The “Prague Spring” in the Documents of the Hungarian Radio
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The “Prague Spring” in the Documents of the Hungarian Radio Irén Simándi1 ABSTRACT It was fifty years ago, in 1968 that the “Prague spring”, an experiment to create “Socialism with ahuman face” was born in Czechoslovakia. Through the documents of Hungarian radio broadcasts, this study will trace the most significant events of the reform movement led by Alexander Dubček. The broadcast information, in its various programs, was almost invariably based on the reports of TASS, the Soviet Telegraph Agency and MTI, the Hungarian News Agency. However, the news actually aired was often re-shaped and augmented by the editors. The radio broadcasts were careful in dealing with the role of party leaders, such as of Janos Kadar. The Czechoslovakian situation remained the principle topic of the Hungarian political and public life for several months, especially in connection with the introduction of the “new economic reform” in Hungary. In the radio, the editors kept avoiding any reference to any similarity between the “Prague Spring” and the new Hungarian economic reform. The goal of the silence was to protect the Hungarian reform from interference from Moscow. KEYWORDS International politics; socialism; Czechoslovakia crisis 1968; Alexander Dubček; János Kádár; “New Economic Reform” in Hungary It was fifty years ago, in 1968 that the “Prague spring”, an experiment to create “Socialism with ahuman face” was born in Czechoslovakia. Through the documents of Hungarian radio broadcasts, this study will trace the most significant events of the reform movement led by Alexander Dubček. The broadcast information, in its various programs, was almost invariably based on the reports of TASS, the Soviet Telegraph Agency and MTI, the Hungarian News Agency. However, the news actually aired was often reshaped and augmented by the editors. Ifind it important to point out, that relying on solid sources, the events of the “Prague spring” have been exhaustively analyzed in Hungary where numerous works have been published about these historical events.2 1 Irén Simándi, John Harsanyi Center and Archives for Social Studies, Harsányi János Tudásközpont, 1084 Budapest, Német utca 9–11, Hungary, [email protected] 2 See in the first place an excellent summary of the public history and Party history aspects: astudy by Csaba Békés titled “János Kádár and the Prague Spring”, which relates the events
154 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 From the files of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP), we now know that the Hungarian party leaders played aremarkable part in the negotiations— the sequence of events can be traced quite accurately in the various party documents. The radio public, however, were not given detailed information: we can find only cautiously articulated statements about these discussions, and often, there was no mention of the meetings at all, which becomes evident when we compare the scripts of the news materials with the MSZMP files. Part of the reason for this was that in 1968, the memory of the 1956 revolution and the invasion of the Soviet troops was till painfully vivid, as well as the fact that at the time, Hungary’s new economic reform, marking a digression from the Soviet model, was already in the pipeline, well ahead of the Prague reforms. The agit-prop activities of the press, the radio and the television were under the supervision of the Socialist Party’s Agitation and Propaganda Committee, who took firm actions as the events in Czechoslovakia developed. At their May 21st, 1968 session, the committee put regulations on the duties related to news release and the writing of commentaries as follows: “It is the responsibility of our organs to support the positive forces and the evolution of atwo-front struggle. We should refrain from any kind of evaluation that might pose difficulties for consolidation efforts, or from the transmission of views that might prove to be ahindrance to our own development.”3 WHAT WAS COVERED IN THE NEWS? It was as soon as the January 6th morning news program (Morning Chronicle, Reggeli Krónika) in 1968 that the Hungarian radio gave an account of the fact that the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party had “relieved” Antonín Novotný of his position as First Secretary of the party “at his own request”. His post was taken over by Alexander Dubček, First Secretary of the Slovakian Communist Party at the time. Already at this CC session, there were some other important issues on the agenda— outlining the change in the policy of the party and the main direction of the trend: the democratization of the political life and the decentralization of power. According to the Morning Chronicle report, the (committee) discussed “theoretical questions about the leading role of the party as well as problems related to increasing the topicality and effectiveness of party work”. In its communiqué, the Central Committee announced that they had, “in ademocratic and critical spirit, and in full awareness of their responsibility, analyzed the present situation of the Czechoslovakian Communist party and pointed out the shortcomings that are apparent in the internal management of the party with regard to working methods and working style as well as to the concrete implementation of the principles of democratic centralism and democracy within the party”. One point of the communiqué emphasized by the Morning Chonicle was that adecision had been based on archived documents. Beszélő, 2008, Vol.13, Is.7, http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/ kadar-janos-es-a-pragai-tavasz (referred to further as BÉKÉS, 2008), [cit 2018-04-06]. 3 The minutes of the May 21st 1968. Session of the Agitation and Propaganda Committee. Hungarian National Archives/ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára. 288. f. 41/95. ő. e. 4.
IRéN SIMáNDI 155 made to “separate the presidential and the First Secretary of Party posts”. It was also mentioned that the Soviet leaders had sent atelegram to greet Alexander Dubček on the occasion of his being elected First Secretary.4 Along with the Soviet leaders, János Kádár, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the MSZMP also sent atelegram to greet Dubček on the occasion of his election— as is reported by the Evening Chronicle (Esti Krónika). On behalf of the party as well as in his own name, he wished “good health, successful work and further achievements in his high commission and in his endeavors to promote the interests of the Czechoslovakian people and the international communist movement. It is my strong belief”, Kádár said, […] that the fraternal cooperation between our peoples and our parties will continue to strengthen, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism”.5 On March 23rd, one of the most widely followed radio programs, the Weekend Foreign Policy Observer (Hétvégi Külpolitikai Figyelő) broadcast areport about the session of the Central Committee of the Cz CP which ended on 22nd March. It was only abrief summary but it contained the most important resolutions made at the CC session, giving voice to some statements that hinted at asense of danger felt by the Czechoslovakian party leadership. They pointed out that “the leaders of the party are analyzing the movement of renewal that the Czechoslovakian society is going through and they welcome its— for the most part— creative tendencies. At the same time, the leaders of the Czechoslovakian party firmly refuse any attempt to weaken and splinter these progressive socialist efforts. This democratization is aimed specifically at [strengthening] democracy of asocialist character”. It is also reported— without any commentary— that the “presidium had given their approval to the draft of the party’s new action program”. They also discussed the points of the program, with the purpose “to complete the rehabilitation of all persons who were persecuted and victimized in the trials during the 1952–54 period, and whose punishments by the party have not yet been revoked”. The most important part of the news, of course, was the one about the change in leadership: the presidium approved of the content of the letter written by Antonín Novotný, President of the Republic. In accordance with the constitution, aresolution was made about the interim task management until the election of the new President, namely that the leading body of the National Assembly “mandated the government to take over the presidential duties”. Without directly quoting them, the Weekend Foreign Policy Observer also gave an account of the rather cautious statements made by the representatives of the reform: “several Czechoslovakia statesmen and party leaders have expressed their views about the foreign and home policy of our country”. Acharacteristic example was their account of the TV announcement given by Ján Pudlak, first deputy of the foreign minister, who had been appointed the previous year, in which Pudlak emphasized that “the key element of the main trend [in our policy …] is our friendship and alliance with the Soviet 4 Reggeli Krónika. Jan.6.1968. Archives of the Media Service Support and Trust Fund (Médiaszolgáltatás-támogató és Vagyonkezelő Alap— further referred to as MTVA. Programscript. Broadcast Jan.6.1968. 7:00–7:15. Kossuth Rádió. 5 Esti Krónika. Jan.6.1968. MTVA Archíves. Program script. Broadcast Jan.6.1968. 19:00–19:29. Kossuth Rádió.
156 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 Union, which Iconfidently believe to be further enhanced by the new action program of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party.”6 At the same time, it is by no means accidental that the Hungarian radio public was given no coverage of the events of the Dresden meeting, which took place on March 23rd. In fact, the meeting was attended by all leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries— with the exception of Rumania. The meeting was initiated by the Soviet management, with the purpose of “consolidating the situation that has evolved in Czechoslovakia.” As it was claimed, the meeting was of particular importance since, “despite the warnings of the fraternal parties, the Czechoslovak leaders have not halted the democratization process, instead, they have been trying to present it as an effort to renew socialism, and have been naïve enough to believe that it does not pose adanger to the positions of the communist party.”7 As part of the transformation process, asupporter of the reform, ex army general Ludvík Svoboda was elected President of the Republic, who had been imprisoned during the show trials and then rehabilitated after Stalin’s death, with the approval of Khrushchev. György Halasi, the Prague correspondent of the Hungarian Telegraph Agency reported as follows about one of his first statements aired in the March 30 program of the Evening Chronicle (Esti Krónika). In his speech delivered after taking the oath in the Prague Castle, the President of the Republic emphasized that “the invaluable work of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party accomplished since the liberation [from Fascism] must be greatly appreciated”. He also underlined that he “fully agrees with the January resolutions of the Central Committee and is determined to assist in their accomplishment. He does this in the conviction that the party, together with the national front and the leading bodies of the state will be able to gradually solve all the problems”. In his speech, he also remembered the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovakian state. After the war, Czechoslovakia “opted for taking the path of social transformation, which meant that its foreign policy was oriented towards the Soviet Union, who had proved to be atrue friend and ally in the hardest of times. Meanwhile, we started out from our own conditions in building socialism [… but] we keep doing our best to contribute with all our strength to consolidating the friendship and unity of the socialist countries and to implementing the principle of socialist internationalism. This is the right path to serve the interests and safety of our country”— summed up György Halasi the main ideas of the new President’s speech.8 The April 1st evening news in Esti Krónika reported that the Central Committee of the CzCP continued their work, discussing the action program of the party as well as the current political situation. In his speech as first secretary, Dubček pointed out that “the process initiated at the January session by the Communist Party is of an explicitly socialist and democratic nature. The Party was right to emphasize the political aspect of the problems waiting to be solved and to take the lead in the process in an increasingly determined and convincing way, even if the CC has been unable to keep the course of 6 Hétvégi külpolitikai figyelő. March 23. 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script, broadcast March 23. 1968. 14:45–15:00. Kossuth Rádió. 7 BÉKÉS, 2008. 8 Esti Krónika. March 30. 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast March 30. 1968. 19:00–19:29. Kossuth Rádió.
IRéN SIMáNDI 157 the fast and complex events of the last 3 months within the pre-defined limits. Characteristic of the process is that for the most part, especially what regards the pace of events, it has been shaped by the ‘mass-creating’ activities being guided by the Communists yet spontaneous at the same time. Thus, the resolutions of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party could prevail without any orders from above.” The party relies predominantly on “the interests and experiences of the broadest masses”, which is “approved of by the decisive majority of Communists and of the people”. He called it an achievement that “there is agrowing trust in the party and agrowing confidence within the Party”. At the same time, Dubček explained that “the activity is not balanced enough yet and is sometimes instinctive”. It is the “responsibility of each party member to focus all their energy on the implementation of socialist democracy and to analyze and further improve the so far positive process. We must by no means ignore any extremes that can be damaging for the movement”. The reports kept laying great emphasis on the position of defense, highlighting the leading role of the party, but these statements were accompanied by more and more critical elements. This is quite palpable in Dubček’s speech, too, who stated that “the party has always relied and will keep relying on the leading role of the working class […]. It does not suffice to simply acknowledge the mistakes of the past but we need to highlight the causes of their evolution. Therefore we need to do avery thorough analysis of our past economic and political development and to work out the program of the Party, within the time left until its 14th Congress.” He also noted that “since the January session, we have witnessed the revival of certain non-socialist sentiments, and even some voices of revanchism. But the Party will not let itself be seized by any potential attempt to legalize these sentiments under the guise of democracy or rehabilitation. The Party rejects any attempt directed at weakening and dividing the progressive democratic and socialist efforts.” Dubček pointed out that “in the future, more attention must be paid to the requirement that the members of the Central Committee represent aunited stance on basic issues…” It is necessary that the Party continue to be “in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism so that they can demonstrate the greatest possible unity in their actions”.9 The thorough debate on the action program continued the following day, and it was also covered in the April 2 evening broadcast of Esti Krónika. It was Halasi again who gave asummary of the events: One of the participants of the debate, Finance Minister Bohumil Sucharda, who had worked at the International Monetary Fund before, emphasized: “We must make our companies understand that they cannot base their future on state subsidies.” He also said that „we need to explore additional opportunities of economic integration between the Comecon countries as well as to widen cooperation with the developed capitalist countries.” He outlined the prospect of “creating within 5–7 years the realistic possibility to make the Czechoslovakian crown convertible,” in coordination with “the other Comecon countries”. Jiří Hájek, Minister of Education at the time, later Minister of Foreign Affairs, aman strongly committed to reforms stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should “take amore active role in the UN and its various organs”. Another reform politician, Čestmír Císař, Secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the 9 Esti Krónika. April 1st 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script, broadcast on April 1st 1968. 19:00–19:29. Kossuth Rádió.
158 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 National Assembly said that the Central Committee, which “was the initiator of the socialist renewal program will be powerful enough to correctly evaluate both its positive and its negative aspects and to guide the way towards further progress.” Císař “took astand on the need to thoroughly reshape the government”. It was also mentioned in the report that many of the speakers had exercised self-crititcism and asked to be relieved of their duties. Such was the case with Jiři Herih, who resigned from his post in the committee of ideology of the Party. Vladimír Kocky spoke of the mistakes he had made in his work in education and the field of international relations, and also asked to be relieved of his duties at the secretariat of the Central Committee. He explained that “it is no longer possible to go back to the old working methods but we must be determined to fight anti-socialist tendencies and to protect the positive achievements, which have always dominated in the work of the Party”. There was only abrief mention of the speech made by Josef Smrkovský, who had been given alife sentence in ashow trial, to be released from prison only in 1955. The politician, who was the most adamant representative of the reform process in the administration and who was elected chairman of the national assembly in April pointed out that “the process of renewal has brought about apolitical activity never yet seen in Prague”.10 Several news programs reported about The acceptance of the reform program. One of the detailed summaries was given in the April 5th evening broadcast of Hírek, where the leading news item was that the action program had been endorsed by the CzCP CC even before Dubček’s concluding speech. This was followed by an account of the program details, underscoring the issue of rehabilitation. “The plenum made aresolution to fully complete the just and comprehensive rehabilitation of persons persecuted and victimized between 1949 and 1954. Those who played arole in violating socialist justice must not take any important position in social and political life. The plenum declared that the party punishment of several writers had been of an explicitly administrative nature, and that the decision of the plenum made last September to that effect had been based on incorrect information. Therefore, the Central Committee hereby annulled the expulsion of writers Ivan Klíma, Antonín J.Liehm and Ludvík Vaculík as well as the party punishment of Pavel Kohout, and they also put astop to the disciplinary procedure in progress against the writer Milan Kundera. The party organization of the Czechoslovakian Writers’ Association was called upon to re-evaluate the procedure of last year’s writers’ congress.” On the other hand, there are also hints to aposition of defense in the document of the Central Committee— as well as in the radio commentary— maintaining that “the foundations of the socialist society are strong, and there is no political weight of any effort to turn back on the path of progress”. They describe the situation in aremarkably responsible way, accentuating the events differently than before but also with atone of caution: “The situation that has evolved is such where in the wake of atorrent of social criticism all the essential problems that have accumulated are being simultaneously exposed. It would be irresponsible to promise that solving these problems would be as simple and fast as their exposure. Many of the rightful demands simply cannot be met at once and at the same time, in absence of the financial and organizational conditions that it would require.” 10 Evening Chronicle. April 2nd 1968. MTVA Archíves. Program script, boradcast on April 2nd, 1968. 19:00–19:34. KossuthRrádió.
IRéN SIMáNDI 159 In regard to party work, the resolution calls upon the party members to be more independent in their actions, noting also their changing position: the “communists in Czechoslovakia are often forced into adefensive position when in fact, they should take the lead in the struggle for the new. Therefore, the resolution calls upon party members to be fast and active in solving the problems in political work within their own competence, in line with the action program and the new party policy.” Very firm is, however, the tone of the closing part of the document, taking astand for the reforms as adistinctive path for the country: “We have set off on adifficult journey: the Czechoslovakian way to build and improve socialism, which is our own, internal affair. In the spirit of socialist internationalism, in cooperation with all other socialist and progressive forces and on the basis of our alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, we will be capable of realizing this goal.”11 The radio program broadcast in Hétvégi külpolitikai figyelő (Weekend Foreign Policy Observer) on April 6th, dealt with the accepted action program again, reporting further details. The news material, as they found it important to underline, was compiled on the basis of Dubček’s summative speech. “Everyone, party members in the first place, must be aware of the fact that what we want is not any kind of democracy but asocialist democracy. Weakening the role of the party is out of the question; it is the effective and successful implementation of Lenin’s norms, in accordance with the new conditions that we want to achieve.”As the first step of the action program, “the government wants to achieve the improvement of socialist statehood by further democratization and the drafting of anew constitution. Special attention must be paid to the proposals aimed at reshaping the Czechoslovakian state in afederal form, which would point beyond aco-existence in which Czechs and Slovaks enjoy equal rights as [in this new state form] the demands of the other nationalities and the facilitation of their development will be taken into far stronger consideration than before.” They also quoted Dubček about another crucial point in the action program: “the necessity for aconsistent implementation of the new methods of economic management, and the importance of their quickpaced introduction”. This was followed by the announcement of personal changes, which stirred great public interest both at home and abroad: during the session of the Central Committee, they elected the leading organs of the party, the presidium and the secretariat. (No names were mentioned in this broadcast.) The closing sentences dealt with foreign policy, as yet another indication that Czechoslovakia had no intention of modifying her system of alliances. “The core of our country’s foreign policy”, they quoted Dubček, “is astrong alliance and versatile cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, relying on the principles of equal rights, mutual advantages and noninterference as well as on international solidarity”. Its fundamental theses are “just as untouchable as the socialist nature and the untouchability of our further path”.12 After the Czechoslovakian CC session and the acceptance of the action program, the Hungarian political leadership followed the events with growing concern. On 11 Hírek (News) April 5th 1968. MTVA Archives K615. Press archives. Box 473. Broadcast on April 5th 1968. 22:00. Kossuth Rádió. 12 Hétvégi külpolitikai figyelő (Weekend Foreign Policy Observer, April 6th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script, broadcast April 6th 1968. 14:45–15:00. Kossuth Rádió.
160 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 16th April, Leonid Brezhnev had atelephone conversation with János Kádár. He made no bones about the situation, evaluating it as follows: “We are on the threshold of losing Czechoslovakia.” He proposed another meeting, inviting the party leaders to Moscow. The meeting took place on May 8th— Dubček and Rumanian party leader Nicolae Ceaușescu were not invited to the secret conference. Here, Kádár was trying his best to convince the East German, Polish, Bulgarian and Soviet party leaders that “with the necessary support, the current leadership in Czechoslovakia should be capable of getting the situation under control”. The conference participants, however, with the exception of Kádár— “declared that the situation was, without adoubt, of acounter-revolutionary nature, and that the present leadership was powerless to consolidate the situation, therefore from this point on, the outlines of anew concept were taking shape with increasing clarity: in order to settle the critical situation by political means, there is aneed for an internal take-over of power, to be carried out by ‘healthy forcesʼ”. In his speech, János Kádár also admitted that the situation in Czechoslovakia was “grave”: “There is anarchy, which is taken advantage by anti-social [ist] forces.” With regard to the action program, Kádár said that it was: “a‘big zero’, since it can embrace or include anything, both the defending and the giving up of socialism, therefore it can be easily exploited by anyone for their own purposes”.13 Needless to say, the Hungarian audience received no information whatsoever about the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Kádár. On the other hand, there was areport about the Moscow conference convened on May 8th in the early morning broadcast of Reggeli Krónika on the following day. It was abrief announcement, with the usual clichés: the party leaders of the four countries discussed the international situation and the “topical issues of the workers’ movement”. The participants confirmed that they would keep “informing each other about the situation of their respective countries, and they declared their firm intention to continue improving their fraternal relations and versatile cooperation based on the principles of Marxism and Leninism and the proletarian internationalism in every respect”. The atmosphere of the Moscow conference was one of cordiality and amicability.14 In the May 8th program of Esti Krónika, there was adetailed report about another meeting, which also took place in Moscow through May 4th— 8th. Jiří Hájek, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia returned home after avisit to Moscow. In Prague, he gave an interview for the chief editor of Novosti, the Soviet news agency. In this interview, Hájek emphasized that „the love and respect for the Soviet Union in his country has long roots. Although there are some who are trying to cast ashadow on the Czechoslovakian-Soviet friendship, they will never succeed in it”. The Cechoslovakian foreign minister recalled aprevious interview of his given to aWestern correspondent: “If you are hoping that one day Czechoslovakia will speak in adifferent voice, then you are greatly mistaken. Our country will keep speaking out as member of the socialist community.” The journalist of Novosti brought up that some Western newspapers had hinted at certain signs of change in the Czechoslovakian foreign policy. In his response, Hájek asserted once more: “The Czechoslovakian orientation will not change. Czechoslovakia will 13 BÉKÉS, 2008. 14 Reggeli Krónika. May 9th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script, broadcast on May 9th 1968. 5:30–5:40. Kossuth Rádió.
IRéN SIMáNDI 161 remain part of the socialist world system and friend of the Soviet Union in the future, too. We will do our best to actively utilize our country’s geographical and economic potential and the creative powers of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia.” As to the issue of the European security, he took astand on the “untouchability of the borders drawn after the Second World War. The Czechoslovakian politics will keep starting out from the fact of the existence of the two German states, and regard East Germany as our friend and ally. As for West Germany, Czechoslovakia takes into consideration the danger of arevival of Nazism and militarism on one hand, and the growth of anti-fascist, realist forces on the other.”15 On the anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s liberation [from Fascism…], Ludvík Svoboda, President of the Republic gave aspeech at the grandiose rally to celebrate the Czechoslovakian-Soviet friendship. It was Halasi, the Hungarian radio’s correspondent in Prague who gave asummary of the events, broadcast on May 9th in the evening news. In his speech, the head of state commemorated their joint fight against fascism and the 140,000 Soviet soldiers who were killed on Czechoslovakian ground in those fights. He underscored the importance of friendship with the SU, which “is based on firm traditions and ensures unfailing support for the independence and security of Czechoslovakia. […] This friendship provides protection against the attempts of the forces that are determined to revive their revanchist plans against the independence and unity of our country”. With regard to the current political state of affairs, he said that “the Czechoslovakian Communist Party has given acritical evaluation of the situation, condemning the mistakes of the past and facilitating fundamental changes in all spheres of social life. He stated that the party’s action program and the government’s program proposal reflect and express the needs and desires of every good Czechoslovakian citizen. The time has come […] to turn from comprehensive criticism to concrete work. This does not mean that we should put an end to meaningful debates, rather, it means the gradual implementation of the new plans and proposals supported by the people.” The President also emphasized that the country’s “place is by the side of the forces of peace and progress. Therefore, the basis of our foreign policy will be our alliance and versatile cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries”.16 Although the “reassuring” offensive of the Czechoslovakian party and state leaders failed to meet afavorable response in Moscow, the Hungarian radio aired some optimistic or at least neutral commentaries. However, the news that in accordance with the plans of the united armed forces staff, the armed forces of several members of the Warsaw Pact were to perform ajoint military exercise on the territory of Poland and Czechoslovakia in June, stirred considerable attention and concern. The fact was reported in the May 27th program of Reggeli Krónika, with the comment that the goal of the exercises is „to practise the tasks of cooperation and management and to increase the level of combat readiness required by modern military operations. The joint military exercise will be led by the commander-in-chief of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.”17 15 Esti Krónika. May 8th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast on May 8th 1968. 19:00–19:29. Kossuth Rádió. 16 Esti Krónika. May 9th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast May 9th 1968. 19:00–19:29. Kossuth Rádió. 17 Reggeli Krónika. May 25th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast May 25th 1968. 7:00–7:14. Kossuth Rádió.
168 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 the members of the two delegations. On the Soviet part, it was Brezhnev, N.Voronov, A.Kosigin, K.Mazurov, A.J.Pelse, N.Podgorníj, M.Suslov, A.Shelyepin and P.Shelest, all members of the Political Committee of the Soviet Communits Party, as well P.Demisev and P.M.Masherov, alternate members of the political committee, along with K.F. Katushev and B.Ponomarjov, secretaries of the Cenral Committee who were present. On the Czechoslovakian side, the participants were Dubček, František Barbírek, Vasil Biľak, Oldřich Černík, Kriegel, Piller, Rigo, Smrkovský, Špaček and Švestka, along with the alternate members of the presidium: Kapek, Josef Lenárt and Simon as well as Miloš Jakeš, chair of the Central Supervising Committee, Revision Committee. President of the Republic Svoboda also attended the meeting.37 The Soviet-Czechoslovakian meeting, which was to be of critical importance, was followed with great attention not only by the TASS but also by the Western press and radio commentators. The Evening Chronicle, too, broadcast asummary of it on July 30.According to the protocol text of the TASS, the meeting at Ágcsernyő “was characterized by sincere, comradely spirit”. As to the commentary that summed up the western responses to the Czechoslovakian events, the account consisted of two parts. In the first part, the radio public was given “an analysis of the most important articles written for the readers in capitalist countries”, whereas in the second, they could hear some details from “the commentaries advising the Czech and Slovak people on how to go on with the movement of renewal”. The tone and topic selection of these latter writings is completely in line with the tactics pursued by the capitalist world regarding the Czechoslovakian events. “Since it is not in the nature of imperialism to launch an open attack, rather, it is by sotosay peaceful means, i.e. by ideological diversion and intensive but subtle subversion that they are trying to shift the movement of renewal in Czechoslovakia to the right, the bourgeois papers employ great strategic discipline and amoderate tone but at the same time give extensive coverage to the issue, in order to divert the positive changes from their original direction.” According to the Evening Chronicle, the strongest position in this regard was taken by the Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Indeed, they went as far as suggesting that “maintaining the autocracy of the party would be the violation of [the] people’s will. This is aclear reference to and encouragement of having the leading role of the Communist Party eliminated. But the paper goes even further: it advocates the elimination not only of the party but also of all other pillars of the socialist system.” The article also claims that the “people’s militia is along outdated institution, and it is now becoming evident what amistake it was not to have it disbanded before”. As to the article published in Die Welt, the radio commentary states that “they give aless concrete but more aprogrammatic articulation of the direction that the Czechoslovakian processes should take. In their view, it is through economic and political competition with the western democracies that the Czechs and Slovaks should acieve their desirable goal: asocial system of the Western type and the bourgeois restoration.” The editor of the radio program also quoted from the American press, namely from the Wall Street Journal: “America should demonstrate whose side they are on, and they should support the efforts for agradual bourgeois restoration.” 37 Esti Krónika. July 29th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast July 29th 1968. 19:00–19:25. Kossuth Rádió.
IRéN SIMáNDI 169 West Germany, Czechoslovakia’s neighboring country, views the situation in asimilar way— goes on the editor. “After all, there is no other way we can interpret the statement of the Sudeten German revanchists dreaming about seizing Czechoslovakian territories, who have declared that they support the freedom fight of the Czech and Slovak peoples by all possible means.”38 The report about the Ágcsernyő meeting was aired by the Evening Chronicle on August 1st. This was also restricted to the official protocol text: the meeting “took place in an atmosphere of complete openness, sincerity and mutual understanding, and was aimed at finding the ways and means of further improving and strengthening the traditionally amicable relationships between the two parties and the two peoples based on the principles of MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism”. The Chronicle closed its report with the statement that the meetings would continue in Bratislava on August 3rd, with the participation of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, the German Socialist Party, the United Workers’ Party of Poland, the Soviet Communist Party and the Czechoslovakian Party.39 On the evening of August 1st, President Svoboda gave aTV speech about the Ágcsernyő meeting, to be covered by the Morning Chronicle the following day. What they highlighted from the speech was the president’s statement that “the only way they can implement their program and the tasks they set for themselves is if Czechoslovakia remains afirm link in the chain of the socialist countries’ community and if the country relies on the support and cooperation of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries […].” Svoboda also said that “the Soviet leaders have assured the Czechoslovak leaders that they are in support of the socialist program outlined in the party’s action program and the government’s manifesto”. He added that their neagotiations with the Soviet leaders “have created the calm atmosphere necessary for the fulfillment of their socialist program”.40 From the archival sources, we know that once again, the Hungarian political leadership played an important mediating role in organizing the Ágcsernyő meeting as well as during the meeting itself. Amajor part of this was the secret meeting of Kádár and Dubček in Komárom, on July 13. “Kádár felt that […] he managed to scare Dubček and Černík, both of whom broke down in tears at the end of the meeting, realizing only then how far they had got.” Therefore, Kádár was hoping that “alast warning [by the Soviets] before the expulsion from the party would do the trick, and the comrades in Prague would eventually take the necessary administrative steps leading to the consolidation of the communist system”.41 The Hungarian radio gave an account of the Bratislava conference in its late evening (10 pm) news on August 3rd. The meeting was characterized by “sincere, comradely atmosphere”. The leaders of the six parties discussed the most significant developments in the international political situation. They expressed, among others, 38 Esti Krónika. July 30th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast July 30th. 1968. 19:00–19:30. Kossuth Rádió. 39 Esti Krónika. August 1. 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast August 1st. 1968. 19:00–19:30. Kossuth Rádió. 40 Reggeli Krónika. Aug 2nd 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast on August 2nd 1968. 7:00–7:14. Kossuth Rádió. 41 BÉKÉS, 2008.
170 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 their “resolution to do their utmost for deepening the many-sided cooperation of their countries, relying on the principles of egality, sovereignty and national independence as well of mutual, fraternal assistance and solidarity”.42 It is apparent from the sentences above that the statement contained no more than the usual clichés, and failed to show any concrete solutions to the situation in Czechoslovakia, or to say anything new for the public. In fact, at the Bratislava conference, Kádár was absolutely clear in explaining to Dubček the alternative that the CzCP was facing: it is either they themselves who will forcefully put an end to certain tendencies of the development, or the force will come from somewhere else.43 There were two more events of importance that preceded the launching of the “fraternal assistance” on 20th August, as evidenced by archival sources. The first one: on August 15th. János Kádár paid avisit to Yalta on the invitation of Brezhnev. “By this time, the negotiations have been running in full awareness of an imminent order for the armed solution.” The second: Kádár’s “last attempt for mediation”, commissioned by Brezhnev in Yalta, “in the belief that the only one who can have any influence on Dubček is, besides the SCP, the Hungarian party”. The meeting took place in Komarno on 17th August, where Kádár came to the conclusion that “[…] it had become plainly clear that the Czechoslovak leaders were not aware of the fact that they were riding atrain rushing towards aprecipice, or if they were, they were just waiting for the approaching catastrophe, resigned to their fate, with no one having the strength to pull the emergency brake.”44 Kádár’s words seemed to be confirmed by aspeech that Dubček gave in the Avia car factory in Prague. The account was aired in the August 17th program of the Evening Chronicle. Dubček said that he did “not want to hide the fact that the internal development of the country had created certain difficulties. He pointed to the spontaneous actions that involved extremist excesses against the Communist construction work. […] even the people’s militia are being vilified, despite the fact that their assemblies have explicitly committed themselves to the trend the country has pursued since January.” Therefore, it is all the more perplexing that the authors of these calls against the people’s militia act as though their demands to disband the militia were in fact supporting the work of the new party leadership. Dubček expressed his belief that in the present stage of affairs, the people’s militia “is the safeguard of the democratic process, and it is the responsibility of all good people to fight back any reckless actions, as such actions can have grave consequences and prove to be detrimental to the processes that have evolved since January.”45 After this, the pace of events sped up. The first report about the invasion of Czechoslovakia appeared in the early morning News (Hírek), on 21st August. “The Hungarian Telegraph Agency MTI reports: the units of the Hungarian people’s army, which are stationed in Czechoslovakia as part of the allied forces with the purpose of providing fraternal 42 Hírek. August 3rd 1968. MTVA Archives K615. Press archives. Box482. Broadcast August 3rd 1968. 22:00. Petőfi Rádió. 43 BÉKÉS, 2008. 44 Ibidem. 45 Esti Krónika. August 17th. 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast August 17th 1968. 19:00–19:25. Kossuth Rádió.
IRéN SIMáNDI 171 assistance and averting the danger of acounter-revolutionary turn of events in Czechoslovakia, have fulfilled their task, without meeting any resistance or suffering any human or material losses.”46 (This report was repeated in every edition of the news.) Amore elaborate report was released in the 10 o’clock news program on 21st April. “On the request of the leading party and state figures of our neighbor, Czechoslovakia, the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic— together with other allied countries— provides assistance, including armed assistance, too, for the fraternal Czechoslovak people, in order to avert the danger of acounter-revolutionary turn created by both internal anti-socialist forces and external imperialist powers […]. The situation that has evolved in Czechoslovakia is so grave that it threatens to destroy the socialist achievements as well as the law and order, endangering the vital interests of the socialist world system, the security of fraternal countries and the peace of all European peoples. In order to avert in time the imminent danger, and empowered by the request of the leading Czechoslovak party and state figures on one hand and by the resolution of the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic on the other, the units of our people’s army have entered the territory of Czechoslovakia as part of the allied troops. As soon as the imminent danger has ended and the legitimate Czechoslovak authorities have concluded that there is no longer need for the military presence of the allied military units, the troops will be instantaneously withdrawn from the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. This resolution of the socialist countries’ governments is not directed against any of the states, nor does it violate the interests of other states, and it is in full accordance with the fraternal socialist countries’ treaty of alliance. It is the unity and solidarity of the fraternal socialist countries that confronts the sinful attempts of the enemy. Never shall we allow it for anyone to take hostage of any member of our socialist community.”47 More information followed in the news. On 21st August, the Soviet news agency TASS released an evening announcement about the developments in Czechoslovakia. On the following day, August 22nd, the Hungarian radio gave asummary of this Soviet interpretation in the Morning Chronicle: “The military units of the allied socialist forces which have moved into the territory of Czechoslovakia on the request of leading Czechoslovak party and government figures have performed their maneuvers without meeting any resistance. [Meanwhile,] the military units of the Chechoslovakian people’s army remained in their stations. Many Czechoslovak citizens have expressed their gratitude to the soldiers of the allied troops for having given timely assistance in their fight against the counter-revolutionary forces. […] the subversive activites are the work of the same [allegedly] socialist elements who have, during the last few months, been constantly attacking the foundations of Czechoslovakian socialism and the friendship that links the Czechoslovak party and the Czechoslovak people to the Soviet Union and to the other socialist countries.” The TASS statement also found it important to mention that the military units of the allied countries “have no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia”.48 On 23rd August, the Evening Chronicle reported that 46 Hírek. August 21st 1968. MTVA Archives K615. Press archives. Box 484. Broadcast August 21st 1968. 4:30. Kossuth Rádió. 47 Hírek. August 21.1968. MTVA Archives K615. Press archives. Box 484. Broadcast 21.August 1968. 10:00. Kossuth Rádió. 48 Reggeli Krónika. August 22. 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast August 22nd, 1968. 5:30–5:40. Kossuth Rádió.
172 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 aCzechoslovakian delegation, headed by President of Republic Soboda had arrived in Moscow.49 In its August 26th program, the Morning Chronicle gave an account of the latest Czechoslovakian developments, indicating that the negotiations between the Czechoslovak delegation and the Societ party and government leaders were continuing. After that, they read out the report of the TASS’s special correspondent in Prague: “The reactionary, anti-socialist forces are persisting in their intrigues, and are making every effort to hinder and block the process of getting the situation normalized. Therefore, they are carrying out numerous acts of provocation in various regions of Czechoslovakia, most notably in the capital. On the dawn of Sunday, there were shootings, and in several districts various weapons, machine guns and anti-tanks were discovered and confiscated. The soldiers of the allied forces had no choice but to hold up and check all cars with aforeign number plate as it turned out that the enemy forces were using such cars for transporting weapons. Several provocative attempts are being averted with the help of the population. On Saturday night, in Prague, some soldiers of the allied troops managed to prevent saboteurs from making the city’s water supply system collapse. The citizens of Prague and of other cities who communicate with the soldiers of the allied troops can become increasingly assured that these fighters are there in Czechoslovakia because they want to help defend its socialist order and the achievements of its people. The new television broadcast center in Prague has been in operation for two days. In many places in the Czechoslovakian capital, the graffiti slandering the peoples of the socialist countries have been removed from the house walls, reports TASS’s special correspondent in Prague.”50 The Moscow correspondent of the East German news agency ADN (Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst) was informed by persons close to President Svoboda, who was pursuing negotiations in Moscow, that the Czechoslovak head of state instructed “Foreign Minister Hájek, who is currently staying in New York, not to speak up at the session of the UN Security Council […] as the Czechoslovakian developments should be discussed and [the problems] solved by the socialist countries among themselves”. This news was aired in the August 26th program of the Evenng Chronicle.51 In the Soviet capital, astatement was released about the Soviet-Chechoslovak negotiations in Moscow through August 23–26. According to the August 27th news, “the negotiations were characterized by an open, comeradely atmosphere. The parties have discussed the latest developments of the international situation as well as the newly evolved situation in Czechoslovakia and the events related to the temporary entry of the armed forces of the five socialist countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia”. There was no further commentary, letting the listeners do the work of evaluating this piece of news. The Soviet negatiating party started out from the resolution endorsed by the Czechoslovak party leadership in January and May, “with the purpose of perfecting the methods of directing the society, improving socialist democracy and strengthening the so49 Esti Krónika. Aigust 23.1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast August 23rd 1968. 19:00–19:25. Kossuth Rádió. 50 Reggeli Krónika. August 26th, 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast August 26th 1968. 7:00–7:15. Kossuth Rádió. 51 Esti Krónika. August 26th, 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast August 26th 1968. 19.00–19.25. Kossuth Rádió.
IRéN SIMáNDI 173 cialist order on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles”. During the talks, the two parties came to an agreement on “the measures necessary for the soonest possible normalization of the Czechoslovakian situation”. The Czechoslovak political leaders delineated the most important measures they wished to take to achieve this goal. The Czechoslovak negotiating team “has declared their intention that the party and the bodies of the state will devote all their energy in every field to ensuring the efficiency of the measures that should serve the socialist power, the leading role of the working class and of the communist party, and the interests of improving and consolidating the amicable relationships with the Soviet Union and the peoples of the socialist community”. The Soviet leaders expressed “the unanimous intention of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the friendship and brotherhood with the peoples of socialist Czechoslovakia, confirming their eagerness for the sincerest and most wide-scale cooperation, on the basis of mutual respect, equality, territorial integrity, independence and social solidarity”. During the talks, the Soviet party reassured the Czechoslovakian leaders that the troops of the allied countries “will not interfere” in the internal affairs of the country. The two parties agreed on the conditions of withdrawing the troops, which “will take place in concert with the consolidation of the Czechoslovakian situation”. The Slovak party announced that “the commander–in-chief of the Czehoslovakian armed forces gave the appropriate orders for the troops to exercise no tolerance regarding any incidents and conflicts that could trigger aviolation of peace and public order”. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces was also instructed to “keep up contact with the commanders-in-chief of the allied troops”. At the end of the announcement, both parties agreed that “just like before, they will be firm in their response to militarist, revanchist and neo-Nazi forces, who attempt to revise the outcomes of the Second World War, and to defy the untouchability of the existing European borders”. They also declared that “they will make good on all the obligations they have undertaken in their biand multilateral contracts with the oher socialist countries, in order to strengthen the military power of the socialist community and increase the efficiency of the Warsaw Pact”.52 Finally, at the end of October, Kosigin and Černík signed the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty in Prague, as was reported in the October 17th program of the Morning Chronicle. The treaty “strengthens the close cooperation and friendship of the two peoples as well as of all peoples in the socialist community. Kosigin stated that according to the agreement, the greater part of the Soviet troops as well the troops of Hungaey, Poland, the GDR and Bulgaria will be gradually withdrawn from Czechoslovakia.”53 On 21st October, the early morning news confirmed that the Hungarian troops were indeed being withdrawn. “The Hungarian units stationed in Czechoslovakia organized afarewell meeting, as— according to the recently signed agreement— their gradual withdrawal is to commence in the near future. The commanders and officers of our troops will take their leave from the local leaders, who have worked successfully together with the Hungarian units in the last few weeks. During the festive event at Galánta, the local leaders 52 Hírek. August 27th. 1968. MTVA Archives. K615.Press archives. Box 484. Broadcast August 27th 1968. 15:00. Kossuth Rádió. 53 Reggeli Krónika. October 17th 1968. MTVA Archives. Program script. Broadcast October 17th 1968. 7:00–7:14. Kossuth Rádió.
174 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2018 emphasized that the conduct and activity of the Hungarian people’s army had greatly contributed to the process of consolidation.”54 After the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops, the Czechoslovakian situation remained to be the main topic of the Hungarian political and public life for several months— not in the least part in connection with the introduction of the “new economic reform”. In the radio, the editors kept avoiding any reference to the partial similarity between the “Prague spring” and the Hungarian process pointed out before. The silence was protecting the Hungarian reforms— from Moscow. And, as it later turned out, not without reason. 54 Hírek. October 21st 1968. MTVA Archives. K615. Press archives, Box 489. Broadcast October 21st 1968. 4:30. Kossuth Rádió.