Truth Matters, Aesthetically

RESEARCH ARTICLE T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically Tilmann Köppe1 and Julia Langkau2 1 Uni e si y o Gö ingen, DE 2 Uni e si y o F ibou g, CH Co esponding au ho : Julia Langkau ([email protected]) This pape de ends a e sion o aes he ic cogni i ism: he u h o s a emen s exp essed, implied, o alluded o by a wo k o ic ion ma e s aes he ically, and bea s upon he wo k’s aes he ic alue. Ou aim is o explo e a ou e om u h o aes he ic alue ha claims, oughly, ha , i ou engagemen wi h a wo k o ic ion is based on u h, i is mo e i id han o he wise, and he eby con ibu es o he aes he ic alue o he wo k. Whe he u h inc eases he i idness o ou engagemen wi h ic ion is an empi ical ques ion. On he assump ion ha i does, we spell ou some consequences o he aes he ic alue, and in pa icula o he li e a y alue o a wo k, as well as o c i ical p ac ice. Keywo ds: aes he ic cogni i ism; ic ion; i idness; aes he ic alue; li e a y alue; c i ical p ac ice I. In oduc ion Wha is he ela ion be ween cogni i e and aes he ic alues? Some hold ha cogni i e al- ues can bea upon aes he ic ones1 and o he s ha aes he ic alues can bea upon cogni i e ones.2 A hi d posi ion claims ha nei he bea s upon he o he , a leas no c ucially.3 In his pape , we se ou o de end a e sion o he i s iew: ha he u h o s a emen s exp essed, implied, o alluded o by a wo k o ic ion ma e s aes he ically, and bea s upon he wo k’s aes he ic alue. In doing so, he pape de ends a pa icula e sion o cogni i ism wi h espec o li e a y wo ks, which is in line wi h wha has been labelled ‘aes he ic cogni i ism’. In i s adi ional o m, cogni i ism is he iew ha we can gain some so o knowledge o insigh om li e a y ic ion. So-called ‘neo-cogni i is s’ a gue ha li e a y ic ion can enhance o 1 See Be ys Gau , A , Emo ion and E hics (Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, 2007), chaps. 7 and 8. 2 See An hony Aumann, ‘The Rela ionship be ween Aes he ic Value and Cogni i e Value’, Jou nal o Aes he ics and A C i icism 72 (2014): 117–27; Alexand e Declos, ‘The Aes he ic and Cogni i e Value o Su p ise’, P oceedings o he Eu opean Socie y o Aes he ics 6 (2014): 52–69. 3 See Pe e Lama que and S ein Haugom Olsen, T u h, Fic ion, and Li e a u e: A Philosophical Pe spec i e (Ox o d: Cla endon P ess, 1994); o u he e e ences conce ning he h ee posi ions, see Aumann, ‘Rela ionship’, 124–25nn1–3; o gene al discussion, see also Dominic McI e Lopes, ‘The My h o (Non-Aes he ic) A is ic Value’, Philosophical Qua e ly 61 (2011): 518–36. Köppe, Tilmann and Julia Langkau. ‘T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically.’ Es e ika: The Eu opean Jou nal o Aes he ics LVIII/XIV, no. 2 (2021): pp. 114–128. DOI: h ps://doi.o g/10.33134/eeja.224 ESTETIKA THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically 115 en ich ou exis ing knowledge.4 Acco ding o Be ys Gau , aes he ic cogni i ism comp ises wo claims: an epis emic claim and an aes he ic claim. The epis emic claim has i ha we can gain non- i ial knowledge om a . The aes he ic claim is ha he knowledge we hus gain can con ibu e o he wo k’s aes he ic alue.5 The iew pu o wa d in his pape s ays neu al ega ding whe he he ele an u hs a e new o he eade o no , and whe he hey a e newly unde s ood by hem o no . We a e in e es ed in he ela ion be ween u hs ha he eade migh e en ha e been amilia wi h p io o hei encoun e wi h he wo k, on he one hand, and he aes he ic alue o he wo k, on he o he hand. Ou aim is o explo e a ou e om u h o aes he ic alue ha claims, oughly, ha , i ou engagemen wi h a wo k is based on u h, i is mo e i id han o he wise, and his con ibu es o he aes he ic alue o he wo k. One may objec by claiming ha , o coun as cogni i ism p ope , he u h in ques ion has o add o he eade ’s knowledge, o a leas enhance hei unde s anding o he ma e . Howe e , o ou e sion o cogni i ism i is enough ha u h and aes he ic alue a e ele an ly connec ed. The idea ha u h con ibu es o he i idness o ou imaginings is pu o wa d, albei in passing only, by Kendall Wal on in his Mimesis as Make-Belie e.6 We hink i is wo h explo ing in mo e de ail. In he second sec ion o ou pape , we hus p esen Wal on’s claim ha u h may enhance he i idness o ou engagemen wi h a wo k o ic ion. We explain his idea mo e ully and make some sugges ions as o how i could be ue. Whe he u h inc eases he i idness o ou engagemen wi h ic ion is an empi ical ques ion and will ha e o be es ed by empi ical esea ch. Howe e , in he emaining sec ions, we wo k on he assump ion ha i is co ec and spell ou some consequences o he aes he ic and li e a y alue o a wo k, as well as o c i ical p ac ice. In he hi d sec ion, we u n o ques ions o alue. Vi idness has o en been hough o as a (posi i e) aes he ic alue. I i idness is conside ed an aes he ic alue, and i i is co ec ha u h enhances he i idness o ou engagemen wi h a wo k o ic ion, hen he u h o s a e- men s exp essed, implied, o alluded o by he wo k con ibu es o i s aes he ic alue. This iew con lic s wi h wha we may call li e a y an i-cogni i ism, a iew ha was de ended mos o ce ully by Pe e Lama que and S ein Haugom Olsen in hei T u h, Fic ion, and Li e a u e. While Lama que and Olsen hink ha u h is i ele an o a wo k’s li e a y alue, we a gue ha i idness should in ac be conside ed c ucial o wha he au ho s ake o be he co - ne s one o a wo k’s li e a y alue, which esides cen ally in he wo k’s capaci y o exp ess a powe ul ‘ ision’ o some humanly in e es ing con en , and he no ion o a powe ul ision can be pa ly spelled ou in e ms o he i idness o he eade ’s engagemen wi h he wo k. Hence, i u h enhances i idness and i i idness is c ucial o he no ion o li e a y alue, cogni i e alues bea on aes he ic ones in Lama que and Olsen’s e y own e ms. In he ou h sec ion, we sugges ha , on he one hand, poin ing o he u hs exp essed by a wo k o ic ion should play an impo an ole in c i ical p ac ice, because c i ics can he eby enable eade s o ully app ecia e he ‘powe ulness’ o some ‘humanly in e es ing con en ’ as de eloped by a wo k o li e a y ic ion. On he o he hand, we gi e some easons why his does no mean ha c i ics should a gue o he u h o claims exp essed by a wo k o ic- ion. We hus go some s eps owa ds explaining why ou igh deba e abou he u h o hese claims seems o be absen om li e a y c i icism. 4 See John Gibson, Fic ion and he Wea e o Li e (Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, 2007). 5 See Gau , A , Emo ion and E hics, chap. 7.1, o a discussion conce ning he epis emic claim, and chap. 8 o he aes he ic claim. 6 Kendall L. Wal on, Mimesis as Make-Belie e: On he Founda ions o he Rep esen a ional A s (Camb idge, MA: Ha a d Uni e si y P ess, 1990). Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically116 II. T u h and Vi idness In his Mimesis as Make-Belie e, Kendall Wal on commen s on he ela ion be ween he u h o wha is imagined in ou engagemen wi h ic ion, imagina i e i idness, and ‘a is ic’ pu - poses. He no es ha , i s , knowing ha wha one imagines is ue may enhance he i idness (o ‘ i aci y’, as Wal on has i ) o one’s imaginings and, second, ha u h may hus se e ‘a is ic’ pu poses: The i aci y o he eade ’s imaginings may be enhanced by he knowledge ha wha he imagines is ue, by his ealiza ion o he eali y o he se ing o a s o y and i s cha - ac e s and e en s. E en i The Execu ione ’s Song [by No man Maile ] – o Tols oy’s Wa and Peace, o ha ma e – is ead mainly as a agic able o an ad en u e s o y and no wi h an eye o imp o ing (in any di ec way) one’s knowledge and unde s anding o he ac ual his o ic e en s, i is likely o be mo e exci ing, mo e g ipping, i one akes i o be la gely accu a e han i would o he wise be. […] To he ex en ha ‘a is ic’ pu - poses a e dis inc om cogni i e ones, hey may be se ed by ge ing he ac s igh . The eno mous e o s no elis s some imes expend in esea ching he se ings o hei ic ions and he his o ical igu es hey use as cha ac e s a e no o be explained solely, some imes p obably no a all, by an in e es in in o ming he eade abou hem. The pu pose may be – o use an excep ionally obscu e wo d – o enhance ‘ ealism’.7 Le us s a by no ing wo hings, which can hen be se aside. Fi s , Wal on no es ha ‘ge - ing he ac s igh ’ may be among he au ho ’s a is ic pu poses, bu he does no go in o much de ail as o how knowledge o hese ac s ge s ac oss o he eade . The sen ences o he wo k may be s aigh o wa dly ue, bu u hs may also be o he wise exp essed, implied, o alluded o by he wo k, o hey may be a p esupposi ion o unde s anding wha he wo k is abou , and so on. These di e ences do no ma e o ou pu poses. Fu he , as Wal on no es in a c oss- e e ence, he eade s’ knowledge ha wha hey imagine is ue may also s em om he ac ha hey imagine some hing ‘o some ac ual objec ’ ha is in hei p es- ence.8 Since we a e conce ned wi h li e a y ic ion, he case o immedia e pe cep ion is no ele an o us. Howe e , as we shall see, he i idness o he eade ’s engagemen wi h he wo k may e y well bene i om ha ing pe cei ed some objec in he pas , and hence om aking o be ue ha his objec has ce ain pe cep ual p ope ies. Second, Wal on endo ses a pa icula idea o he connec ion be ween ic ion and imagina ion as ‘make-belie e’.9 Bu we should no e om he ou se ha , o he pu pose o explo ing a ou e om u h h ough i idness o aes he ic alue, no hing much hangs on he p ecise con ou s o ei he he no ion o imagining o he ela ion be ween ou imagina ion and wo ks o ic ion. While we ake i ha an accoun ha assigns he imagina ion a cen al place in ou engagemen wi h ic ion is basically igh ,10 we hink ha ou iew is independen o any heo y abou he a i ude 7 Ibid., 93–94. 8 In his c oss- e e ence, Wal on links his obse a ion o his discussion o ‘p ops’, whe e he epo s he ‘imp ession which I ha e, and which I suspec o he s sha e, ha an expe ience o imagining a bea is likely o be mo e “ i id” i one imagines o some ac ual objec ha i is a bea han i one does no ’ (ibid., 26). 9 See ibid., chap. 1. 10 See G ego y Cu ie, Imagining and Knowing: The Shape o Fic ion (Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, 2020), chaps. 1 and 2, o discussion. Recen con ibu ions o he deba e include S acie F iend, ‘Fic i e U e ance and Imagin- ing II’, P oceedings o he A is o elian Socie y Supplemen a y Volume 85 (2011): 163–80; De ek Ma a e s, Fic ion and Na a i e (Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, 2014); Albe o Vol olini, ‘The Na u e o Fic ion/al U e ances’, Kai os 17 (2016): 28–55; Ka hleen S ock, Only Imagine: Fic ion, In e p e a ion, and Imagina ion (Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, 2017). Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically 117 we ypically ake (o a e p esc ibed o ake). Wha we a e in e es ed in is a quali a i e ea u e o ou engagemen wi h ic ion ha is assessable independen ly. Any heo y conce ning he a i ude ha cha ac e izes ou engagemen wi h ic ion has o accoun o he ac ha ou engagemen wi h ic ion can be mo e o less i id. This should no be su p ising, since i is commonly held ha , besides imagina ion, memo ies, belie s, o d eams can be i id, and some imes e en eal-li e expe iences. Because he au ho s we discuss hold ha imagina ion is he cen al men al a i ude in ou engagemen wi h ic ion, and o easons o simplici y, we e e o he ele an a i ude as ‘imagining’. We can now u n o a mo e p ecise cha ac e iza ion o ou cen al hesis conce ning he ela ion be ween u h, imagining, and i idness in o de o pa e he way o an explana ion o he bea ing o his ela ion on he aes he ic alue o a li e a y wo k o ic ion. Conce ning he connec ion be ween u h, imagining, and i idness, wha we a e dealing wi h is a psy- chological dependency hesis o he o m ‘X ends o be la ge i i is based on Y han i i is no based on Y’. ‘X’ is a placeholde o he i idness o ou imagining some p oposi ion p as pa o ou engagemen wi h wo ks o ic ion. ‘Y’ is a placeholde o ‘ aking p o be ue’ o , o sho , ‘belie ing p’. As can be seen om i s cons i uen s, he psychological dependency hesis is an empi ical hesis. We can he e o e begin i s cla i ica ion by no ing ha i should be expec ed o exhibi ou egula ea u es o such heses. Fi s , he e a e ce ain backg ound condi ions ha need o ob ain o he dependency be ween X and Y o hold. Resea ch indica es ha people show indi idual di e ences in hei esponses o ic ion mo e gene ally, as well as in hei capaci y o imagine some hing i - idly.11 Also, whe he o no someone imagines some hing i idly is expec ed o depend on si ua ional ac o s, as well as on he e y p oposi ion in ques ion. Thus, imaginings may be blocked om being i id by some si ua ional dis ac ions, and some u hs ha a e ega ded as dull o abs ac will simply no be candida es o i id imagining. Second, he posi i e dependency be ween ‘ aking p o be ue’ and ‘imagining p i idly’ should be hough o as p obabilis ic. I is an empi ical p edic ion o he e ec ha , i we look a su icien ly many ins ances, we will see he p edic ed dependency. Thi d, he compa a i e claim (‘la ge wi h Y han wi hou Y’) o he dependency hesis should be hough o as go e ned by a ce e is pa ibus p o iso: he p edic ed e ec will occu , o he hings being equal, ha is, only i no o he ac o s a e in e e ing wi h i . Also, he hesis does no imply ha o he ac o s may no o e ide he p edic ed e ec . Fou h, as wi h any empi ical claim, he psychological dependency hesis is in need o empi ical con i ma ion. While empi ical es ing is beyond he scope o his pape , in wha ollows we p o ide some easons o hink ha he psychological dependency hesis is in ac ue. Doing so comes as pa and pa cel wi h explaining he no ion o i idness in ol ed. This is he ask o which we u n now. Wal on gi es bu one hin as o how an inc ease in i idness may be unde s ood in he p esen con ex , namely as imaginings ha a e ‘mo e exci ing, mo e g ipping’. An expe ience ha is bo h exci ing and g ipping can be unde s ood as one ha no only ca ches bu also sus ains ou a en ion and keeps us ocused on wha is imagined. P esumably, i also does so in an a ec i ely cha ged way, as is he case when we de elop an emo ional in e es in he heme o he li e a y wo k, o in some o he subjec -le el pa icula s such as a ce ain cha ac- e . Fo ins ance, we may hope ha hings u n ou well o an ado ed cha ac e , o ea ha 11 See Richa d Ge ig, ‘Indi idual Di e ences in Reade s’ Na a i e Expe iences’, Scien i ic S udy o Li e a u e 1 (2011): 88–94; Xu Cui e al., ‘Vi idness o Men al Image y: Indi idual Va iabili y Can Be Measu ed Objec i ely’, Vision Resea ch 47 (2007): 474–78. Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically118 hey migh no . And, indeed, he e a e good easons o hink ha he ela ionship be ween u h and i idness holds in his ega d. Ou imaginings may be mo e i id in he sense o being mo e exci ing and mo e g ipping when hey a e based on wha we ake o be ue because we migh belie e ha someone, possibly we ou sel es, could be a ec ed by wha we imagine. When imagining some hing abou , say, Gandal (a cha ac e in J. R. R. Tolkien’s an asy gen e ic ion), a eade would usually no hink ha hey could be a ec ed in any way ha goes beyond hei engagemen wi h he no el. Bu imagining, say, ha a no o ious mass mu de e is on he un will keep he eade ocused and be mo e emo ional i hey also belie e ha he mu de e exis s and may e en be in he icini y. The eade ’s exci emen may consis in ea o hemsel es o o he s, in hopes o e ade he mu de e , and so on. So, he eade ’s imagining may be mo e i id in he sense o being bo h a en i ely ocused and a ec i ely cha ged when i is based on wha hey belie e is ue.12 In addi ion o his, he e a e a leas ou u he ways in which he i idness o ou engagemen wi h ic ion may be a ec ed by he u h o wha we imagine. Fi s , ou imagin- ings may be mo e i id in he sense o being mo i a ionally cha ged. An expe ience ha is i id in his sense is one in which you ha e a endency o ac upon wha is on you mind. The u h o wha we imagine may play an impo an pa he e, oo. This is so because ou belie se is no decoupled om ou mo i a ional sys em. I we belie e some p oposi ion p, we will be disposed o ac upon i (i app op ia e, gi en he con en o p and ele an u he ci cums ances). So, i we en e ain p as pa o ou engagemen wi h ic ion and p is based on u h, we migh also imagine being mo i a ed o ac upon p, o we migh ac ually be mo i a ed o ac upon p. Again, he abo e-men ioned example o he mass mu de e may come o mind. I you hink ha wha you ead is ue, hen his may e y well dispose you o ac upon i in some app op ia e ways. Wi hou u h, we would expec you imaginings o be decoupled om eali y, and hence he e will be no immedia e mo i a ional p essu e o in e e e wi h hings. Second, he i idness o ou imagining ha p may be a unc ion o he easiness o spon a- nei y wi h which we b ing p o mind. I is ha d o imagine p i idly i we ha e no idea wha p is abou , i we hink i is unlikely o e en impossible, o i we o o he easons ha e o in es a lo o e o in o imagining i . In con as , imagining ha p is compa a i ely easy when i is based on wha we ake o be ue anyway. Suppose a eade has ne e hea d o Da e Sco and inds i ha d o imagine ha someone could win he I onman Wo ld Championship six imes. Bu suppose he eade belie es ha Sco did win he I onman Wo ld Championship six imes – hen imagining i will be easy.13 No e ha he ease wi h which we imagine some hing may no cons i u e an aspec o i idness bu a he only p omo e i . This would, o cou se, also p o ide an answe o he ques ion why, in he con ex o eading li e a y ic ion, imagin- ings based on wha we ake o be ue end o be mo e i id han me e imaginings. Thi d, belie s a e always embedded in o he belie s. I we belie e ha p, we will usually also belie e many hings implied by p; we will, ollowing some minimal a ionali y equi emen , belie e some hings ha cons i u e e idence o p and ha p is e idence o . We may, mo eo- e , ha e ce ain highe -o de a i udes (such as: I wan o ha e his belie as long as i is ue) and belie e ce ain coun e ac ual condi ions (I would gi e up his belie i I we e con inced o i s alsi y). In sho , a belie ha p will be mo e o less i mly en enched in ou web o 12 Compa e Richa d Nisbe and Lee Ross, Human In e ence: S a egies and Sho comings o Social Judgmen (Englewood Cli s, NJ: P en ice-Hall, 1980), chap. 3, on ac o s con ibu ing o he ‘emo ional in e es ’ o in o - ma ion, which in u n has an impac on he ‘ i idness’ o he in o ma ion. 13 See Cu ie, Imagining and Knowing, 159, o a ela ed a gumen om e olu iona y psychology. Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically 119 belie and, in his sense, be unde s ood by us.14 This may ha e wo consequences o ou co - esponding imaginings. On he one hand, he i idness o an imagina i e episode may be a unc ion o he amoun o de ail o he imagining.15 So, i , because o co esponding belie s, he e a e many implica ions a hand, his may acili a e imagining some hing i idly in he sense o imagining some hing wi h many (imagined) implica ions. On he o he hand, jus as a belie ha p would be mo e o less i mly en enched in ou web o belie and he eby unde s ood, ou imagining ha p may be mo e i id in he sense o bo h being en enched in a ‘web o imagining’ and being unde s ood. Conside Da e Sco again: i you belie e ha Sco won he I onman Wo ld Championship six imes, you will mos likely belie e many o he hings as well, including ha he e is a wo ld- amous ia hlon ace loca ed on Hawaii, ha i consis s o a swim, a bicycle ide, and a ma a hon, ha i is hough o as one o he mos di icul aces in he wo ld, ha winning i is e y ha d, and so on. In his sense, you imagining ha Sco won he I onman Wo ld Championship six imes will be bo h mo e de ailed and (mo e ully) unde s ood i i is based on u he belie s.16 Fou h, i ou imagining is based on u h, he e will some imes be some eal objec we may eso o in o de o u nish ou imaginings wi h phenomenal ( isual, audi o y, ac ile, o gus- a o y) p ope ies. Fo ins ance, imagining ha some e en s ake place on he Twin Towe s in New Yo k Ci y may in oke men al images o he Twin Towe s. Thus, imagining some hing o some eal objec may make ou imagining ca ego ically di e en om me e p oposi ional imagining such ha we imagine isual p ope ies o some hing, o imagine seeing some- hing. The imagining may he e o e be mo e i id in he sense ha i has phenomenal p op- e ies ha a e e ie ed om memo y.17 This is he sense in which i ma e s whe he he eade has pe cei ed he ele an ac ual objec in he pas (see he beginning o his sec ion). As he o egoing conside a ions should ha e shown, ‘ i idness’, when applied o ou engagemen wi h wo ks o ic ion, is an umb ella e m ha co e s a ange o di e en phe- nomena, namely (compa a i ely high le els o ) he a en i eness and ocus we b ing o ou imagina i e en e p ise, i s being a ec i ely and mo i a ionally cha ged, he ease and spon a- nei y o ou imaginings, hei amoun o de ail, he amoun o unde s anding in ol ed, and phenomenal p ope ies o wha we imagine. As we wish o unde s and i , he e is a disjunc- i e se o indi idually su icien and non-exclusi e ea u es ha cons i u e he i idness o ou engagemen wi h wo ks o ic ion. Wha binds hese di e en ea u es oge he is ha hey a e all sensi i e o u h, as explained by he psychological dependency hesis. In a nu - shell, gi en he app op ia e backg ound condi ions a e me , ou imagina i e engagemen will (ce e is pa ibus) be mo e i id in any, some, o all o he ways we ha e jus explained, i we ake wha we imagine o be ue. 14 Fo a no ion o unde s anding along hese lines, see Linda Zagzebski, Vi ues o he Mind: An Inqui y in o he Na u e o Vi ue and he E hical Founda ions o Knowledge (Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess, 1996), 49. 15 The amoun o de ail is some imes said o be ele an o (o explana o y o ) he i idness o men al images, no o p oposi ional imaginings; see Amy Kind, ‘Imagina i e Vi idness’, Jou nal o he Ame ican Philosophical Asso- cia ion 3 (2017): 32–50, and Julia Langkau, ‘Two Kinds o Imagina i e Vi idness’, Canadian Jou nal o Philosophy 51 (2021): 33–47. Bu p oposi ional imaginings can be mo e o less de ailed oo, o example, by consis ing o la ge o smalle numbe s o ele an p oposi ions. 16 Compa e also F iend, ‘Fic i e U e ance and Imagining II’, 173–75, o empi ical e idence ha ou eal-wo ld knowledge is ac i a ed when eading ic ion, and o an a gumen ha his ac i a ion is indeed necessa y o basic unde s anding. 17 A guably, phenomenal p ope ies can hemsel es be mo e o less i id; see Kind, ‘Imagina i e Vi idness’ and Langkau, ‘Two Kinds o Imagina i e Vi idness’. See also Rena e B osch, ‘Wha We “See” When We Read: Visualiza- ion and Vi idness in Reading Fic ional Na a i es’, Co ex 105 (2018): 135–43, o a e iew o empi ical esea ch on men al image y while eading ic ion. Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically120 To ge clea e on ou hesis, le us discuss some po en ial coun e e idence. Suppose ha we obse e ha some imaginings a e especially i id e en i – o maybe in some sense because – hey a e e y emo e om he u h. Ho o ic ion may be especially exci ing and g ip- ping (indeed, all oo g ipping o some), and s ill i is abundan ly clea o anybody ha he d ead ul mons e s do no exis . Wha his shows is ha u h is no necessa y o imagina i e i idness, o so he objec ion goes.18 Now, while we ce ainly ag ee ha u h is no necessa y o imagina i e i idness, poin ing his ou in no way h ea ens he psychological depend- ency hesis. Suppose ha you wa ch a ho o mo ie, and you ind i exci ing and g ipping. The psychological dependency hesis p edic s ha you would ind i e en mo e exci ing and g ipping i you ( o wha e e eason) hink ha wha you imagine is ue. The psychologi- cal dependency hesis hus amoun s o some so o a (coun e ac ual) compa ison be ween wo imaginings o he e y same con en such ha , in he one case, you will imagine some con en (simplici e ), while in he o he case you will imagine his con en and also ake i o be ue. In his compa a i e scena io, he p edic ed e ec is ha you imaginings will ce e is pa ibus be mo e i id in he second case. No e also ha he psychological dependency hesis does no claim ha u h will c ea e i idness in he sense ha i is causally su icien . Ra he , u h will ( end o) enhance i idness, gi en ha all ele an ci cums ances a e such ha i - idness is a possibili y in he i s place.19 Is he e any empi ical e idence a ailable ha shows ha he psychological dependency hesis migh be ue? We a e awa e o no s udies ha a e di ec ly pe inen o his hesis, bu he e is some in e es ing esea ch in i s icini y ha could be ele an . Nico F ijda hypo hesizes ha emo ions ‘eme ge, wax, and wane acco ding o ules in s ic ly de e mined ashion’,20 and he se s ou o o mula e ‘laws’ ha cap u e hese empi ical egula i ies. Among hem is he ‘law o appa en eali y’, which eads as ollows: ‘Emo ions a e elici ed by e en s app aised as eal, and hei in ensi y co esponds o he deg ee o which his is he case.’21 The i s hing o no ice is ha , since his ‘law’ is coined on he elici ing condi ions o emo ions speci ically, i add esses only pa o wha we ha e iden i ied as cons i u ing he i idness o ou engage- men wi h wo ks o ic ion. Howe e , i does i he psychological dependency nicely since app aising e en s ‘as eal’ seems o in ol e he belie ha an emo ion s imulus is eal.22 In a mo e ecen s udy by G een, Cha ham, and Ses i , F ijda’s ‘law’ is dubbed as a ‘“common sense” iew’ ha sugges s ‘ ha non ic ion ( ac ) would c ea e heigh ened emo ions as com- pa ed o ic ional ma e ials. […] All else equal, o he ex en ha an indi idual conside s an ac ual pe son’s dea h mo e eal han a ic ional dea h, i should e oke mo e g ie .’23 The s udy is o pa icula in e es o us because he au ho s in e p e hei own esul s as showing ha his ‘common sense iew’ migh be w ong. In hei s udy, wo expe imen s we e conduc ed 18 Thanks o Pe e Lama que o p o iding his objec ion. 19 We should also no assume ha a lack o u h gene ally leads o lack o i idness: Reading ic ion may lead o i id imaginings o easons o he han aking wha we imagine o be ue. Howe e , suppose ha you i idly imagine some hing you ake o be ue, only o lea n hen ha i is no ue a e all. In such a case, you imagin- ing will hen a guably become less i id in any, some, o maybe all o he sense we ha e explained. Fo a simila p edic ion conce ning ou emo ional engagemen wi h ic ions, see Colin Rad o d, ‘How Can We Be Mo ed by he Fa e o Anna Ka enina?’, in A guing Abou A : Con empo a y Philosophical Deba es, 2nd ed., ed. Alex Neill and Aa on Ridley (London: Rou ledge, 2002), 240. 20 Nico H. F ijda, ‘The Laws o Emo ion’, Ame ican Psychologis 43 (1988): 349. 21 Ibid., 352. 22 I is mo e di icul o explain he co ela ion implica ed in F ijda’s o mula ion o he ‘law’. In wha sense does ‘being eal’ allow o deg ees? Pe haps one can spell ou deg ees o ‘app aisal’ in e ms o deg ees o ‘c edence’; see D. Hugh Mello , P obabili y (New Yo k: Rou ledge 2005), chap. 5. 23 Melanie C. G een, Ch is ophe Cha ham, and Ma c A. Ses i , ‘Emo ion and T anspo a ion in o Fac and Fic ion’, Scien i ic S udy o Li e a u e 2 (2012): 42. Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically 121 ha measu ed he emo ional eac ions o eade s depending on whe he hey ead a ex labelled as ei he ‘ ic ion’ o ‘non- ic ion’. Wha he au ho s ound indica es ha how a s o y is labelled does no ha e an e ec on he indi iduals’ emo ional esponse.24 A i s sigh , his seems o con adic he psychological dependency hesis wi h espec o he emo ional aspec s. Howe e , he e is why we hink i does no . Fi s , we mus be ca e ul no o equa e he p esen a ion o a s o y as ‘ ac ’ wi h he eade ’s belie ing wha hey ha e been old. Some eade s may s aigh o wa dly ake as ue wha hey a e old due o such labelling alone, bu o he s may be mo e ca e ul. A e all, all hey ge o con ince hem o he u h is a label in some expe imen al design. Wha is mo e, i may e y well be ha indi iduals ‘ o ge ’ abou he labelling o a s o y as ac o ic ion when imme sed in a s o y: hey migh p ocess he in o ma ion in a ious ways, including (pe haps au oma ically) checking i s pu a i e u h by d awing on hei indi idual knowledge esou ces. Second, in e ences conce ning he psychological dependency hesis will also be somewha blu ed by he ac ha indi iduals who ead he ex s labelled as ‘ ic ion’ will p esumably belie e many hings connec ed o he con en s o he ic ion.25 In any case, we should no assume ha labelling a ex as ‘ ic ion’ will au oma ically esul in eade s’ disbelie in wha is said, le alone in wha is implied o alluded o by he ic ion. I is he e o e no clea ha any di e ences in emo ional eac ion can be aced back o he p esence o absence o indi idu- als’ belie s conce ning he con en s o he s o ies o conce ning wha is implied o alluded o. Thi d, we ha e some qualms conce ning some backg ound assump ions o he s udy: Al hough he e a e some di e ences be ween emo ions in esponse o ic ion and emo ions in esponse o eal e en s ( o example, being a aid o a mons e in a mo ie does no gene ally p omp one o un o he exi s o pull ou a weapon; sadness o e a cha ac e ’s dea h is a ely as long-las ing as g ie o e he loss o a eal lo ed one), ou p emise is ha he immedia e expe ience o he emo ion has he same essen- ial quali ies ega dless o whe he ha emo ion is spa ked by na a i e o by ac ual e en s. The e o e, ou esea ch ques ion is no whe he ic ion can p oduce emo ion, bu whe he he in ensi y o he emo ion p oduced by a na a i e a ies depending on whe he he na a i e is desc ibed as ac ual o ic ional.26 No e, i s , ha he au ho s make wo claims he e ha do no go well oge he . On he one hand, hey acknowledge ha emo ions in esponse o ic ion gene ally di e in hei mo i a- ional powe and du a ion om hose p oduced by eal s imuli; on he o he hand, hey hold ha ‘ he immedia e expe ience’ o hese emo ions does no di e om hei eali y-di ec ed coun e pa s. Howe e , we belie e ha he mo i a ional endency o an emo ion (whe he one eels an u ge o ac ) does coun among he ‘essen ial quali ies’ o ‘ he immedia e expe- ience’ o an emo ion. Mo e impo an ly, in decla ing ha a mo i a ional endency is no among he ‘essen ial quali ies’ o he ‘immedia e expe ience’ o emo ion, he au ho s simply gloss o e wha we ake o be an impo an aspec o i idness (as explained abo e), namely he ex en o which wha is imagined is mo i a ionally cha ged. I indi iduals in ei he he 24 Ibid., 52. Mo e ecen esea ch in he e ec s o labelling ex s as ‘ ic ion’ o ‘non- ic ion’ is epo ed in F anziska Ha ung e al., ‘When Fic ion Is Jus as Real as Fac : No Di e ences in Reading Beha io be ween S o ies Belie ed o Be Based on T ue o Fic ional E en s’, F on ie s in Psychology 8, no. 1618 (2017). 25 See again n. 15 abo e and F iend, ‘Fic i e U e ance and Imagining II’. See also Cu ie, Imagining and Knowing, 187–88. 26 G een, Cha ham, and Ses i , ‘Emo ion and T anspo a ion in o Fac and Fic ion’, 42. Köppe and Langkau: T u h Ma e s, Aes he ically122 ic ion o he non- ic ion condi ion el some endency o ac upon wha hey ead, hen his would coun owa ds he i idness o he espec i e expe ience. In sum, we ake i ha empi ically es ing he psychological dependency hesis equi es no only b eaking i up in o se e al heses conce ning he di e en aspec s o i idness iden i ied abo e bu also esolu ely checking ha he belie condi ion is sa is ied as pa o he es - ing p ocedu e. This does no mean, howe e , ha he expe imen s e e ed o abo e migh no ha e an impo an lesson o each o ou case. In o de o ge o hose lessons, le us assume (con a y o ou wo ies a icula ed abo e) ha indi iduals did belie e he p oposi- ion exp essed in he non- ic ion condi ion o he expe imen and did no ake as ue wha was p esen ed o hem in he ic ion condi ion. Wha could explain ha he e was no di e - ence conce ning he ‘in ensi y’ o he emo ion expe ienced in ei he case? The key o answe - ing his ques ion could lie in he ac ha in nei he o he expe imen al condi ions we e he indi iduals in any way a ec ed by wha hey we e old. The s o ies in bo h he ic ion and non- ic ion condi ions simply did no conce n hem, because (le us assume) hey we e aken ei he o be pu ely ic ional o o deal wi h wha happened o some unknown people some ime ago. The ‘ u hs’ hey con eyed we e hus p ac ically i ele an . Abo e, we men ioned ha among he backg ound condi ions ha need o hold o he psychological dependency hesis a e condi ions pe aining o he con en o wha is belie ed. Speci ically, we no ed ha he u hs in ques ion mus no be ega ded as dull o abs ac . Now, in he p esen case, his may be ele an in he ollowing sense: he u hs in ques ion ha e o somehow conce n he indi idual. The p oposi ion ha ‘man is mo al’ will be abs ac and dull o you o as long as you do no ealize ha i applies o you. This hypo hesis is consis en wi h how F ijda explains he ‘law o appa en eali y’. Acco ding o him, emo ional s imuli a e especially e ec i e (‘ eal’) i hey a e based on sense expe ience, because he pe cei e is pe sonally a ec ed by hem. Simila ly, in ou explana ion o he no ion o i idness, we e e ed o he example o belie ing ha a mass mu de e migh be in he icini y – which is supposed o accoun o a heigh ened a ec i e and mo i a ional one o he expe ience. In such cases, indi iduals may de elop belie s ha a e egocen ic: hey in some sense in ol e he indi iduals hemsel es. We hink ha i is qui e plausible o expec such belie s in he con ex o eading li e a y wo ks o ic ion. As Ma ha Nussbaum emphasizes, li e a u e ‘speaks abou us, abou ou li es and choices and emo ions, abou ou social exis ence and he o ali y o ou connec ions’.27 We hus conclude ou discussion o he connec ion be ween u h and i idness by assuming ha he ollowing holds: i we ake wha we imagine o be ue, hen his will (gi en ha app op ia e backg ound condi ions a e me ) ce e is pa ibus heigh en he p obabili y ha ou imaginings a e mo e i id in any, some, o all o he senses explained abo e. III. Vi idness, Aes he ic Value, and Li e a y Value In his sec ion, we discuss he hesis ha , when engaged wi h a li e a y wo k o ic ion, i id imaginings bea on he aes he ic alue o ha wo k. We do so, i s , by conside ing a mo e gene al no ion o aes he ic alue and, second, by conside ing he a he speci ic no ion o li e a y alue as de eloped by Lama que and Olsen. While we ouch upon he mo e gene al no ion o aes he ic alue only in passing, ou main aim is o a gue ha i idness and hence u h ma e s o he speci ic no ion o li e a y alue. In his The Opaci y o Na a i e, Lama que uses ‘ i id’ o e e o a quali y o he w i ing o a no el: ‘no els a e p aised o denig a ed o he quali y o he w i ing, i s i idness, powe , 27 Ma ha C. Nussbaum, Lo e’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Li e a u e (New Yo k: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess, 1990), 171.