Wittgenstein and Heidegger against a Science of Aesthetics
Abstract
64
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains
a Science o Aes he ics
And eas V ahimis
Depa men o Classics and Philosophy, Uni e si y o Cyp us, Nicosia, CY
ahimis.and [email protected]
Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s objec ions agains he possibili y o a science o
aes he ics we e in luen ial on di e en sides o he analy ic/con inen al di ide.
Heidegge ’s an i-scien ism leads him o an alē heic iew o a wo ks which
p ecedes and exceeds any possible aes he ic educ ion. Wi gens ein also ejec s
he ele ance o causal explana ions, psychological o physiological, o aes he ic
ques ions. The main aim o his pape is o compa e Heidegge wi h Wi gens ein,
showing ha : (a) he e a e signi ican pa allels o be d awn be ween Wi gens ein’s
and Heidegge ’s an i-scien ism abou aes he ics, and ha (b) hei an i- scien ism
leads bo h owa ds pa ly di e gen c i icisms o wha I will call ‘ aes he icism’.
The di e gence is mainly due o a b oade me aphilosophical disag eemen
conce ning appeals o o dina y language. Thus si ua ing he wo philosophe s’
posi ions acili a es a possible c i ical dialogue be ween analy ic and con inen al
app oaches in aes he ics.
Keywo ds: Wi gens ein; Heidegge ; B en ano; Nie zsche; scien ism; psychologism
I. In oduc ion
I should be ob ious o anyone who has aken an in e es in Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s
discussions o aes he ics ha he e a e a ious philosophically signi ican pa allels o be d awn
be ween hei s ances agains a science o aes he ics. None heless, he g owing compa a i e
schola ship on he wo hinke s’ o e all philosophical ou looks has no ye , o he bes o my
knowledge, unde aken a de ailed compa ison o hei an i-scien ism in aes he ics.1 This pape
1 A compa a i e accoun o he wo philosophe s’ aes he ics is gi en in S ephen Mulhall, On Being in he Wo ld:
Wi gens ein and Heidegge on Seeing Aspec s (London: Rou ledge, 2014), 156–95. The ele an deba es in he
li e a u e also include a compa ison o hei iews o he ela ionship be ween philosophy and science; see
Taylo Ca man, ‘Wha Science Lea es Unsaid’, in Wi gens ein and Heidegge , ed. Da id Egan, S ephen Reynolds,
and Aa on Wendland (New Yo k: Rou ledge, 2013), 133–45. Wo ks by Wi gens ein e e ed o in his pape
a e abb e ia ed as ollows: Las W i ings on he Philosophy o Psychology: P elimina y S udies o Pa 2 o
‘ Philosophical In es iga ions’, ol. 1, ed. Geo g Hen ik on W igh and Heikki Nyman, ans. C. G an Luckha d
and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Chicago: Uni e si y o Chicago P ess, 1982), abb e ia ed as LW I; Las W i ings on he
Philosophy o Psychology, ol. 2, ed. Geo g Hen ik on W igh and Heikki Nyman, ans. C. G an Luckha d and
Maximilian A. E. Aue (Chicago: Uni e si y o Chicago P ess, 1992), abb e ia ed as LW II; Wi gens ein’s Lec u es:
V ahimis, And eas. ‘Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains
a Science o Aes he ics.’
Es e ika: The Eu opean Jou nal
o Aes he ics
LVII/XIII, no.1 (2020): pp.64–85. DOI:
h ps://doi.o g/10.33134/eeja.29
ESTETIKA
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 65
will show ha bo h Heidegge and Wi gens ein a e conce ned abou a emp s o es ablish a
science o aes he ics, and he ela ion ha such a science would hold o psychology and physi-
ology. Thus wha ollows is i s o all a his o ically minded a emp o compa e Wi gens ein’s
and Heidegge ’s poin s o iew. Ha ing shown ha hey a e pa ly in p oximi y, I will a gue
ha Wi gens ein’s iew o he misma ch be ween he ele an o dina y ways o speaking and
he limi ed ocabula y o aes he ics is a odds wi h a ype o linguis ic essen ialism p esup-
posed by Heidegge ’s ocus on unea hing he condi ions o possibili y o aes he ic concep s
wi hou ecou se o hei use in o dina y language.
In he cou se o demons a ing he abo e, we shall see ha he pa allels be ween
Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s conce ns in aes he ics ela e o hei esponses o (di e en )
deba es conce ning he ela ion be ween psychology and philosophy. Bo h Heidegge ’s and
Wi gens ein’s philosophical p edecesso s (including Go lob F ege, Be and Russell, and
Edmund Husse l) we e, a guably, eac ing o he ise o expe imen al psychology as a dis-
cipline dis inc om philosophy.2 The p oblem o dema ca ing be ween he wo had been
cen al in philosophical deba es a he u n o he wen ie h cen u y. Such deba es we e
no simply pa o he backg ound in bo h hinke s’ philosophical de elopmen , bu also
o conce n h oughou hei ca ee s. Heidegge ’s wo k was, om i s ou se , conce ned wi h
ex uding ‘psychologism’ om a e sion o philosophy ha is pu i ied om i . Simila ly,
Wi gens ein c ucially dis inguishes be ween philosophy and psychology h oughou his
wo k (e en in hose la e ins ances whe e he wo k in ol es a kind o philosophical psychol-
ogy, o example in his Las W i ings on he Philosophy o Psychology).3
Gi en he signi icance o he deba e o e psychologism, I will begin his pape by b ie ly
ou lining F anz B en ano’s iew o aes he ics as a ‘p ac ical’ discipline dependen upon psy-
chology, as well as Husse l’s an i-psychologis ic esponse o B en ano. I will show hese o
ha e been, a leas in pa , he concep ions o a science o aes he ics o which Heidegge
was esponding. They a e in ol ed in Heidegge ’s c i icism o he educ ion o he wo k o
a o an objec o aes he ic app ecia ion, which u he mo e includes an accoun o he
a wo k’s esis ance agains psychologis ic o physiologis ic educ ions. Wi gens ein, who
was esponding o a di e en Anglophone deba e o e aes he ic psychologism, also ook
a c i ical s ance owa ds a emp s o explain aes he ics psychologically. Ha ing discussed
Wi gens ein’s an i-scien is ic s ance in aes he ics, I will inally demons a e ha he e is a
ce ain ension be ween Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s con as ing app oaches o wha I
shall call ‘aes he icism’ (de ined as he iew ha he wo k o a is educible o an objec o
aes he ic expe ience).
Camb idge 1930–1933; F om he No es o G. E. Moo e, ed. Da id G. S e n, B ian Roge s, and Gab iel Ci on
(Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess, 2016), abb e ia ed as M; Lec u es and Con e sa ions on Aes he ics and
Religious Belie (Be keley: Uni e si y o Cali o nia P ess, 1967), abb e ia ed as LC; Ludwig Wi gens ein and
F ied ich Waismann, The Voices o Wi gens ein: The Vienna Ci cle, ed. Go don Bake , ans. Go don Bake e al.
(London: Rou ledge, 2003), abb e ia ed as VW.
2 See Ma in Kusch, Psychologism: A Case S udy in he Sociology o Philosophical Knowledge (New Yo k: Rou ledge,
1995); Oma W. Nasim, Be and Russell and he Edwa dian Philosophe s: Cons uc ing he Wo ld (Basings oke:
Palg a e Macmillan, 2008).
3 See Alessand a B usadin, ‘Wi gens ein’s C i icism o a “Science o Aes he ics” and he Unde s anding o Music’,
in Wi gens ein on Aes he ic Unde s anding, ed. Ga y L. Hagbe g (Basings oke: Palg a e Macmillan, 2017),
281–84. Di e en subsequen e sions o an i-psychologism we e de eloped pa ly in an a emp o in e p e
Wi gens ein. See S ina Bäcks öm, ‘Wha Is I o Depsychologize Psychology?’, Eu opean Jou nal o Philosophy
25 (2017): 358–75. Fo an o e iew o Wi gens ein’s c i ical encoun e wi h psychology h oughou his wo k,
see Pe e M. S. Hacke , ‘P ologue: Wi gens ein’s Philosophy o Psychology as a C i ical Ins umen o he
Psychological Sciences’, in A Wi gens einian Pe spec i e on he Use o Concep ual Analysis in Psychology, ed.
Timo hy P. Racine and Ka hleen L. Slaney (Basings oke: Palg a e Macmillan, 2013), 10–27.
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics66
The main aim o his pape is o compa e Heidegge wi h Wi gens ein, a he han sys-
ema ically de end hei wo h o con empo a y aes he ics. In pa icula , wha I aim o
show is ha , (a) he e a e signi ican pa allels o be d awn be ween Wi gens ein’s and
Heidegge ’s posi ions wi h ega d o wha I will call ‘aes he icism’, and ha (b) Wi gens ein’s
and Heidegge ’s b ands o an i-scien ism in aes he ics none heless lead hem owa ds pa ly
di e gen c i icisms o ‘aes he icism’. In pa icula , I will show how a Wi gens einian b oad-
ening o he ocabula y o aes he ics by appeal o o dina y language clashes wi h Heidegge ’s
e o o see wha unde lies he cen al e ms o mode n aes he ics.
Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s lines o in luence, wi hin aes he ics as in philosophy mo e
gene ally, ha e ended o lead owa ds di e en sides o he analy ic-con inen al di ide. By
d awing pa allels be ween hei b ands o an i-scien ism, while also making explici hei
pa icula poin s o di e gence, his pape can hope ully acili a e u u e c i ical dialogue
be ween he di e gen adi ions in luenced by each hinke .
I would be use ul, a he ou se , o cla i y some poin s o e minology. This pape dis-
cusses Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s ‘an i-scien ism’ in aes he ics, o , in e changeably,
hei ejec ion o ‘aes he ic scien ism’. The e m ‘scien ism’ has been employed owa ds di -
e en ends in di e en con ex s, and as a esul can be qui e ague. I is no commonly
employed as an emic e m. Ra he , b oadly speaking, i is used as an accusa ion, in ol ed
in a kind o bounda y-policing conce ning he misuse o scien i ic me hods. ‘Scien ism’, o
he pu poses o his pape , is employed agains a ie ies o a emp s o apply he me hods
o empi ically minded, expe imen al disciplines o disciplines in which such me hods a e
deemed (by he accuse ) o be i ele an . Mo e speci ically, I will be looking a a emp s o
s udy aes he ics in a psychological o physiological manne , which is b oadly speaking wha
I ha e e e ed o as ‘aes he ic scien ism’. This pape mo e na owly employs he ph ase
‘aes he ic scien ism’ in a way which can be b oken down in o wo dis inguishable elemen s:
‘aes he ic scien ism’ he e means he iew ha aes he ics can somehow be (a) causally
explained by, o (b) educed o, ei he (i) psychology, o (ii) physiology ( ia psychology). No e
ha (i) is wha is o en e e ed o in his pape as (aes he ic) psychologism; ‘psychologism’,
like ‘scien ism’, is a e m ha has been pu o mani old o he uses. Bo h Wi gens ein and
Heidegge , as I will show, a e conce ned wi h (i) and (ii), inso a as hey a e c i ical o psycho-
logical o physiological a emp s o s udy aes he ics. In his sense, hey a e bo h opposed o
‘ aes he ic scien ism’. Howe e , as we shall see, Wi gens ein explici ly ocuses on c i icising
(a) (wi hou di ec ly being conce ned wi h (b)), while Heidegge explici ly a ge s (b) (wi h-
ou speci ically add essing (a)).4 I cons ue ‘aes he ic scien ism’ in o de o co e bo h (a) and
(b), hus aiming o show ha he wo philosophe s ha e di e en , bu pa allel, objec ions
o his posi ion. Bo h Wi gens ein and Heidegge a e also in ol ed in wide c i icisms o
scien ism mo e b oadly cons ued, o which his pape will e e , hough i is p ima ily con-
ce ned wi h he na owe sense.5
Fu he e minological cla i ica ion needs o be gi en he e conce ning he no ions o a
‘science o aes he ics’ and o aes he ics as a discipline. When I claim ha bo h Wi gens ein
and Heidegge objec o ei he o hose no ions, I do no mean o say ha hey gene ally
ejec he possibili y o any ype o sys ema ic s udy o aes he ics. Ra he , as we shall see, hey
4 I could be a gued ha Wi gens ein’s c i ique o (a) also ex ends o (b), because om a sys ema ic poin o iew
a ejec ion o (a) implies a ejec ion o (b). In o he wo ds, a demons a ion o he impossibili y o p o iding
causal explana ions o aes he ic phenomena a o io i p ecludes he psychological o physiological educ ion o
aes he ics. I no e he dis inc ion he e o highligh a di e ence in emphasis be ween he wo philosophe s, impo -
an om he pe spec i e o ex ual analysis. As I show in wha ollows, his di e ence in emphasis connec s o
b oade di e gences, Wi gens ein’s ocus being on language, as opposed o Heidegge ’s on ological ocus.
5 See, o example, Jona han Beale and Ian James Kidd, eds., Wi gens ein and Scien ism (London: Rou ledge, 2017).
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 67
ha e some hing mo e speci ic in mind. In Wi gens ein’s case his is s aigh o wa d: when
he explici ly ejec s he possibili y o aes he ics as a science, he is e e ing o he scien is ic
concep ion o aes he ics ou lined abo e (in (a)), ha is, he idea ha aes he ics may, pu po -
edly, be causally explained by psychology and physiology. In o he wo ds, o Wi gens ein he
e y idea o a ‘science o aes he ics’ is an example o wha I ha e called ‘aes he ic scien ism’.
In Heidegge ’s case, as we shall see, hings a e sligh ly mo e complica ed, since Heidegge ’s
alk o aes he ics as a discipline de i es om B en ano’s and Husse l’s concep ion o aes he -
ics as a discipline dependen on some p io inqui y. To u he analyse his, I will now u n o
B en ano’s accoun o he ela ion be ween psychology and aes he ics.
II. Heidegge ’s His o ical Backg ound: B en anian Aes he ics and
Psychologism
A i s bi h in he 1870s, he new academic discipline o expe imen al psychology p omised
o o e an inno a i e scien i ic me hod o s udying he human mind. Among he conse-
quences o his se e ing o psychology away om philosophy was a c isis wi h ega d o
philosophy’s sel -concep ion. Expe imen al psychology was no s ic ly delimi ed, ende ing
i unclea wha was excluded om becoming i s objec o s udy. A he end o he nine een h
cen u y, i seemed possible ha psychology could p o ide empi ical ways o inally sol ing
wha had adi ionally been pu ely philosophical p oblems.
One o he i s a emp s o delimi expe imen al psychology’s explana o y powe was
amously o e ed by F anz B en ano.6 B en ano made a well-known dis inc ion be ween
wo ypes o psychology: gene ic and desc ip i e.7 The o me would expe imen ally s udy
‘psycho-physics’,8 ha is, he educ ion o men al p ocesses o physiological biochemical p o-
cesses om an objec i e, hi d-pe son poin o iew. The la e , which B en ano also calls
phenomenology,9 would desc ibe men al phenomena om a i s -pe son poin o iew.
B en ano hough ha desc ip i e psychology, in he way he o mula ed i , would be in a
posi ion o gi e a scien i ic accoun o he ‘p ac ical’ disciplines o philosophy – aes he ics,
logic, and e hics.
Acco ding o B en ano, qua p ac ical discipline, aes he ics is no ye a science because
i canno i sel p o ide he jus i ica ion o he no ms i p oduces conce ning he co ec -
ness o as e and he p oduc ion o he beau i ul.10 Aes he ics can, B en ano a gues, acqui e
scien i ic s a us only h ough being co ec ly connec ed wi h a p io desc ip i e psychologi-
cal s udy.11 Seen om he poin o iew o B en anian desc ip i e psychology, an aes he ic
judgemen is a pa icula e alua i e eeling di ec ed owa ds a ‘men al p esen a ion’ o a
phenomenon. Acco ding o B en ano’s desc ip i e psychology, he e a e wo p ocesses ha
ake place in aes he ic judgemen : he i s is he p esen a ion o he objec o ou con-
sciousness, while he second is he p esen a ion o ou consciousness o he e alua ion
ha he i s p esen a ion is beau i ul (o ha i is ugly). This second s ep in ol es a kind o
6 The ea lies sys ema ic a emp o apply expe imen al psychological me hods o aes he ics comes in Gus a
Theodo Fechne , Vo schule de Äs he ik (Leipzig: B ei kop & Hä el, 1876).
7 F anz B en ano, Desc ip i e Psychology, ed. and ans. Beni o Mülle (London: Rou ledge, 2002).
8 Ibid., 21.
9 Ibid., 137–42.
10 See Wol gang Hueme , ‘Expe iencing A : Aus ian Aes he ics be ween Psychology and Psychologism’, in Values
and On ology: P oblems and Pe spec i es, ed. Bea ice Cen i and Wol gang Hueme (F ank u : On os, 2009),
267–88.
11 ‘And simila ly one could show mos easily o aes he ics and e e y o he philosophical discipline ha
sepa a ed om psychology i would ha e o wi he like a b anch ha is de ached om he unk’ (quo ed
in ibid., 269).
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics68
me a-p esen a ion, ha is, a p esen a ion o an aes he ic alua ion ha is abou he o iginal
p esen a ion. This desc ip i e psychological accoun can unc ion as a g ound on which he
no ms pu o h by he discipline o aes he ics ely. Thus, acco ding o B en ano, he science
o aes he ics is buil on he ounda ions laid by he p io scien i ic in es iga ions o desc ip-
i e psychology.
B en ano’s wo k, among a ious o he in-de-siècle a emp s o use psychology in in es iga -
ing adi ional philosophical p oblems, became he a ge o a ehemen a ack ins iga ed
by his s uden , Edmund Husse l. Despi e he se ious objec ions o ‘psychologism’ which
p opelled Husse l’s Logische Un e suchungen12 o he cen e o he Psychologismuss ei in
1900,13 Husse l ollowed B en ano in concei ing o aes he ics, logic, and e hics, as p ac ical
o ‘no ma i e’ disciplines.14 In o he wo ds, like B en ano be o e him and Heidegge a e
him, Husse l hough ha aes he ics elies on i s g ounding in some p io discipline. A he
same ime, howe e , Husse l’s p ojec eplaced B en ano’s g ounding o he no ma i e philo-
sophical disciplines in desc ip i e psychology wi h a new non-psychologis ic g ounding in
wha (a e B en ano) he calls phenomenology. Though logic is Husse l’s p ima y conce n in
he Logische Un e suchungen, aes he ics is also ea ed as a no ma i e discipline in need o
g ounding in some p io o m o knowledge (which, o Husse l,15 is achie ed by phenom-
enology h ough a quasi-Pla onic in ui ion o essences).
The Husse lian p ojec o de eloping an an i-psychologis ic phenomenological g ounding
o he philosophical disciplines is also one o he s a ing poin s o Heidegge ’s wo k.16 The
a oidance o biologism, an h opologism, and psychologism o ms a c ucial pa o he in o-
duc ion o Sein und Zei .17 I is indeed he dange looming in he usion be ween psycholo-
gism and a o m o biologism ha cons i u es he backd op o Heidegge ’s unde s anding o
he pi alls o aes he ics.
III. Heidegge ’s O e coming o Aes he ics
In ‘The O igin o he Wo k o A ’,18 Heidegge ’s discussion o a wo ks is a i s oo an a emp
o oppose a pa icula educ ionis accoun o a wo ks. The pa icula kind o educ ionism
ha Heidegge add esses allows us o slip o a u he chain o educ ions. Acco ding o
Heidegge , he i s s ep ha makes he subsequen chain possible is one ha in ol es he
ela ion be ween a and aes he ics:
Almos as soon as specialized hinking abou a and he a is began, such e lec ions
we e e e ed o as ‘aes he ic’. Aes he ics ea ed he a wo k as an objec , as indeed an
objec o αἴσθησις, o senso y app ehension in a b oad sense. These days, such app e-
hension is called an ‘expe ience’. The way in which man expe iences a is supposed
o in o m us abou i s essen ial na u e. Expe ience is he s anda d-gi ing sou ce no
only o he app ecia ion and enjoymen o a bu also o i s c ea ion. E e y hing is
expe ience. (OWA, p. 50)
12 Edmund Husse l, Logical In es iga ions, 2 ols, ans. John N. Findlay (London: Rou ledge, 2001).
13 See Kusch, Psychologism.
14 Husse l, Logical In es iga ions, 2:95.
15 Ibid., 2:86.
16 Ma in Heidegge , Die Leh e om U eil im Psychologismus: Ein k i isch-posi i e Bei ag zu Logik (Leipzig: Ba h,
1914). See also Kusch, Psychologism, 121.
17 Ma in Heidegge , Being and Time, ans. Joan S ambaugh (Albany, NY: SUNY P ess, 1996), 42–47.
18 Ma in Heidegge , ‘The O igin o he Wo k o A ’, in O he Bea en T ack, ed. and ans. Julian Young and
Kenne h Haynes (Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess, 2002), 1–56. He eby abb e ia ed as OWA.
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 69
He e Heidegge de ines aes he ics as he pa icula ly mode n and specialised philosophi-
cal subjec which akes a ce ain ype o expe ience (and, a e Hegel, he pa icula ype
o expe ience ha can be induced by a wo ks) as i s objec . This, as Heidegge poin s ou ,
is a his o ically con ingen o m o unde s anding o wha a is, and only exis s wi hin a
pa icula o m o Wes e n cul u e in he mode n age. This unde s anding o a , Heidegge
a gues, is de i a i e om a pa icula ea ly mode n philosophical concep ion o subjec i i y
and objec hood. In Heidegge ’s unde s anding o he his o y o Wes e n philosophy, mode n
aes he ics is bo n om he Ca esian econ igu a ion o he philosophical signi icance o
he subjec .19 Heidegge hinks ha he mode n ad en o aes he ics means ha he wo k
o a is, p oblema ically, educed o he ype o expe ience ha can be s udied by aes he -
ics: ‘[An] essen ial phenomenon o he mode n pe iod lies in he e en o a ’s mo ing in o
he pu iew o aes he ics. Tha means ha he a wo k becomes he objec o me e subjec-
i e expe ience.’20 Mode n philosophy, a e Desca es, opens up he possibili y o seeing he
wo k o a in e ms o aes he ics, and hus in e ms o subjec i e aes he ic expe ience. This
educ ion is p esupposed by he u he chain o educ ions which Heidegge discusses. The
aes he ic educ ion o he a wo k may be ollowed by he educ ion o aes he ics o psychol-
ogy (in he ein o B en ano). F om he e onwa ds he pa h is pa ed o he u he educ ion
o psychologis ic aes he ics o physiology, a educ ion which Heidegge discusses in ela ion
o he wo k o Nie zsche.21
Seeing he wo k o a as educible o subjec i e aes he ic expe ience p esupposes, and
hus is only made possible by, a ce ain way o hinking abou wha hings a e, as discussed
in he ea ly sec ions o OWA. The e Heidegge a gues ha mode n aes he ics elies on some
o he ollowing pa icula me aphysical concep ions o a hing: i) as some hing ha can be
cap u ed in e ms o subs ance and acciden , he la e being co ela ed wi h p oposi ions o
subjec -p edica e o m (OWA, pp. 5–7), o ii) as he uni y o a mani old o sense-da a (OWA,
pp. 7–8), o iii) as some hing ha has o m and con en (OWA, pp. 8–12).22 The me aphysical
dis inc ion be ween o m and ma e is, Heidegge no es, ‘ he concep ual scheme deployed
in he g ea es a ie y o ways by all a heo y and aes he ics’ (OWA, p. 9). Thus, acco ding
o Heidegge , an aes he ic app oach o he wo k o a necessa ily in ol es a educ ion o i s
objec o he ype o objec ha can possibly be s udied by aes he ics. In his sense, mode n
aes he ics is no longe capable o hinking abou he hing i s udies,23 bu a he alks o i s
a ious educ ions ( o example, o ‘aes he ic expe ience’, o o he ‘aes he ic s ance’ a subjec
akes owa ds he objec o aes he ic app ecia ion). Heidegge ’s posi i e accoun o he wo k
o a is one which does no all wi hin aes he ics, bu which a he a emp s o ind some
mo e ‘p imo dial’ wo king o he a wo k which is p esupposed by aes he ics.
Bu wha exac ly does Heidegge ake ‘aes he ics’ o be? In o de o unde s and his, we
need o go beyond he ague men ion o i s ela ion wi h subjec i e expe ience ou lined
abo e. Clea ly Heidegge does no conside aes he ics as a iable candida e o he ole o
i s philosophy, gi en ha i is po ayed by him as de i ing i s concep ions o hinghood
om p io exe cises in me aphysics. (This is why Heidegge dis inguishes his own musings
19 Bu see R. Ma hew Shockey, ‘Heidegge ’s Desca es and Heidegge ’s Ca esianism’, Eu opean Jou nal o
Philosophy 20 (2012): 285–311.
20 Ma in Heidegge , ‘The Age o he Wo ld Pic u e’, in The Ques ion Conce ning Technology and O he Essays, ans.
William Lo i (New Yo k: Ga land, 1977), 116.
21 Ma in Heidegge , Nie zsche, ol. 1, The Will o Powe as A , ans. Da id Fa ell K ell (New Yo k: Ha pe , 1991).
He eby abb e ia ed as NWP.
22 Heidegge hinks o he dis inc ion as p ima ily me aphysical, inso a as i is a gene al concep ion o a hing; i
is subsequen ly applicable o a a ie y o specialised ields, om logic and epis emology o aes he ics.
23 I is unable o hink his because ‘ he way in which aes he ics is disposed, in ad ance, o iew he a wo k s ands
wi hin he dominion o he adi ional in e p e a ion o beings in gene al’ (OWA, p. 18).
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics70
abou he wo k o a om wha usually alls unde he opic o ‘aes he ics’.) In his, Heidegge
is esponding o B en ano and Husse l, ag eeing wi h hei a emp o demons a e ha
aes he ics equi es g ounding in a p io discipline:
The e m ‘aes he ics’ is o med in he same manne as ‘logic’ and ‘e hics’. The wo d
epis eme, knowledge, mus always comple e hese e ms. […] The wo d ‘aes he ics’ is
o med in he co esponding way: ais he ike epis eme: knowledge o human beha -
io wi h ega d o sense, sensa ion, and eeling, and knowledge o how hese a e
de e mined. […] Wha de e mines man’s eeling, hence aes he ics, and wha eeling
compo s i sel owa d, is he beau i ul. The ue, he good, and he beau i ul a e he
objec s o logic, e hics, and aes he ics. Acco dingly, aes he ics is conside a ion o man’s
s a e o eeling in i s ela ion o he beau i ul; i is conside a ion o he beau i ul o he
ex en ha i s ands in ela ion o man’s s a e o eeling. (NWP, pp. 77–78)
No ice he e ha , o bo h Heidegge and B en ano, aes he ics (like logic and e hics) is unques-
ionably a discipline dependen on p io in es iga ions. This p io i y is asc ibed by B en ano
o ‘desc ip i e psychology’, ha is, o an in es iga ion o men al phenomena in gene al ha
is p esupposed by he in es iga ion o aes he ic men al phenomena in pa icula . B en ano’s
aes he ics hus p esupposes an accoun o ‘p esen a ions’, o o he in en ionali y in ol ed
in aes he ic expe ience (which, as men ioned ea lie , is analysed in e ms o he di ec ed-
ness o a eeling o app o al o disapp o al owa ds a ‘p esen a ion’). Heidegge ’s c i ique
o Husse l’s an i-psychologis ic ende ing o B en anian accoun s o in en ionali y in ol es
digging benea h he desc ip ion o cogni i e s a es such as ‘in en ionali y’ o unco e p e-
cogni i e s a es such as ‘compo men ’.
Thus Heidegge ’s c i ique o aes he ics in ac p esupposes he possibili y o i s B en anian
educ ion o psychology. Once we de ine he ‘ais he ike epis eme’ as ‘ he ela ion o eeling
owa d a and i s b inging- o h’ (NWP, p. 78), hen he oad is pa ed owa ds i s educ ion
o psychology. Fu he mo e, once his pa h is ead on, hen why should he psychologis
be limi ed o gi ing i s -pe son desc ip i e accoun s o he ele an ‘aes he ic’ eelings? Is
he e some hing o p e en he u he educ ion o a desc ip i e psychological aes he ics
o a gene ic accoun o b ain s a es o o he bodily s a es in ol ed in aes he ic eelings (now
educed o psychological s a es)?
In his a emp o in e p e he wo k o Nie zsche, Heidegge con on s a i al in e p e a-
ion which sees Nie zsche as de ending he educ ion o aes he ics o physiology. Thus, in his
i al in e p e a ion, Heidegge inds a way o p esen ing a possible de ence o his educ ion.
In he b ie wo k Nie zsche con a Wagne (1888) Nie zsche says (VIII, 187): ‘O cou se,
aes he ics is no hing else han applied physiology.’ I is he e o e no longe e en ‘psy-
chology,’ as i usually is in he nine een h cen u y, bu in es iga ion o bodily s a es
and p ocesses and hei ac i a ing causes by me hods o na u al science. [… In] knowl-
edge o a as ‘physiology’; a is deli e ed o e o explana ion in e ms o na u al
science, elega ed o an a ea o he science o ac s. He e indeed he aes he ic inqui y
in o a in i s ul ima e consequences is hough o an end. The s a e o eeling is o
be aced back o exci a ions o he ne ous sys em, o bodily condi ions. (NWP, p. 91)
As Heidegge sees i , a he end o a p ocess which begins wi h a educ ion o a o aes he ic
expe ience we ha e he esul o wha Nie zsche calls a ‘physiology o a ’. The way in which
Heidegge p esen s he i al in e p e a ion o Nie zsche’s accoun o physiology b ings i
close o wha B en ano calls ‘gene ic psychology’. As Heidegge cla i ies:
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 71
When Nie zsche says ‘physiology’ he does mean o emphasize he bodily s a e; bu
he la e is in i sel always al eady some hing psychical, and he e o e also a ma e
o ‘psychology’. The bodily s a e o an animal and e en o man is essen ially di e -
en om he p ope y o a ‘na u al body’, o example, a s one. E e y body is also a
na u al body, bu he e e se does no hold. On he o he hand, when Nie zsche says
‘psychology’ he always means wha also pe ains o bodily s a es ( he physiological).
(NWP, p. 96)
In o he wo ds, Nie zschean physiology, acco ding o he i al in e p e a ion p esen ed by
Heidegge , should be seen as a physicalis ic educ ion o psychological s a es. And hus, by
ex ension, Nie zsche’s aes he ics is mean o be in e p e ed as a kind o physiology o a .
Heidegge ’s s a egy in his commen a y on Nie zsche is, peculia ly (and o a ious easons
ha exceed he bounds o his inqui y), no o a gue agains he physicalis ic educ ion o aes-
he ics, bu a he o a gue ha Nie zsche himsel ne e in ended o appea as i s p oponen .
Heidegge ’s unde aking in ol es an in e p e a ion o Nie zsche’s p edecesso s in aes he ics,
namely Kan and Schopenhaue . In he Nie zsche lec u es, Heidegge ’s in en ion is o show ha
Kan ’s aes he ics is essen ially an i-psychologis ic.24 Heidegge blames, ins ead, Schopenhaue
o mis eading Kan in a psychologis ic manne .25 Nie zsche’s concep ion o he possibili y o
a physiology o a elies, in u n, on Schopenhaue ’s mis eading. Heidegge hus complexly
hinks ha he has demons a ed ha Nie zsche’s c i ique o Schopenhaue ’s e sion o Kan ian
aes he ics u ns ou o be ha monised wi h wha Kan had o iginally in ended o say (NWP,
p. 111). Fu he mo e, Heidegge p esen s Nie zsche’s posi ion in a way ha is a leas pa ly
ha monised wi h he posi ion he will ake up conce ning he opic in OWA.
Whe he Heidegge is co ec o no in his in e p e a ions o Kan , Schopenhaue , and
Nie zsche ma e s li le o he pu poses o his pape . Pe haps mo e c ucially, wha is missing
om Heidegge ’s endea ou is a clea a gumen agains he possibili y o a physiology o a .
In place o such an a gumen , wha Heidegge does o e is a genealogy o a concep ion o
he physiology o a . The genealogy is gi en as a way o con incing his eade ha Nie zsche,
in e p e ed co ec ly, o e comes he c ude psychologis ic o physiologis ic educ ionisms.
I wha is sough a e is some hing ha mo e closely esembles an a gumen agains educ-
ionism in Heidegge ’s wo k, hen he place o look is OWA. The anscenden al a gumen we
ind Heidegge de eloping he e does no , howe e , a ack psychological o physiological
educ ionism in aes he ics, bu a he some hing e en mo e undamen al. I shall he ea e
e e o Heidegge ’s a ge , namely he aes he ic educ ion o he wo k o a , by using he
(pe haps awkwa d) e m ‘aes he icism’.26
24 He e he elies on his p e ious uncon en ional in e p e a ion o Kan ’s ela ion o me aphysics. See Ma in
Heidegge , Kan and he P oblem o Me aphysics, ans. Richa d Ta (Blooming on: Indiana Uni e si y P ess,
1997). Heidegge uncon en ionally in e p e s Kan ’s aes he ics in a manne which exemp s i om he o e all
Heidegge ian c i ique o mode n aes he ics. See Ing ild To sen, ‘Disin e es and T u h: On Heidegge ’s In e p e-
a ion o Kan ’s Aes he ics’, B i ish Jou nal o Aes he ics 56 (2016): 15–32.
25 Appelq is has shown ha Wi gens ein’s commen a y on aes he ics also in ol es a Kan ian concep ion
o aes he ic no ma i i y. See Hanne Appelq is , ‘Wi gens ein on Aes he ic No ma i i y and G amma ’,
in Wi gens ein in he 1930s: Be ween he ‘T ac a us’ and he ‘In es iga ions’, ed. Da id G. S e n (Camb idge:
Camb idge Uni e si y P ess, 2018), 209–23. Thus, in e es ingly, bo h igu es could be seen as wo king ou di -
e en endi ions o a b oadly speaking Kan ian aes he ics. Schopenhaue is a poin o di e gence: as opposed
o Heidegge ’s ejec ion o Schopenhaue ’s in e p e a ion o Kan ’s aes he ics, Schopenhaue ’s iews in luenced
Wi gens ein’s o e all ou look, including his iews conce ning aes he ics. See Hans-Johann Glock, ‘ Schopenhaue
and Wi gens ein: Language as Rep esen a ion and Will’, in The Camb idge Companion o Schopenhaue , ed.
Ch is ophe Janaway (Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess, 1999), 422–58.
26 By using his e m I mean o sugges a pa allel wi h ‘psychologism’, a he han any associa ion wi h he mo e-
men in a ou o ‘a o a ’s sake’.
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics72
Wha Heidegge has o say abou aes he ics elies on his p e ious wo k, o example in
Being and Time, whe e he had de eloped a sus ained c i ique o specialisa ion in philosophy
and science ha is a consequence o Wes e n me aphysics. Heidegge ’s hesis (de i ed, o a
la ge ex en , in c i ical dialogue wi h he B en anian concep ion o science discussed abo e)
claims ha any specialised ield o s udy in o one pa icula ype o being mus somehow ely
on a p io unde s anding o Being in gene al. Such an unde s anding is necessa ily p esup-
posed by each ype o specialised inqui y in o some being, hough i may no be p o ided by
he enqui y i sel . This leads Heidegge o con en ha in o de o en e in o modes o ques-
ioning abou beings, hese specialised o ms o inqui y a e equi ed o become obli ious o
undamen al ques ions abou Being in gene al. A o ge ulness o he g ound om which
hey s em is necessa y o hei exis ence.27
In OWA, Heidegge applies his o e all app oach o aes he ics, which is a specialised way
o s udying one pa icula ype o being (and, as such, an ou g ow h o Wes e n me aphys-
ics). Heidegge ’s con ic ion seems o be ha aes he ics, qua specialisa ion, educes he wo k
o a , which exceeds i s ield o s udy, o he ype o en i y which can become an objec o
aes he ics. In his educ ion, aes he ics has o o ge abou e e y hing in he a wo k ha
canno become i s objec o s udy. Heidegge hinks ha aes he ics hus becomes obli ious
o he mos undamen al wo kings o he a wo k. The wo k o a is no p ima ily an objec
o aes he ics, bu some hing al oge he di e en .
Fo Heidegge , wha specialised enqui y (whe he in he guise o aes he ics, psychology, o
physiology) in o he a wo k ails o cap u e has o do wi h a pa icula ela ion be ween a wo k
and u h. Heidegge , as is well-known, se s aside he adi ional philosophical concep ion o
u h as adequa io ei e in ellec us, eplacing i wi h a iew o u h as a p ocess o disclosedness.28
In OWA, he aces his back o he G eek no ion o alē heia, which he (ques ionably) in e p e s
e ymologically as ‘ he unconcealmen o beings’ (OWA, p. 16). Acco ding o Heidegge , wo ks o
a in ol e his p ocess o unconcealmen , which p ecedes and exceeds any aes he ic educ ion.
As Heidegge would la e poin ou , his p ojec in OWA should be unde s ood as an a emp
o o e come he Wes e n adi ion o philosophical aes he ics, which is in u n seen by
Heidegge as an aspec o his o e all p ojec o o e coming me aphysics.
The ques ion o he o igin o he wo k o a […] s ands in he mos in insic connec-
ion o he ask o o e coming aes he ics, i.e., o e coming a pa icula concep ion o
beings—as objec s o ep esen a ion. The o e coming o aes he ics again esul s neces-
sa ily om he his o ical con on a ion wi h me aphysics as such. Me aphysics con ains
he basic Wes e n posi ion owa ds beings and hus also he g ound o he p e ious
essence o Wes e n a and o i s wo ks. O e coming me aphysics means gi ing ee
ein o he p io i y o he ques ion o he u h o being o e e e y ‘ideal’, ‘causal’, ‘ an-
scenden al’, o ‘dialec ical’ explana ion o beings. The o e coming o me aphysics is no
a epudia ion o philosophy hi he o, bu is a leap in o i s i s beginning, al hough
wi hou wan ing o eins a e ha beginning.29
In o he wo ds, wha Heidegge is conce ned wi h in his discussion o aes he ics is a way o
digging owa d some o iginal p imo dial essence o he wo k o a .30 Reaching owa d his
27 No e he e ha his conce n o g ounding is connec ed o B en ano’s and Husse l’s conce ns o he desc ip i e
phenomenological g ounding o he ‘p ac ical disciplines’.
28 See Heidegge , Being and Time, 204–20.
29 Ma in Heidegge , Con ibu ions o Philosophy (O he E en ), ans. Richa d Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu
(Blooming on: Indiana Uni e si y P ess, 2012), 396.
30 See Ma Dill, ‘Heidegge , A , and he O e coming o Me aphysics’, Eu opean Jou nal o Philosophy 25 (2017):
294–311.
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 79
co ec ly concei ed.54 To show ha an expanded ocabula y (including, o example, egu-
la i e, in addi ion o e alua i e, e ms) en e s in o he domain o aes he ics would en ail
ex ending i much u he han he philosophical adi ion’s concep ion. The o e all ame-
wo k in which Wi gens ein p oposes his is an a emp ed he apy o he philosophical p e-
dilec ion o simpli ica ion. One example o he emp a ion o simpli y is ha which akes
place when he complexi y o aes he ic language is na owed down o he limi ed ocabula y
employed by deba es in philosophical aes he ics. The b oade iew Wi gens ein has in mind
is one which a i ms he complexi y o he in e wo en phenomena a play in wha we call
aes he ics. These a e nei he limi able o he kind o ocabula y usually employed in adi-
ional philosophical deba es abou he ‘beau i ul’ o he ‘sublime’, no a e hey e en ually
explainable ia acing causal connec ions. Aes he ic ques ions ela e o b oade ques ions
abou human unde s anding, which a e dis inguishable om he ypes o causal in es iga-
ions o men al s a es in ol ed in psychology.55 The nega i e ema ks Wi gens ein has o
o e by way o he apy om o e simpli ying ‘aes he icism’ look owa d a posi i e accoun
which emb aces complexi y. This accoun culmina es in seeing aes he ic ques ions as inex i-
cably connec ed o b oade cul u al phenomena (a posi ion ha is no a om Heidegge ’s
iew o a wo ks as ied o ‘wo ld’ and ‘ea h’).56
In pa ial ag eemen wi h Heidegge , Wi gens ein’s appeal o he complexi y o an
expanded aes he ic ocabula y shows ha he p oblem wi h ‘aes he icism’, cons ued as he
a bi a y p e e ence o a limi ed aes he ic ocabula y, would be i s i ele ance o ou o di-
na y ways o speaking abou a wo ks. I one we e o imagine a pe son ha is, o some
eason, es ic ed o speaking only in aes he ic e ms, i would become appa en ha hei
discussion o a wo ks would no go e y a . I migh , pe haps, go deep in o ques ions o
de ining he e ms (wi hin a gi en con ex ), o deciding when o apply a e m co ec ly o
no . I is easy o see ha his kind o discu si e game will soon become e y emo e om any
discussion abou ac ual a wo ks, which explains he i ele ance o aes he ics o he a wo ld
(as diagnosed by Heidegge ).
VI. A Wi gens einian C i ique o Heidegge ’s Remedy o ‘Aes he icism’
In Wi gens ein’s case, he emedy o linguis ic ‘aes he icism’ does no in ol e, like in
Heidegge ’s case, a u he shi away om ou o dina y ways o speaking. Acco ding o a
Wi gens einian diagnosis, we should s ee away om Heidegge ’s emp a ion o exp ess wha
has been inexp essible in he e ms employed by aes he ics by using an obscu e philosophi-
cal e minology ha a emp s o dig benea h aes he ic e ms. Heidegge , o example, claims
ha ‘ o m’ and ‘ma e ’, as employed in aes he ics, a e only mani es a ions o a p io wo king
o he a wo k which he sees as a clash be ween ‘wo ld’ and ‘ea h’ (OWA, pp. 22–38). F om
54 Fo a mo e de ailed accoun o he signi icance o aes he ics o he la e Wi gens ein’s o e all concep ion o
philosophy see William Day, ‘The Aes he ic Dimension o Wi gens ein’s La e W i ings’, in Hagbe g, Wi gens ein
on Aes he ic Unde s anding, 3–29.
55 See B usadin, ‘Wi gens ein’s C i icism’, 288–91. Fo a compa ison be ween Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s
ela ed concep ions o he unde s anding as an abili y, see Joseph K. Schea , ‘Unde s anding as a Fini e Abili y’,
in Egan, Reynolds, and Wendland, Wi gens ein and Heidegge , 163–78. No e ha Schea ’s sugges ion ha
Wi gens ein’s an i-Ca esianism is an i-psychologis ic, while Heidegge ’s ocus agains Desca es is on ologi-
cal also conce ns hei di e gence o ocus ega ding aes he ics. Whe eas Heidegge ’s o e coming o aes he ics
alls unde an o e coming o me aphysics, Wi gens ein’s main conce n is o p o ide a he apy o he iew ha
(aes he ic) unde s anding consis s in some unde lying men al s a e.
56 Like Heidegge , Wi gens ein holds ha , in Sch oede ’s wo ds, ‘wha gi es subs ance and signi icance o ou
app ecia ion o a , wha makes i mo e han a supe icial liking, is he way i is ancho ed in a speci ic cul u e,
a way o li e de ined by i s cus oms and manne s, i s mo al alues, i s eligious and poli ical belie s’ (Sch oede ,
‘“Too Ridiculous o Wo ds”’, 122).
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics80
Wi gens ein’s pe spec i e we can see Heidegge as seeking a emedy o ou limi ed aes he ic
ocabula y in an essen ialis ea men o pa icula e ms cen al o aes he ics.57
The e a e h ee in e ela ed c i icisms agains Heidegge ’s posi ion ha can be made om
Wi gens ein’s pe spec i e:
A) Heidegge ’s posi ion p esupposes an essen ialis (in he Wi gens einian sense ou -
lined abo e) unde s anding o he aes he ic e ms he seeks o dig benea h. This, as
Wi gens ein shows, ails o add ess one o he basic p oblems aced by ‘aes he icism’,
namely i s lack o acknowledgemen ha he e ms i discusses ha e mani old uses in
di e en games. Heidegge ’s essen ialis a emp o g ound aes he ic e ms in some-
hing ha p ecedes hem p esupposes ha he e ms a e uni ocal in all con ex s o
use (and hus always p eceded by he p io e ms). Wi gens ein’s examina ion o he
o dina y uses o aes he ic e ms is mean o show such essen ialism o be un enable.
He e Heidegge is making a simila (bu clea ly no he same) mis ake o ha made
by his a ge s:58 as Wi gens ein shows, essen ialism abou he de ini ion o aes he ic
e ms is p esupposed bo h by he mode n philosophical adi ion in aes he ics, and by
he scien is ic a emp o educe he aes he ic e m o a bundle o eelings.
B) Fu he mo e, by choosing o g ound aes he ic e ms in p io e ms, Heidegge is inca-
pable o emedying he p oblem o he limi a ions o aes he ic language (as opposed
o o dina y language applied o a wo ks). In o he wo ds, Heidegge ’s anscenden-
al p ojec – which sees ‘wo ld’ and ‘ea h’ as condi ions o possibili y o ‘ o m’ and
‘ma e ’ (OWA, pp. 22–38), o a p ocess o alē heuein as a condi ion o possibili y o
aes he ic expe ience (OWA, pp. 32–50) – me ely ‘deepens’ he es ic i e manne o
speaking in ol ed in aes he ic language.59 Thus Heidegge does no o e come he limi-
a ions o he ocabula y ha he philosophical adi ion discussed unde he banne
o ‘aes he ics’.
C) I seems ha he a emp o go beyond aes he ic language by ‘deepening’ ou ways o
alking o a wo ks is in ac p omp ed by he e y s ic u es ha aes he ic language
imposes. In o he wo ds, Heidegge ’s opposi ion o aes he ics is based on a diagnosis
o i s educ i e na u e, and u he mo e on he incomple eness o his educ ion. A
Wi gens einian c i ic migh say ha he seeming incomple eness in ol ed in educ-
i e ‘aes he icism’ is no hing o he han a linguis ic es ic ion, ha is, ha aes he ics
appea s educ i e only inso a as i has es ic ed ou ways o alking abou a wo ks.
The e o o dig benea h aes he ic language in o de o ind wha unde lies i p o ides
no emedy o his es ic ion – a he i is ounded upon i .
VII. Responses o he C i ique?
The h ee old Wi gens einian c i ique de eloped abo e p esupposes he alidi y o appeals
o o dina y language, and he la e Wi gens ein a gues ha he e is no highe cou o which
philosophe s may meaning ully appeal. Con a y o Heidegge , Wi gens ein speci ically
57 Mulhall (On Being, 156–95) de elops a Wi gens einian c i ique o Heidegge along hese lines.
58 No e ha he e is a basic disc epancy be ween Heidegge ’s posi ion and he es o he posi ions a ge ed by he
Wi gens einian c i ique de eloped he e. Whe eas o he a ge s may ha e no wil ully ansg essed he ules o
o dina y language, Heidegge may ha e knowingly done so. I shall e u n o he p oblem which a ises by he
possibili y ha Heidegge may e use o accep he elenchus based on o dina y usage, which also applies o (B)
and (C).
59 I should be men ioned ha (B) wo ks wi hou ejec ing he anscenden al p ojec in gene al, bu only i s pa -
icula ailu e o o e come he es ic ions on aes he ic language. (This is no ewo hy since Wi gens ein’s wo k
could be in e p e ed as in ol ed in an enqui y in o condi ions o possibili y.)
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 81
a gues agains p obing deepe o look a wha e e is hough o unde lie ou o dina y
employmen o language. A common p oblem aced by c i icisms ha ely on appeals o
o dina y language is a di icul y in inding ac ion wi h opponen s who a e dissa is ied wi h
such appeals.60 We ha e seen ha Wi gens ein’s c i ique o aes he ic scien ism elies on he
assump ion ha his a ge had imagined ha hey a e abiding by he ules o o dina y lan-
guage, and ha hey will hus pay heed o Wi gens ein’s disco e y o hei misuse o o dina y
language.
Such a s a egy migh no wo k agains a philosophe who wil ully igno es he ules o
o dina y language. This appea s o be p ecisely wha he la e Heidegge does. Con a y o
Wi gens ein, Heidegge ’s la e hough u ns owa ds a highly c i ical posi ion conce ning
he concealing unc ion o me e Ge ede wi hin o dina y language. Indeed, he posi i e di ec-
ion which he la e Heidegge ’s nega i e c i ique o aes he icism poin s o is ha o he
powe o alē heuein in ol ed in poe ic (in Heidegge ’s special sense), as opposed o o dina y,
language. The o me , as opposed o he la e , can unconceal, as all a wo ks do, some hing
undamen al abou he wo ld. Thus, due o a disag eemen conce ning he me aphilosophi-
cal signi icance o o dina y language, an impasse seems o ha e been eached.
The e a e oughly speaking wo esponses (only e y b ie ly ske ched he e) o he objec ion
a ailable o hose who would seek o de end Heidegge ’s esponse o ‘aes he icism’.61 One
possible pa h o ollow would be o deny ha Heidegge ’s employmen o language is such
as is a ge ed by Wi gens ein’s c i ique. This would equi e showing how Heidegge ’s seem-
ing linguis ic essen ialism, o his emphasis on he poe ic aspec o language, is no in u h
a p oduc o some bla an dis ega d o he ules o o dina y language. Such an in e p e a-
ion o Heidegge would ha e o explain why he uses language o en simply eminiscen o
adi ional me aphysics, sugges i e o eaching owa ds some hing mo e undamen al ha
appea ances hide. In o he wo ds, he goal would be o show ha Heidegge does no simply,
con usedly, and unknowingly, ‘ un up agains he bounds o language’ (as Wi gens ein him-
sel claims in his ew di ec e e ences o Heidegge ).62
A second esponse migh ins ead in ol e an admission o he abandonmen o he ules o
o dina y language, and a emp o o e some jus i ica ion he eo . Heidegge depa s om
o dina y language p ecisely wi h a iew owa ds eaching beyond i owa ds some hing which
he Wi gens einian c i ic seems o p ohibi ia he appeal o he o dina y usage o language.
A Heidegge ian esponse o he Wi gens einian c i icism ou lined abo e migh a gue ha
some aluable insigh is los due o he la e ’s s ic u es on he meaning ul employmen
o language. This opens he way owa ds a numbe o possible Heidegge ian objec ions o
Wi gens einian aes he ics ( hough de eloping such a gumen s would be a ask bes le o
ano he pape .)
No ice, he e, ha he e a ises a ce ain disc epancy be ween he Wi gens einian a gumen
and he possible Heidegge ian esponses. In he op ions ou lined abo e, a Heidegge ian
de ence would need o add ess he con en o Wi gens ein’s ema ks, ei he by jus i ying i sel
in e e ence o he s ic u es o o dina y language, o by ejec ing hose s ic u es. By con-
as (like a ious ‘analy ic’ objec ions agains ‘con inen al’ philosophy) he Wi gens einian
a gumen wo ks by simply in es iga ing pa icula cases in which he language is misused,
60 See S anley Ca ell, The Claim o Reason: Wi gens ein, Skep icism, Mo ali y, and T agedy (Ox o d: Ox o d
Uni e si y P ess, 1979), Pa II.
61 A hi d possible esponse, which o he sake o b e i y I shall no u he discuss, would be o challenge he
in e p e a ion o Wi gens ein ha would lead o he a gumen de eloped abo e.
62 Ludwig Wi gens ein, ‘On Heidegge on Being and D ead’, in Heidegge and Mode n Philosophy, ed. Michael
Mu ay (New Ha en, CT: Yale Uni e si y P ess, 1978), 80; see also LVW, pp. 69–77.
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics82
ins ead o ca e ully examining he con en and o e all pu pose o he philosophical heo ies
employing he language. This almos ques ion-begging peculia i y, coupled wi h he abo e
discussion, can help demons a e how he Wi gens einian a gumen can lead o he impasse
we ha e been discussing (o a ype which has o en cha ac e ised he di ide be ween ‘analy ic’
and ‘con inen al’ philosophy).63 I can unc ion as an excuse o hose al eady con inced o he
alidi y o appeals o o dina y language o igno e wo k by he opposing camp. A he same
ime, i can emain unheeded by hose who a e con inced o he me i s o anscending o di-
na y language in o de o each some hing signi ican beyond i . As demons a ed abo e, he
Wi gens einian elenchus based on o dina y language quickly leads o ques ions which con-
ce n di e en me aphilosophical and me hodological p e e ences. Bo h philosophe s ha e
elabo a e jus i ica ions, o appealing o o dina y language in he la e Wi gens ein’s case,
and o he (poe ic) leap away om i in Heidegge ’s la e wo k. The ask o c i ically exam-
ining hese con a y jus i ica ions emains beyond he bounds o his pape , which limi s
i sel o poin ing ou he apo ia ha can be eached by he pa allel c i iques o scien ism in
aes he ics.
VIII. Concluding Rema ks
Fu he app ecia ion o he a ious o he signi ican pa allels be ween Wi gens ein’s and
Heidegge ’s o e all ou looks, which any c i ical examina ion o hei disag eemen s needs
o keep in mind, also emains beyond he bounds o his pape . Su ice i o say ha o no e
hei di e gences conce ning o dina y language is no o say ha hei o e all philosophical
p ojec s a e no o he wise aligned. This pape has shown hei posi ions in aes he ics o be
su p isingly close, and o in ol e pa allel c i icisms o wha I ha e called ‘aes he ic scien ism’.
And hough hei me hods o doing so a e di e gen , i should no be o go en ha , as ou
discussion has shown, bo h philosophe s ul ima ely occupy he same side o he deba e by
ejec ing ‘aes he icism’. I has al eady been men ioned ha hei ejec ion o scien ism and
aes he icism has a ious pa allel consequences in hei o e all posi i e iews in aes he ics,
wi h bo h hinke s seeing a wo ks and ou esponses o hem as inhe en ly connec ed o
some cul u al backg ound. This connec s o o e all pa allels in hei philosophical ou looks,
e.g. in Wi gens ein’s la e concep ion o sha ed o ms o li e, which may pa ly o e lap wi h
Heidegge ’s conce n abou Being-in- he-wo ld.
In his ligh , hough he Wi gens einian c i ique de eloped abo e may no inally be con-
incing o some Heidegge ians (and i is e y likely ha analogous Heidegge ian objec ions
o appeals o o dina y language migh simila ly no con ince Wi gens einians), i is use ul in
allowing us o cla i y, compa e, and his o ically si ua e Wi gens ein’s and Heidegge ’s posi-
ions. As ou lined abo e, Wi gens ein’s app oach may be used o indica e ha Heidegge is
close o he mode n aes he ic adi ion han his own he o ic sugges s. As ou analysis has
shown, Heidegge dec ies mode n aes he ics o i s educ ionism, while a he same ime ail-
ing o con incingly a gue di ec ly agains he educ ion o aes he ics o psychology o physiol-
ogy. Ins ead, he shi s his ocus owa ds he condi ions o possibili y o aes he ics, ul ima ely
p esen ing no eason o abandoning a kind o e ised aes he icism (o any u he ype o
educ ionism) which acknowledges such condi ions o possibili y. Wi gens ein’s examina-
ion o o dina y linguis ic usage a oids, hough pe haps no unp oblema ically, ocusing on
condi ions o possibili y. Gi en an accep ance o appeals o o dina y language, which oppo-
nen s (and o cou se, Heidegge is only one among many) migh esis , Wi gens ein shows
us how o expand ou o e simpli ied concep ion o aes he ics, while also a guing agains he
63 See And eas V ahimis, Encoun e s be ween Analy ic and Con inen al Philosophy (Basings oke: Palg a e
MacMillan, 2013).
V ahimis: Wi gens ein and Heidegge agains a Science o Aes he ics 83
possibili y o an aes he ic scien ism. Compa a i ely si ua ing he wo philosophe s’ posi ions
allows us o see ha he basic di e gence o he conclusions eached by hei c i ique o aes-
he ic scien ism elies on a di e en iew o appeals o o dina y language. This acknowledge-
men helps o cla i y some o he con lic ing concep ions o aes he ics in ei he hinke ’s line
o in luence, and hus can acili a e c i ical dialogue be ween hem.
Acknowledgemen s
The inspi a ion o his pape came om deba es ha ook place a he ‘Phenomenology
and he A s’ semina held a Poin Cen e o Con empo a y A in Nicosia, Cyp us. I would
like o hank all hose who con ibu ed, and pa icula ly Ch is os Hadjioannou, who led he
semina s wi h me. An ea ly d a o his pape was p esen ed a he 2018 Eu opean Socie y
o Aes he ics con e ence a Ma ibo , Slo enia, and published as ‘Aes he ics, Scien ism, and
O dina y Language: A Compa ison be ween Wi gens ein and Heidegge ’, P oceedings o he
Eu opean Socie y o Aes he ics 10 (2018): 659–84. I owe many hanks o all hose p esen o
hei ques ions and commen s. Fo hei help ul sugges ions and c i icisms, I am hank ul o
Jona han Beale, Da id Egan, and Paul S andish.
Compe ing In e es s
The au ho has no compe ing in e es s o decla e.
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LVII/XIII,no.1 (2020): pp.64–85. DOI:
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