Japan and Korea at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Century

Japan and Korea at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Century1 veronika krištofová For Japan, Korea is its closest neighbour, a distance of just 50 kilometres separating them at the narrowest part of the Korean Strait between the Korean port of Busan and the Japanese island of Tsushima. It was simply a natural course of events that mutual relations were formed between both countries over the millennia, which were marked by both fraternal friendliness and hostile competition. The opening of Japan to the world and the onset of imperialist mentality, however, transformed Japan’s attitude to its closest neighbour. For Japan, Korea became a vision of a source of raw materials which the Japanese islands lacked, a market for products and a defensive and offensive military base. By annexing Korea, Japan succeeded in joining the other Western imperial powers, but at the same time alienated itself from the other Asian countries and disrupted previous relations with Korea. The years of 1868–1910 were a mere prelude to Japan’s colonialism of the Korean peninsula which would continue for the next 35 years. It was, however, decisive in terms of Japan’s transformation from a closed Asian nation to an imperialist and powerful state forming its own colonies. This transformation, however, meant for Korea the suppression of its own national identity and a growth in hostility towards Japan, which in certain respects still survives today. Despite two attempts at a military invasion of Korea by Japan’s great unifier, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598) in 1592 and 1597 (also known as the “Imjin War”),2 JapanKorea relations were renewed in 1607.3 Beginning in the 17th century, both countries had isolationist policies. This didn’t mean, however, that mutual diplomatic relations 1 This study is a part of the grant project SGS-2015–014 Velká Británie, Francie a Japonsko ve druhé polovině 19. století on which the author participates at the Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. 2 More on Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s military expeditions to Korea can be found in R. KO DET, Války samurajů: Konflikty starého Japonska 1156–1877, Praha 2015, pp. 312–335; R. H. P.MASON — J.G.CAIGER, Dějiny Japonska, Praha 2007, pp. 180–181, 190; E.O.REISCHAUER — A. M.CRAIG, Dějiny Japonska, Praha 2008, p. 79; C. J. ECKERT — K.LEE — Y. I. LEW et al., Dějiny Koreje, Praha 2001, pp. 107–111; J. JANOŠ, Japonsko a Korea, Praha 2007, pp. 87–88; CH. H. YI, Korean Envoys and Their Relations with Japan in the 17th to 19th Centuries, in: Korean National Commission for UNESCO (Ed.), Korean History, New Jersey / Soul 2004, pp. 289–306. 3 YI, Korean Envoys…, p. 293. OPEN ACCESS 46 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 ended. Just between 1607 and 1811, twenty Korean missions to Japan took place.4 These missions were organised on a formal basis of mutual respect and equal sovereign status.5 Mutual diplomatic and trade relations between Korea and Japan were secured by the Só clan on the island of Tsushima. In 1868, however, after the Meiji Restoration when the shogunate ended and imperial power was restored, Japan decided unilaterally to change the previous protocol for mutual negotiations with Korea.6 Previous delegation representatives were replaced, a new seal began to be used which had not been approved by Korea, and the term ‘Emperor’ (hwange) began to be used in official documents for the Japanese head of state. The original sinocentric system in Asia (termed hua-yi) meant that Korea considered its relationship with China to be tributary, such that even the King (or wang) of Korea’s relation to the Chinese Emperor was a subordinate one. As such, the King’s relationship to the Emperor was a vassal relationship. Until 1868, Japan had used the title of “Great Prince” (daegun) for the Shogun in official documents. Korea rejected the new title in official documents, which would mean on the basis of traditional relations within Asia that the Korean “King” had a subordinate status to Japan’s “Emperor”. The Koreans announced that they would not accept any further Japanese expeditions until previous diplomatic practices were restored. In the second half of the 19th century, Korea, in contrast to Japan which had begun to open itself to the world, moved ever more towards a policy of isolationism. In 1864, King Gojong (1852–1919) took the throne while still a minor, with his father the Daewongun (own name Yi Ha-eung, 1821–1898) holding real power as regent, a great proponent of such policies. He was strengthened in his conviction through violent conflicts with Western powers, in 1846 with France, in 1854 with Russia, and in 1866 a clash with a French Asian flotilla occurred and the American vessel General Sherman was sunk on the Taedong river, for which the USA sent an unsuccessful punitive expedition to Korea in 1871.7 All these attempts at forcing the opening of Korea led to the growth of anti-Western conviction in the country and its closing in on itself, even to Japanese demands, which were considered by Korea to be rash and one-sided. In contrast, Japan considered Korea’s rejection a snub. Unsuccessful attempts at discussions became a tool in the hands of those who supported an aggressive foreign policy. In 1869–71, Japan’s Foreign Minister was Sawa Noboyushi (1835–1873), a nationalist who supported the idea of an active foreign policy. Together with other supporters, he proposed the policy of “conquering Korea” (seikanron) using targeted weapons along the Western powers model. In spring 1870, Japanese official Sada Hakubo 4 S. PARK, Korea-Japan Relations and the History of Science and Technology, in: Korean Journey, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1992, pp. 80–88. 5 MASON — CAIGER, s. 208. Korea’s King considered himself equal to Japan’s Emperor, not the Shogun, who was considered the Emperor’s deputy. P. DUUS, The Abacus and the Sword, London 1995, p. 30. 6 T. J. YI, Was Korea Really a ‘Hermit Nation’?, in: Korean National Commission for UNESCO (Ed.), Korean History, New Jersey / Soul 2004, pp. 385–412. 7 ECKERT — LEE — LEW, pp. 142–146. Amongst others here, this included the case of Prussian adventurer, Ernst J. Oppert, who as a result of his failed attempts at opening Korea to the world in 1868, desecrated the grave of the Daewongun’s father on the shore of Chungcheong province. Ibidem, p. 142. vERONIkA kRIŠTOFOvá 47 proposed the conquering of Korea, which he thought should take no longer than 50 days.8 Although Sada did not receive much support, he brought together reasons for an attack on Korea. Besides the already mentioned behaviour of Korea considered a snub by Japan, there were also fears that another power could occupy Korea.9 Since France, Russia and the USA had previously attempted to open up Korea, these fears seemed real. A third reason was to provide a distraction and ease domestic unrest caused by the ending of previous feudal conditions and the dissolution of the Samurai nobility. In relation to the abolition of the traditional nobility, in 1871 the Só clan lost its status as mediators in negotiations with Korea, with its previous role taken on by Japan’s foreign ministry.10 That year, Soejima Taneomi (1828–1905) became the new minister, and he also supported an active policy in South-East Asia. At the end of 1871, the Iwakura Mission occurred, a two-year study journey around the world with 48 official members including government members (named by statesman Iwakura Tomomi, 1825–1883). On the eve of the journey, a promise was signed by government representatives in December 1871 that remaining government members would avoid drastic measures and decisions. On 12 June 1873, the Japanese government discussed the issue of Korea, and Saigó Takamori (1828–1877) proposed sending emissaries to Korea.11 Saigó and Soejima assumed a subsequent military expedition of 50,000 men.12 In October, a quarrel broke out between two factions within the Japanese government — Iwakura Tonomi, Kido Takayoshi, Ókubo Toshimichi and Ito Hirobumi (also supported by Ókuma Shigenobu, Inoue Kaoru, Yamagata Aritomo and Kuroda Kiyotaka, who did not take part in the Iwakura Mission) against supporters of a military mission to Korea, Saigó Takamori, Itagaki Taisuke, Soejima Taneomi, Etó Shimpei and Gotó Shójiró.13 Although Saigó was named Imperial Envoy for Korean Affairs on 17 August, the return of the Iwakura Mission thwarted any plans for a military expedition. The Naval Minister (Katsu Kaishu) and Army Minister (Yamagata Aritomo) both warned of the Japan military’s unpreparedness for such an extensive military action.14 Furthermore, Japan was then only just in the middle of its reforming efforts and besides domestic affairs also had to deal with its foreign relations with Taiwan (or China) and Sakhalin (or Russia). It wasn’t so much opposition to the proposal itself, but rather to its inopportune timing. Most supporters of a military mission to Korea subsequently left the government as a result of their failure. 8 DUUS, p. 35. 9 For Japan, Korea held a strategically important position, as German advisor in Japan, Major Jacob Meckel (who worked in Japan from 1885) said, it was a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”. Ibidem, p. 49. 10 Ibidem, p. 37. 11 Saigó suggested himself as one of the emissaries, referring to the fact that if there was to be conflict on Korean territory, it would cause war. Sometimes his stance is interpreted as an attempt to sacrifice himself in order for war, sometimes as proof of his sincerity and endeavours to deal with political affairs without the use of force. DUUS, p. 40; KODET, p. 456. 12 M. J. MAYO, The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy, in: Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1972, pp. 793–819. 13 Ibidem. 14 DUUS, p. 42. 48 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 In April 1874, Japan solved its dispute with Taiwan, where in 1871 54 shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors had been murdered. The Tokyo government took control of the Ryukyu archipelago in 1872 and as such decided to send a punitive expedition of 3,600 men against the aboriginal population on the east coast of Taiwan.15 China, to whom Taiwan belonged, was even forced to pay Japan compensation at the level of the costs relating to the expedition and money for the lost lives of the 54 Ryukyuan sailors. This meant the de facto recognition of Japan’s claims to the Ryukyu archipelago, which was eventually declared the Okinawa Prefecture in 1879 (named after the largest of the islands. Japan also solved its dispute with Russia over the island of Sakhalin, where there had been repeated attacks by Russian settlers on the Japanese. At the beginning of 1874, Enomoto Takeaki (1836–1908) was sent to St Petersburg as ambassador, and in the following year he negotiated an agreement in which Japan gave up its claims to Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands. In 1873, a year before King Gojong of Korea came of age, the Daewongun was forced to relinquish power as a result of pressure from the Min clan, of which the Queen was a member. Thus the main proponent of an isolationist policy left the political scene, and it was then that concessions were made on both sides, with Korea agreeing to establish diplomatic relations with Japan and also recognising the use of the term of “Emperor” (hwangye). For Japan’s part, it forgave Korea for using this title in diplomatic documents. In the end, Japan provoked the so-called Un’yó boat incident, in which the warship Un’yó was illegally dispatched to the waters around the port of Incheon, leading to an armed response from the Korean island of Ganghwa.16 The Japanese used this conflict as a pretext for implementing a policy in accordance with the Western model, sending a flotilla of six ships (three of which were warships) to the Korean shores in 1876 with 800 men on board under the command of Lieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840–1900).17 It was Kuroda, accompanied by Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915) who was to negotiate compensation for the conflict and a diplomatic treaty with the Korean government, which was facing the threat of war. On 26 February 1876, the Treaty of Ganghwa was signed under the threat of Japanese military action. The treaty used the American-Japanese Treaty of 1854 as a model, with Article 1 declaring that, “Korea is an independent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as does Japan”,18 which rejected the idea of the traditional China-Korea tributary relationship. The remaining 11 articles provided Japan with one-sided benefits which 15 KODET, pp. 457–458; REISCHAUER — CRAIG, p. 145. 16 There is no direct proof that it was deliberate provocation, but indirect evidence suggests so. It is not known why the Japanese warship would not have enough supplies, the alleged reason the Un’yó stopped at Ganghwa, located at the mouth of the Han river and guarding entrance to Korea’s capital city, Seoul. Korea’s aggressive response could also have been predicted, since until then Korea had responded in this manner to the French, Russians and Americans. Furthermore, the voyage took place just a few days after Moriyama Shigeru, who was to secure negotiations with Korea, was withdrawn from the country. DUUS, p. 44. 17 Y. LEW, Japanese Challenge and Korean Response, 1876–1910, in: Korean National Commission for UNESCO (Ed.), Korean History, New Jersey / Soul, 2004, pp. 475–498; DUUS, pp. 44–47. 18 LEW, pp. 475–498. vERONIkA kRIŠTOFOvá 49 included the right to trade in stipulated Korean ports,19 the right of extraterritoriality for Japanese in Korea, the right to survey the Korean coast and an exchange of envoys between the countries. A supplementary treaty and memorandum was signed six months later in which Japan acquired additional concessions, including the right to use Japanese currency in Korean ports, and the exemption of Japanese imports from Korean customs duty.20 The result was Japanese trade with Korea being exempt from duties until 1883, when customs tariffs were first determined in a trading treaty between Korea and Japan. The Treaty of Ganghwa was unequal and had a fundamental impact on the future course of Korean independence. Korea was opened to the world under military pressure, its previous isolationism was ended and as such it arrived on the international stage for the first time. Korea’s foreign policy also changed, its objective now being the modernisation of Korea through the acceptance of Western models and technologies, which was to result in the strengthening of the country. In autumn 1876, a 75-member Korean mission was sent to Japan led by Kim Gi-suem (1832–1893), whose objective was to study Japanese modernisation. This was the first mission attempting to strengthen mutual relations and trust between the countries since 1764. Two more such missions had occurred by 1881, all supported by King Gojong. The Japanese also profited from their monopoly position until the early 1880s with no other foreign nations operating here. Sea transport between Korea and Japan was secured until 1887 by the Mitsubishi Steamship Company operating as a monopoly. In June 1878, Japanese bank, DaiIchi, opened a branch in Busan, opening up branches in Wŏnsan and Incheon once these ports were opened.21 In 1880, Japan was the first foreign power to open a legation in Seoul (the first Japanese envoy in Korea was Hanabusa Yoshitada, 1842–1917), while Kin Gojong established the Office for the Management of State Affairs, which was to secure co-ordination of the government reform programme. Essentially, this was a prototype foreign ministry. In the same year, a new Special Skills Force was set up, and led by Japanese military officer, Horimoto Reijo, which was to be the model for modern troops. It was in relation to these troops that a mutiny of soldiers took place on 23 July 1882 (known as the Imo Mutiny), who felt at a disadvantage compared to the newly formed units as they had not received wages for 13 months.22 They even received support from the anti-foreigner former regent, the Daewongun, killed the Japanese officer who was in charge of the Special Skills Force, and burned down theJapanese legation. They also entered the royal palace where Gojong submitted to the Daewongun’s decision, leading to the abolishment of the elite units and the abolishment of the Office for the Management of State Affairs. In response to the Korean rebellion, Japan sent its own units to Korea, to which China responded by sending its own troops to Korea with the permission of the Korean emissaries in Tianjin. The 19 In 1876 the port of Busan was opened, Wŏnsan in 1880, Incheon in 1883, Mokpo in 1897 and Kunsan in 1899. C. ECKERT, Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945, Seattle 1991, p. 9. 20 LEW, pp. 475–498. 21 Japan took advantage of Korea’s ignorance of international prices and overvalued its goods by up to 1,000 percent. DUUS, p. 254. 22 ECKERT — LEE — LEW, p. 152. 50 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 Chinese, who significantly outnumbered the Japanese, captured the Daewongun and interned him for three years in Tianjin. King Gojong’s powers were restored. In the meantime, Japan signed the Treaty of Chemulpo (the old name for the port of Incheon) on 30 August 1882, gaining the right to position its troops in Seoul to protect its legation, and the right to compensation. With the support of the Min clan, China restored its sovereign status over Korea, with Chinese commander Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) taking control of the Korean army, Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) becoming the Chief Commissioner for diplomatic and commercial affairs in Korea, and German, Paul von Möllendorff (1847–1901) recommended as an advisor at the foreign minister by China.23 Furthermore, the signature of the China-Korea sea and land regulations in October 1882 gave China a number of advantages and Japan’s previous monopoly of Korean foreign trade began to be disturbed.24 As such, Japan anticipated a future conflict with China, and this led them to increase military spending, which had amounted to 19 % of total national expenditure in 1880 and reached 25 % by 1896.25 With Li Hongzhang’s consent, Korea concluded a number of treaties with foreign powers in the early 1880s, which according to the Chinese Chief Commissioner would protect Korea from any pressure from Russia or Japan.26 On 22 May 1882, the United States-Korea Treaty was signed in Incheon, representing the first unequal treaty Korea signed with a Western power. This was followed by a number of further unequal treaties signed in 1883 with the United Kingdom and Germany, in 1884 with Italy and Russia, in 1886 with France and in 1892 with Austria-Hungary. While the Min clan supported the policy going by the motto of “Eastern ways, Western machines”,27 i.e. the implementation of Western technology while preserving traditional values with the help of China, the so-called Progressives (Kaehwadang) faction was formed whose motto was. “Independence and modernisation of the nation” and who demanded changes implemented quickly in accordance with the Japanese model.28 Besides radicals such as, e.g. Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yong-hyo, Sŏ Kwang-bŏm and Hong Yong-sik, this faction also included members of the so-called Independence Party, who were high-status politicians such as e.g. Kim Hong-jip, Kim Yun-sik and Ŏ Yun-jung. Many of them were involved in the increasing numbers of Korean-Japanese cultural and diplomatic exchanges of 1882–1884.29 The Progressives’ political lobbying led to a number of modernising reforms such as securing sea duties, creating a modern postal system, establishing a modern police service in the centre of Seoul, establishing modern trading and industrial businesses, supporting students and stu23 A. C. NAHM, Introduction to Korean History and Culture, New Jersey 1993, p. 151. 24 For Korea, this treaty represented national humiliation, because the preambule speaks of Korea as a vassal state of China. Y. SHIN, Modern Korean History and Nationalism, Soul 2000, p. 35. 25 DUUS, p. 62. 26 P. J. TREAT, China and Korea, 1885–1894, in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1934, pp. 506–543. 27 ECKERT — LEE — LEW, p. 153. 28 SHIN, p. 29. 29 Pak Yong-hyo created the Korean flag still used today on a visit to Japan in October 1882. NAHM, Introduction to Korean History…, p. 152. vERONIkA kRIŠTOFOvá 51 dents’ journeys abroad, etc.30 Likewise, the first modern Korean newspaper, known as Hanseong sunbo began publication in October 1883.31 In 1884, the Progressives decided to eliminate Chinese influence in Korea by taking advantage of the growing conflict between China and France which had led to China withdrawing 1,500 men from Korea in 1884 (1,500 Chinese soldiers remained in Korea).32 On 4 December 1884, a coup which came to be known as the Gapsin Coup occurred at a banquet celebrating the opening of the new post office. Kim Ok-gyun and the other conspirators entered the Changdokkung Palace where they ousted the barracks commanders and a number of important officials from the conservative faction, and on 5 December they declared a fourteen-point programme demanding the return of the interned the Daewongun from China, the ending of Korea’s tributary relationship to China, the restriction of the ruling classes’ privileges, a revision of the land tax laws, equal rights for all, a central budget policy and central management of the military, the naming of officials in accordance with their merit and not their social origins, as well as other demands.33 In brief, their objective was to create an independent and efficient modern state with an egalitarian policy. Their government, however, lasted just three days. The whole attempt at a military coup had been undertaken with the support of the Japanese envoy in Korea (Takezoe Shinichiro, 1842–1917), who in reality did not provide them with much backing when on 6 December Chinese units began a counteroffensive, the Korean revolutionaries were broken and the Japanese units fled to safety.34 The Japanese envoy and eight leading Korean members of the Progressives including Kim Ok-gyun, Pak Yong-hyo and Sŏ Kwang-bŏm escaped to Japan. In this manner, the first autonomous attempt at creating the powerful nation which the modernisation reforms were meant to lead to, failed as a result of an arbitrary attack from China. Japan and China withdrew their troops from Korea, and Japanese statesman, Ito Hirobumi met his Chinese opposite number, Li Hongzhang on 18 April 1885 in Tianjin, where they signed a treaty which contained clauses that should either party send their troops to the Korean peninsula in future, they would inform the other party first of their intentions.35 In 1885, China restored the Mongolian practice of sending a monitor to Korea, who on the recommendation of Li Hongzhang was Yuan Shikai, who acquired the title of General Resident and began consolidating China’s position in Korea with the support of the pro-Chinese Min clan. This influence was also expressed in the economic sphere, with Chinese imports to Korea growing from 19 % of 30 For more, see SHIN, pp. 33–34. 31 NAHM, Introduction to Korean History…, p. 153. 32 SHIN, p. 41. 33 ECKERT — LEE — LEW, p. 155; NAHM, Introduction to Korean History…, p. 154; The 14points can be found in SHIN, p. 47. Originally, the manifesto contained 80 articles; these 14are known to the public thanks to Kim Ok-gyun, who published them in 1884 in the magazine Kapsin illok. Ibidem, p. 46. 34 “The number of victims of the whole act was more than 180, 38 of whom were Japanese, and ten of whom were Chinese.” Ibidem, p. 155. 35 Korea and Japan signed a treaty in Seoul on 9 January 1885 in which the Koreans promised to pay compensation and build a barracks in Seoul for 1,000 Japanese soldiers. LEW, pp. 475–498. 52 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 total imports in 1885 to 45 % in 1892.36 In the meantime, a pro-Russian faction began forming in Korea, at whose head, paradoxically, was the originally Chinese-assigned German advisor, von Möllendorff, who maintained close co-operation with the Russian envoy in Korea, Karl Waeber (1841–1910). Möllendorff thought that Chinese and Japanese influence in Korea should be balanced by a third power — Russia.37 China responded to this by repatriating the former Regent, the Daewongun, and replacing Möllendorff in his role as advisor for foreign affairs with American, Owen N Denny (1838–1900). It should be noted, however, that Denny became just as strong a critic of Chinese acts in Korea as Möllendorff had been. While Yuan Shikai prevented foreign powers from building their own legations in Korea, King Gojong attempted to stabilise Korea’s fragile independence by founding a permanent legation in Tokyo in 1887 and in Washington in 1888.38 Korea attempted to restore its independence by taking control of telegraph lines, the duties system and through loans from other powers.39 There was also a gradual modernisation taking place in Korea during the 1880s which led to the development of the education system, missionary Dr Horace N Allen built the first modern medical clinic in Seoul in 1885, the military was modernised, gas lamps were introduced and a national mint was constructed. On the other hand, the costs related to modernisation and market corruption and incompetence within the governing Min faction led to citizens being faced with having to pay three to four times as much tax as they had previously had to.40 This led to the dissatisfaction of the local Korean population, who came together to enact the extensive peasant rebellion led by the Donghak (meaning Eastern Learning) religious sect. This movement had been founded in 1860 by Choe Je-u (1824–1864) and was based on the idea that all are equal before God.41 Besides Christianity, it also drew on teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and traditional shamanism, and it was not merely a religious, but also a social, movement which endeavoured to improve the living conditions of ordinary people. In 1892–1893, members of the movement repeatedly requested the rehabilitation of Choe Je-U, who had been executed in 1864, and demanded the ending of the corrupt practices of government officials. In 1894, these endeavours grew into a peasant’s revolt which began in the district of Gobu in the province of Chŏlla, and was led by Jeon Bongjun (1854–1895). Its objective was to overthrow the corrupt Min faction, expel the Japanese from Ko36 W. G. BEASLEY, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945, Oxford 1991, p. 45. For a comparison of Japanese-Korean and Chinese-Korean foreign trade in 1885–1893, see LEW, p. 484. 37 ECKERT — LEE — LEW, p. 157. 38 LEW, p. 483. 39 TREAT, p. 539. 40 Korea was also taken economic advantage of by Japan. Their economic activity during the first half of the 1890s reached an enormous level, and each of the open ports held a huge number of Japanese trading companies. “[…] in 1896, 210 of a total of 258 companies were Japanese. Japan also controlled freight transport in Korean waters: of 1,322 merchant ships weighing 387,507 tons which sailed into Korean ports in 1893, 9,856 ships weighing 304,224 tons sailed under the flag of Japan.” ECKERT — LEE — LEW, p. 158. 41 Ibidem, p. 138. Equality before God also applied to women, which was a radical departure from the Confucian tradition of division of the sexes. M. E. ROBINSON, Korea’s TwentiethCentury Odyssey, Honolulu 2007, p. 191. vERONIkA kRIŠTOFOvá 53 rean territory, undertake land reform, restore traditional values and abolish the social stratification advantageous to the Yangban class.42 On 31 May, they conquered Jeonju, the capital of Chŏlla province. As such, an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist civil war broke out (also known as the Gabo Peasant War), whose objective was the creation of a modern nation state.43 It was the largest peasant rebellion in Korean history. Because it became uncontrollable for the Korean government, the Korean King asked China for military assistance on the advice of Yuan Shikai.44 On 7 June, Chinese troops numbering 3,000 men arrived at Asan near the port of Incheon, with the Chinese government having informed Japan of their act in accordance with the Tianjin Convention of 1885 (on 4 June). Japan responded on 9 June by sending 8,000 of their own soldiers from Hiroshima to Incheon. They did so in order to secure their own influence in Korea and to begin the long-expected conflict with China. Furthermore, the government of Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909) was facing a crisis which they wanted to ward off by drawing attention to foreign affairs and silencing the Japanese militarists who feared Russia’s growing influence in Asia since 1891 when the Trans-Siberian Railway began construction across Chinese territory (Manchuria). The Korean government attempted to calm the overall situation by concluding a separate peace with members of the Donghak movement, which was signed in Jeonju on 11 June.45 Korea’s foreign minister subsequently requested the withdrawal of both foreign armies from Korean territory. Otori Keisuke (1833–1911), Japan’s envoy in Seoul, refused to withdraw the Japanese units and demanded the Korean government implement satisfactory modernising reforms.46 Japan’s foreign minister, Mutsu Munemitsu (1844–1897) proposed co-operation with China on a reform programme in Korea.47 On 22 June, China rejected this proposal, referring to Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa in which Japan recognised Korean independence. Furthermore, Li Hongzhang also referred to the Tianjin Convention of 1885 in which both countries agreed to withdraw their forced after quelling a revolt or in cases where Korea no longer considers the presence of foreign forces to be necessary. In fact, the current Korean government headed by the pro-China Min faction suited China. On 26 June, Ótori proposed a set of reforms to King Gojong, who ignored the suggestion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea. On 23 July, Japanese units marched to 42 ECKERT — LEE — LEW, p. 160. 43 Y. LEE, The Peasant War in 1894 and the Growth of the Peasant Society, in: Korean National Commission for UNESCO (ed.), Korean History, New Jersey / Soul 2004, pp. 413–427. 44 Although Korea’s army based itself on China’s recruitment system where a certain number of families had to provide one soldier, with Korea’s population of 16 million and 700–1,000 families per district, only a few hundred men were sent to the army. Korea did not even have a navy. In 1891, Korea had a total of 3 divisions with 5,407 men. See The Armed Strength of Korea, 1892, The National Archives, London-Kew (henceforth only TNA), War Office 106/6318. 45 The Donghak’s 12-point programme approved in Jeonju can be read in NAHM, Introduction to Korean History…, p. 161. 46 Ótori met with Yuan Shikai on 13 June, and on 15 June both parties agreed to reduce the number of troops on Korean territory, although Ito’s government rejected this. DUUS, p. 68. 47 The Japanese modernization programme is summarised in ibidem, p. 73. 60 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2015 quirements such as through its title being added after it was signed, presenting the agreement first as a memorandum, and not sending the full text to the Japanese envoy until 4 September. On 17 November, Japanese troops were positioned at key positions throughout Seoul including in close proximity to the Kyŏngun’gun Royal Palace (currently Tŏksugung Palace). Japanese armed guards were even present in the meeting room and were not called out even on Emperor Gojong’s express protest.87 It was under this pressure that a Convention was signed on 17 November 1905 which dissolved Korea’s Foreign Ministry, transferring its powers to a new Resident-General. Not only did this break the Protocol of 23 February 1904 which promised Korean sovereignty, but it was also originally a forced ‘agreement’ yet documents entitled “agreement” or “convention” are not meant to deal with affairs of such international significance. Names such as the Second Japan-Korea Agreement, the New Japan-Korea Treaty and the Protectorate Treaty began to be used later.88 Most surprising, however, was that Ito Hirobumi added the official seal of the Foreign Minister taken from Korea’s Foreign Ministry without the permission of Emperor Gojong. The agreement itself did not even contain the Emperor’s authorisation or ratification.89 It was this agreement, however, which resulted in Korea becoming a Japanese protectorate, with all foreign envoys returning to their countries of origin on Japan’s demand. As such, the path for Japan’s dominance over Korea was opened, giving rise to the country’s annexation in 1910. JAPAN AND KOREA AT THE TURN OF THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY ABSTRACT The Meiji Restauration in Japan prefigured a change of mutual relations with Korea. Through coerced Ganghwa Treaty by Japan was Korea opened to the world in 1876. Subsequent three decades Japan sought to consolidate its position on the Korean Peninsula, which became not only economically but also strategically important territory for Japanese government. These efforts led to disputes with China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05), of which Japan emerged as victor. The signing of the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 was a significant step forward for the strengthening of Japanese dominance over the Korean Peninsula. Five years later was Korea annexed. KEYWORDS Japan; Korea; China; Great Britain; Diplomacy; Sino-Japanese War; Russo-Japanese War; Annexation of Korea Veronika Krištofová | Department of Historical Studies, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Tylova 18, 306 14, Plzeň, Czech Republic, [email protected] 87 For the course of the talks, see DUUS, pp. 190–194; P. PARK, Discussions Concerning the Legality of the 1910 ‘Annexation’ of Korea by Japan, in: Korean Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2010, pp. 13–41. 88 For more on the content of the agreement and its legal shortcomings, see T. YI, The Illegality of the Forced Treaties Leading to Japan’s Annexation of the Great Han Empire, in: Korean Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1996, pp. 55–84. 89 T. YI, Forced Treaties…, pp. 11–60.