Great Britain and the Great Powers Rivalry in North China at the Beginning of the 20th Century

G ea B i ain and he G ea Powe s Ri al y in No h China a he Beginning o he 20 h Cen u y1 Roman Kode Fo mos o he 19 h cen u y G ea B i ain main ained an almos dominan posi ion in he Chinese poli ics and ade. Al hough i had o compe e wi h o he G ea Pow‑ e s — especially F ance and Russia — in his pe iod, he in e es s o hese coun ies we e o a long ime limi ed o pa icula a eas and in he key egions, hey we e no able o compe e wi h B i ain.2 Howe e his si ua ion began o change conside ably du ing he la e 80s and 90s o he 19 h cen u y. The ascend o he new G ea Powe s in China and he s eng hening o he Russian in e es s in no he n China3 ep esen ed a se ious challenge o he B i ish posi ion in he coun y.4 The Fa Eas became one o he main subjec s o i al y be ween he G ea Powe s a he end o he 19 h cen u y. The unsuccess ul Chinese e o s o e o m he Qing Empi e des abilized he land and di ided he in e nal poli ical scene o he coun y, which wasn’ able o challenge he inc eased p essu e om ou side.5 The weakened empi e became a ic im o he Eu‑ opean powe s, which ollowed hei own, mainly economic, in e es s. Howe e he inc eased in e es in China c ea ed condi ions o he disag eemen s among hem, especially G ea B i ain and Russia obse ed opposi e cou se in hei Fa Eas e n pol‑ icy, which was demons a ed by inc eased Russian e o s in he ques ion o p o id‑ ing loans o China.6 Mo eo e a he end o he 19 h cen u y a new powe igo ously en e ed in o he Chinese policy p oclaiming i s own in e es s in he Middle King‑ 1 This ex is one o he esul s o he g an “Poli ical and Economic In e es s o G ea B i - ain and Ge many in China in 1894–1914” awa ded by he G an Agency o he Czech Re- public (GA13–12431S). 2 R. BICKERS, The Sc amble o China: Fo eign De ils in he Qing Empi e 1832–1914, New Yo k, London 2012, pp. 152 . 3 A. MALOZEMOFF, Russian Fa Eas e n Policy 1881–1904, Be keley, Los Angeles 1958, p. 36. 4 T. G. OTTE, The China Ques ion: G ea Powe Ri al y and B i ish Isola ion, 1894–1905, Ox o d 2007, p. 3. 5 To his ques ion see D. SCOTT, China and he In e na ional Sys em 1940–1949, New Yo k 2008, pp. 117–142. Compa e wi h OTTE, pp. 74 . To he p oblem o Qing e o ms a he end o he 19 h cen u y see D. TWITCHETT — J. K. FAIRBANK, The Camb idge His o y o China, Vol. 10, Pa I, London, New Yo k, Melbou ne 1995, pp. 491 ; o he e o ms in China in he second hal o he 19 h cen u y see D. PONG, Shen Pao ‑chen and China’s Mode niza ion in he Nine een h Cen u y, Camb idge, New Yo k 1994. 6 To he G ea Powe ’s policy in China see OTTE, p. 80. ROMAN KOdET 99 dom. The dynamic Japanese en y in o he powe policy in China and i s p o ec o ‑ a e Ko ea7 had impo an consequences on he in e na ional scene — especially he Russo ‑Japanese i al y should ha e had c i ical impac on he e olu ion o he in e ‑ na ional ela ions. The Russo ‑Japanese con en ion s a ed al eady a he u n o he 18 h and 19 h cen u y, when he Russians showed he in e es in he islands no h o Hokkaido — Sakhalin and he Ku iles.8 In 1861 (only a ew yea s since he Japanese opened hei po s o o eign essels) Russian sailo s empo a ily occupied he island o Tsushima wi h he aim o es ablish a na al base.9 The island was e u ned o Japan only a e igo ous p o es s om London, which was anxious abou i s own in e es s in he Land o he Rising Sun. This s ep was one o he impulses, which igge ed he en‑ mi y be ween Japan and Russia. Ano he impo an ac o accele a ing hei i al y was he Russian p essu e, which compelled Japan o abandon he sou he n pa o Sakhalin, which was aken o e by he Russians.10 The u he Russian claims on he Ku il Islands pe suaded he Japanese ha he Russian p essu e ep esen ed a mo al dange o he na ion and ha Japan had o ind a way how o de end i sel o Russian expansion. One o he main p oblems o Japan was he ac ha he coun y was no sel ‑ ‑su icien in s a egic aw ma e ials (wi h no able excep ion o coal) and ag a ian p oduc ion, which soon ceased o be su icien o he Japanese popula ion, which ose om 34 million in 1875 o 46 million in 1903.11 This was he impe us o Japanese own expansion, which was igge ed by he expedi ion o Fo mosa in 1874 and he annexa‑ ion o Ryukyu i e yea s la e .12 A e he opening Ko ea o he G ea Powe s in 1876 he nex s ep o Japanese expansion was clea . Howe e he peninsula was nominally assal o he Qing, who opposed he sp ead o he Japanese in luence. Bo h s a es con‑ side ed he si ua ion and he posi ion o he peninsula kingdom di e en ly: “Qing diplomacy in la e nine een h ‑cen u y Ko ea is cus oma ily iewed as a ea ‑gua d ac ion o main ain suze ain y o e a waywa d assal s a e in he an iqua ed ‘Chinese wo ld o de ,’ by con as wi h he ‘mode nizing’ h us o expansionis Japan.”13 The i al y o bo h s a ed e en ually igge ed a wa in which he Chinese we e soundly de ea ed. The ensuing peace ea y o Shimonoseki (17 h Ap il 1895) ga e he Japanese he island o Fo mosa, Pescado es, Liaodong peninsula wi h an impo an na al base in Po A ‑ hu . Mo eo e he Chinese we e obliged o pay 25 million pounds o wa epa a ions (200 million Chinese aels, which we e o be paid du ing nex se en and hal yea s).14 This de elopmen caugh mos G ea Powe s by su p ise, because i was expec ed 7 S. C. M. PAINE, The Sino ‑Japanese Wa o 1894–1895, Camb idge 2003, pp. 94–95. 8 See M. B. JANSEN, The Making o Mode n Japan, Camb idge, London 2000, pp. 258–264. 9 M. R. AUSLIN, Nego ia ing wi h Impe ialism: The Unequal T ea ies and he Cul u e o Japanese Diplomacy, Ha a d 2006, pp. 80 . 10 J. L. McCLAIN, A Mode n His o y o Japan, New Yo k, London 2002, p. 288. 11 R. M. CONNAUGHTON, The Wa o he Rising Sun and Tumbling Bea : A Mili a y His o y o he Russo ‑Japanese Wa 1904–1905, London, New Yo k 1988, p. 6. 12 See JANSEN, pp. 423 . 13 W. T. ROWE, China’s Las Empi e: The G ea Qing, Camb idge, London 2009, p. 228. 14 PAINE, pp. 271 . 100 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 ha he bigge and iche China will eme ge ic o ious. Many B i ish poli icians and diploma s in he Fa Eas howe e an icipa ed his ou come. One o hem Si Hen y No man a co esponden o News Ch onicle w o e abou he con lic : “The wa wi h China […] will a las o ce o eigne s o see Japan as she is. The Japanese a e ma ial and a p oud ace, wi h ma elous in elligence, and un i ing ene gy and en husiasm.”15 The Japanese ic o y and subs an ial gains on he con inen was displeasing espe‑ cially o Russia which own ad ance was hinde ed by Japanese seizu e o Liaodong peninsula. The Russians also despised he Japanese and hei newspape s claimed ha “i would be desi able ha she [Eu ope] ac wi h a ce ain uni y is ‑á ‑ is peoples epu ed o be ba ba ian and ha she o m a kind o syndica e…” o s op Japanese ambi‑ ions.16 The e o e he Russians in coope a ion wi h F ance and Ge many o ced Tokyo o abandon he peninsula in exchange o ano he 5 million pounds (30 million aels) o wa epa a ions.17 This so ‑called T iple In e en ion caused up oa in Japan whe e he public el ha he land was obbed o i s ha d won gains and hese opinion was s eng hened by u he Russian s eps, which we e aimed o gain con ol o e all o Manchu ia.18 The B i ish we e p epa ed o ake ad an age o he si ua ion. The Fo ‑ eign sec e a y lo d Kimbe ley old he Japanese o eign minis e Coun Ka o Takaaki, ha “B i ain had no in en ion o dep i ing Japan o ‘ easonable ui s o he ic o ies, al‑ hough hey would ha e much p e e ed no dis u bance o he s a us quo’.”19 London was awa e o he g a i y o he si ua ion caused by he Russian policy and wan ed o help Japan o s op hei ad ance. This was o cou se no an al uis ic policy, bu an e o o gain suppo agains Russia.20 The Russians we e able o u ilize he weakening o China and only a yea a e he ea y o Shimonoseki, hey made Chinese go e nmen o consen wi h he building o an impo an po ion o he T ans ‑Sibe ian ailway (which cons uc ion s a ed in 1891) o e he e i o y o Manchu ia. This ea y enabled he Russians o s a ion hei oops on he Chinese e i o y o icially o p o ec he cons uc ion.21 The Rus‑ sian Finance Minis e Se gei Yulye ich Wi e22 s ood behind all his. He was one o he mos impo an ini ia o s and suppo e s o indus ializa ion o Russia and he saw a huge comme cial po en ial in Manchu ia. He s a ed his poli ical ca ie on he cou o he Tsa Alexande III and du ing nex decade he gained conside able in luence. The Russian diploma Alexande Pa lo ich Iz olsky said abou him: “…on accoun o his cons an endency o ex end inde ini ely he powe o he s a e o he de i‑ men o pe sonal ini ia i e and ac i i y which was s ill in i s in ancy in Russia, one may 15 Ibidem, p. 17. 16 Ibidem, pp. 284 . 17 Ibidem, p. 289. 18 To he Russian expansion in Manchu ia see MALOZEMOFF, pp. 69 . 19 OTTE, p. 70. 20 Ibidem, p. 71. 21 To he Russian ailway concessions in China (allowe h ee acks o 2,460 kilome e s) see A. SKŘIVAN, Výs a ba železniční sí ě Číně do s ě o é hospodářské k ize, in: Ac a Uni e si a- is Ca olinae — Philosophica e his o ica 1, 1974, pp. 10 . 22 To Wi e’s pe sonali y see S. HARCAVE, Coun Se gei Wi e and he Twiligh o Impe ial Rus‑ sia: A Biog aphy, New Yo k 2004. ROMAN KOdET 101 say, ha o some en yea s he was he eal mas e o he 160 million inhabi an s o he Empi e.”23 Wi e’s p ima y p ojec was he T ans ‑Sibe ian Railway, which was con‑ s uc ed in o de o boos he economics o backwa d Asian pa s o Russia and o se e as ins umen o sp eading Russian poli ical in luence o he Fa Eas . How‑ e e Wi e’s in e es s in Manchu ia we e p ima ily economic and he e o e he used p ima ily means o business o gain in luence in his a ea. The e o e Wi e’s main ins umen o his Fa Eas e n policy was he Russo ‑Chinese Bank ounded a he end o 1895.24 On he o he hand al hough Wi e ollowed mainly comme cial goals, he poli ical impo ance o he ailway was clea o he B i ish, who wan ed o limi he Russian gains.25 The Russian expansionis s and mili a y opposed Wi e’s poli ical cou se and planned g adual seizu e o Manchu ia. They saw i s impo ance in o ally di e ‑ en way — as a s a ing s age o u he expansion. Especially he po o Po A ‑ hu was seen as a key base o he Russian Paci ic Flee . The Russians decided o ac in his ques ion a e he Ge mans occupied he po o Qingdao (which hey la e leased om he Beijing go e nmen ) and gained a sphe e o in luence on he Shan‑ dong peninsula. The e o e he Russian na y en e ed Po A hu in Decembe 1897 and spen he win e he e. Only a ew mon h la e Russian a my uni s en e ed he ci y.26 Al hough Wi e opposed his cou se, because he was anxious abou he B i ish eac ion,27 o he membe s o he Russian cabine ga e hei consen wi h hese s eps. The powe ul inance minis e was anxious ha his s ep would lead o a clash wi h o he powe s especially Japan. A e he cabine mee ing he old p ophe ic wo ds o he G and Duke Alexande Mikhailo ich: “You Highness, emembe his day; you will see wha disas ous esul s his a al s ep will ha e o Russia.”28 The seizu e o Po A hu compelled he Russians o build a b anch o he T ans‑ ‑Sibe ian ailway leading o he sou h om Ha bin, secu ing and supplying he new base.29 The ask o his ailway was also o s eng hen he Russian in luence in sou h‑ e n Manchu ia.30 This howe e caused anxie y among he Japanese and o he G ea Powe s, which saw he Russians as dange ous i als in he s uggle o he Middle Kingdom. Many B i ish poli icians iewed he Russian e i o ial enc oaching on China as a dange ous de elopmen . The B i ish High Commissione in China and one o he mos expe ienced diploma s in he Fa Eas Si E nes Mason Sa ow wa ned, 23 J. A. WHITE, The Diplomacy o he Russo ‑Japanese Wa , P ince on 1964, p. 15. 24 MALOZEMOFF, pp. 71–73. 25 OTTE, p. 82. 26 Ibidem, p. 139. 27 Ibidem, p. 95. 28 WHITE, p. 18. 29 The Russians we e howe e no only pene a ing Manchu ia, bu also Ko ea, which was seen as dange ous in Tokyo. On he o he hand he Japanese we e awa e o he ac , ha G ea B i ain had no special in e es s in his so much impo an coun y. The Na ional A - chi es Kew (hence o h only TNA), PRO 30/33/16/1, E nes Mason Sa ow Dia y, May 4, 1896. 30 The Russians gained he concession o Sou h Manchu ian Railway on 6 h July 1898. MALOZEMOFF, p. 112. 102 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 ha China could no be uled as a colony o any o he wes e n na ions, bu also poin ed ou one o he weakness o he go e nmen in Beijing — ha he Middle Kingdom, which acco ding o his opinion “was no a cen alized s a e like F ance bu a g oup o loosely ede a ed sa apies”,31 which o cou se ga e an oppo uni y o he G ea Powe s o seize con ol o hei objec s o in e es s. The local popula ion, which was hos ile o he sp ead o o eign in luence in China, also opposed his Russian s ep. The o ‑ eigne s and local Ch is ians we e a acked all ‑o e he coun y since he beginning o 1899. This un es culmina ed in Yihe uan Mo emen (Boxe Rebellion) in 1900, which was de ea ed by he expedi iona y o ces o he G ea Powe s, which en e ed Beijing in Augus 1900 whe e he ebels we e sieging he embassies o he G ea Powe s.32 The Boxe mo emen had also i s e lec ion in Manchu ia, whe e se e al up is‑ ings occu ed du ing which he o eigne s we e hun ed and killed. One B i ish co ‑ esponden w o e ha “ he Boxe mo emen was as iolen in Sou he n Manchu ia as anywhe e in China, and he symp oms we e iden ical: ailways des oyed, o eign houses bu ned and o eigne s mu de ed”.33 To keep o de in he Manchu ian p o inces S . Pe‑ e sbu g inc eased he numbe o oops gua ding i s ailways om 4,500 o 11,000 and la e called mo e a my uni s o he Fa Eas , which b ough peace o Manchu ia. These s eps led o an anxie y on he pa o he o he G ea Powe s, which Russia ied o calm down. The e o e S . Pe e sbu g issued a no e in he summe 1900, in which i said ha Russia had special igh s in Manchu ia, bu did no in end o ha m he in e es s o o he lands in he a ea. I also s a ed ha he in lux o new uni s in o he a ea had he pu pose o con olling he ebels. The no e had only a limi ed e ec and didn’ hinde o he G ea Powe s in s eng hening hei posi ion in he Fa Eas by mili a y ein o cemen s. The Russians he e o e decided o secu e hei posi ion by a ea y wi h China, signed on 26 h No embe 1900 by Russian go e no o Mukden (soon a go e no o whole Russian Fa Eas ) Admi al Ye geni I ano ich Alekseye who was an illegi ima e son o Tsa Alexande II. The ea y allowed he Russians o es ablish a mili a y p esence o Manchu ia o so long hey needed.34 The o he G ea Powe s (especially G ea B i ain) we e qui e conce ned by his u n o e en s, which impe iled hei in e es s. A he end o 1901 Beijing was ull o he umo s o Russian in en ions o annex he no he n pa o Manchu ia includ‑ ing Ha bin h ough which he cons uc ed T ans ‑Sibe ian ailway led.35 Sa ow e en claimed ha he Russians aimed o gain dominance in he whole China a he cos o G ea B i ain.36 Al eady he end o 1900 Sa ow decla ed ha Russia es ablished a non ‑o icial p o ec o a e o e no he n Manchu ia37 and a he end o 1901 he si u‑ 31 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, E nes Mason Sa ow Dia y, Oc obe 8, 1901. 32 J. KOČVAR, Boxe ské po s ání Číně, 1899–1900, in: His o ický obzo , Vol. 19, No. 9/10, 2008, pp. 194–205. C . R. BICKERS, pp. 337 . 33 WHITE, p. 5. 34 MALOZEMOFF, pp. 153–155; acco ding o B i ish diploma s he ea y made Manchu ia in eali y a Russian p o ec o a e. See I. NISH, The O igins o he Russo ‑Japanese Wa , London, New Yo k 1985, pp. 91–93. 35 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, E nes Mason Sa ow Dia y, Oc obe 25, 1901. 36 Ibidem. 37 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, E nes Mason Sa ow Dia y, Decembe 14, 1900. ROMAN KOdET 103 a ion became e en mo e se ious, because some o he Manchus we e con inced ha Russia was hei bes iend.38 The B i ish he e o e ied o o ce he Russians o de‑ cla e; ha hey will e acua e Manchu ia, a e he secu i y o hei esiden s in he a ea was secu ed.39 The Russians he e o e p epa ed a ea y wi h Beijing abou he wi hd awal, bu i s e ms we e p oposed in such a way, ha he Chinese could no accep . The Russian p oposals had ou een pa ag aphs conce ning he si ua ion in Manchu ia. In he i s se en o hem Pe e sbu g p omised o coope a e wi h Chinese au ho i ies and o e acua e hei o ces a e he o de was es o ed. On he o he hand he Chinese go e nmen should p omise ha i will emo e e e y o icials wi h whose appoin men he Russians would no ag ee and ha i would no accep any o eign mili a y ad iso s. The o he hal o Russian condi ions ough o co ec he Sino ‑Russian ela ions, bu in eali y we e p oposed in such a way ha would e en‑ ually mean con ol o he Chinese policy by he Russians. The Russians o example demanded, ha China did no g an any he mining igh s in Manchu ia o any o he powe . Simul aneously Russia wi h i s ally F ance issued a s a emen in which i sup‑ po ed he independence o China and Ko ea and p omo ed he idea o ee ade wi h hose coun ies. Al hough he Russians signed a ea y wi h China which obliged hem o wi hd aw hei oops in eigh een mon h, hey condi ioned i wi h a e m, ha his e acua ion would be conduc ed only “p o ided ha no dis u bances a ise and ha he ac ion o o he Powe s should no p e en i ”,40 in e ec making a dead le e ou o he ag eemen . Al hough he Russians conduc ed he i s s age o he wi hd awal, o he s did no ollow unde made ‑up p e ex s. The Russian’s s eng hening o hei posi ion in Manchu ia was obse ed espe‑ cially ca e ully in Japan, because i was di ec ly connec ed wi h he ques ion o Ko‑ ea, which was in he pas iewed as a dagge poised a he hea o Japan.41 To secu e i s in luence in Ko ea Japan s a ed he wa wi h China in 1894 and now i aced he p ospec ha i s dominan posi ion he e would collapse unde Russian p essu e. Al hough Tokyo and Pe e sbu g concluded a ea y conce ning equal igh s in Ko‑ ea on 9 h June 1896, he Japanese leade s iewed he Russian gua an ees as ague.42 Tokyo he e o e s a ed nex ound o nego ia ions and made he Russians o issue a s a emen ha hey did no in end o in e e e in he e olu ion o Japanese eco‑ nomic ela ions wi h Ko ea. The Japanese ied o u ilize his new Russian obliga ion o s eng hen hei g ip o e Ko ea — in se e al nex yea s, hey we e able o domi‑ na e Ko ean ade and gain a concession o build a ailway om Pusan o Soul and o e ook an Ame ican ailway ‑p ojec o he Soul ‑Incheon ( han called Chemulpo).43 As he Japanese in e es s and in es men s in Ko ea ose, he Japanese anxie y o Russian in en ions inc eased. The g ea es conce n o Japanese s a esmen became Russian ac i i ies along he bo de o Manchu ia and Ko ea (along he Yalu Ri e ), 38 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, E nes Mason Sa ow Dia y, No embe 25, 1901. 39 MALOZEMOFF, pp. 168 . 40 WHITE, p. 10. 41 The e o e he Japanese ini ia ed nego ia ions abou possible neu aliza ion o Ko ea. NISH, pp. 97 . 42 MALOZEMOFF, pp. 86 . 43 WHITE, p. 79. 104 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 whe e Russian company led by Julius I ano ich B ine gained an impo an mining concession.44 Howe e B ine did no ha e enough capi al o s a he mining, he u ned o he Russo ‑Chinese Bank o c edi .45 Wi e, who con olled he ins i u ion, did no wan o con ibu e o he de e io a ion o he Russo ‑Japanese ela ions ins uc ed he bank di‑ ec o A. I. Ro hs ein o deny he loans o B ine who ied o ind suppo a he cou in S . Pe e sbu g. In he Russian capi al he opposi ion agains Wi e g adually s eng h‑ ened. A i s head was Alexande Mikhailo ich Bezob azo , who did no ha e any o icial unc ion, bu had an impo an in luence on he Tsa Nicholas II. Bezob azo in ended o weaken Wi e using he ques ion o he B ine ’s concession.46 On se e al occasions he he e o e c i icized Wi e’s Fa Eas e n policy and claimed ha Russia could spa e i sel o many p oblems i i would pu sue mo e asse i e policy. Thanks o his agi a‑ ion a Russian company, which would mine aw ma e ials in he Yalu basin, was c e‑ a ed. Wi e was obliged o ollow Bezob azo lead and o suppo Russian mining com‑ panies in he a ea. This o cou se had nega i e impac on Russo ‑Japanese ela ions. A e hey gained mining concessions along he Yalu Ri e , he Russians could ake less ega d o China and expanded hei in luence in Manchu ia. The Russian in usions on he Ko ean e i o y ueled he anxie y o he Japanese o he di ec Russian mili a y in ol emen in Ko ea. The e idence seemed o be clea — a he end o 1902 Russian mili a y ga isoned 2,000 men in he ci y o An ‑ ung on he Chinese bank o Yalu.47 The Russians hen (on he 18 h Ap il 1903) demanded in Beijing ha China would no cede any o i s e i o y o o eign coun y wi hou Russian consen and o ecognize Russian “special igh s” in Manchu ia. Al hough he Chinese go ‑ e nmen s ic ly declined such claims ou days la e , i was clea ha he Russians s eng hened hei posi ion in Manchu ia o he poin , ha i any hing unexpec ed happened, hei p esence would be pe manen .48 A his poin S . Pe e sbu g ied o imp o e i s ela ions wi h Japan and a e a possible clash by appoin ing Ba on Roman Romano ich Rosen, who was ins uc ed o p esen he Russian poli ical s ance as gen ly as he could.49 Despi e o his S . Pe‑ e sbu g came o a conclusion ha i mus p epa e o a possibili y o a wa . The Wa Minis e Aleksey Nikolaye ich Ku opa kin he e o e opposed any idea o e acua ion o Manchu ia, because acco ding o his a gumen s Po A hu would be unde end‑ able wi hou secu e hin e land. He also insis ed ha Russian A my p epa ed he de‑ ense o Russian concessions on he Yalu Ri e . Bezob azo concu ed and called o ein o cemen a he minis e ial con e ence in Tsa skoe Selo on he 20 h May 1903.50 Wi e was o ced o ag ee, al hough he claimed ha i Russia ied o hold he Yalu Ri e boa de , i would be de ea ed. Bezob azo only used his a gumen s o achie e a ans e o wo addi ional b igades o Manchu ia. 44 NISH, p. 155; MALOZEMOFF, pp. 89, 177. 45 MALOZEMOFF, p. 181. 46 On he weakening o Wi e’s in luence. Ibidem, pp. 177 . 47 WHITE, p. 44. 48 MALOZEMOFF, p. 217. 49 NISH, p. 133. 50 MALOZEMOFF, pp. 218 . ROMAN KOdET 105 While he Russians we e slowly s eng hening hei posi ion in Manchu ian, he poli icians in Tokyo came o a conclusion ha he nego ia ions wi h S . Pe e sbu g a e hopeless and he only chance o secu e he sa e y o Japan was o d i e Russia om Manchu ia by o ce. Despi e o his I o Hi obumi, Yamaga a A i omo and o he Japanese s a esmen ealized ha Japan was no able o challenge Russia wi hou sup‑ po o o he G ea Powe . The e o e hey ied o ind help on he in e na ional scene, which would be able o back up Japan diploma ically and inancially i no mili a y. Wi h ega d o he ac ha F ance and Ge many in he Fa Eas o en sup‑ po ed Russia, Japan had o look a B i ain and Uni ed S a es as possible allies.51 Bo h s a es app ecia ed Japanese suppo o he p inciple o he opened doo s o China, which was h ea ened by Russian policy. Especially B i ain nega i ely iewed he ac ha Russia u ilized B i ish p oblems in Sou h A ica du ing he Boe Wa in o de o en o ce i s in e es s in Manchu ia. The B i ish he e o e welcomed Japanese p obes in London.52 This was no only due o he ac , ha Japan had almos no col‑ liding in e es s wi h G ea B i ain and obse ed he open ‑doo policy in China, bu also because Japan was iewed as an na u al ally o G ea B i ain because o com‑ monly sha ed in e es s — especially ha o s opping Russia. Al eady in he middle o he 90s he B i ish Sec e a y o S a e o Fo eign A ai s John Wodehouse, 1s Ea l o Kimbe ley claimed, ha “[Japan] will no doub ha e a powe ul lee , bu ha will be a coun e poise o he Russians & so a a dis inc ad an age o us. Ou policy mus be o make he ou ally”.53 Japanese ambassado in London Coun Hayashi made he i s conc e e p oposal du ing his nego ia ions wi h Sec e a y o S a e Lo d Lansdowne in Ap il 1901, when he s a ed ha i was necessa y o G ea B i ain and Japan “ o make a pe manen ag ee‑ men o he main enance o peace in he Fa Eas ”.54 The alks con inued in Oc obe a e he all o he I o’s go e nmen , which was eplaced by he cabine o Ka su a Ta o. The Japanese Fo eign Minis e Komu a Ju a o made se ious p oposals o he B i ‑ ish, who we e also in e es ed in he possible alliance wi h Japan, which p omised a limi a ion o he Russian in luence in Asia. The e o e he B i ish p epa ed hei own p oposals o a ea y be ween bo h s a es. This was discussed on 7 h Decembe by Japanese elde s a esmen and on he 11 h Tokyo sen i s coun e p oposal o B i ain. A e u he nego ia ions, bo h s a es eached an ag eemen signed on 30 h Janua y 1902.55 The alliance o Japan and G ea B i ain gua an eed ha i one o hem en e ed wa wi h o he powe , he second would emain neu al. I ano he s a e en e ed he hypo he ical con lic wi h he allied powe , i s pa ne would en e he wa . Al hough some o he B i ish diploma s we e con inced, ha he alliance is only loose and i s 51 On he o he hand London was awa e o he possibili y, ha i hey did no help Japan, i would ha e come o e ms wi h Russia a any cos . B i ain would be hen isola ed in he Fa Eas . OTTE, p. 286. 52 To he Japanese nego ia ions abou he alliance wi h G ea B i ain see I. NISH, The Anglo‑ ‑Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy o Two Island Empi es, 1894–1907, London 1966. 53 OTTE, p. 71. 54 A. M. POLEY (Ed.), The Sec e Memoi s o Coun Tadasu Hayashi, Vol. 2, New Yo k 2002, p. 121. 55 The e ms o he ea y see a h p://www. i s wo ldwa .com/sou ce/anglojapaneseal- liance1902.h m, [2014–08–11]. C . POLEY, pp. 323 . 106 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 main goal is o keep check on he Russians in Manchu ia,56 he B i ish e a o “Splen‑ did Isola ion” ended.57 A e hey gained B i ish suppo he Japanese could concen a e on hei nego ia‑ ions wi h Russia. Tokyo he e o e sen se e al p oposals conce ning he si ua ion in Manchu ia and Ko ea o S . Pe e sbu g, bu e e y se lemen was ejec ed. This s ic Russian a i ude owa ds Japan mi o ed he ise o Bezob azo ’s clique in Pe e s‑ bu g. Russia howe e conside ed he si ua ion as se ious and he e o e sen gene al Ku opa kin o Manchu ia, om whe e he con inued o Japan,58 whe e he a i ed on 12 h June 1903 and alked wi h Japanese Wa Minis e Te auchi Masa ake, who de‑ clined he Russian aspi a ions in Ko ea. Ku opa kin also me he Empe o Mu suhi o and p ominen Japanese s a esmen, howe e his nego ia ions wi h P ime Minis e Ka su a and Fo eign Minis e Komu a we e ui less. Ku opa kin old he Japanese ha acco ding o he Russian go e nmen i was impossible o e acua e Manchu ia, because i would endange he ailways o Vladi os ok and Po A hu .59 A e he e u ned o Pe e sbu g he pa icipa ed on a minis e ial con e ence, whose a endan s we e also Bezob azo , Admi al Alekseye and Russian ambassado in Beijing P. M. Lessa and he ep esen a i es o he Russo ‑Chinese Bank. The pa icipan s ag eed ha Russia had o secu e i s in e es s a any cos . They he e o e ag eed on sending addi ional ein o cemen s o he a ea and assigned 30 million ubles o he s eng h‑ ening o de ense o Manchu ia. One o he esul s o his con e ence was he appoin ‑ men o Admi al Alekseye o he pos o he go e no o Manchu ia unde whose esponsibili y ell also he command o all mili a y uni s in he a ea.60 This s ep elimi‑ na ed all Wi e’s in luence on he si ua ion in he Fa Eas . His posi ion weakened by Bezob azo clique wi h which sided G and Duke Alexande Michaylo ich and he minis e o he in e io Ple e, whose aim was Wi e’s all. Tsa dismissed Wi e on 28 h Augus 1903 and eplaced him wi h he go e no o he Russian Bank E. D. Plesko.61 A e ha Russia en e ed a poli ical cou se o con on a ion wi h Japan, which was soon ecognized in Tokyo. While i was qui e clea ha Japan and Russia we e on a collision cou se, bo h s a es s a ed p epa a ions o wa . The Russians we e an ically ying o comple e un inished po ions o T ans ‑Sibe ian Railway, anspo ing addi ional oops and supplies o Manchu ia and abo e all s eng hening he Russian Paci ic Flee . The Japa‑ nese we e meanwhile p epa ing hei wa plans and es ablishing espionage ne in 56 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/5, E nes Mason Sa ow Dia y, Feb ua y 12, 1902. 57 C. J. LOWE, The Reluc an Impe ialis s: B i ish Fo eign Policy 1878–1902, London, New Yo k 1967. 58 The choice o Ku opa kin o a mission o Japan was a mis ake (in he case Russia mean he nego ia ions se iously) because he was one o he p oponen o he mili a y solu ion o he si ua ion in he Fa Eas . D. WARNER — P. WARNER, The Tide a Sun ise: A His o y o he Russo ‑Japanese Wa 1904–1905, London, Po land 2005, p. 118. 59 To he Ku opa kin’s F a Eas e n jou ney see WHITE, pp. 63 . 60 Ibidem, p. 72. 61 Fo he i s hand accoun o Wi e’s all see S. Y. WITTE, The Memoi s o Coun Wi e, Lon- don 1990, pp. 312 . Tsa commen ed Wi e’s all laconically in his dia y: “Now I ule.” MALOZEMOFF, p. 226.