imposition of such kind of an influence on a minor child is against the rational education, […] and principles of the laic state. Laic state has equidistance to all faiths. The citizens from different faiths were ignored by this regulation. The regulation is against the rule of conduction of education based on modern principals settled by the 42nd article of the constitution. This decision is against the freedom of religion and conscience. No relation can be settled between religion and the state in a laic state. Using the laws and the state in order to raise a generation that fits in one‟s ideology is clearly abuse of religion; it means giving priority to one belief and ignoring others. It is against the 10th and 24th articles of the constitution. Religion education is up to the request of the student and their guardians. Optional course and elective course concepts are entirely different from each other. Everybody is forced to announce their faith through this regulation. Moreover, their faith is tried to be measured. This means to insulate the children from their parents‟ influence and educate them systematically in direction of a specific perspective through imposing a certain ideology. Only the oppressive regimes that want to educate monotype people want to use such kind of a method.”273 With these words, the polarization can be clearly seen between the laic and religious conservative parties. The accusations are actually accurate in regards to the 272 “4+4+4‟e İptal Davası” (Nullity Suit for 4+4+4), 08.06.2012, Haberler.com, Acc. 20.06.2013 http://www.haberler.com/4-4-4-kanununa-iptal-davasi-3693438-haberi/ 273 loc. cit. 123 Turkish constitution. As a matter of fact, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already stated that he strives for educating a religious generation at a press release he made at the presentation of an educational project. He made the following statement: “We cannot agree with you (the journalists) here but when we talk about „a modern generation‟, cannot a religious generation be modern? Cannot it be both religious and modern? Gentlemen, bend your head down and think how a generation both religious and modern is educated.”274 Even though the intention is clearly seen in the words of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Constitutional Court dismissed the lawsuit on September 20th, 2012 and published its justified decision in the Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey on March 18th, 2013 with 2012/128 registration number.275 The court listed the following reasons in its justified decision: “Laicism is a feature of the state rather than being a feature of the society.[…] There are two interpretations of laicism; the strict version does not approve the reflection of religious faith to the public space while more flexible version considers that personal dimension of religion is a social fact. […]The individuals that are making part of different religious beliefs are under protection of laic state. […] 2nd article of the constitution signifies that laicism does not mean to be a non-believer; each individual can follow the religion or sect they desire and comply with its obligations and not to be subject of a different procedure in regards to their religious beliefs.[…] The state should remove the obstacles in front of religious and conscious freedoms of individuals and provide an appropriate environment for them to live according to their beliefs as an outcome of its positive responsibility. […] According to 5th article of the constitution, state is responsible of removing social, political and economic obstacles which limit individuals‟ basic rights and freedoms and provide necessary conditions for evolution of moral and material existence. […] As constitution does not allow foundation of private religion institutions, naturally it should be state‟s responsibility to provide religion education. It is clear that the elective lessons that were introduced by the code are the requirements of the religious education that will be provided by the request of oneself and their guardian. Name preference of Quran and Life of Prophet Mohammed lessons do not necessarily mix religion with state affairs as the names are designed only to show respect to the followers of the religion. […] Besides, foundation of schools to educate clerics was stipulated by the Law on Unification of Education of March 3rd, 1924 which clearly holds Ministry of National Education responsible of the education of clerics. 24th article of the constitution gives the possibility of providing a state-run religious education while it prohibits determination of the principles of the state based on religion. Therefore this regulation is not against the 2nd and 24th articles of the constitution.”276 Even though the Constitutional Court stated that the amendments are aligned with the constitution, CHP stated that they will reapply for reconsideration. Considering that the law is open for interpretation, it can be seen that the interpretations of the 274 “Erdoğan Dindar Nesili Savundu” (Erdoğan Advocated Religious Generation), 06.02.2012, Radikal, Acc. 19.04.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_dindar_nesili_savundu-1077899 275 “Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı” (Decision of Constitutional Court), 18.04.2013, Official Gazette, No: 28622, Acc. 19.04.2013 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130418. htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130418.htm 276 loc. cit. 124 Constitutional Court and CHP are completely different from each other. As mentioned before277, the court also stated that there are two interpretations of laicism and the court clearly decided to interpret it according to the more flexible version that is known as of Anglo-American type of secularism. However, considering this, the amendments are actually against the constitution if they are considered in the context of the French laic understanding which is stricter than secularism. In this sense, it is possible to say that Constitutional Court gave its decision in favor of the government. This attitude is an outcome of the recent structure of the Constitutional Court, which was changed through the referendum held in 2010. The new structure abolished independence of the Constitutional Court by letting three of its members to be selected by the parliament and seven by the president.278. While the 4+4+4 education system is still a matter of conflict, there were more steps taken by the government that would concern the laic society. For example, according to the article of a Turkish internet newspaper Ntvmsnbc dated June 19th, 2012; Ministry of National Education founded 67 new imam-hatip schools in 39 counties of Istanbul following the 4+4+4 regulation.279 However, the concerns are not limited with the increase in the number of imam-hatip schools. As mentioned above, the 4+4+4 education system introduced elective religion lessons at public schools. Even though this implementation was considered as rightful by the Constitutional Court and the legislation was not abolished, its effects are debatable. Compulsory religion lesson was introduced in the curriculum at the pos-1980 period as a result of the military coup government‟s pro-Islamic attitude against the communism threat, but the minorities and laic circles were always in favor of its elimination. Therefore, introduction of new religion lessons and conservation of the compulsory lesson was seen as a threat by those circles. Nevertheless, the worries are not groundless. According to the article of Milliyet Newspaper dated January 15th, 2013, an exclusion anxiety emerges on the kids that do not select elective religion lessons. The article states that even though each student was affected differently, the majority is unhappy with existence of religion lessons. There is 277 See Above: DP and AP Term 278 “Can Erdoğan Pull it Off?”, 09.09.2010, The Economist, Acc. 06.07.2013 http://www.economist.com/node/16994644?story_id=16994644 279 “İstanbul‟da 39 İlçeye 67 İmam-Hatip Okulu” (67 İmam-Hatip School to 29 Districts of Istanbul), 19.06.2012, Ntvmsnvs, Acc. 10.07.2013 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25359468/ 125 also the effect of the discomfort originated by the exam based evaluation which brings faith and obligation together. Besides, exempt of some Alevi students based on the decision of European Court of Human Rights from religion lessons has been a hope for many families that strive for rescission of the lesson. However, the families which were expecting a rescission faced a bad surprise by implementation of new elective religion lessons on top of the compulsory one instead of abolishing them. Moreover, the article states that even though some electives such as Democracy or Human Rights are not opened, the lessons about religion are always opened. Thus, if another lesson is not opened, the students get forced to take religion lessons. This situation is especially inconvenient for the Alevi students as their Muslimhood beliefs would be evaluated in case they refuse to take the lessons.280 Moreover, this system also causes tagging of the students which avoid electing religion lessons. As is seen, the curriculums are clearly organized in favor of the government‟s biased policy. As a matter of fact, religion should not be this much prominent is a laic state. Even though compulsory religion lesson is insisted, a new curriculum that includes different sects should be created, because this way the system is against the human rights as per 24th article of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this sense, polarization in the society which is embittered by the current education system is seen in the words of an Alevi citizen who enjoyed the right of exemption of his child from religion lessons: “I am the first person who sued the compulsory religion education and won. My child was not attending religion lessons, instead was having a break at the yard as there were no other course options. He was exposed to questions and harassed, therefore because he was fed up with explaining the situation, he started to say that he was punished by the teacher. He was only ten. I spoke to the school manager and provided him with staying at the classroom; we won the case, but could not prevent my son to take the lesson physically. I also faced problems in my job, they forced me to resign, I was threatened, my son was leaving school under assistance of the police, my house was kept under surveillance by the police against threat risks.”281 This is not the only discriminative incident at schools. According to the article of Vatan Newspaper dated August 28th, 2013, middle school student Nazlı Şirin El, who preferred not to attend the religion lessons and carried the incident to court due to her 280 “Türkiye‟de Alevilik” (Alevism in Turkey), 15.01.2013, Milliyet, Acc. 07.07.2013 http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-de-alevilik-secmeli-din-dersi-nde-dislanacagim-kaygisi- /gundem/gundemdetay/15.01.2013/1655403/default.htm 281 ibid. 126 religious faith, was classified with 2 over 5 for the religion lessons and lost her chance to obtain a certificate of appreciation for her overachievement. Moreover, according to the 86th and 99th articles of the regulation, sanctuaries could be placed at schools in case of request and students of imam-hatip schools would be responsible for education of the public by organizing one-on-one meetings with the people within the range of school‟s neighborhood.282 These alterations show that a comprehensive religion project is in question. Saygı Öztürk mentioned that these alterations would lead to conflict of the teachers and students who practice salats and who do not. He also expressed that the next step might be formation of separate schools for boys and girls.283 However, Ministry of National Education did not accept the allegations, defended that the objections to the new education system were ideological and blamed the circles who criticize the implementation with not being able to give up the habit of education monotype generations by assimilating differences.284 This blame is critically discriminative and reflects the intolerance of the government against criticism. In the first place, criticism is a democratic right and the criticism is not entirely insubstantial. It was proved many times that the Islamist and religious conservative parties had the tendency of conveniently misunderstanding. Thus religious conservatives usually claim criticism as in their monopoly.285 As is seen from these incidents, following another religion, sect, belief or political thought and enjoying the rights that is obtained through these identities is not welcomed in Turkey. These are typical exemptions that the laic people suffer at the present day. The society is under influence of a strict Sunni understanding which exempts other understandings and accepts Sunnism as the only truth and unfortunately such kinds of oppressive attitudes also became a major element in politics. This attitude is seen either in politics and social life. As mentioned many times before, the real reason of polarization in Turkey is based on religion. 282 “Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Ortaöğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliği (Ministry of National Education Code of High School Institutions), 07.09.2013, Official Gazette, Acc. 15.09.2013 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/09/20130907-4.htm 283 Saygı Öztürk, “Eğitimde Yeni Hedef Kız ve Erkekleri Ayırmak” (Seperating Girls and the Boys is the New Target in Education), 15.09.2013, Sözcü, Acc. 15.09.2013 http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/yazarlar/saygi-ozturk/egitimde-yenihedef-kiz-ve-erkekleri-ayirmak-371617/ 284 “MEB: Ortaokul ve Liselerde Türban Serbest” (Min. of Nat. Edu.: Turban is Allowed in Middle and High Schools), 05.06.2012, Sol, Acc. 05.07.2013 http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/meb-ortaokul-ve-liselerde-turbanserbest-haberi-55604 285 See Above: RP‟s Double Standard Policy 127 Another concern is the elimination of academic public schools from education system in alignment with the 4+4+4 education system. Academic public schools were serving for the students which did not wish to specialize in vocational or religious spheres and could not be successful in the high school placement test. The exam gives the possibility for the students to access an academic quality education in special public schools that are called Anatolian High School. However considering that the precondition of being admitted to these schools is to pass the exam, it means that elimination of academic public high schools forces the students either to attend to private schools or specialize in vocational or religious schools. Basically, it can be seen that the system covertly directs the students to imam-hatip schools. With the initiation of the process, many repressive incidents started to arise. According to the article of Radikal Newspaper dated August 22nd, 2013, during transformations of the schools according to 4+4+4 system, it was detected that despite the lack of interest, approximately 20 public schools in a conservative city called Konya were transformed into imam-hatip schools which were previously providing academic education. Moreover, registrations of the students who were attending those schools were transferred automatically to imam-hatip schools.286 Article also states that registrations were transferred beyond the parents‟ knowledge. Even though the school managers stated that parents can transfer their children if they are not content, in a small conservative city such as Konya, where the social pressure is extremely high, it is impossible for the parents to take the risk of being otherized.287 It is clearly seen that the state tries to direct the students to imam-hatip schools which is a sheer violation of law. Eğitim-Sen states that 1,112,604 students which attended to the last exam show that the students are still interested in academic education; it is seen that Ministry of National Education strives for canalizing the students to educate cheap workforce by vocational schools and obedient citizens by imam-hatip schools.288 However, after the complaints that Ministry of National Education received and manifestations of the students, Ministry of National Education had to retreat by announcing that obtaining the desired education is a democratic right and promising that classrooms will be 286 “Çocuğunuz Otomatik Olarak İmam-Hatipli Oldu” (Your Child Became İmam-Hatipper Automatically), 22.08.2013, Radikal, Acc. 22.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/cocugunuz_otomatik_olarak_imam_hatipli_oldu-1147303 287 ibid. 288 loc. cit. MEB, Ortaöğretime… 128 introduced that will give academic education in a part of vocational schools. But, it is ironic to see that they considered it as a democratic right while they did not think about this before introducing the new system.289 In the recent years there is a significant raise in the number of conservative families who send their children to the private schools and other institutions for better education. This is due to the raise in the number of private schools and strong encouragement of the state in extent of raising schooling rates. Besides, the Gülen Movement schools are sought after for their quality education, outstanding opportunities and accessible prices as well as more conservative environment compared to the public schools. Fethullah Gülen started an educational movement in Turkey and different parts of the world since 1990 through private schools, after-school courses, universities and university dormitories. While there were only 125 schools of the movement in Turkey in 1998, Prof. Helen Rose Ebaugh, who is a sociologist in collaboration with Gülen Movement, stated that the number of movement schools reached approximately to 1000 in Turkey on an interview she gave on CNNTurk on January 12th, 2011.290 He passionately supports this educational movement. Students who attend these schools and courses usually score high in the university placement tests as a result of the high quality education. However, the increasing cheating scandals in the university placement tests aroused suspicions against the movement institutions.291 This makes the movement identical to elitist Islam. Even though Gülen supports the schools, he denies the existence of an organic relationship between himself and these institutions. He claims that the financial resources for establishment of the schools are provided by conservative businessmen.292 However these schools are heavily criticized by the laic circles for serving Great Middle East Project by pioneering moderate Islam. In this sense, the claims of the laic circles are not insubstantial. As a matter of fact, the movement does not hide its objective of providing education based on Turkish-Islam synthesis. 289 “Meslek Lisesi ve İmam-Hatip istemeyenlere care bulundu” (Solution is Found for the Ones who Does not want Both İmam-Hatip School or Vocational Schools), 20.08.2013, Radikal, Acc. 20.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/meslek_lisesi_ve_ihlyi_istemeyenlere_care_bulundu-1146888 290 Cüneyt Özdemir, Helen Rose Ebaugh, 5N1K , 12.01.2011 291 “KPSS‟de Vurgun Cemaat mi?” (Is the Loot Cemaat‟s in the Examination for Civil Servants), 02.09.2010, Sol, Acc. 18.07.2013 http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/kpssde-vurgun-mu-cemaat-mi-haberi-32885 292 loc. cit. Gülen Hareketi… 129 Apart from the private schools, the critics concentrate on movement‟s dormitories and private apartments which are called “Houses of Light”. It is widely known that as a part of Gülen movement‟s education system based on Turkish-Islam synthesis, the dormitories and apartments serve as missionary houses. Some people are forced to stay there and read books about the movement or Fethullah Gülen. On İlker Akşit‟s article on Free Kocaeli Newspaper dated December 23th, 2011, an interview with two university students that were staying in the movement‟s dormitories shows that the movement does not hide itself anymore. While approximately six, seven years ago the movement‟s members were hiding themselves, in the last years they became more prominent. Akşit states that the activity style of the movement has changed as an outcome of the changing political environment in Turkey. The dormitories are cheap and it is obligatory to perform salats five times a day. The author states that there is a big effort to brainwash by forcing students to watch only the movement‟s television channel and read its newspaper.293 Another article in Aydınlık Newspaper dated January 06th, 2012 tells a story about three students that were forced to stay in the dormitories and were obligated to sign a yearly contract. The students stated that the dormitories were missionary schools and they were approached to be converted to missionaries, however when they could not pay their rent, they ended up in court.294 The above mentioned profile forms the main reason of the controversy of Gülen inspired institutions by the modern laic circles. As seen from both articles, there is a heavy effort to educate a religious generation. However, it is debatable whether the only objective is to educate or influence the students. The community pays great importance to winning at least five or ten students from each school. This is why they choose especially poor children win their hearts by offering them things they will never have on their own and forcing them to perform salats and fasting. This contrast between what is being said and what is being done is suspicious. Education system of Turkey is being used politically. The community makes great effort not to go public. Like headhunters they are searching for poor, needy and uneducated people to include them in the community. If the main purpose was to create a Golden Generation it would not draw 293 İlker Akşit, “Cemaat Yurtlatında Öğrenci Olmak” (Being Student in Religious Community Guesthıuses), 23.12.2011, Özgür Kocaeli, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.ozgurkocaeli.com.tr/roportaj/cemaat-yurtlarinda-ogrenciolmak-83824.html 294 “3 Muhafazakar Genç Işık Evlerini Anlattı” (3 Conservative Youngsters Told Enlightenment Houses), 06.01.2012, Aydınlık, 08.08.2013 Acc. http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/7361-3-muhafazakar-genc-iik-evlernanlatti.html 136 urban moderns and modernized conservatives and their scramble for political power should be taken into consideration while studying the reasons of polarization. The higher quality of the urban elites in terms of education, culture and knowledge as well as their material and power advantage has been a distinguishing feature between them and the rural migrants. Tahire Erman states that while the first generation migrants emphasized the first point in her research, the second generations emphasized the latter. According to the research while first generation feels uncomfortable with socializing with urbanites because of not being able to act free like them and not sharing the same values; the second generations stated that urbanites does not accept rural migrants as a part of them as they do not want to discredit themselves.315 She cites the thoughts of a young migrant student in one of the interviews: “Of course, we experience exclusion. Look at the Cankaya (an upper-class district) youth who imitate Western culture. They definitely pretend that our people do not exist, they reject them. I cannot be friends with them. I cannot listen to the same music they listen to. Yet, I can live together with them if I am put in a room, but they cannot live with me. Why? Because they are conceited, they put on airs; they are inclined to look down on people like me.”316 These words of the student explain the polarization between the urbanites and rural circles at his school. However, this situation widely changed in the 2000‟s. It is true that these people were excluded in the first years of their arrival; however as a result of the changing balances they were able to access the high class society through their Islamist clientelist network. The Islamist project is also based on leadership of the educated elites, their elite lifestyles and showing their lifestyles as a model such as in Kemalist social engineering‟s top-down model. Nilüfer Göle states that the present actors of Islamism are the university students, future intellectuals, self employed professionals and new elites rather than the uneducated masses which are marginal and unsuccessful on reaching their objectives.317 According to White, the Islamists use cultural symbols such as veiling in a strategic and deliberative frame in order to achieve a social genuineness. They strived for associating the social behaviors such as veiling and gender discrimination with 315 ibid. p. 548 316 ibid. 317 op. cit., White, p. 353 137 urban/modern/educated meaning combination, thus challenging the social hierarchies which related these behaviors with rural/reactionist/uneducated/slum concepts. Thus, this approach has elitized this behavior and provided a connective cultural demonstrator between the Islamist parties and the Islamist movement. The differentiation between the prevalent Muslim practices and elite Islamist practices expresses the efforts to step out of proletarianism as a result of the identification of cultural differences with class discrimination in Turkey. However, members of the Islamist elite are the least suffering circles of this polarization as they already obtained a social statute in life through their education, occupation or political activities. The real victims of this polarization are the lower class proletarians which still live in the slums of the city. As their income is not enough, they usually are used as political means by the elite Islamists in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamist movements and parties. These Islamist elites give these lower class citizens what they cannot afford to buy and thus force them voting for Islamist parties. As the lower class citizens are in needy conditions, most of the time they perform a self-seeking attitude and search for what is beneficial to them. The assistance can be given them in many ways by the Islamist movements. For instance, it can be assistance of supplies, home appliances, educational or vocational courses, deductions from their taxes and it can even be a full day at the rallies of Islamist parties with all expenses covered such as transportation, food and extra pocket money for spending the day at the meeting. This is the main reason for the lower class society to be attracted to the Islamist parties. Usually this aid is provided through the party funds, companies supporting the Islamist movement or sometimes the government funds. As it is seen, this competition definitely is not fair; in one hand there are the people who pay their taxes and try to survive without assistance while the groups which vote for Islamist parties are rewarded as well as the Islamist elite which use the lower classes. One of the parties which attracts supporters by the assistance given is AKP. According to the article of Radikal Newspaper, Governorship of Tekirdağ gave 50 Turkish Liras just one day before AKP rally in the city.318 Another article from AKP‟s 318 “Tekirdağ‟da AKP Mitingi Öncesi Para Dağıtıldı” (Money was Given a Day Before AKP‟s Tekirdağ Rally), 16.03.2009, Radikal, Acc. 05.07.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/tekirdagda_akp_mitingi_oncesi_para_dagitildi-926433 138 newsletter states that 20,000 students were financially assisted.319 T24 Internet Newspaper states that the coal assistance of AKP which especially peaks before the election periods has reached to 13.6 tons between 2003-2011 periods which was 185.6 % more than 2003 data. 1.9 million packages of coal were distributed by AKP only in 2009.320 However, another article from Milliyet Newspaper states that MHP office in Turgutlu detected that the coal assistance which was done by the district governorship was distributed through the trucks which belonged to AKP-run municipality and this caused an unfair propaganda as it created the perception as the assistance was done directly by AKP rather than the state. The article states that the MHP organization at the town was furious about the situation and claimed that AKP only cared about the votes they would get as the scandal occurred right before the elections.321 According to Sol Newspaper, the checks for financial aid which were distributed in Batman right before the elections were overdraft. Following the local elections in 2009, the people which went to the banks in order to liquidate their money, were told that the accounts were closed and could not get their money. The newspaper states that AKP was punishing the people because it lost the elections against another party at Batman and the aid was an election bribe of AKP.322 On the other hand, OdaTV Internet Newspaper states that Zorlu Holding, which is one of the biggest holdings in Turkey, donated 40,000 support packages for Ramadan month to be handed to AKP Women Branch. Total of the aid was 1,844,000 Turkish Liras. Moreover, article criticizes AKP for turning the Ramadan month into a political show by providing iftar323 banquets through the assistance of AKP organization itself and it mentions the anxiety about capital groups to be forced to AKP partisanship through stricter controls of Ministry of Finances over the companies which do not share the same ideology with the government. Besides, the article 319 “20 Bin Öğrenciye Eğitim Yardımı” (Education Assistance for 20,000 Students), 17.09.2011, AKP Newsletter, Acc. 05.07.2013 http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/20-bin-ogrenciye-egitim-yardimi/12998 320 “AKP 8 Yılda 13,6 Ton Kömür Dağıttı (AKP Ditributed 13.6 Tons of Coal in 8 Years), T24, Acc. 04.07.2013 www.t24.com.tr/haber/akp-8-yilda-136-ton-komur-dagitti/211012 321 “Fotoğraflı Tespit Yapan MHP‟den Suç Duyurusu” (Criminal Complaint from MHP that Made Photo-Detection), 03.03.2009, Milliyet, Acc. 04.07.2013 http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/fotografli-tespit-yapan-mhp-den-sucduyurusu/siyaset/siyasetdetay/03.03.2009/1066612/default.htm 322 “AKP Yardımları Karşılıksız Çıktı” (AKP Assistance was Overdraft), 04.04.2009, Sol, Acc. 04.07.2013 http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/akp-yardimlari-karsiliksiz-cikti-haberi-12506 323 See Also: Glossary 139 underlines that the aid was 60 times of the legal limit which should be 30,710.36 Turkish Liras in maximum according to the Code of Political Parties.324 As it is seen from the newspaper articles, Islamist elites only remember the rural migrants when they need their votes. This leads to the abuse of religion by taking advantage of the lower classes‟ needy conditions. Parties which take religion as their official program try to attract people through the Islamist rhetoric. 4.1.2. Political Parties and Politics A very intensive polarization in Turkish society takes place at the present day. There is a predictable positioning about issues. For instance when somebody speaks about the political situation in the country, they can at least predict what type of an attitude they have to expect from the other side. Because it is supposed that the other side lost their objectivity and equanimity towards the discussed subject, has prejudice while evaluating the situation according to their position and their remark is an outcome of this prejudice and position. Nobody denies that this tension is not a polarization. However, while everybody thinks that they are the only ones that can make sensible critics; they blame the others with not being objective or being biased. Even this manner is an example, reason and result of the polarization in Turkey. Naturally the most common spheres that this argument can be noticed are media and politics. There is a political perception which doing politics depends on an arrogant manner with almost no negotiation and persuasion efforts. It is very interesting that the media also is a part of this polarization. At the end, politics is the process of reconciling different or rival interests and demands in the society. Political parties are the primary elements of this process. It can be said that political parties should reconcile the state with citizens and politics with daily life. Political parties are the organizations which reflect the society‟s daily needs and demands to the decision making mechanisms, negotiating with the other political 324 “Bu da Yardım Lobisi” (And This is the Assistance Lobby), 27.07.2013, OdaTV, Acc. 27.07.2013 http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=al-sana-faiz-lobisi-2707131200 140 parties and demand groups, striving for finding solutions to these demands and needs in the pos-reconciliation period. The political parties which are the primary elements of politics demonstrate a top-down structure as a result of westernization efforts. As the system is based on a topdown strategy instead of being formed through demands of the society, parties do not take their source from the needs and demands of the society; on the contrary foundation of a political party depends on organization of a group of people around an ideology. A new political party emerges and exists traditionally under control of the leader and small group of people around the leader instead of cultural and social differences or variation of demands and needs. Followingly, this cadre and political ideas are tried to relate to society‟s demands and needs. As the system works adversely, the ideological transformation and evolution of cadres does not happen through the natural ways. However, when the situations like state intervention through the laws, its restriction or even prohibition are articulated to this system parties institutionalize and neglect to produce self-renovation mechanisms. Therefore, parties which embrace the citizens and search for their needs and demands do not arise. Parties live on and exist through the power and resources of the state. As a result of this perception, political ground focuses on seizing all potential of the state. Political ground evolves on how to seize the state mechanisms and share them rather than the demands of society. Naturally, this kind of a structure produces an unhealthy political style. Main understanding which dominates the political method does not evolve on understanding different demands and needs, negotiation, persuasion and reconciliation. The rivalry of seizing the power and interest mechanisms causes an aggressive and intolerant political environment. Aggressive environment of the last sixty years does not rise because of the aggressive personalities of the politicians; instead this model necessitates the cadres that can keep up with such kind of a political style. However, this situation also produces different issues. Moreover, as their topdown organization, this aggressive attitude and style spreads first to their organization, then to their supporters, the society and daily life. Eventually political parties which should be the subjects of compromise become the subjects and reasons of social polarization. 141 As the simple citizens cannot find a place for themselves in the political life, they start not to trust political parties. All researches made on the subject state that citizens are not happy with general functioning of political system. Citizens believe that parties do not fulfill the responsibility of their role, they only follow up the interests of people that are close to the political party and do not represent their electorates. As a result of this situation, people fall into despair with the political system, inure the issues, lose motivation to struggle for the common good and even try to resolve their individual issues through unlawful ways. When Study A is analyzed, it is possible to see the evidence of this situation. In graphic A-1, the responses to “Which party can resolve the biggest and most urgent issues of Turkey?” as “new parties are necessary” by 5 % and “these issues remain unresolved” by 4 % of the participants indicate that the society lost its hopes on politics. According to Graphic A-2, when “Which institution do you trust the most?” question is asked to the simple citizens, the ones provide a political actor form only 10 % of the society and the individuals that do not trust on any institutions form 24 %. Moreover, existence of a social segment that does not trust on any institutions and lost hopes on politics which forms approximately one fourth of the participants is another big issue. On the other hand, Graphic B-17 shows that 53.13 % of the participants of Study B state that they do not participate in political activities while 43.75 % participate. This shows that the participants are almost divided in half on participating in political activities. The same question was asked to the subjects who participated in Study C. Subject 2 responded as: “I think I have a lot to do in this area and therefore I perform political activities. I worked on several platforms.” while Subject 1 responded as: “We always supported CHP as a family, so I was raised with the ideology of Atatürk since my childhood. I did not join political activities that much during the university period, I went to the meetings of CHP for a few times in Ankara. After my graduation, I joined the Atatürkist Thought Association‟s activities, but apart from that I was not very into the politics. […] It was an association, not a political party. But I do not think the association is that neutral; even though they do not have an organic link with CHP they are still linked in a way.” In the answers given to this question proof of the statement above can be seen. Subject 1 stated that she is not that much interested in politics while Subject 2 states that she makes a part of political platforms. As Subject 2 mentioned before the interview, she 142 works for AKP Youth Branch in order to defend her opinions. Thus, also another conclusion could be reached about the political attitudes of individuals through analyzing this question. While Subject 1 who has a laic and consequently a relatively left worldview states that she is tired of politics, Subject 2 is very interested in politics. This attitude can interrelate with the actual decline in left politics while religious conservative liberal though has showed a development in the recent years. Objective of Graphic B-13 is to see if the participants of Study B are satisfied with the current AKP government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the participants are not happy with the government. It is certain that the recent polarization affected government‟s reputation such as prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan‟s fierce attitude against people that were concerned about the implementations against laicism, government‟s strict attitude towards military officers and Ergenekon Case, government‟s attitude towards Syrian civil war, abatement of action about Madımak Hotel victims, legislation of the code letting imam-hatip graduates to be admitted in the faculties other than theology faculties, arrest of journalists. It is seen that 36.88 % of the participants define themselves as democrats while 30 % claim that they are socialists according to Graphic B-11. It is strange to see that liberalists only form 15 % of the participants. On the other hand religious conservatives form the smallest cluster with 3.75 % in Study B. When this question is analyzed along with question Graphic B-8, it is seen that there are different perspectives in each political group. According to the statistics we can presume that especially CHP shelters liberal, socialist and democrat groups within it. When which ideology they support is asked to the participants of Study C, again it is possible to see the polarization between two subjects. Subject 2 responded as “I define myself as a democrat indeed. My parents are a bit conservative in family life, but they are also democrats as a political ideology.” while Subject 1 mentioned: “There was a big impact of my family in determining my ideology. We were supporting CHP and Kemalist ideology. For example when I was at the university I was staying in the university dormitories, at first my father did not want to send me there, because he was concerned that I would veil myself as a result of being affected by the main atmosphere there. He thought the religious fanatics there might influence me and we argued about this several times. These incidents have a major influence on determining my ideology. However, when I joined the association after the university, I realized that I was not Kemalist. I think it is incorrect to sanctify his ideology. Respecting his thought and sanctifying his ideology are different things.” 143 It is seen that Subject 2 considers herself as a democrat even though her family is relatively conservative. However, as it was handled before, not defining themselves as Islamist or conservative bus as democrat is a general feature of AKP partisans. This reflects the diversity of party grassroots. On the other hand, Subject 1 mentioned that her ideology was generally determined by her family. So, it can be said that Subject 1‟s family tried to draw the line she has to obey. But, also considering that Subject 2‟s family is conservative and herself also embraces conservative values; it can be thought that family has a big influence on defining ideology of the individuals. As a matter of fact, Graphic B-22 proves proposition. However, it is seen that Subject 1 started to dislike the political ideology which was imposed on her after she became an active member in politics. Consecutively, their political party preference was asked to the participants of Study C. Subject 1 said that she had voted for CHP at the last elections, but did not want to vote in the next as there was no party which she felt close to. On the other hand, Subject 2 was confident about her choice and mentioned that she voted for AKP. Besides, she stated that everybody should be comfortable to speak about their political preference. As mentioned before, especially during the Cold War period Turkey was gradually transformed into a country which was seen as a base for political Islam model of USA in order to create and isolation line against communism threat. In the light of this information, it is asked if the subjects of Study C think that Turkey is still imposed to be a model for the region countries. Subject 1 mentions that she finds this situation worrisome and adds that she perceives it more as a conspiracy theory; she says that she does not want to think that deep. But, she carries on as in the following: “Such kind of incidents does not arise beyond the desire of the West. For instance, Mubarak was supported by USA; but at the point that he completed his mission, he was overthrown and manifestations started followingly. For this reason, I suspect the incidents are only for democracy.” When the same question was directed to Subject 2, she answered as: “I do not think that external powers have an influence on that, this situation is peculiar to Turkey. Turkey is an example country where the people following different faiths live together in a democratic and laic system. The messages, which our prime-minister gave in his visits to Middle East in the recent past, show that Turkey is ascending as an example country. The struggle of the people in other countries shows that. I absolutely do not think that the external powers have an influence on that, because Turkey is an independent country and it progresses in a good way. Therefore it does not need orientation.” 144 Subject 1 mentions that she does not to think much on conspiracy theories, but she also states that the uprising in Egypt was an incident that was planned by the West. On the other hand, Subject 2 emphasizes that Turkey was definitely not influenced by the external powers and the so called democratization process was peculiar to Turkey. In this part, politicization process of Turkish society and different attitudes towards political parties were handled. According to the findings that were collected in different researches and short evaluation of the polarization focuses, it is obviously seen that Turkish society suffers a great social and political polarization which gradually radicalize the different poles. In the next part of the thesis, recent political disputes and opinion of the society will be handled. 4.2. POLITICAL DISPUTES Political disputes are the main reason for the polarization in Turkish sociery. As the system is based on seizing the government, rivalry of the parties often cause conflicts in society as each party desires to govern according to its own ideology. In this sense, major disputes are the corruption, Ergenekon Case, Shari‟a, military intervention and seizure of judiciary system in Turkey. This part will provide an overview of these conflicts. 4.2.1. Public Opinion about Political Disputes In this part, a short summary of the findings of Study A on public opinion about recent political disputes will be reflected.  When the general opinion of the participants on preparation of a new constitution is asked, 55.8 % of the participants consider it as a correct and necessary step towards democratization while 44.2 % consider it as a step of the political power towards a civil dictatorship.  When their opinion is asked about Ergenekon Case, 56.5 % of the participants responded that the government was fighting with the illegal networks while 43.5 % consider that the government was punishing its opposers. 145  When their opinion is asked about the tension between the government and the higher judiciary institutions, 53 % of the participants consider that the government was interfering in the juridical affairs while 47 % consider that the government was not interfering.  While 29.3 % of the participants consider that military coup was the highest threat, 17.1 % consider that religious reactionism was the highest threat. While 44.5 % of the participants consider that they were both threats, according to the 9.1 % none of them were considered as threats.  The ones that are anxious about establishment of Shari‟a rule were 40 %, while the ones that are not anxious are 46.2 %.  While the idea of military intervention is supported by 28.5 %, 47.1 % of the participants are against an intervention.  While the 57.1 % of the participants think that political parties could be closed in case of necessity, 30.3 % of the participants are against closure of parties.  While 55.2 % of the participants believed that many important reforms were done during the AKP term, 23.2 % of the society was thinking the opposite way.  While 38.1 % of the individuals believe that religious reactionism increased during the AKP term, the individuals who think on the contrary are 42.5 %. 4.2.2. Recent Political Disputes If the opinions regarding the current political discussions are taken into consideration, it is seen that the society is divided in almost all subjects. Therefore, the reasons and demographic characteristics of this dissolution should be investigated. As a result of the research, analyzing the responses to some questions through main groups based on gender, age or location may not be enough to explain the reasons of dissolution in the society; however other differences such as being Kurdish or Alevi, veiled or unveiled give clues about the changes in results on some issues. For example Kurdish people are strongly against closure of parties or Alevis are more anxious about the establishment of Shari‟a rule. Nevertheless, even those differences do not have a common basis to explain the dissolution in all questions. 248 three fourths of participants do not think that Islam in politics does not assure freedoms while more than half of the participants do not want to see religious items in public space. A major part of the participants think that Islamism is a threat for Turkey. Majority have never participated in political activities. Almost all participants say that they make friends from different opinions, but in the meanwhile they think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish participants. Half of the participants think that media does not assist liberal thought. Majority partially practices their religion, thinks that their freedom is restricted by the participants which is not tolerant. A major part of the participants think that social environment is the most important factor in influencing lifestyle. STUDY C SUBJECT 1 Interviewer: Today‟s topic is political Islam and I will get your opinions on it. Participant: Of course. Interviewer: First of all I would like to know your name if you do not mind. Participant: Ş. Interviewer: How old are you Ş.? Participant: 26 Interviewer: What is your occupation? Participant: I am currently studying. I am assigned in a master‟s program. Interviewer: At which institution? Participant: At Istanbul University in Istanbul Researches Department. Interviewer: What is your research about? Participant: I write a thesis about immigration. Interviewer: Which university did you graduate from? Participant: From International Relations Department of Uludağ University. Interviewer: Which kind of schools did you attend first? Participant: I went to state schools. Interviewer: Did you ever attend a private school or an imam-hatip school? Participant: I have always studied at public schools, but at high school I attended an English-weighted high school. Interviewer: Where did you attend to school? Participant: I went to school in Istanbul. Interviewer: In which city were you born? Participant: I was born in Istanbul. Interviewer: Where are you originally from? Participant: My mother is from Hopa, Artvin; my father‟s father is from Greece but my father was born in Istanbul. Interviewer: You said your mother is from Hopa; do you have any Georgian ancestry? Participant: They are not Georgian, but they came from Georgia through population exchange after the establishment of Turkey. Interviewer: Do you join political activities? Participant: We always supported CHP as a family, so I was raised with the ideology of Atatürk since my childhood. I did not join political activities that much during the university period, I went to the meetings of CHP for a few times in Ankara. After my graduation, I joined the Atatürkist Thought Association‟s activities, but apart from that I was not very into the politics. 249 Interviewer: Did you join to the youth branch of any party? Participant: No, after the university I just worked in the youth branch of the Atatürkist Thought Association. It was an association, was not a political party. But I do not think the association is that neutral; even though they do not have an organic link with CHP they are still linked in a way. Interviewer: Which political ideology do you support? Participant: There was a big impact of my family in determining my ideology. We were supporting CHP and Kemalist ideology. For example when I was at the university I was staying in the university dormitories, at first my father did not want to send me there, because he was concerned that I would veil myself as a result of being affected by the main atmosphere there. He thought the religious fanatics there might influence me and we argued about this several times. These incidents have a major influence on determining my ideology. However, when I joined the association after the university, I realized that I was not Kemalist. I think it is incorrect to sanctify his ideology. Respecting his thought and sanctifying his ideology are different things. Interviewer: Which party did you vote at elections? Participant: I voted for CHP at the last elections, but next time I will not participate in elections. Interviewer: Are you tolerant to liberal thoughts? Participant: I support liberal thoughts. I am working in human rights area, but I worry about the definition of freedom. The boundaries of freedom are disputable. There is constitution which all subjects including the state itself should respect. Prominence of Islam worries me; that is why I ask myself about the boundaries of freedom. In this sense I share the anxiety of the majority of laic society. Interviewer: Where do you see yourself in the sense of religious belief, do you practice religion? Participant: This is also another thing that I question. I try to meet some of the requirements from time to time. I believe in Islam, but if you ask what kind of a Muslim I am, I can say that I filtered the religious values and built up a belief system by myself. I am not a very religious person in terms of obligations, but I like to see faithful people. Faith is a good thing. I also follow a faith, but I believe everyone should be free on what to believe. Interviewer: What do you think about political Islam; how would you define it? Participant: I would say it is an idea that the West imposed or it is a method of politicians to abuse religious values. There is a global tendency towards right. Actually, usage of Islam as a political tool in Turkey is reasonable as Turkey has a Muslim majority. I think it is a set of rules that are implemented by a conservative party. Interviewer: What do you think about the solidarity network that is supported by the conservative society? Participant: Until now, the conservative people were not that much visible, this actually was an opportunity for them to come together and defend their ideas. Interviewer: Do you think political Islam presents a threat? Participant: I am suspicious on it. I do not like the prominence of Islamic values. For example when I think about establishment of mosques at the universities, prohibition of abortion, etc., I think the Islamic values are promoted and this worries me because there are also people that do not follow any faith. Of course the conservatives also have rights; it is important that they live according to their beliefs but in this sense prohibiting abortion is pointless for non-believers. I am not against veiled people, but their freedom ends where mine starts. However, most religious conservative people do not agree on that. Nevertheless, I support the secularist model like in the USA which has an equal distance to all religions, but not the laic model in Turkey which basically has control over religion. Interviewer: Do you think that Turkey is imposed to be a model for the region by external powers? Participant: I think this is more like a conspiracy theory; I do not want to think this deep. Interviewer: What do you think about Arab Spring; do you think it was a civil uprising? 250 Participant: Such kind of incidents do not arise beyond the desire of the West. For instance, Mubarak was supported by USA; but at the point that he completed his mission, he was overthrown and manifestations started followingly. For this reason, I suspect the incidents are only for democracy. Interviewer: What do you think about the practices of the current government; are you content? Participant: I think they do a good job. But on the other hand promotion of religious values at the term of AKP government makes me uncomfortable. While religion was never discussed at my home before, it became a daily subject recently. Interviewer: What do you think about the people fitting the Islamic values according to themselves such as the ladies covering their hair but wearing a revealing dress? Participant: After a point, religious values transformed into political tools and values lost their significance. Promotion of religious values by a political party is bothersome. Interviewer: What do you think about religious communities? Participant: I am against communities; I think associations are more creditable. Interviewer: What do you think about veiling at public space? Participant: It is a religious symbol. I was not used to see that many people with religious outfit before. Because I am a former CHP supporter, I have a different state of mind and that is why this really affected me. I even started to dream of covered women. I believe veiling should be a personal choice. There are two important things; first of all constitution should be studied in order to determine limits of freedom and secondly the practices in the western countries should be reviewed. For instance we can give an example; think of a veiled psychologist, her patient might want to consult an issue about sexuality; psychologist‟s orientation according to her religious values can lead the patient in a wrong way. If the psychologist does not use her position to impose her thoughts, then it is OK; but certainty of this or objectivity of the education that is given by a veiled teacher is polemical. I cannot be sure how this would orient a child. Interviewer: What do you think about Shari‟a? Participant: I think Shari‟a is the last step in transformation to an Islamist state. It is not possible to speak about an Islamist state without Shari‟a rules. For instance Sudan; it is an Islam republic which is governed through Shari‟a. I hope such a thing would not happen in Turkey. Interviewer: What do you think about secularism or laicism? Participant: I think AKP follows a policy which is based on seizing the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Most of the conservatives say they are secularists not laics, at this point I think presence of the presidency should be questioned. We do not know the future program of AKP, maybe merging Presidency of Religious Affairs to a ministry is in their agenda. Then there is a possibility for the president to use this entity according to the needs. Thus, AKP can orient the religion and state affairs as they wish. If they want to transform to an Islam state, this would also be a step for it. If this is the case, they can starts to follow an Islamist policy through assigning a caliphate. In this case it would be an entity to serve for the ones in the power. I think the state should not have a policy on religion. Interviewer: What do you think on corruption in politics? Participant: Almost all parties do that. But, when Islam is used as a political tool, it loses its significance. When the organizations such as Deniz Feneri which are based on Islamic values do corruption it frustrates me. Recently we started to see the reality and realized that such parties and organizations are actually not that innocent. Interviewer: What do you think about the people consider themselves as Muslims but do not practice religion? Participant: If you would speak about this to a fanatic person, they would probably claim that you need to meet the obligations if you are Muslim. In my opinion this is all about the inner system of the individuals, you should live as you feel. Even if Islamic values are imposed by force, if forced person is not happy with practicing religion, then it 251 has no meaning. If the people want, they can adopt the religious way of life, but they should not force others. I am against the neighborhood pressure. Interviewer: What do you think about committing sins? (i.e. consuming alcohol) Participant: It is up to my decision; even if I drink alcohol I drink it for myself, this should not interest anyone. Interviewer: Why do you think political Islam started to attract so much interest? Participant: When the Republic of Turkey was formed, a more homogenous nationalist structure was desired. For this reason also Kurdish people felt the same pressure that Islamists felt; progress of an Islamist ideology was not desired. CHP ignored that the country has a Muslim majority and there is a group which consider Islamic values as important. Actually Islamist community felt excluded, because they felt their rights were neglected. The reason of their current organization is to reclaim their rights back. Interviewer: What do you think about existence of Islamist parties in the political system? Participant: I think there should be parties from all thoughts. Interviewer: Do you think Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life? Participant: Actually I think it does. I can feel there are the separatist acts, but I do not know how to explain it precisely. Interviewer: Do you think the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts? Participant: Yes, but we should also consider how independent the media is. I do not think media is independent in Turkey. Interviewer: Do you think media is effective globally? Participant: Yes, indeed it is. Interviewer: What do you think about women‟s situation in Islam? Participant: Actually now Islamic feminism has started, now we see that veiled women also have a voice, they run their own businesses and join political activities. Even though the importance of women is increasing, it is possible to say that women still lag behind especially in rural areas of Muslim countries while they have the same rights with men in urban life. Interviewer: Which factors are influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle? Participant: I think the people are influenced by the society and their family. If I should give an example from my family, I see my mother‟s side tends to Islamic values recently. For example while my mother was consuming alcohol in the past, she started to practice religion and stopped consuming alcohol. Besides, one of my friends from the university who was not using a headscarf suddenly decided to cover her head and completely changed her life style; another friend decided to veil after a traffic accident. Apart from that, of course family influences people‟s decisions. In my circle of acquaintances I see a tendency to the right wing, but I do not know what the exact reason is. Interviewer: What do you think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards each other? Participant: For example in Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı (Society Volunteers Foundation) liberal and conservative people are working together and give messages of unity, these people work side by side; but of course I do not know how integrated they are. It is about people‟s point of view, if they tolerate they can live together. Interviewer: Do you feel any restraint from different political groups? Participant: I felt my family pushed me to be Kemalist. For example, my family supports CHP and they still blench when their opinion about Kurds is asked; I also was grown up with this idea. Now I feel the pressure about Islamic values from the society. I think these constraints are an outcome of the political system. 252 SUBJECT 2 Interviewer: The topic of today‟s interview will be about political Islam for my master‟s thesis. First of all, can I learn your name? Participant: Of course, it is T. Interviewer: How old are you? Participant: 27 Interviewer: What is your occupation? Participant: I am a German teacher; I give lessons to the high school and secondary school students. Interviewer: What education do you have? Participant: I did not do an extra research following the university; I carry on my profession. Interviewer: Which schools did you attend? Participant: I completed my compulsory curriculum and graduated from Marmara University followingly. Interviewer: Did you attend imam-hatip schools? Participant: No. Interviewer: Where do you live? Participant: I live in Istanbul as a part of the crowded city life. Interviewer: Where are your parents from? Participant: My parents are also from Istanbul. Interviewer: Do you perform political activities? Participant: I think I have a lot to do in this area and therefore I perform political activities. I worked on several platforms. Interviewer: Which political ideology do you support? Participant: I define myself as a democrat indeed. My parents are a bit conservative in family life, but they are also democrats as a political ideology. Interviewer: Where do you see yourself in the sense of religious belief, do you practice religion? Participant: I try to meet religious requirements as much as I can, but of course I cannot claim that I do everything perfectly. It is a bit difficult for a person to say where they see themselves in terms of religion, I think only God can decide that. As currently we are in the month of Ramadan, fasting is required and I try to perform as much as my health allows me. I also try to meet the other requirements depending on my timetable, but we are not in this world only for religion; social life and business life are also important. Interviewer: What do you think about political Islam; how would you define it? Participant: I am against the statement of political Islam, because I do not believe the existence of such kind of a concept. This is a long subject that should be discussed; I think political Islam is a statement that was suggested by orientalists, people that does not want to see the success that conservative understanding sustains under democracy and people do not want to acknowledge this order to raise tension. I am against political Islam. Interviewer: Do you think political Islam is a statement that some interest groups suggested to keep maintain their benefits? Participant: It is not exactly what I wanted to say. This is an assertion that arose in the recent past when Turkey is taken into consideration. When we think of the political parties in power and the conditions of the period, I believe political Islam is a statement which was suggested by the circles that ignore the advance of conservativism to raise tension in the society. Interviewer: Do you think political Islam is a threat for Turkey? 253 Participant: Right now it is not capable of generating a threat for Turkey. Such kind of statements were made in the past, as democracy culture advances and the system settles people see that Turkey will sustain a democratic system; so political Islam is far from being a threat. Interviewer: Do you think that Turkey is imposed to be a model for the region by external powers? Participant: I do not think that external powers has an influence on that, this situation is peculiar to Turkey. Turkey is an example country where the people following different faiths live together in a democratic and laic system. The messages, which our prime-minister gave in his visits to Middle East in the recent past, show that Turkey is ascending as an example country. The struggle of the people in other countries shows that. I absolutely do not think that the external powers have an influence on that, because Turkey is an independent country and it progresses in a good way. Therefore it does not need orientation. Interviewer: Which party did you vote for in the last elections? Participant: I think the people should express their political attitude freely. I voted for AKP in the last elections. Interviewer: What do you think about the current AKP government? Participant: I am very satisfied about its implementations; that is why I voted for it. I am especially satisfied with their positive attitude towards innovative ideas, efforts to solve problems and progress in domestic and international politics. Only the rapid transformations in Turkey‟s agenda and bad reactions against AKP for these implementations were challenging, it would be better if implementations were done gradually. Interviewer: What do you think about the usage of religious items in the public space and do you think headscarf is also a religious item? Participant: Turban or headscarf, you know there was a meaning conflict about that which was created by the groups whom suggested the political Islam definition; but for me it is absolutely not a political symbol. Prayer rug or bead can be religious materials but headscarf is a dressing style for the women to conceal their charm. I am not against headscarf, because in the end the public area is a civilian area, people should be more tolerant towards that. I do not feel uncomfortable about the symbols that individuals bear as long as they do not make others uncomfortable. Interviewer: What do you think about the people that adjust Islamic values to their style? (i.e. the ladies cover their hair but wear revealing dresses) Participant: I think dressing is also a preference; everyone has the right to dress according to their taste regardless being veiled or not. That is why; I tolerate and do not feel uncomfortable about it. Interviewer: What do you think about Shari‟a? Participant: I do not envisage anything about an Islamic state; therefore I do not see the need of a state which is ruled through Shari‟a. This is not an option in Turkey anymore; as we see the citizens of countries which are ruled by an Islamist order also want to live their faith in a democratic system. I think the epoch of such extreme thoughts has ended. Interviewer: What do you think about secularism or laicism? Participant: We always hear about laicism and secularism, the people are more conscious on that recently. Turkey is a laic state at present. When we investigate secularism seems to be a more flexible concept, eventually while laicism is a political concept, secularism is more sociological; that is why people might see secularism more suitable as it is flexible; but until the recent past, laicism was perceived differently, because of the suppression of laic system, they were standing against it. But during AKP term, laic system has settled better; because there is no intervention to the faith, they are more comfortable. Therefore, I do not see any issues about laicism and I hope the orientalists are also convinced about the new laicism perception. Interviewer: What do you think about corruption in politics? 254 Participant: As any citizen I am also against corruption. It was a higher threat before AKP term and we lived the consequences of that all together. During the term of current government, there are implementations to prevent this. That is why I do not see corruption as a threat anymore. Eventually corruption is something I always stand against, no one should use their positions for interests. This is also something that is related to the personality of the people; it is something not related to the ideology but mentality. People should think about the consequences of their actions, this is a civic responsibility. Interviewer: What do you think about the people consider themselves as Muslims but do not practice religion? Participant: People‟s religious orientations should not interest anyone else as long as they do not interfere with the others‟ liberties. Personally I do not consider this while approaching people. I think meeting religious requirements is something between the person and their God, but people should not hurt each other‟s feelings. Recently there are not that much, but still there are people insulting veiled women or in the opposite, the women wear revealing dresses. I think those should not happen. The most important thing is to respect people because they are human. Interviewer: Why do you think political Islam started to attract so much interest? Participant: It would be more accurate to interpret this as conservative people, not as political Islam. First of all I do not think AKP is an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party which is also stated by the party organization. A trust was built between AKP and the people; therefore it was elected three terms in a row. Ten years ago everything was more complicated, more different; the economical situation was extremely challenging that Kemal Derviş was invited from USA and even he was not successful. AKP made a great progress concerning rights and freedom and implemented its election promises. That is why AKP attracts that much attention. Interviewer: What do you think about existence of Islamist parties in the political system? Participant: For example, SP promotes religious values but we still cannot claim that it is an Islamist party; I also do not think they have a different agenda about the political system. In other countries Islamist parties might have emerged because of the conditions in their society but they have nothing to compare with the parties in Turkey. As religious faith is an individual space, a person‟s religious belief only interests oneself. In an epoch that the states based on religion disappear one by one, I do not think that Islamist parties are necessary. Nevertheless, I believe that various parties to defend various opinions should take place in the political system. Besides, also the political and social environment of the country should also be evaluated. It is important to know how and what do the Christian parties represent in the countries they are located and what they promise to their supporters. That is why this should be evaluated more comprehensively. Interviewer: Do you think Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life? Participant: I believe both segments should not avoid speaking about the current situation of Turkish society. The reluctant individuals should probably be hesitating as a result of their lack of knowledge. However, now there is rather a relieved ambiance in Turkey; that is why everyone is free to discuss their thoughts. Objective of the circles who introduced political Islam twenty years ago was to establish a ground for conflicts and distract the current harmony. Because conservative people were shown as religious extremists and this way impossibility of execution of a democratic system tried to be proven by some circles; this is a result of the struggle for political power. This is not the case at the present day, but this separatist perspective was attempted to be imposed in the past. Right now there are not separatist thoughts; everyone can discuss their opinions freely. Interviewer: Do you think the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts? Participant: Indeed. Now, door-to-door promotion is outdated, internet and the TV has replaced it; that is why media plays an important role on spreading liberal thoughts. Also social media encourages people to state their ideas freely. Media is also important in Turkey for the same reasons; we have seen that media caused great transformations on the opinions of people, but of course it should be used consciously. Because if media gets under influence of an authority 255 and tries to orient people in an obsessive manner, it becomes misleading. But media gets more liberal each day in Turkey which is pleasing. Interviewer: What do you think about women‟s situation in Islam? Participant: “Heaven is under mothers‟ feet.” idiom means a lot. A politician, a beggar or a soldier are all begotten by a mother; that is why women are very important in Islam. It is also written in the Farewell Sermon of Mohammed that the women were entrusted to men by God; this is also very elucidative. Unfortunately there are still places where women are neglected because they are weaker, such as Afghanistan; it is not possible to speak about women rights there. This is because of the oppressive regimes but in Islam as a religion, it is not possible to say the women are ignored. I suspect the faith of those who mistreat women; because in our religion no one should limit the freedom of others and men should pay attention to women. Some men‟s desire about suppression of women is an issue related to lack of education. I think the men who mistreat women are either uneducated or mentally unbalanced. Nevertheless, place of women is very important in Turkish society; women have a voice in important platforms. For example while the number of women deputies was 48 in the past, this number increased to 78 at the present day in Turkish parliament; this is a very good progress. Moreover, the implementations on women rights are very successful; shelter is given to the women suffering from maltreatment, financial aid is given for the women that lost their husbands. Considering that women also take place in important tasks at the present day, we can say that importance given to the women is thriving. One of the other alluring sides of AKP is its respect to women and youth. I hope the number of maltreating people to women will decrease soon. Interviewer: Which factors are influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle? Participant: If we keep the people that do not let the women in their household to go out, as this is related to the mentality of people rather than religion itself, seeing more veiled women in the daily life could be considered as an outcome of abolishing the strict rules in public space against the conservative women. Those kinds of restrictions are vexatious as headscarf is not a style only Muslim women prefer. People that follow different faiths all around the world use it without encountering strict restrictions. I do not think the number of veiled women increased, but I think they are more visible in the social life after the abolishment of restrictions. Interviewer: What do you think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards each other? Participant: I think the people shall approach each other humanly, differences are not important. If a person approaches impolitely to me because of my political view while I approach them humanly, I would get frustrated. I think the people should not be prejudiced. This is what I strive for, I have friends from different faiths around me, but I respect their choices. I think this should not affect interpersonal relationships. Interviewer: Do you feel any restraint from different political groups? Participant: There were some circles that strived for disintegrating the society and restrict the freedom of opinion in the past, but I believe these circles could not hang on during AKP term; now I do not feel any pressure. 256 .... / .... / ......... DECLARATION Hereby I agree that the printed, visual and recorded materials collected during this interview are subject to educational purposes and I have no objections for usage and publication of those materials. Name / Surname: Signature: