The King-Byng Affair and Transformation of the Role of Governor-General in Canada

The King-Byng Affair and Transformation of the Role of Governor-General in Canada1 Martin Šubrt2 ABSTRACT The study focuses on an analysis of the King-Byng affair, Canadian constitutional crisis of 1926. During the government crisis in Canada, the British Governor-General Lord Byng of Vimy denied the request of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to dissolve parliament and declare new elections. Lord Byng chose adifferent procedure instead, as aresult of which he interfered significantly in internal Canadian politics. This incident contributed to aprecise definition of the new office of Governor-General in dominions during the Imperial Conference in London in 1926. The Governor-General lost his office as representative of the British government and he became only the representative of the British monarch. The aim of this paper is to focus on what role the King-Byng affair plays in this transformation of the conception of Governor-General and in the process of establishment of the independence of Canada from its mother country. KEYWORDS Canada, Great Britain, British-Canadian Relations, the King-Byng Affair, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, Imperial Conference in 1926 Canada gained its independence from Great Britain gradually. The history of this process does not include any dramatic events, such as revolution or civil war. But we can find different incidents here, which pushed this development forwards. One of these was the constitutional crisis of 1926, which we can find in Canadian history under the name of the King-Byng Affair.3 This affair was named after the two main figures of this event, who were William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister at the time and Julian Hedworth George Byng, the British Governor-General, subsequently 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy. During the government crisis in 1926 Lord Byng denied the Prime Minister’s request to dissolve parliament and declare anew election. He chose 1 This article was published with the financial support of agrant provided by GA UK No.250718, with the title of “British-Canadian Relations 1921–1930“, provided by Faculty of Arts of Charles University. 2 Martin Šubrt, Institute of World History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Nám. Jana Palacha 2, 116 38, Praha 1, Czech Republic, [email protected] 3 Sometimes also referred to as the King-Byng dispute or Byng-King affair. 2 ŘÁDKY PŘES MARTIN ŠUBRT 31 adifferent procedure instead, as aresult of which he interfered significantly in internal Canadian politics. After this incident, the office of British Governor-General in Canada underwent transformation during the Imperial Conference in London in the same year. The aim of this paper is to focus on what role this affair plays in the transformation. However, the text will not only focus on the dispute and the function of the Governor-General but it will try to define the place that the affair occupies in the development of British-Canadian relations and on the way to Canadian independence from the mother country. We can also wonder if the affair helped Mackenzie King’s political goals. For the purpose of penetrating more deeply into the issue of the dispute between the Canadian Prime Minister and the British Governor-General, we must, first of all, introduce both key figures of this affair. MACKENZIE KING AND LORD BYNG The longest-serving Prime Minister of Canada was born on 17 December 1874 in Ontario in the town of Berlin, which was renamed Kitchener in 1916. We can describe him as adeeply religious, educated, well-read and lonely man.4 His grandfather on his mother’s side was William Lyon Mackenzie, the leader of the rebellion in Upper Canada in 1837, whose celebrity as asymbol of the fight against repression he did not hesitate to utilise subsequently for his own political career. In addition to his famous grandfather, his role model was also Wilfried Laurier the Canadian Prime Minister of Liberal Party from the beginning of the twentieth century.5 It was under this Prime Minister that young Mackenzie King began his political career. Laurier was asupporter of Canada’s limited participation in matters of the British Empire, but his opposition towards centralisation of the Empire during the conferences held in 1907 and 1921 can be considered rather passive or passive-aggressive.6 When Mackenzie King became Prime Minister of Canada it soon became apparent that his efforts to change Canada’s direction on the international stage and its independent foreign policy towards its mother country would be much more intensive. This approach can also be considered an expression of the wave of isolationism that arrived in Canada from the United States of America.7 His vision clashed with the concept of acommon imperial policy within the British Empire. Loring Christie, the advisor to previous Canadian Prime Ministers Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen, believed that if the common imperial policy took the interests of all the parts of the empire into consideration, Canada should play an active role in it. The position of the oldest 4 R.BOTHWELL— I.DRUMMOND— J.ENGLISH, Canada: 1900–1945, Toronto— Buffalo— London 1987, pp.200–201. 5 J.E.ESBEREY, Personality and Politics: ANew Look at the King-Byng Dispute, in: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.6, No.1, Mar. 1973, p.42. 6 J.T.THOMPSON, Canada and the Third British Empire, in: P.BUCKNER, (ed.), Canada and British Empire, New York 2008, p.90. 7 H.D.HALL, Commonwealth: AHistory of the British Commonwealth of Nations, London 1971, p.477. 32 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 British dominion in international relations would therefore change from submission to responsibility.8 In 1923 Mackenzie King chose anew key advisor for foreign affairs. He recruited professor of Queen’s University Oscar Douglas Skelton to be his special adviser for Imperial Conference that year and in 1925 appointed him the undersecretary in the Department of External Affairs. Skelton, just like the Prime Minister himself, defended the need for an independent Canadian foreign policy and was deeply involved in its formation for nearly twenty years from that point on.9 Mackenzie King was very persistent in his efforts. During negotiations with the British he subscribed to the theory that Canada is an autonomous dominion in relation to imperial policy. According to his biographer Blair Neatby, Mackenzie King did not wish his attitude to cause fragmentation of the unity of the British Empire, but rather to promote the opportunity for Canada to make its own decisions in international matters, which is why he did not agree to bind the dominion under acommon imperial policy, where Canada may have been too subordinate to the interests of Great Britain. However, he believed that if Canada had the opportunity to direct its own policy on the international field in the future, this would still fall within the broader context of the common imperial policy.10 The second party to the dispute in 1926 was Field Marshal Julian Hedworth George Byng, subsequently 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy, who was born on 11 September 1862 in Hertfordshire in Great Britain. During his military career he served in India and in the Boer Wars. He gained popularity in Canada during the First World War when he commanded Canadian forces on the Western Front from 1916. He led his troops into the famous battle of Vimy Ridge in 1917, during which the Canadians defeated the Germans and his soldiers proudly started to call themselves the Byng boys after their commander.11 After the war he was promoted for his services to General and was created Baron of Vimy. When Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, offered him the post of Governor-General of Canada in 1921, he was overjoyed, and his wife even mentioned that she had never seen him happier.12 He held this office during the period from 1921 to 1926. At that time the Governor-General represented the British monarch and also the British government in the dominion. He also assured communication with the Colonial Office and subsequently with the newly created Dominions Office. For this reason, he played an important role on the stage of Canadian internal politics, but as the power of the government in Ottawa grew, his office appeared increasingly weaker and more formal. Due to increasing Canadian autonomy he was more and more often seen as an imperial official and his office waited for more precise definition until 1926.13 Lord Byng officially assumed his office in August 1921 and he was welcomed very enthusiastically in Canada. When meeting with Arthur Meighen, who was Prime 8 BOTHWELL, p.232. 9 Ibidem, p.236. 10 H.B.NEATBY, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924–1932: The Lonely Heights, London 1963, p.32. 11 J.COWAN, Canada’s Governors-General 1867–1952, Toronto 1952, p.112. 12 Ibidem. 13 R.MacGREGOR DAWSON, Constitutional Issues in Canada: 1900–1931, London 1933, p.66. MARTIN ŠUBRT 33 Minister of Canada at the time, he reputedly apologised for his inexperience in asimilar position and warned him that he would certainly make mistakes.14 When Meighen came to the end of his term in office as Prime Minister, Lord Byng said to him, “you are my constitutional advisor and Imust act on your advice.”15 Not even the new Prime Minister Mackenzie King had any reason to believe that the Governor-General, who he also considered his friend, would act in opposition to his advice. Their mutual relationship between 1922 and 1925 can be considered full of respect and understanding and the Prime Minister only spoke of the Governor-General in superlatives.16 ELECTIONS IN 1925 We can observe the first stirrings of the internal political crisis in Canada after the elections in 1925. The current Prime Minister hoped to continue his Liberal Party’s government, which had been in power since 1921 when it replaced adecade of Conservative party governments. However, after the votes were counted on 29 October 1925 it became clear neither of the parties had won amajority and the ratio of power in parliament was as follows: the Conservatives held 117 seats and the Liberals won 100 seats, the Progressive Party of Canada held 23 seats and the remainder were divided between the Labour Party and independent candidates.17 Mackenzie King considered the results of the election adefeat, which he certainly did not expect. He believed that he would win acomfortable majority with his Liberals and that his position would be even stronger with the potential support of the Progressives, but the Liberal Party actually lost 16 mandates compared to the preceding elections and its leader was not even elected in his own election district of North York.18 During the period from 30 October to 4 November 1925 he met with the Governor-General several times to discuss the post-election situation with him. After his first meeting with Lord Byng, he rationally considered resigning from the post of Prime Minister, but he did not officially submit his resignation to the Governor-General, although Lord Byng agreed with this opinion.19 The Prime Minister was also expected to resign because it is traditional in Canada, although not obligatory, for the leader of the party that won the elections to receive the opportunity to form agovernment that would undergo avote of confidence. At their second meeting Mackenzie King informed Lord Byng of his decision to remain in office and ask the lower 14 J.WILLIAMS, Byng of Vimy: General and Governor General, 3rd ed., Barnsleys 2014, p.271. 15 ESBEREY, p.46. 16 Ibidem. 17 Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (further only LAC), MG 26, J 2, W.L.Mackenzie King Papers: Prime Minister’s Office, E-1100, General Elections 1925, Copy of Code Telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from the Governor-General, Ottawa, 4th November 1925. 18 NEATBY, p.78. 19 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Correspondence and addresses, f. 1. 34 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 house of parliament in Ottawa for avote of confidence. The Governor-General tried to convince him to follow his original plan and resign with dignity. He argued on the basis of the results of the elections and the fact that the opposition Conservative Party had won more seats compared to the preceding elections, but the Prime Minister had no intention of changing his opinion.20 On the evening of 4 November 1925 Mackenzie King issued an official statement in which he summarised the results of his meetings with Lord Byng. He presented three options, which the Governor-General could take: dissolve parliament, which would be the route to another election, authorise the leader of the strongest party to form anew government or convene parliament as soon as possible so that the current Prime Minister could try to continue with the previous administration. According to Mackenzie King the most suitable response was the last of these options, because he believed that the strongest party should not automatically have the opportunity to govern, but that this responsibility should fall to the majority formed in parliament.21 The Governor-General clearly indicated to the Prime Minister during meetings that he did not like the first option at all. He did not wish to dissolve parliament, because in his opinion the Canadians did not want another election.22 He was again inclined to take the second option so that Meighen would get the opportunity to form agovernment.23 Although he was of adifferent opinion, he finally decided to agree to the Prime Minister’s request, but he insisted that he must not make any political decisions until he acquired amotion of confidence from parliament.24 Their differing viewpoints of the solution to the post-election situation became the key cause of their dispute during the crisis in the summer of the following year.25 Parliament convened in Ottawa at the beginning of January 1926. At that time Mackenzie King was in his office due to the loss of his seat in the lower house and he hoped that the rhetorical skills of his colleague and the speaker of the House of Commons, Ernest Lapointe, would help him to acquire amotion of confidence in the incumbent cabinet.26 This effort was successful and the Prime Minister was able to continue in his office, but he was forced to rely on the support of the Progressive Party and several other members of parliament.27 He could therefore only hope that his government would survive long enough to announce anew election, which would assure him astronger position. 20 Ibidem. 21 Ibidem, f. 3. 22 Ibidem, f. 2. 23 NEATBY, p.79. 24 ESBEREY, p.47. 25 J.VALKOUN, Na cestě kWestminsterskému statutu: Velká Británie, dominia aproměna Britského impéria vletech 1907–1931, Praha 2015, p.220. 26 NEATBY, p.107. 27 R.GRAHAM, The King-Byng Affair, 1926: AQuestion of Responsible Government, Toronto 1967, p.2. MARTIN ŠUBRT 35 GOVERNMENT CRISIS Representatives of the extensive opposition attempted to make use of the unstable position of the newly formed government. Henry Herbert Stevens, amember of parliament from the Conservative Party, elected for the district of Vancouver, was prepared to confront the cabinet with aserious problem at the beginning of February 1926. This concerned the corruption of customs officers and the smuggling of alcohol over the Canadian-American borders. At midnight between 2 and 3 February 1926 Stevens appeared before parliament with aspeech in which he accused members of the government of corruption and criminal actions. According to his words the Prime Minister, Minister of Justice Lapointe and other ministers knew about the corruption and failed to take any action against it.28 He demanded that aspecial parliamentary committee be created, which would investigate the whole matter. An all-party committee with nine members was subsequently appointed and it was expected to create areport on the whole affair.29 Leopold Stennett Amery, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs at the time, was also aware of events in Canada. However, Lord Byng did not inform him of the political situation in the country in much detail or very often. He only sent amemorandum describing post-election developments to London after the cabinet was appointed on 18 January 1926.30 This is also why Amery asked him to send regular reports about development of the situation in asecret telegram on 12 February 1926, because he wanted to have more information about this matter. He focused his attention on Canada’s internal political situation within the terms of the British Empire.31 The long-awaited report from the parliamentary committee was completed and presented on 18 June 1926, but the Conservatives were disappointed with its contents.32 It stated that customs officers did not work effectively and that the Minister, under whose competence the specific field was, failed to fulfil the responsibilities of his office.33 Stevens did not intend to come to terms with the conclusions of the report and demanded an amendment be attached, which would accuse the entire government of corruption.34 On 25 June 1926 it became clear during voting about the amendment to the investigation committee’s report that the opposition conservatives had managed to draw more members of the Progressive Party to their side. The government would fall if the Progressives ceased to support it, which is why Mackenzie King decided to meet with the Governor-General on 26 June 1926 after consulting 28 J.L.GRANATSTEIN, (ed.), Nation: Canada since Confederation, 3rd ed., Toronto 1990, p.297. 29 Ibidem, p.298. 30 The National Archives, London, Kew, (further only TNA), Dominions Office (further only DO) 117/4, Byng of Vimy to L.S.Amery, Government House, Ottawa, 18th January 1926, f.8. 31 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Correspondence and addresses, Secret and personal, L.S.Amery to Lord Byng, 12th February 1926, f. 10. 32 E.A.FORSEY, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth, Toronto 1943, p.132. 33 GRANATSTEIN, p.298. 34 Ibidem. 36 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 with his colleagues and ask him to dissolve parliament and declare anew election. He even instructed his ministers to agree on adate for the elections, but the turn of events took him by surprise.35 Lord Byng decided to deny the Prime Minister’s request. The Governor-General had refused to act on the basis of the Prime Minister’s wishes only in very exceptional cases throughout Canada’s history and all these incidents also dated from the nineteenth century,36 which is why Byng’s refusal of the Prime Minister’s proposal was unexpected. On the other hand, there had never been asituation when the Prime Minister requested anew election just six months after the cabinet had been appointed.37 This was alogical step for the Governor-General, because in November of the previous year Mackenzie King had stated that he was entitled to remain Prime Minister because he relied on amotion of confidence in parliament, but this confidence was not granted in June 1926.38 During several meetings Mackenzie King tried to convince Lord Byng that the Governor-General has no reason to refuse arequest by the Canadian Prime Minister. He even proposed that Byng consult the entire matter with the British Dominions Office, which he resolutely refused, because he was convinced that after five years as Governor-General in Canada, he was much more familiar with the local situation than anyone in London.39 When Mackenzie King realised that he would not succeed with his request to dissolve parliament, he decided on 28 June 1926 that he would not continue as Prime Minister. He informed Lord Byng of his resignation in atelegram dated the same day. He also informed him that refusal of advice from the Canadian Prime Minister could have further serious consequences. In his opinion the Governor-General should always ask for instructions from the Dominions Office in London in such matters, because he had been sent to Canada by the British government.40 However, it is very surprising that this statement was issued by aPrime Minister who was famous for his defence of Canada’s independence from its mother country. His biographer Neatby even remarked that the sacred principle of Canadian autonomy was overshadowed by the need for dissolution.41 Constitutional expert Eugene Forsey argued that this was athoughtful gesture from Mackenzie King. If the Secretary of State for Dominions had given an opinion that the refusal by Lord Byng was unconstitutional, the Governor-General might have granted the dissolution. If Amery had given an opinion that the refusal was constitutional, Macken35 NEATBY, p.145. 36 MacGREGOR DAWSON, p.65. 37 W.R.SHARP, The Canadian Election of 1926, in: The American Political Science Review, Vol.21, No.1, Feb. 1927, p.102. 38 TNA, Cabinet Papers (further only CAB) 24/181/14, Canadian Political Crisis. Note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, f. 101. 39 C.P.STACEY, Canada and the Age of Conflict: AHistory of Canadian External Policies, Volume:2, 1921–1948: The Mackenzie King Era, Toronto 1981, Vol.2, p.76. 40 TNA, DO 121/60, Private letters addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, when he declined to dissolve Parliament at the request of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Mackenzie King, Prime Minister’s Office, Ottawa, 28th June 1926, f. 14. 41 NEATBY, p.150. MARTIN ŠUBRT 37 zie King could say that London was interfering in purely Canadian affair.42 Leader of Liberals himself then explained his suggestion as “achivalrous action intended to prevent the Governor-General from making the mistake which he did make.“43 Forsey noted that the suggestion was unconstitutional and Lord Byng did the right decision in that case.44 In reaction to this telegram the Governor-General clarified his subsequent actions to Mackenzie King. In Byng’s opinion the leader of the opposition, Arthur Meighen, should be given the opportunity to form agovernment. Although Mackenzie King believed that the leader of the Conservative Party would be unable to manage this task, Lord Byng preferred to make use of all the appropriate options to hastily declaring anew election.45 Lord Byng asked Meighen whether he would be willing to form agovernment. He received apositive answer from him and on 29 June 1926 he appointed him Prime Minister.46 On the same day he met with the leader of the Progressive Party, Robert Forke, who assured him that the Progressive Party does not support dissolution of parliament for now and is ready to support the new administration in continuing the investigation of corrupt customs officers.47 Byng’s approach during the crisis gave rise to conflicting reactions in Canada and in Great Britain. Meighen, the newly appointed Prime Minister, believed that Byng acted correctly in the entire matter.48 Leopold Stennett Amery, the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, objected to Byng’s procedure and declared, on the soil of the British House of Commons on 29 June 1926, that the British cannot interfere in the internal matters of the dominions.49 However, at that time Amery had not been informed of the situation in sufficient detail, because Lord Byng had sent him only abrief telegram aday earlier, in which he informed of his decision to decline to dissolve parliament, adecision that was made in the best interests of Canada in his opinion. He also informed him of Mackenzie King’s resignation in this telegram.50 In another message to London on 30 June Lord Byng decided to explain his actions in more detail to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. He stated that the Governor-General is entitled to decline arequest by the Prime Minister if he believes that this is the incorrect solution, which is in the interests of neither the country nor its people.51 He also justified his resolute refusal of Mackenzie King’s proposal that he 42 FORSEY, pp.247–248. 43 GRAHAM, p.6. 44 FORSEY, p.249. 45 TNA, DO 121/60, Private letters addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, when he declined to dissolve Parliament at the request of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Mackenzie King, Byng of Vimy to Mackenzie King, 29th June 1926, f. 13. 46 GRAHAM, p.28. 47 Ibidem, p.29. 48 GRANATSTEIN, p.301. 49 SHARP, p.105. 50 LAC, MG 27, III A, Julian Hedworth George Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy fonds, Correspondence and addresses, Copy of Telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from the Governor General, Ottawa, 28th June 1926, f. 17. 51 TNA, DO 121/60, Private letters addressed to Lord Byng of Vimy, Governor-General, when he declined to dissolve Parliament at the request of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Mac- 38 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 consult his decisions with the Office for Dominion Affairs in advance. Byng believed that any proposal of asolution to the situation by the British government would be considered British interference in Canada’s internal political matters by the Canadian people.52 On the following day Amery formulated aresponse to the Governor-General in which he admitted that Lord Byng found himself in adifficult situation and expressed his support.53 Copies of the correspondence with the Governor-General even reached Buckingham Palace through the Dominions Office, where they were read by the British monarch, king George V, who actually expressed his opinion that Lord Byng “acted constitutionally and probably did the right thing.”54 In the meant time Meighen’s government was due to undergo avote of confidence. At that time the political system in Canada was configured so that members of the government surrendered their seat in the House of Commons and underwent supplementary elections, which Meighen and the ministers he appointed did not do, because if they surrendered their seats in parliament they would certainly not be able to assure amotion of confidence in their future government during the voting. The previous Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, protested against this and criticized Meighen for illegal procedure.55 On the morning of 2 July 1926 parliament was due to decide whether Meighen’s new government would receive amotion of confidence or amotion of no-confidence. Following criticism by the Liberals Meighen’s seat was empty and it was just the one vote that decided the voting.56 When the final result of 96 to 95 votes for amotion of no-confidence in the government was announced, member of parliament Thomas William Bird from the Progressive Party stood and declared in embarrassment that he had made an error when voting and had voted against by mistake. However, the decision was valid, which meant that Meighen did not receive amotion of confidence in his government due to an unfortunate accident.57 This is why he subsequently went to meet with the Governor-General with aproposal to dissolve parliament and declare anew election, which meant that Lord Byng faced the same request from the Canadian Prime Minister for the second time within avery short period, but this time he decided to accept the Prime Minister’s proposal. After Meighen’s government received avote of no-confidence, Mackenzie King, who was aleader of the opposition at the time, sent Lord Byng atelegram in which he reminded him that the situation he had warned against had occurred. He reminded him of his advice, that Meighen should not be given the opportunity to form agovernkenzie King, Copy of Telegram (Cypher) to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from the Governor General, Ottawa, 30th June 1926, f. 11. 52 Ibidem, Copy of Telegram (Cypher) to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from the Governor General, Ottawa, 30th June 1926, f. 12. 53 TNA, CAB 24/180/64, Cabinet, Canadian Political Crisis, Note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor General of Canada, 1st July 1926, f. 334. 54 TNA, DO 117/20, Lord Stamfordham to M.E.Antrobus, Buckingham Palace, 2nd July 1926, f. 32. 55 FORSEY, p.138. 56 Ibidem, p.139. 57 GRANATSTEIN, p.301.