Transnational trajectories and diaspora policies

COVER EVA JANSKÁ (ED.) TRANSNATIONAL TRAJECTORIES AND DIASPORA POLICIES THE CASE OF CZECHIA IN COMPARISON TO POLAND, HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA KAROLINUM EVA JANSKÁ (ED.) TRANSNATIONAL TRAJECTORIES AND DIASPORA POLICIES The book examines diaspora policy in Central European countries in the context of changes following their accession to the EU, utilizing the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary as case studies. With afocus on the previously underexplored new Czech diaspora (i.e.,the emigration of Czechs/Czechoslovaks after 1990), individual case studies provide acomprehensive description of the contemporary Czech diaspora while also elucidating key inquiries directed towards its current character and specific needs. transnational trajectories_mont.indd 1transnational trajectories_mont.indd 1 29.05.2024 7:3529.05.2024 7:35 Transnational Trajectories and Diaspora Policies The Case of Czechia in Comparison to Poland, Hungary and Slovakia Edited by Eva Janská KAROLINUM PRESS Karolinum Press is a publishing department of Charles University Ovocný trh 560/5, 116 36 Prague 1, Czech Republic www.karolinum.cz © Veronika Beranská, Zdeněk Čermák, Markéta Doležalová, Dušan Drbohlav, Jiří Hasman, Eva Janská, Kristýna Janurová, Eszter Kovács, Magdalena Lesińska, Olga Löblová, Zdeněk Uherek, Michal Vašečka, 2024 © Edited by Eva Janská, 2024 Cover and text illustration © Newman & Friends, 2024 Layout by Jan Šerých Set by Karolinum Press First edition This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. ISBN 978-80-246-5919-0 ISBN 978-80-246-5920-6 (pdf) https://doi.org/10.14712/9788024659206 The original manuscript was reviewed by JUDr. Ivan Dubovický, CSc., MZV ČR, and Prof. Ruxandra Trandafoiu, Edge Hill University. Charles University Karolinum Press www.karolinum.cz [email protected] TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Eva Janská 11 Foreword Roman Bělor 13 ABridge to Comparative Diaspora Policy Jiří Krátký 15 Introduction Eva Janská 17 CHAPTER 1 Czech Diaspora Policy Kristýna Janurová & Eva Janská 25 1.1 Introduction 25 1.2 The Czech Diaspora in Time 26 1.2.1 The Contemporary Czech Diaspora 27 1.3 Terminology Associated with the Czech Diaspora 28 1.4 The Goals, Achievements, and ‘Hot Topics’ of the Contemporary Czech Diaspora 34 1.4.1 The Place of Czech Diaspora Policy in Comparative Typologies 36 1.5 The Institutional and Legislative Background of Czech Diaspora Policy 39 1.6 Conclusion 44 CHAPTER 2 Building the Global Nation: Diaspora Policy in Poland Magdalena Lesińska 52 2.1 Introduction 52 2.2 An (Historical) Overview of the Polish Diaspora 53 2.3 Building the Global Nation– the Main Approach of Diaspora Policy in Poland 55 2.4 The ‘Hot Topics’ of Polish Diaspora Policy: Education, Ethnic Cards, and Enfranchisement 56 2.4.1 Symbolic Policies Aimed at the Polish Diaspora 56 2.4.2 The Education System Abroad 57 2.4.3 The Pole’sCard’ 58 2.4.4 Enfranchisement 60 2.5 The Normative and Institutional Framework of Polish Diaspora Policy 61 2.6 Conclusion 64 CHAPTER 3 Hungarian Diaspora Policy Eszter Kovács 67 3.1 Introduction: Hungarian Diaspora Policy Contextualised 67 3.2 Interpreting Kin-State and Diaspora Policies in the Hungarian Context 69 3.2.1 Kin-State and Kin-Minorities 69 3.2.2 Diaspora and Diaspora Policy 70 3.3 Types of Co-ethnic Groups Abroad: Kin-Minority, Diaspora Hungarian Communities, and Recent Emigrants 71 3.3.1 Kin-Minority Hungarians 71 3.3.2 Diaspora Hungarians 72 3.3.3 Recent Emigrants 73 3.4 Hungary as aKin-State since 1990 74 3.5 Hungarian Kin-State and Diaspora Policy after 2010 78 3.5.1 The Legal and Institutional Framework 78 3.5.2 Engaging the Diaspora 80 3.6 A‘Hot Topic’ of Diaspora Policy: The Political Remittances of the External Population 83 3.7 Conclusion 86 CHAPTER 4 Diaspora Policies in Slovakia: The Long Shadow of an Essentialist Approach to aNation Michal Vašečka 91 4.1 Introduction 91 4.2 An Overview of Diaspora Policies in Slovakia 92 4.3 Statistics on the Slovak Diaspora 94 4.4 Remittances from the Slovak Diaspora 95 4.5 Legislative Provisions Concerning the Diaspora 96 4.6 Diaspora Policies and Rights 97 4.7 Institutional Background of Diaspora Policies in Slovakia 100 4.8 Conclusion 102 CHAPTER 5 The Theoretical Framework, Preliminary Data, and Research Design for Collecting Data on the Czech Diaspora Eva Janská, Zdeněk Uherek, & Kristýna Janurová 106 5.1 Introduction 106 5.2 Czech Diaspora and Recent Contributions to Diaspora Research 107 5.3 Blurring the Boundaries between Transnationalism and the Diaspora 108 5.4 The Number of Czechs Abroad and the Issue of Data Availability 110 5.4.1 Remittances 114 5.5 Research Design for the Study of the Czech Diaspora in Migration Conditions 115 5.5.1 The Questionnaire Survey 115 5.5.2 In-Depth Interviews 117 5.5.3 Focus Group 117 5.5.4 Data Limitations 118 5.6 Conclusion 119 CHAPTER 6 The Expectations and Needs of the Czech Diaspora towards the Czech State: From aSurvey Perspective Eva Janská, Dušan Drbohlav, & Zdeněk Čermák 125 6.1 Introduction 125 6.2 The Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Members of the Czech Diaspora 125 6.3 The Transnational Relations of Diaspora Members to Czechia 128 6.4 Assessing What the Czech Diaspora Needs and Expects from the Czech State 129 6.5 The Relationship of the Diaspora to Political Life in the Czech Republic: The Issue of Voting 132 6.6 Potential Re-emigration: Barriers and Limits 133 6.7 Conclusion 135 CHAPTER 7 The Institutional Engagement of the Czech Diaspora: AComparative Case Study of Czechs in Austria and Germany versus North America Eva Janská, Dušan Drbohlav, Zdeněk Čermák, & Jiří Hasman 137 7.1 Introduction 137 7.2 Key Factors Behind the Level of Migrants’ Engagement 138 7.2.1 Structural Differences between Geographically Close and Distant Diasporas– United States & Canada vs Germany & Austria 138 7.2.2 Geographic Distance 140 7.2.3 Socioeconomic and Cultural Factors 141 7.2.4 Transnationalism 142 7.3 Propositions 143 7.4 Methodology, Methods, Data 143 7.4.1 The Questionnaire 143 7.4.2 Variables 144 7.4.3 Methodological and Methodical Notes 150 7.5 Results 150 7.5.1 Similarities and Differences between Two Geographically Distant Diasporas– the United States &Canada vs Germany & Austria 150 7.5.2 The Factors behind Migrants’ Institutional Engagement 155 7.6 Discussion and Conclusion 158 CHAPTER 8 Continuous Individual Mobilities and New Forms of Integration: The Example of the Czech Diaspora Zdeněk Uherek & Veronika Beranská 164 8.1 Introduction 164 8.2 We Certainly Do Not Recognise All the Layers of Diasporic Integration: The Discursive Level from Which the Presented Data Come 164 8.3 Initial Premises and Research Questions 167 8.4 Methodology 169 8.4.1 Sample 169 8.4.2 Data Collection and Evaluation 170 8.5 Results 171 8.5.1 Decision Phase and the Motivation to Migrate 171 8.5.2 Transfer from the Source Country to the Current Country of Residence 172 8.5.3 The Implementation of Plans in the Destination Country 173 8.5.4 Integration into the New Environment and Ties to the Source and Destination Countries 174 8.5.5 Professional (Corporate) Diasporas as aForm of Integration into aNew Environment 175 8.6 Discussion 176 8.7 Conclusion 177 CHAPTER 9 Internationally Mobile Czech Academics: Weighing the Reasons to Stay Abroad or Return Home Markéta Doležalová & Olga Löblová 180 9.1 Introduction 180 9.2 Academic Mobility As ‘High Skill’ Migration 181 9.2.1 Changes in Academic Structures and Employment 184 9.3 The Czech Emigration Context and Methodological Considerations 186 9.4 Czech Academics Abroad– Who Are They? 187 9.5 Motivations to Return and Reasons to Stay 190 9.5.1 The Professional Context 190 9.5.2 The Personal Context 193 9.5.3 The Societal Context 194 9.6 Conclusion 196 CHAPTER 10 Forging Bonds Beyond Borders: Concluding Insights on Diaspora Policies in Central and Eastern Europe, with aSpotlight on Czechia Kristýna Janurová & Eva Janská 199 10.1 Introduction 199 10.2 The Parallels and Differences of the Diaspora Policy of Four Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries 199 10.3 The Czech ‘New Diaspora’, Transnational Relations and Institutional Engagement 202 10.4 Concluding Remarks 205 Summary 207 List of Contributors 208 16 aBridge to comParative diasPora Policy Iappreciate the wise decision made by the authors of this book to come up with anew advanced concept for approaching the topic of the Czech diaspora. They have addressed this topic thoroughly by examining it from acontemporary international perspective and setting it in the wider Central European context. Iam sure that this is the right way to bring more attention to the topic of the Czech diaspora, not only in the Czech Republic but internationally among students and younger generations. Iam glad that the MFA has been able to count on the work that the research team led by doc. RNDr Eva Janská, PhD conducted in 2021 and 2022 on the research project ‘New Approaches to Expatriates Issues’ on the needs of the contemporary Czech diaspora, which was commissioned by the MFA and financially supported by the Technology Agency of the Czech Republic. Iam especially happy that some of the results of this project were used to prepare this book. Many interesting books have been written about Czech emigration history, but relatively few of them were written in English or focused primarily or even partly on the future of the Czech diaspora, modern trends abroad, or comparative case studies. The book you have in front of you will surely help to fill in this gap. Dear readers, Iwish you pleasant reading. JUDr Jiří Krátký MA Special Envoy for the Czech Expatriate Community and Expatriate Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic INTRODUCTION eva JaNsKÁ Dynamic changes towards hybridity, liquified homes, and creolisation have reshaped the term ‘diaspora’ as amodern concept compared to its traditional use as areference for the Jews in exile (e.g. Cohen 1996; Brubaker 2005). It has more recently become acentral concept in transnational analysis (Faist 2010). Other researchers have studied the dispersion of emigrant populations to two or more locations, ongoing orientations towards the ‘homeland’, and group boundary maintenance (Gamlen 2011; Brubaker 2005). The modern approach to the concept of diaspora is exemplified by Dufoix (2003), who recommends focusing on how and why diaspora communities emerge and dissipate, rather than on whether or not they conform to an ideal type at any given moment. Academic interest in the cross-border practices and affiliations of migrating individuals has gradually expanded to encompass how states engage with their diasporas and how they formalise, bolster, and make use of this relationship– diaspora policy. Simultaneously, the discourse in many countries has undergone anotable ‘diaspora turn’, where attitudes towards emigrant populations worldwide have shifted from dismissive or indifferent to celebratory (Ragazzi 2014). States across various regions and economic development levels are increasingly embracing engagement with diasporas as astandard practice (Gamlen 2006, 2014). The rationale behind this trend is multifaceted, often stemming from the belief that incorporating diasporas symbolically and bureaucratically into the state’simagined community benefits the state– or specific in-state stakeholders– in return (financially, economically, politically, and culturally) and extends governmentality (Anderson 1991; Gamlen 2014; Ragazzi 2014). The study of diaspora policy has gained more attention and significance in recent years, as countries have started to recognise the important role of their diasporas. Unlike in the past, emigrants are no longer viewed as deserters or traitors but rather as valuable contributors through remittances, investments, donations, and tourism. Scholars have focused on the social and political challenges faced by different diasporas and their home countries, as well as on the policies that countries have put in place to engage with their diasporas (e.g. Zeveleva 2019; Zapata-Barrero and Rezaei 2020). Diaspora policy encompasses arange of governmental actions and policies related to acountry’sdiaspora. This includes the establishment of institutions for 18 iNtroductioN diaspora affairs, methods of communication and cooperation with diaspora communities, regulations for financial transfers and cross-border mobility, and the recognition of dual citizenship or ethnic membership for historical diasporas or kin-minorities (Gamlen 2008; Kovács 2017; Ragazzi 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen 2016). Today the literature on diaspora policy counts numerous single-case studies focused on aparticular country (e.g. Brinkerhoff et al. 2019; Mosneaga 2014; Erdal 2016) and comparative studies (e.g. Popyk, Lesińska, and Dambrauskas 2023; Iyi and Umarova 2022). Several authors have also developed typologies and indexes to enable international comparisons and make sense of the multiplicity of policy practices (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Gamlen 2006; Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2019; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017) or contribute to the evolution of arelatively new research programme, such as the study of diaspora mobilisations in conflict processes (Koinova 2023) or criminal remittances (Paarlberg 2022). This book offers acomparative look at how diaspora politics are approached in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), with aspecific focus on Czechia. The Czech diaspora has been somewhat overlooked in diaspora literature, and this book aims to fill that gap. In addition, it highlights the use of mixed methods in case studies of the Czech diaspora (quantitative vs qualitative). Since the 1990s, following the end of communism, there has been significant progress in Czech diasporic politics. Efforts have been made to enhance cooperation with the diaspora, acknowledge the contributions of both new and established communities to fostering ashared Czech identity, and maintain language skills. However, while relevant policies have been in place for over adecade, some objectives have received less attention. This includes the aim of strengthening ties between the state and the diaspora and cultivating apositive perception of the diaspora among the public. Overall, there has been anoticeable shift from the Czech state taking minimal interest in the diaspora to agradual strengthening of cultural, legal, and economic ties with the diaspora. The political and economic changes after 1989 and the subsequent accession of Czechia, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia to the EU in 2004 and to the Schengen Area in 2007 fundamentally affected the conditions for migration. The gradual minimisation of migration barriers, including the subsequent opening up of the European labour market, led to anew form of migratory behaviour among the population. Economic factors, academic and educational aspirations, and other personal reasons now prevail over political reasons as the main migration motives (Nešpor 2002). At the same time, some former emigrants have returned home to apply the skills and qualifications they acquired abroad. Based on information from various sources and from the national chapters in this book, we can estimate that as many as 17–20 million 19iNtroductioN people from the four countries that are the focus of this book were living abroad in the years between 2020 and 2022 (although precise numbers are difficult to compare and should be critically examined): 2–2.5 million from Hungary, 1.2 million from Slovakia, 12–15 million from Poland, and 2.5 from Czechia. The governments of Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary have been increasingly active in formulating policies that target not only the older, pre-1989 diaspora communities but also new emigrants, choosing policy instruments according to the diasporas’ specific political, economic, and social contexts. At the same time, the European Union has been increasingly concerned about the ‘brain drain’ in some regions, in particular in the case of CEE countries (see, for instance, the 2023 European Commission Communication ‘Harnessing Talent in Europe’sRegions’– European Commission 2023). Reviewing the activities that governments in the region undertake to foster links with its expatriate populations therefore seems like atimely endeavour. The first part of the book comprehensively explores the diaspora policies in the four CEE countries. This comparative part aims to provide up-to-date information on diaspora policies in CEE to both academics and the wider professional community interested in the four countries’ policies towards their diasporas, including the descendants of earlier migrants. Recently, this topic has been raised more frequently in connection with the political engagement of citizens living abroad (for example, the number of eligible votes from abroad in the most recent Polish parliamentary election in 2023 almost doubled, when 569,000 valid votes were cast from abroad, compared to the number in 2019) and in connection with transferring the knowledge and skills acquired by diaspora members back to their country of origin and the need to preserve the traditions, cultures, and education of compatriots and their descendants in destination countries. Individual chapters of this book focus on the more discussed aspects of diaspora policy in each country. Acomparison of the four countries reveals that their diaspora policies are very similar when it comes to the possibility of compatriots participating in elections but differ somewhat in their institutional and political approaches. The second part of the book is an in-depth exploration of the Czech diaspora and Czech compatriots. It is aimed at both the academic community and the wider public in the Czech Republic (as well as in Slovakia, given that knowledge exchange relevant to policymaking is common between the two countries). We focus primarily on the ‘new diaspora’, those Czechs who left for other countries after 1990, but the sample of respondents also includes those who left under different conditions and who fled the authoritarian regime in Czechoslovakia. The chapters of this book are thus set in the new context of contemporary emigration from Czechia, where the (freely made) decision to leave can be reversed at any time by returning or re-emigrating to the Czech Republic. 20 iNtroductioN The book has the following structure. Chapter 1 provides an extensive overview of Czech diaspora policy, starting with abrief historical overview of the Czech diaspora, followed by an examination of the terminological nuances associated with the concept of diaspora in the Czech context. Eva Janská and Kristýna Janurová provide adetailed analysis of Czech diaspora policy, spotlighting its key objectives, achievements, and as yet unresolved ‘hot topics’. Diaspora policy is scrutinised in the light of acomparative international framework to highlight its distinctive features. The chapter then reviews the institutional and legislative context, providing insight into the structural foundations of Czech diaspora policy. The chapter shows that, despite arelatively insignificant place in the Czech domestic political landscape, occasional setbacks, and delays in goal implementation, Czech diaspora policy has undergone anotable shift towards becoming more responsive to the needs of the diaspora. Diaspora policy as aglobal nation-building process is examined by Magdalena Lesińska in Chapter 2. This process can be viewed on different levels: the official narrative about the diaspora; the institutional structure dedicated to the diaspora; the scope of rights that diaspora members are guaranteed (e.g. citizenship for children born abroad, dual citizenship, and/or asimplified naturalisation path for co-ethnics); and the political level (enfranchisement). As amigrant-sending and ethnic kin-state with alarge and widely dispersed diaspora, Poland is agood example of this global nation-building approach. The Polish diaspora consists of emigrants (settled mainly in EU countries) and ethnic minorities (mostly in neighbouring countries). In recent years, the nationalist approach of the Polish right-wing government has been externalised. This has been visible not only in official rhetoric but particularly in educational and cultural initiatives aimed at Poles abroad. The chapter is based on an analysis of legislative reports, legal documents, and programmes dedicated to the Polish diaspora, as well as interviews with administration representatives and experts. In Chapter 3, Eszter Kovács provides an overview of the post-1990 developments in Hungarian kin-state and diaspora policy within the context of external homeland engagement. The narrative posits that, until 2010, the focus of Hungary, as an external homeland, was predominantly on Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, with limited attention given to Hungarian diaspora communities. Apivotal shift occurred in 2010 following the resounding victory of the right-wing conservative Fidesz party, marking aturning point where Hungary not only intensified its kin-state policy but also developed acomprehensive policy framework for Hungarian diaspora communities. Kovács looks at the various engagement practices of kin-state and diaspora policy since 2010 and highlights the specific potential of political remittances. While transnational policies towards kin-minorities are 21iNtroductioN primarily concerned with the political contributions of these communities, practices for engaging with diaspora communities prioritise identity building and reinforcing the homeland–diaspora relationship. The chapter also discusses how recent Hungarian emigrants living in Western European countries largely fall outside the scope of the state’stransnational engagement practices, and how the right to participate in national elections differs for different types of external populations. In Chapter 4, Michal Vašečka analyses diaspora policy in Slovakia. Until 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia formed asingle state, Czechoslovakia, and they consequently share many tools and instruments in common in their policies, both towards the diaspora and in other areas. Vašečka describes the preferential treatment given to foreign Slovaks over other foreigners and shows how and why diaspora policies in Slovakia focus on preserving the cultural identity of Slovaks living abroad, regardless of their citizenship. The chapter describes the legislative and institutional background of Slovakia’sdiaspora policies and the main developments and features of policies within the sphere of cultural protection and identity building. It analyses the ways in which the country’sdiaspora policy programmes have given priority to educational and cultural engagement with ethnically defined Slovak nationals residing abroad. Finally, the chapter critically analyses the background of Slovak diaspora policies and why these policies are driven by the symbolic ties between the diaspora and the homeland. Chapter 5 opens the second part of the book and focuses on Czechia. In this chapter, Eva Janská, Zdeněk Uherek, and other members of the project’steam discuss the theoretical framing of the second part of the book, selected academic works on the Czech diaspora used as sources of information, data on the size of the Czech diaspora in the world, and the research design the team chose to further study this important group of people who have aspecific relationship to the space of their homeland and who often significantly influence its future. This chapter provides acomprehensive description of the Czech diaspora while considering recent research contributions and shedding light on key themes. Chapter 6 describes the relationship of expatriates to the Czech state, especially their needs and expectations from Czech institutions, providing the project’ssponsor, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which initiated and funded our applied research project in 2020–2022), with sufficient incentives to create new policies towards the diaspora. The authors, Eva Janská, Dušan Drbohlav, and Zdeněk Čermák, analyse the most important problems encountered by diaspora members in their contact with the Czech state based on information from aquestionnaire fielded in the research (see Chapter 5). The chapter introduces readers to the basic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, including their geographic 22 iNtroductioN distribution. It then offers abrief overview of the types of contact they have with the Czech Republic, both personal (e.g. with family) and more or less official forms of contact with Czech institutions in their place of residence and Czechia. The core of the chapter then consists of an assessment of compatriots’ needs from Czech institutions to support and improve their life abroad or to facilitate the possibility of their return. Particular attention is paid to the social and political involvement of compatriots in the form of their possible participation in elections in the Czech Republic and the problems associated with this. In Chapter 7, authors Eva Janská, Dušan Drbohlav, Zdeněk Čermák, and Jiří Hasman investigate the dynamics of Czech diaspora engagement and activity through acomparative analysis of groups in the United States/Canada and Germany/Austria, drawing on asimilar methodology published in the article by Janská et al. (manuscript), which was written in parallel with the work on this chapter. We draw on data from the questionnaire survey to answer two key questions: what differences in institutional engagement are there between Czech diaspora groups located closer to or agreater distance away from the Czech Republic, and what factors beyond geography influence the level of diaspora engagement. The results suggest the delineation and use of two types of institutional engagement with the diaspora: (1) institutions in the host country oriented towards the country of origin and (2) institutions in the country of origin. This usefully contributes to adeeper and more comprehensive understanding of the transnational practices of the diaspora under study. The examples of migration biographies presented in Chapter 8, by Zdeněk Uherek and Veronika Beranská, show asomewhat different type of migration than that represented by the main migration streams in Czechia until 1989. The chapter discusses continual individual mobilities, which have been apart of European migration since the Middle Ages but are now gaining in importance and becoming perhaps the most common migration pattern in Europe. The multiple modes of migration and primary integration into the formal institutions of ahost country that exist and the phenomenon of corporate diasporas are illustrated through the example of the Czech diaspora. The chapter shows that continual individual mobilities are not only atype of migration but afeature of integration into anew society and an element in the formation of diasporas. In Chapter 9, Markéta Doležalová and Olga Löblová focus on an important part of the diaspora, academics and scientists, examining factors that impact their decisions around mobility, including return or onward migration. Looking at academics in different career stages (from PhD students to senior scholars), the authors discuss the ongoing institutional and personal ties these academics have to Czechia, their motivations for returning, and 23iNtroductioN the barriers to doing so. Because of the specific nature of academic work, where multiple mobilities have become part of the academic labour market, the decisions around mobility and potential return are complex and express atension between the desire for career advancement and the hope for greater stability in both one’scareer and one’spersonal life. The chapter draws on aquantitative survey sample (N=198) and afocus group with eight participants and shows that continual/multiple mobility is driven by the specific nature of academic work. Despite this multiple mobility, many academics and scientists abroad try to maintain or develop their professional and personal links to Czechia. Finally, Kristýna Janurová and Eva Janská summarise in Chapter 10 the parallels and differences in the diaspora policies of four Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. 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Reemigranti asociálně sdílené hodnoty: Prolegomena ksociologickému studiu českých emigračních procesů 20. století se zvláštním zřetelem kzápadní reemigraci 90. let. [Re-emigrants and socially shared values: prolegomena to asociological study of Czech emigration processes in the 20th century with afocus on western re-emigration in the 1990s] Prague: Sociologický ústav Akademie věd České republiky. Paarlberg, M. A. 2022. ‘Transnational Gangs and Criminal Remittances: AConceptual Framework.’Comparative Migration Studies10, no. 1: 24. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. 2016. ‘Sending Country Policies.’ In Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors, edited by B. Garcés-Mascareñas and R. Penninx, 147–165. Cham: Springer. Pedroza, L., and P. Palop-García. 2017. ‘Diaspora Policies in Comparison: An Application of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) for the Latin American and Caribbean Region.’ Political Geography 60: 165–178. Popyk, A., M. Lesińska, and K. Dambrauskas. 2023. ‘The Evolution of Post-Accession Diasporas and Diaspora Policies after 2004: AComparative Analysis of Poland and Lithuania.’ Journal of Baltic Studies, 55, no. 1: 1–22. Ragazzi, F. 2014. ‘AComparative Analysis of Diaspora Policies.’ Political Geography 41: 74–89. Zapata-Barrero, R., and S. Rezaei. 2020. ‘Diaspora Governance and Transnational Entrepreneurship: The Rise of an Emerging Social Global Pattern in Migration Studies.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 10: 1959–1973. Zeveleva, O. 2019. ‘States and Standardisation: Constructing Co-ethnic Migrant Story in Germany.’Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies45, no. 4: 636–655. cHaPter 1 CZECH DIASPORA POLICY KristÝNa JaNurovÁ & eva JaNsKÁ 1.1 INTRODUCTION Czechia’sdiaspora policy is noteworthy for several reasons. While it has undergone major changes, much like similar policies in other Central and Eastern European countries have, it is absent from the literature on the topic (Janská et al. 2022a; Janská et al. forthcoming; Ragazzi 2014; Kovács 2017; Popyk, Lesińska, and Dambrauskas 2023). Despite ashared history with these countries and the same political and institutional experience within the European Union (EU), Czechia, as acountry with positive net migration, faces different migration issues than, for example, Poland or Romania. Ethnically its population is relatively homogeneous (unlike the populations in, for example, Latvia or Lithuania) and it has no significant kin minorities in neighbouring states (unlike, for example, Hungary or Slovakia). Moreover, there has been asubstantial increase in the amount of remittances sent to Czechia from Czechs abroad (CZSO 2023). This makes the diaspora an important stakeholder in the development of strategies and policies aimed at people with Czech ties living abroad, which may affect the amount and form of remittances sent. The current policy documents outlining the Czech state’sintentions in relation to the diaspora are the Concept of the Czech Republic’sForeign Policy and the Concept of the Relationship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Czechs Abroad (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2011). They stress the diaspora’spositive role in helping to build the good reputation of Czechia abroad and extoll the benefits of amutually supportive relationship between the diaspora and the Czech state, including the public. The findings presented in this chapter, and in this book as awhole, show that Czech diaspora policy has come along way since the 1990s, when anew era of Czech politics began after the collapse of communism. Much of this development has involved improving collaboration with the diaspora and acknowledging the activities of both the new and the old communities aimed at fostering ashared Czech(oslovak) identity and maintaining knowledge of the Czech language. However, even though these policy documents have been in place for more than adecade, not much effort has gone into achieving some of their goals. This is especially true of the aims of strengthening the state–diaspora relationship and nurturing the diaspora’spositive image among the public. 32 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy reasons for leaving, including adesire for economic betterment (see, e.g., Tigrid 1990; Štěpán 2011). In our text, we rarely use this term, reserving it for persons who left Czechoslovakia or Czech territory in times of political oppression for political reasons (often because they were forced to do so by the regime, or because of persecution or restrictions imposed on their choice of career, social ties, or lifestyle). In the international academic discourse, the term ‘migrant’ and the derived expressions ‘immigrant’ and ‘emigrant’ tend to be used in aneutral sense just to express the fact that aperson lives outside the territory of his or her country of origin (e.g. De Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Ackers and Gill 2008; cf. Feldman 2015). However, in some political contexts these terms have also begun to acquire negative connotations, so some people now refuse to be referred to by them (Kunz 2020). The term ‘migrant’ has recently acquired anegative connotation, especially since the migration crisis that began when there was asurge in the number of migrants entering Europe as refugees, mainly from war-torn Syria, but also from several other Middle Eastern and African countries (Crawley and Skleparis 2017; Collier 2015). Some critics claim that many of these refugees are actually ‘economic migrants’, whom they accuse of migrating to make money or to get easy access to social benefits, rather than actually seeking asafe haven from war, and they blame them for the increased strain on the security and social systems of some European countries. The word ‘migrant’ has thus (temporarily) become almost apejorative term in public discourse, even in the Czech Republic, which has not been significantly affected by the migration crisis. In the context of state-socialist Czechoslovakia, the term ‘(e)migrant’ acquired similarly negative connotations when persons leaving their homeland (illegally) were labelled traitors to the nation by the ruling party (see, e.g., Tigrid 1990, 47–51). In our text, we use these terms in their neutral sense and in line with the international scholarship on this subject, unless otherwise stated in the specific context. As the analysis presented here suggests, none of the terms used in connection with Czech migrants and their descendants fully captures the entire population we are concerned with. All the terms are biased in some way, and it would probably be impossible to find asingle expression that could be used without qualification to apply to all the people targeted by our project. The scheme in Figure 1 summarises how the terms overlap and relate to each other. In this book, we have decided to stick to the international term ‘diaspora’, even though its use is not without problems. Individual members of the diaspora are and should be the cornerstone of the state’sentire diaspora policy, which is essentially aimed at them, their needs, their ties to their country of origin, and the potential benefits of these ties for both Czech society (from acultural and social perspective) 33cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy DIASPORA / COMPATRIOTS CZECHS (LIVING) ABROAD/ FOREIGN CZECHS Emigrants Exiles Expatriates/ Expats Czech citizens living abroad Figure 1. Ahierarchy of terms used according to their breadth of meaning and the Czech state (from an economic and political perspective). However, although all members of the diaspora have in common that they (or their ancestors) left their country of origin, in other characteristics (whether we are talking about reasons for migration, occupational orientation, or sociodemographic features) they are almost as diverse as Czech society itself. This diversity also explains why some of them associate with one another and others do not, what kind of ties they maintain to Czechia and how strong they are, and how they relate to the Czech state, its institutions, and diaspora organisations. It is not possible to capture the attitudes and needs of all members of the Czech diaspora in the world. Those who are not interested in contact and purposefully avoid it will always be largely absent from our picture. However, it is valuable for diaspora policy to know both about those who organise and communicate with Czech institutions engaged in diaspora issues and about those who do not want this kind of contact. This chapter and the book as awhole should contribute to getting to know the Czech diaspora in its diversity alittle better and should enable Czech diaspora policy to speak to an ever-wider spectrum of people in the diaspora and address their needs. 34 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy 1.4 THE GOALS, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND ‘HOT TOPICS’ OF THE CONTEMPORARY CZECH DIASPORA Czech diaspora policy has gradually developed since the 1990s, which is consistent with global and regional trends in state–diaspora engagement (Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2019; Kovács 2017; Popyk, Lesińska, and Dambrauskas 2023). In 1993, individuals who had emigrated when the previous political regime was in power were granted the option to regain their Czech citizenship, which many of them had been stripped of by the regime (Černý and Valášek 1996). In 2014, the option of having dual citizenship was also legally introduced (Zákon ostátním občanství České republiky 2013). Over time education,8 culture, and, more recently, political participation (particularly remote voting) have become key areas of focus in Czech diaspora policy. These developments have largely been the result of bottom-up initiatives from the diaspora community, but they have gradually won both symbolic and financial support from the Czech state9 (Janská and Janurová 2020). Over time, this support and cooperation between state institutions and diaspora organisations have become relatively systematised and regular. Although Czech diaspora policy is relatively new, it has developed quite rapidly, as the intensive activities of Czech political institutions and various new and traditional diaspora organisations abroad demonstrate (see also Janská et al. 2022a). However, anumber of hot topics remain unresolved. At present, the main issues are the introduction of remote voting, the digitisation of public services, the simplification and activation of communication channels between the diaspora and the state, and acontinuous and targeted effort to develop and promote agood and realistic image of the Czech diaspora in Czech society (Janská et al. 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d). Remote voting, which has already been introduced (in the form of postal voting) in Slovakia and Hungary, has been on and off the table for almost adecade in Czech diaspora policy circles, as asolution to the diaspora’scomplaints about the geographic and administrative barriers to voting, which currently can only be done in person at selected types of representative authorities abroad or in Czechia (Kandalec 2013; Janská and Janurová 2020; Janská et al. 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d). Compared, for instance, to Poland, where the dominant strategy has been to enable as many citizens abroad as possible to vote by rapidly increasing the number of polling stations abroad,10 8 Here education refers to learning the Czech language and maintaining knowledge of Czech(oslovak) history and culture. 9 In these matters the Czech state is mainly represented by the Department for Expatriate Affairs at the MFA and the Senate Standing Committee for Compatriots Living Abroad. 10 See Lesińska in this volume. 35cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Czechia allows only certain types of representative authorities to serve as polling stations, with tragicomical repercussions for international voters who sometimes have to travel thousands of kilometres to reach the nearest voting location.11 The Senate Standing Committee for Compatriots Living Abroad (see below), the Department for Expatriate Affairs at the MFA, and individual politicians have to varying degrees been advocating for remote voting for along time. An international initiative recently launched by the Czech diaspora titled ‘We Want Remote Voting’ (Chceme volit distančně 2022) intensified the pressure on Czech institutions, which prompted adebate in Parliament and among the general public. Opponents of remote voting think that it compromises the secret and liberal nature of the vote as inscribed in the Czech Constitution, and they question the right of people to take part in the political life of the country left behind and speculate about whether the diaspora would prioritise some parties over others (Pancíř and Berný 2022; Stonjeková 2023; Vrlák 2021; Bumba 2024). While some proponents of the idea would prefer the introduction of online voting, postal voting12 is currently being put forth as acompromise solution to the demand for remote voting, since it promises to be safer (in the sense of alower risk of personal data misuse) and is more likely to be accepted by all the relevant stakeholders (Pecháček 2012; Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2019). The issue of postal voting was more strongly reflected in the electoral programmes of some political groups for the first time in the parliamentary elections held in October 2021.13 However, legislation to allow postal voting has repeatedly failed to pass the Chamber of Deputies, and at the time of this book’spublication this effort remains at adead end (Novela zákona ovolbách do Parlamentu ČR 2021). Calls for ahigher degree of digitisation and the simultaneous de-bureaucratisation of public services are being heard with increasing frequency among both the resident public in Czechia and the diaspora. The added benefits for the latter group, however, are obvious (Janská et al. 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d). It must be noted that asignificant number of public services have already been digitised in Czechia and the process to digitise more is ongoing. Our research also highlighted the need to simplify communication channels between the diaspora and the state. This not only involves the use of 11 Posts from members of the Facebook group ‘Češi aDEMOKRACIE vzahraničí’ [Czechs and DEMOCRACY abroad] (n.d.). 12 Postal voting is aform of voting that is carried out on official printed election ballots that are sent to adesignated state authority by post using adouble-envelope system, which facilitates both identification and anonymity at the same time. 13 See the election programme of the SPOLU (‘Together’) coalition (ODS, TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL (SPOLU 2021), and the election programme of the coalition of the Czech Pirate Party and the Mayors (Piráti aStarostové 2021). 36 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy simpler modes of communication but also requires that state representatives become more open and less formal in their approach to getting to know and listening to the diaspora (Janská et al. 2022a, 2022d). The fourth hot topic mentioned repeatedly by members of the diaspora in our empirical research, as well as by policy stakeholders, is the long-term need for acontinuous and targeted effort to promote agood and realistic image of the Czech diaspora in Czech society, which would neither just praise celebrities and famous Czechs abroad, nor support the sense of suspicion and contempt towards ‘emigrants’ that was sown by communist ideology in the past and is still sometimes present in public opinion today (Janská et al. 2022b, 2022c; see also above). Members of the diaspora generally want the Czech public to view them as equals– in the sense of the possibility of their returning to Czech society and its labour market and their potential to contribute knowledge and skills. The reluctance and ambivalence that characterise Czechia’srelationship to its diaspora are connected with the fact that the status of the diaspora is not explicitly addressed in any of Czechia’skey legal documents, in contrast, for instance, to other CEE states, which recognise the diaspora in their constitutions (see the remaining country chapters in this volume; Kovács 2017). In addition (and perhaps as aconsequence of the lack of any legal treatment of this issue), key political representatives rarely speak about the diaspora. This is amajor difference to the political scene in the other three Visegrád countries, most notably Poland, where the notion of a‘global nation’ figures prominently in the political discourse, as Lesińska demonstrates in another chapter in this volume. 1.4.1 THE PLACE OF CZECH DIASPORA POLICY IN COMPARATIVE TYPOLOGIES Based on the overview of Czech diaspora policy presented here and the detailed analysis of the policy that we have discussed elsewhere (Janská and Janurová 2020; Janská et al. 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d), we can consider the policy mechanisms, rights, and provisions that are specific to Czechia in an international context. To date, only ahandful of authors have devised and systematically analysed typologies and indexes that can be used to compare the diaspora policies of individual states and groups of states (see especially Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Gamlen 2006, 2008; Ragazzi 2014; Kovács 2017; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017). These typologies and indexes generally tend to classify states into groups on acontinuum ranging from generous/very engaged to dismissive/condemnatory states on the basis of how much recognition they give to their diasporas, how many rights they grant them, and what obligations they require of them. Most of the classification tools then class diaspora policies according to type as sym- 37cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy bolic, cultural, social, economic, citizenship, and administrative, with some classifications including more subtypes and others fewer. Looking at Czech diaspora policy via this lens provides us with apicture of the country’sposition in aglobal context. It shows that Czechia applies policies targeting its diaspora that correspond to all the types named above, some of them very intensively, some to alimited degree. The country’ssymbolic policies mainly involve the conferences and seminars organised regularly to discuss issues of importance for the Czech diaspora. Another example is the idea of aDiaspora Day. While this idea has not yet been approved by the Parliament of the Czech Republic, aproposal for such aday was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies in the 2017–2021 parliamentary term, and 4 February, the day of Jan Amos Komenský’sdeparture for exile, has been chosen in an online open-access poll and announced by the government as the day to commemorate Czechs living abroad (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2021; Kuchyňová 2021). Akey part of symbolic policies is the representation of the diaspora at the state level. As explained in the next section, Czechia does not have astandalone ministry or agency for Czechs abroad. The idea of asingle agency has been floated as asolution to the fractionalism in the provision of information, as well as to the long-term problem of the lack of any clear-cut expression of the relationship between the state and the diaspora, which was noted above (Janská et al. forthcoming). Czechia’scultural policies focus mainly on the preservation and fostering of linguistic and cultural heritage and on policies relating to religion. As mentioned above, Czechia’sprimary diaspora-oriented policies concern linguistic and cultural heritage. The funding system that supports both traditional and new diaspora organisations and helps them to maintain their libraries and monuments and to run various cultural events is already aroutine form of the state’srecognition of the Czech diaspora’sactivities (Janská and Janurová 2020; Cibulková 2023). Also, the relevant state departments nowadays regularly communicate and cooperate with the many Czech schools and grassroots diaspora organisations abroad, some of which have gradually set out on amore formal path of providing education that is officially recognised by Czech education law (see §38 in the Education Act in Czech: Zákon opředškolním, základním, středním, vyšším odborném ajiném vzdělávání 2004). The work done by these schools, their representatives, and government officials alike in effectuating this has been enormous. Despite this, our research shows that the demand for Czech schools abroad is still not saturated– in some areas they are hard to access and parents consequently end up teaching their children Czech themselves (Janská et al. 2022b, 2022c). The issue of the transferability of education attained abroad to Czech schools has also not yet been resolved. Besides this, the Czech state sends teachers to Czech diaspora communities abroad and lecturers in Czech Language and 38 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Literature to universities worldwide. The religious aspect of cultural policy is represented by religious missions run by the Czech Bishops’ Conference in various locations around the world, sometimes in cooperation with the Slovak Catholic Mission (Česká biskupská conference 2016). These missions not only fulfil aspiritual purpose, they also serve both religious and nonreligious members of the Czech diaspora as asource of support and provide occasions and spaces for get-togethers and festivities. They operate in both historical and new destinations of the Czech diaspora. Also, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren maintains close relations with Czech Evangelical congregations abroad, which operate especially in the traditional communities in Ukraine, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Poland (Českobratrská církev evangelická 2016). The degree to which Czechia engages with the diaspora on social and economic policies is rather limited. Through state-funded organisations, Czechia offers students and academic staff financial support and helps them find scholarships for study and research abroad, which are funded from both international and local sources (DZS 2022), but there is no policy that is specifically aimed at securing their return or utilising the skills they have gained upon return. While grassroots movements such as Czexpats in Science seek to connect Czech scientists abroad, they are not much concerned with the matter of Czech scientists returning to Czechia. Czechia does not offer investment schemes or specialised financial transfer services that would address diaspora needs, such as facilitating the transfer, use, or investment of remittances. Even though remittances represent asignificant financial gain for the Czech economy in astatistical perspective, they are hardly ahot topic in the discourse surrounding the diaspora. Our interviewees seldom referred to remittances (Janská et al. 2022b, 2022c). The state’ssocial security programmes are not designed to target the diaspora and the domestic resident population separately, they are aimed at the entire population residing in Czechia and/or contributing to the social security system (Kropáčová 2014). Pensions are the key exception, as they can be drawn even by people who reside abroad, as long as aperson was gainfully employed in Czechia/Czechoslovakia and made payments to the health and social insurance systems. Other social security transfers that can be paid to people living abroad are primarily guided by state responsibility allocation stipulated by EU law and bilateral agreements with other states (Janská and Janurová 2020; Cibulková 2023). In the area of citizenship, Czechia scores quite high in aglobal comparison– at least de iure. With some exceptions, the state does not restrict or monitor the movement of its citizens across state borders (Česká národní rada 1993; Trestní řad 1961), it has allowed its citizens to hold dual citizenship since 2014 (Zákon ostátním občanství České republiky 2013), and Czechs 39cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy abroad can vote in person in elections to the Chamber of Deputies14 and in the presidential elections (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2021). The MFA issues acertificate of membership in the Czech diaspora on the basis of proven Czech origin. Holders of this certificate may apply for permanent residence in Czechia ‘for other reasons worthy of special consideration’ (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2023), which, in effect, simplifies the path to Czech citizenship for them. In addition, adraft amendment of the Citizenship Act that offers the offspring of emigrant former citizens an easier path to Czech citizenship has recently entered the legislative process (Návrh poslanců … 2013). As noted above, members of the diaspora interested in participating in Czech elections still feel that the issue of voting abroad has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Unlike in some of the states that engage most with their diaspora, in Czechia questions of political representation and enabling the diaspora’sparticipation in abroader range of election types remain issues that are not likely to be addressed anytime soon. In the administrative policy dimension, Czechia nowadays has arather extensive legislative and institutional apparatus to deal with diaspora issues (see below). It allows its citizens to migrate and return and the only reporting obligations relate to their participation in the social and health insurance systems and not to relocation per se. However, some policy stakeholders, as well as the diaspora, view this liberalism with regard to emigration as adeficit, pointing to the fact that the state has only alimited capacity to monitor the size of the diaspora in different places and, in effect, also alimited capacity to get in touch– for the purpose of networking, lobbying, emergencies, or other reasons– with those individuals who do not show an active interest themselves (Janská et al. 2022a). Also, most of the contact with the diaspora remains on an administrative level (sorting out funding applications, monitoring the activities and contact details of diaspora organisations, etc.) and little of it is in the form of political acknowledgement (e.g. key politicians speaking to and about the diaspora at important moments observed by the public; Janská et al. 2022a). 1.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF CZECH DIASPORA POLICY Czechia has no state authority that is exclusively dedicated to diaspora issues. However, individual ministries have departments or offices that deal with diaspora issues within the scope of their portfolio (Janská and Janurová 2020; 14 I.e. the lower house of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (Poslanecká sněmovna). 40 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Brouček et al. 2017). Similarly, the diaspora is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution or in other key legislative documents, unlike in many other countries (e.g. all three of the other CEE states discussed in this book; see also Kovács 201715). Instead, it is addressed in conceptual documents that are not legally binding (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2015b; Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2011).16 The first contact point for Czechs living abroad who need to get in touch with the state on official matters is usually the consular departments of the representative authorities abroad, which are accountable to the Consular Department of the MFA. The list of services that consular departments provide includes the usual consular agenda: issuing or renewing passports and birth, death, and marriage certificates;17 helping Czechs in situations where they may require consular assistance (illness, accidents, arrest or custody, limitation of personal freedom, loss of travel documents or financial resources, death, natural and human-made disasters).18 Ambassadors and consuls also, with varying frequency, organise social events for the diaspora and inform them about relevant issues. The Department for Expatriate Affairs (Oddělení pro krajanské záležitosti Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky) is adepartment of the MFA that has for along time (since 1990) served as the key policy stakeholder in diaspora affairs, dealing exclusively with diaspora issues in all their breadth. As well as being responsible for various administrative tasks, the office’srole also includes fostering state–diaspora relations on amore general basis, strengthening international and economic relations with host countries via cooperation with the diaspora, and promoting apositive image of the diaspora in Czechia. The office supports diaspora organisations by providing funding in support of their activities and providing opportunities where they can network and increase their visibility (conferences, ceremonies, and awebsite). It also collaborates with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports in running an educational programme designed to teach the Czech language abroad, especially in traditional diaspora communities. It is the contact point for people who wish to apply for acertificate of belonging to the Czech community living abroad, which can be used as asupporting document if the person then applies for permanent residence in Czechia. The office also chairs the Interministerial Commission for Czechs Living 15 According to the analysis by Kovács (2017), the diaspora is addressed in the constitutions of Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, and Hungary. 16 See also the introduction to this chapter. 17 Czech citizen ID cards can only be issued by municipal authorities in Czechia. No other documents (driving licence, health insurance card, etc.) can be used as identification documents in Czechia. 18 See § 17 in the Foreign Services Act (Zákon ozahraniční službě 2017). 41cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Abroad (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2015a, 2017), which was established recently in order to pool and coordinate the diaspora-related agendas of individual ministries. The Interministerial Commission for Czechs Living Abroad (Meziresortní komise pro Čechy žijící vzahraničí) was established as an advisory body to the Department for Expatriate Affairs of the MFA. It aims to improve information-sharing and cooperation between public authorities and other public institutions on issues pertaining to the diaspora and gradually to create aunified online information pool (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR n.d.-b) enabling Czechs abroad to access information more easily on administrative, financial, and other official matters in Czechia or relating to their potential return. The Senate Standing Committee for Compatriots Living Abroad (Stálá komise Senátu pro krajany žijící vzahraničí) is as an advisory body to the Senate of the Czech Republic that focuses exclusively on diaspora issues (Senát Parlamentu ČR 2017). It initiates parliamentary discussions on amendments to laws that impact the diaspora, and it participates in diaspora-related expert conferences and roundtables. The committee’sachievements include initiating the legal process to allow dual citizenship in 2014, allowing nationals abroad to collect newly issued passports at honorary consulates in 2015, and proposing alegal amendment that made completing education at abranch of the Czech School Without Borders equivalent to having studied the same subjects at aprimary school in Czechia. The Subcommittee on Relations with Compatriots (Podvýbor pro styky skrajany; see Poslanecká sněmovna Parlament ČR 2024) is part of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, which regularly discusses compatriot issues, participates in and organises diaspora-related events, and maintains relations with other relevant stakeholders. The composition and activities of the subcommittee depend on the current composition of the Chamber of Deputies and change with each parliamentary election. How interested and able the MPs involved in specific compatriot issues are in these issues and in getting them on the floor for parliamentary discussion fluctuates and depends on the MPs’ personal interests and the interests of their party (Janská et al. 2022a).19 The Czech Centres (Česká centra) are acontributory organisation of the MFA that promotes Czechia abroad (Czech Centres n.d.). The network of Czech Centres engages in public diplomacy, promoting cultural events, and fostering external economic relations and tourism. The Centres sometimes 19 The Subcommittee was involved in introducing adraft amendment of the Citizenship Act into Parliament, which makes the road to Czech citizenship easier for the offspring of emigrant former citizens (Návrh poslanců … 2013). 48 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Janská, E., V. Beranská, Z. Čermák, M. Doležalová et al. 2022c. ‘Výzkum potřeb krajanských komunit ve vybraných zemích zhlediska udržení jejich vazeb na ČR: Velká Británie, Austrálie, Nový Zéland, USA aNěmecko. Souhrnná výzkumná zpráva. Nové přístupy ke koordinaci krajanské problematiky.’ [Research on the needs of expatriate communities in individual countries in terms of maintaining their ties to the Czech Republic: Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, United States, and Germany. Summary research report. New approaches to coordinating the compatriot issue] Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Přírodovědecká fakulta. http:// cestikrajane.cz. Janská, E., V. Beranská, Z. Čermák, M. Doležalová, et al. 2022d. ‘Komunikační portál. Souhrnná výzkumná zpráva. Nové přístupy ke koordinaci krajanské problematiky.’ Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Přírodovědecká fakulta. [Communication portal. Summary research report. New approaches to the coordination of the expatriate issue] http://cestikrajane.cz. Janská, E., and K. Janurová. 2020. ‘Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Czech Citizens Abroad.’ In Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond: Comparing Consular Services and Diaspora Policies (Volume 2), edited by J. M. Lafleur and C. D. Vintila, 123–141. Cham: Springer. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-030-51245-3. Janurová, K. 2018. ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Moving: Czech Migrants Making aHome (or Not) in the UK.’ Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review 54, no. 3: 315–342. Jirka, L. 2020. ‘Návratová migrace, reemigrace nebo etnická návratová migrace? Potomci krajanů ze západní Ukrajiny azjižní Moldávie ajejich důvody migrace do České republiky.’ [Return migration, re-emigration, or ethnic return migration? The descendants of compatriots in western Ukraine and southern Moldova and their reasons for migrating to the Czech Republic] Český lid 107: 211–229. Kandalec, P. 2013. Access to Electoral Rights: Czech Republic. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2013/06, Electoral Rights Reports. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/29808. Kovács, E. 2017. ‘Post-socialist Diaspora Policies.’ Hungarian Journal of Minority Studies 1, no. 1: 89–109. Kropáčová, K. 2014. ‘Systém sociálního zabezpečení vČeské republice ve vztahu kmigrujícím občanům.’ [The social protection system in the Czech Republic as it pertains to migrant citizens] In Nová emigrace zČeské republiky po roce 1989 anávratová politika (náhled na problematiku vkontextu vývoje světových migrací: vznik moderních diaspor atransnacionálních společností), edited by S. Brouček and T. Grulich, 76–83. Prague: Etnologický ústav AV ČR in collaboration with the Senát Parlamentu Cěské republiky and the International Organization for Migration. Kučera, M. 1994. Populace České republiky 1918–1991. [Population of the Czech Republic 1918–1991] Prague: Česká demografická společnost, Sociologický ústav AV ČR. 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Mezinárodní koordinační výbor zahraničních věcí. [International Coordination Committee of Czechs Living Abroad] 2023. Konference Úloha amísto zahraničních Čechů vbilaterálních vztazích aaktuální potřeby české diaspory II., Senát, Prague, 21–22 September 2023. http:// zahranicnicesi.com/. Ministerstvo financí ČR. [Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic] 2022. Závěrečný účet kapitoly 398– Všeobecná pokladní správa za rok 2021. [Closing account of chapter 398– general 49cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Treasury report] https://www.mfcr.cz/assets/attachments/2022-06-09_Zaverecny-ucet-kapitoly-398-Vseobecna-pokladni-sprava-za-rok-2021.pdf. Ministerstvo vnitra ČR. [Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic] 2019. Korespondenční hlasování. [Postal voting] https://www.mvcr.cz/soubor/podklad-pro-koalicni-rozhodnuti -cast-korespondencni-hlasovani-7458401-pdf.aspx. Ministerstvo vnitra ČR. 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[Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic] n.d.-a. ‘Krajané.’ [Compatriots] Accessed 14 February 2024. https://mzv.gov.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni _vztahy/krajane/index.html. Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic] n.d.-b. ‘Užitečné informace pro Čechy žijící vzahraničí.’ [Useful information for Czech living abroad] Accessed 25 March 2024. https://www.mzv.cz/cesi_v_zahranici/cz/index.html. Návrh poslanců Romana Bělora, Vladimíra Balaše, Ondřeje Benešíka, Evy Decroix, Jakuba Michálka, Martiny Ochodnické aHayata Okamury na vydání zákona, kterým se mění zákon č. 186/2013 Sb., ostátním občanství České republiky aozměně některých zákonů (zákon ostátním občanství České republiky), ve znění pozdějších předpisů. [Draft amendment of the Citizenship Act No. 186/2013 Coll.] Sněmovní tisk č. 585/0. Poslanecký návrh zákona. Accessed 27 November 2023. https://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/orig2.sqw?idd=238844. 50 cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Nešpor, Z. R. 2002. Reemigranti asociálně sdílené hodnoty: Prolegomena ksociologickému studiu českých emigračních procesů 20. století se zvláštním zřetelem kzápadní reemigraci 90. let. [Re-emigrants and socially shared values: prolegomena to asociological study of Czech emigration processes in the 20th century with aspecial focus on western re-emigration in the 1990s] Prague: Sociologický ústav Akademie věd České republiky. Nešpor, Z. R. 2017. Sociologická encyklopedie. [Encyclopaedia of sociology] Prague: Sociologický ústav AV ČR. https://encyklopedie.soc.cas.cz/w/%C4%8Ceskoslovensk%C3%BD_%C3%BAstav _zahrani%C4%8Dn%C3%AD. Novela zákona ovolbách do Parlamentu ČR. [Draft amendment to Act No. 247/1995 Coll. on elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic] Sněmovní tisk 39. Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR. Accessed 5 November 2023. https://www.psp.cz/sqw/historie.sqw?O=9&T=39. Pancíř, T., and T. Berný. 2022. ‘Korespondenční volba nevyhovuje ústavě, navíc usnadní kupčení shlasy, míní ústavní právník Kudrna.’ [Constitutional lawyer Kudrna believes that postal voting is incompatible with the constitution and also makes vote rigging easier] Český Rozhlas. Dvacet Minut Radiožurnálu, published 5 May 2022. https://radiozurnal.rozhlas.cz /korespondencni-vol-ba-nevyhovuje-ustave-navic-usnadni-kupceni-s-hlasy-mini-8739364. Pecháček, Š. 2012. ‘Korespondenční volba. Informační podklad č. 1.222, září 2012.’ [Postal voting. Information document no. 1.222, September 2012] Parlamentní institut, Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR. [Parliamentary Institute, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic]. https://invenio.nusl.cz/record/135395/files/nusl-135395_1.pdf. Pedroza, L., P. Palop-García. 2017. ‘Diaspora Policies in Comparison: An Application of the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) for the Latin American and Caribbean Region.’ Political Geography 60: 165–178. Piráti astarostové. 2021. ‘Volební program.’ [Election programme] https://www.piratiastarostove .cz/documents/70/PIRÁTI_A_STAROSTOVÉ_VOLEBNÍ_PROGRAM.pdf. Popyk, A., M. Lesińska, and K. Dambrauskas. 2023. ‘The Evolution of Post-Accession Diasporas and Diaspora Policies after 2004: AComparative Analysis of Poland and Lithuania.’ Journal of Baltic Studies 55, no. 1: 1–22. Poslanecká sněmovna Parliament ČR. 2024. ‘Zahraniční výbor: Členové– Podvýbor pro styky skrajany.’ Last modified 20 March 2024. https://www.psp.cz/sqw/snem.sqw?id=658. Ragazzi, F. 2014. ‘AComparative Analysis of Diaspora Policies.’ Political Geography 41: 74–89. Senát Parlamentu ČR. 2017. ‘Senate Standing Committee for Compatriots Living Abroad. Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.’ Last updated 30 April 2107. http://www.senat.cz /organy/index.php?ke_dni=30.4. 2017&O=11&lng=en&par_2=376. SPOLU. 2021. ‘Spolu pro chytrý stát.’ Last modified 12 October 2021. https://www.spolu21.cz /program/spolu-pro-chytry-stat. Stálá komise Senátu pro krajany žijící vzahraničí. [Senate Standing Committee for Compatriots Living Abroad] 2017. ‘Zápis č. 4 z4. schůze Stálé komise Senátu pro krajany žijící vzahraničí ze dne 20.9. 2017.’ [Record of minutes no. 4 from the 4th meeting of the Senate Standing Committee for Compatriots Living Abroad dated 20 September 2017]. http://www.senat.cz/xqw /xervlet/pssenat/htmlhled?action=doc&value=85963. Štěpán, J. 2011. Československý exil ve Švédsku vletech 1945–1989. [Czechoslovak exile in Sweden 1945–1989] České Budějovice: Veduta. Stonjeková, K. 2023. ‘Komentář: Udržet STAN aTOP 09 ve Sněmovně. To je pravý důvod pro korespondenční volbu.’ [Commentary: Keeping STAN and TOP 09 in Parliament. That’sthe real motive for postal voting] CNN Prima News, published 16 August 2023. https://cnn.iprima.cz /komentar-udrzet-stan-a-top-09-ve-snemovne-to-je-pravy-duvod-pro-korespondencni -volbu-409454. Tedeschi, M., E. Vorobeva, and J. S. Jauhiainen. 2022. ‘Transnationalism: Current Debates and New Perspectives.’ GeoJournal 87, no. 2: 603–619. Tigrid, P. 1990. Politická emigrace vatomovém věku. [Political emigration in the atomic age] Prague: Prostor. 51cHaPter 1 czecH diasPora Policy Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. otrestním řízení soudním (in Czech). UN DESA. 2020. ‘International Migrant Stock 2019.’ https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd /content/international-mi-grant-stock. Vaculík, J. 1991. ‘Komenský ačeské minoritní školy vzahraničí.’ [Comenius and Czech minority schools abroad] Pedagogická orientace 1, no. 2: 26–28. Vaculík, J. 2007. Češi vcizině 1850–1938. [Czechs abroad 1850–1938] Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Pedagogická fakulta. Vertovec, S. 1999. ‘Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism.’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no.2: 447–462. Vrlák, M. 2021. ‘Bezpečný způsob, nebo možný podvod? Návrh na korespondenční hlasování leží na vládě.’ [Asafe method or possible fraud?] ČT24, published 19 January 2021. https:// ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/clanek/domaci/bezpecny-zpusob-nebo-mozny-podvod-navrh-na -korespondencni-hlasovani-lezi-na-vlade-40200. Zákon opředškolním, základním, středním, vyšším odborném ajiném vzdělávání/školský zákon [Education Act], zákon č. 561/2004 Sb. (in Czech). Zákon ostátním občanství České republiky. [Citizenship Act], zákon č. 186/2013 Sb. Zákon ozahraniční službě [Foreign Service Act], zákon č. 150/2017 Sb. cHaPter 2 BUILDING THE GLOBAL NATION: DIASPORA POLICY IN POLAND magdaleNa lesiŃsKa 2.1 INTRODUCTION Poland, like other countries in the Central and Eastern European region, has along history of emigration, marked by successive waves of exodus. From the mid-19th century onwards, emigrants from Poland headed mainly for the countries of Western Europe and North and South America, and the reasons for their departure were primarily slow economic development and alack of prospects at home. In turn, the border changes that followed the successive world wars in the 20th century, accompanied by dynamic population processes and migration flows, resulted in the emergence of large kin-minorities living in Poland’sneighbouring countries, such as Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, apolitical and socioeconomic transformation took place, which led to the re-emergence of traditional emigration routes (in particular to Germany and the United States). Another turning point in the history of the formation of the Polish diaspora was Poland’saccession to the European Union (on 1 May 2004), which was immediately followed by alarge wave of economic emigration and gave rise to anew form of mobility. This migration wave was characterised not only by intensity and by the new destinations it moved to (such as Norway and Ireland), but also by the different profile of the emigrants, most of whom were young and educated. They used the right of free movement, which allows EU citizens to legally reside and work anywhere in the EU, and moved to the more developed ‘old’ EU Member States in search of better educational opportunities, jobs, and higher incomes. This chapter will present ageneral overview of the Polish diaspora and Polish state policy on Poles abroad. Individual sections of the chapter focus on the history of Polish settlements, the main normative approach of Polish diaspora policy, and the institutional framework and selected areas of Polish diaspora policy. The chapter shows that the main goal of Polish diaspora policy is to build the global Polish nation by maintaining and strengthening national identity and promoting Polish language and culture among Poles residing in other countries. Key elements at the centre of the Polish diaspora policy, namely education, the ‘Pole’scard’, and enfranchisement (external voting), are described here in greater detail. 53cHaPter 2 BuildiNg tHe gloBal NatioN: diasPora Policy iN PolaNd 2.2 AN (HISTORICAL) OVERVIEW OF THE POLISH DIASPORA As aresult of the migration and population processes mentioned above, Poland has alarge diaspora dispersed all over the world, which was created both by successive waves of emigration and by changes in national borders. In general, three groups can be distinguished in the Polish diaspora: (1) the ‘traditional’ diaspora, which was formed by waves of emigration during the 20th century; (2) kin-minorities, most of whom live in neighbouring countries; and (3) emigrants who left the country after 2004, who can be colloquially described as the ‘new’ diaspora or the post-accession diaspora (Popyk et al. 2023). It is difficult to obtain reliable data on the size of the Polish diaspora. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that the diaspora is made up of approximately 12–15 million people (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych n.d.). It should be emphasised, however, that the majority of this group consists of people for whom Poland is the homeland of their parents or grandparents, who have symbolic ties to the country, and who do not hold Polish citizenship. Among the three aforementioned diaspora groups formed through history (the traditional diaspora, kin-minorities, and the post-accession diaspora), the largest is the ‘traditional’ diaspora, which is often referred to as ‘Polonia’.26 The largest number of members of the Polish diaspora live in the United States, where 9.6 million people declared Polish ancestry in asurvey conducted in 2012. There are approximately 1 million diaspora Poles living in Canada, 1.5 million in Brazil, 120,000 in Argentina, 170,000 in Australia, and 30,000 in South Africa (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych n.d.). They are ahighly diverse group of people. Some of them (especially first-generation emigrants) maintain close relations with Poland, but in subsequent generations these ties can become purely symbolic and be limited to people just knowing that Poland is the country of origin of their ancestors. The second of these groups consists of Polish minorities in neighbouring countries; this group is referred to (including in official documents) as ‘Poles in the East’. As aresult of the border changes after the Second World War, Poland lost territory to what are now present-day Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine, leaving many Poles outside Polish territory. It is estimated that about 1 million people of Polish origin currently reside in these countries, including about 200,000 Poles in Lithuania, about 300,000 in Belarus who de26 The term commonly used for Polish communities abroad is ‘Polonia’ (traditionally applied to the Polish population in the United States). In official documents, however, the term that is usually applied is ‘Polonia and Poles abroad’, which is broader and includes Polish emigrants and Polish minorities in addition to people of Polish origin. 54 cHaPter 2 BuildiNg tHe gloBal NatioN: diasPora Policy iN PolaNd clare Polish nationality, and 144,000 in Ukraine (the data are from before the war that began in 2022; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych n.d.). In addition to the concentrations of Poles in these neighbouring countries, mention must also be made of the descendants of Poles who were deported to Kazakhstan and other Asian countries at the turn of the 20th century, who have been the target of arepatriation policy since the early 1990s (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Grzymała-Moszczyńska 2014). It is also worth noting that the size of the Polish communities in Eastern Europe is regularly decreasing, undoubtedly influenced by assimilation processes that are observed in successive generations. Only aminority of people in this group have Polish citizenship. Polish kin-minorities, like Hungary and its kin-minorities, have been apriority target of diaspora policy since the early 1990s. The third group mentioned above, the post-accession diaspora, consists of approximately 2.3 million people (according to the latest estimates from the Central Statistical Office on the number of persons staying abroad for more than three months), which is approximately 6% of the country’spopulation (CSO 2021). The vast majority of these people– approximately 1.9 million (including 1.3 million in EU Member States)– reside in European countries. The largest concentrations of Polish nationals were recorded in Germany (706,000), the United Kingdom (678,000), the Netherlands (135,000), and Ireland (114,000). The distribution of Polish emigrants across EU countries has changed over time, though only slightly. In recent years, according to the Central Statistical Office, adecrease in the number of temporary emigrants from Poland was recorded in Italy, while an increase was observed in the Netherlands and Norway (CSO 2021). It can be assumed that these changes are influenced by factors related to the economic situation in the destination country and by individual migration plans. The latest massive wave of emigration since 2004 has triggered achange in Polish diaspora policy. The appearance of new and numerous Polish communities in European countries, who had left primarily for economic reasons, presented the Polish authorities with anew challenge. The post-accession diaspora consists of a‘transnational’ model of migrants, who often visit Poland, remain interested in the economic and political situation in Poland, and still have Polish as their primary language (Lesińska et al. 2014). Consequently, the most important challenges for policy makers have been to encourage Poles residing abroad to maintain ties with Poland, to retain their identification with their country of origin, and to inspire younger generations to learn the Polish language and culture. 55cHaPter 2 BuildiNg tHe gloBal NatioN: diasPora Policy iN PolaNd 2.3 BUILDING THE GLOBAL NATION– THE MAIN APPROACH OF DIASPORA POLICY IN POLAND Poland’sapproach to the diaspora can be analysed as a‘global nation policy’, aconcept introduced by Francesco Ragazzi (2019), according to which the diaspora is seen as part of acountry’sglobal nation and legal solutions are created and actions are taken to build and sustain ties between the diaspora and the country of origin and to integrate the diaspora into the state-national community. Using this approach, global nation-building activities are undertaken on anumber of levels, the main ones being symbolic (promoting apositive narrative about the diaspora and its ties to the country of origin), legal (giving legal status to its members, e.g. by granting citizenship to children born abroad, accepting dual citizenship, or issuing an ‘ethnic card’– adocument confirming aperson’sancestry), and political (ensuring political representation, allowing Polish citizens to vote even if they live abroad). Many states, especially those with alarge diaspora, have active policies towards diaspora groups. The reasons for these policies are manifold and depend on the economic, political, and identity relations between the diaspora and the country of origin (Gamlen et al. 2013; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). First, the diaspora is often treated primarily as asource of financial remittances. Sending states attempt to encourage the diaspora to engage economically with the country of origin by sending money, making investments, and providing professional expertise (Brinkerhoff 2018; Newland 2010). The economic relationship between the diaspora and the country of origin is of great importance, especially for developing countries, where the amount of transfers sent from abroad can often account for adozen or more percent of the country’sGDP (World Bank 2019). Second, the diaspora is equally as often seen as asource of soft power, its role being particularly important in the context of building relations between the country of origin and the states in which members of the diaspora are settled, who are considered alobbying force for the country of origin’sinterests (Shain and Barth 2003). Rey Koslowsky refers to the process of drawing on the help of the diaspora to realise the interests of the country of origin in the international arena as the ‘globalisation of domestic politics’, meaning the transfer of policy from the national to the international level and the inclusion of the diaspora in its implementation (Koslowsky 2004). Another particularly interesting explanation of the country of origin’sengagement with the diaspora in the context of global nation-building is an identity-based explanation. The diaspora is seen as an integral part of the national community, as (part of) an ‘imagined community’ whose unity is based on acommon origin, culture, language, and history (Anderson 2016). Unlike economic or political relationships, the relationship between the di- 56 cHaPter 2 BuildiNg tHe gloBal NatioN: diasPora Policy iN PolaNd aspora and the country of origin based on identity and culture and abelief in acommon ancestry proves to be very durable– it is reproduced and lasts for generations. It is worth noting that the identity-based approach to this relationship is the prevailing one, and not just in Poland (see Chapter 4 on Slovakia). The essence of the diaspora phenomenon has been very aptly described by Yossi Schain and Aaron Barth (2003), who point out that the diaspora exists outside state structures and, at the same time, inside the national community. Building a‘global nation’ that includes those who live outside the borders of the state (emigrants, kin-minorities, and descendants), as well as the citizens living within the state’sborders, requires the implementation of specific policies and actions that target the diaspora and sustain identity relations. Many scholars have pointed out that the overarching goal of diaspora policy is the integration of the diaspora into the structures of the country of origin. Although it is variously referred to as the ‘policy of external belonging’ (Brubaker 2010), the ‘embracing policy’ (Gamlen et al. 2013), the ‘global nation policy’ (Ragazzi 2014), and ‘political incorporation’ (Collyer 2014), all these terms refer to the same process: the symbolic and real inclusion of the diaspora into the political community. Activities leading to this goal are carried out on anumber of levels, among which it is possible to distinguish those of asymbolic, legal, and political nature. 2.4 THE ‘HOT TOPICS’ OF POLISH DIASPORA POLICY: EDUCATION, ETHNIC CARDS, AND ENFRANCHISEMENT 2.4.1 SYMBOLIC POLICIES AIMED AT THE POLISH DIASPORA Symbolic policies aimed at the diaspora include activities to promote apositive narrative about the diaspora as an integral part of the national community. This is achieved, among other ways, through the state’sofficial ‘diaspora days’, the existence of various media dedicated to the diaspora, ceremonial celebrations of national holidays with the participation of representatives of the diaspora, and regular references to the diaspora in official speeches by key politicians. In Poland, 2 May was selected as the Day of the Polish Diaspora and Poles Abroad. There is adedicated TV channel (TV Polonia) for emigrants and kin-minorities that broadcasts programmes in the national language. The channel’sofficial role is integrating the Polish diaspora, promoting apositive image of Poland and Poles, and maintaining Polish identity through the dissemination of Polish culture, history, and language. It is co-financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An example of concrete action to reinforce the symbolic narrative of the global national 57cHaPter 2 BuildiNg tHe gloBal NatioN: diasPora Policy iN PolaNd community was the media campaign announced in 2019 by the Polish authorities under the slogan ‘There are 60 million of us’, amessage stating that the Polish national community consists of 40 million Poles at home and 20 million abroad. Apositive narrative about the diaspora is important, but of much greater importance are the concrete legal solutions taken to maintain the formal and identity ties of diaspora members to their country of origin. Acountry of origin may grant certain benefits to diaspora members living outside its borders, such as preferential access to citizenship or an ethnic card– aspecial certificate that proves ethnic belonging to the nation. In the sections that follow, selected areas of Poland’sdiaspora policy will be presented in detail, such as the system of education abroad, ethnic cards, and diaspora enfranchisement, which represent the cultural, legal, and political dimensions of the process of global nation-building. 2.4.2 THE EDUCATION SYSTEM ABROAD Supporting education in the Polish language abroad is one of the main priorities of diaspora policy in Poland. The main aim is to establish ties with diaspora members by ensuring access to Polish-language learning and Polish culture and transmitting the history and traditions of the country of origin. These activities are aimed at the superior purpose of strengthening ethnic identity and national awareness among Poles abroad. The education system abroad is especially important in the case of the post-accession diaspora, which is characterised by an increasing number of children and youth, who migrate with their parents. Additionally, the growing number of children born to Polish parents abroad has increased the size of the child and youth diaspora, who are the main targets of education activities (Popyk 2022). The main institution dedicated to education abroad is the Centre for the Development of Polish Education Abroad (ORPEG), which is subordinate to the Ministry of National Education. The official mission of ORPEG is to shape and sustain asense of national identity among Poles living abroad by teaching the Polish language, history and culture to children and young people in Polish, facilitating young Poles’ eventual return to the Polish education system, promoting Polish culture, and providing methodological and content-related support for teachers teaching the Polish language (ORPEG n.d.). The centre runs Polish schools at Poland’sdiplomatic missions; in 2023 there were 74 Polish schools in 36 countries teaching the Polish national curriculum. ORPEG also offers Polish children living abroad with innovative learning curricula, Polish textbooks and teaching aids (such as online handbooks for children), online and distance learning courses, and advisory services and professional training for teachers working abroad to support the teaching of the Polish 64 cHaPter 2 BuildiNg tHe gloBal NatioN: diasPora Policy iN PolaNd To present the institutional infrastructure dedicated to the Polish diaspora, it is also necessary to mention information about two parliamentary commissions. There is the Commission for Liaison with Poles Abroad in the Sejm (the lower house) and the Committee for Emigration and Contacts with Poles Abroad in the Senate (the upper house). Both committees meet regularly and discuss current issues relating to the Polish diaspora. 2.6 CONCLUSION The process of ‘global nation-building’ involving the diaspora is particularly evident in the case of countries with along history of being asending country and akin-state in which there is asignificant number of emigrants and kin-minorities. The idea of a‘global nation’ is visible in Poland in the form of the symbolic actions that the Polish diaspora engages in and the official narrative about the diaspora. The priority areas of development within Polish diaspora policy are the education system abroad, legal regulations (issuing the Pole’sCard), and political regulations (enfranchisement). The country’smain approach to the Polish diaspora can be described as nationand culture-centred. The main focus is on maintaining national identity, teaching the Polish language, and supporting access to Polish culture. This approach is rooted in the common conviction that Poles living abroad are an essential part of the Polish nation. The appearance of the post-accession diaspora after Poland joined the EU in 2004 resulted in some changes in the policy aimed at Poles abroad. The state made some structural and legal changes relating to the development of consular infrastructure, especially in European countries, and the network of Polish schools abroad, along with expanding access to the Pole’sCard to persons of Polish origin living all over the world, increasing the number of polling stations available during elections for non-resident citizens who want to vote from abroad. The most developed area of diaspora policy is the education of Polish children and youth abroad, which remains akey interest of the Polish authorities. 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[Ministry of Foreign Affairs] n.d. ‘Government Programme for Cooperation with Poles and Poles Abroad 2015–2020.’ https://www.gov.pl/web /dyplomacja. Newland, K. ed. 2010. Diasporas. New Partners in Global Development Policy. Migration Policy. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default /files/publications/Diasporas-Partners.pdf. Nowosielski, M., and W. Nowak. 2017. ‘Między Wschodem aZachodem– geograficzne ukierunkowanie polityki polonijnej ijego przemiany w latach 1989–2017.’ [Between East and West– the geographic focus of Polish diaspora policy and its transformation between 1989 and 2017] Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe 15, no. 1: 139–158. ORPEG. 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Sendhardt, B. 2021. ‘The Paradoxical Nature of Diaspora Engagement Policies: AWorld Polity Perspective on the Karta Polaka.’ Ethnopolitics 20, no. 1: 25–38. Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. [Service of the Republic of Poland] n.d.-a. ‘Misja.’ [Mission] Accessed 15 October 2023. https://www.gov.pl/web/polonia/misja. Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. [Service of the Republic of Poland] n.d.-b. ‘W służbie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Polakom iPolonii na świecie. Rola idziałania Pełnomocnika Rządu do spraw Polonii iPolaków za Granicą.’ [In the service of the Republic of Poland on behalf of the Polish Diaspora. The role and activities of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Polish Diaspora] Accessed 17 October 2023. https://www.gov.pl/web/polonia/w-sluzbie -rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-i-polakom-i-polonii-na-swiecie. Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. [Service of the Republic of Poland] n.d.-c. ‘Historia.’ [History] Accessed 15 March 2024. https://www.gov.pl/web/polonia/historia. Shain, Y., and A. Barth. 2023. ‘Diasporas and International Relations Theory.’ International Organization 57, no. 3: 449–479. Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów. [Office of the Prime Minister] n.d. Ustawa zdnia 7 września 2007 r. oKarcie Polaka [Pole’sCard Act], Dz. U. no. 180/1280 (in Polish). ‘W służbie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Polakom iPolonii na świecie. Rola idziałania Pełnomocnika Rządu do spraw Polonii iPolaków za Granicą.’ [In the service of the Republic of Poland on behalf of the Polish diaspora. The role and activities of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Polish Diaspora] Accessed 17 October 2023. https://www.gov.pl/web/polonia/w-sluzbie -rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-i-po-lakom-i-polonii-na-swiecie. World Bank. 2019. Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook. Washington, DC: World Bank. cHaPter 3 HUNGARIAN DIASPORA POLICY eszter KovÁcs 3.1 INTRODUCTION: HUNGARIAN DIASPORA POLICY CONTEXTUALISED Hungarian minorities living in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine– communities that became minorities as the result of the dissolution of historical Hungary due to 20th-century border changes– have been an important concern for Hungarian governments since the democratic transition, although the major focuses, goals, and means of kin-state policy of conservative and left-leaning governments have differed significantly. Interestingly, however, diaspora (or emigrant) Hungarian communities in the West (that were formed with the great emigration waves of the 20th century) received barely any attention from Hungary until 2010, despite the fact that their number is roughly the same as that of the ‘historic’ Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. The total number of Hungarians living in Hungary’sneighbouring countries is close to 2 million, and, according to an estimate from the Hungarian government, the number of Hungarians in the West is also around 2 million.27 The Hungarian government’sattitude towards the diaspora changed significantly in 2010 with the landslide victory of the right-wing, conservative Fidesz party. After 2010, Hungarian kin-state activism entered an intensified phase, and the government started to dedicate special attention to the diaspora communities as well. This shift was above all marked by the decision to grant Hungarians abroad the possibility to obtain Hungarian citizenship, which was followed by the introduction of external voting rights for dual citizens. These rights are not restricted to the historic Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries but are open to diaspora Hungarians as well. Simultaneously, diaspora Hungarian communities also began to be the target of greater attention in government discourse and policies after 27 Just like in the Polish case, the Hungarian government’sestimate defines the Hungarian diaspora in the broadest sense. Its definition includes people with any kind of Hungarian heritage (e.g. people claiming Hungarian heritage in the US census but not having any effective ties to Hungary) as well as recent emigrants. Therefore, the 2 million estimate should be accepted with reservations. 68 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy 2010. The government’sdiscourse stresses that ‘every Hungarian matters’ and that diaspora Hungarians constitute an equal part of the ‘unified’ and ‘cohesive’ Hungarian nation. Actual government practices in the field of kin-state politics, however, clearly differentiate between the ‘transborder’ (or historic) Hungarian communities and the diaspora (or emigrant) communities. Recent Hungarian emigrants constitute athird category of Hungarian population abroad. Hungary experienced an upswing of emigration trends in the early and mid-2010s. This wave of emigration was the result of the opening up of the EU labour market, the existence of asignificant wage gap between Eastern and Western European countries, and the economic recession in Hungary following the 2008 crisis. While statistical data on the estimated number of Hungarian emigrants in Western European countries vary widely, there may be several hundreds of thousands of Hungarians living temporarily or settled permanently abroad. Despite the considerable number of recent emigrants in Western Europe, they do not appear to be an integral part of Hungarian diaspora policy in either the discourse or actual engagement practices. Hungarian minority communities based in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, and Serbia are politically active and organised, have strong and effective ties to Hungary, and can easily be mobilised through their ethnic parties. For this reason, their votes in Hungarian elections represent apotential political resource and can thus mean political remittances for the state. On the other hand, the direct political remittance potential of the Hungarian diaspora communities is less obvious. Their ties to Hungary are more symbolic and cultural, and their organisations are of acivil and not apolitical nature. Therefore, their votes in Hungarian elections have less potential; they represent amuch weaker direct political resource for the state (Kovács 2020). In this chapter Iprovide aconcise introduction to Hungary’sdiaspora policy in the context of acomparative analysis of Central East European states’ diaspora engagement. First, Igive ashort introduction to the different types of Hungarian population groups abroad. Ithen elaborate on how Hungary has related to its kin-minorities in neighbouring countries since 1989/1990, and how the country paid only sporadic attention to its diaspora in that period until recently. Lastly, Iaddress the developments of the post-2010 era, which brought about an intensified phase of kin-state policy activism, and, alongside this and for the first time in the post-1990 era, astrong diaspora policy as well. To compare how Hungary engages with Hungarian kin-minorities and Hungarian diaspora communities, the chapter discusses government practices: legal acts, government programmes, institutions, and policy papers. 69cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy 3.2 INTERPRETING KIN-STATE AND DIASPORA POLICIES IN THE HUNGARIAN CONTEXT 3.2.1 KIN-STATE AND KIN-MINORITIES The states in Central and Eastern Europe have in common that, as aresult of 20th-century border changes and more recent state dissolutions, they have significant kin-minorities in their neighbouring countries or in the wider region. During the communist era, the issues of these minorities were not addressed in any way by their kin-states, as the official ideology did not allow transnational nationalist engagements of any sort. After the democratic transition and the consolidation of the new states, Central European governments immediately reached out to and started to engage with their kin-minorities, most often acting as ‘protective external homelands’ (Žilović 2012). The term ‘kin-minority’ denotes those national or ethnic minorities that were created through border changes or state dissolution (Waterbury 2010, 18). Wolff (2002, 4) uses the term ‘external minorities’ to describe kin-minorities as ‘minorities that, while living on the territory of one state (host-state) are ethnically akin to the titular nation of another, often neighbouring, state (kin-state)’. In the Hungarian case study, the term kin-minority is used to describe the ethnic Hungarian groups that live in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, and Serbia. These groups have been living as ethnic minorities since the dissolution of historic Hungary in 1920.28 Kin-state is the term used to describe the kin-minority’s‘homeland’ (i.e. the country which claims historic, cultural, linguistic, or religious affiliation with the kin-minority). One of the first authors who tried to conceptualise kin-minorities likened the phenomenon to family ties and, thus, described kin-minorities as ethnic or national ‘relatives’ of the kin-state (Walzer 1984). However, as the term ‘homeland’ is associated with emigration, it is misleading to describe the kin-minority’skin-state with that term. Yet, ‘homeland’ is frequently used in kin-state politics to refer to the kin-state because it represents astrong emotional connection and affinity between the state and the minority. Kin-state policy or politics is the term that describes the kinstate’sprojects, programmes, politics, and relations with its kin-minority. Kin-state politics should be regarded as aconglomerate of different policies and regulations: foreign, educational, and cultural policies; nationality and electoral law; financial support provided for the kin-minority, etc. (Csergő 2011). The aim of these policies is to provide political and financial support for the kin-minority’snation-building, to influence the ‘self-perception’ of the 28 The minority status of these communities was interrupted in the interwar era, when, for ashort time, Hungary gained back some of the territories it had lost. 70 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy minority (Kántor 2006), to promote cross-border interaction, and in many cases to enable co-ethnics to move to the kin-state through preferential naturalisation procedures (Csergő 2011). 3.2.2 DIASPORA AND DIASPORA POLICY While kin-state politics are relevant mostly in the context of Central and Eastern European countries, the other central notions in this chapter, namely, diaspora and diaspora politics, are more global phenomena. While the definition of kin-minorities is rather straightforward, in the case of ‘diaspora’ there is avaried understanding of the concept. As Dufoix argues, the term ‘diaspora’ has gone through significant changes in recent decades (Dufoix 2011). The initial definition was based on the classic example of the Jewish diaspora, and it entailed dispersion, exile, traditions, and the eventual wish to return to the homeland. As the concept evolved, different authors applied different criteria to define the essence of diasporas (Esman 2009; Safran 1991; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1997; Bauböck 2010), but all of these definitions were slightly different variants of the classic example and focused on emigration as the essential ingredient. Acontrasting approach to diasporas was offered by Stuart Hall through the cultural identity concept, where the essence of adiaspora community lies not in its relationship to the homeland, but in the cultural reproduction and reinterpretation of the community’sheritage (Hall 1990). Anew approach to understanding the concept of diaspora has been evolving since the 1990s as the result of intensified labour migration. In this new approach, the term does not have to entail experiences of exile, nor does it require the idea of homecoming. The ‘diaspora option’ (Meyer et al. 1997) has emerged as acounterpoint to the notion of the ‘brain drain’ and it emphasises the advantages and potential that the homeland can gain from the mobilisation of highly skilled expatriate networks abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Studies on diaspora policies directly or indirectly apply the ‘diaspora option’ approach in order to develop potential typologies and models for diaspora policies (Gamlen 2006; Gamlen 2014; Ragazzi 2014; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Tiwari 2013). Utilising the potential of the diaspora is an idea that is applicable to all ‘layers’ of the diaspora in its broader sense. The ‘diaspora as aresource’ approach is now widely used and addressed in international migration organisations, and many countries of origin have moved in this direction of outreach since the late 20th century. This approach incorporates all kinds of diaspora populations as target groups: recent labour migrants, scientific diasporas, and further generations of migrants who are attached to the original homeland only by descent. Rogers Brubaker’scontribution to the understand- 71cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy ing of the term also resonates with this approach, since he suggests that, instead of conceptualising diasporas as groups or (closed) ethno-cultural entities, one should rather talk about diasporic ‘stances’, ‘projects’, or ‘claims’ (Brubaker 2005). Brubaker’sdefinition is, thus, very useful for astate-centred examination of and research on diaspora politics. He points out that instead of setting out the criteria for what makes adiaspora, the emphasis should be on how the homeland constitutes its diaspora, what projects it formulates to engage the diaspora, and how the ‘claimed members’ (Brubaker 2005, 12) of the diaspora react to these calls from the homeland. Brubaker’scontribution to understanding what adiaspora is and, through that, to understanding astate’sdiaspora policy, provides the theoretical underpinnings of this chapter as it examines how and why the Hungarian government tries to engage with its (putative) diaspora population. 3.3 TYPES OF CO-ETHNIC GROUPS ABROAD: KIN-MINORITY, DIASPORA HUNGARIAN COMMUNITIES, AND RECENT EMIGRANTS 3.3.1 KIN-MINORITY HUNGARIANS Like Poland (see Chapter 2 by Lesińska), Hungary has large co-ethnic communities abroad, which were created either through border changes in the 20th century or by successive waves of emigration. The first type are kinminorities, while the second type are diaspora or emigrant communities. Hungarian kin-minorities came into existence with the Treaty of Trianon that concluded the First World War for Hungary and created the new borders of the Hungarian state. As aresult of these new borders, millions of ethnic Hungarians became citizens of the countries neighbouring Hungary. Although for ashort period of time during the interwar years Hungary gained back some of the territories it had lost in 1920, the 1945 settlement of the Second World War reaffirmed the earlier border changes and, with that, the minority status of the Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries (Romania, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia). In the communist era, minority communities did not have the proper means to maintain their institutions, and through them, their language and culture. After the democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungarian minority communities started to mobilise themselves on an ethnopolitical basis. Since 1990, all Hungarian minority communities have had political organisations in their respective countries, with the primary aim of representing the interests of the Hungarian community in the given state (Kántor 2013). According to the most recent census results, the four largest ‘transbor- 72 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy der’ Hungarian communities number approximately 1 million in Romania, 420,000 in Slovakia, 184,000 in Serbia, and 150,000 in Ukraine (Pro Civis Polgársi Társulás 2022; Romanian National Institute of Statistics 2022; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2023; Kapitány 2015). 3.3.2 DIASPORA HUNGARIANS The history of Hungarian diaspora communities is considerably different from that of Hungarian kin-minorities. The first significant wave of emigration from the territory of Hungary started at the end of the 1880s, when the great economic recession reached Austria-Hungary. Most of these emigrants settled in the United States. The outbreak of the First World War put an end to Hungarian economic emigration, but soon after the end of the war emigration started again, though on amuch smaller scale. In the interwar period, many educated people left the country, and many ethnic Hungarians who had become residents of neighbouring countries following the post-war border changes also fled to the West. The next significant wave of emigration began at the end of the Second World War, and some years later in 1947 the establishment of the communist government again forced thousands of Hungarians to leave the country (Borbándi 2006). Another large number of Hungarians left the country following the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Between 1956 and 1960, approximately 200,000 ethnic Hungarians emigrated, most of them to the United States and asmaller amount to Canada, Australia, and Western Europe. The emigrants of 1956 were in alarge part fleeing from the persecutions following the suppression of the revolution, but the number of those who did not actually participate in the revolution but seized the opportunity to leave communist Hungary behind in and after 1956 was more significant. Further steady but not particularly substantial emigration occurred after the 1960s, and it continued after Hungary’stransition to ademocratic state as well. After Hungary’sEU accession, migration to Western European countries accelerated. Today, there is still avery high rate of labour migration to EU countries (foremost to the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria), and new forms of transnational formations can be observed among the newest emigrant (or diaspora) communities (Papp Z. 2010; Papp Z. et al. 2023). The number of Hungarians in the diaspora can only be estimated, but not determined exactly, for various methodological reasons (e.g. alack of data on second and further diaspora generations and on return migration, or the different statistical methods used in receiving states). Despite methodological concerns, the number of Hungarians in the diaspora has been estimated by the Hungarian government to be around 2–2.5 million (Kucsera and Kulcsár-Szabó 2011, 35; Prime Minister’sOffice, State Secretariat for Hungar- 73cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy ian Communities Abroad 2016). This number, however, has to be interpreted within the context of diaspora policy; the Hungarian government applies the broadest concept possible to define who constitutes part of the Hungarian diaspora.29 Here, Brubaker’sremark on the concept of adiaspora has to be referred to again; this number of members of the Hungarian diaspora reflects the Hungarian government’s‘claim’ (Brubaker 2005) on aputative diaspora population. Based on the above introduction, the difference between the two kinds of Hungarian groups abroad is evident. Hungarian kin-minorities in neighbouring countries have been an important concern for post-1990 Hungarian politics, and those communities– through family ties, work and educational opportunities, the accessible Hungarian-language media, and simply the geographic proximity– have continued to exist with close ties to Hungary. In contrast, Hungarians in the Western diaspora have had weaker contacts with Hungary, and they have been living in amore remote reality from the homeland. Furthermore, while in the past 25 years the Hungarians in neighbouring countries have been the subject of many studies in the humanities and social sciences, there have been few such projects devoted to the diaspora. For this reason, there is very limited scientific knowledge about the Hungarian diaspora population. 3.3.3 RECENT EMIGRANTS In addition to Hungarian kin-minorities and diaspora Hungarians, recent emigrants constitute athird large group of the Hungarian population abroad. Contemporary emigration from Hungary is hard to quantify (Blaskó 2015). National statistical data provided by home and host countries capture only one side of atransnational relationship. In Hungary, nationals who emigrate are officially obliged to register their emigration with the respective authority in Hungary or with aHungarian consulate; however, only amarginal proportion of emigrants do so.30 For example, official Hungarian statistical data suggest that the number of Hungarians who left Hungary in 2012 was under 15,000, while mirror statistics from receiving countries showed almost 80,000 new Hungarian immigrants that year (Blaskó et al. 2014, 353). Host countries use different methods to monitor their immigrants: some countries define immigrants by citizenship, while others do so by place of 29 See, e.g., Papp (2008) on the methodological concerns of counting the Hungarian diaspora in the United States. 30 The obligation concerns only those who emigrate permanently; those who plan to work abroad only temporarily are not obliged to register. In practice, however, many emigrants who plan to work abroad temporarily end up staying in aforeign country for several years or even decades. 80 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy munities abroad. In terms of financial support, existing foundations were replaced by an entirely new organisation, the Bethlen Gábor Fund, which is now the only public body to which Hungarian organisations, institutions, and individuals abroad can apply for funding. The financial allocations to Hungarians abroad have been growing steadily since 2010 (Átlátszó Erdély 2017). The State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad defines specific themes for each year and thereby determines the kinds of projects external Hungarian communities can apply to get funding for. For example, 2012 was the year of minority Hungarian kindergartens, 2017 the year of Hungarian family businesses abroad, 2018 the year of Hungarian families abroad, and 2020 the year of strong communities (Kulhoni Magyarok n.d.). 3.5.2 ENGAGING THE DIASPORA Although kin-state policy has been acentral concern of Hungarian governments since 1990, it is interesting that the Hungarian diaspora communities, the number of which is basically equal to the number of kin-minorities in neighbouring countries, received very little attention from the homeland before 2010. It was not until the 2010s that astructured policy for diaspora engagement was introduced, and this policy’smeasures were inserted into the logic and structure of the enhanced national kin-state policy (‘Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad…’ 2011). One of the central mottos of post-2010 kin-state politics has been the promotion of a‘unified and single Hungarian nation’, which in the government’sinterpretation refers to the spiritual and symbolic unification of the nation, without any revisionist (territorial) claims, and in which there is room for all Hungarians, regardless of where they live. In 2010, when the Hungarian Standing Conference convened anew for the first time since 2004, the government decided to set up aseparate consultative forum exclusively for diaspora organisations: the Hungarian Diaspora Council. With that measure, the coordinating bodies of kin-minority Hungarians and diaspora Hungarians were separated. As noted above, before 2010 the Hungarian Standing Conference served as aconsultation forum between Hungarian parliamentary parties and Hungarians abroad– both minorities and the diaspora– but the issues of Hungarian minorities were given priority. The establishment of the Hungarian Diaspora Council marked official acknowledgement of the different character and needs of and different approaches to be taken to the two kinds of ‘Hungarians abroad’. Thus, it can be claimed that Hungarian kin-state and diaspora politics became separated from each other in institutional terms after 2010. The Hungarian Diaspora Council convenes once ayear. Its participants are invited by the government. Most of the old and well-established Hungarian diaspora organisations 81cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy around the world are members of the Diaspora Council, but representatives of newly established emigrant organisations are not. Diaspora policies differ from kin-state policies not only in institutional terms but also in their objectives and programmes. One of the initial steps of diaspora engagement policy was the launch of the Hungarian Register (Nemzeti Regiszter), avirtual database for Hungarians worldwide, which also published aweekly newsletter on Hungarian politics in both Hungarian and English. Its primary aim was to reconnect with those who had lost contact with the homeland and give them an up-to-date picture of the country. However, this project was not very successful, nor did it last very long, and eventually it was essentially replaced by the website of the State Secretariat. Another new form of engagement was the cultural revitalisation programme (Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Programme) launched for the diaspora, within the framework of which young Hungarians travel to diaspora organisations for six to nine months and help them in organising cultural events, heritage cultivation, and language education. The programme was welcomed with great enthusiasm and satisfaction by diaspora organisations. Other key programmes include one that focuses on the cultivation of tangible heritage, the Julianus programme, which aims to record all Hungarian examples of commemorative sites and phenomena worldwide (streets named after Hungarians, statutes, plaques, etc.), and the Mikes Kelemen programme, which ran from 2014 to 2022 and was designed to collect personal collections of books and journals in the diaspora. All of these programmes convey the symbolic message that the Hungarian diaspora matters, and that the Hungarian government maintains acertain kind of responsibility for diaspora Hungarians as well. The core idea of Hungarian diaspora policy programmes, much like Slovak diaspora engagement practices, is to strengthen the cultural ties between Hungary and the diaspora. In Gamlen’s(2006) definition, Hungary primarily practices acapacity-building type of diaspora engagement. The Kőrösi Csoma revitalisation programme undoubtedly became the flagship project of Hungarian diaspora policy. The programme started in 2013. That year, 50 young people travelled to diaspora host organisations, and the government doubled the number of participants in the second year. The types of host organisations in North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Australia (and New Zealand), South Africa, and Israel are diverse: they include Hungarian schools, parishes, Hungarian cultural houses and community centres, libraries, scout groups, folk dance groups, and other associations. What they have in common is that most of them are ‘old’ diaspora organisations, which means that they were founded by emigrants from the big emigration waves of the 20th century, not by emigrants who left Hungary in the last 30 years. 82 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy The Hungarian government also supports several initiatives that originated in the diaspora itself. ReConnect Hungary, aHungarian birthright programme, has been running since 2012 with the aim of reaching out to the younger generations of the oldest Hungarian diasporas– the American and Canadian ones. It follows the same logic as Israeli diaspora tourism projects (Kelner 2010). The programme was created by some New York-based leaders of the Hungarian diaspora, and it enjoys the financial support of the Hungarian government. Asimilar, slightly newer heritage tourism project (Rákóczi Szövetség Diaszpóra Tábor) that is also supported by the Hungarian government targets more recent generations of the diaspora and seeks to connect them with Hungarians living in the Hungarian minority communities in the neighbouring countries of Hungary. In 2016, the State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad drafted astrategy document for adiaspora policy that was then adopted by the Hungarian Diaspora Council later that year. The document is titled ‘Hungarian Diaspora Policy– Strategic Directions’ and it defines the strategic goals of Hungarian diaspora policy as locating, addressing, supporting, engaging, and linking the diaspora to Hungary. However, instead of actually outlining strategic plans, goals, and tools, the document is much more of an organised presentation of existing diaspora programmes and thus seems to serve the purpose of justifying the programmes that were already launched without any special planning work beforehand. In connection with the above-described diaspora engagement projects, it needs to be emphasised again that they target older, established Hungarian diaspora communities (mostly the communities of emigrants from 1945 and 195634) and not recent Hungarian emigrants who left the country in the past few decades and mostly live in Western European countries. The issue of recent emigrants sporadically and very briefly appears in some of the government’sdocuments on diaspora policy. The diaspora projects that have been launched since 2010 do not reflect the needs of recent emigrants. Similarly, the government’sdiscourse on the Hungarian diaspora does not address recent emigrants. Thus, recent emigrants in fact do not constitute an integral part of the government’sdiaspora policy and strategy. The State Secretariat responsible for kin-minority and diaspora Hungarians does not deal extensively with recent emigrants’ affairs; the only exemption is the increasing support for Hungarian Sunday schools in the newly emerging Hungarian communities in Western Europe and other places. The reasons behind this distinction between Hungarian communities abroad are not quite clear and are empirically hard to prove, but it is an issue 34 See the section on the different kinds of Hungarian communities abroad. 83cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy often addressed in public discourse and by political actors in opposition parties. They claim that the Hungarian government applies adouble standard in relation to Hungarian communities abroad: while the government supports Hungarian minorities and old diaspora communities and facilitates their participation in Hungarian elections through postal voting, it ignores recent emigrants and complicates their participation by only allowing them to vote in person (at consulates or back in Hungary). This leads us to the last section of the chapter: the political remittances of external Hungarian populations. 3.6 A‘HOT TOPIC’ OF DIASPORA POLICY: THE POLITICAL REMITTANCES OF THE EXTERNAL POPULATION Based on the tense relations between left-wing parties and Hungarians abroad since 2004 and the nationalistic politics of Fidesz between 1998 and 2002 and especially after 2010, it was widely expected that newly enfranchised non-resident citizens would overwhelmingly support the governing Fidesz party. The first elections that took place after citizenship extension to Hungarians abroad were held in 2014 and they confirmed initial presumptions: 95% of those non-resident citizens who cast avote did indeed vote for the governing Fidesz (Herner-Kovács, Illyés, and Rákóczi 2014). However, of the roughly 500,000 new citizens who had acquired their Hungarian citizenship by 2014, only alittle over 200,000 registered to vote in the Hungarian elections, and the number of votes from abroad that were valid was 128,429. This number of votes meant one parliamentary seat for the party, which in the 2014 elections was not decisive.35 The breakdown of non-resident citizens’ votes in the 2018 and 2022 elections was very similar to what was observed in the 2014 election: in 2018 the number of valid non-resident votes was 225,471, and 96% of them were cast for Fidesz; in 2022 these numbers were 268,766 and 93.5%, respectively. Non-resident votes contributed to one to two parliamentary seats in the 2018 and 2022 elections. The composition of external votes in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 national elections showed aclear difference between the political remittance potential of Hungarian kin-minorities in neighbouring countries and that of the Hungarian diaspora. In all three elections, the majority of external votes were cast by Hungarian minorities living in Romania and Serbia, whereas the postal votes cast in the larger Hungarian diaspora communities (United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Germany) ranged from acouple of hundred to afew thousand. In 2022, 121,645 votes were received from Romania and 35 There have been elections in Europe in which external voters had adecisive effect on the results; Italy and Romania both faced such asituation (Pogonyi 2014). 84 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy 44,729 from Serbia, while the number of votes received from countries with larger Hungarian diaspora communities was again much lower: 394 from the United States, 546 from Canada, 608 from the United Kingdom, and 2,966 from Germany. These data show that the level of political participation of the old Hungarian diaspora communities in Hungarian elections is negligible. The fact that Hungarians in neighbouring countries have greater electoral power and potential than the diaspora does has several explanations. First of all, Hungarian kin-minorities are more invested in what is on Hungary’spolitical agenda than are the diaspora Hungarians, who live farther away. Transactional practices are part of the everyday life of Hungarians in neighbouring countries: they are just as informed about Hungarian politics as they are about the politics of their own country; they closely follow Hungarian offline and online media; and commuting between Hungary and their own country for work or education is an everyday experience. Furthermore, Hungary has an almost thirty-year tradition of acting as the protective external homeland of these communities. Even before 1990, Hungary had an apathetic (neither friendly nor hostile) relationship to those communities. Moreover, Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries are politically active communities, with well-established and politically integrated ethnic parties that have good relations with the Hungarian government. Thus, these communities are easily mobilised through their political organisations. In all three of the post-2010 elections, Hungarian ethnic parties in neighbouring countries played an active role in encouraging minority Hungarians to vote in the Hungarian parliamentary elections and effectively helped the Hungarian government parties’ campaign in their respective communities (Pogonyi 2017, 8). For all of these reasons, Fidesz’scampaign efforts have been highly successful in the Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries, and these communities have shown overwhelming support for the ruling Fidesz party in Hungarian national elections. By contrast, Hungarians in the diaspora exhibit weaker political identification with the homeland. Hungarian emigrants were considered enemies and traitors by Hungary before 1990. Even after the democratic transition, unlike the Hungarians in neighbouring countries, diaspora communities were not explicitly considered co-ethnics in need of the external homeland’sprotection. Moreover, there is adifference in the intensity of the two transnational groups’ identification with the homeland. Ethnic boundaries in kin-minority communities are constructed and fluid, but they are even more fluid and constructed in the diaspora (Brubaker 2005; Bauböck 2010). Especially after the second generation, the typical pattern of identification among people in the diaspora is what Gans describes as symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979), where ethnic heritage is most often passed on through symbols and traditions, but not through actual involvement or engagement with the 85cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy homeland’sactual political reality. The fact that Hungarian diaspora communities are cultural rather than political communities makes it challenging for the homeland to reach out to them with political projects. The second explanation for the greater political significance of kinminorities is that the organisations of the diaspora, unlike those of the Hungarian kin-minorities, are civic and cultural rather than political organisations. They are not democratically elected bodies and therefore they do not represent the Hungarian diaspora in apolitical sense. As aresult, they do not have the legitimacy to act on behalf of the diaspora community, and, eventually, to work as partners of the Hungarian government. Their potential in political mobilisation is therefore rather limited. Athird reason that hinders the effective political mobilisation of these communities is that diaspora members are scattered all over the world, and they do not live in cohesive ethnic blocs. These factors contribute to the fact that Hungarian diaspora communities have very limited political remittance potential compared to that of the Hungarian kin-minorities. The potential political remittances of the third type of external population, recent emigrants, is, however, less obvious. As discussed above, Hungarian citizens who are not residents of Hungary (i.e. most of the naturalised minority Hungarians) can vote by mail in the national elections, while Hungarian citizens who are residents of Hungary can only vote in person, even if they are not living in Hungary at the time of the elections. This means that Hungarian emigrants who have not cancelled their residency in Hungary must either visit Hungary at the time of the national elections or travel to the closest Hungarian consulate in their host country if they wish to cast avote. Having to show up in person at aconsulate to vote is obviously much more inconvenient, so it is not very surprising that the number of in-person votes at Hungarian consulates was relatively low in the last two elections: it was roughly 46,000 in 2018 and 57,000 in 2022. This regulation definitely presents an interesting contrast to the case of Poland. As explained in Chapter 2, Poland has taken avery different approach to the political rights of recent emigrants: the number of external polling stations has grown considerably in countries with large Polish communities over the past two decades in order to facilitate the political participation of Polish migrants. The diaspora’s(presumed) support for certain parties in the homeland elections is acommon issue in the Central Eastern European region (see Chapter 1 by Janurová and Janská). In Hungary, opposition parties have been discussing how the system of external voting in Hungary is unfair as it puts emigrants who maintained their official resident status in Hungary in adisadvantaged position. In the opposition’sargumentation, the governing party applies adouble standard to Hungarian communities abroad; while it 86 cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy facilitates the participation of Hungarian minorities and old diaspora communities in Hungarian elections through postal voting, it ignores recent emigrants and complicates their participation by only allowing them to vote in person (at consulates or back in Hungary). According to the opposition, the reason for the double standard is that while Hungarian minorities and the old diaspora overwhelmingly support the government (as the results of the last three election indicate), recent emigrants probably do not favour the governing party. This hypothesis was recently confirmed by asurvey: astudy by the 21 Research Center in Budapest showed that afew months before the Hungarian national elections of 2022, 43% of Hungarian migrants said that they supported an opposition party, while only 11% supported the governing Fidesz party (21 Kutatóközpont 2022). 3.7 CONCLUSION This chapter aimed to outline the post-1990 developments of Hungarian kinstate and diaspora policy, with aprimary focus on the more intense phase of diaspora relations since 2010. It discussed the important milestones of Hungary’spost-1990 kin-state and diaspora policy and argued that until 2010 Hungary as an external homeland focused almost exclusively on Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, whereas Hungarian diaspora communities received barely any attention. This changed significantly in 2010. After the landslide victory of the right-wing, conservative Fidesz party, not only did Hungary start to pursue amore active kin-state policy, but it also began to develop acomprehensive policy framework for Hungarian diaspora communities. The engagement practices of kin-state and diaspora policy after 2010 differ from each other, and the potential political remittances of kin-state and diaspora policy are different, too. While the transnational policies aimed at kin-minorities are prompted by an interest in the political remittances of those communities, the programmes for engaging with the diaspora communities focus primarily on identity-building and strengthening the relationship between the homeland and the diaspora. There are several explanations for this difference. First of all, the historical contexts of homeland–kin-minority vs homeland–diaspora relations are different. In the case of Hungarian kinminorities, Hungary has alonger tradition of acting as aprotective external homeland (since 1990). Hungarian emigrants were considered enemies and traitors by Hungary before 1990, and even after the democratic transition diaspora communities were not explicitly considered co-ethnics in need of the external homeland’sprotection. Second, there is aclear difference in the two transnational communities’ identity. While Hungarian kin-minorities are 87cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy politically active and organised communities with strong and effective ties to Hungary, Hungarian diaspora communities’ ties to Hungary are of amore symbolic and cultural nature. On the other hand, both kin-state and diaspora policies are integral parts of the post-2010 government’snationalising discourse. The basic idea is that the current government acts in the interest of a‘single, united Hungarian nation’, and every Hungarian, no matter where they live, forms apart of this nation. Therefore, the opening up to the Hungarian diaspora communities– which had been neglected since 1990– is alogical step towards completing the government’snarrative about the Hungarian nation. Hungarian diaspora engagement practices are potentially an important source of indirect political remittances as well: the nationalist narrative and symbolic aspects of kin-state and diaspora policy aim to reinforce the support of the nationalist, right-wing electorate of the governing parties, which could be competed for by other radical right-wing parties in the domestic political scene. 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Dokumentumok, Tanulmányok, Publicisztika, edited by Zoltán Kántor, 159–184. Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány. Kántor, Z. 2004. ‘Status Law and “Nation Policy”: Theoretical Aspects.’ In The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/ or Minority Protection, edited by Zoltán Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, Balázs Vizi, and Iván Halász. Sapporo: Hokkaido University, Slavic Research Center. Kántor, Z. 2006. ‘Nationalism, Nationalizing Minorities and Kin-State Nationalism.’ In Interculturalism and Discrimination in Romania: Policies, Practices, Identities and Representations, edited by F. Ruegg, R. Poledna, and C. Rus, 249–276. Münster: LIT Verlag. Kántor, Z. ed. 2013. Nemzetpolitikai alapismeretek. [Foundations of kin-state policy] Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó Zrt. Kapitány, B. 2015. ‘Ethnic Hungarians in the Neigbouring Countries.’ In Demographic Portrait of Hungary 2015, edited by J. Monostori, P. Őri, and Z. Spéder, 225–239. Budapest: Hungarian Demographic Research Institute. https://demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php /demographicportrait/article/view/894/656. Kelner, S. 2010. Tours That Bind: Diaspora, Pilgrimage, and Israeli Birthright Tourism. New York: New York University Press. Kovács, E. 2020. ‘Direct and Indirect Political Remittances of the Transnational Engagement of Hungarian Kin-Minorities and Diaspora Communities.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 6: 1146–1165. 89cHaPter 3 HuNgariaN diasPora Policy Kovács, E. 2017. ‘Post-Socialist Diaspora Policies: Is There aCentral-European Diaspora Policy Path?’ Hungarian Journal of Minority Studies no. 1. https://bgazrt.hu/wp-content/uploads/ NPKI_folyoiratok/Hungarian%20Journal%20of%20Minority%20Studies%20VOL%20I/06 _kovacs.pdf. Kovács, M. M., Z. Körtvélyesi, and S. Pogonyi. 2010. ‘The Politics of External Kin-State Citizenship in East Central Europe.’ EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010/06, Comparative Reports. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/19576. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. n.d. ‘Akivándorló magyar állampolgárok célországok és nemek szerint.’ [Emigrant citizens according to host countries and gender] STADAT Report No. 22.1.1.31. Hungarian Statistical Office. https://www.ksh.hu /stadat_files/nep/hu/nep0031.html. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. 2017. ‘Új magyar állampolgárok - Változások az egyszerűsített honosítási eljárás bevezetése után.’ [New Hungarian citizens– Changes after the introduction of the preferential naturalisation process] Report. Hungarian Statistical Office. http:// www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/pdf/ujmagyarallampolgarok.pdf. Kucsera, T. G., and E. Kulcsár-Szabó. 2011. ‘Nyugati Magyar Tudományos Tanács.’ [The Western Hungarian Scientific Council] In Nemzeti Önismeret. Az MTA Magyar Tudományosság Külföldön Elnöki Bizottságának Tevékenysége 2006–2011, edited by C. Fedinec and M. Tarnóczy, 29–36. Budapest: MTA Magyar Tudományosság Külföldön Elnöki Bizottság. Kulhoni Magyarok. [Hungarians in Cologne] n.d. ‘Tematikus programok akülhoni magyarság támogatására.’ [Thematic homes to support Hungarians living abroad] https://www .kulhonimagyarok.hu/kategoria/programok/tematikus-evek/. Mák, F. 2000. ‘Az új nemzeti politika és aHatáron Túli Magyarok Hivatala (1989–1999).’ [The new kin-state policy and the Office of Hungarian Communities Abroad] Magyar Kisebbség 6, no, 3. https://www.jakabffy.ro/magyarkisebbseg/index.php?action=cimek&lapid=16&cikk =m000315.html. Meyer, J.-B., J. Charum, D. Bernal, J. Gaillard, J. Granés, J. Leon, A. Montenegro, A. Morales, C.Murcia, N. Narvaez-Berthelemot, L. Stella Parrado, and B. Schlemmer. 1997. ‘Turning Brain Drain into Brain Gain: The Colombian Experience of the Diaspora Option.’ Science, Technology and Society 2, no. 2: 285–315. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. 2003. ‘The Politics of Migrants’ Transnational Political Practices.’ International Migration Review 37, no. 3: 760–786. Papp Z., A. 2010. ‘Anyugati magyar diaszpóra és szervezeti élete néhány demográfiai, társadalmi jellemzője.’ [Organisational life of the Hungarian diaspora in the West and some of their demographic and social characteristics] Kisebbségkutatás 19, no. 4. https://epa.oszk .hu/00400/00462/00048/1890.htm. Papp Z., A., E. Kovács, and A. Kováts. 2023. ‘Unpacking the Functions of Institutions in an Emerging Diaspora: Hungarian Weekend Schools in the UK.’ Diaspora, Indigenous, and Minority Education. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15595692.2022.2164271. Pogonyi, S. 2014. ‘Four Patterns of Non-Resident Voting Rights.’ Ethnopolitics 13, no. 2: 122–140. Pogonyi, S. 2017. ‘Europeanization of Kin-Citizenship and the Dynamics of Kin-Minority ClaimMaking: The Case of Hungary.’ Problems of Post-Communism 64, no. 5: 1–15. Prime Minister’sOffice, State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad. 2016. ‘Hungarian Diaspora Policy– Strategic Directions.’ http://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/download /7/80/30000/diaspora_policy.pdf. Pro Civis Polgári Társulás. 2022. ‘Aszlovákiai népszámlálás eredményei.’ [Results of the Slovak Census] https://www.onkormanyzas.sk/dokumentumok. Ragazzi, F. 2014. ‘AComparative Analysis of Diaspora Policies.’ Political Geography 41: 74–89. Romanian National Institute of Statistics. 2021. ‘Rezultate provizori. Populatia rezidenta pe sexe, dupa etnie, pe sexe si judete.’ [Preliminary results. Population by sex, ethnicity, and counties] https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-rpl-2021/rezultate-provizorii/. Safran, W. 1991. ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return.’ Diaspora: AJournal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1: 83–99. Sik, E., and B. Szeitl. 2016. ‘Migráció amai Magyarországról.’ Education 25, no. 4: 546–557. 96 cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia 4.5 LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE DIASPORA Two main official documents regulate relations between Slovakia and its diaspora. The first one is Act No. 474/2005 on Slovaks Living Abroad (often translated into English as the Act on Expatriate Slovaks), which came into effect in 2005 and defines what state institutions can do for Slovaks abroad and the main policies of engagement with nationals living abroad (Koncepcia… 2015). The second document is the Declaration of the State Policy of the Slovak Republic in relation to Slovaks living abroad for the period 2016–2020. This document does not contain any commitment on the part of state organisations and institutions to create special policies, programmes, or services to respond to the needs of nationals living abroad. But the document insists that it is important for Slovakia to engage in the areas of culture and education and to define key institutions, organisations, programmes, and grant schemes that cover these areas of interest (see Surová 2018). In addition, Act No. 474/2005 sets out important principles for the treatment of the Slovak diaspora. First, the principle of equal treatment prohibits discrimination in the provision of state assistance on the grounds of gender, race, skin colour, language, faith and religion, political or other beliefs, social origin, wealth, descent, or other statuses. Second, the principle of territoriality states that Slovak institutions must respect the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the state of which the Slovak living abroad is acitizen and the territory in which the Slovak living abroad resides. And third, the principle of a‘specific approach’ means that the cultural objectives of Slovak diaspora policies must be adapted to the specific needs of Slovaks living in different countries (Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). The preferential treatment of Foreign Slovaks over any other group of foreigners noted above involves aseries of exceptions and specific benefits that those who hold Foreign Slovak status can enjoy on the territory of the Slovak Republic even if they do not have Slovak citizenship. For instance, Foreign Slovaks do not require avisa to enter the territory of the Slovak Republic and have the right to permanent residence. Similarly, the status of Foreign Slovak comes with the right to apply for admission to any educational institution in Slovakia, apply for employment without awork permit, and apply for Slovak citizenship. Foreign Slovaks also benefit from awaiver on the specific restrictions on acquiring property that otherwise apply to foreigners in Slovakia. Overall, Foreign Slovaks can use this status as an instrument to obtain legal residence and employment in Slovakia (Správa za rok 2016 oštátnej politike vo vzťahu kSlovákom žijúcim vzahraničí 2016). Over the years, ethnic Slovaks have become active in different economic sectors of the Slovak economy, whether they are from Romania (e.g.agriculture, mining, and construction), the former Yugoslavia (e.g. higher education), 97cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia or Ukraine (construction, service industry). As the Slovak Republic has faced ashortage of labour since 2017 and the unemployment rate has reached historically low figures, discussions have started on the need to motivate Slovaks living abroad to return. Consequently, in 2017 the Government of the Slovak Republic prepared astrategic document called the ‘Complex Action Plan for the Return of Slovaks Working Abroad to Slovakia’. The document focuses mainly on promoting the state portal for seeking employment on the official websites of the Slovak consulates abroad. This service is meant to provide Slovaks living abroad with easier access to employment offers. The document has been criticised for being vague and formal and for not considering practical solutions and measures. Therefore, although the activities described in the document were supposed to start at some point in 2018, the document has never been introduced into Parliament and has not been followed by any further action. Similarly, the financial stimuli that the government put in place to attract Slovaks back home drew interest from only ahandful of Slovaks living abroad (Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). As far as electoral rights are concerned, Slovak nationals living abroad can vote by mail, stand as acandidate in parliamentary elections, and vote in referenda. Citizens who reside permanently abroad must send arequest by mail to the Department of Elections, Referenda, and Political Parties at the Ministry of the Interior to register on adedicated electoral roll. Applicants must include with this request aphotocopy of their Slovak nationality certificate, aphotocopy of part of their Slovak passport, and astatement in the Slovak language that they are not permanent residents in Slovakia (see Surová 2016; Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). 4.6 DIASPORA POLICIES AND RIGHTS As mentioned in section 4.3, the most important dimension of Slovakia’sdiaspora policies is aimed not at providing services to Slovak nationals living abroad, but rather at strengthening ties at the cultural level. Slovak diaspora policies promote avision of citizenry that is based on cultural affinities; they favour ethnic Slovaks abroad no matter what their citizenship is (Vašečka 2008). In this respect, Slovak policies on social protection for citizens living abroad are weak and rarely exceed the obligations required by the EU. Ethnic Slovaks, once they move to Slovakia, have preferential access to labour and social protection services over other foreigners. Diaspora policies consider return aprecondition for obtaining access to most rights. In asymbolic sense, however, there are numerous examples of diaspora policies outside of social protection provisions. Since 1993, the Day of Slovaks abroad (5 July) has been celebrated annually and it is included in the national 98 cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia calendar of celebrations. Another example is the ‘Conference of the Slovak Republic and Slovaks Living Abroad’ that is organised annually. Slovak Institutes, which promote Slovak culture abroad and fall under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provide the Slovak diaspora with additional opportunities for engaging with Slovak culture. Slovak Institutes can be found in Prague, Berlin, Budapest, Jerusalem, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, and Vienna. Religious institutions are an important part of the life of the Slovak diaspora and Slovak parishes are active in many countries. However, the Slovak Republic as asecular state is not officially involved in their activities. In terms of Slovakia’sinvestments into scientific networks and efforts to prevent the brain drain, the country implemented the Support Scheme for Returning Professionals from Abroad in 2018–2020. As aresult of this, 26Slovak scientists returned to the country. Aproposal to continue this activity did not pass the interministerial comment procedure in 2019 and no similar scheme is currently being implemented. The Slovak Constitution states that Slovak citizens are guaranteed the right to leave the territory of Slovakia. This right may be restricted only for reasons of protecting national security, public order, or the rights of others. There are no mobility restrictions for citizens. The state’sopposition to dual citizenship changed in 2022 (Amendment to Act No. 40/1993 Coll. on Citizenship). Slovaks no longer lose their Slovak citizenship after receiving foreign citizenship if they can prove they were living in another country for at least five years. Between 2010 and 2022 as many as 3,622 Slovak citizens lost their Slovak citizenship because they had become citizens of another country (Ministry of the Interior 2022). Citizenship does not follow the ius sanguini principle and cannot be obtained through ethnic or religious belonging. Nevertheless, the Citizenship Act waives the eightyear residency requirement for foreigners who have an ancestor who was born in Slovakia. In this case, the criterion used is territorial and ancestral citizenship, not ethnic or religious affiliation. For persons who hold aForeign Slovak Card, the requirement is just three years of residence in Slovakia or, alternatively, having made asignificant contribution to the community of Slovaks living abroad. As noted in section 4.2, to recognise Slovaks living abroad Slovakia issues Foreign Slovak Cards. This card is intended for Slovaks abroad who do not have permanent residence in Slovakia and are citizens of Slovakia or do not have Slovak citizenship retain Slovak national awareness. As for social benefits, the conditions governing eligibility depend on the type of benefit and there are none that specifically favour Foreign Slovaks. The provision of material hardship assistance and state social support is usually conditional upon apersonal actually residing or being apermanent resident of Slovakia. The sickness and pension insurance schemes allow voluntary participation 99cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia for anyone who applies, including non-residents. It is therefore possible for members of the diaspora to participate in these social security institutions, but they are not privileged in any way, and it and their status as Foreign Slovaks does not bring them any substantial benefits in this area. Beyond EU regulations, there are no specific programmes or policies for Slovaks living abroad in unemployment. Consulates may help Slovak nationals abroad in asituation of unemployment, but, as stated above, this is not alegal obligation, and it mostly involves providing nationals with information or helping them contact their family. Various diaspora organisations make it part of their mission to help nationals living abroad with employment issues and they may also receive financial support from the Office of Slovaks Living Abroad for doing this work. The Slovak healthcare system is based on mandatory health insurance contributions. Every individual with permanent residence in Slovakia is required to contribute to the system and Slovak nationals who reside in another EU Member State naturally benefit from EU provisions in this area. Compared to other social protection dimensions, ethnic Slovaks with aForeign Slovak Card have no preferential access to healthcare and need to be insured with acommercial insurance company, as public insurance is for residents only. This means that anyone with aForeign Slovak Card who comes to Slovakia and does not have health insurance must pay for any medical care received in the Slovak Republic. Students with aForeign Slovak Card studying at Slovak schools and universities, however, are an exception to this, as stipulated in Act No. 250/2011 on health insurance, and can access public health insurance. As well as being allowed to apply for temporary residence in Slovakia without giving areason for their stay, people who have aForeign Slovak Card do not have to provide any other administrative documentation or evidence of financial resources for their stay in Slovakia. Unlike other third-country nationals, who must obtain apermanent residence permit, ethnic Slovaks have immediate access to two types of benefits after receiving the right to temporary residence– access to the use of state kindergartens, public schools, and universities free of charge, and immediate access to the child allowance scheme. Slovaks abroad with aForeign Slovak Card can benefit from the provisions of Act No. 474/ 2005 Coll. and get subsidies to send their children to study at the postsecondary level in Slovakia. Upon request, Slovakia will pay the full tuition fee for children, along with accommodation and meals for Foreign Slovak cardholders, an opportunity mostly utilised by ethnic Slovaks living abroad in third (i.e. non-EU) countries and by Slovak kin-minorities from neighbouring countries that are not members of the EU. All above-mentioned provisions have highlighted acentral feature of the Slovak diaspora policy: it grants preferential treatment to Slovak autochtho- 100 cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia nous communities abroad. Together with the Hungarian status law, this is the best example of an ethnicised understanding of a‘core group’ and broadly of citizenship as well. The laws on ‘foreign Slovaks’ show that this group has become aprivileged subgroup within the diaspora and enjoys the most attention from the homeland. In this sense, the fact that their unique status within the Slovak legal system has not been criticised by any relevant political or social group in Slovak society is very indicative of the ethnical definition of the nation that is widely shared (Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). 4.7 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF DIASPORA POLICIES IN SLOVAKIA The term ‘Slovaks living abroad’ was used for the first time in 1992 in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic: ‘The Slovak Republic shall support the national awareness and cultural identity of Slovaks living abroad, support the institutions established to achieve this purpose and relations with their home country’ (Ústava Slovenskej republiky 1992). However, the first legislation that dealt with the issues of Slovaks living abroad did not come into effect until 1997. The rights of ‘foreign Slovaks’ are guaranteed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in conformity with Act No. 70/1997 on Foreign Slovaks (Zákon ozahraničných Slovákoch 70/2005). AForeign Slovak is aperson to whom such status can be granted on the grounds that he/she is aSlovak citizen residing in aforeign country or he/she is of Slovak ethnic origin and has Slovak cultural awareness and language skills. Any such person who wishes to obtain the status of Foreign Slovak must apply for the special Foreign Slovak Card. For this law, an expatriate Slovak is someone with direct ancestors up to the third generation that held Slovak citizenship. Applicants for this status must prove their Slovak citizenship or Slovak ethnic origin by presenting supporting documents– such as birth certificates, baptism certificates, registry office statements, and/or aproof of citizenship or permanent residency permit. The most recent legislative act, Act No. 474/2005 Coll. (Zákon oSlovákoch žijúcich vzahraničí aozmene adoplnení niektorých zákonov 474/ 2005) on Foreign Slovaks, came into effect in 2005 and replaced Act No. 70/1997 Coll. on Foreign Slovaks. This more recent legislation defines Slovaks living abroad according to two characteristics. First, they can be individuals living abroad who do not have Slovak citizenship and are acitizen of another country but want to claim Slovak citizenship and show interest in promoting or maintaining Slovak culture abroad. This would include individuals claiming Slovak citizenship through direct ancestry. Second, this legislation defines as Foreign Slovaks also those who live abroad, do not have Slovak citizenship and are citizens of 101cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia another country, but who declare Slovak ethnicity, display Slovak identity or ancestry, and are interested in their Slovak heritage. However, these people do not have to show an interest in applying for Slovak citizenship. According to the latest report of the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad, more than 2,000 Foreign Slovak Cards were issued to non-nationals in 2017, mostly to individuals attracted by the possibility of entering the Slovak labour market. Applicants were from Serbia (1,646), Ukraine (355), the United States (6), Russia (5), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (4) (Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). Diaspora policies in Slovakia are therefore predominantly focused on issues of culture and identity. Various institutions in Slovakia share the responsibilities for and cooperate on implementing the policies described in the preceding section. At the national level, the official institution responsible for engaging with Slovaks living abroad is the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic. The President’srole in interactions with Slovaks living abroad is to cooperate with diaspora representatives on cultural heritage protection and on enhancing cooperation with diaspora communities. For instance, the President of Slovakia has the prerogative to grant state honours to Slovak figures living abroad. The Office for Slovaks Living Abroad, created in 2005, is the central actor in Slovakia’sdiaspora infrastructure. It is considered ‘the central government authority for relations between the Slovak Republic and Slovaks living abroad, and state support to Slovaks living abroad’ (2005, 3). For this reason, coordinating diaspora policies with other ministries is one of its three core missions. The other two are conducting joint activities with ethnic Slovak associations in all countries and documenting the life and activities of Slovaks living abroad. The Office for Slovaks Living Abroad is in Bratislava and its budget is directly connected to the budget of the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic. The office is headed by achair who is nominated by the Government of the Slovak Republic for afive-year term. As Surová (2016) suggests, despite the diversification of the Slovak diaspora in recent years, the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad is still very much focused on protecting the traditions and heritage of the traditional Slovak diaspora living in neighbouring countries that constitute autochthonous minorities in those countries. The focus on this population has attracted criticism from non-governmental organisations, academia, and the media, which highlight other issues relating to the migration of Slovaks that the office does not treat as apriority, such as the brain drain or the depopulation of marginalised regions of Slovakia (Surová 2016). One of the office’smain activities in support of Slovaks abroad concerns the financing of activities abroad that focus on education, research, information, and culture. Organisations abroad can apply for subsidies to conduct activities in these areas. This focus on cultural and symbolic activities means 102 cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia that their impact on the socioeconomic conditions of Slovaks abroad is not necessarily obvious. Indeed, the support for these kinds of activities is primarily aimed at improving cultural relations and historical ties between the diaspora and the Slovak Republic. This perception is reinforced by the office’ssupport for publishing activities, broadcasting in the Slovak language abroad, educational events, activities to enhance cooperation between Slovak nationals living abroad and the homeland, and the promotion of cultural heritage. In the area of education, the office finances the establishment and activities of Slovak schools and educational centres and the purchase of preschool equipment for Slovaks living abroad that can respond to the social needs of communities abroad (Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). 4.8 CONCLUSION The notion of self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe was primarily founded on the 19th-century concept of nationalism. Unlike Western Europe and the United States, which were inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and individual freedom, the Central and Eastern European concept of selfdetermination was characterised by the primacy of agroup defined by its ethnic, cultural, and linguistic features (see, e.g., Raška 2014). Castles and Davidson (2000) suggest that the idea of civic inclusion, based on active democratic citizenship, can only be sustained on the condition that the cultural community is replaced by apolitical community. First, the state should be separated from the idea of the nation and replaced by afully democratic state based upon the open and flexible coexistence of all citizens. Second, and this is an even greater challenge, forms of political participation need to be invented that go beyond the borders of the state. Group cultural belonging, while it should not be ignored, cannot be the sole grounds for living together within astate formation. New forms of belonging together should be based upon both principles of individual equality and collective difference (Castles and Davidson 2000) Consequently, there are several structural changes that Central European countries need to make. First, there is aneed to redefine national identity to include space for unifying universalistic principles. Second, there is aneed to shift from an ethno-cultural to alegal-political definition of anation. Third, there is aneed to redefine the core basis of solidarity so that it rests on postmodern citizenship instead of ethnicity (Vašečka 2008). These changes will certainly not happen in Central Europe in ashort-term perspective. The absence of any discussion, active policies, and legislative changes relating to ade-ethnicised concept of citizenship could, however, work against the interests of the EU. And this has been happening in Poland, Hungary, and 103cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia Slovakia since the changes of 1989. Joppke and Morawska (2003) suggest that de-ethnicised citizenship is certainly not happening everywhere and show that it is an exclusively Western phenomenon, while the countries of Central Europe may eventually follow sometime in the future. The preferential treatment of Slovak autochthonous communities abroad is by far the best example of an ethnicised understanding of a‘core group’ and broadly of citizenship as well. The Hungarian Status Law is awell-known and much-discussed example of the preferential treatment of foreign citizens, and here we have seen an example of asimilar Slovak law on ‘Foreign Slovaks’, who over the years since 1989 have become an untouchable group. The fact that their unique status within the Slovak legal system has not been criticised by any relevant political or social group in Slovak society is not asign of intellectual failure but rather aperfect example of the dominance of aprimordial and ethnical conception of the nation. As Surová (2016) highlighted, the highest law in Slovakia, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, clearly distinguishes the Slovak nation from other nations that form national minorities or other ethnic groups in Slovakia. She also devotes attention to the definition of the Slovak national language in the Constitution. The Constitution defines the ‘Slovak language as the most important feature of distinctiveness of the Slovak nation, the most esteemed value of its cultural heritage, and an articulation of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic’ (Ústava Slovenskej republiky 1992, 11). In other words, the diaspora holds almost the same status as Slovaks living in the homeland. The status enjoyed by diaspora Slovaks in this sense is more symbolic, capable of stimulating asense of belonging to the nation, rather than automatically entailing any advantages in terms of abetter life, social services, or protection (Vašečka and Žúborová 2020). Individuals who have the Foreign Slovak Card are no different from other European citizens living or working in Slovakia or other European countries. What is different is when these nationals come from third countries and are automatically treated in Slovakia as if they were European citizens. At the same time, the Slovak diaspora plays acrucial role in the sense of cultural belonging, and Slovak institutions are providing financial resources to strengthen ties with the Slovak diaspora, especially through education and culture. Instead, Slovak institutions and the diaspora, however, are in legal terms operating in away that prioritises an ethnically defined group, which is in sharp contradiction to the idea of active citizenship and can interfere with national policies and civic participation in government affairs. It is more than obvious that these kinds of legal and institutional provisions are inconsistent with the idea of modern citizenship. 104 cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia References Alexander, J. C. 1988. ‘Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup, and Social Differentiation.’ In Action and Its Environment. Towards aNew Synthesis, edited by J. C. Alexander, 78–106. New York: Columbia University Press. Blahová, N. 2018. ‘Representations of “Compatriotism”. Slovak Diaspora Politics as aToll for Building and Cultivating Diaspora.’ In Cultural Heritage in Migration, edited by N. Vukov, L.Gergova, T. Matanova, and Y. Gergova, 72–87. Sofia: Paradigma. Brubaker, R. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Castles, S., and M. Davidson. 2000. Citizenship and Migration. New York: Macmillan Press. 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Dohoda medzi vládou SR avládou MR ospolupráci voblasti, školstva, vedy, športu amládeže [Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and Hungary on cooperation in the field of education, culture and sport], oznamenie č. 120/2004 Z. z. https://www.culture .gov.sk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/kulturna__dohoda_MR.pdf. EMN/OECD. 2020. ‘The Impact of Covid-19 on Remittances in EU and OECD Countries– EMN OECD. ‘Inform.’ Brussels: European Migration Network. https://www.oecd.org/els/mig /EMN-OECD-Inform-01122020.pdf. Epstein, G. S., and O. Heizler. 2016. ‘The Formation of Networks in the Diaspora.’ International Journal of Manpower 37, no. 7: 1136–1153. Fang, T., and A. Wells. 2022. ‘Diaspora Economics.’ Discussion Paper Series, May 2022, No. 15334. Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics. Faulks, K. 2000. Citizenship. London: Routledge. Fox, J. E., and C. Miller-Idriss. 2008. ‘Everyday Nationhood.’ Ethnicities 8, no. 4: 536–563. Joppke, C., and E. Morawska. 2003. ‘Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices.’ In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship, edited by C. Joppke and E. Morawska, 1–36. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kabat, L., L. Cibak, and S. Filip. 2020. ‘The Remittance Inflows in VISEGRAD Countries: ASource of Economic Growth, or Migration Policy Misting.’ Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues 8, no. 2: 606–628. Koncepcia štátnej politiky starostlivosti oSlovákov žijúcich vzahraničí do roku 2015. [The general vision of the state policy of care for Slovaks living abroad to the year 2015] 2015. http:// www.uszz.sk/data/files/519_koncepcia_do-r-2015.pdf. Manning, A., and R. Sanchari. 2010. ‘Culture Clash or Culture Club? National Identity in Britain.’ Economic Journal 120, no. 542: F72–F100. Raška, F. D. 2014. Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (1870–2010). Lausanne: Peter Lang AG. Správa za rok 2016 oštátnej politike vo vzťahu kSlovákom žijúcim vzahraničí. [Report for the year 2016 on state policies in relation to Slovaks living abroad] 2016. https://bkp-uszz .mediatop.sk/sk/sprava--za-rok-2016-o--statnej-politike-vo-vztahu-k--slovakom-zijucim -v-zahranici. Surová, S. 2016. ‘How Slovakia Engages and Constructs Its Diaspora.’ ERSTE Foundation, Working Paper. https://issuu. com/erste-foundation/docs/surova_diasporas. Surová, S. 2018. ‘National and Ethnic Identifications among the Slovak Diaspora in Serbia: Stranded between State(s) and Ethnicity?’ Nationalities Papers 46, no. 6: 1081–1100. 105cHaPter 4 diasPora Policies iN slovaKia Szelényi, B. A. 2007. ‘From Minority to Übermensch: The Social Roots of Ethnic Conflict in the German Diaspora of Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.’ Past and Present 196, no. 1: 215–251. Úrad pre Slovákov žijúcich vzahraničí. [Office for Slovaks Living Abroad] 2023. ‘Aktuálny počet Slovákov žijúcich vzahraničí.’ [The current number of Slovaks living abroad] https://www .uszz.sk/krajania/. Ústava Slovenskej republiky. [Constitution of the Slovak Republic], Ústavní zákon č. 460/1992 vznení neskorších predpisov. Accessed 26 September 2023. http://www.nrsr.sk/web/default .aspx?SectionId=124. Vašečka, M. 2008. ‘Nationalized Citizenship in Central European Countries.’ In Processes of Redefinition and Reconstruction of the Term Nation in Central Europe, edited by M. Vašečka, 199–215. Bratislava: Center for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture. Vašečka, M., and V. Žúborová. 2020. ‘Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Slovak Citizens Abroad.’ In Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond (Volume 2), edited by J. M. Lafleur and D. Vintila, 427–439. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer. Zákon oSlovákoch žijúcich vzahraničí aozmene adoplnení niektorých zákonov [Act on Slovaks living abroad and amending and supplementing certain laws (1997)], zákon č. 474/2005 Z. z. (in Slovak). http://uszz.sk/data/2016/ZZ_2005_474_20160101.pdf. Zákon ozahraničných Slovákoch [Act on foreign Slovaks], zákon č. 70/1997 Z. z. (in Slovak). https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/1997/70/vyhlasene_znenie.html. 112 cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK Statistics 2021; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2021; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2022; Insee 2021; United States Census Bureau 2019). Data published by international organisations including the OECD (OECD Stat 2022) and the MPI are compiled from national statistics and national estimates. Table 1 illustrates how much estimates of the number of Czechs abroad vary. It presents the numbers for countries that have the largest Czech diaspora communities and shows the estimated numbers according to several different sources. Taking as an example the number of Czechs in Germany, we can see how the figures differ depending on the source of the data and on how the given institution defines the target population. The number of Czech expatriates in Germany, which has long ranked just behind the United Kingdom in terms of the size of the post-1989 diaspora, has been increasing in recent years, partly as aresult of the restrictions that Brexit placed on migration to the United Kingdom. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (2020) estimates that there are around 80,000 Czech compatriots in Germany. According to the results of the regular German micro-census and information from the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the number of Czech migrants (persons with Czech citizenship and/or persons of migration origin with ties to the Czech Republic) living in Germany is around 200,000. The UN’sfigure for Germany is fundamentally out of line with all the other statistics and is asignificant overestimate, as it claims there are more than 500,000 people living in Germany who were born in the Czech Republic. This figure, which is based, among other things, on the results of the 2011 German census, is equal to 55% of the total number of Czech-born people living outside the Czech Republic, which seems like agross overestimate when compared to other major destination countries. Acloser analysis of this figure reveals that 84% of this number is made up of people aged 65+, asignificant proportion of whom appear to be displaced Germans and others who were born in the borderlands and were affected by the post-Second World War border changes. These people, therefore, are not Czech migrants or their descendants. Although the aggregate data presented above are likely biased by the different methodologies used by the statistical institutions that compiled them in individual countries and by the range of people included in these statistics, they can– subject to correction by other sources– be used as aguideline to the global distribution of the Czech diaspora and its activities. There is also an interactive map that provides an idea of where the largest concentrations of expatriates are (https://www.cestikrajane.cz/). 113cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK Table 1. The size of the Czech diaspora overall and in selected countries Source of data Total Australia New Zealand Germany France United Kingdom United States ČSÚ (2022) 494,890 31,502 2,467 96,430 - 63,134 51,744 UN DESA (2019) 911,388 13,796 1,374 502,609 9,514 35,906 81,926 National statistics – 12,200 (2020 – place of birth) 1,203 (2021 – nationality) 117,000–200,000 (2020 – people with migrant background) 7,700 (2018 – place of birth) 36,000 (2020–2021 – place of birth) 33,000 (nationality) 68,312 (2019– place of birth in Czechia /Slovakia MFA 200,000–250,000 Czech citizens 2–2,500,000 Czech origin 27,000–35,000 6,00000 80,000 (2020) – 40,000 1,300,000 (Czech origin) OECD – FB by country of birth (2022) –11,860 (2021) 2,361 (2018) 121,000 8,333 36,000 (2021) 27,539 (2014) OECD – FB by nationality (2022) – – – 63,280 4,675 33,000 (2021) 13,896 (2021) Migration Policy Institute (2020) 1,026,000 14,000 3,000 603,000 9,000 46,000 110,000 Source: Adjusted according to Cibulková (2023). 114 cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK 5.4.1 REMITTANCES Another and equally important piece of information for identifying important destination countries and the presence of the Czech diaspora in those countries is data on remittances (Ionescu 2006, 62–65), which can have an impact on the development of the destination country’seconomy (Gamlen 2008a, 850–851; Gamlen 2014, 181; Tan et al. 2018, 9; Østergaard-Nielsen 2016, 149). However, as with the number of people living abroad (see above), it is not possible to obtain accurate data on the total volume of remittances sent to the Czech Republic (Solimano 2003). The data published by the CZSO (2023a), for instance, only capture remittances sent through formal channels. It is very difficult to obtain any record of remittances that are sent informally– for example, in the form of cash or goods (Solimano 2003; Drbohlav et al. 2022; Cibulková 2023). The growing importance of remittances for Czechia and thus for the development of new policies aimed at the diaspora is demonstrated by more reliable data from the World Bank, which show arapid increase since 1993 from USD 138million to 4.15 billion in 2022 (WB 2023b). The largest amounts come from Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria, and the United States. But if we set the data on the number of Czechs in individual countries within the context of the data on remittances sent, we see that the volume of remittances sent from the United States and Australia, where the more traditional expatriate communities are located, is relatively small in relation to their diaspora numbers. On the other hand, large amounts of remittances per capita flow to the Czech Republic from New Zealand and Germany. Obtaining accurate data on the exact number of Czechs living abroad is generally challenging, and this complicates the development of more efficient diaspora policies (Ionescu 2006, 62–65). The most comprehensive approach is to amalgamate diverse sources to ensure that the resulting data are as accurate as possible. BOX 1. THE KEY DESTINATION COUNTRIES United States (USA): cca 1.6 mill. people of Czech origin (1.3 mill. of Czech origin and 0.3mill. of Czechoslovak origin; United States Census Bureau 2019) Canada: cca 105,000 people of Czech origin and cca 40,000 of Czechoslovak origin (Statistics Canada 2018) United Kingdom: cca 100,000 people according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020) Germany: 63,280 Czech citizens (in 2023, the last census), 117,000 of whom are Czechs who migrated themselves and 217,000 are people of Czech origin (Destatis) Austria: 65,000 people (UN in 2019) Switzerland: 40,000–50,000 115cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK France: 30,000 (Ministry of the Interior 2020) Australia: 31,000 Spain, Slovakia, and Italy currently host comparable numbers of Czech migrants, estimated to be in the range of 20,000 to 25,000 (Janská et al. 2021) (for more see www .cestikrajane.cz). 5.5 RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE STUDY OF THE CZECH DIASPORA IN MIGRATION CONDITIONS The current circular migration and the confluence of migration and mobility are conditions that prevent us from being able to capture migration from the Czech Republic by just studying historical enclaves or active members of the diaspora in local associations abroad. In addition to these sources of information, it is necessary to develop away of capturing as many as possible of the growing number of Czechs who are living outside the Czech Republic but are not in contact with other members of the Czech diaspora, as these persons may have strong transnational ties and be an active element in cross-border exchange. To gather comprehensive information, we developed acomprehensive research methodology that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This involves using tools such as surveys and interviews, with an emphasis on questionnaires, observational techniques, and active participation. 5.5.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY Since it is impossible to create arandom sample of the diaspora for data collection, we created aplatform to facilitate the widest possible distribution of our questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent out using MailerLite, and we also asked the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Czexpats in Science network to distribute the questionnaire through their networks. Through the involvement of Czexpats in Science we were able to target aselection of Czech scientists with international careers, who completed aset of additional questions. Some questionnaires were also distributed personally by all the individual researchers involved in our research project through their own networks and activities (conferences, their own contact database, etc.). We also sent the questionnaires to Czech Clubs, distributed them through relevant Facebook groups, and used paid advertising targeting Czech Facebook users located abroad with the default language set to Czech. The questionnaire survey was conducted between May 2021 and September 2021 and atotal of 985 questionnaires were collected. After discarding 116 cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK incomplete and duplicate questionnaires 940 remained. The questionnaire included 99 items. Some questions, however, were used to filter respondents without the required characteristics. Therefore, each respondent answered fewer than 99 questions. Specific questions were included for Czech-born scientists abroad that concerned their work and possible employment in Czechia. Atotal of 198 respondents completed the questions for expats in science (see Chapter 9 for details). The questionnaire took approximately 30 minutes to complete. It was anonymous, and anonymity was also promised to the respondents in the cover letter, which explained the purpose of the research and listed the institutions that conducted the research and the website where the respondents could learn more about the research. The data were analysed by partner institutions, not the institution that fielded the survey, thereby ensuring the anonymity and independence of the data. There was no pay to respondents to complete the questionnaire. There was some possible reward and motivation for respondents in that, after completing the questionnaire, they were able to select and download publications issued by the Institute of Ethnology of the Czech Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Science of Charles University. In addition to the basic passport questions, the questionnaire also asked respondents which country they live in and how long they have been abroad. It, therefore, made it possible to sort respondents not only by age, education, gender, marital status, and children in the family but also by location and length of stay abroad. The core of the questionnaire consisted of questions about the motivation for going abroad, the respondent’s’ employment abroad, language skills, the language of communication in the family, contact with other members of the diaspora, and the nature of the respondent’scontact with Czechia, whether the respondent expects to return to the Czech Republic and under what conditions. Aseparate battery of questions was devoted to communication with Czech authorities abroad, remittances, and the issue of the children’seducation. Given the ongoing discussion about postal and electronic voting in the Czech Republic and among compatriots, apart of the questionnaire was reserved for questions about political participation and the possibility of compatriots abroad voting in the elections for representative bodies in the Czech Republic. In addition to closed and semi-closed questions, the questionnaire also included open questions where respondents were able to comment freely on any worries and difficulties they have in life and what obstacles they see to returning to Czechia or integrating into the society of the destination country. At the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were thanked for their participation and offered the opportunity to continue to communicate with the researchers and to participate in qualitative research in the form of in-depth interviews. Alarge part of the sample used to collect qualitative data was constructed this way. 117cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK 5.5.2 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS The qualitative, in-depth interviews focused on certain themes that were raised in the questionnaire survey. Communication partners selected for the interviews were from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, France, and Germany. Based on the results of the questionnaire survey, we identified the most important discussion themes and then formulated relevant questions. The questions were formulated in away that would allow for dialogue and create space for afree-flowing discussion with an expected length of 20–45 minutes. The interview questions covered the following topics: (1) Motivations for living abroad and ideas for the future (whether or not to return to Czechia); (2) Relationship to the Czech Republic (contacts, memories, property, sentiments, feeling at home); (3) Contact with institutions and their assessment (embassies, consulates, diaspora organisations, institutions in Czechia); (4) An estimate of the current and potential benefits that the Czech Republic has or could have from the diaspora’stransnationalism and from Czech compatriots abroad (economic, cultural, and political benefits and knowledge). During the interview, respondents were allowed to suggest other topics they wanted to discuss. 5.5.3 FOCUS GROUP The questionnaire survey and the additional questions aimed at the scientific community then formed the basis of afocus group discussion that was held with eight scientists living abroad. The focus group was part of the qualitative research and was aimed at scientists abroad as aspecific population of expatriates. In principle, this group is similar to other highly educated and highly mobile groups of expatriates (e.g. officials in international organisations, multinational companies, and NGOs). In this population, mobility is very closely tied to aperson’sprofession, which influences both the decision to emigrate and to potentially return to the Czech Republic and affects how much or whether aperson cooperates with Czech colleagues and the Czech public sphere. The focus group with the scientists was therefore held in addition to and not in place of the semi-structured interviews. The focus group was organised around professional and career questions, through which we interpreted the compatriot-scientists’ relationship to the Czech Republic and their needs. The questions were prepared after apreliminary analysis of the questionnaire survey so that they would reflect the main issues raised by the scientists in their survey responses. The eight participants in the group were selected by the Czexpats in Science team. They were drawn from the wider community of Czech scientists abroad whom Czexpats in Science knows about, and not just from the group 118 cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK of survey respondents, who can be assumed to be more interested in cooperation with the Czech Republic or in returning because they are in contact with the Czexpats in Science organisation. The team paid special attention to contacting potential participants who were not connected to the organisation and to capturing participants in different career stages. The focus group took place online on 31 March 2022 via Zoom, and it lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes (this was shorter than the standard live focus groups because online focus groups make it more difficult for participants to concentrate. As well as focus groups, we also included, where possible, observation and personal participation. We carried out surveys in Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand. 5.5.4 DATA LIMITATIONS The quantitative data we are working with comes from the most extensive questionnaire survey ever conducted among the Czech diaspora, which used every possible means to reach its members. We also collected alarge amount of qualitative data with substantial narrative value. However, the data are not representative, in astatistical sense, as we do not have acomplete record of all diaspora members or any other instrument with which to conduct random sampling. This limits the range of mathematical and statistical operations that can be performed on the sample. Although we reached out to the diaspora in many ways, ultimately asignificant role was played by self-selection, that is, by diaspora members’ own activity and their decision to complete the questionnaire. This logically tends to lead to an overrepresentation of people who want to say something, are active, use written and electronic communication, find our questions understandable, and are interested in communicating with Czech academic institutions. In this sense, the data set is clearly skewed towards persons who were born in Czechia, are familiar with Czech conditions and institutions, have Czech as their native language, and have secondary and higher education. Conversely, there is an underrepresentation of those members of the diaspora who were born abroad, feel themselves to be Czech but do not have Czech as their mother tongue, older people, and people who do not use electronic communication. Alimitation of the questionnaire is that it targeted people over 18 years of age and people who had been living abroad for more than six months– anyone abroad for less than six months could not complete the questionnaire. The survey also did not include potential members of the diaspora who might feel Czech but were not of Czech origin or born in Czechia, such as partners of Czechs in mixed marriages. 119cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK 5.6 CONCLUSION In our investigations, we were not just pursuing narrow intellectual, academic interests, as we also sought to implement the results of the research in practice and to engage in adiscussion with institutions in Czechia that work with Czech compatriots. In our view, these institutions are part of the transnational space that compatriots move in. We have therefore produced three research reports,39 which we have submitted to the executive and legislative bodies of the Czech Republic. The biggest discussion devoted to the Czech diaspora took place in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in November 2022 and included the research team, Czech politicians and policymakers, and the interested public (see, e.g., the Executive Report at https://www.cestikrajane.cz/). The following chapters in this book are based on the survey, in-depth interviews, and focus groups discussed above: the quantitative survey was used (as asource for the research presented in Chapters 6 and 7, the qualitative data were used for Chapter 8 (primarily data from the in-depth interviews) and Chapter 9 (the focus group). This study on the Czech diaspora and contemporary research on diaspora issues provide insight into diverse facets of the life, mobility, and transnational connections of Czechs abroad. This work builds on existing research, particularly qualitative analyses focused on ethnic identification and integration, and offers afresh perspective on the Czech diaspora in light of recent changes, especially in Eastern Europe. In the field of transnationalism and diaspora studies, we present adynamic view that blurs the boundaries between these concepts and emphasises how modern conceptions of the diaspora have moved beyond traditional uses of the term. Our approach to defining anew diaspora builds on the more intensive transnational practices of migrants and identifies arange of such phenomena, from economic to cultural and political activities. In the section above concerning data on the Czech diaspora, we underscore how difficult it is to acquire accurate migration data. It is hard to estimate the number of Czechs abroad because of the various methodologies 39 Report 1: Výzkum možností koordinace krajanské politiky; (Research on the possibilities of coordination of compatriot policy); Report 2: Výzkum potřeb krajanských komunit vjednotlivých zemích zhlediska udržení jejich vazeb na ČR (Research on the needs of compatriot communities in individual countries in terms of maintaining their ties to the Czech Republic); Report 3: Výzkum potřeb krajanských komunit ve vybraných zemích zhlediska udržení jejich vazeb na ČR: Velká Británie, Austrálie, Nový Zéland, USA aNěmecko (Research into the needs of expatriate communities in selected countries in terms of maintaining their ties to the Czech Republic: the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Germany). 120 cHaPter 5 tHe tHeoretical frameworK used in different countries and the difficulties associated with identifying diaspora communities. Our work stimulates discussion of the need for more precise data sources, particularly on the role of the Czech diaspora in the economic and cultural development of the country. The research design of this study combines quantitative and qualitative approaches, which yielded arich body of information on the motivations, transnational ties, and needs of Czech expatriates. We employed abroad range of methods– asurvey, interviews, and observations– that allowed us to explore the Czech diaspora in its diversity and complexity. Despite the limitations associated with the data collection– our sample is not statistically representative and is mostly the product of self-selection– this study constitutes avaluable contribution to understanding the contemporary challenges faced by the Czech diaspora. It underscores the need for further research in this area. 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[Czech Statistical Office] 2023b. ‘REM_IN_PS Czech citizens abroad.’ https://apl.czso.cz /pll/rocenka/rocenka.presmsocas?jmeno_tabulka=LR11&rokod=2010&rokdo=2022&mylang =EN&ceny=bc&vystup=obrazovka&priznak=LR&typ=2&jak=2&dejarchiv=0. DESTATIS. 2022. Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund - Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2020 - Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 - 2020 (Endergebnisse). Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 28 June 2022. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung /Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/migrationshintergrund -endergebnisse-2010220207004.html?nn=208952. Doležalová, M. 2021. ‘Working Towards Wellbeing: Negotiating Wellbeing in the Interactions Between Services and Roma Migrants in Leeds.’ In Mobilities of Wellbeing: Migration, the State and Medical Knowledge, edited by Anne Sigfrid Grønseth and Jonathan Skinner, 101–118. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Drbohlav, D., et al. 2010. Migrace a(i)migranti vČesku. Kdo jsme, odkud přicházíme, kam jdeme. [Migration and (im)migrants in Czechia: Who are we, where are we coming from, where are we going] Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství. Drbohlav, D., A. Bailey, M. Lupták, and D. Čermáková. 2017. ‘Migrant Values and Social Remittances across the Contemporary Migration–Development Nexus: The Case of Moldovans in Czechia.’ Geografie 122, no. 4: 526–553. Dubovický, I., D. Kraft, and M. Secká. 2003. Téma: Češi vAmerice: české vystěhovalectví do Ameriky ačesko-americké vztahy vprůběhu pěti staletí: informační materiál pro učitele kvýuce na základních astředních školách. [Topic: Czechs in America– Czech migration to America and CzechAmerican relations over the course of five centuries: information materials for lessons at basic and secondary schools] 1st ed. Prague: Communicatio Humana– C.H. Expo ve spolupráci sPražskou edicí. Dufoix, S. 2003. Diasporas. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Düvell, F., and D. Vogel. 2006. ‘Polish Migrants: Tensions Between Sociological Typologies and State Categories.’ In Contemporary Polish Migration in Europe: Complex Patterns of Movement and Settlement, edited by A. Triandafyllidou, 267–289. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Faist, T. 2000. The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Faist, T. 2010. ‘Towards Transnational Studies: World Theories, Transnationalisation and Changing Institutions.’Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies36, no. 10: 1665–1687. Gamlen, A. 2008. ‘The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination.’ Political Geography 27, no. 8: 840–856. Gamlen, A. 2014. ‘Diaspora Institutions and Diaspora Governance.’ International Migration Review 48, no. S1: S180–S217. Glick-Schiller, N., L. Basch, and C. Blanc‐Szanton. 1992. ‘Towards aDefinition of Transnationalism.’ Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 645, no. 1: ix–xiv. Hugo, G. 2006. ‘An Australian Diaspora?’ International Migration 44, no. 1: 105–133. Insee. 2021. ‘Étrangers et immigrés.’ Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. Paris: Insee. https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/5363834?sommaire=5363676. Ionescu, D. 2006. Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. 128 cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora (see Chapter 5). The main motive respondents cited for leaving the Czech Republic was not political, but for work and private reasons, and in the case of scientists, in order to pursue ascientific career or for education. 6.3 THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF DIASPORA MEMBERS TO CZECHIA The main part of the questionnaire focused on evaluating the relations of compatriots to the Czech Republic. Such relations include direct contact with family and friends (visits, online communication, remittances) and relations with institutions and informal associations in the country of residence (e.g. Czechoslovak embassies, expatriate associations) and in the Czech Republic (mainly various state and public administration bodies: municipal and city authorities, labour offices, social insurance administration, health insurance companies, etc.). Considering the nature of the respondents in terms of their length of stay abroad, including asignificant proportion of students and young researchers, the high intensity of their contact with the Czech Republic is not too surprising. About 80% of respondents reported that they visit the Czech Republic at least once ayear and more than half of them are in online contact with their family several times aweek. The high number of direct visits they reported making to the Czech Republic is connected, of course, to the location of the respondents and thus their geographic distance from or proximity to the country: two-thirds of the respondents were living in aEuropean country, while 23% were living in acountry directly neighbouring the Czech Republic. Aspecific indicator of the relationship between the source country and the country of residence is remittances. In terms of financial remittances, i.e. money earned abroad and sent home (usually to immediate or extended family), it turns out, not surprisingly, that Czechs do not support their family members in the Czech Republic with remittances (19% of respondents were sending remittances). The main reason for this is that the Czech Republic belongs to the group of developed countries with arelatively high standard of living, and therefore sending remittances to the Czech Republic is not necessary, unlike the case in many less developed countries. Therefore, the earnings of Czech expatriates mostly go to consumption and investments. While expatriate associations are an important institution for maintaining ties with the country of origin, it appears that only about one-third of the respondents had frequent or at least sporadic contact with such associations or participated in their events. Among those respondents who were in contact with expatriate associations, two-thirds rated these forms of contact as excellent or very good. On the other hand, 59% of respondents had no contact 129cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora with Czech expatriate associations in their new country of residence. Similarly, attendance at Czech schools abroad was low– afull 69% of respondents had had no direct communication with aCzech educational institution in the past five years. This, however, does not correspond to the possibility that children could enter these schools given their reported knowledge of Czech. It is possible that the children were learning at home, or that they were still young and did not yet have to attend school, or that there were problems with school accessibility. Those who were in contact with aCzech school were very satisfied with the communication, with about two-thirds rating the communication very positively– as excellent or very good. Czech state and public institutions are an integral part of the links that exist between compatriots and their country of origin. In away, they represent the relationship of the state to the compatriot communities and thus enable the direct implementation of state policy towards these communities. The institutions operating directly abroad, i.e. primarily the embassies of the Czech state, are the first line of contact with Czechs abroad. Compatriots turn to them primarily to deal with various official matters such as passports, ID cards, birth certificates, etc. Alarge share of the respondents did not rely on Czech embassies very much or did not seek them out– 44% of respondents had had direct communication with the consular section of the Czech embassy in the destination country only once ayear at most during the last five years and 40% had had no communication at all. However, this may also indicate the relative self-sufficiency of the Czech diaspora. Among those who communicated with the consular section of the Czech consulate in their destination country, there were more who were satisfied than dissatisfied with their experience. Contact with the embassy was even less frequent than contact with their consular sections among expatriates: 22% of respondents had communicated directly with the Czech embassy in their destination country at most once ayear during the last five years and afull 68% had had no contact with the embassy. Asmaller proportion of respondents reported being in contact with institutions in the Czech Republic. About one-half of them said that they had been in contact with local authorities in the Czech Republic and asimilar number had been in touch with ahealth insurance company in the Czech Republic to deal with some problem. For other institutions, the number of respondents who reported any contact drops significantly below 30%. 6.4 ASSESSING WHAT THE CZECH DIASPORA NEEDS AND EXPECTS FROM THE CZECH STATE In examining the needs and expectations of expatriates towards the Czech Republic, we based our assessment primarily on an open-ended question 130 cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora aimed at improving the Czechs state’srelationship to these communities (Figure 2). We summarised the diverse range of responses into the following broad recommendations: ● Less bureaucracy, more computerisation, digitalisation, make it easier to find services and make the provision of services clearer, faster, and more accessible; ● Make voting easier and more accessible to Czech citizens abroad; allow electronic, correspondence, and remote forms of voting; ● Provide more information, more and better communication; ● See compatriots abroad as equal partners, do not disparage their role, envy them, or discriminate against them; ● Show more interest, be more proactive, be more accessible, and do more to promote the activities of embassies and events in the Czech Republic; ● Promote the achievements of Czechs abroad, appreciate and exploit their potential, try to attract them back to the Czech Republic, and make more use of their experience for the development of the Czech Republic (involvement in government, business, foreign contacts, expert activities, etc.); ● Expand the availability of accredited online instruction in the Czech language and other courses about the Czech Republic for adults and children; more diverse support for Czech schools and teachers abroad; 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1 – digitalisation, reduction of bureaucracy 2 – accessibility of elections 3 – communication, information 4 – don’t belittle the role of compatriots abroad, don’t envy them 5 – show more interest, promote more the activities of the Foreign Office and events in the Czech Republic) 8 – improve the quality of work in authorities’ offices (embassies and offices in the Czech Republic 6 – promote the achievements of Czechs abroad, exploit their potential 7 – support for Czech language teaching and Czech schools other Figure 2. Number of responses to the question ‘In what ways do you think the Czech Republic’s relationship with compatriots abroad could be improved?’ (N=357, number of responses = 437) 131cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora ● Improve the quality of work at the Czech consulates and embassies (better staff, friendlier opening hours, shorter waiting times for appointments, kinder behaviour, more empathy and respect); similarly, improve the quality of the work with Czech citizens living abroad in institutions in the Czech Republic. The battery of questions focusing on the quality of the work of Czech institutions that expatriates come into contact with is also to some extent indicative of what their needs and expectations are. There were two problems that were most frequently mentioned. The first and more or less general problem relates to the quality of the staff of these institutions. Some compatriots criticise the unwillingness, incompetence, and sometimes even arrogance of staff at these institutions (20% of responses): ‘The approach to the client, especially the communication and the willingness to help, especially at the office, if you don’t know something, they look at you like you’re from outer space, they are usually unwilling to help and are arrogant.’ ‘Ahuman approach, and not acting from aposition of power or aposition of strength or superiority. The concept of an equal relationship, i.e. apartnership between aCzech institution and acitizen, or between aCzech doctor and apatient, is unfortunately still an unknown thing in the Czech Republic.’ ‘Better communication would certainly be great. Ioften find that when Icontact someone from the Czech authorities, Iget arude answer, which unfortunately is not very helpful. It would certainly also be abig plus if it were possible to solve certain problems online– through some sort of verified portal– as it is not always possible to go to the Czech Republic to visit the office in person.’ The second problem relates to the previous one and is about expanding the possibility of online (‘digital’) relations with the authorities. In many of the answers (25%) this was also presented as asolution to the bureaucracy of institutions: ‘What is dealt with by the authorities in the Czech Republic abroad can all be dealt with comfortably from home online. Maybe the Czech Republic could also start thinking about an online portal and simplifying the process for people living outside the Czech Republic.’ ‘Better training for electronic communication and improving its use. Even though officially it is often possible to send documents and applications via adata box, it happens that officials don’t read these messages, don’t respond to them, or they don’t get into the right hands. You then have to call the authorities to see if they have received your documents properly and if that’senough to take care of things.’ 132 cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora 6.5 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DIASPORA TO POLITICAL LIFE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: THE ISSUE OF VOTING An important finding is the relatively high interest among compatriots in current events in the Czech Republic, with astrong focus on political activities. Atotal of 70% of respondents said they follow news and events in the Czech Republic once or more aweek. One-half of the research sample reported they were interested in politics in the Czech Republic and another quarter were somewhat interested. Therefore, it is not surprising that the most frequently voiced demands of respondents from the Czech state include improving the possibility to participate in elections through Czech representative bodies abroad (see Figure 2). The biggest obstacle to participating in elections, in the view of respondents, is the long distance they have to travel to the place where they have to register to vote and then actually vote. ‘Going to apolling station, which is sometimes more than 100km away, is not environmental, it’sinefficient and it costs alot of money. It’snot fair.’ ‘Registration at apolling station abroad is done in person and has adeadline of afew weeks before election day. Those who live further away will not consider making two trips to the consulate or remember to do it in advance. At the very least, it should be possible to change your polling place via adata message.’ In response to the question ‘What could be improved in the election procedure to make it easier for you to vote?’, respondents clearly supported introducing any form of remote voting– whether by correspondence or online. Of those who answered this question (N=666), over 70% of respondents were in favour of this option: ‘There should be no more ignoring Czechs abroad with the right to vote. We should be able to vote by correspondence.’ These results may contribute to adiscussion on the merits of postal voting for Czech expatriates abroad. The absence of this form of voting may also be an important reason for the relatively low turnout in the last elections in the Czech Republic, which was around the time of the survey– 59% of respondents did not participate in the presidential elections and 63% did not participate in the parliamentary elections. 133cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora 6.6 POTENTIAL RE-EMIGRATION: BARRIERS AND LIMITS Returning to one’shomeland, though hard to define in the current era of transnational migration, can be an important expression of people’srelationship to their country of origin. At the same time, it can be expected that astate’spolicy towards its diaspora will support return migration, especially in terms of potential returnees’ re-entry into the domestic labour market and their ability to contribute their knowledge and skills to its development. In our research sample, we identified arelatively high proportion of respondents for whom returning might be an option. More than half of the respondents can be regarded more or less as potential return migrants (those who when asked about returning responded definitely yes– 16%, maybe yes– 12%, don’t know– 24%), while only 15% said that they are not considering areturn to the Czech Republic. In addition to awide range of factors that influence the use of this potential, the activities of the state play asignificant role in this field. Therefore, we asked respondents what the main obstacles to their returning to the Czech Republic were and how the Czech state could facilitate their return. If we asked more broadly what would make the decision to return easier, alarge part of the answers focused on structural changes in the Czech Republic. By far the most common response was ‘change in the social/political situation’ (21% of all responses, N=499). Here reference was often made to the names of individual politicians and the overall direction of the country– for example, the issues the country’sforeign policy focuses on. Respondents often criticised the orientation ‘towards the East’, but some, on the other hand, were bothered by membership in the European Union. Among social phenomena, sexism, the closed nature of Czech society, and the absence of same-sex marriages were criticised. The following answers as to what would make deciding to return easier fell into this category: ‘Achange in political conditions in the Czech Republic, more openness of the Czech Republic towards the world.’ ‘If the admirers of oligarchs and undemocratic regimes would disappear.’ ‘Lower property prices, [better] quality food, less pro-Brussels politics - more pride in the Czech nation.’ ‘The mind of Czech citizens … they’re looking at each other’splates, gossiping, the mentality of the nation simply has to be “further” developed …’ ‘The promotion of marriage and adoption by same-sex couples.’ 134 cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora ‘If the Czech political scene would become abit more cultured, the situation of minorities would improve, sexism and envy would disappear, and people would not look at me enviously or through their fingers just because Ilived somewhere else for awhile.’ The next most common category of responses to this question relates to ‘adequate job opportunities’ (16%). This response was often shared by scientist respondents, but not exclusively. Responses often linked the existence of job opportunities to financial remuneration (but these also form aseparate category below). Here are some examples of the responses people gave: ‘Employment opportunities in the field, recognition of years of service outside the EU.’ ‘Knowing that Ican find awell-paid job in the field.’ ‘The possibility for further advancement in my field, ajob– Iam aprofessional diplomat with 15 years of experience including several long-term missions and working on missions for OBSE UNHCR.’ The next most common category of responses as to what might induce people to return is about ‘better social policies (including housing policies)’ (10%). Frequently raised topics here include housing affordability and support for families with children, pensions, and health issues. ‘More support for young families with children.’ ‘Conditions for our child who has special needs.’ ‘The possibility of getting amortgage and the availability of housing, nursery schools, or playgroups for very young children (under 3).’ ‘Stability and security of pension provision.’ ‘If there was abetter school system ....’ The last significant category is ‘administrative support/less bureaucracy’ (8%). Respondents mention the need for clear, up-to-date information, especially in the areas of health insurance, taxes, the social system, but also information about jobs. When we asked more specifically how the Czech Republic could make it easier to return, we received answers that could be classified into three main categories: 135cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora (1) The availability of online applications with the necessary information, online access to process various documents, less bureaucracy, better communication with the authorities (16% of the total number of responses, N=265); (2) An equal salary level (in the Czech Republic), abetter economic situation, incentives (16%); (3) Working in the industry/networking, the possibility to work in the industry, and greater transparency in hiring procedures (15%). Interesting results were also provided by respondents who are not yet considering returning. Their decision to stay where they are is mostly based on reasons that are personal or generally have to do with their satisfaction with the place where they live (this is the view of approximately three-quarters of those who expressed an opinion, N=387). We included these reasons in the following categories: ‘Children’seducation, background, contacts, family, housing’; ‘Iam at home here, Ihave lived here for along time’; ‘Better quality of life, Iam happy here, we are better off here’; or ‘Better opportunities, work reasons, salary’. Asmaller number of reasons related to anegative view of the situation in the Czech Republic. These views fall into the following types of categories: ‘Political situation, shameful political scene’, ‘Sexism, racism, mentality, morality’, or ‘Corruption, bureaucracy’. 6.7 CONCLUSION As we already stated above, the results of the questionnaire survey cannot be considered fully representative given the way that the respondents were selected. They relate primarily to the sample we selected, which is likely to deviate in several ways from the real composition of the diaspora (especially its structure by age, gender, education, and length of stay abroad). Nevertheless, some of the robust findings may help to identify the problems that the diaspora most often faces in relation to the Czech state. The most strongly voiced demand of respondents was for an increase in the efficiency of the work of the Czech authorities, both in the place where they live (at the embassies) and in the Czech Republic. Criticism was directed at the extensive bureaucracy, the low level of digitisation of services, and the limited flexibility. For expatriates abroad, these general requirements relating to the functioning of the state and public administration and, in particular, to ensuring the provision of services are of particular importance. Therefore, terms such as computerisation or digitisation often appeared in the suggestions for improvement. The issue of accessibility is also linked to the next most com- 136 cHaPter 6 tHe exPectatioNs aNd Needs of tHe czecH diasPora mon request, which relates to the possibility of remote voting. Respondents in our survey expressed arelatively high level of interest in political events in the Czech Republic and the possibility of voting is of great importance to them. Other frequent themes in the respondents’ requests related to education in the Czech language and in Czech culture and making efforts in the homeland to overcome the underestimation or even devaluation of the role of compatriots in Czech society. At the same time, the demands Czech compatriots have of the Czech state authorities as identified in this research are reflected in anumber of formal and informal activities they engage in, which is creating pressure to shape Czech expatriate policy from the bottom up (see also Chapter 1 in this book). An example in this respect can be found in compatriots’ efforts to bring about the introduction of correspondence voting, to which Czech political representatives are currently responding. The Czech Republic presently lags behind many other Central European countries in making it possible for Czech expatriates to vote from abroad (see the chapters on expatriate politics in Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary in this book). In connection with the possibility of returning to the Czech Republic, problems of amacrostructural nature were most frequently mentioned: dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the Czech Republic and, as aresult, concerns about finding ajob in the Czech labour market, as well as criticism of the political and social situation in the Czech Republic (including references to low levels of tolerance, alack of openness to the world, or even alow level of national pride). In addition, returning depended on there being areduction of bureaucracy, increased transparency, and administrative support for moving back to the Czech Republic. Akey factor mentioned in various contexts for not yet having returned was the unacceptable level of remuneration for work (where the human capital at the respondent’sdisposal is left insufficiently utilised). Areturn would lead to asignificant, and therefore mostly unacceptable, decline in income and, therefore, the individual’sor family’sstandard of living. References Janská, E. et al. 2022. Výzkumná zpráva 2: Výzkum potřeb krajanských komunit vjednotlivých zemích zhlediska udržení jejich vazeb na ČR Čeští krajané– nové přístupy ke koordinaci krajanské problematiky (https://www.cestikrajane.cz/vysledky-vyzkumu/). [Research report 2: the needs of compatriot communities in individual countries and their ties to the Czech Republic. Czech compatriots– new approaches to the coordination of diaspora issues] 19 February 2024. https://www.cestikrajane.cz/vysledky-vyzkumu/. Tan, Y., X. Liu, A. Rosser, B. Yeoh, and F. Guo. 2018. ‘Transnationalism, Diaspora, and Development: APurposive Review of the Literature.’ Geography Compass 12, no. 12: e12413. cHaPter 7 THE INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE CZECH DIASPORA: ACOMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF CZECHS IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY VERSUS NORTH AMERICA eva JaNsKÁ, duŠaN drBoHlav, zdeNĚK ČermÁK, & JiŘÍ HasmaN 7.1 INTRODUCTION The developed world has more limited knowledge about the institutional involvement of its diasporas than the developing world. Czechia is an example of adeveloped country whose new diaspora’stransnational practices are primarily focused not on sending remittances but rather on various conditionalities, on the various influential factors that we will discuss in our analysis, such as institutional engagement. Diasporas from wealthier countries behave differently than those from countries that are less developed in terms of their relative affluence and freedom to travel across borders, resulting in varied levels of engagement with host and home institutions. The geographic proximity of migrants to their country of origin is afactor in this that should also be taken into consideration. This chapter aims to demonstrate how engagement can be examined by comparing the Czech diaspora in the United States & Canada and in Germany & Austria (for more examples, see Janská et al. forthcoming). Utilising data from our own survey (see below), we address two primary inquiries: How do the Czech diaspora groups that are geographically close to and distant from Czechia differ? What factors, aside from geographic distance, influence the level of institutional engagement among the diaspora? The data for this study derive from an online questionnaire survey conducted among Czechs residing abroad (for more details on methodology and methods, please see Chapter 5). From atotal of 940 respondents representing more than 40 countries, we specifically selected 413 individuals living in the United States (N=143), Canada (N=58), Germany (N=163), and Austria (N=49). For the analysis, we identify two types of institutions in which the diaspora may engage: (a) hostland institutions (country of origin-oriented) and (b)homeland institutions in the destination country. This approach, in our opinion, contributes to adeeper and more comprehensive understanding of the transnational practices of the Czech diaspora. 144 cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora The questionnaire was fielded in the Czech language in order to recruit only respondents who still speak or understand Czech. It was distributed online through alink on the project website. Four methods were used to find respondents. First, we gathered data from the websites of various relevant institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of the Czech Republic. Second, we utilised our own databases from previous research and the database of experts and scientists available from the Czexpats association. Third, we used the crawling method, which involves machine data collection from websites, whereby we extracted from pre-defined areas on the Internet as many relevant contacts as possible. We collected approximately 91,000 contacts in total using this method. Unfortunately, it proved to be unsatisfactory as only about athousand of these contacts were found to be relevant, and only asmall number of them returned the questionnaires. The final method of data collection was through acampaign on Facebook. We targeted people living abroad (outside Czechia) using Facebook in the Czech language on an iPhone. An email with information on the project and arequest to fill in the questionnaire was sent to the contacts identified in this way. It took an average of 40 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The sample collection aimed to gain as wide aspectrum of Czech migrants as possible, although this approach had clear limitations in terms of obtaining afully representative sample (see Chapter 5). 7.4.2 VARIABLES The questionnaire consisted of several parts. First, we asked for the basic characteristics of the respondents, which we then entered into the analyses as explanatory variables. These were the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents (Table 1) and attributes associated with respondents’ migration history (Table 2). The remaining parts of the questionnaire focused on the key concepts pursued in our research. Since, as latent variables, they cannot be measured directly, each of them was surveyed through anumber of items. The first of these items examines the level to which respondents behave transnationally (Table 3). Next, two types of institutions or organisations in which the diaspora is active are analysed (both of them are bottom-up and top-down). Hostland institutions with aconnection to Czechia are one type of institution– Czech migrants engage with the institution voluntarily, and these are people who are interested in maintaining their ties to Czechia and the Czech language and culture (Table 4). Homeland institutions are the second type of institution in which the diaspora is active. These are institutions that exist in the country of origin and their mission, at least in part, is to help compatriots abroad maintain ties to the homeland by actively engaging with the diaspora. (Table 5). 145cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora Table 1. Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics  USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Age  30 years and under 26 12.9 31 14.6 31 – 45 years 89 44.3 81 38.2 46 – 60 years 49 24.4 60 28.3 more than 60 years 37 18.4 40 18.9 Gender  Female 127 62.9 155 72.8 Male 75 37.1 58 27.2 Lives with a partner No 47 23.5 74 35.2 Yes 153 76.5 136 64.8 Has children  No 75 37.1 71 33.3 Yes 127 62.9 142 66.7 Place of residence  Country or smaller town 92 45.6 129 60.6 Metropolis 110 54.5 84 39.4 Education* Secondary or less 50 24.8 95 44.6 University 96 47.5 75 35.2 Postgraduate 56 27.7 43 20.2 Relative economic level Low 1 0.5 3 1.4 Rather low 10 5.0 6 2.8 Average 92 45.5 117 54.9 Rather high 75 37.1 77 36.2 High 24 11.9 10 4.7 Employment status  Non-working 63 31.2 65 30.5 Employee 114 56.4 128 60.1 Entrepreneur 25 12.4 20 9.4 Economic sector  Manufacturing 25 12.4 26 12.2 Other services 79 39.1 78 36.6 Social services 62 30.7 74 34.7 Science and research 36 17.8 35 16.4 Frequency of Czech language use (index)** Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 0.61 0.19 0.62 0.18 * As the level of education was measured on a scale with six categories, it enters into the regression analysis as a continuous variable. ** This index was constructed from seven items: frequency of Czech language use at home, frequency of Czech language use at work, reading Czech books, watching Czech TV, communication with relatives in Czechia, communication with Czech friends in the host country, communication with offices in Czechia. It was standardised as a scale from 0 to 1. 146 cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora Table 2. Migration characteristics   USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Czech citizenship No 16 7.9 21 9.9 Yes 186 92.1 192 90.1 Length of stay abroad 10 years or less 79 39.1 102 47.9 11 – 20 years 43 21.3 38 17.8 More than 20 years 80 39.6 73 34.3 Ever lived in Czechia No 5 2.5 1 0.5 Yes 197 97.5 212 99.5 Plans to return to Czechia Definitely not 28 20.4 43 25.7 Rather not 60 43.8 57 34.1 Rather yes 28 20.4 45 26.9 Definitely yes 21 15.3 22 13.2 Reasons for leaving Czechia Political 35 17.3 22 10.3 Labour (education) 47 23.3 63 29.6 Private 63 31.2 92 43.2 Education (academic/scientific) 50 24.8 34 16.0 Other/combination 7 3.5 2 0.9 Table 3. Variables measuring the level of transnationalism USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Frequency of visits to Czechia Less than once in five years 22 10.9 3 1.4 Once in 5 years 12 5.9 5 2.3 Once in 2 years 48 23.8 6 2.8 Once ayear 83 41.1 24 11.3 Once in 6 months 35 17.3 97 45.5 Once amonth 2 1.0 63 29.6 More than once amonth 0 0.0 15 7.0 Frequency of contact with family in Czechia Never 6 3.0 9 4.2 Several times ayear 26 12.9 48 22.5 Several times amonth 59 29.2 50 23.5 Several times aweek 111 55 106 49.8 147cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Frequency of contact with friends in Czechia Never 8 4.0 7 3.3 Several times ayear 74 36.6 103 48.4 Several times amonth 58 28.7 47 22.1 Several times aweek 62 30.7 56 26.3 Frequency of following news about Czechia Several times amonth or less 26 12.9 21 9.9 Several times amonth 43 21.3 39 18.3 Several times aweek 53 26.2 48 22.5 Daily or every other day 80 39.6 105 49.3 Remitting money to Czechia No 148 82.2 151 80.3 Yes 32 17.8 37 19.7 Frequency of remitting money to Czechia Once ayear 15 46.9 8 21.6 2-3 times ayear 9 28.1 4 10.8 Every 2 months 3 9.4 6 16.2 Every month or more often 5 15.6 19 51.4 Interest in Czech political life Absolutely not 9 4.5 5 2.3 Rarely 22 10.9 21 9.9 Sometimes 30 14.9 20 9.4 Partly, yes 54 26.7 50 23.5 Yes 87 43.1 117 54.9 Participation in the last Czech elections* Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 0.19 0.31 0.30 0.37 * This index was based on whether the respondent participated in presidential, house, senate, or municipal elections. It was standardised as a scale from 0 to 1. Table 4. Variables measuring the level of engagement with hostland institutions (DIM)  USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Contact with other Czechs in destination country No 20 10.0 57 26.9 Yes 181 90.0 155 73.1 Contact with organisations No 86 42.8 155 73.1 via Facebook 16 8.0 15 7.1 Yes 99 49.3 42 19.8 148 cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Taking part in Czech-run social activities No 98 48.8 166 78.3 Yes 103 51.2 46 21.7 Embassy (contact intensity on nonconsular matters) No 131 65.5 152 72.7 Max. once a year 46 23.0 50 23.9 More than once a year 23 11.5 7 3.3 Czech cultural centres (contact intensity) No 162 81.0 188 89.1 Max. once a year 22 11.0 13 6.2 More than once a year 16 8.0 10 4.7 Diaspora associations (contact intensity) No 111 55.5 170 80.6 Max. once a year 25 12.5 20 9.5 More than once a year 64 32.0 20 9.5 Table 5. Variables measuring the level of engagement with homeland institutions (HI) USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Activities in Czechia No 160 79.6 169 79.7 Yes 41 20.4 43 20.3 Assets in Czechia No 58 32.4 71 37.0 Yes 121 67.6 121 63.0 Czech health services (contact intensity) No 114 57.0 119 56.7 Once a year or less 69 34.5 57 27.1 More than once a year 17 8.5 34 16.2 Czech tax office (contact intensity) No 140 70.0 143 68.8 Once a year or less 54 27.0 59 28.4 More than once a year 6 3.0 6 2.9 Czech Social Security Administration (contact intensity) No 160 79.6 154 72.6 Once a year or less 38 18.9 35 16.5 More than once a year 0 0.5 19 9.0 Czech education institutes (contact intensity) No 139 69.2 153 73.6 Once a year or less 33 16.4 27 13.0 More than once a year 29 14.4 28 13.5 149cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora USA/Canada Germany/Australia N % N % Special Commissioner (contact intensity) No 185 92 202 96.7 Once a year or less 9 4.5 5 2.4 More than once a year 7 3.5 2 1.0 Senate Diaspora Committee (contact intensity) No 188 94 207 99.0 Once a year or less 9 4.5 0 0.0 More than once a year 3 1.5 2 1.0 Czech municipality institutions (contact intensity) No 123 61.8 98 46.9 Once a year or less 67 33.7 85 40.7 More than once a year 9 4.5 26 12.4 All three latent variables were measured by aggregate indexes as follows: variables in the questionnaires (Table 6) were standardised as ascale from 0 to 1, and the values obtained were then averaged. As aresult, we got three indexes, where 0 denotes the minimum transnationalism/engagement theoretically possible and 1 denotes the maximum. Table 6. The operationalisation of the transnationalism and engagement indices Index of transnationalism Frequency of visits to Czechia Frequency of contact with family in Czechia Frequency of contact with friends in Czechia Frequency of following news about Czechia Remitting money to Czechia Interest in Czech political life Participation in the last Czech elections Index of hostland institutions (DIM) Contact with any other Czechs, with any Czech organisations, and attending any Czech events Contact with various Czech institutions in the destination country* Index of homeland institutions (HI) Having any activities and assets in Czechia Contact with various Czech institutions in Czechia** * Embassy in non-consular matters, Czech cultural centres, diaspora associations ** Czech health services, tax office, Czech Social Security Administration, educational institutions, Special Commissioner, Senate Diaspora Committee, municipality institutions 150 cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora 7.4.3 METHODOLOGICAL AND METHODICAL NOTES In accordance with the research aims, the empirical section consists of two parts. In the first one, we present acomparison of respondents from both groups (United States & Canada vs Germany & Austria) in terms of their selected demographic, socioeconomic, geographic, and migration characteristics as well as of their transnationalism and engagement parameters. As all of these characteristics are categorical, Cramer Vwas used to show us the extent of the differences between the two groups. The values can range between 0 and 1; higher values indicate bigger differences between the two groups. In the second part, two sets of models were calculated using multivariate linear regression analysis to determine the relationships between the variables of interest. In the first set, the index of engagement in the host country was the dependent variable, while in the second set this variable was set as the independent variable and the index of engagement in Czechia was the dependent variable. The transnationalism index and other selected relevant respondent characteristics, as discussed in the theoretical section, were included in the models as explanatory variables. In both sets, the models were first calculated for the two groups separately to compare the different relationships in the different immigration contexts. Then amodel that included the entire sample was calculated, with the destination country set as adummy variable, allowing the magnitude of the differences between the two groups to be assessed. Before the analyses, standard procedures were performed to check that the assumptions of the linear regression analysis were met; as aresult, two variables (economic sector and age) were dropped owing to multicollinearity. Only variables that exhibited some relationship to the dependent variables in the preliminary bivariate analysis were entered into the regression analysis. The standardised regression coefficients are reported in the final tables. 7.5 RESULTS 7.5.1 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTANT DIASPORAS– THE UNITED STATES &CANADA VS GERMANY & AUSTRIA As for the selected socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, the values of Cramer’sVshow that the differences are not substantial. Nevertheless, the following facts are worth mentioning: in our sample and in agiven comparative perspective amuch larger proportion of the American 151cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora respondents are university graduates, and the majority of respondents live in large urban areas (Table 1, Figure 1). We should, of course, take the first fact into account when analysing and interpreting results relating to our main research questions. Regarding migration characteristics (see Table 2 and Figure 2), the biggest difference between regions is in the reasons for migration, with political reasons being more important for the respondents in the United States & Canada than for the group living in Germany & Austria. 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Cramer V Economic sector Employment status Rel. economic level Education Place of residence Have children Lives with a partner Gender Age 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Cramer V Figure 1. Effect size of the differences between the two regions– socioeconomic and demographic characteristics Age Gender Lives with a partner Has children Place of residence Education Rel. economic level Employment status Economic sector 152 cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora In the case of transnationalisation (Table 3, Figure 3), there are, logically, large differences in the frequency of visits to Czechia. More frequent visits to Czechia are made by the respondents from Germany & Austria, given the geographic location of these countries. There is also adifference in the frequency with which respondents send remittances, where, again, the European respondents significantly dominate over the American respondents. This is probably because of the greater importance economic interests hold as the reason for emigrating among the Czech diaspora respondents in Germany & Austria compared to those in the United States & Canada. Figure 2. Effect size of the differences between the two regions– migration characteristics 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Cramer V Reasons for leaving Czechia Plans to return to Czechia Has already lived in Czechia Length of stay abroad Czech citizenship 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Cramer V Czech citizenship Length of stay abroad Has already lived in Czechia Plans to return to Czechia Reasons for leaving Czechia 153cHaPter 7 tHe iNstitutioNal eNgagemeNt of tHe czecH diasPora Voluntary involvement in compatriot (Czech-related) institutions in the destination country of migration is much more typical for respondents from the United States & Canada than for those living in Germany & Austria (Table4, Figure 4). The main reason for this is probably the greater geographic distance, which prevents frequent direct contact with the home country and, as aresult, encourages the fulfilment of this need through greater contact with other Czechs in the country of residence, stronger ties to Czech organisations, attendance at Czech events, and more intensive involvement in Czech associations in the country of residence. For respondents from Germany &Austria, there is no such need, as it is easy to have direct contact with Czechia, even for short periods of time, given the country’sproximity. 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Interested in Czech political life Remitting frequency Remitting money to Czechia Following news about Czechia Contact with friends in Czechia Contact with family in Czechia Visits to Czechia Cramer V 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Visits to Czechia Contact with family in Czechia Contact with friends in Czechia Following news about Czechia Remitting money to Czechia Remitting frequency Interested in Czech political life Cramer V Figure 3. Effect size of the differences between the two regions– transnationalism characteristics