Memory of Central and Eastern Europe: Past Traumas, Present Challenges, Future Horizons

Alena Marková Mariia Kuznetcova (eds.) Memory of Central and Eastern Europe Past Traumas, Present Challenges, Future Horizons KAROLINUM MEMORY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE PAST TRAUMAS, PRESENT CHALLENGES, FUTURE HORIZONS Alena Marková Mariia Kuznetcova (eds.) Reviewers: PhDr. Stanislav Tumis, M.A., Ph.D. Dr John Paul Newman Language editor: Lucy Elizabeth Brown This publication was supported by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports– Institutional Support for Long term Development of Research Organizations– Charles University, Faculty of Humanities (2021). Published by Charles University, Karolinum Press Prague 2023 Edited by Kristýna Boháčová Layout by Jan Šerých Typeset by DTP Karolinum Press First edition This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction inany medium, provided the original author and source are credited. © Univerzita Karlova, 2023 © Peter Buchmüller, Veselina Dzhumbeva, Iuliia Iashchenko, Marek Kettner, Adrianna Krzywik, Mariia Kuznetcova, Alena Marková, Charlotte Adèle Murphy, Seval Merve Sarıhan, Lena Franziska Schraml, Ines Skibinski, Ramil Zamanov, 2023 ISBN 978-80-246-4085-3 (pdf) https://doi.org/10.14712/9788024640853 Charles University Karolinum Press www.karolinum.cz [email protected] Table of Content Introduction 7 Part 1: Commemoration in Public Space 15 The Transformation of Historical Politics in Post-Socialist Russia of the Urban Space (Mariia Kuznetcova) 17 Commemorating Victims of World War II During the Communist Takeover in Hungary – A Case Study of the Budapest Bar Association (Peter Buchmüller) 34 Instagram Stories and Historical Re-enactment in Social Media Memory: Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl (Charlotte Adèle Murphy) 48 Practices of Restoring Memory or Perhaps Constructing Memory? The Significance of Commemorative Murals to Their Initiators and Creators (Adrianna Krzywik) 73 Dealing with an Unloved Past – Decommunization in Poland under PiS (Ines Skibinski) 93 Part 2: Memory of Nations and Rethinking History 117 Militarised Masculinities: Analysis of Hegemonic Azerbaijani Masculinities During the II Nagorno Karabakh War (Ramil Zamanov) 119 The Experiences of Female Ethnic Prisoners in Soviet Camps: Between Collective Memory and the Historiographical Debate (Iuliia Iashchenko) 146 A Lightning Flash on the Sky of Memory: Walter Benjamin’s Late Theory of History (Marek Kettner) 165 Part 3: Memory and History-telling 179 Trauma, Silence, and Memory: Waiting for Godot and Shoah (Seval Merve Sarıhan) 181 Remembering and Forgetting in Monika Sznajderman’s Fałszerze Pieprzu (Lena Franziska Schraml) 194 Memories of Russia: Ekaterina Bakunina’s Account of the Homeland (Veselina Dzhumbeva) 213 About the Editors 227 About the Authors 228 7 Introduction The collective monograph Memory of Central and Eastern Europe: Past Traumas, Present Challenges, Future Horizons deals with anumber of issues surrounding memory and historical politics alongside questions of national histories, national myths, practices of memory, commemoration and even forgetting in the regions of Eastern and Central Europe. In the last decade, afocus on memory studies in the humanities has fostered new approaches to the study of the past. At the same time, memory and commemorative practices have become sites of contestation and the politics of history are becoming increasingly noticeable. This interdisciplinary collective monograph offers acomplex perception of memory and the ways in which different and changing national histories may be interpreted. It offers aview of memory as aprocess, as aproduct linking individual experiences and acollective (national) history formed through social interactions and larger-scale political and economic factors. The current monograph is an attempt at an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of memory of Eastern and Central Europe provided by early career researchers. The monograph aims to support adialogue between different fields of study (history and literature to name afew) as well as between theoretical and methodological approaches in memory and related studies. Thus, the monograph provides aunique platform for collaboration between different theoretical and conceptual approaches. Over the last few decades, memory and its related historical politics have undergone changes in Europe. This has been related to the enlargement of the European Union and, more broadly, the role of the EU in world politics and wider changes in the international political landscape. However, the changes do not only concern the construction of apan-European narrative but, even more profoundly, understandings about the very 8 nature of the sphere of public activity called memory. Almost thirty years after the fall of the communist regime, the history of Central and Eastern Europe still sparks intense discussions in the former socialist bloc as contested memories, as part of the re-thinking and re-definition of the communist regime, are relived. In recent years, all post-communist countries have seen adramatic rise in political influence on their histories and an increase in the use of different interpretations and assessments of the past for political purposes. Thus, this monograph focuses its main attention on two connected points which explain the current proliferation of memory games in Central and Eastern Europe. Firstly, the growing number of social and political actors trying to develop and elaborate new memory forms into society and secondly, the ‘generalisation’ of conflictmemories. The monograph, therefore, analyses the conflicts in memory around painful histories within contemporary political events. The connection between memory as adefensive safeguard against attempts to silence the voices of the past and the complicity of memory itself in this silencing runs throughout the book. Another purpose of this work is to introduce the reader to the most current methodological trends in the field of memory studies and to provide insights into important issues concerning the treatment of the past and discussions of the darker pages of history. The monograph is divided into three main parts. The first part Commemoration in Public Space focuses on the issues related to the problematic aspects of memory in the context of urban and social media space. It is important that public memory is located within publicdiscourse. This is realised through various practices of commemoration and remembrance intended to reify public memory by transforming it into aset of representations of the past. According to the authors of the chapter, urban and city space is expressed in avery complex interweaving of public memory, urban cultural landscapes and commemorative places and practices. These are not silent places of memory, but agents of active dialogue in the present, suggesting an awareness and rethinking of the past. The focus of memory studies has changed due to rapid technological changes which have created anew digital space that influences how individuals and collectives forget and remember. This section also includes an analysis of the use of social media platforms for commemoration. Commemoration in the public space is considered here as aform of public recognition and away to implement the policy of memory of the state. The first part Commemoration in Public Space includes Mariia Kuznetcova’spaper The Transformation of Historical Politics in Post-Socialist Russia 9 of the Urban Space. This paper provides an overview of the development and trends in historical politics through the example of the urban space of post-socialist Russia. The author considers the restructuring of the Soviet past, the restoration of ‘historical justice’ and the search for new images of theSoviet past as the main strategies of historical politics in post-socialist Russia. The study deals with the history of the installation of monuments to Stalin as the most effective way to commemorate the memory of the history of the USSR. The author focuses on the transformation of the national historical narrative in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the processes of the construction of the national history narrative through historical politics. Peter Buchmüller, in his paper Commemorating Victims of World War II During the Communist Takeover in Hungary– ACase Study of the Budapest Bar Association, presents the post-war remembrance of Budapest lawyers including both those who perished in the Shoah and those who died on the battlefield. The issue of amemorial is avery good example of how complex it was to deal with the question of victims of the war years and how to remember them afterward. Besides examining this process, the circumstances of the Bar Association before and after the war, their inner struggles and oppositions are also briefly presented. The process of the transition to acommunist state whose official ideology had ahuge impact on how to commemorate the victims of the war in Hungary is also discussed. Charlotte Adèle Murphy in her study Instagram Stories and Historical Re-enactment in Social Media Memory: Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl analyses Instagram projects as historical re-enactments and discusses the dynamics and functions of re-enactment for the collective memory of historical atrocities in the digital age. With the Instagram series Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl, the author observes the emergence of anew and important phenomenon within social media memory: combining historical re-enactment with participatory social media practices. The author argues that historical re-enactment is not characterised by only historical authenticity; its objective is to re-create the past symbolically, and for re-enactors (their audience) to feel the events they are re-enacting on an emotional level. Another study Practices of Restoring Memory or Perhaps Constructing Memory? The Significance of Commemorative Murals to Their Initiators and Creators by Adrianna Krzywik initially seeks to read the meanings contained in the messages of selected commemorative murals. Secondly, it tries to establish the meanings attributed to commemorative murals 17 The Transformation of Historical Politics in Post-Socialist Russia of the Urban Space Mariia Kuznetcova Introduction The field of historical politics has been rapidly expanding in recent years and occupies an important position at the intersection of various socialand humanitarian disciplines. Expanding academic interest in the subject also stems from the increasing number of states utilising their own national history as major political tool. Such uses of historical politics represent acombination of interests such as those of the government, political opposition groups and institutions. Historical politics thus becomes apowerful tool of state building. By providing the state with internal and external legitimacy based upon historical narratives, society can be mobilised and united under acommon understanding. The use of national history for political purposes has become increasingly relevant to the study of post-socialist spaces due to the consistent interpretation and re-interpretation of their own national histories. In the case of Russia, expanding spaces for commemoration and political discourse are associated with transformations within the political sphere following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent creation of new institutions. As the largest state to undergo such changes, Russian historical politics serves as aparticularly informative case study of the phenomenon. Specifically, the period following the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet bloc (1991) was atime of significant historical revision regarding the Soviet period1. The events of this period are often an attractive resource for political forces in Russia because of an assumed 1 This paper will examine the presidencies of Yeltsin (1991–1999), Putin (1999–2008, 2012–2022) and Medvedev (2008–2012). 18 general social consensus. One of the dominant strategies for the modernisation of Russian society was therefore to create unity betweenthe state and public organisations founded upon appeals to patriotism. Thepoor coordination of such activities has, however, meant that Russia has not formed ageneral national consensus on attitudes towards the past. The result is that no single and consistent version of historical politics exists that could encompass the numerous competing narratives. The main goal of this research is therefore to provide ageneral overviewof the developments and trends in historical politics through the example ofthe urban spaces of post-socialist Russia. Two major approaches will also be considered. The first is the transformation of the national historical narrative in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The second is the processes involved in constructing this national historical narrative through historical politics. Definitions of Historical Politics: an Overview of Notions While ‘historical politics’ is afrequently used academic term, consistent definitions for the concept are not so easy to come by. Within the context of this chapter, ‘historical politics’ most accurately describes the activitiesof politicians in post-soviet Russia however there are many competing concepts which also describe similar phenomena: symbolic politics, political uses of the past, memory regime, the politics of the past, memory games etc.2 2 Krumrey, J., The Symbolic Politics of European Integration: Staging Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2018; Poceluev, S.P., “Simvolicheskaya politika kak inscenirovanie iestetizaciya”, Polis, Vol. 5, 1999, 62–76; Kangaspuro, M., “The Victory Day in history politics” in: E.Kahla, Between utopia and apocalypse. Essays on social theory and Russia, Kikimora Publications, Helsinki 2011, 292–305; Levi, G., “The distant Past: On the Political Use of History”, in: J.Revel– G.Levi, Political Uses of the Past: The Recent Mediterranean Experiences, Routledge, London-New York 2014; Langenbacher, E., “Collective Memory as aFactor in Political Culture and International Relations”, in: E. Langenbacher– Y. Shain, Power and the Past. Collective Memory and International Relations, George Town University Press, Washington 2010, 13–49; Onken,E.-C., “The Baltic States and Moscow’s9 May Commemoration: Analyzing Memory Politics in Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, Issue 1, 2007, 23–46; Bernhard, M.– Kubik,J., Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014; Koposov, N., Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia, University Printing House, Cambridge 2018; Art, D., The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006; Mink, G., “Between Reconciliation and the 19 The concept of historical politics emerged as acategory of political practice first in Germany in the 1980s, then in Poland in the 2000s.3 In contemporary Russian history, the concept of historical politics was first circulated at the turn of the 2000s and then during the 2010s. This popularity was primarily due to reactions from sections of the Russian academic community towards the authorities’ interventions in the approval and interpretation of historical events.4 From the point of view of the state, the goal was to fight against revisionism in interpretations of World War II. The primary objective was to marginalise historical interpretations which rejected the war as being foundational to Russian civil identity.5 According to Alexei Miller historical politics is defined by aset of practices, based on the financial and administrative resources of astate, through which certain interpretations of historical events come to dominant. The memory of the past becomes asymbolic resource used not only by professional historians but also by politicians and social activists.6 Specifically, historical politics aims to represent acertain image of the past demanded by the current political context. Georgiy Kasianov argues that historical politics is autilitarianist form of politics aimed based upon arelatively stable set of interrelated collective ideas about aparticular historical memory. As aresult, historical politics is ameans of ensuring political and cultural loyalty through the creation and/or appropriation of symbolic capital. It involves the ideological and political instrumentalization of history and memory, including the creation and/or appeal to cultural stereotypes.7 Thus, the concept of historical politics can be used in both abroad and narrow sense. In abroad sense, it is any purposeful activity involving the political use of the past, including the activities of the authorities in the sphere of national and state identity. It also includes the competition, within the public sphere, of influential social groups for the approval of their interpretations of the collective past. In anarrow Reactivation of Past Conflicts in Europe: Rethinking Social Memory Paradigms”, Czech Sociological Review, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2008, 469–490. 3 Malinova, O. YU., “Politika pamyati kak oblast’ simvolicheskoj politiki”, in: A. I. Miller– D.V.Efremenko, Metodologicheskie voprosy izucheniya politiki pamyati, Izdatel’stvo Nestor-Istoriya, Moskva 2018, 33. 4 Particularly by authorities’ attitudes to interpretations by public groups. 5 Bubnov, A. YU., “Istoricheskaya politika ibor’ba interpretacij kollektivnogo proshlogo vpublichnoj sfere”, Izvestiya Tul’skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki, Vol. 4, 2017, 4. 6 Miller, A. I., “Russia: power and history”, Pro et Contra, Vol. 13, Issue 3–4, 2009, 6–23. 7 Kasianov, G., Ukraina isosedi, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moskva 2019, 34–36. 20 sense, historical politics can be understood as astrategy to strengthen identity through apositive assessment of one’sown history based on the elaboration of adifficult past.8 In the view of Olga Malinova, politics works not with the past, but with social ideas about the past. Moreover, it deals not so much with history– asystematic reconstruction of the past based on critical selection– it is more connected with what is commonly called “collective memory”, that is, with socially shared cultural knowledge of the past.9 Collective memory is based on simplified myths and emotional narratives that reduce complex and contradictory historical processes to seemingly simple schemes which are perceived as indisputable. It is therefore more accurate to discuss the ‘actualised past’: alist of historical events, figures and symbols that are given meaning through contemporary political and cultural practices.10 The core of the actualised past is formed by previously established myths, while the periphery is aset of less obvious (but recognisable) meaning constructions. The fundamental principle is that complex contemporary societies produce different memories of the same events.11 This conflicting basis for memory is determined by the fact that the identity of individuals and groups are based on different myths. The interaction of political forces interested in certain interpretations of the past does not, however, always take the form of conflict. Different versions of memory can complement and support each other.12 Consequently conflicts over the historical past draw attention to memory as afactor in domestic and international policy. By promoting or supporting certain interpretations of the past, the authorities pursue political goals that are not always subordinated to the task of making avision of the past clearer. They seek to legitimise their own power, strengthen community solidarity and justify their decisions (amongst other motivations).13 8 Bubnov, A.YU., “Istoricheskaya politika ibor’ba interpretacij kollektivnogo proshlogo vpublichnoj sfere”, 6. 9 Malinova, O.YU., “Politika pamyati kak oblast’ simvolicheskoj politiki”, 32. 10 Ibidem. 11 Langenbacher, E., “Changing memory regimes in contemporary Germany”, German Politics and Society, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, 50. 12 Miller, A.I.– Efremenko, D.V., Politika pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii istranah Vostochnoj Evropy, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, Sankt-Peterburg 2020, 28. 13 Malinova, O.YU.– Miller, A.I., “Vvedenie. Simvolicheskaya politika ipolitika pamyati”, in A.I. Miller– V.V. Lapin, Simvolicheskie aspekty politiki pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii ivostochnoj Evrope, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, Sankt-Peterburg 2021, 14. 21 Historical politics characterises public discussion regarding the connection between the past and the present through the continuing presence of political forces in the debate. The issue of historical politics has gone beyond purely theoretical reasoning into practical use, where rather abstract content from historical politics is transformed into concrete symbols and signs. Such forms of visualisation and objectification by historical politics are known as commemoration and are fundamental to commemorative practice. Historical Politics and Commemoration An important element of historical politics is the public commemoration of historical figures and events through contemporary acts of public remembrance and reassessment. Commemoration should be interpreted as aset of public collective practices with the aim of forming values and models of behaviour through ritual retention and reproduction within the actual cultural meaning for the group.14 It is aprocess which mobilises avariety of discourses and practices in order to publicly represent an event. Commemoration of the past deals with the existing socio-cultural infrastructure of memory. Such infrastructure includes monuments, museums and memorial complexes, public holidays and rituals, space toponyms etc. Commemoration can have different semantic meanings: it is not necessarily an act of triumph that involves celebration; it can also serve as an act of mourning. Commemoration is formed through the deliberate selection of events as part of either astrategic memorialisation or censorship and banishment. The logic of remembering and forgetting takes into account not only the truth of historical facts, but also the emotions associated with them. This consists of remembering what seems important from the point of view of the present and forgetting inconvenient details, mistakes, or controversial topics. In all cases, public recollection inserts the past into the context of the present, actualises it, and reinforces group continuity.15 Memory is an image of the past which is subjectively constructed in the present. Commemoration is formed by the attitude to the past that exists in society at the moment: it is the attitude shared by alarge number of people towards the representation of past events 14 SHub, M.L., “Fenomen kommemoracii: opyt kul’turologicheskogo analiza praktik publichnogo pominoveniya”, Observatoriya kul’tury, Vol. 15(2), 2018, 162. 15 Malinova, O.YU.– Miller. A.I., “Vvedenie. Simvolicheskaya politika ipolitika pamyati”, 28. 22 which confirms asense of its unity. Thus, the practices of commemoration generate and maintain aliving connection with the past and serve to strengthen and transmit said memory of the past.16 These practices act as symbolic resources for political forces and can be used by the state to manipulate historical consciousness. At the same time, they can create restrictions: in particular if their proposed interpretation of the event is significantly different from the established one.17 Through historical politics, memories of ambiguously experienced and difficult to understand historical events are embodied into contrastingly ‘hard’ monumental forms (statues, plaques etc.). This instils certain meanings into an urban environment. Over time, these meanings change under the influence of the changing contexts of historical politics. The systems of memorial sites themselves change: some of them disappear without atrace, others are reconstructed and re-created. Urban Space Urban spaces are continually changing and transforming environments. New elements are constantly added representing particular patterns of behaviour and social practices. Symbolic meaning is achieved through their appeal to the past and their historic presence legitimises their place in the contemporary social space. Such elements are therefore seen as monumental and indestructible in the eyes of inhabitants. The visual level of the contemporary social landscape becomes aspace for political struggle and for the implementation of various strategies of historical politics. Political changes are often reflected in the symbolic structure of the urban environment: the installation and reinstallation of monuments, the renaming of streets and squares. These architectural decisions introduce new meanings into already established spaces and significantly change the cultural infrastructure of collective memory due to their longterm significance.18 Thus, it is possible to implement political strategies in relation to the consciousness of inhabitants by updating certain images of the past and their inclusion in everyday social practices. 16 Gornova, G.V., “Kollektivnaya pamyat’ ipraktiki kommemoracii vformirovanii gorodskoj identichnosti”, Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Seriya “Gumanitarnye issledovaniya”, Vol. 2, 2017, 19. 17 Malinova, O.YU.– Miller. A.I., “Vvedenie. Simvolicheskaya politika ipolitika pamyati”, 29. 18 Malinova, O.YU., “Politika pamyati kak oblast’ simvolicheskoj politiki”, 48. 23 The city acts as acollective experience where historical and social associations play ahuge role in defining urban space. Monuments act as markers, giving apart of the city symbolic meaning. If that value is shared collectively, it acquires the status of sacrosanct, carrying within itself the norms and rules of behaviour of agiven place. Monuments are material symbols that have acquired aspecific character through the activation of symbols of collective memory. These symbols unify and reinforce communal memories which form part of aframework of common meaning. Monuments symbolically connect with the temporality of the city (both past and present) and also participate in the formation ofrelatively static cultural images of the city. Amonument therefore stands out against the urban background, attracting everyone’sattention. The most important monuments are usually installed in places which Kevin Lynch has referred to as “knots”– places where communication streams are concentrated and paths connect.19 The image of the monument is included in the present-day system of routes and strongly associated with aspecific place (district, avenue, square, park, etc.). However, the monument ‘lives’ only as long as it serves as ameans of political manifestation and conveys an idea. Sometimes monuments ‘die’ and become only ‘dead’ elements of alandscape. The monumental form has the greatest visibility and fundamentality in the practices of historical politics. They provide an opportunity for subsequent generations, who do not have the appropriate experience of their own, to take part in the common memory.20 Historical figures, immortalised in bronze, form amonumental “pantheon” which provides some indication of who society reveres as the founding fathers of the nation.21 Shadows of Stalin and Stalin’s Monuments Today, the official memory of Russia is built around the memory of the Soviet past. The current official rhetoric of historical politics increasingly speaks of the positive aspects of the Soviet Union and Stalin’srule, 19 Linch, K., Obraz goroda, Strojizdat, Moskva 1982, 52. 20 Assman, A., Dlinnaya ten’ proshlogo: Memorial’naya kul’tura iistoricheskaya politika, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moskva 2014, 32. 21 Lipman, M. A., “Panteon nacional’nyh geroev kak element simvolicheskoj politiki. Monumental’nye praktiki postsovetskoj Rossii iobshchestvennye predstavleniya ovydayushchihsya istoricheskih lichnostyah”, in: A.I. Miller– V.V. Lapin, Simvolicheskie aspekty politiki pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii ivostochnoj Evrope, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, Sankt-Peterburg 2021, 38. 24 especially regarding victory in World War II. Even though almost 70 years have passed since the death of Stalin, the memory of him is still alive. Stalin’spopularity in today’sRussian society is, however, superficial, since such attitudes are associated with anostalgia for the period of his rule and the achievements of his era (for example military success and industrialisation). These are events of the past which presuppose at least arelative social consensus and thus become an attractive resource for political forces seeking to use them to legitimise their own goals or place in political space. The most effective way of commemorating Joseph Stalin in post-socialist Russia is by building monuments, busts and memorial plaques to commemorate anniversaries related to the history of the USSR. This includes victory in World War II, the beginning of the October Revolution and the birth of Stalin. Monuments to Stalin began to appear in the early 1930s and soon became an equally integral part of the monumental landscape. One of the first monuments to Stalin was made by the sculptor Matvey Kharlamov in 1929, on the eve of the celebration of Stalin’s50th anniversary and took the form of abust erected in Leningrad.22 Monuments to Stalin, as arule, were erected on the central street of acity, village or settlement, in asquare that often bore the name of Stalin himself or near administrative buildings. Busts of Stalin were installed in parks, squares, gardens, school grounds, hospitals and territories of higher and secondary educational institutions. The Soviet communist project to erect monuments to Stalin incorporated great symbols of power, but also retained impeccable loyalty to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.23 Monuments to Stalin continued to be erected even during World War II (1939–1945). In the occupied territory of the USSR, the German fascist invaders mocked these monuments by sawing off their heads and committing other acts of vandalism. Most of the nation’smonuments to Stalin were destroyed during this period of German occupation. After World War II, many of the monuments destroyed by the enemy were restored.24 The majority of Stalinist monuments were erected in the first decade of the post-war period (1945–1955), when the cult of Stalin and the system he created reached its climax. Stylistic alterations were now 22 Artamonov, V. A., Gorod imonument, Strojizdat, Moskva 1974. 23 Lipman, M. A., “Panteon nacional’nyh geroev kak element simvolicheskoj politiki…”, 43. 24 Malinina, T. A., Iz istorii sovetskoj arhitektury, I94I-I945 gg.: Dokumenty imaterialy, Nauka, Moskva 1978, 176. 25 being made to these Stalinist monuments, with imagery of the leader beginning to be depicted in the military uniform of the generalissimo. In the USSR, after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, the erection of monuments to Stalin was stopped. The destruction of monuments to Stalin, which radically accelerated after the 22nd Congress held in 1961, is probably the most ambitious monumental iconoclasm in history. Within afew months, the image and name of Stalin almost completely disappeared from public spaces.25 The dismantling of monuments took place, as arule, in the middle of the night; in the morning even traces of the pedestals had often disappeared. Dismantled bronze sculptures were usually smelted down at metallurgical plants. The sculptures cast from concrete were buried on the outskirts of the city or, in some cases, flooded in rivers. The systematic dismantling of the monuments to Stalin took place gradually and did not cause any shocks or public resonance.26 The hastiness of the initiatives to dismantle one or another monument to Stalin came entirely from the local authorities at different levels. Therefore, in certain settlements, some monuments were preserved even up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. No matter how carefully the monumental images were removed, it turned out to be amuch more difficult task to oust Stalin from public perception. The de-Stalinisation measures taken by the successive leaders of the USSR were limited. In the official communist discourse, Stalin’sname became afigure of silence and to the public it acquired an underground status. The same trend is present today, although in amodified form. The implicit presence of the image and name of Stalin in Soviet life, combined with the successive destruction of monuments and other forms of commemoration, allows us to assert that since 1980 the popular “pantheon” begins to diverge from the “monumental” one.27 The end of the Soviet period and the collapse of the USSR (1991) marked the next phase in the destruction of monuments. The de-Stalinisation of the monumental ‘pantheon’ was a grassroots and often spontaneous process. Destroying monuments to the communist leaders had powerful emotional element but in reality, the destruction was less extensive than the second iconoclasm associated with Khrushchev’sde-Stalinisation. The dismantling of monuments to statesmen of 25 Lipman, M. A., “Panteon nacional’nyh geroev kak element simvolicheskoj politiki…”, 43. 26 Tukanov, V. P., Monumenty vsovetskom gradostroitel‘stve, Moskva 1962, 63. 27 Lipman, M. A., “Panteon nacional’nyh geroev kak element simvolicheskoj politiki…”, 44. 32 Kangaspuro, M., “The Victory Day in history politics”, in: E. Kahla, Between utopia and apocalypse. Essays on social theory and Russia, Kikimora Publications, Helsinki 2011, 292–305. Kasianov, G., Ukraina isosedi, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moskva 2019. Koposov, N., Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia, University Printing House, Cambridge 2018. Krumrey, J., The Symbolic Politics of European Integration: Staging Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2018. Langenbacher, E., “Changing memory regimes in contemporary Germany”, German Politics and Society, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, 46–68. Langenbacher, E., “Collective Memory as aFactor in Political Culture and International Relations”, in: E. Langenbacher– Y. Shain, Power and the Past. Collective Memory and International Relations, George Town University Press, Washington 2010, 13–49. Levi, G., “The distant Past: On the Political Use of History”, in: J. Revel– G. Levi, Political Uses of the Past: The Recent Mediterranean Experiences, Routledge, London-New York 2014. Linch, K., Obraz goroda, Strojizdat, Moskva, 1982. Lipman, M. A., “Panteon nacional’nyh geroev kak element simvolicheskoj politiki. Monumental’nye praktiki postsovetskoj Rossii iobshchestvennye predstavleniya ovydayushchihsya istoricheskih lichnostyah”, in: A. I. Miller– V. V. Lapin, Simvolicheskie aspekty politiki pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii ivostochnoj Evrope, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, Sankt-Peterburg 2021, 38–64. Malinina, T. A., Iz istorii sovetskoj arhitektury, I94I–I945 gg.: Dokumenty imaterialy, Nauka, Moskva 1978. Malinova, O. YU., “Politika pamyati kak oblast’ simvolicheskoj politiki”, in: A. I. Miller– D. V. Efremenko, Metodologicheskie voprosy izucheniya politiki pamyati, Izdatel’stvo Nestor-Istoriya, Moskva 2018, 27–53. Malinova, O. YU., “Rezhim pamyati kak instrument analiza: problemy konceptualizacii”, in: A. I. Miller– D. V. Efremenko, Politika pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii istranah Vostochnoj Evropy, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, SanktPeterburg 2020, 26–39. Malinova, O. YU.– Miller. A. I., “Vvedenie. Simvolicheskaya politika ipolitika pamyati”, in A. I. Miller– V. V. Lapin, Simvolicheskie aspekty politiki pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii ivostochnoj Evrope, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, SanktPeterburg 2021, 7–37. Miller,A. I., “Russia: power and history”, Pro et Contra, Vol.13, Issue3–4, 2009, 6–23. Mink, G., “Between Reconciliation and the Reactivation of Past Conflicts in Europe: Rethinking Social Memory Paradigms”, Czech Sociological Review, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2008, 469–490. Onken, E.-C., “The Baltic States and Moscow’s9 May Commemoration: Analyzing Memory Politics in Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, Issue 1, 2007, 23–46. Pahalyuk, K. A., “Ispol’zovanie istorii vkontekste vneshnej politiki sovremennoj Rossii”, in: A. I. Miller– D. V. Efremenko, Politika pamyati vsovremennoj Rossii istranah Vostochnoj Evropy, Izdatel’stvo Evropejskogo universiteta vSankt-Peterburge, SanktPeterburg 2020, 98–121. Pinkus, M., “VChelyabinskoj oblasti vosstanovili najdennyj vprudu pamyatnik Stalinu”, Rossijskaya gazeta, 06. 09. 20202, URL: https://rg.ru/2020/09/06/reg-urfo/vcheliabinskoj-oblasti-vosstanovili-najdennyj-v-prudu-pamiatnik-stalinu.html [accessed: 03.05.2022]. 33 Poceluev, S. P., “Simvolicheskaya politika kak inscenirovanie iestetizaciya”, Polis, Vol. 5, 1999, 62–76. Romanovskaya, E. V.– Fomenko, N. L., “Identichnost’ ikommemoraciya”, Vlast’, Vol. 23, Issue 7, 2016, 81–84. SHerstobitova, S., “Alleyu Marshalov Pobedy otkryli vKomsomol’ske-naAmure”, Novosti Habarovska, 01. 12. 2018, URL: https://www.dvnovosti.ru/ komsomolsk/2018/12/01/91719/ [accessed: 03.05.2022]. SHub, M. L., “Fenomen kommemoracii: opyt kul’turologicheskogo analiza praktik publichnogo pominoveniya”, Observatoriya kul’tury, Vol. 15(2), 2018, 161–169. Tukanov, V. P., Monumenty vsovetskom gradostroitel‘stve, Moskva 1962. Udar po chuvstvam repressirovannyh narodov [Ablow to the feelings of the repressed peoples], URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zm7VnRuGIVY [accessed: 01.05.2022]. Vcentre Penzy ustanovili byust I.V. Stalinu, Press-sluzhba Penzenskogo obkoma KPRF, 09.10.2015, URL: https://kprf.ru/party-live/regnews/146323.html [accessed: 03.05.2022]. 34 Commemorating Victims of World War II During the Communist Takeover in Hungary – A Case Study of the Budapest Bar Association Peter Buchmüller On the 1st of July 1947, the Memorial Committee of the Budapest Bar Association announced its intention to erect amonument for lawyers who were victims of the Second World War. The monument would include the names of all so-called ‘martyrs of the Bar’ and was an early attempt to address the memory of the Shoah in Hungary’sturbulent post-war, pre-communist period. Initially estimated to cost 75,000 forints, this project required significant financial support from current Bar members in order to fund the endeavour. These costs led to heated debate by members over the financial and political legitimacy of the enterprise, delaying its inauguration until the 26th of February 1950. In case of the Budapest lawyers, the complexity of Shoah memorialisation in post-war Hungary is exemplified and thus provides an insight into contemporary debates over identity, solidarity and commemoration. In order to understand the question of commemorating lawyer victims of the Shoah, we need to briefly summarise the history of the profession in Hungary, particularly in the interwar years. It is also important to discuss briefly the connection between Jews and the Hungarian national identity within this framework. Although due to their legal emancipation, Jews were given the right to become lawyers as late as 1867, by 1910, 45.2% of lawyers in Hungary were Jewish,1 while the proportion of Jews in the population was around 5%. In interwar Hungary, the proportion of Jews amongst lawyers was around 50%, while in Budapest around 55%.2 This over-representation was similar in the centre 1 Kovács, M., Liberalizmus, radikalizmus, antiszemitizmus– Amagyar orvosi, ügyvédi és mérnöki kar politikája 1867 és 1945 között, Budapest 2001, 41. 2 Karady, V., “Jews in The Hungarian Legal Professions and among Law Students from The Emancipation until The Shoah”, CEU Jewish Studies Yearbook, Vol. 8, 2016, 33–34. 35 of the Habsburg Monarchy: in 1910 in Vienna, 22.8% of law students were Jewish3 and by the Anschluss of 1938, 62% of lawyers of the Bar were Jewish. Their over-representation among lawyers was not unique to the Habsburg Monarchy. The number of Jewish lawyers also rapidly grew in Germany between the late 19th century and 1933 when out of the 3,890 Berlin lawyers, 1880 were Jewish, representing 48.3%.4 We cannot go into further details now; it is enough to underline that the profession served as aparticularly important avenue of Jewish emancipation and assimilation in the region, especially in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. After the collapse of the Dual Monarchy and the emergence of Hungary as anation-state in agenerally anti-Semitic political and social atmosphere, astruggle between liberal and far-right lawyers in Budapest started in the late 1920s. This was somewhat belated compared to other free professions. Due to alack of interest, the far-right association of lawyers in Budapest, Magyar Ügyvédek Nemzeti Egyesülete, MÜNE [National Association of Hungarian Lawyers], whose main goal was to lower the number of Jewish lawyers and eventually exclude them from the profession, was only established as late as 1927. Nevertheless, afterthe lawyers’ initial reluctance to join an openly anti-Semitic initiative, by 1939 around 47% of Christian lawyers supported MÜNE. If we reasonably disregard baptized Jews (17.3% of lawyers in 1941 in Budapest) as potential MÜNE members, then their proportion is as high as 57%.5 In 1942, the association grabbed power in the Bar through acoup d’état and immediately proposed the barring of their Jewish colleagues, which eventually happened only after the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. Even though the process of acculturation and assimilation among lawyers seems to have been exceptionally successful, the presence of arelevant group of non-Jews who did not appreciate Jews as equal members of the Hungarian nation is evident. As Gábor Gyáni stresses, acommon disinclination between Jews and non-Jews had always existed that led to the fact that even the Shoah could not become an authentic Hungarian national remembrance.6 In addition, even at the present time, it seems to be impossible nationally to remember an event in which groups were 3 Rozenblit, M. L., The Jews of Vienna, 1867–1914: Assimilation and Identity, Albany 1984, 221. 4 Jarausch, K. H., “Jewish Lawyers in Germany, 1848–1938 The Disintegration of aProfession”, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 1991, 181. 5 Ügyvédi Határidőnapló az 1940. szökőévre, Budapest: MÜNE, 1939. 6 Gyáni, G., Nép, nemzet, zsidó, Pozsony 2013, 204. 36 in opposition as victims and perpetrators.7 Nevertheless, the Budapest Bar Association aimed to commemorate its Jewish and non-Jewish victims together, probably in order to strengthen the bridge between the two; not only in the past but in the future as well. In the following, we will see what the procedures were and, to alimited degree, evaluate how successful they were. The victims of the Shoah and World War II, in the case of Budapest lawyers, can be divided into three groups: Jews who were victims of persecution, Christian war victims who were members of the far-right associations and those who were no. All groups are considered to be problematic when commemorated in the Hungarian context. The first and largest group was, of course, Jewish lawyers who died in deportation, during forced labour, or were murdered by Hungarian Nazis in Budapest. Ihave already identified 642 Budapest lawyers who died in such circumstances.8 Especially after 1949, remembering and commemorating theShoah was ataboo topic for the Communist regime. In parallel withthe Soviet campaign against ‘cosmopolitanism’ and Zionism, in Hungary there was also no space to properly discuss the so-called Jewish question. As Randolph Braham underlines, even Communists with Jewish origins, who were in many cases survivors of the Shoah, were urged to forget their traumas and work on building the new socialist society instead.9 The Christian victims of the war fall into two groups: those who had been members of the aforementioned far-right association, and those who hadnot. It was obvious that the Bar refused to commemorate thosewhohad actively participated in an initiative that urged the exclusion of Jews from the Bar, even though membership did not necessarily mean enthusiastic engagement. The strong suspicion that in 1944, aMÜNE member had provided alist of Jewish lawyers to the Gestapo which was followed by arrests and deportation, did not support the reputation of the association.10 As the Bar emphasized: “those cannot be commemorated on amemorial who had participated even by their membership in an organization that played akey role in the necessity of erecting such amemorial now.”11 Many of those Christian victims who did not support MÜNE were still forced 7 Ibid., 204–205. 8 Buchmüller, P., “Aholokauszt során elhunyt magyar ügyvédek”, in: M. Kovács, Kései főhajtás– Aholokauszt jogász áldozatai, Budapest 2016, 87–108. 9 Braham, R. L., “Assault on Historical Memory: Hungarian Nationalist and the Holocaust”, in: P. A. Shapiro– R. M. Ehrenreich, Hungary and the Holocaust: Confrontation with the Past. Symposium Proceedings, Washington 2001, 50. 10 Kovács, M., Liberalizmus, radikalizmus, antiszemitizmus, 163. 11 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Jegyzőkönyv, 1949, november 8. 37 to become soldiers in the Hungarian Army, agroup that would have been equally embarrassing to commemorate in the eyes of the Communists. This was primarily because they were fighting against the Soviet Army and hence were considered to be supporters of afascist regime. Consequently, high politics had several reasons for not supporting amemorial for any of the groups suggested by the Bar. Nevertheless, the memorial was finally erected in 1950 after along procedure and was criticized from different sides. There were issues concerning the who, the where, the why, and the how of commemoration. The first idea of erecting amemorial came from the prominent lawyer, Géza Vekerdy, in October 1946 who was the president of the Independent Lawyers Party. In aletter, he asked the Bar to commemorate the “memory of martyr lawyers of the 1942–1944 terror”. He also asked the National Lawyer Home Association to provide aspace for it in their courtyard and suggested that the memorial should be funded by the members of the Bar.12 The Bar did not support the idea to place amonument in that courtyard. They circulated their opinion in a January 1947 letter arguing that it was not apublic space and would also require constant care and attention. Instead, they recommended the main hall of the Bar or the street façade of the building for the memorial.13 By July 1947, aMemorial Committee had been organized. Immediately they sent an official letter to all members of the Bar in which they asked for their financial support for the memorial. The estimated cost of the monument was 70,000 forints.14 The Committee received many letters against the suggested place of the memorial. The most telling one came from the National Lawyer Home Association itself: “We have concerns whether the ceremonial hall would provide the necessary publicity for the memorial, enough relief, consolation and accessibility for widows and orphans of our former colleagues. […] The other concern is that the hall is often aplace of parties and dancing schools.”15 The Home Association aimed to separate the memorial even spatially from everyday life events of the Bar but, as there was no other prominent and publicly available space in the building of the Bar, it was finally erected there. This question is indeed connected tothe very concept of the memorial. Choosing the main hall 12 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Vekerdy Géza levele aVálasztmányhoz, 1946, október 4, [All translations of these documents by Peter Buchmüller]. 13 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Levél Dr. Dániel Miklós részére, 1947, január 14. 14 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Körlevél akartársaknak, 1947, július 1. 15 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Levél aBÜK részére az Országos Ügyvédotthon Egyesülettől, 1947, július 5. 38 as alocation of the memorial expresses the serious intentions of the Bar to consider it as amemento, rather than amere memorial plaque. Besides the debate about the ideal location of the memorial, opinions were also divided on whether the monument should be a‘symbolic grave’ or only amemorial. Interestingly enough, even the president of the Bar, Ármin Ladányi expressed his view that instead of amonument, afoundation would have been more appropriate and useful to support the widows, orphans, and lawyers who lived in very bad circumstances.16 Zsolt Szirmai was of the same opinion stating it more vehemently though: “Ifind it not only wrong-headed, but really displeasing to use 75,000 forints on amemorial under the given circumstances, when the Pension Fund is unable to take care of the widows and orphans of our lost colleagues […] Iwill be the first to support them with aproper donation, but Iwill not give money for amemorial.”17 Not surprisingly, Memorial Committee’surge to financially support the memorial created ahuge response from Bar members. There are several letters in which lawyers allude to their extremely bad financial situation, hence they are unable to take part in the initiative, which is quite understandable given it was only two years after the end of the war. Besides the generally harder living and working conditions for lawyers, many of them were suspended due to their former participation in far-right initiatives such as MÜNE, which the official authorities already considered to be afascist association. That was the case of Gyula Szögyéni, who wrote the following to the Bar in October 1947 as an excuse: “the 1-year suspension by the Examining Committee will expire at the end of the year; if my income is higher afterward, Iwill definitely send my contribution.”18 The Examining Committee investigated the political role of all members of the Bar, but rarely adjudicated aserious penalty. Still, the example of Antal Rainprecht shows how chaotic the political situation was at the end of 1947. He was arrested on the 10th June of 1947 and, even though he was dispensed from all charges, remained under arrest, requiring his mother to inform the Bar of his situation on his behalf.19 The Memorial Committee insisted on the support of all members 16 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Ladányi Ármin levele Dr. Friedmann Ignác részére, 1947, november 27. 17 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Szirmai Zsolt levele az Emlékmű Bizottsághoz, 1947, július 7. 18 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Szögyéni Gyula levele az Emlékmű Bizottsághoz, 1947, október 18. 19 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, özv. Dr. Rainprecht Antalné levele az Emlékmű Bizottságnak, 1947, október 27. 39 of the Bar and in October 1947 they sent again afirmly toned notice to those who had neglected it before: “Since it is our obligation who luckily survived and stayed alive to maintain the memory of victims of afascist regime and World War II, we urge you again to support the memorial with an appropriate amount of money immediately.”20 Certainly many lawyers reacted to this tone with indignation and several letters expressed their resentment, particularly because some lawyers had already losttheir job due to the process of nationalization that had already begun. The most convincing response however was given by Károly Wagner: “It is not necessary to emphasise my duties twice; if Iwant to help, Ido at the first call. Imyself buried my brother-in-law, László Dénes, who had been beaten to death. Itook care of his daughter’smarriage, who received nothing from the Bar, and now Itake care of his 82-year-old mother, too. Iassume Ihave won the charity contest. Do not use strong words unless you are familiar with reality.”21 The frustration of both the Memorial Committee and members of the Bar was palpable. Beyond the memorial’smain purpose of maintaining the memory of lost colleagues, it was also intended to strengthen collegiality instead of creating additional tensions. It also became obvious that members of the Bar had very different concepts of who should be remembered and what exactly had happened to their colleagues. József Károly Kovács argued: “Iwould be willingto support the monument, if it was not called amemorial to martyrs, but amemorial to murdered lawyers.”22 In ameeting of the Memorial Committee on the 24th of November 1947, they repeatedly declared that “the Bar intends to commemorate around 800 martyrs who died during fascist times.”23 It is clear that this intention is conceptually different from the original one proposed by Géza Vekerdy. In his letter quoted above, Ármin Ladányi also stresses that in addition to commemoration, the purpose of the memorial is to be “amemento for future colleagues that lawyers must not be as fool again to sacrifice their colleagues in their madness.”24 It still remained unclear whether the memorial was meant to be dedicated to the victims of the Shoah and/or to be amemorial to 20 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Budapesti Ügyvédi Kamara Emlékmű Bizottságának levele, 1947, október 6. 21 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Wagner Károly levele aKamarának, 1947, október 22. 22 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Kovács József Mihály levele az Emlékmű Bizottságnak, 1947, október 22. 23 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Jegyzőkönyv, 1947, november 24. 24 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Ladányi Ármin levele. 40 all lawyers who died in the war years and in addition, whether it should emphasize the responsibility of those who supported the perpetrators. In the end, the memorial can primarily be considered aHolocaust memorial, as the final 638 people whose names were engraved had almost all (with afew exceptions) been considered to be Jews by anti-Semitic legislation. It is still not known when and why the Memorial Committee made the final decision to dedicate the memorial first and foremost to the victims of the Shoah and gave up on the idea of commemorating both Jewish and non-Jewish victims. The halt in progress and the lack of documents for the year 1948 express the confusion of the Bar concerning the memorial. The process of collecting the necessary amount of money for the memorial was also going very slowly. Moreover, as Imre Adler underlined in aletter of October 1948, to the best of his knowledge it had been unsuccessful. Therefore, he offered to collect on his own 10,000 forints for this purpose but also asked the Bar if erecting the memorial was still on the agenda as he had received no information about it for months.25 From aletter written by the president of the Memorial Committee to the Bar it becomes clear that the Committee had had to deal with yet another problem. “The Committee together with the leadership of the Bar decided that the list of passed away colleagues would not be finalized before the last war prisoners came home. We do not want to place aperson’sname ontothe memorial who might still possibly come home, and this way destroy thefamily’s remaining hope.”26 This concern was valid, since even Jews who were working in forced labour battalions on the battlefield and captured by Soviet soldiers were not allowed to go home before 1947.27 The question of war prisoners was indeed asensitive issue as well. Jewish prisoners were not much differentiated from regular soldiers in the Soviet Union. In general, they did not support any sort of autonomous initiatives, even Jewish ones. Thus from 1948 the Soviet Union brutally attacked Zionist initiatives as well. Consequently, in Hungary, Zionists were barred from the Hungarian Working People’sParty28 and in 1949 aso-called Zionist trial was organized following the Soviet example (like other satellite states of the region).29 For the Communist state, Jewishness was only considered to be areligious denomination and hence could only 25 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Adler Imre levele aKamarához, 1948, október 4. 26 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Dr. Dániel Miklós levele aBÜK-höz, 1949, február 1. 27 Komoróczy, G., Azsidók története Magyarországon…, 877–878. 28 Ibid., 992. 29 Ibid., 993–995. 41 be manifested within achurch, similar to Christianity. Nothing besides or beyond that was tolerated.30 The situation can briefly be compared to the Raoul Wallenberg Memorial. The idea to commemorate Wallenberg with amonument, thereby providing amemento for the victims and the struggle against fascism, also arose not long after the end of the war.31 Indeed, the Soviets and the communist leadership felt it risky to erect amonument for aperson who had most probably been arrested and murdered by the Soviet secret police. The inauguration was originally scheduled to be on the 17th of January 1949 but was finally postponed “due to technical problems”, as was officially communicated. Eventually, aday before the officially planned inauguration (which was previously postponed), the monument was erected on the 8th of April 1949. The monument was subsequently removed the very next day.32 As Géza Komoróczy summarizes the case: “it is obvious, that the monument had to be hidden, more precisely, it had to be detached from the case of saving Jews.”33 The case of the Wallenberg memorial in apublic space was even more problematic and complex than the memorial to lawyers. This aptly represents that victims of the Shoah, victims of the war, Zionists, war prisoners, as well as other groups were very problematic for the political leadership to define and judge. The contradictory and ambiguous decisions and hesitations made by memorial politics expresses the uncertainty of contemporary decision-makers. After along silence, on the 19th of November 1948 the secretary of the Bar recommended the following to the Board: “the Bar should desist from erecting amemorial and should find adifferent way to commemorate the martyrs; the Bar will offer an alternative way at alater date.”34 The Board accepted the suggestion. Nevertheless, according to the documents of the year 1949, preparations of the memorial were continuing, however, it was still uncertain who exactly would be commemorated according to the correspondence of the lawyers involved. On the 1st of February 1949, Miklós Dániel stated that “the Memorial Committee has started to collect the data of those who died during the 30 It is not the main topic of the present paper but it is worth to emphasize that by this tactic it was possible to employ left-wing antisemitism in the futere. In detail see in Novák A., Átmenetben. Acionista mozgalom négy éve Magyarországon. 1945–1949. (In Transition. The Four Years of the Zionist Movement. 1945–1949, Budapest 2000. 31 Komoróczy, G., Azsidók története Magyarországon…, 961. 32 Ibid., 963. 33 Ibid., 965. 34 BÜK Irattár II/V, 28-as számú doboz, Kivonat aBÜK Választmányának üléséről, 1948, november19. 48 Instagram Stories and Historical Re-enactment in Social Media Memory: Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl Charlotte Adèle Murphy Introduction As social media has become such an important medium of communication in the digital age, it is unsurprising that historical memory practices are also experiencing aparallel shift towards utilising such platforms.1 Social media can now be considered the main venue for social interaction and information-sharing among younger generations,2 which also makes these platforms an important space for the remembrance of historical atrocities. Although commemorative projects on social media present challenges as well as raise ethical questions, they represent atool in the dissemination of knowledge and make it possible to present individual personal accounts to acontemporary, younger audience.3 The trend towards internationally accessible social media memory projects and digital remembrance initiatives was also accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic through its social distancing regulations and which lead to the increased use of social media for remembrance ceremonies and projects. One important example is the campaign #RememberingFromHome #ShoahNames on the Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Day on the 20th/21st of April 2020. This global online name-reading initiative was organised by Yad Vashem and invited “the public to participate in 1 This has resulted in anew interdisciplinary research subfield of Social Media Memory Studies, proposed by the German communication studies researchers Thomas Birkner and André Donk in 2018. See Birkner, T.– Donk, A., “Collective memory and social media– Fostering anew historical consciousness in the digital age?”, Memory Studies, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2020, 367–383. 2 Bohus, K., “Éva on Insta. Holocaust Remembrance 2.0”, Cultures of History Forum, 31.10.2019, URL: https://www.cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/exhibitions/eva-on-insta-holocaust-remembrance-20 [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 3 Ibidem. 49 an international campaign to record themselves reciting the names of Holocaust victims, and share the video on social media.”4 Another example is the ceremony Vozvrashchenie imyon [Return of the names] organised by the Russian NGO Memorial which takes place annually on the 29th of October, the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Political Repression. Since 2007, the names of those murdered during the years of Stalin’sGreat Terror have been recited in apublic ceremony on Moscow’sLubyanka Square. In 2020, it took place online due to COVID-19, with people from all over Russia and the world participating by submitting or sharing short videos of themselves reading names of victims with the hashtag #ВозвращениеИмен [#ReturnOfTheNames].5 These digital initiatives were accessible to awide audience from all over the world and made it possible for many people to participate directly by creating their own videos, or interactively by watching, sharing and commenting. The most influential social media memory project to date is the Instagram series Eva Stories from 2019.6 In this paper, Iwill explore Eva Stories and its “copycat project” Ich bin Sophie Scholl from 2021 and their relevance for the collective memory of historical atrocities in the digital age.7 The projects combine aspects of historical re-enactment with the remembrance of victims of historical atrocities on social media. The common objective is to reach ayounger audience, educate people about the Holocaust and the Nazi regime, and stimulate discussion about the respective historical events by making the content relatable. This research will analyse the projects as historical re-enactments on social media in the context of ‘mimetic mourning’ as outlined by Alexander Etkind and discuss the dynamics and importance of re-enactment for collective memory practices. Eva Stories With the launch of the Instagram series Eva Stories on the 2019 Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Day [Yom HaShoah], Israeli entrepreneur 4 Yad Vashem, Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day 20–21 April 2020. Yad Vashem, URL: https://www.yadvashem.org/press-release/06-april-2020-12-41.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 5 The official Vozvrashchenie imyon [Return of the names], URL: https://october29.ru/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 6 The Eva Stories project on Instagram, URL: https://www.instagram.com/eva.stories/ [accessed: 30.04.2021]. 7 The Ich bin Sophie Scholl project on Instagram, URL: https://www.instagram.com/ichbinsophiescholl [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 50 and producer Mati Kochavi and his daughter Maya Kochavi attempted to create anew genre of social media memory. The project re-enacts Holocaust victim Éva Heyman’stragic experiences during the German occupation of Hungary in aseries of 70 short videos– known as ‘Instagram stories’– and posts on the social media platform Instagram based on Heyman’sdiary. Why was Éva Heyman’sstory chosen for this project? In an interview with Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Mati Kochavi explained that he chose Éva Heyman’sdiary from 30 diaries written during the Holocaust.8 He felt that her story deserved to be made accessible to younger generations and that it was necessary to speak about Holocaust memory “in away that alot of people would want to see it”:9 Eva wanted to be afamous photographer in London, so we gave her acamera, let her tell her story on Instagram, and put up huge billboards in Tel Aviv. We said that instead of London, it’sTel Aviv and she’ll be famous in Israel.10 For Maya Kochavi, Instagram is not to be considered atrivial medium. It “is essentially the new diary, and to use this platform, to exploit the way it enables you to feel that you are living the life of the person you’re seeing, is incredible.”11 For this reason, the creators wanted to use Instagram as atool to reach the younger generation about aserious topic.12 Aware that their project could cause controversy and in order to guarantee their creative freedom, Mati and Maya Kochavi decided to fund their project privately to ensure their greatest possible independence from official institutions and established practices in commemoration and remembrance.13 Who was Éva Heyman? Born on the 13th of February 1931 in Oradea14 to Jewish parents, Heyman witnessed the German occupation of Hungary 8 Anderman, N., This Father-and-daughter Team Explains Why It’sGood to Put the Holocaust on Instagram, Haaretz, URL: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-father-and- -daughter-team-who-brought-the-voice-of-a-holocaust-victim-to-instagra-1.7189733 [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem. 11 Ibidem. 12 Ibidem. 13 Kershner, I., AHolocaust story for the social media generation, The New York Times, 30 April 2019, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/world/middleeast/eva-heyman-instagram- -holocaust.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 14 The city of Oradea (hung. Nagyvárad) is located in Transylvania in the Romanian-Hungarian border region and was under Hungarian rule from 1940 to 1944, until the Germans occupied Hungary in March 1944. Romanian and Soviet troops captured the city in October 1944. It has been part of Romania since. 51 which began on the 19th of March 1944– ordered by Adolf Hitler under the name Operation Margarethe15– as athirteen-year-old girl. After the occupation, the Nazis actively began to plan the genocide of the Hungarian Jews. Sent to Hungary for this purpose, SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann organized their ghettoization and the subsequent mass deportations of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.16 Hungarian authorities were also involved in order to expedite the process. According to an official report by SS-Brigadeführer Edmund Veesenmayer, who was also involved in the deportation and murder of the Hungarian Jews, 437,402 Jews had already been deported from Hungary by the 9th of July 1944.17 It is estimated that of these people, 300,000 were murdered in the gas chambers of Auschwitz.18 Éva Heyman documented her experiences during this time in her diary between February and May of 1944.19 On the 3rd of June 1944, she was deported from Nagyvárad to Auschwitz together with her grandparents and was murdered in the gas chambers on the 17th of October 1944. Her mother Ágnes Zsolt and her stepfather Béla Zsolt (awell-known leftist journalist) were able to escape to Switzerland via Bergen-Belsen on the famous yet controversial Kasztner train on the 30th of June 1944.20 Ágnes Zsolt allegedly received her daughter Éva’s diary from their former housekeeper in 1945 and published it in 1947 under the title Éva lányom. Napló [My daughter Éva: Diary].21 There has been some academic discussion and speculation about the authenticity of the diary with social historian Gergely Kunt arguing that Zsolt must have written the diary herself “in the format and style of ayoung girl’sdiary to explore Éva Heyman’sshort life from the child’sperspective and to help Ágnes process her grief over losing her daughter.”22 The diary was published just before the Holocaust became ataboo topic in post-war socialist Hungary.23 The publication of Heyman’sdiary and the nature 15 Ránki, G., Unternehmen Margarethe. Die deutsche Besetzung Ungarns, Wien 1984; Durucz, P., Ungarn in der auswärtigen Politik des Dritten Reiches 1942–1945, Göttingen 2006, 159–173. 16 Gerlach, C.– Aly, G., Das letzte Kapitel. Realpolitik, Ideologie und der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944/1945, Stuttgart 2002, 249–343; Ránki, G., Unternehmen Margarethe…, 298. 17 Ibid., 346–347. 18 Ibid., 347. 19 Zsolt, Á., Éva lányom [My daughter Éva], Budapest 1947. 20 Kunt, G., “Ágnes Zsolt’sAuthorship of her Daughter Éva Heyman’sHolocaust Diary”, Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLIII, Issue 1–2, 2016, 127–154, 129–130. 21 Zsolt, Á., Éva lányom…; Schwartz, A., “Éva Heyman, the Hungarian Anne Frank. Writing Against Persecution and Trauma”, Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLII, Issue 1–2, 2015, 117–134, 117–118. 22 Kunt, G., “Ágnes Zsolt’sAuthorship of her Daughter Éva Heyman’sHolocaust Diary”, 127. 23 Zsolt, Á., Das rote Fahrrad, Wien 2012. 52 of her story led to her becoming known as a“Hungarian Anne Frank”,24 although her story has not received widespread recognition until now. In Eva Stories, Heyman is played by British actress Mia Quiney, who speaks with aHungarian accent and re-enacts scenes and situations from her diary. She documents the events surrounding the German occupation of Hungary in stories, photographs and posts on her social media channel as though she were ayoung girl with access to asmartphone and social media. The Instagram series was filmed mostly in selfie format from Heyman’sperspective in Lviv, Ukraine, with hundreds of actors and extras and many historical props, such as military tanks, furniture, clothing, and everyday objects. The dialogue is in English with Hebrew subtitles. With the question “What If aGirl in The Holocaust Had Instagram?”, contemporary social media users are invited to imagine themselves in Heyman’sposition as agirl living in Nagyvárad, Hungary in 1944, in order to witness the events prior to her deportation to Auschwitz as though they were happening now, and to react to them. Like her diary, Eva Stories begins on the 13th of February 1944, with her stories chronicling Éva Heyman’sfeelings and thoughts on her thirteenth birthday, her carefree everyday life with her family and friends, and her relationship with her first teenage crush Pista Vadas (aboy from Nagyvárad). All of this is shown taking place against the backdrop of the war and the German occupation. Her stories soon take on asinister tone with the deportation of her cousin Martha, which Éva documents in one of her stories with the hashtag #lifeduringthewar, writing “This is the first time the war has entered my home.”25 She uses the hashtag #reporterlife when she is documenting important historical events in her stories, such as on the 19th of April, when she films the Nazis emptying her friend Annie’shouse of its belongings. Another example of her using this hashtag is on the 5th of May, when her family is brought to the Nagyvárad ghetto.26 The last entry in Heyman’sdiary was on the 30th of May 1944 on the day of her deportation from the ghetto to Auschwitz.27 Eva Stories takes her story beyond the timeline of the original diary, doc24 See for example Schwartz, A., “Éva Heyman, the Hungarian Anne Frank. Writing Against Persecution and Trauma…” and Bohus, K., “Two Diaries, Two Holocaust Memories in Communist Hungary”, Remembrance and Solidarity, Vol. 5, 2016, 97–113. 25 The Eva stories story from 15th of February, URL: https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/17998120066205191/?hl=de [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 26 The Eva stories story from 19th of April, URL: https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/18061359865032810/?hl=de [accessed: 30.04.2022]; The Eva stories story from 5th of May, URL: https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/17959394311269817/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 27 Zsolt, Á., Das rote Fahrrad, Wien 2012, 125–126. 53 umenting the Nazis leading alarge group of Jewish people through the ghetto to acattle train and filming herself and her reactions from aselfie perspective in her stories from June.28 Her invisible camera films what she sees as she walks up the ramp into the cramped cattle truck and we can hear her heavy breathing as well as groaning sounds from within the car. The last stories are filmed from aselfie perspective and capture Eva’sterrified facial expression as the train leaves the station.29 These stories are followed by another story entitled “Eva”, in which the viewer receives more information about Eva’sfate and her death in the gas chambers of Auschwitz.30 Before the credits, there is ashort video of Eva and her friend sitting on the floor of the cattle truck with her friend saying: “Yes Eva, your journal, everyone will remember us.” The viewers are encouraged to react to this story with the words “Write amessage in memory of Eva.”31 Ich bin Sophie Scholl Following the example of Eva Stories, the German state television channels SWR and BR launched asimilar project Ich bin Sophie Scholl [Iam Sophie Scholl] on Instagram in May 2021. The project seeks to commemorate German student and anti-Nazi political activist Sophie Scholl, who was part of the non-violent White Rose resistance group, and what would have been her 100th birthday on the 9th of May 2021.32 Today, Sophie Scholl and her brother Hans Scholl– two of the most famous activists to resist Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime– occupy acentral place in Germany’sculture of remembrance with many streets, squares and schools named after them and numerous books and films covering their story.33 Sophie Scholl was born on the 9th of May 1921 in the German town of Forchtenberg into aLutheran family with five brothers and sisters. In 28 The Eva stories story from June, URL: https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights /17926929286293660/?hl=de [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 29 Ibidem. 30 The Eva stories story “Eva”, URL: https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/17877652939352743 /?hl=de [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 31 Ibidem. 32 Südwestrundfunk, “Instagram-Projekt zu Sophie Scholl von SWR und BR”, SWR, 26.04.2021, URL: https://www.swr.de/unternehmen/ich-bin-sophie-scholl-projekt-100.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 33 Gottschalk, M., Wie schwer ein Menschenleben wiegt: Sophie Scholl. Eine Biographie, München 2020, 304–305. 54 1932, the family moved to Ulm– astronghold of the National Socialist Party.34 During her childhood and teenage years, Sophie Scholl was an ardent supporter of the National Socialist Party as was her brother Hans, with him joining the Hitler Youth [Hitlerjugend] in 1933 and Sophie joining the League of German Girls [Bund Deutscher Mädel] in 1934 when she was thirteen.35 Their parents, especially their father Robert Scholl, reluctantly supported their children’sdecision as they were sceptical of the National Socialist party.36 Sophie Scholl remained an enthusiastic member of the League of German Girls until 1941, two years longer than required.37 In 1937, Sophie fell in love with her old acquaintance Fritz Hartnagel, with whom she went on to have an ambivalent relationship. He wanted to become amilitary officer and was stationed in Augsburg as alieutenant. They sent each other letters, in which they discussed their relationship, poetry, their religious beliefs and eventually Fritz’sexperiences in the war.38 In 1942, Sophie Scholl began her studies at the university of Munich, where her brother Hans had already been studying Medicine since 1939.39 Motivated in part by the intellectual university environment and his experiences in France as amedic in the Wehrmacht, where he had been enrolled during the semester break in 1940, Hans Scholl began to question the National Socialist ideology and the purpose of the war.40 Hans Scholl and his friend Alexander Schmorell founded the resistance group White Rose in June 1942, which Sophie Scholl later joined. Their resistance began with a campaign in which they anonymously disseminated leaflets and pamphlets around Munich, calling for active opposition against the regime and for the war to end, and denouncing the mass murder of the Jews.41 After having supported the regime’sideas in her youth, it is important to note that Sophie Scholl shifted her opinion of National Socialism. After the war started, she began to have doubts about National Socialism, distancing herself from her former views as she could no longer reconcile her religious beliefs with her animosity towards the Nazi regime and the 34 Ibid., 51–54. 35 Ibid., 57–59, 67–77. 36 Zoske, R. M., Sophie Scholl. Es reut mich nichts. Porträt einer Widerständigen, Berlin 2020, 38–42. 37 Ibid., 44. 38 Ibid., 80–81. 39 Ibid., 219. 40 Zoske, R. M., Flamme sein! Hans Scholl und die Weiße Rose. Eine Biografie, München 2018, 129. 41 Gottschalk, M., Wie schwer ein Menschenleben wiegt…, 229–234. 55 war.42 Fritz was sent to the Eastern Front in 1942, where he eventually ended up in Stalingrad.43 Similar to Eva Stories, the Instagram series Ich bin Sophie Scholl uses the phrase “Imagine it’s1942 on Instagram…” to draw in the social media audience. It depicts German actress Luna Wedler playing Sophie Scholl and documents the last ten months of Sophie Scholl’slife before she is executed for her activism against the National Socialist regime. The dialogue and subtitles are in German, but some of Scholl’sweekly updates have also been translated into English to make them accessible to awider audience. Based on letters and diary entries written from 1937 until her execution in 1943, as well as additional historical documents about Sophie Scholl and the resistance group Weiße Rose, the project re-enacts Scholl’sexperience in Instagram stories and social media entries from the perspective of acontemporary social media user. Ich bin Sophie Scholl was launched on the 4th of May 2021, with Sophie Scholl travelling by train to study in Munich. From this date on, she creates Instagram posts and stories about her life, her relationship with Fritz Hartnagel, her studies and eventually about her resistance to the Nazi regime. She shares photographs, quotes, her favourite music, and some of her drawings as well as her thoughts about the current events she is experiencing during the war.44 The audience is meant to imagine the events are taking place in ‘real time’ in 1942. Viewers accompany Scholl through her life as she becomes more aware of the injustices of the Nazi regime and the war and joins the Weiße Rose. In some of her Instagram stories, Scholl addresses the audience directly, asking questions such as “Is anybody to be trusted in these times?”.45 Ich bin Sophie Scholl and Scholl’sdocumentation of her life on Instagram ended in February 2022: On the 18th of February 1943, Sophie and Hans were arrested, tried in ashow trial and sentenced to death on the same day.46 The other members of their group– Alexander Schmorell, Christoph Probst, Willi Graf and Kurt Huber– were also apprehended and executed in July and October 1943.47 42 Zoske, R. M., Sophie Scholl…, 243. 43 Ibid., 80–81. 44 This was acreative addition by the creators of the project as Sophie Scholl was known for her drawing talent. The drawings and illustrations were created by French illustrator Édith Carron and are integrated into Ich bin Sophie Scholl as Sophie’sown drawings. 45 Ich bin Sophie Scholl post from 11 January, URL: https://www.instagram.com/p/CYlfB4SM0Ux/ [accessed: 30. 04. 2022]. 46 Südwestrundfunk, “Instagram-Projekt zu Sophie Scholl von SWR und BR”. 47 Gottschalk, M., Wie schwer ein Menschenleben wiegt…, 303. 56 With Ich bin Sophie Scholl, the creators aimed to tell Sophie Scholl’sstory from amore personal and relatable angle in order to “make history tangible and emotional, to show ayoung resistance fighter from aperspective that few people know from history lessons.”48 To them, their project embodies “Living History on Instagram,” representing a“unique way to let users participate in history.”49 Since its launch, Ich bin Sophie Scholl has gained 840,000 subscribers.50 Initially aimed at ayounger audience of 18 to 25-year-olds, to the surprise of the producers this group only makes up 20% of the subscribers with 50% of them belonging to the demographic of 25 to 35-year-olds.51 This demonstrates that this format is also interesting to an older demographic. Originally, all of the social media posts for Ich bin Sophie Scholl were planned out in advance by the producers up to and including February 2022, but in reaction to numerous comments and responses, they decided to add some details suggested by viewers and have adapted the project to match the audience’sreactions and discussion. One such adaptation is the addition of more religious content, as the Scholls’ resistance to the Nazi regime was influenced in part by their Lutheran upbringing and values– an aspect the creators had decided not to focus on at first.52 Media Response and Critique of the Projects Both Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl sparked intense discussions about appropriate and respectful approaches to remembering victims of the Holocaust– and in Sophie Scholl’scase of National Socialism– with some individuals criticizing the fact that Instagram or social media in general was not asuitable platform for such serious topics.53 The media response as well as the comments received by the projects highlight the ambivalence of public opinion about these projects. Eva Stories was criticised for its “aggressive marketing campaign”– with huge billboards being installed in Tel Aviv promoting the project 48 Südwestrundfunk, “Instagram-Projekt zu Sophie Scholl von SWR und BR”. 49 Ibidem. 50 The Ich bin Sophie Scholl project on Instagram, URL: https://www.instagram.com/ichbinsophiescholl [accessed: 30. 04. 2022]. 51 Jakob, J., “Ich bin Sophie Scholl’: Zwischen Fiktion und Wirklichkeit”, NDR Kultur, 14.05.2021, URL: https://www.ndr.de/kultur/-Sophie-Scholl,sophiescholl110.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 52 Ibidem. 53 Henig, L.– Ebbrecht-Hartmann, T., “Witnessing Eva Stories. Media witnessing and self-inscription in social media memory”, New Media & Society, October 2020, 1. 57 before its launch.54 During this campaign, the project was also promoted by the Israeli prime minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, in aTwitter post on the 29th of April 2019, in which he drew attention to Eva Stories before it went online.55 This could be deemed problematic as it could point towards apolitical instrumentalization of Éva Heyman’sstory for purposes of national identity. Some critics took aculturally pessimistic stance, claiming that Eva Stories was exploiting aHolocaust victim’sstory to “generate likes.”56 This corresponds with Eva Hoffman’scritique of contemporary media portrayals of Holocaust accounts as “hyper-mediated memory”, which she understands as the fetishization of (Holocaust) memory through media such as films and books aimed to provoke feelings of empathy for victims.57 This discussion may be part of a pattern in Holocaust memory. As executive director of the Anne Frank House, Ronald Leopold, said when Eva Stories was launched, it “always stirs acontroversy” when the Holocaust is portrayed with new media.58 This was already the case with Marvin J. Chomsky’stelevision series Holocaust (1978), Art Spiegelman’stwo-part graphic novel entitled Maus (1980, 1991) as well as Steven Spielberg’sfilm Schindler’sList (1993) which were accused of trivialising as well as inaccurately portraying the Holocaust when they first came out.59 However, these books and films ultimately contributed positively to Holocaust awareness around the world. Similarly, critics of Eva Stories are sceptical of the way in which the portrayal of such stories on Instagram may trivialize and distort the real experience of Holocaust survivors– as it was documented in Heyman’sdiary. 54 Kershner, I., “AHolocaust story for the social media generation”. 55 Netanyahu, B. [@netanyahu], Join Eva’sstory, URL: https://instagram.com/eva.stories?igshid=j8x4qsx7rqgm [Translation by Charlotte Adèle Murphy], 29. 04. 2019, Twitter, URL: https:// twitter.com/netanyahu/status/1122835826709270528 [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 56 Schwarz, C., “Likes für den Holocaust”, Taz, 03. 05. 2019, URL: https://taz.de/Erinnerungskultur-bei-Instagram/!5592218/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 57 Hoffman, E., After Such Knowledge. AMeditation in the Aftermath of the Holocaust, London 2004. 58 Holmes, O., “Instagram Holocaust diary Eva.Stories sparks debate in Israel”, The guardian, 08.05. 2019, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/08/instagram-holocaust- -diary-evastories-sparks-debate-in-israel [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 59 See Wiesel, E., “Trivializing the Holocaust: Semi-Fact and Semi-Fiction”, The New York Times, 16.04. 1978, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/16/archives/tv-view-trivializing- -the-holocaust-semifact-and-semifiction-tv-view.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]; Doherty, T., “Art Spiegelman’sMaus: Graphic Art and the Holocaust,” American Literature, Vol. 68, 1996, 69–84; Burkeman, O., “Biographer takes shine off Spielberg’sSchindler”, The guardian, 25.11. 2004, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/25/germany.film [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 64 actors and their audiences” enabling re-enactors to “touch the past.”85 This can be confirmed when watching the Instagram stories of boththe Eva Stories and the Ich bin Sophie Scholl profiles. The portrayal of authentic looking props as well as everyday objects such as clothes, shoes, newspapers or books in their Instagram stories and social media posts stand in stark contrast to the momentousness of the events ahead and as harbingers of what is to come. Astriking example of this is Éva’sred bicycle, which Heyman writes about in her diary entry from the 7th of April 1944, describing how her beloved red bicycle was confiscated by the police and how she put up afight, not wanting to let them take it.86 In Eva Stories, this event is not mentioned, but we see the bicycle at the periphery of Eva’sstories on the 15th of February when her cousin Martha is taken away, framing the terrible events that are being captured by the camera (Fig. 1).87 85 Auslander, M., “Touching the Past: Materializing Time in Traumatic “Living History” Reenactments”, Signs and Society, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2013, 161–183. 86 Zsolt, Á., Das rote Fahrrad, 82–83. 87 The Eva stories story from 15 February, URL: https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights /17998120066205191/?hl=de [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Figure 1: The Eva Stories story from 15 February 65 Both Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl represent apoint of intersection between social media practices and re-enactment techniques. Here, the re-enactment of past events has moved to anew platform with social media users able to interact with the re-enactment by commenting, sharing, and reacting to the posts, expanding the concept of historical re-enactment and living history by the dimension of social media. The projects involve the users in the events in an emotional manner, creating an interactive platform for remembrance. In both Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl, there are aspects of historical re-enactment which creatively re-create the atmospheres and surroundings in which Heyman and Scholl found themselves. These re-enactments are highly aestheticized and emotionally charged interpretations of Heyman’sand Scholl’sexperiences. They contain historical inaccuracies and are embellished with elements of fiction, which is also determined by the projects’ contemporary social media perspective with Heyman and Scholl documenting their experience on camera. An example of this is adrawing posted to the Ich bin Sophie Scholl profile on the 18th of May 2021 with the caption “Liebe machen statt Krieg” [Make love instead of war] portraying anaked couple having sexual intercourse on achair accompanied by some of Sophie Scholl’sthoughts on how her boyfriend has changed during the war (Fig. 2).88 Not only does the 88 Ich bin Sophie Scholl post from 18 May 2021, URL: https://www.instagram.com/p/CPBa7dTnZDz /?hl=de [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Figure 2: Ich bin Sophie Scholl post from 18 May 2021 66 caption seem like an anachronism from the 1970s, but the drawing has little to do with the real Sophie Scholl, who tried to avoid aphysical relationship with Fritz, instead preferring an intellectual-spiritual connection, which is something she emphasized in her letters to him.89 This example demonstrates how Scholl’sstory was manipulated and made more ‘contemporary’ in order to engage the viewers and to motivate them to contribute their own thoughts about her situation. Another similar example from Ich bin Sophie Scholl is her post from the 24th of September 2021, in which she writes about her menstrual pain and asks the viewers to share their experience.90 The creators of the Instagram project are thereby involving the ‘influencer’ Sophie Scholl in the current discussion about period awareness on social media. “Mimetic Mourning” on Social Media The two projects should also be considered from the perspective of “mimetic mourning”– aconcept advanced by psychologist and cultural scientist Alexander Etkind and characterized as “mournful reenactments of suffering, which are cultural processes that involve contemplation and aestheticization.”91 He elaborated on this concept in his study Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied (2013), describing it as “arecurrent response to loss that entails asymbolic re-enactment of that loss.”92 Both Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl are informed by ‘mimetic mourning’ in the sense that they can be considered as historical re-enactments created for collective mourning and remembrance. Here, mimetic mourning is performed as acreative contemporary re-enactment of Heyman’sand Scholl’sexperiences through the interactive media of Instagram stories and posts. Presented from the perspective of acontemporary social media user, the viewers are able to identify with the individualized victims through their personal perspective, feelings and anecdotes, and develop feelings of empathy and understanding towards them. These social media memory projects also encourage their viewers to interact with and contemplate the ‘current events’ being experienced by Heyman and Scholl and to play an active role in their memorialisation 89 Zoske, R. M., Sophie Scholl. Es reut mich nichts. Porträt einer Widerständigen, Berlin 2020, 84–85. 90 Ich bin Sophie Scholl post from 24 September 2021, URL: https://www.instagram.com/p /CUMmNHbD_eo/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 91 Etkind, A., Warped Mourning…, 98. 92 Ibid., 1. 67 and remembrance by liking, sharing or commenting on posts, answering questions or polls in their Instagram stories or reacting to them with emojis and stickers. Their realities are re-created, re-enacted and designed to evoke an emotional response in the viewers and to create agreater proximity to the events. As if replying to the critiques of Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl mentioned above, Etkind points out that historians tend to be uncomfortable with such stories because “postcatastrophic memory often entails allegories rather than facts and imaginative fiction rather than archival documentation.”93 Mimetic mourning is therefore characterized by re-presentations or re-enactments of the past in a“symbolic, detoxicated form”94 which address core questions of mourning such as how, where and when an event happened and if one could have done anything to prevent it. Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl explore these questions creatively by integrating them into their portrayal of Heyman’sand Scholl’sexperiences and by allowing the viewers to interact with them during their experiences, for example by directly answering their questions in the respective comment sections or stories. Etkind also argues that re-enactment and therefore the repetition of traumatic events can help to process them and mourn the catastrophic past, because it does not matter whether “the mourner has evidence that testifies to the circumstances of the loss, or whether the reminiscence and the witness are pure fantasy, these re-presentations– bringing the dead back to life in imagination, social interaction, or performance– are at the core of mourning.”95 In this sense, it is not the projects’ goal to re-enact historical imagery, footage or biographical material in arealistic or historically accurate manner, but to create an important responsive space for participation in cultural memory and memorialisation. This observation also corresponds with Maurice Halbwachs’sdefinition of the creation of collective memory as anegotiation between apast event and contemporary culture:96 At the core of these social media memory projects lies the creation of aconnection between “past event and present memorialization”97 created through “the presence of engaging social media memory that inscribes the users into the mediation of past events and memo93 Etkind, A., Warped Mourning…, 244. 94 Ibid., 1–2. 95 Ibidem. 96 Halbwachs, M., The Collective Memory, New York 1980. 97 Balestrino, A., “Mimetic Mourning at 9/11MM”, 164. 68 ryinto present media lives.”98 This is aprocess which we can witness with Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl judging by the number of subscribers and comments, the media response and the intense, controversial and often emotional discussions sparked by the two projects. Conclusion With the Instagram series Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl we are able to observe the emergence of anew and important phenomenon within social media memory, combining historical re-enactment with participatory social media practices. These projects are aimed at ayounger and digitally literate demographic with the objective of making historical remembrance and memorialisation accessible and interactive in an age where public discussions have moved to the digital space. As shown in this paper, there are historical inaccuracies present in the two projects which distort the realities of both Heyman’sand Scholl’sstories. Yet, historical re-enactment in ‘mimetic mourning’ is not characterised by historical authenticity– its objective is to re-create the past symbolically, and for re-enactors– and in this case their audience– to ‘feel’ the events they are re-enacting on an emotional level. As this applies to Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl, Ihave argued that the projects are informed by mimetic mourning as emotionally charged interpretative re-enactments of Éva Heyman’sand Sophie Scholl’sexperiences on Instagram. Although many critics have called the appropriateness of these social media memory projects into question, their positive media response and impact may quite possibly outweigh the criticism– proving social media memory projects to be effective in sparking discussion and in creating an interactive genre of digital remembrance on social media. This demonstrates the increasing potential and international relevance of social media memory projects and initiatives and proves how valuable this approach is in keeping victims’ memories alive in the age after postmemory, as Hirsch originally defined it. This is crucial for the negotiation of acollective memory of historical atrocities in the digital age and during atime in which the number of living witnesses is sadly diminishing and younger generations (the third and fourth generations after the Holo98 Henig, L.– Ebbrecht-Hartmann, T., “Witnessing Eva Stories…”, 2. 69 caust and the Second World War) need to be involved in the discussion and in the process of memorialisation. Due to the potential of digital and online remembrance projects as highlighted above and as shown with Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl, it is likely that we can expect to see aproliferation of similar projects and initiatives commemorating the victims of past atrocities on social media. One such example is the highly controversial project Equiano.Stories99, which was launched in February 2022 during the American Black History Month, commissioned by the DuSable Museum Of African American History in Chicago and produced by Stelo Stories100, the Kochavis’ film studio behind Eva Stories. The project is based on the biography of the writer and abolitionist Olaudah Equiano from the Eboe region in the Kingdom of Benin (today’ssouthern Nigeria), who as ayoung boy was sold to aRoyal Navy officer as aslave and taken to the Caribbean in the mid-18th Century before being able to purchase his freedom in 1766. Equiano.Stories aims to portray his traumatic experience on Instagram from his point of view and has– much like Eva Stories and Ich bin Sophie Scholl– been criticized for its profiteering commercialisation of memory and trauma.101 References “An Interview with Marianne Hirsch”, Columbia University Press, URL: https://cup. columbia.edu/author-interviews/hirsch-generation-postmemory [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Álvarez Berastegi, A.– Hearty, K., “Acontext-based model for framing political victimhood: Experiences from Northern Ireland and the Basque Country”, International Review of Victimology, Vol. 25, 2019, 19–36. Anderman, N., “This Father-and-daughter Team Explains Why It’sGood to Put the Holocaust on Instagram”, Haaretz, URL: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/. premium-the-father-and-daughter-team-who-brought-the-voice-of-a-holocaust-victimto-instagra-1.7189733 [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Anderson, J., The living history sourcebook, Nashville 1985. 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Foreign Models in the Commemoration of Atrocities, London 2017, 1–21. Gerlach, C., Aly, G., Das letzte Kapitel. Realpolitik, Ideologie und der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944/1945, Stuttgart 2002. Gottschalk, M., Wie schwer ein Menschenleben wiegt: Sophie Scholl. Eine Biographie, München 2020. Halbwachs, M., The Collective Memory, New York 1980. Handler, R.– Saxton, W., “Dyssimulation. Reflexivity, Narrative, and the Quest for Authenticity in “Living History”, “Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 3, 1988, 242–260. Henig, L.– Ebbrecht-Hartmann, T., “Witnessing Eva Stories. Media witnessing and selfinscription in social media memory”, New Media & Society, October 2020. Hirsch, M., “Surviving Images. Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory”, The Yale Journal of Criticism, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2001, 5–37. Hirsch, M., The Generation of Postmemory. Writing and visual culture after the Holocaust, New York 2012. Hoffman, E., After Such Knowledge. AMeditation in the Aftermath of the Holocaust. London 2004. 71 Holmes, O., “Instagram Holocaust diary Eva.Stories sparks debate in Israel”, The Guardian, 08. 05. 2019, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/08/ instagram-holocaust-diary-evastories-sparks-debate-in-israel [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Jakob, J., “Ich bin Sophie Scholl: Zwischen Fiktion und Wirklichkeit”, NDR Kultur, 14.05. 2021, URL: https://www.ndr.de/kultur/-Sophie-Scholl,sophiescholl110.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Kershner, I., “AHolocaust story for the social media generation”, The New York Times, 30 April 2019, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/world/middleeast/evaheyman-instagram-holocaust.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Khlevnyuk, D., “Victim-heroes in collective memory: Surviving soviet repressions heroically”, Memory Studies, 2021, 1–14. Kunt, G., “Ágnes Zsolt’sAuthorship of her Daughter Éva Heyman’sHolocaust Diary”, Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLIII, Issue 1–2, 2016, 127–154. Landsberg, A., Engaging with the Past. Mass Culture and the Production of Historical Knowledge, New York 2015. Lowenthal, D., The Past is aForeign Country. Revisited, New York 2014. Nahari, I., “Sklaven als Influencer”, taz.de, 13. 04. 2022, URL: https://taz.de/InstagramProjekt-equianostories/!5845250/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Neiman, S., Learning from the Germans. Race and the Memory of Evil, New York 2019. Netanyahu, B. [@netanyahu], Join Eva’sstory, URL: https://instagram.com/eva. stories?igshid=j8x4qsx7rqgm [Translation by Charlotte Adèle Murphy], 29. 04. 2019, Twitter, URL: https://twitter.com/netanyahu/status/1122835826709270528 [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Ránki, G., Unternehmen Margarethe. Die deutsche Besetzung Ungarns, Wien 1984. Salzborn, S., Kollektive Unschuld. Die Abwehr der Shoah im deutschen Erinnern, Leipzig 2020. Schwartz, A., “Éva Heyman, the Hungarian Anne Frank. Writing Against Persecution and Trauma”, Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLII, Issue 1–2, 2015, 117–134. Schwarz, C., “Likes für den Holocaust”, Taz, 03. 05. 2019, URL: https://taz.de/ Erinnerungskultur-bei-Instagram/!5592218/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Simões, A., “It is not yet resolved. Post-memories of the Third Reich”, in: E. De Gregorio Godeo– J. A. Caride, Constructing Selves. Issues in Gender, Age, Ethnicity and Nation, Castilla 2014, 129–140. Südwestrundfunk, “Instagram-Projekt zu Sophie Scholl von SWR und BR”, Swr, 26. 04. 2021, URL: https://www.swr.de/unternehmen/ich-bin-sophie-scholl-projekt-100.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. The Anne Frank video diary, URL: youtube.com/annefrank [accessed: 30. 04. 2022]. The Equiano.Stories project on Instagram, URL: https://www.instagram.com/equiano. stories/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. The Eva Stories project on Instagram, URL: https://www.instagram.com/eva.stories/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. The Ich bin Sophie Scholl project on Instagram, URL: https://www.instagram.com/ ichbinsophiescholl [accessed: 30.04.2022]. The official Vozvrashchenie imyon [Return of the names], URL: https://october29.ru/ [accessed: 30.04.2022]. Wiesel, E., “Trivializing the Holocaust: Semi-Fact and Semi-Fiction”, The New York Times, 16.04. 1978, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/16/archives/tv-view-trivializingthe-holocaust-semifact-and-semifiction-tv-view.html [accessed: 30.04.2022] Yad Vashem, “Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day 20-21 April 2020”, Yad vashem, URL: https://www.yadvashem.org/press-release/06-april-2020-12-41.html [accessed: 30.04.2022]. 72 Zoske, R. M., Sophie Scholl. Es reut mich nichts. Porträt einer Widerständigen, Berlin 2020. Zoske, R. M., Flamme sein! Hans Scholl und die Weiße Rose. Eine Biografie, München 2018. Zsolt, Á., Das rote Fahrrad, Wien 2012. Zsolt, Á., Éva lányom [My daughter Éva], Budapest 1947. 73 Practices of Restoring Memory or Perhaps Constructing Memory? The Significance of Commemorative Murals to Their Initiators and Creators Adrianna Krzywik Introduction The first wall paintings created by humans during the Palaeolithic primarily depicted the realities and surroundings of the primitive people who made them. Prehistoric art, commonly known as ‘cave art’, effectively represent Palaeolithic ‘art galleries’ which have survived for thousands of years and offer awindow into the priorities of early man. The oldest examples of such cave paintings can be found in the Chauvet cave in France and date to more than 32,000 years ago. These paintings are the starting point for the artwork, murals and frescoes found all over the world today. Although mural painting has, for centuries, fulfilled aesthetic, symbolic, magical and social functions (as well as conferring rank and prestige on agiven piece of architecture), it has not always been respected as art by the public.1 Apossible reason is the confusion of monumental painting with graffiti; aphenomenon associated with vandalism by subcultural groups. The definition of ‘murals’ as all paintings or inscriptions, painted with or without permission, on public facades can also add to this confusion.2 This is because phenomena aimed at both aestheticisation and deformation of public space are lumped together leading to acritical attitude by the public towards the murals. Such attitudes may also be influenced by the events sometimes accompanying the realisation of murals: namely street demonstrations. Violent political and social changes stimulate not only the formation of asocial movement but also 1 Bąkowska, M., “Obrazy w pejzażu miasta– murale”, Architektura krajobrazu, Vol. 1–2, 2006, 43. 2 Mendelson-Shwartz, E.– Mualam, N., “Taming murals in the city: Aforay into mural policies, practices, and regulation”, International Journal ofCultural Policy, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2020, 2. 80 Not surprisingly, they are increasingly found in the spaces of smaller or larger towns and cities around the world. They have become astrong site for increasing interest in cultural heritage.28 Murals bring many benefits to individuals, communities and the spaces in which they are located.29 They are seen as vehicles for shaping place and community, tools for revitalising neglected buildings, promoting tourism and socio-economic development.30 The aforementioned benefits demonstrate that the popularity of murals has influenced their division into private and public identities. The public identity of murals is associated with the arbitrary action of the artist or grassroots community action. The private identity of murals is related to the decision of authorities and political elites to realise them and place them on specific walls of buildings. Concerning these factors, murals should be analysed as products of conflicts between social and local government interests. When studying murals in Poland, conflicts between different interest groups can be observed. The most common occurrence is the painting over of commemorative murals which depict historical figures with aresidually known past or which are associated with values incompatible with those shared by the persons painting the mural. An example of such devastation is the murals commemorating the ‘cursed soldiers’ (apost-war anti-communist guerilla), whose past has been demythologised in Polish memorial discourse in recent years. Despite this there are still groups that do not share the opinion that they are figures worth commemorating. Such opinions are manifested, for example, in murals commemoratingthe members of the Unbroken Soldiers in Białystok, Mińsk Mazowiecki or Gorzów Wielkopolski, which have been painted over. It is difficult to point to examples of commemorative murals which were painted over at the request of the authorities. Perhaps this is because 28 Skinner, J.– Jolliffe, L., “Wall-to-wall coverage. An introduction to murals tourism”, in: J. Skinner– L. Jolliffe (eds.), Murals and Tourism. Heritage, Politics and Identity, Routledge, London 2016, 6. 29 Mendelson-Shwartz, E.– Mualam, N. Y., “Taming murals in the city: aforay into mural policies, practices, and regulation”, International Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2020, 2. 30 Austin, J., “More to See than aCanvas in aWhite Cube: For an Art in the Streets”, City, Vol.14, Issue 1–2, 2010, 33–47; Drescher, T., “Introduction”, in: J. Braun-Reinitz– J. Weissman– A.Goodman, On the Wall: Four Decades of Community Murals in New York City, Press of Mississippi, Jackson 2009; Golden, J.– Scobey, D. M.– Rice, R.– Kinney, M. Y., Philadelphia Murals and the Stories They Tell. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, Pennsylvania 2002; Young,A., Street Art, Public City: Law, Crime and the Urban Imagination, Routledge, London 2013; Markusen, A.– Gadwa, A., “Arts and Culture in Urban or Regional Planning: AReview and Research Agenda”, Journal of Planning Education and Research, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2010, 379–391; Hall, T.– Robertson, I., “Public Art and Urban Regeneration: Advocacy, Claims and Critical Debates”, Landscape Research, Vol. 26, Issue 1, 2001, 5–26. 81 murals are anew phenomenon in the discourse of memory. Nevertheless, in adozen or so years, it may turn out that the importance of some figure was overexaggerated through their commemoration on amural. Thus, as in the case of toppled and destroyed monuments or renamed streets, the mural will be painted over. Such anarrative encourages people to think about historical figures or events in binary terms.31 Commemorative murals are representations of communities’ ideas about the past.32 They are modern and intentionally produced media in which memories are stored.33 Modern, because they belong to visual messages that have replaced oral messages.34 Intentional, because they are created by activists of the sphere of memory to commemorate and protect from being forgotten.35 Commemorative murals most often appear before (but not exclusively) national celebrations or on the anniversary (sometimes immediately after) the death of aculturally or historically important figure. The problem can be the lifespan of murals which, due to their nature (murals placed on the outside walls of buildings can corrode) and the meanings and values given to them, is uncertain.36 Therefore, the field of research around the restoration of murals has been recently expanded.37 Methodology The analysis of the meanings attributed to memorial murals as intentional and modern carriers of memory falls within the field of memory stud31 Light, D.– Young, C., “Public Memory, Commemoration and Transitional Justice: Reconfiguring the Past in Public Space”, in: L. Stan– N. Nedelsky (eds.), Post-Communist Transitional Justice: Lessons from 25 Years of Experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, 233–251; Czerwiński, M., “Archive of Signs: The Semiotics of Cultural Memory”, Tekst iDyskurs, Vol. 7, 2014, 32. 32 Hołda, R., “You are in our memory”: Polish murals as memory medium and apopular form of patriotism, Intercultural Relations, Vol. 1, Issue 7, 2020, 48. 33 Kula, M., Nośniki Pamięci Historycznej…, 7–31. 34 Karkowska, M., “Międzypokoleniowe transmisje pamięci. Na podstawie badań we wsiach świętokrzyskich”, Studia Socjologiczne, Vol. 3, Issue 222, 2016, 112. 35 Szpociński, A., Współczesna kultura historyczna ijej implanty, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2021, 93. 36 McCormick, J.– Jarman, N., “Death of aMural”, Journal of Material Culture, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2005, 49–71. 37 Remesar, A., “Del arte público al post-muralismo. Políticas de decoro urbano en procesos de Regeneración Urbana”, On the w@terfront, Vol. 61, Issue 1, 2019, 3–65; Gralińska-Toborek, A., Experience of Art in Urban Space. Urban Forms Gallery 2011–2013, Urban Forms, Łódź 2014. 82 ies. Memory is treated as acomplex phenomenon that manifests itself in different spheres and changes under the influence of various factors.38 Therefore, it was important to select appropriate research methods that would allow for in-depth analysis and to answer the main research questions. The research objectives were firstly to attempt to read the meanings contained in the messages of selected commemorative murals and secondly to establish the meanings agents gave to the commemorative murals. It was decided to use qualitative methods: semiological analysis and in-depth interviews with the creators and initiators (originators) of the commemorative murals. The combination of the two aforementioned methods enabled amultifaceted approach and objective knowledge of the phenomenon of the mural boom in Poland. The first method used was the semiological analysis of media images developed by Roland Barthes39 most probably based on Ferdinand de Sausure’slinguistic analysis of cultural texts.40 The semiological analysis of images (in the case of this article: commemorative murals) is nothing other than the decomposition of acultural product into ‘significant’ and ‘signifie’ elements. The second method used to investigate the meanings attributed to commemorative murals was individual in-depth interviews with the creators and originators of the murals completed in the last ten years. The interview method provided insight into how murals are talked about and narrativised. The planned interviews included a group of twenty creators of commemorative murals and agroup of twenty originators of their implementation. The respondents were selected in a deliberate manner; based on photographs of murals searched on the internet, information about the mural’screator and originator was found on websites. Subsequently, selected representatives of both groups were contacted by e-mail (contact to respondents was possible thanks to publicly available information on websites). Due to the coronavirus pandemic, interviews were conducted by telephone and instant messaging. During the interviews, the researcher based himself on the thematic threads which had been written out in advance. This included the respondent’sartistic path or activities in the public space, the respondent’sattitude to Polish history, historyinthepublic space, factors influencing the decision to realise com38 Olick, J. K., “Collective memory: Amemoir and prospect”, Memory studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2008, 23–29. 39 Barthes, R., Mythologies, Hill and Wang, New York 1970. 40 De Saussure, F., Course in General Linguistics, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York 1959. 83 memorative murals, the meaning and impact of commemorative murals, or the attitude to historical policy. The topics which had been prepared in advance formed the basis not only for establishingthe meaning of the murals for the respondents but also for answeringthequestions: “to which group of activists of the ‘sphere of memory’ do the authors belong?”, “to which group do the originators belong?”, “to whom do they direct their activity?” and “what is their goal?”. In the case of the last question, the interest oscillates around the process of creating memory and social bonds. Semiological Analysis of Selected Commemorative Murals Roland Barthes’ semiological theory was applied to the analysis of the memorial murals. This theory is used for the qualitative analysis of media and cultural products and, more specifically, their social impact and functioning. Barthes assumed that publicised products, especially media texts, strongly resonate socially and their meaning is not well known.41 Therefore, asemiological analysis of them is anecessity. Two types of analysis have emerged in the sphere of sign science: the semiology of communication and the semiology of meaning. The first focuses on the relationship between the message and the sender and receiver in relation to the communication situation as awhole. The second examines the relationship between the elements of the message. It is adivision of agiven creation into significant elements and signifie elements, which form acoherent sign for both groups. The difference between the mentioned elements will be easiest to explain on the basis of examples. 41 Barthes, R., Mythologies…, 203. Figure 1: Pleszew 84 Figure 2: Radzymin Figure 4: Władysławów Figure 3: Kozienice 85 Murals commemorating the Battle of Warsaw and the people associated with it were asubject of analysis. This group of murals was chosen because they were created in large numbers on the occasion of the centenary celebrations of the battle which was victorious for the Poles. The idea of one of the largest initiatives commemorating the battle came from the Ministry of National Defence, which announced acompetition entitled “Historical Mural– 1920 Polish”.42 Most of the painted murals depict the year 1920, the year of the battle between the units of the Bolshevik Red Army and the armies of the Polish Army fought between the 13th and 25th August. Some of the murals depict fragments of the decisive battle of the Polish-Bolshevik war. In the village of Władysławów (Fig. 4.) amural depicting afragment of the painting “Cud nad Wisłą” by Wojciech Kossak was painted. For example, the mural in Pleszew (Fig. 1.) depicts two fronts, the Polish and the Bolshevik, on awhite and red map. These colours appear on all murals referring to the Battle of Warsaw as anational symbol, similar to aflag or emblem. The objects depicted in the large-format murals include machine guns, tanks, aeroplanes and armoured cars, although most often the figures depicted in the murals were accompanied by horses which outnumbered armoured equipment during the battle. The murals also depict people of merit in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Primarily the image of Józef Piłsudski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, was used. Less frequently, Tadeusz Rozwadowski can be found on the murals, who, as Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, co-created the operation of outflanking the Soviet troops. Apart from these two important figures in the history of Polish defence, the murals also feature the figure of the Polish Army chaplain, Father Ignacy Skorupka, whose death became one of the symbols of the Battle of Warsaw. The elements listed above are significant elements formed on the first level: that is, visible to the consumer of memory at first sight. Signifie elements are culturally inferred; they are shared in asimilar way by members of a given culture43. Culture according to Clifford Geertz is apattern of meanings transmitted over time44. Therefore, societies with common memory and common roots find similar meanings in cultural products and recognise symbols (compound meanings that 42 The competition “Historical Mural– 1920 Polish”, URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/konkurs-pn-historyczny-mural--1920-polskie-zwyciestwo-dla-wolnosci-europy-rozstrzygniety2 [accessed: 03. 08. 2022] 43 Griswold, W., Cultures and Societies in achanging world, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles 2013, 53. 44 Geertz, C., The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York 1973. 86 signify more than one thing). Signifie elements will therefore constitute the subjective meanings attributed to significant elements such as values and ideas (examples are presented in the word cloud below). Source: own diagram Results From the Analysis of Data Collected During In-depth Interviews In selecting representatives of both groups, an attempt to maintain balanced proportions between the men and women surveyed was made. The proportions were successfully maintained in the group of originators, however, in the group of muralists, aproblem was encountered with the representation of women in the Polish mural environment. Despite this, it was possible to talk to 7 women out of the 20 muralist groups surveyed. The researched groups– creators and originators of commemorative murals– come from slightly different backgrounds. It might seem obvious that the muralists have an artistic education. In fact, most of them graduated from studios or courses in graphics or painting, but among the muralists there are also people who gained their experience in practice (without specialist education). More than half of the interviewed muralists in the 1990s (the heyday of street art in Poland) belonged to the graffiti community and were trying their hand at mural painting. Most of them treat mural painting as aregular job especially when they regularly receive orders for new paintings. The originators of commem- 87 orative murals usually have higher education in the humanities or social sciences.They are people who have vast experience in scientific orcultural circles. Theyarepeople with doctoral or professorial degrees or employees of local government or cultural institutions. The division of duties related to the realisation of the murals has always been specific. Most often, amuralist was commissioned or won a competition announced by public institutions to design a mural. The technical assumptions of the project prepared by the originators usually specified the characters and events which should be included in the painting. The process of accepting the project often took slightly longer due to changes introduced after consultations with the originators. The artists were mainly responsible for the meticulous execution of the mural. For muralists, the walls of buildings are like canvases. The difference is that when they paint on canvases at home they only listen to their inner voice and can fulfil themselves creatively. Muralists treat society’severyday living space as astage or an urban gallery. It is very important to them that their works– murals– will be seen by alarger audience than in galleries or museums. For muralists, murals, even if commemorative, are an art in themselves. Art which everyone should have regular contact with. Art, although containing asimple message, is supposed to stimulate the viewer to think. The originators, who also pointed to the aesthetic value of murals, focused more often on the popularity of muralism worldwide. The success of the mural phenomenon lies precisely in the fact that it was aunique phenomenon when people started to take interest in it. Murals were atourist attraction in many countries. Today, this phenomenon has become so popular that even commemorative plaques or monuments are giving way to these modern forms of commemoration. Commemorations in the form of colourful murals (although murals often appear in grey) can be amore effective attempt to reach the public than asingle-coloured monument. Both groups pointed out that the commemorative murals are primarily addressed to the younger generation who to learn something mainly by reaching for visual materials. This is all the more so because for years researchers in Polish literature have been observing adecline in interest in the past among Polish society.45 The creators themselves, but above all the originators, are unaware of the problem of lack of interest in the 45 Kwiatkowski, P. T.– Nijakowski, L. M.– Szacka, B.– Szpociński A., Between everyday life and great history: World War II in the collective memory of Polish society, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2010. 88 past. The creators of the murals, more often spoke about the interest in the local past, while the originators spoke of the national past. Both groups cited numerous stories related to the fate of elderly family members during the wars. In many cases, the respondents admitted that it was thefamily stories that made them want to get involved in activities in the sphere of memory or in the social affairs of the locality in which they live. Interest in history was one of the motives behind the decision to realise the commemorative mural especially when it came to the originators. The originators work in institutions that, according to their status, should cherish the national heritage. They are therefore obliged to be active in this respect. Although they can decide themselves who or what to commemorate, they often make suggestions such as aresolution by the Sejm to establish aparticular patron of agiven year or on anniversaries of national holidays. The originators pointed out that they are willing to engage in commemorative practices because the goal of nurturing and shaping memory sustains the persistence of society. Muralists, on the other hand, were the first to indicate that they undertook commissions for commemorative murals because of their desire to expose their work to social negotiations or tensions46. As with their work exhibited in galleries they want arelationship to be formed between the mural and the viewer. In addition, most artists were also motivated by gratification for the commission and adesire to present historical figures they valued to the viewer. The factor of declared values was more pronounced in the group of mural artists. Each muralist emphasised that they would not undertake to paint acharacter they did not identify with or asubject contrary to their views. For both groups, commemorative murals are atool for the transmission of memory. As acarrier of memory, it does not in itself analyse the past but contains a‘portion of knowledge’ about the past. Commemorative murals are an expression of apopular form of patriotism. As long as patriotism is mentioned, different terms for murals commemorating a historical figure or event – commemorative, historical and patriotic– resonated during the interviews. Although they were used interchangeably, some respondents tried to specify the differences between them. According to the interviewees, patriotic murals include murals depicting national symbols such as the flag, white and red co46 Greaney, M. E., “The Power of the Urban Canvas : Paint, Politics, and Mural Art Policy”, New England Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2002, 6–48. 89 lours, the national emblem or fragments of the national anthem. They are carriers of memory with aspecific message: patriotic values. Historical murals present elements referring to national and local history. These can be murals depicting atimeline of events related to agiven locality, or aplace that used to be in the place of execution. Both patriotic and historical murals are described as commemorative, so they fall into the largest group. Below is an attempt to delineate the relationship between these three types of murals. patriotic historical commemorative Source: own diagram based on IDIs According to the respondents, the role of murals is extremely complex. The creators emphasised the role of restoring memory while the originators emphasised the role of shaping memory. These two words, although synonymous, give food for thought because they speak of something different. Restoring means transferring knowledge about the past as it was. Shaping, on the other hand, often means interfering with historical facts. Such activities are referred to as actions on memory; that is, interpreting the past for one’sown purposes. For the originators, therole of popularising history through commemorative murals andthe transmission of the values which guided the person painted is very important. According to the respondents, all these factors contribute to making the past present and shaping asense of belonging to acommunity among individuals. 96 of aconciliatory approach to the old elites.11 More than once there were ambitions to start alustration in the 1990s but the attempts were not successful. It is important to know that the Kaczyński brothers were also present at the round table talks, against which PiS is making serious accusations and through which they are trying to legitimise their politics and the current decommunization. While discussing decommunization at The Round Table Talks, the first post-communist government decided not to give in to lustration demands. This amounted to ageneral amnesty. At that time, obvious street names were changed and monuments of famous communists, like that one of Feliks Dzierżyński in Warsaw, were knocked down. In general, the approaches of afirst decommunization wave had been very superficial as the politicians did not agree on profound lustration or decommunization laws after the system had already been broken down. Indirect procedures also came to life such as the changing of the Polish constitution, the national anthem, and important public holidays.12 The state’sofficial name was changed from the People’sRepublic into the Third Republic and the eagle on the flag was given acrown which is areference to the aristocratic republic before Poland was divided. It was not only politics which failed at that time but also the legal system’sability to prosecute perpetrators for crimes which had been previously committed. The issue of the legal processing after the system change was dragged out for more than 20 years until it lost its relevance and explosiveness. It included shooting orders given by high-ranking politicians such as Kiszczak or Jaruzelski, as well as the murder of political opponents such as the priest Jerzy Popiełuszko and many others.13 In some cases other culprits were found but in most cases there were no further investigations. Some cases had been closed because Jaruzelski’sstate of health and his age. There were always reasons for interrupting the trials again and again. Over the years, trials against people who were involved or responsible were repeatedly initiated but not even one conviction was made.14 11 Zagańczyk-Neufeld, A., Die geglückte Revolution. Das Politische und der Umbruch in Polen 1976– 1997, Paderborn 2014, 319. 12 Ziemer K., Das politische System Polens, 23. 13 Puttkammer, von J., “Enttäuschte Erwartungen. Die Strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung kommunistischer Diktatur in Polen”, in: J. Ganzenmüller, Recht und Gerechtigkeit. Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung von Diktaturen in Europa, Köln 2017, 173. 14 Ibid., 191. 97 Moreover, former elites made up alarge part of the active economy. 70% of the economic and financial elites were brought over from the old system.15 Thus, one can clearly see acontinuity of the old system and alack of decommunization in the 1990s. As time went on, the issue became more and more unpopular in the society. The Remembrance Culture of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość The national conservative party, PiS, has been governing since 2015 and they were also previously in charge of Poland between 2005 and 2007. At this time, the Kaczyński twins owned the highest offices as the Prime Minister and the President of Poland. One of their goals at the time, which overlaps with the current government, was to introduce the socalled “Fourth Republic”.16 This ideology wants to separate the current Polish state from the Third Republic (the one that has existed from 1989 until today) and create abetter, more democratic, more national, and more social version of Poland. Through this demarcation they want to demonstrate that they have nothing to do with the previous governments which they associate with communist structures from before 1989. The best example for this is the hatred of the PiS towards the first Polish President after the end of communism, Lech Wałęsa. Wałęsa’s achievement in fighting for afree Poland (and even afree Europe) has been widely recognised by many. Only PiS is constantly trying to discredit him and is desperately looking for evidence on his collaboration with the elites of that era. This case is also known as the “Bolek” file.17 This kind of discrediting is also experienced by other Solidarność fighters. For the “Fourth Republic”, the rotten compromise of 1989 is about to be abolished and replaced with anew model of democracy. This is tobe done, among other things, through atargeted history policy, which includes decommunization and the development of deep Polish patriotism. The highest priorities are independence and the free nation of Poland, 15 Jaskułowski, T., “Polen Erfolge und Misserfolge der ersten osteuropäischen Transformation 1989”, in: C. Vollnhals, Jahre des Umbruchs. Friedliche Revolution in der DDR und Transition in Ostmitteleuropa, Göttingen 2011, 58. 16 Lang, K.-O., “Auf dem Weg zur 4. Republik. Die Parlamentswahlen in Polen vom 25. September 2005”, Osteuropa, Vol. 55, Issue 10, 2005, 143. 17 Paradowska, J., “Aufarbeitung und Ranküne. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, Osteuropa, Vol. 56, Issue 11–12, 2006, 213. 98 which– in the vision of the conservatives– collides with any kind of EU-membership. The underlying problem is that in order to implement the ‘Fourth Republic’, the current narratives are being reshaped. Existing narratives that do not fit into the scheme are being concealed, denied, or questioned. Patriotic heroic narratives are being deliberately created and criticizing Poland is practically forbidden. This can be seen in the Instytut Pamęci Narodowej [Institute of National Remembrance, IPN] law, which criminalises statements about Poland.18 According to the Director of the Willy Brandt Institute in Wrocław, Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, there are four ways to implement the desired historical policy.19 First, one has to design public space with monuments and anniversaries which fit the ideology one wants to spread. The educational system is also very important: schools should teach the ideologically distorted image of history to the youth. To create anew reality and awareness, science should also be regulated by the ruling party. Last but not least, one has to adjust jurisdiction. In the meantime, these methods are tolerated and dealt with quite openly. Official discussions are only held with historians that represent the prescribed narrative. Universities and their professors get surveilled, sometimes dismissed, and new, patriotic history books find their way into schools. Even monuments are removed and replaced by others.20 The main danger of state-controlled memory is that uncomfortable truths are left out, while more positive memories are specifically brought up or are heroised.21 There are state-sponsored programs that are aimed primarily at young people which are supposed to revive patriotism and their love for the Polish nation. An example of this is the program “Patriotyzm Jutra” [Patriotism of tomorrow]. They organize patriotic festivals, concerts, meetings, and re-enactments of battles.22 The government and the ruling party, PiS, do not make asecret of this special 18 Ustawa ozmianie ustawy oInstytutcie Pamięci Narodowej – “Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy ogrobach icmentarzach, ustawy omuzeach oraz ustawy oodpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod grożbą kary”, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polkiej, Warsaw 14.2.2018, URL: http://ipn.gov.pl/pl/o-ipn/ ustawa/24216,Ustawa.html [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 19 Ruchniewicz, K., “Zur Geschichtspolitik der PiS”, in: A. Rostek, Polska first. Über die polnische Krise, Bonn 2018, 204. 20 Lang, K.-O., “Auf dem Weg zur 4. Republik. Die Parlamentswahlen in Polen vom 25. September 2005”, 144. 21 Ruchniewicz, K., “Zur Geschichtspolitik der PiS”, 208. 22 Steffen, K., “Ambivalenz des affirmativen Populismus. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, Osteuropa, Vol. 56, Issue 11–12, 2006, 29. 99 instrumentalisation of history and their state control. In 2015, shortly after the presidential election, Andrzej Duda said: “To pursue history, politics is one of the most important activities of the President”.23 With this in mind, it is no surprise that historical debates are often led by politicians rather than historians. That is the reason why laws to regulate historical politics, such as the decommunization law or the IPN law have been passed. The IPN, as the leading institution of history, takes avery important part in this field and adecisive role in the governmental control of remembrance. This institution is supported and financed by the government.24 Since the founding of the IPN, the institution has been an instrument of the governing parties to steer the political history, but PiS takes it to another level. The reasons behind this approach to dealing with the past are diverse and come from Polish history itself. Poland’smost common metaphor for their own identity is the term “Christ among the nations”, which was shaped by the national writer Adam Mickiewicz. Poland’spain, selflessness and its role as avictim of aggression should also be pointed out.25 Catastrophes like Katyń, Wolyń and Smoleńsk, as well as foreign rule, which is accompanied by the oppression of national identity, strengthen the urge of self-assertion in this country. In fact, it is particularly strong in Poland. The suppression and censorship during the Cold War have led to long suppressed memories returning to the collective memory.26 In addition, the conservative forces in particular did not feel included during the redesign phase after 1989. This complex, which is based on the fact that they were not involved in the reorganisation of Poland, is ascar that goes deep and that ultimately led to the recent political situation. Decommunization The current decommunization is based on the law named “On the prohibition of the spread of communism or other totalitarian regimes through 23 Duda, A., in: Saryusz-Wolska– Stach– Stoll, Verordnete Geschichte, 447. Translated by the author. 24 Leschnik, H., Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in Polen von 1998 bis 2010, (Studien zur Ostmitteleuropaforschung, Vol. 42), Marburg 2018, 435. 25 Ruchniewicz, K., “Die historische Erinnerung in Polen”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 5–6, 2005, 18. 26 Steffen, K., “Ambivalenz des affirmativen Populismus. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, 222. 100 the names of buildings, institutions and facilities of public use”27. It was published on the 1st of April 2016. The main message of this legal text is: 1. The names of buildings, facilities, and installations of public use, including streets, bridges, and squares, given by public authorities, may not be used for any commemorate persons, organizations, events, or dates that symbolize communism, or other totalitarian regimes, or otherwise propagate these political systems. 2. Names of people, organizations, events, or dates that symbolize the repressive, authoritarian and non-sovereign power system in Poland in the years 1944–1989 are also regarded as names that propagate communism.28 According to the IPN, there were approximately 1,000 street names to be changed prior to this bill.29 Mostly those named after former PZPR members (with 44 the absolute leader: Leon Kurczowski)30 and some more or lesser-known politicians. Furthermore, streets carrying the nameof the People’sArmy or the 1st of May were also renamed. The most commonly assigned names were: Witold Pilecki, Zbigniew Herbert, and Anna Walentynowicz.31 Most of the criticism they earned was for the renaming of streets into Lech Kaczyński Street. It is particularly noticeable that most of the criticism about renaming streets came from bigger cities. It can be assumed that in smaller towns and in the Polish countryside, people tend to be more conservative and vote for PiS. In big cities like Warsaw, Gdańsk or Wrocław, the population in general is more liberal, modern and well educated. Traditionally it is more difficult for 27 Ustawa zdnia 1. kwietnia 2016 r. ozakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego totalitarnego przez nazwy budowli, obiektów iurządzeń użytecznośći piblicznej, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw 01.04.2016, URL: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails. xsp?id=WDU20160000744 [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 28 Ibidem. 29 Frey, D., “Odekomunizacja rozstrzyga opinia Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej”, Rzeczpospolita, January 27, 2018. 30 Ferfecki, W., “Dekomunizacja: Nowi patroni ulic wygodni dla PiS”, Rzeczpospolita, June 21, 2018. 31 Frey, D., “Odekomunizacja rozstrzyga opinia Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej”, Rzeczpospolita, January 27, 2018; Pilecki was aPolish officer, who wrote the first report on Auschwitz and the Holocaust. After the war, he was found guilty by the Polish court of espionage. As aresult, he was sentenced to death and was eventually rehabilitated after 1989; Herbert was awriter from Lwów and lived from 1924–1989. Walentznowicz was afounding member of the Solidarność in the 1980s. She died in the aeroplane disaster in 2010 in Smoleńsk, Russia. 101 conservative parties to find voter communities there. This phenomenon can be illustrated by the following examples: Warsaw Warsaw is the capital and the biggest city in Poland with apopulation of 1,8 million. The decommunization in Warsaw was more difficult than in other parts of the country. The inhabitants of Warsaw often did not agree with the changes. Therefore, Warsaw was rather reluctant to enforce the decommunization law. Initially, the Voivode of Mazowia demanded 50changes. However, 44 of them were rejected by the Administrative Court and consequently only 6 names were changed.32 Some places used atrick to avoid the changing of street names: they looked for anew patron who carried the same surname as the one who had to be changed. The overall changes were therefore kept to aminimum as in Poland the first name is rarely used.33 In most cases renaming also had financial and bureaucratic reasons, as not only did it affect the state, but also the inhabitants of the streets. The PiS politician, Filip Franckiwiak, was pleased about the changes that had taken place but accused those who were involved of undermining the seriousness and meaning of the measures which defined this action.34 One of the most well-known name changes in Warsaw is the renaming of one of the main streets “Aleja Armii Ludowej” [People’sArmy Avenue] to “Aleja Lecha Kaczyńskiego” [Lech Kaczyński Avenue], which angered many citizens. Signatures were collected, petitions were signed, and the city held massive demonstrations against the new name.35 In the end, after along legal dispute, the first name “Aleja Armii Ludowej” remained. This case shows that, especially in big cities, the population shares acritical attitude towards the changing of street names and stands up against PiS or IPN regulations.36 It is also clear that the changes, for the most part, are left to the discretion of politicians, judges or authorities, as there are no clear and unambiguous provisions in this regard. At this 32 Krupa-Dąbrowska, R., “Dekomunizacja– zmiana nazw ulic pochłania pieniądze iczas mieszkanców”, Rzeczpospolita, December 10, 2018. 33 Osowski, J., “Dekomunizacja ulic w Warszawie. Radni zmienili szesc imionnazwiska zoastały”, Gazeta Wyborcza, August 31, 2017. 34 Ibidem. 35 Osowski, J., “Koniec dekomunizaji nazw w Warszawe? Nie ma ulic Duracza i17. Stycznia, są protesty”, Gazeta Wyborcza, July 5, 2019. 36 Ibidem. 102 point, the different approaches by Aleksandrów Lwowskie and Warsaw should be mentioned. In both cities there was astreet called “Ulica 17 Stycznia” [17 Stycznia Street], aname on the list of those that had to be changed.37 Due to different legal judgements in these cities, in Aleksandrów they had to change the name, while in Warsaw the name could be retained.38 Unlike in smaller towns, bigger cities seem to give more attention to matters like apolitically ordered name change. In contrast to this stands the example of Miedzychód. Miedzychód Miedzychód is asmall town in the western part of Poland with apopulation of approximately 11,000 citizens. According to the IPN, astreet with the name of Slanisław Langowicz, had to be renamed.39 Langowicz was alocal politician who stood up for the community and the city but who also belonged to the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR [Polish United Workers’ Party]. When it became clear that this street had to change its name, the citizens held aconsultation. This consultation took place without protests or complications. Since the local stadium of the football team is located on that street, it was immediately suggested to rename it “Ulica Sportowa” [Sports Street].40 The law met no resistance, which makes it clear that the electorate of the conservatives are mainly located in the rural areas and small towns, in contrast to Warsaw which possesses adifferent population structure. Not only has the renaming of streets been amuch-discussed topic, but abolition of monuments that have aconnection with the communist system was also addressed. Next are three examples showing how the Polish society handled this matter. In Poland’slarge, important centres the first decommunization wave had already taken place by 1989/90. The best example is the toppling of Feliks Dzerżyński’smonument on Warsaw’s Plac Bankowy [Bank Square], former Plac Feliksa Dzierżyńskiego [Feliks Dzerzhinsky Square]. This action 37 Vgl. Homepage Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Zmiany nazw ulic, URL: https://ipn.gov.pl/ pl/upamietnianie/dekomunizacja/zmiany-nazw-ulic/37180,Zmiany-nazw-ulic.html [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 38 Osowski, J., “Dekomunizacja ulic w Warszawie. Radni zmienili szesc imionnazwiska zoastały”, Gazeta Wyborcza, August 31, 2017. 39 Sobkowski, K., “Dekomunizacja w Międzychodzie. Czyli ulice Gwardi Ludowej Kaczarka iLangowicza do zmiany”, Międzychod Nasze Miasto, July 5, 2017. 40 Ibidem. 103 can be seen as symbolically dedicated to the decline of communism in Poland.41 Today, new monuments are constantly being erected to spread anew historical narrative. The most common monuments to erected are monuments of Lech Kaczyński or symbols commemorating the tragic accident of the presidential plane in Smoleńsk from 2010. Both of those can be seen in Warsaw on the central and famous “Plac Piłsudskiego” [Piłsudski Square], which is the main square for historical and political events. The newest memorial site in the city centre of Warsaw is for the Solidarność [Solidarity]. The memorial depicts a big Solidaność logo crashing into apart of the Berlin Wall. It is not only asymbolic monument that should transfer patriotism and pride in the nation, but also an excellent instrument for competing with Gdańsk as the center of the Solidarność, since Gdańsk holds one of the biggest oppositions against the conservative PiS-party. By contrast in Kraków and smaller cities monuments of John Paul the Second are very common (as shown on the picture from Prochowice in Lower Silesia). These places demonstrate adeep attachment to Catholicism and the pride that there was aPolish Pope who helped to end communism. 41 Jaskułowski, T., “Polen Erfolge und Misserfolge der ersten osteuropäischen Transformation 1989”, 60. Ulica Sportowa and the local football stadium in Międzychód. Photo: Ines Skibinski 104 A statue of John Paul the Second in Prochowice. Photos: Ines Skibinski. New Solidarność monument from 2021 in the center of Warsaw. Photo: Ines Skibinski. 105 Legnica Legnica is amedium-sized city in Lower Silesia with around 100,000 residents. Legnica was the largest garrison town of the Red Army and held the highest number of Soviet soldiers in Poland (it was therefore called “Little Moscow”). To honour the Soviet soldiers amonument of Polish-Soviet friendship was erected in the centre of the town. This monument had been discussed for along time, but many inhabitants considered it to be apart of the history of their town and of their own identity. It had become one of the landmarks of the city. When they decided to demolish the monument, the decision was successfully opposed initially although this did not last long:42 in 2018, was demolished. During the removal, some people shouted “Down with communism”, while others had tears in their eyes.43 The unique thing about the case of Legnica and its statue is that agrassroots action took place. Activists have erected their own monument at the place where the Polish-Soviet friendship stood, after it was removed. It was arubber duck attached to acardboard base. It was called the “Pomnik cyzstośći narodu” [Monument to the Purity of the Nation].44 An unknown group organized this action and it consisted of young activists who were very critical not only of decommunization, but of the entire government and its current policies.45 In this way, they wanted to show their protest and, through the humorous allusion of the duck46, also underlined their criticism of Jarosław Kaczyński and his way of ruling Poland from the second row. This was the explanation from the activists: We (…) referring to the campaign in our homeland to cleanse the Polish nation of filth and to its getting up from its knees, want those knees to be clean. By placing the Duck on apedestal in anon-accidental place, aplace where for years there was amonument that provoked and divided us Poles, we want to introduce agood, clean change. The Monument to the Purity of 42 Ruchniewicz, K., Polskie rozrachunki ze spadkiem po komunizmie, URL: https://krzysztofruchniewicz.eu/polskie-rozrachunki-ze-spadkiem-po-komunizmie/ [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 43 Dobkiewicz, A., “Frontwcy zniknęli zcokołu, W ramach dekomunizacji pozbyli się znanego pomnika”, Gazeta Wyborcza, March 24, 2018. 44 Dobkiewicz, A., “W Legnicy stanął pomnik czystosci narodu zkaczką na cokole”, Gazeta Wyborcza, April 5, 2018. 45 Ibidem. 46 Some political opponents call J. Kaczynski “Kaczor” = Male duck. 112 like Barbara Świątek from Wołów and her commitment restoring the plaque but also institutions like the local museum in Katowice (which found aloophole in the law) or even the citizens and inhabitants of the streets of Warsaw that are meant to be renamed. In Legnica, one sees another special way to show resistance against the current decommunization and the politics of the PiS, in form of acivic movement. They oppose it with humour and sarcasm, showing their rebellion not only against the decommunization law but also against the current policies around history. “The duck of the purity of the nation” also aimed to show that in Poland agroup of people exist who think critically and are brave enough to say their opinion out loud. This is in contrast to Miedzychód where an official vote on name-changing was decided by citizens without any opposition. Here it also became clear that in smaller towns, it is much easier to carry out this law than in larger cities. But we see resistance also in small communities like Wołów, where councillors and citizens are fighting against the mayor and trying to rebuild the dissent plaque at its original place. These are only afew examples of selected resistance cases that happened after the decommunization law was published. On the one hand, the existence of these cases is asign that the law from 2016 was very controversial and not easily enforced in Polish society. On the other hand, we see new monuments that were erected in apatriotic, national, Catholic, and Pole-centred spirit. Monuments, such as the Statue of John Paul the Second, Lech Kaczyński or even the newest Solidarność monument in Warsaw, intend to show that the Solidarność, and therefore only Poland, were responsible for the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is obvious that these monuments and the new narratives go hand in hand. However, the decommunization does not stop with the abolishing of monuments and changing street names. The civil service, the judiciary,the military, and police will also be decommunized. In the judiciary, judges are replaced at the pleasure of the PiS, with the justification that the legal system is in big parts still as it was during the PRL.61 It is aparadox that people who were strongly connected to the old system are now working at the decommunized offices. Krystyna Pawłowisch and Stanisław Piotrowicz are the best examples that decommunization does not apply to PiS party members. One can see that the actual idea of decommunization might be only pretended, since these two people are allowed to hold the offices of constitutional judges despite their 61 Nowosielska, P., Pis ipędzajaca dekomunzacja. “To nie zemsta, ale naprawianie zanecheń”, Forsal, March 11, 2020. 113 professional past in the PRL. The situation is similar in the military and the police. There were plans to cut the pensions of retired soldiers who have served in the Polish People’sArmy.62 In Warsaw, there have been debates and demands to decommunize the Palace of Culture and Science and the Powaski cemetery but there are currently no concrete plans to do so. In 2022 we are seeing acompletely new development on this issue. Putin’swar in Ukraine has triggered anew wave of monument demolitions. Since the war of aggression, monuments related to the Red Army have been re-examined and removed at the request of city residents or local authorities who had previously opposed their removal. In many places, vandalism has already occurred.63 Red paint has been poured on these monuments to symbolize Ukrainian blood. These current issues are still being discussed today and we can safely say that this topic is not closed yet. The Polish historian and political scientist Antoni Dudek raises the following thesis: Kaczyński continues to fight against […] post-communist clans, although only marginal remnants remain. He wants to destroy aPoland that has not existed for along time.64 In the eyes of Dudek, the policies of the PiS are deeply anachronistic. There is no doubt that in the last 30 years, the vast majority of people, who were more or less deeply anchored in the communist system of Poland, have already left their working lives behind and are now pensioners. It seems absolutely outdated to assume that after such along time, people are still ideologically anchored in the previous system. The thought that decommunization is used as apretext to create aparty-loyal elite becomes clearer and clearer. The principle is very reminiscent of the communist system that prevailed in Poland and that the current government actually wants to fight. The ideology is different but the methods with which one acts are almost the same. The problem is that in order to implement this, narratives are being reshaped, existing narratives that 62 Ibidem. 63 Szołucha, S., “Derusyfikacja po polsku: czasem uroczysty demontaz, czasem czerwona farba”, Gazeta Wyborcza, April 20, 2022. 64 Vetter, R., Kaczyńskis PiS und die “Dekommunisierung. Entprofessionalisierung durch Personalwechsel in Justiz, Diplomatie und Streitkräften”, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2017, URL: https://www.bpb.de/248425/analyse-kaczyskis-pis-und-die-dekommunisierung-entprofessionalisierung-durch-personalwechsel-in-justiz-diplomatie-und-streitkraeften [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 114 do not fit into the scheme are being concealed, denied or questioned. Patriotic and heroic narratives are created, and the critical treatment of Polish history is forbidden. One example is the so called IPN law which criminalises critical statements about Poland’shistory.65 Recent victims of this law and the treatment were Barbara Engelking and Andrzej Grabowski from the book Dalej jest Noc, which deals with the Jews in occupied Poland during the Second World War and especially how they were threatened by Poles.66 It is obvious that some things were missed in the chaotic early 1990s when coming to terms with the past. However, it is also clear that decommunization by the PiS is being utilised to erase certain narratives (in this case everything that has to do with the time of the PRL) and to build new narratives, as well as taking the opportunity to use party-loyal personnel in all areas of political and social life. References Borodziej, W., Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, München 2010. Buras, P. – Tewes, H., Polens Weg von der Wende bis zum EU-Beitritt, Stuttgart 2005. Dobkiewicz, A., “W Legnicy stanął pomnik czystosci narodu zkaczką na cokole”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5.4.2018. Engelking, B.– Graboski, J., Dalej jest noc. Losy Żydów w wzbranzch powiatach okupowanej Polski, Warsaw 2018. Fehr, H., Vergeltende Gerechtigkeit– Populismus und Vergangenheitspolitik nach 1989, BerlinToronto 2016. Ferfecki, W., “Dekomunizacja: Nowi patroni ulic wygodni dla PiS”, Rzeczpospolita, 21.6.2018. Frey, D., “Odekomunizacja rozstrzyga opinia Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej”, Rzeczpospolita, 27.1.2018. Jaskułowski, T., “Polen Erfolge und Misserfolge der ersten osteuropäischen Transformation 1989”, in: C. Vollnhals, Jahre des Umbruchs. Friedliche Revolution in der DDR und Transition in Ostmitteleuropa, Göttingen 2011, 47–62. Karko, “Policija złapała drugiego wandala, którz ukradł izdewastował pomnik Rokossowskiego”, Gazeta Wyborcza, August 15, 2020. Krupa-Dąbrowska, R., “Dekomunizacja– zmiana nazw ulic pochłania pieniądze iczas mieszkanców”, Rzeczpospolita, 10.12.2018. 65 Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o Insttytut Pamięci Narodowej – “Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy ogrobach icmentarzach, ustawy omuzeach oraz ustawy oodpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod grożbą kary”, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw 14.02.2018, URL: http://ipn.gov.pl/pl/o-ipn/ ustawa/24216,Ustawa.html [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 66 Engelking, B.– Grabowski, J., Dalej jest noc. Losy Żydów w wzbranzch powiatach okupowanej Polski, Warsaw 2018. 115 Lang, K.-O., “Auf dem Weg zur 4. Republik. Die Parlamentswahlen in Polen vom 25.September 2005”, Osteuropa, Vol. 55, Issue 10, 2005, 135–147. Leschnik, H., Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in Polen von 1998 bis 2010, (Studien zur Ostmitteleuropaforschung, Vol. 42), Marburg 2018. Madejski, T., “Borne Sulinowo chce radzieckich pomników”, Radio Szczecin, 22.4.2016. Nowosielska, P., Pis ipędzajaca dekomunzacja. “To nie zemsta, ale naprawianie zanecheń”, Forsal, 11.3.2020. Osowski, J., “Dekomunizacja ulic w Warszawie. Radni zmienili szesc imionnazwiska zoastały”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 31.8.2017. Osowski, J., “Koniec dekomunizaji nazw w Warszawe? Nie ma ulic Duracza i17. Stycznia, są protesty”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5.7.2019. Paterek von Sperling, A., “Pomniki, które depczą pamięć– Andrzej Paterek von Sperling oustawie dekomunizacyjnej”, Rzeczpospolita, 11.8.2018. Paradowska, J., “Aufarbeitung und Ranküne. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, Osteuropa, Vol. 56, Issue 11–12, 2006, 205–218. Ruchniewicz, K., “Zur Geschichtspolitik der PiS”, in: A. Rostek, Polska first. Über die polnische Krise, Bonn 2018, 200–209. Ruchniewicz, K., “Die historische Erinnerung in Polen”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 5–6, 2005, 13–24. Sobkowski, K., “Dekomunizacja w Międzychodzie. Czyli ulice Gwardi Ludowej Kaczarka iLangowicza do zmiany”, Międzychod Nasze Miasto, 5.7.2017. Steffen, K., “Ambivalenz des affirmativen Populismus. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, Osteuropa, Vol. 56, Issue 11–12, 2006, 219–233. Szołucha, S., “Derusyfikacja po polsku: czasem uroczysty demontazl, czasem czerwona farba”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20.4.2022. von Puttkammer, J., “Enttäuschte Erwartungen. Die Strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung kommunistischer Diktatur in Polen”, in: J. Ganzenmüller, Recht und Gerechtigkeit. Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung von Diktaturen in Europa, Köln u.a. 2017, 173–194. Zagańczyk-Neufeld, A., Die geglückte Revolution. Das Politische und der Umbruch in Polen 1976–1997, Paderborn 2014. Ziemer, K., Das politische System Polens. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2013. Homepage Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Zmiany nazw ulic, 15.8.2020, URL: https://ipn. gov.pl/pl/upamietnianie/dekomunizacja/zmiany-nazw-ulic/37180,Zmiany-nazw-ulic. html [accessed: 23.04.2022]. Mazowiecki, T., Tadeusz Mazowiecki’sinaugural address at the Sejm on August 24, 1989, URL: https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/wystapienie-tadeusza-mazowieckiego-w-sejmie-24sierpnia-1989-r [accessed: 23.04.2022]. Ruchniewicz, K., Polskie rozrachunki ze spadkiem po komunizmie, URL: https:// krzysztofruchniewicz.eu/polskie-rozrachunki-ze-spadkiem-po-komunizmie/ [accessed: 23.04.2022]. Ustawa zdnia 1. kwietnia 2016 r. ozakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego totalitarnego przez nazwy budowli, obiektów iurządzeń użytecznośći piblicznej, in: Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw 1.4.2016, URL: http://prawo.sejm.gov. pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20160000744 [accessed: 23.04.2022]. Ustawa ozmianie ustawy oInstytutcie Pamięci Narodowej– “Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy ogrobach icmentarzach, ustawy omuzeach oraz ustawy oodpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod grożbą kary”, in: Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw 14.2.2018, URL: http://ipn.gov.pl/pl/o-ipn/ustawa/24216,Ustawa.html [accessed: 23.04.2022]. 116 Vetter, R., Kaczyńskis PiS und die “Dekommunisierung. Entprofessionalisierung durch Personalwechsel in Justiz, Diplomatie und Streitkräften”, URL: https://www.bpb. de/248425/analyse-kaczyskis-pis-und-die-dekommunisierung-entprofessionalisierungdurch-personalwechsel-in-justiz-diplomatie-und-streitkraeften [accessed: 23.04.2022]. Interview Interview with Emilia Barbara Świątek, Wołów, 31.8.2021, author’sarchive– Ines Skibinski. Interview with Emilia Barbara Świątek, Wołów, 18.4.2022, author’sarchive– Ines Skibinski Part 2: Memory of Nations and Rethinking History 119 Militarised Masculinities: Analysis of Hegemonic Azerbaijani Masculinities During the II Nagorno Karabakh War Ramil Zamanov Introduction Of all the post-soviet countries which have undergone tremendous change since the 1990 collapse of the USSR, Azerbaijan is amongst the most severely affected.1 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been the defining feature of post-soviet Azerbaijani history and the resultant culture of militarism has deeply affected the character of the country’s hegemonic masculinities. This paper therefore analyses the impact of militarisation on masculinity during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and vice versa. Hegemonic Azerbaijani masculinities helped to shape the dynamics of the war through discourse on social media channels which in turn fed into the militarisation process. This process is the method by which asociety adapts and prepares itself for military conflict and for the different forms of violence to come.2 The central role of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the construction of masculinities is also apparent from these online discourses, indicating both reinforcement and interdependence.3 The themes of humiliation, war crimes and martyrdom by Azerbaijani men have been chosen as examples of issues affected by both militarism 1 See: Shahnazarian, N.– Ziemer, U., “Young Soldiers Tales of War in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, Issue 9, 2012; Zamanov, R., “Challenges of Gender Studies in Azerbaijan”, in: IN:SIGHTS, International Student Journal of Anthropology, Strasbourg 2022; Waal, T., Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York 2005. 2 See: Adelman, M., “The Military, Militarism, and the Militarisation of Domestic Violence”, Violence Against Women, Vol. 9, Issue 9, 2003; Schofield, J., Militarization and War. 1st ed. Initiatives in Strategic Studies– Issues and Policies, New York 2007; Klare, M., “Militarism: the issues today”, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 1978. 3 Zamanov, R., Gender, Ethnicity and Peacebuilding in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Prague 2020. 120 and masculinity. Through these examples it is possible to deconstruct how some Azerbaijani men employed these concepts to force and justify militarisation in social media discourse. Within the first example, Azerbaijani hegemonic masculinity was frequently employed to belittle and humiliate perceived ‘alternative’ masculinities on social networks, directly influencing the tensions and dynamics of the war. Secondly, some Azerbaijani men justified war crimes (committed by Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War) on social networks, which helped to trigger the normalisation of violence in Azerbaijani society. Lastly, the issue of martyrdom became avery problematic issue, with many Azerbaijani men justifying the death of soldiers as necessary sacrifices to protect Azerbaijan from the enemy. This paper builds on the limited (but growing) research on masculinities in Azerbaijan and therefore explores hegemonic masculinity in Azerbaijan with anew perspective on the problems of militarisation, war and violence.4 This paper therefore contributes not only to the fields of masculinity and gender but also their relation to the military and conflicts of countries not often discussed in Western academia. Revisiting Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Azerbaijan gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and has grown into ademographically homogenous majority Muslim country located close to the Caspian Sea.5 According to areport by the Democracy Index in 2021, Azerbaijan was ranked 141st of 165 independent states, identifying it as an authoritarian regime.6 In 2016, Azerbaijan was ranked eleventh in the global militarisation index, which refers to the level of state military spending versus spending other sectors (relative to GDP).7 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the source for most of this spending, is an ongoing territorial and ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The dispute has led to 4 Mahmudova, L., Azeri Masculinities and Making Men in Azerbaijan, Chicago 2017; Zamanov, R., Gender, Ethnicity and Peacebuilding in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Prague 2020. 5 Waal, T., Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York 2005, 10–30. 6 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2021, New York 2021, 16. 7 Mutschler, M., “2016 Global Militarisation Index”, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn 2016. 121 war, displacement, trauma and continuing animosities.8 Nagorno-Karabakh was established as an oblast in 1923 within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).9 Azerbaijan claims that until the end of the19th Century, Armenians and Christians made up only 10% ofthe entire population in Karabakh.10 In 1988, deputies of Armenia in thelocal Soviet Assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh voted for uniting the Nagorno-Karabakh with Soviet Armenia.11 The First Nagorno Karabakh War lasted from 1988 to 1994 when aceasefire agreement was signed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan.12 Despite both sides investing in the following peacebuilding efforts, animosity and conflict remained prevalent in the region. In June 2020 (during the COVID-19 pandemic) war preparations in both states began once again and, as aconsequence, both armies broke the ceasefire. On the 27th of September 2020, the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began. Initially, the Azerbaijani army liberated its territories occupied by Armenia13 and then continued beyond the occupied territories into the unrecognised Republic of Artsakh.14 In order to stop the war, Russian president Vladimir Putin invited both sides to sign adeclaration of peace and the war ended on 10th November 2020 with victory given to Azerbaijan. The status of Nagorno Karabakh has, however, not been fully resolved with regards to the co-living of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the territories of Nagorno Karabakh. The Role of Hegemonic Masculinities in Azerbaijani Society Before introducing the role of militarisation and war in the lives of Azerbaijani masculinities, it is important to familiarise ourselves with the context of hegemonic masculinities in Azerbaijani society. It is essential to first 8 Zamanov, R., Gender, Ethnicity and Peacebuilding…, 15–20. 9 The oblast was atype of administrative division in the former Soviet Union. 10 Ahmadov, E., Armenia’saggression against Azerbaijan: analysis chronology (1987–2011), Baku 2011. 11 Waal, T., Black Garden…, 15–20. 12 Ibidem. 13 The Armenian side occupied seven territories of Azerbaijan (which surround the Nagorno- -Karabakh region) with protecting Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani attacks (Waal 2005); Grzybowski, J. et al., “Fault Lines of aWar Foretold”, Eurozine, 2020, 1–8. 14 The Republic of Artsakh is the official name of the unrecognised state in Nagorno Karabakh. 128 of these eight accounts but also the discourses of other Azerbaijani hegemonic masculinities on social media. These accounts were selected by using unique keywords with which were found on multiple social media channels. ‘Nagorno Karabakh’, ‘Karabakh is Azerbaijan’, ‘Justice to Karabakh’, ‘Don’t Believe Armenia’, ‘Stop Armenian Lies’, ‘Armenia Supports Terrorism’, and ‘Stop Armenian Occupation’ were the main hashtags used to filter social media posts on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and LinkedIn.40 The opinions collected were posted on social networks between the 26th of September and the 10th of November 2020, when the ceasefire agreement was officially signed.41 The research subjects also represented different social classes, including working class, working-middle class, middle class and upper class. The names of all the research subjects were replaced with their pseudo-names. In terms of citizenship, all the participants were from Azerbaijan and were based in the cities of Baku, Sumgayit, Ganja, Sabirabad, Nakhchivan and other small cities. Diverse age groups were represented in the analysis: young (approximately 18–26), young adult (approximately 26–45) and middle-aged (over 45). There was no data collected regarding the ethnic identities/ethnicities of the research subjects. Conducting interviews with them was impossible since the internet was not accessible in Azerbaijan until November 2020. As an Azerbaijani researcher working in Europe, it was also not safe to communicate directly with commentors as they would expect me to serve in the military, not to stay in Europe. Social media became extremely important to study during this war. Firstly, the information war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis became as crucial as the war happening on the battlefield. Secondly, staying home and having free time because of the COVID-19 pandemic allowed Azerbaijanis on social networks to actively engage in the information war. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was not possible to conduct this research in person in Azerbaijan. In addition, the Azerbaijani government shut the internet down from the 27th of September until the 12th of November 2020.42 Employing cyber ethnography was therefore the most appropriate methodology for this research. 40 As an alternative, Iused Nagorny Karabakh and Dağlıq Qarabağ (in Azerbaijani). 41 Grzybowski, J. et al., “Fault Lines of aWar Foretold”, Eurozine, 2020, 1–8. 42 Even though the internet was inaccessible, many people attempted to access the internet via VPNs. However, the internet connections were not good enough to conduct video or audio calls to interview the research subjects. 129 Cyber ethnography,43 is an online research method which employs ethnographic methods to examine the communities and cultures presented through computer-mediated social interactions.44 Acknowledging the power of the internet to unite people, regardless of place or time, and adopting a virtual form of ethnography is becoming asignificant new approach in the social sciences.45 Digital ethnography allows researchers to actively engage with research participants in force majeure cases such as the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Robinson and Schulz, it is not clear whether identity performances in e-settings should be thought of as disjointed from offline identities or if they are continuations of offline identities.46 Once researchers feel that comprehending the relationship between online and offline identities of members is required, researchers may then request to meet with their informants face to face.47 In my research, however, it was impossible practically to meet with the individuals who wrote those comments from September to November 2020. The position of the researcher also plays an essential role in gender studies.48 As aqueer young Azerbaijani migrant, the topic of hegemonic masculinities and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was chosen by me specifically. This sensitive topic, especially focused on war, loss and conflict is challenging to analyse in detail, especially considering the current nationalism and Armenophobia in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, as an individual and independent researcher, Iaimed to cover the issueof hegemonic masculinities and their direct influence on the dynamics ofthe Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Mainly, conducting this research aimed to uncover the unknown and unseen cultural elements of patriarchy and nationalism within Azerbaijani society. Findings 43 Also known as virtual ethnography, digital ethnography and online ethnography. 44 Boellstroff, T.– Nardi, B.– Pearce, C.– Taylor, T. L., Ethnography and Virtual Worlds: AHandbook of Method, Princeton 2012. 45 Crichton, S.– Shelley K., “Virtual Ethnography: Interactive Interviewing Online as Method”, Canadian Journal of Learning and Technology, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2003. 46 Robinson, L.– Schulz, L., “New Fieldsites, New Methods: New Ethnographic Opportunities”, in: S. N. Hesse-Biber (ed.), The Handbook of Emergent Technologies in Social Research, Oxford 2011. 47 Hine, C., Virtual Ethnography, London 2000. 48 Gunaratnam, Y., Researching Race and Ethnicity Methods, Knowledge and Power, London 2003. 130 The findings Idescribe here are the most common issues discussed by socially dominant Azerbaijani men on social networks during the war. These findings are therefore the sum of socially expected behaviours, expectations and motivations as articulated through the hegemonic perspective which in turn is accepted and taken for granted by wider society. They demonstrate the different opinions present within hegemonic Azerbaijani masculinities, which then shape societal conventions in Azerbaijan. The Real Man vs the Betrayer: Hegemonic Azerbaijani Masculinities Against Belittled Armenian Masculinities An old Turkic proverb states ‘At, avrat, silah ödünç verilmez’,which can be translated to: ‘Horse, wife and weapon is not borrowed’49. Hegemonic Azerbaijani men commonly used this proverb, especially during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The proverb reiterates and reinforces the value of ahorse/land, awoman/wife and aweapon/military. In other words, these elements should be kept under the control of men, and thus, they need to protect these valuables from ‘the enemy’. “Azerbaijani men will never lose the war because we are real men! We have never betrayed our friends, neighbours, wife and land! With the support of all the real men– our soldiers–, we will liberate our lands from the treacherous Armenian men! Armenians are hopeless, and they even do not have normal military supplies to fight against us. They should stop this meaningless resistance!”– Zeynal, amiddle-aged man. This excerpt from Facebook, which was written on the 2nd of October 2020 in Azerbaijani on the page of BBC News Azerbaijani. The comment clearly explains the position of the commenter and demonstrates his understanding of what constitutes ‘real Azerbaijani men’. The discussion of the war on social media was the only space where groups of hegemonic Azerbaijani and Armenian men could debate due to the fact that most of these men have never talked to an Armenian or Azerbaijani in real life. Areal man is considered to be loyal to his friends, neighbours, and wife; therefore, all Azerbaijani soldiers are ‘real men’. 49 Cosan, L.– Karabag, I., “The Relationship Between Proverbs and Language Economy in the Light of German and Turkish Proverbs”, The Journal of Social Sciences Institute of Ataturk University, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2015, 263. 131 However, Armenian men are considered to be ‘treacherous’ and not ‘real men’, at least according to Zeynal. In Zeynal’sopinion, Armenian masculinity has a‘treacherous’ character compared to Azerbaijani masculinity which he then uses to justify the militarisation of Azerbaijan. Zeynal’scomment was an embodiment of Armenophobic sentiments. Through social media, men like Zeynal popularised strong messages of hatred towards Armenia which contributed to the war in two ways. First, it re-shaped the mainstream thinking of Azerbaijani society against Armenian men (in ahumiliating way); and second, such standpoints justified the war by fighting against the ‘inferiority’ of Armenian masculinity. Zeynal’sopinion was acommon narrative amongst hundreds of social media discourses which aimed for the extreme humiliation of Armenian masculinity during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Such online bullying of Azerbaijani men therefore indirectly contributed to the escalation of the war in anumber of ways. Another example was acomment on the Instagram post of Kim Kardashian,50 which was posted in Azerbaijani by a young male student, Elshan: “Armenian men only know how to produce aporn star… Do not mess up with our men! Our army will liberate Karabakh!” This comment 50 Kim Kardashian is afamous American celebrity with Armenian heritage. In Azerbaijan, Kardashian is considered, on the societal level, to be apornographic celebrity. Figure 1: Humiliation of the Armenian flag tied to the trunk of a random car in the city centre of Baku. Photo: the author 132 also associated Armenian men with the notion that they are ‘betrayers of their women’. In Caucasian societies, women are often expected to obey male authority; therefore, when awoman becomes more independent, the man is blamed for losing his authority over that woman.51 As Mahmudova argued, Azerbaijani men develop their identities using binary thinking: ‘us’– Azerbaijanis and ‘them’– Armenians.52 In the context of this comment, Elshan distinguished Azerbaijani masculinities as morally superior in comparison to the nation of Kim Kardashian. Azerbaijani Society re-produces the idea that if women are celebrities like Kardashian, they must be perverted. Hence, Elshan assumed that Armenian masculinities did not know how to protect their lands. To put it differently, Elshan supported militarisation because he believed Azerbaijani soldiers would win this war because Armenian men did not have the capacity to protect their lands. Narratives (and ways of thinking) like Elshan’s greatly reinforced the militarised mood of Azerbaijani hegemonic men, and through social media, the ‘victorious’ identity was established to further promote militarisation during the war. On social media, militaristic ideas and posts like Elshan’saimed to belittle the potency of Armenian masculinity and to reunite Azerbaijani men around the idea of superiority. As Connell discussed regarding hegemonic masculinities, aparticular group of men is controlling society through gender processes and such societies are being reproduced themselves by that power.53 In the Azerbaijani context, men such as Elshan and Zeynal, were encouraged to humiliate Armenian men and their position in the war through presidential speeches. The Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, used statements to humiliate Armenian men and the prime minister of Armenia: “We chased Armenians from Karabakh like chasing adog”;“What now, Pashinyan? The status of Nagorno-Karabakh became damned!”and“Pashinyan will cowardly sign this document in abasement far from the cameras!”.54The strongman image of Ilham Aliyev also reinforced the notion of militarisation and humiliation against Armenian masculinity. Doing so increased his ‘manly’ reputation within Azerbaijani society and gained him massive support from the hegemonic and non-hegemonic Azerbaijani male population. During my fieldwork in May–June 2021, Ifound pictures of Aliyev on the windows and doors of 51 Shahnazarian, N.– Ziemer, U., “Young Soldiers Tales of War in NagornoKarabakh”, Europe- -Asia Studies, Vol. 64, Issue 9, 2012. 52 Mahmudova, L., Azeri Masculinities and Making Men in Azerbaijan, Chicago 2017, 53. 53 Connell, R., Masculinities (2nd ed.), Berkeley, California 2005. 54 Nikol Pashninyan has been the Prime Minister of Armenia since 2018. 133 all state buildings, restaurants, and big shopping malls in Baku. Under Connell’stheory, these activities would represent the “masculinity politics”of the system in Azerbaijan.55 A‘strongman figure’ forces his ideals and aims on society and consequently, other members of this hegemonic male club start to support his militaristic policies. Through such politics, Azerbaijani society developed binary thinking, regarding Azerbaijani men as ‘real men’ and Armenian men as ‘traitors’. Therefore, the humiliation of Armenian masculinity in the hundreds of social media discourses Iexamined directly contributed to the promotion of militarisation. Analysing these two accounts together, the commenters’ support towards militarisation celebrates the Azerbaijani soldier’smanhood and devalues the Armenian militarisation. Azerbaijani male identity constructs itself by belittling the Armenian male identity and this becomes the first commonly problematic issue.56 Zeynal and Elshan (and the discourses of Azerbaijani hegemonic men on social media) believe that Armenia is poor and helpless, and therefore it cannot resist Azerbaijan. In other words, Azerbaijani men were seen as strategically and morally superior while Armenian men were belittled and made vulnerable in these accounts. This can be associated with the historical background of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.57 Since Azerbaijani men lost these territories in the 1990s, they became ‘losers’ of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.58 In response, the propaganda of the superiority of Azerbaijani men was spread on an official level in Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. However, during the war the Armenian military bombed the second Azerbaijani city of Ganja and as well as other cities.59 This fact contradicts the powerful and invincible image of Azerbaijani men and the weakness of Armenian men and their military which was portrayed on Azerbaijani social media channels. It also suggests that such representations promoted the idea of militarisation and justified the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War as the only solution to end this conflict. 55 Connell, R., Masculinities (2nd ed.), Berkeley, California 2005. 56 See: Akhundov, J., “Rise of Militaristic Sentiment and Patriotic Discourses in Azerbaijan: An Analytic Review”, Caucasus Edition–Journal of Conflict Transformation, 2017; Zamanov, R., Gender, Ethnicity and Peacebuilding in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Prague 2020. 57 See: Jumayeva, L., “Discourses of War and Peace within the Context of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: The Case of Azerbaijan”, Caucasus Edition–Journal of Conflict Transformation, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2018; Militz, E., Affective Nationalism. Bodies, Materials and Encounters with the Nation in Azerbaijan, Zürich 2019. 58 Zamanov, R., Gender, Ethnicity and Peacebuilding… 59 “Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan Says 12 Civilians Killed by Shelling in Ganja”, The Guardian, October, 2020. 134 This finding implies that social media discourses had a significant role in promoting the humiliation of Armenian men in order to motivate Azerbaijani men during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Directly and indirectly, these discourses on social media contributed to abetter organisation and unification of Azerbaijani hegemonic masculinity regarding the promotion of militarisation, which was never an option during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. The humiliation of Armenian masculinitywas one of the strongest tools used by hegemonic Azerbaijani masculinity. “Karabakh is Azerbaijan!” #KarabakhisAzerbaijan was the most commonly used hashtag on social networks during the war. Different members of Azerbaijani society used this hashtag advocated for the legal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven surrounding territories as belonging to Azerbaijan. During my fieldwork in May 2021, in many shops and restaurants hung signs that read “Karabakh is Azerbaijan!”; this phrase was even printed on many of their receipts. However, the scope of this hashtag went beyond its initial aim into supporting war crimes. According to Alexander Schwarz, awar crime is any action or omission committed in an armed conflict or war that establishes asevere violation of the laws and customs of international humanitarian law and has been criminalised by international treaty or regular law.60 Abroader methodology describes war crimes as all acts creating aviolation of the laws or customs of war, regardless of whether the conduct is criminal.61 In this context, many hegemonic Azerbaijani masculinities directly or indirectly buttressed these crimes committed in the II Nagorno-Karabakh War.For instance, Alim wrote several comments in Azerbaijani on Twitter by using the hashtag #KarabakhisAzerbaijan. “We should kill all of their men to protect our future! Otherwise, this dirty blood will attack us again! Azerbaijani army should destroy each and every Armenian soldier. #KarabakhisAzerbaijan’AND We have awell-organised military to attack and destroy those Armenian bandits! #KarabakhisAzerbaijan” Alim, middle-aged man. 60 Schwarz, A., “War Crimes”, in: Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford 2014, 2. 61 Ibidem. 135 Alim’scomments demonstrate how civic protest on the social network became atool to express support for war crimes. In this context, Armenian men are seen as apotential danger to the very existence of Azerbaijanis, even in the future. Thus, Alim expressed his sympathy towards such war crimes.62 This opinion also suggests Azerbaijani men became supporters of war crimes through discourse on social networks and their involvement also encouraged the soldiers who committed the war crimes. As Connell argued, hegemonic masculinities encourage other individuals to willingly participate in their extreme projects, containing extreme violence.63 In this context, by using ‘rational’ arguments, Alim encouraged Azerbaijanis to protect Azerbaijanis and, thus, to kill Armenian men. Consequently, on social networks, Azerbaijanis accepted war crimes as anormal process of war. While analysing the historical background of this conflict, it is possible to conclude that hegemonic Azerbaijani men normalised the war crimes in order to take revenge on Armenians for the past (the First Nagorno-Karabakh War).64 Such an approach normalised war crime and worsened opinions about Armenians in Azerbaijani society. Social media discourse helped to promote many narratives similar to Alim’sin order to normalise war crimes and there62 Amnesty International analysed 22 videos and concluded that both sides committed war crimes during the war (Amnesty International, 2020). 63 Connell, R., Masculinities (2nd ed.), Berkeley, California 2005. 64 See: Jumayeva, L., “Discourses of War and Peace within the Context of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: The Case of Azerbaijan”, Caucasus Edition–Journal of Conflict Transformation, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2018; Akhundov, J., “Rise of Militaristic Sentiment and Patriotic Discourses in Azerbaijan: An Analytic Review”, Caucasus Edition–Journal of Conflict Transformation, 2017; Abilov, S.– Isayev, I., “The Consequences of the Nagorno–Karabakh War for Azerbaijan and the Undeniable Reality of Khojaly Massacre: AView from Azerbaijan”, Polish Political Science Yearbook 45, 2016. Figure 2: The picture from the Trophies Park. “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”. The Armenian car plates behind this motto were brought from Karabakh to demonstrate the victory of Azerbaijani soldiers. Photo: the author 136 fore kill more Armenian soldiers. Such discourses on online platforms were used as tools to strengthen and promote the idea of war crimes as anormalised concept amongst men such as Alim. In other words, these discourses contributed to the direct and prompt endorsement of the militarist actions of Azerbaijani soldiers with the support of Azerbaijani hegemonic men. Another example that normalised war crimes was written in Azerbaijani by Rashad on LinkedIn.65 “Everyone became humanist now, but we cannot forget what Armenians have done to us in the past! They killed our women, elderly, children and soldiers in the 1990s. We should kill these Armenians before they kill us! This is logical, and you cannot know more than our military! People who are against this war have no idea about the governance! #KarabakhisAzerbaijan.”– Rashad, amiddle-aged man (senior manager at aclothing brand). Rashad’scomments bring us back to Connell’sconcept of “rationalised hegemonic masculinity”.66 Hegemonic men consider themselves rationally superior to women, children, queers or any other group who disagrees with them. It also implies how these masculinities oppress others’ ideals and terrorise these ‘others’.67 In this context, Rashad clearly states that people against the war or killing Armenians are ‘irrational’. He reasons that an Azerbaijani should not forget the past, and hence, Azerbaijanis should support the killing of Armenians because of their historical conflicts. This approach suggests that hegemonic Azerbaijani men perceive the concept of war and killing as the rational solution to this conflict.68 Peace is not an option for hegemonic Azerbaijani men because they believe that violence is always the immediate solution. Therefore, social media discourse becomes the primary tool for men like Rashad and Alim to promote militarisation by justifying the war crimes and historical challenges that Azerbaijanis have faced. This finding implies that social media platforms have adirect impact on the everyday lives of humans in the 21st century.69 Therefore, the Azerbaijani hegemony have employed 65 Even though LinkedIn is aplatform to promote businesses and develop new partnerships (Komljenovic, 2019), Azerbaijani and Armenian hegemonic masculinities broke the ethics of LinkedIn by bringing the non-business-related political conflict to the newsfeed of LinkedIn. 66 Connell, R., Masculinities (2nd ed.), Berkeley, California 2005. 67 Zamanov, R., Gender, Ethnicity and Peacebuilding in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Prague 2020, 20. 68 Ibidem. 69 See: Yaron, A.– Avidar, R., “Information, Interactivity, and Social Media”, Atlantic Journal of Communication, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 2015; Hea, A., “Social Media in Technical Communication”, Technical Communication Quarterly, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 2014. 137 such platforms to better organise and endorse the ideas of war crimes and historical injustices in order to motivate Azerbaijani soldiers fighting on the frontlines. Consequently, hegemonic men like Rashad and Alim justify and promote the concept of war among different groups of Azerbaijanis as the ‘rational’ solution through the militaristic discourse on social media. Since hegemonic masculinities are the sole decision-makers of the nation, other groups and sub-groups are forced to obey their decisions, as well. Thus, militaristic discourse on social media played asignificant role as the ‘messenger’ of these expressions of masculinity. Considering these two accounts together, Alim and Rashad both justified militarisation and promoted war as the only rational solution to conflict. Through such encouragement, war crimes become reasonable violent acts within Azerbaijani society, and society then becomes militarised through social networks. Similar to Mahmudova’sanalysis, it is therefore argued that Azerbaijani hegemonic masculinities force their ideals on to Azerbaijani society, and therefore, such militarised discourses become vital in Azerbaijan. Accordingly, the idea of militarisation becomes an essential element of Azerbaijani society. Attitudes towards war crimes and the justification of violence suggests that discourses on social media can be used as atool to manipulate the masses in order to construct the realities supported by hegemonic male perspectives. In the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, all events of the war were announced by the state officials, including the Azerbaijani president, through social media platforms.70 Thus, by endorsing war crimes and justifying violence on social media, hegemonic Azerbaijani men had abigger group of targets to manipulate, including women and LGBTQI+ people from Azerbaijan and also within the international community. Overall, this finding contributes to the literature in two ways: first, this demonstrates the power of social media discourse in the normalisation of war crimes by hegemonic Azerbaijani men and second, it explains how the Azerbaijani historical agenda is enacted through social media by justifying the emergence of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. “2783: Not Dead, but Martyrs!” In the Azerbaijani context, it is believed that asoldier’sdeath cannot be equal to an ordinary death, and thus asoldier who dies protecting the 70 Pearce, K., “Analysis | While Armenia and Azerbaijan Fought over Nagorno-Karabakh, Their Citizens Battled on Social Media”, Washington Post, 2020. 144 Dudwick, N., “Missing Women“ in the South Caucasus: Local Perceptions and Proposed Solutions”, World Bank Group, 2015, 1–46, URL: http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/539891468281380371/pdf/94705REVISED-WP-PUBLIC-Box393246BMissing-women-Dudwick-July-22-finalclean-English-Version-Nov-6-2015 [accessed: 15.08.2022]. 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Zamanov, R., “Challenges of Gender Studies in Azerbaijan”, in: IN:SIGHTS, International Student Journal of Anthropology, Strasbourg 2022, 184–191. 146 The Experiences of Female Ethnic Prisoners in Soviet Camps: Between Collective Memory and the Historiographical Debate Iuliia Iashchenko Introduction The historical discourse about the wars of the 20th Century still does not include the voices of the women and children who were prisoners of concentration camps. This not only includes those who were imprisoned in Nazi Germany but also those who were prisoners of the Soviet Gulag camps. The presence of such voids in modern historiography supports continuing gender discrimination but it also silences the voices of people who faced the horrors of war away from the frontline. The collective experience of World War II is therefore exclusively described from the perspective or narrative of an armed man. When considering the problems within the narrative dynamics of mass repression, it is important to stress that the diversity in the experiences of victims of political and ethnic persecution in the Soviet Union was wide enough that it is impossible to fully assess the damage done to individuals, their families as well as ethnic groups without athorough examination of archival documents and learning the victims’ stories. Therefore, it is essential to work with victims and their memories. Their evidence allows us to speak not just about the ‘repressed’ but also about the men, women and children in the camps thereby giving ahuman face to the blurred interpretation. It should also be mentioned that relatively little attention has been paid to the history of ethnic cleansing in the USSR because of classified archives and alack of information. Thus, for along, time research priority was given to large-scale events rather than local tragedies as these local events affected fewer people.1 1 Ricoeur, P., Memory, History, Forgetting, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2004, 68–79. 147 In this semantic space aresearch question arises: how does the strategy of silence change the narrative of women’sexperiences in the context of political repression, ethnic cleansing and war? Sources for these events are still (or rather once again) unavailable. As anew far-right historical policy comes into its own, historical studies have been marked by awhole complex of laws focused on classifying archives and representing anew image of the Soviet past. Historical politics influences not only the formation of national historical discourse, but also creates quite tangible boundaries of what is permissible for professional historians to investigate. In other words, the historical laws that exist in Russia today censor several problems, among which are the problems of ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union. Investigations of such historical plots are possible only when referring to oral sources and sources of apersonal origin. This is because available archival documents do not have in-depth information about these events and local sources represent afundamentally new picture of the Soviet past.2 This research is based on oral and written sources received from victims and witnesses of political repression, as well as from representatives of different generations whose family history includes the experience of soviet repression. The research focuses on the informative potential of the interview since such details of the everyday life of deportation cannot be found anywhere else. In total, over 250 interviews were conducted. Some oral sources were collected during field research between 2018 and 2020 in the territory of the Perm region (Russia) and other parts were taken from the archives ofthe International Organization Memorial (Perm). This article is based on an analysis of interviews which could underline certain important aspect of the female prisoners’ discussions of their experiences. The sample was predominantly drawn from the narratives of repressed Russian Germans, Baltic peoples and Ukrainians. The predominance of German and Baltic peoples’ representatives is primarily due to the geography of the interviews. The Ural region (the Molotov region, later the Perm region) was home to predominantly ethnically German prison camps and deportation camps for people from the Baltics. In addition, special settlements for the labour army (one example of avariety of camp regimes in the USSR) were initiated in the Urals. The labour army was predominantly made up of ethnic prisoners. Thus, the sample of interviews was 2 Iashchenko, I., “Discourse in memory of the deportation of the Volga Germans to the USSR in the 1940s in the context of modern museum technologies”, Materials of the International Youth Scientific Forum “LOMONOSOV-2019”, Moscow 2019, 1–3. 148 conditioned by the geography of the ethnographic expeditions. Among the Baltic peoples and German peoples, alarge percentage were sent tothe Urals, therefore the results of the analysis can be extrapolated to the general experience of ethnic minorities in the USSR. Historiographical Debates and Transitional Justice When starting aconversation about the Soviet system of concentration camps and the politics of memory in Russia, one should first clarify the origins of the localisation and oblivious attitudes towards the tragedy of the Volga Germans and Russian Germans. This is especially important within the context of the tradition of talking about political repression in the territory of the USSR. However, within the framework of Russia’s official commemorative policy, silence becomes afrequent tactic in relation to ethnic cleansing.3 In this sense, the current policy on memory looks like an attempt to unite national minorities but also not to talk about the past. On the one hand, there is adesire to differentiate between the national socialist and the national communist regimes from the point of view of “otherness”, undoubtedly demonstrating political reverence for the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the search for compromises in resolving the problems of misunderstanding between national minorities led to amendments to the Strategy of State Ethnic Policy. Now the priority area is “preserving the ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity of the Russian Federation”.4 This creates acertain amount of ‘indulgence’ for removing those historical plots which could split modern Russian society at atime when the government is trying to construct acommon identity for Russians.5 Those factors, when taken together, lead to the creation of amonolithic single image of the past which should unite everyone around the myth of the Great Victory. With this approach, all 3 Iashchenko, I., “Hostages of the past. Russia’shistorical policy as anew round of ethnic repression in the post-Soviet space (2010–2020s)”, Transitional Justice in Central and Eastern Europe Coping with the Communist Past, Berlin 2021, 73–80. 4 The strategy of the state cultural policy for the period up to 2030 Approved by the order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated February 29, 2016, No. 326-r., URL: http://base.garant. ru/71343400/ [accessed 18.02.2022]. 5 Iashchenko, I., Evidence and Memory. Memories about the repressions of the 1940s against the Volga Germans on the materials of the Perm Region, Master’sThesis, Perm State University, Perm 2020, 5; Brandenberger, D., National Bolshevism. Stalinist mass culture and the formation of Russian national identity (1931–1956), St. Petersburg 2009, 19–20. 149 subjects that do not meet the interests of the general policy are excluded from the public narrative. Public political discourse puts forward the argument that todaythere is no longer an urgent need to look at the difficult past so closely; therewere special conditions at the time that forced the USSR government to make sacrifices. Repeatedly, politicians and pro-state historians have voiced the idea that the benefits of the Gulag prisoners and labour army (in Russian trudovaya armiya) workers were so great that this should justify the measures taken. But the main argument in favour of silence is that national hatred should not be stirred up on the basis of memories which divide Russian society. In this context, activists, historians, politicians, and individual members of national minorities are being politically persecuted and charged with violating Article 280 of the Russian Criminal Code “Public calls for extremist activities”.6 In particular, the above article applies to people who are accused of “inciting hatred on grounds of nationality” or “inciting hatred against Russians” as well as to people who conduct “extremist activities to incite separatism in Russia”.7 Note that separatist crimes include the non-recognition of the annexed peninsula Crimea as Russian, as well as the advocacy of Russian Germans for the return of the Volga territory and autonomous republic which was alienated and abolished during the Stalinist repressions of the 1940s.8 Consequently, all local tragedies and micro-plots related to the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) have been deleted from the official discourse, aiding the construction of amonumental history for the victorious country.9 Ethnic diversity in the historical perspective is currently considered an example of separatism. The victory in the war therefore seems to be the only point of consolidation for amultinational society to these modern political actors. As aresult, there is adeliberate avoidance of complex conversations about political repression and ethnic cleansing in the public space.10 6 Art. 280. “Public calls for extremist activities” of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, URL: http://www.ukrf.net/s280.html [accessed: 06.05.2022]. 7 Ibidem. 8 Pohl, J. O., “The Deportation and Destruction of the German Minority in the USSR”, 2001, URL: http://www.norkarussia.info/uploads/3/7/7/9/37792067/deportation_and_destruction_soviet_germans.pdf [accessed: 06.05.2022]. 9 Onken, E., “The Baltic states and Moscow’s9 May commemoration: Analysing memory politics in Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, Issue 1, 2007, 23–46. 10 Malinova, O., “The Great Patriotic War as asymbolic resource: the evolution of display in the official rhetoric of 2000–2010”, Russia and the modern world, Vol. 2, Issue 87, 2015, 6–29. 150 Amidst the development of anew wave of ethnic oppression in contemporary Russia, historiographical debates lag significantly behind due to the avoidance of straightforward discussions of human rights violations by the Soviet Union.11 Only occasional studies have addressed the issue of regime responsibility for crimes against humanity. Historically, this was because the archives were still classified, no qualitative criticism of Soviet historiography had been made and oral sources had never been used to study the history of totalitarianism in the USSR.12 Athorough study of the Gulag and government decisions in the USSR demonstrates the unsightly side of the totalitarian regime: mass killings, torture and multiple crimes against individuals based on both political and ethnic motives.13 For example, it is extremely difficult to rely on research by Sheila Fitzpatrick’sschool of social history because, when talking about the ‘repressions’(which were actually ethnic cleansing), these historians argue that they were caused by background ideologies and not by the concept of anational racial supremacy.14 John Chang describes one major shortcoming of such ideas: Yet when it came to the Soviet diaspora peoples and the “nationalities deportations” from 1937 to 1950, both Suny and Fitzpatrick held that these cases of ethnic cleansing were not racial but ideological in nature, in which both elites and ordinary people could be targeted as “enemies of the people”.15 Terry Martin used the same approach to explain the sources of repression but focused mostly on an idea of ideological nationalism that was closer to the situation that can be observed today: the idea of political unity prevailed over the idea of ethnic superiority.16 It is worth noting that Martin reflected on the fact that the Soviet Union never empha11 Pohl, J., “Socialist racism: Ethnic cleansing and racial exclusion in the USSR and Israel”, Human Rights Review, Vol. 7, Issue 3, 2006, 75. 12 Khlevniuk, O., The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror, Yale University Press, New Haven 2004, 2; Fitzpatrick, S., ASpy in the Archives: AMemoir of Cold War Russia, I.B. Tauris, London 2015, 85–87. 13 Iashchenko, I., “Evidence and Memory. Memories about the repressions of the 1940s against the Volga Germans on the materials of the Perm Region”, 8. 14 Weitz, E., “Racial Politics Without the Concept of Race: Re-Evaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges”, Slavic Review, Vol. 61, Issue 1, 2002, 1–29; Weitz, E., ACentury of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2003. 15 Chang, J. K., “Ethnic Cleansing and Revisionist Russian and Soviet History”, Academic Questions, Vol. 32, Issue 2, 2019, 265. 16 Martin, T., The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2001, 3–5. 151 sised the ethnic side of repression.17 But can one rely on the totalitarian regime’sassessment of actions which are, by definition, violations of human rights? Here asemantic gap arises which creates space for criticisms of this historiographical field. These criticisms are in terms of both the idea of transitional justice, which requires ademonstration of diverse historical experience in a post-totalitarian space, and in the context of the availability of new historical sources of personal origin. Chang strictly emphasised that historians should not play with moral estimates of anti-humanity actions of Soviet regime: It would be hard for any member of the Soviet diaspora or deported peoples to see these revisionist writings as anything other than acover for Soviet ethnic and racial bigotry.18 However, it is also crucial to underline that representatives of the school emphasised many times the fact that national politics in the USSR seemed to be the first step of institutionalised nationalistic discrimination even though they make no statement that in the USSR ethnic cleansing was commonly implemented.19 The persistent defence of the idea that the regime was innocent of crimes against civilians can be considered amanifestation of domestic racism.20 Below is abrief overview of the evolution of Soviet nationality policy from ethnic diversity to radical Russocentrism.21 It is the appeal to the titular nation, as the most full-fledged group of citizens, that makes possible the subsequent destruction of other peoples (Russian Germans, Crimean Tatars, Ingush, etc.). Although the extensive repression of Stalinism affected absolutely all ethnic groups living in the USSR, some ethnic groups were ‘enemies of the USSR’ and were under greater threat of extinction than the more ‘reliable’ peoples. For example, the Russian German ethnic group was practically brought to the brink of extinction by the end of World War II. 17 Martin, T., “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing”, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, Issue 4, 1998, 813–861. 18 Chang, J. K., “Ethnic Cleansing and Revisionist Russian and Soviet History”, 268. 19 Suny, R.G., The Revenge of the Past, Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993, 20. 20 Gudkov, L.– Pipia, K., “Parameters of xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism in modern Russia”, Bulletin of public opinion. Data. Analysis. Discussions, Moscow. Vol. 127, Issue 3–4, 2018, 33–35. 21 Brandenberger, D., National Bolshevism. Stalinist mass culture and the formation of Russian national identity (1931–1956), 116. 152 The second half of the 1930s was the time when national policy suddenly became apriority for the USSR, since at that moment it was becoming more rigid and discriminatory. The concept of ‘unreliable peoples’ appeared which generally consisted of the peoples of the border areas. In 1936, the Soviet government began the process of evicting unreliable groups of the population from the border strip. Francine Hirsch explained the turn in national policy as an evolutionary stage in building asocialist society in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In this sense, the nationalisation of culture and language became aprerequisite for the creation of astate system and identity where the strength of unification was proportional to the speed of building socialism.22 Repression was ameans to an end in the process of building asocialist state and terror was one of the instruments of this stage.23 Precisely it was the events of the 1930s that have made it possible to talk about the deportation of the Volga Germans in 1941 as an early planned act of intimidation. Attempts were made to eliminate an ethnic group which was considered potentially dangerous to the socialist state. While political repression and massacres of Russian Germans began long before World War II, the war became an excuse to do this quickly and without further explanation for such measures. Given this background of repression, the justifications made for deportation as apreventive measure against separatism during wartime, loses all credibility since the original motive for such measures was not the war. The first wave of ethnic cleansing against Russian Germans, Ukrainians, Jews, Tatars, and other minorities took place in the 1930s, long before the war began. Nevertheless, in 1941, hundreds of thousands of Russian Germans became hostages of the Stalinist regime, and who were recorded as “enemies of the people”.24 The history of ethnic repression in the USSR is often poorly understood by the international academic community. At one time the attention of Russian historians was focused on the mass repressions of the Stalinist regime, while the interest of European and American specialists mainly concerned the problems of the concentration camps of Nazi Germany.25 This bias, due primarily to the secrecy of 22 Venelinova, Z., Marxism-Leninism and the Future of Marxist Thought in Post-Socialist Bulgaria, Ph.D. dissertation. in Rhetoric, University of California, Berkley 2011, 42–44. 23 Hirsch, F., Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union. (Culture and Society after Socialism.), Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2005, 100; 146–149; 294–295. 24 Pleve, I.,– Lobacheva, G.,– Parfenov, V., The Volga Germans fault– apolitical myth, Saratov 2011, 251–255. 25 Dmitriev, T., “This is not an army”: national military construction in the USSR in the context of the Soviet cultural and national policy (1920–1930s), Moscow 2013, 115, 127–130. 153 the Soviet and Russian archives, has led to alack of discussion amongst international scholars of history and culture about the crimes against humanity committed by the national communist regime under the pretext of confronting the Nazi threat.26 However, meticulous attention to historiographical and accessible archival sources, as well as to oral and written memoirs confirms the ethnic cleansing of the 1930s and 1940s in the USSR. In both political and academic circles, the idea has long prevailed that the people condemned to deportation during the war were accused of collaborating with the armed forces of Nazi Germany. In addition, the mass repressions which took place under the black banner of mass starvation were distinctly ethnic in nature; the deadliest famines struck regions that were not ethnically Russian. For example, the extreme mortality in Ukraine in the mid1930s was not due to poor harvests but to the confiscation of property and food, as well as the introduction of the concept of “black villages”, which were common only in Ukraine.27 The essence of such villages was that representatives of the punitive bodies (the Extraordinary Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) confiscated all foodstuffs in these villages if they did not deliver the quantities of bread and dairy products required as tax within the specified deadline. Periods of poor harvests and famine resulted in mass deaths and the proportion of ethic victims during these years, as well as the national orientation of the measures, demonstrate that these factors were part of supreme measures taken towards institutionalised nationalism in the USSR. Historical sources confirm that such measures led to many millions of deaths in Ukraine in the pre-war period28. These examples precisely illustrate the nationalist tendencies of the Soviet regime as early as the pre-war period and nullify any attempts to justify the ethnic cleansing of the later period as a“forced necessity”to maintain security during the war period.29 26 Iashchenko, I., Evidence and Memory. Memories about the repressions of the 1940s against the Volga Germans on the materials of the Perm Region, 29–33; 38–39. 27 Timothy, S., Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Basic Book, New York 2010. 28 Yefimenko, H., “The Holodomor as aresult of the Kremlin’snational policy”, Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: Causes, Demographic Impact, Legal Evaluation, Matters of the International Scientific Conference, Kyiv, 2009, 109–119. 29 Yefimenko, H., “The Soviet Nationalities Policy Change of 1933, or Why ‘Ukrainian Nationalism’ Became the Main Threat to Stalin in Ukraine”, Holodomor Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2009, 27–50; Yefimenko, H., “Coronisation, Ukrainization, nationalism. The Holodomor as atargeted result of Kremlin policy”, Modernity, Vol. 6, Issue 11, 2008, 46–52.