Resilient RFID Grouping Proofs with Missing Tag Identification

Mike Burmester, Florida State University, FL, USA Jorge Munilla, Universidad de Malaga, Spain 10th Inter. Confer. Ubiquitous Computing & AmbientIntelligence UCAmI 2016 Canary Islands (Spain). Nov 29th to Dec 2nd, 2016 Contents 2 Goals for securing the supply chain ― promote efficient and secure services ― foster resilience Goals for efficiency ― prioritize efforts to mitigate systematic vulnerabilities ― Plans to reconstitute the flows after disruptions adopted Introduction-Supply Chain 3 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security IntroductionModel 4 IntroductionAdversarial Model 5 Adversaries ― Insiders (misbehaviour) ― Outsiders (hackers) Attacks ― Privacy (Tracking competitor goods) ― Integrity (thefts) ― Availability (detain/obstruct a shipment) IntroductionAdversarial Model 6 IntroductionRFID deployments UHF tags ― Range: 20 feet/6 meters ― Power constrained devices Cryptographic primitives ― Lightweight (basic level) ― Symmetric (medium level) ― Asymmetric (high level) Basic 7 IntroductionRFID deployments, authentication Cryptographic primitives ― Lightweight (basic level) ―Symmetric (medium level) ― Asymmetric (high level) Tag authentication Mutual authentication Mutual authentication +Privacy 8 IntroductionRFID deployments, authentication Cryptographic primitives ― Lightweight (basic level) ―Symmetric (medium level) ― Asymmetric (high level) Tag authentication Mutual authentication Mutual authentication +Privacy 9 Shipping Link-missing tags, without packing list Grouping codes (Forward Error Correction codes) are used Some redundancy is stored Erasure Channel: output is identical to the input or nothing Redundancy of the remaining tags is used to recover the identities of missing tags 16 Shipping LinkIntegrity Proof, without packing list Practical case ― There are missing tags ― Carrier is not Trusted ― Batch connectivity Grouping proofs (integrity proofs) 17 Shipping LinkIntegrity Proof, without packing list ―Symmetric Key Cryptography is assumed own r own r , K gp own MAC ID r     K K K ,gp K ID , K gp own MAC ID r     18 Shipping LinkIntegrity Proof, without a packing list Two-rounds anonymous grouping proof with missing tag identification 19 Shipping LinkIntegrity Proof, without a packing list Two-rounds anonymous grouping proof with missing tag identification 20 Ownership Transfer ― Secure ― Guarantee the privacy of both parties Current owner cannot trace the tag once ownership is transferred. This is challenging because the new owner does not share any private information with the tag that the previous owner does not know. Ownership Transfer 21 Current owner-eavesdropper New owner and tag cannot agree a new private key because the current owner is eavesdropping Options to guarantee the privacy ― TTP not appropriate for decentralized process ― Isolated Environments weak threat model Ownership Transfer Tag New Owner 11 22 Options to guarantee the privacy ― TTPnot appropriate for decentralized process ― Isolated Environments weak threat model Channels with positive secrecy capacity 1101000100 Tag is hidden in the crowd Ownership Transfer 1 0 1 0 0 100 10 shared secret 23 Example Key Update Protocol that uses noisy tags to guarantee the privacy of the new owner Ownership Transfer 24 Conclusions 1. Security and resilience in the supply chain will become even more important in the future. 2. Threats come from different actors (insiders and outsiders) 3. The security of the different segments of the supply chain must be guaranteed: … by using grouping proofs and missing tag detectionmechanisms for the transit flows … and ownership transfer with positive secrecy capacity 25