Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation

Chapter 6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation Ayoe Hoff, Hans Frost, Peder Andersen, Raul Prellezo, Lucía Rueda, George Triantaphyllidis, Ioanna Argyrou, Athanassios Tsikliras, Arina Motova, Sigrid Lehuta, Hazel Curtis, Gonzalo Rodríguez-Rodríguez, Hugo M. Ballesteros, Julio Valeiras, and José María Bellido Abstract To assess the likely economic outcomes to fishing fleets of the Landing Obligation (LO), bioeconomic models covering seven European fisheries, ranging from the North East Atlantic to the Mediterranean, have been applied to estimate the A. Hoff (*) · H. Frost · P. Andersen Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg C, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] R. Prellezo AZTI, Sukarrieta, BIZKAIA, Spain L. Rueda Centro Oceanográfico de Baleares, Instituto Español de Oceanografía, Palma, Spain G. Triantaphyllidis · I. Argyrou NAYS Ltd., Kallithea, Athens A. Tsikliras Laboratory of Ichthyology, School of Biology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki University Campus, Thessaloniki, Greece A. Motova · H. Curtis Seafish, Edinburgh, UK S. Lehuta Ifremer, Fisheries Ecol & Modelling Unit, Nantes, France G. Rodríguez-Rodríguez · H. M. Ballesteros Fisheries Economics and Natural Resources Research Unit, Department of Applied Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Santiago, Santiago de Compostela, A Coruña, Spain J. Valeiras Instituto Español de Oceanografía (IEO), Centro Oceanográfico de Vigo, Vigo, Spain J. M. Bellido Instituto Español de Oceanografía, Centro Oceanográfico de Murcia (IEO), San Pedro del Pinatar, Murcia, Spain ©The Author(s) 2019 S. S. Uhlmann et al. (eds.), The European Landing Obligation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_6 109 economic performance of fleets before and after implementing the LO. It is shown that for most of the analysed fisheries, their economic outcome will be negatively affected in the long term by the LO, when compared to the expected outcome with no LO. Efficient mitigation strategies (exemptions, quota uplifts, improved selectivity, effort reallocation and others) may, for some of the analysed fisheries, reduce the negative economic effect of the LO. Moreover, the possibility to trade quotas, both nationally and internationally, may also reduce the economic losses caused by the LO. However, even with mitigation strategies and/or quota trade in place, most of the analysed fisheries are worse off under the LO than what could be expected if the LO was not implemented. Keywords Costs and earnings · Discards · Economic repercussions · Fisheries management · Fleet adjustment 6.1 Introduction Commercial fisheries in Europe are diverse, with fish being caught for varied purposes ranging from high-value species for human consumption to fish used for fishmeal and fish oil. Technological and biological interactions make it difficult to catch target species completely selectively. For almost a century, landings of immature fish have been prohibited by regulations. Discarding fish below a minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) has been mandatory in European waters since the adoption of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983. The CFP Landing Obligation (LO) of 2013 requires fish under the MCRS to be landed, with implementation being phased in from 2015 to 2019. Similarly, before 2013, it was forbidden to land species for which quota was exhausted, and discarding of catches at or above MCRS was therefore required, a logical practice in mixed species fisheries. Many businesses expect significant short-term negative economic repercussions of the LO due to increased operating costs, decreased income from landings and underutilisation of quotas (Condie et al. 2014). However, the actual outcomes of the LO will depend on several factors, including (i) the management system in place, (ii) application of exemptions (e.g. de minimis allowance of discards up to 5%), (iii) interannual transfers, (iv) catch allowances of stocks without TACs, (v) quota adjustments and quota swaps/movements, (vi) application of selectivity measures, (vii) costs of landing unwanted catch, (viii) prices obtained for unwanted fish and (ix) compliance of the sector. It is hoped that short-term losses could be mitigated by longer-term gains, given the desired reduced pressure on fish stocks and anticipated increases in quota and catch rates. This chapter considers economic outcomes for fleets by analysing possible economic effects of the LO for seven diverse European case studies comprising (i) UK and Danish North Sea demersal fisheries, (ii) the French demersal trawl 110 A. Hoff et al. fishery in the Eastern English Channel, (iii) the Spanish trawl fishery in the Bay of Biscay, (iv) the Spanish trawl fishery in the Cantabrian-NW region, (v) the Greek trawl and small-scale coastal fishery in the Thermaikos Gulf (Eastern Mediterranean) and (vi) the Spanish demersal trawl fishery in the Western Mediterranean. Common for all these fleets is that they have a history of substantial unwanted catches before the LO; therefore it can be expected that the LO would affect them substantially. 6.2 What Can the Literature of Economics Tell Us? The literature tells us that fishers tend to use more fishing effort than socially optimal due to market failures such as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). An unregulated, open-access fishery leads to overexploitation of fish resources; therefore the EU has attempted to prevent this by use of total allowable catches (TACs), limited fishing effort, MCRS and technical specifications for fishing gears, closed areas and seasons, among other measures. However, in mixed fisheries, these restrictions may also, in some cases, encourage a ‘race to fish’and may increase incentives to discard because low quotas of some species prevent full exploitation of species with higher quotas. Quotas may also increase incentives to high-grade (discard lower-value fish) to maximise profit. Although the CFP has a common approach to managing the fishing opportunities of the European Union including rules of compulsory discard, the management and organisation of fleets differ between Member States. Therefore, the economic repercussions of the LO not only depend on the rules of the LO but also on the national management system to which fishing businesses are subjected. When interest for the discard issue arose in the 1990s, four general types of factors that encouraged discarding were identified (FAO 1996b; Nordic Council of Ministers 2003): (i) institutional, e.g. management measures such as quotas, effort restrictions, minimum landing size of fish and mesh size regulations; (ii) biological, e.g. species interaction and characteristics of the fish (e.g. gender, and size); (iii) technological such as gear selectivity (e.g. prohibited gear, damage to fish); and (iv) economic, for example, price and cost relationships determined on the market and high-grading (discarding low-value fish, both regulated and unregulated) to maximise profit by using quota and room on-board for more valuable fish (Batsleer et al. 2015). Discarding originates primarily from non-selective catch and high-grading practices. These form the basis for the empirical and theoretical economic research that has been done regarding discarding over the last 20 years. This research began in the 1990s (e.g. Flaaten and Larsen 1991; Frost 1996; Christensen 1996; Pascoe and Revill 2004). Empirical approaches also appeared in conferences and research programmes (FAO 1996a,b; Clucas 1997). In the FAO context, the economics of discarding can be found in Pascoe (1997) with an update in Kelleher (2005). The Nordic Council of Ministers (2003) investigated incentives 6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation 111 to discard and options to reduce it. An EU Framework 7 project, NECESSITY, investigated options to reduce discarding by using increased mesh sizes or panels in fishing gear (Frost et al. 2007). Alongside empirical research, theoretical work based on socio-economic modelling has developed. One approach concerns unwanted catch in open-access and individual transferable quota (ITQ)-managed fisheries (Ward 1994; Ward et al. 2012; Boyce 1996; Turner 1996,1997). These analyses usually include two species (target and nontarget) and two fleets and deal with the optimal use and allocation of effort subject to a profit- (or resource rent-) maximising objective. In this context, bycatches of nontarget species constitute an endogenous externality, i.e. an outside impact influenced by fishers. In a simple situation where harvest of the target and nontarget species is in fixed proportions, fishing effort used to harvest target species can simply be scaled up and down to reach a first-best optimum. However, harvest of target and nontarget species may take place in variable proportions. Boyce (1996) compares maximisation of welfare in situations governed by open access and ITQs of harvesting two such species by two fleets. He finds that open access leads to excessive bycatches and that an ITQ system can only secure a first-best optimum if imposed on both target species and bycatches. Segerson (2007) extends this analysis to include stochastic bycatches and shows that neither landing fees nor ITQs on both target species and bycatches can secure an expected first-best optimum in which all market failures are corrected in an economically optimal way. A different approach to analyse bycatches is adopted in Abbott and Wilen (2009) where actual regulation, as opposed to estimated economically optimal regulation, is introduced. A given fishery is regulated with quotas for both target and nontarget species combined with limited entry programmes, and this actual regulation generates excessive bycatches and too short harvest seasons. Another theoretical approach deals with high-grading. High-grading may occur for several reasons, e.g. to extend a quota that is nearly exhausted, to get the best value per tonne of quota or to make room on-board the vessel for more valuable fish. Arnason (1994) and Anderson (1994) show that a traditional ITQ system strengthens the incentive to high-grade. However, Turner (1997) shows that a value-based ITQ system (quotas measured in value instead of volume) secures a welfare optimal level of high-grading in a similar way that open access does. Under open-access or effort management, the distance between fishing grounds and ports of landing affects vessel operators’decisions about catching patterns; limited hold or processing capacity may be increased in the short term for high-priced fish through discarding of low-priced fish, and this discarding can thus pay for one or two more hauls per trip (turnaround cost) (see Vestergaard 1996). In the market policy of the CFP, the suppression of withdrawal prices in 2014 also constituted an incentive to discard, as the removal of a fixed minimum price increases the economic propensity to discard. Analysing high-grading requires the inclusion of high- and low-priced fish. This can be done by including age-structured fish stocks in the model or simply dividing the stock in two parts: a low-priced and a high-priced part. 112 A. Hoff et al. Fish sales prices relative to fishing costs also influence the incentives to discard: if the price of fish is lower than the costs of putting the fish on the market, then the fish should be discarded –at least from an economic point of view. However, it may pay to land fish even when handling costs are higher than the total value. That is, if costs of discarding are higher than the loss likely to be incurred by putting the fish on the market, then the fish should be landed. When it is illegal to discard fish while incentives to discard remain, monitoring and control must be effectively invoked to offset incentives to discard (Sutinen and Andersen 1985; Nuevo et al., this volume). Also, social norms, trust and cooperation play a role (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kraak and Hart, this volume). When it is difficult to monitor vessel operations at sea, vessel operators may decide not to comply with regulation. Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) consider discarding in a moral hazard context, i.e. when fishers hide their actions at sea; when these actions cannot be detected, repercussions are placed on them based on common elements such as estimated changes in target fish stocks. To discourage non-compliance, measures are required to assist enforcement, including penalties, incentives to adapt to social norms, increased acceptance of management rules (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kraak and Hart, this volume) and a governance structure which addresses diverging perceptions about the legitimacy of discarding in the first place (Fitzpatrick et al., this volume; van Hoof et al., this volume). In theory, a premium can be introduced, e.g. an increase in the price of fish that would otherwise be discarded because of a low price. It could also be invoked as a penalty placed on the (estimated) net benefit from discarding. In such a case, the vessel operator will include the benefit/penalty in their decision function. However, he/she will also consider the probability of being detected and the likelihood and size of any fine. If the risk of being detected and the penalty are low, fish will probably be discarded and vice versa. 6.3 The European Case Study Fisheries Possible economic implications of the LO are presented through seven diverse European fishery case studies. Characteristics of each case are summarised in Table 6.1. Cases are divided into three groups: (i) demersal fisheries in the North Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel, represented by fleets from Denmark, the UK and France, (ii) Spanish Atlantic fisheries represented by the Basque mixed demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay and the Galician trawl fleet in the Cantabrian- NW region and (iii) Mediterranean fisheries represented by two mixed demersal trawl fisheries from the Balearic Islands (Spain, Western Mediterranean) and the Greek trawl and small-scale coastal fishery in the Thermaikos Gulf (Eastern Mediterranean). All cases have different management systems on top of which the LO is imposed. However, all have a certain degree of MCRS regulation, and before the LO, it was compulsory to discard fish below MCRS, with a few derogations in certain pelagic 6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation 113 Table 6.1 Base characteristics of the European case study fisheries with respect to the type of fishery, its target species, a brief description of the management system and key reasons for discarding Fishery Target species Fleet Management system Reasons for discarding North Sea, West of Scotland, Eastern English channel Danish North Sea demersal fishery Cod, plaice, hake, haddock, sole and Norway lobster Netters and trawlers, with length groups from 12 to 40 metres TACs allocated in ITQs, MCRS Quota utilisation optimisation Fish below MCRS Highgrading UK mixed demersal fisheries in the North Sea, West of Scotland and area 7 73 main UK stocks targeted by different fleets in different areas. Pelagic species and non-quota species representing around 58% of value and 75% of weight landed by UK fleet are excluded All UK active vessels grouped in 99 producer organisation fleet segments TACs allocated in fixed quota allocation units that can be pooled within a PO, traded by vessel owners, or can be leased by other vessels in the same or other PO, MCRS Quota utilisation optimisation Fish below MCRS Highgrading French demersal fishery in the Eastern English Channel Sole, scallops, whiting, cephalopods, cod, red mullet, sea bass and plaice Bottom trawlers, mixed trawlers and trawldredgers, with length groups from 12 to 40 metres TACs, MCRS, seasonal closures for scallops and effort limitation Quota utilisation optimisation Fish below MCRS Highgrading Mediterranean Spanish demersal fishery in Western Mediterranean Four different fishing tactics are used, depending on the main target species (Palmer et al. 2009): (1) shallow shelf (striped red mullet), (2) deep shelf (European Mixed demersal trawl MCRS and other technical measures Hake below MCRS High-grad- ing Discard of low-value species (continued) 114 A. Hoff et al. fisheries. Under the LO, it has become obligatory to land these fish, but they cannot be sold for human consumption. On top of this new obligation to land small fish, the North Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel fisheries are regulated by TACs, in some cases combined with effort regulation and technical conservation measures. While TACs are set at the European level, national quotas (i.e. fixed shares of the TACs) are managed differently by the Member States. They are managed as ITQs in Denmark, are distributed between producer organisations (POs) and vessel owners Table 6.1 (continued) Fishery Target species Fleet Management system Reasons for discarding hake), (3) upper slope (Norway lobster) and (4) middle slope (red shrimp) Greek demersal trawl and small-scale fishery in the Thermaikos Gulf Mainly hake and red mullet (also surmullet and deep-water rose shrimp) Bottom trawlers and small-scale coastal vessels using gill nets and trammel nets Spatial and temporal restrictions, MCRS, other technical measure Hake and red mullet below MCRS Highgrading Spanish fishery in the Atlantic Spanish mixed demersal trawl fishery in the Bay of Biscay Pair trawlers: mainly hake. Otter trawlers: hake, megrims, horse mackerel, blue whiting, mackerel, rays, red mullet, seabass, squids and cuttlefish Pair and otter trawlers using different métiers The fleet is managed with fishing rights, TACs and Total allowable Effort, together with mesh and MCRS limitations Quota utilisation optimisation Fish below MCRS Spanish demersal trawl fishery in the Cantabrian- NW region Hake, megrim, anglerfish, blue whiting, horse mackerel and mackerel Otter bottom trawlers (average length 28 metres) The fleet is managed with fishing rights and Total allowable Effort together with mesh and minimum landing size limitations Quota utilisation optimisation Fish below MCRS 6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation 115 in the UK in a system that is essentially a quasi-ITQ system and are distributed between POs in France. Swaps and quota exchanges are allowed between organisations in the UK and France. The Atlantic Spanish fisheries are regulated with Total Allowable Effort (Prellezo et al. 2016) and TACs. The Mediterranean fisheries are regulated through technical gear specifications and MCRS for the main target species, temporal and spatial closures and other technical measures (Stergiou et al. 2016). Demersal fishing activities in the North Sea, West of Scotland and in the English Channel have highly mixed catches of species, and therefore it is not possible to fully catch all quotas at the same time in the year, leading to either underutilisation of quota or discarding of fish for which quotas are exhausted first. Under the LO, the risk of a choke situation, i.e. having to stop fishing when the quota of a low-quota stock is exhausted, is a great concern to managers and vessel operators alike (Ulrich et al. 2011). This is especially expected to be a problem for French vessels, operating with fixed quota shares within producer/fishery organisations, while this problem may be less severe for UK and Danish fleets, where quota trade may mitigate the problem to some extent. For Spanish demersal fisheries in the Bay of Biscay, mackerel and horse mackerel are discarded because of low-quota allocations, i.e. to optimise quota utilisation of other species, while hake is primarily discarded because of being below MCRS. Thus, in these fisheries choke situations may also be an issue. In the Mediterranean fisheries, discarding is primarily due to fish below MCRS and to high-grading. As such, all cases face lower revenues under the LO given that previously discarded fish of low value and below MCRS must now be landed, combined with increased handling costs of these unwanted catches. 6.3.1 Mitigation Strategies Given the different challenges that the selected fishing fleets face under the LO, different scenarios have been analysed, mainly addressing (i) how fleets will respond given the threats faced and (ii) how economic losses can be reduced through mitigation strategies most relevant for that fleet. Table 6.2 gives an outline of the scenarios analysed for each case study. In all case studies, the economic situation was analysed for the fleet, given the current management system (cf. Table 6.1), i.e. if the LO had not been implemented (named ‘business as usual’). This scenario is used as a first benchmark when analysing the effects of the LO. In all case studies the full implementation of the LO with no exemptions was also analysed, i.e. the economic situation for the fleets given their current management system with the LO superimposed. This is a second benchmark against which the effects of introducing mitigation strategies are compared. Application of full implementation in the case study models was based on different assumptions for each case study: 116 A. Hoff et al. •In the Danish North Sea demersal case, fish below MCRS must be landed, with gradual implementation from 2016 to 2019 depending on species. •In the UK mixed demersal fleets, each vessel in a PO has its initial quota available, and by 2019 no demersal species below MCRS can be discarded. The LO is implemented gradually towards 2019 depending on the fish stock. •In the French mixed demersal case, vessels in métiers are forbidden to continue fishing as soon as the quota of one of their target stocks is reached, and fishing effort is then allocated between the remaining métiers. Fish under MCRS are landed but cannot be sold (price set to zero). •In the Bay of Biscay Basque mixed demersal trawl case, the fishing activity of a given métier is stopped when the most binding quota share is reached. Table 6.2 Scenarios analysed for the European case study fisheries North Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel Spanish Atlantic fisheries Mediterranean fisheries Denmark UK France Bay of Biscay1 Cantabrian -NW Spain (W. Med) Greece (E. Med) Business as usual (no LO) Full LO implementation, no exemptions De minimis Year Transfer Mesh size selectivity Effort reallocation2/Flexibility Quota adjustment Decrease minimum landings size Catch allowance for stocks with zero TACs Vessel effort movements between métiers Quota movement (swaps) Notes: 1 Quota adjustments assumed in all LO scenarios for the Bay of Biscay 2 Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between fleets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French case) or more efficient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case) 6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation 117 inter-year quota transfers and increased mesh size selectivity are introduced. Likewise, the de minimis exemption in the Spanish fishery in the Cantabrian-NW region does not lead to an increased economic result compared to when no exemptions are applied. In parallel with this, applying the de minimis exemption leads to a reduced economic result for the Spanish demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay, because increased fishing pressure leads to higher mortality and reduced hake and megrim stocks and thus reduced fishing possibilities. Likewise, for the French fishery in the Eastern English Channel, applying increased flexibility through spatial effort reallocation leads to a decreased economic result compared to the LO with no mitigation strategies. Mitigation strategies that do increase the economic outcome relative to the full implementation of the LO with no exemptions are (i) quota adjustments in the French demersal fishery in the Eastern English Channel, (ii) more efficient effort use leading to reduced unwanted catches in the Spanish fishery in the Cantabrian- NW region, (iii) increased selectivity in the Spanish fishery around the Balearic Islands (Western Mediterranean) and (iv) all mitigation strategies (quota adjustment, catch allowance for zero TAC stocks, vessel movements between metiers and quota swaps) considered for the UK fishing fleets, but the scale of changes depend on the fishing fleets concerned (North Sea and West of Scotland). Thus, at a glance, Table 6.5 shows that for the analysed fisheries, the most effective mitigation strategies depend on both the fishing fleet and the management system in place. Model structure and the assumptions applied in the models may also influence the results, but all models have been calibrated and tested against the actual situation in each case study. It is thus believed that the relative results provided in each case study are good indicators of the effects of the LO and applied mitigation strategies. 6.5 Summary and Policy Recommendations To assess the likely fleet economic repercussions of the Landing Obligation, bioeconomic models covering seven European fisheries have been applied to estimate the economic performance of fleets before and after implementing the LO. The selected fisheries cover different species compositions and fishing technologies and different management systems ranging from the North East Atlantic to the Mediterranean. When the four groups of factors that encourage discarding, i.e. institutional, biological, technological and economical, are combined, the main issues to address are (i) that certain stocks cause a choke species situation for some fleets; (ii) landings of small or damaged fish, which have low market values; and (iii) illegal highgrading as a consequence of the two former issues when vessel operators seek to maximise their profits. Consequently, it is important to improve catch selectivity through gear changes, changes to fishing patterns and effort reallocation and to apply management measures that decrease effects of choke situations, such as enabling 124 A. Hoff et al. quotas to be traded or reallocated. Finally, the use of price measures (deemed value) that consider the differences between market prices and the social value of the fish should be considered to reduce the relative benefits of high-grading (Pascoe 1997). In the short term, when fleet structure has not adapted to the new situation, the introduction of the LO will generally result in decreasing profits for all selected fleets mainly because of choke situations constraining the catch of other species in TAC-regulated fisheries and because of lower catches of higher-value larger fish given the requirement to land undersize fish in MCRS-regulated fisheries. Obviously, this is of concern for vessel operators, who see the risk that their economic performance will deteriorate. In the long term, economic repercussions will differ as the four factors mentioned above interact in different ways for each fishery and the type of management affects the options for businesses to adjust. In the Mediterranean, which is managed with MCRS and has a wide variety of species, the main anticipated issue is the cost of dealing with undersized fish which cannot be sold for human consumption and for which there is a lack of processing facilities to make it into fishmeal or other non-food products. This issue also applies to the northern fisheries, but here the choke issue also plays a role. Countries that have tradable quota systems, such as Denmark and the UK, can, to some degree, avoid or delay choke situations through quota trade. While trading is possible however, there are no mechanisms to ensure or require trading of quota units to mitigate choke situations. The choke issue could be more severe for stocks managed by non-transferable quota shares such as in France and Spain. Although long-term profits are expected to increase, some vessel businesses may not have the financial resources to overcome the severe economic losses predicted during the first years of implementation. Some governments might find it appropriate to implement measures to ensure that businesses do not fail as a result of short-term impacts of a fully implemented Landing Obligation. What defines the short and long term depends on the individual fisheries and how fast these are able to adjust to the new situation. It must be expected that the fleet structure will have adapted in ~10 years for most of the analysed fishing fleets, which is why it has been chosen to monitor the results in 2025 in the present context. Mitigation strategies such as selectivity changes, de minimis exemptions and quota adjustments equal to previous discarded quantities could enable fishing businesses to increase profits with the implementation of the LO. But for the fisheries analysed in this chapter, the profits are generally lower than or equal to profit with no LO. For the North East Atlantic fisheries, regulated with TACs and quotas, a useful policy could be to further develop a system to mitigate the problem of choke stocks. Such a policy is already in place in the EU (cf. Frost 2010) through the annual setting of TACs, when single-species assessments show recommended total removals that are adjusted to take account of multispecies interactions and fleets’technological characteristics. Reducing differences between stock TACs and fleets’catch compositions could mitigate the choke problem and allow individuals, producer organisations or fleet segments to land and sell fish and decrease the inherent incentive to discard. However, this approach would also to some extent negate the purpose of the Landing Obligation, which is to encourage more selective fishing by creating 6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation 125 incentives to avoid catching species with lower quotas. To create incentives to avoid catching fish below MCRS, price measures could be used to correct the difference between the sale price and the estimated social value of the fish. The difference must be sufficient to cover handling costs of landing the fish, and thus create an incentive to do so, but not high enough to incentivise targeting the fish beyond the quota, and vice versa to reduce prices for fish species with unused quotas. Generally, the modelled economic outcomes for the seven selected fisheries under the LO suggest that fishing businesses may have incentives not to comply with the LO. Monitoring and enforcement are generally considered to be currently insufficient to motivate compliance. 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