The New Game for Energy: Geopolitics of Central Asia

The New Game for Energy: Geopolitics of Central Asia Artúr Lakatos INTRODUCTION The “Great Game”, as the competition between tsarist Russia and the British Em‑ pire for control of Central Asia was known, is familiar to all historians of interna‑ tional relations.1 In the second half of the 19th century, the Game was for territory and strategic positions. Nowadays, a new Game, much more complex and with more numerous actors, focuses on exploitation and control of fossil energy resources. The silent rivalry is ongoing, even if less publicized than conflicts from other cor‑ ners of the world. This paper examines and analyzes this phenomenon. It focuses on the five post‑ ‑Soviet republics, their situation, resources and possibilities, and on global and re‑ gional powers involved in the New Game with all of their motivation and present possibilities. The analysis takes two overlapping and complementary directions. One emphasizes current affairs in Central Asia from the point of view of principal state actors; the other considers competition over the region’s fossil fuel resources. In recent years, specialists in international relations and political analysts have shown increasing interest in the future of Central Asian resources.2 This paper ap‑ proaches this very complex issue from the perspective of global politics, looking at the action, reaction and interaction of the great number of actors involved, among them huge corporations and Islamic movements. 1 As selective Bibliography for the Great Game, see: P. HOPKIRK, The Great Game: The Strug‑ gle for Empire in Central Asia, New York 1992; K. E. MEYER — S. B. BRYSAC, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia, New York 2000. 2 We have to mention a few bibliography titles in here: A. COOLEY, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, Oxford 2012; L. KLEVEMAN, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, New York 2004; S. N. CUMMINGS, Understanding Cen‑ tral Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations, New York 2012; M. LARULUELLE (Ed.), China and India in Central Asia: A New Great Game?, New York 2010; R. JOHNSON, Oil, Is‑ lam and Conflict: Central Asia since 1945, London 2007; A. RASHID, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, London, New York 2000; A. MUSTAFA, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and Predicament, Ankara 2000. ARTúR LAKATOS 141 REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA: A CURRENT STATE The five central Asian states, all former Soviet republics, include Uzbekistan, Turk‑ menistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, share numerous similar charac‑ teristics. Uzbekistan, with its internal stability, is most likely to become a regional he‑ gemonic. It may also be the key for regional security. It is the only one which shares borders with all the others, and has more people than the other four combined.3 Since borders in this region were shaped by central leadership of the Soviet Union during the interwar period, Uzbekistan as Soviet republic represented Moscow’s principal agent in the area.4 However, it does not currently share borders with Russia or China, which makes it to be more attractive for Western powers, especially the USA, situat‑ ing it to allow the Uzbek government to have a policy of balance among Russia, the USA and China. Currently, the authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov seems quite solid, but faces internal challengers, among them fundamentalist Islamist militant groups. This was the main reason why after September 11th 2001, Uzbekistan was among the first ones who joined the Coalition Against Terror, and allowed the US to use its airports and military bases. Due to this, the USA established for the first time a military base on the territory of the former Cold War enemy, at Khanabad.5 According to official US statistics, during 2002, the US allocated 79 million USD to Uzbekistan for improving its security and law enforcement, almost double the second most important state from the region, Kazakhstan, thus causing an even more visible asymmetry between the military strength of Uzbekistan and the other Central ‑Asian countries.6 Actually, according to some sources, among them the British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, Uzbek authorities intentionally midled US forces by exaggerating Al ‑Qaeda links to Uzbek militant Islamist groups, in order to receive Western help and consent in the liquidation of Karimov’s enemies.7 But the US ‑Uzbek romance did not last long. There are several reasons for this. Probably one of the main reasons is the gap between the political values of the two leaderships. Another possible explanation is that with the use of the Manas airport and airbase from Kirgizstan, Uzbek bases lost their value anyway for US strategists. A third motive can be that due to the lack of its own oil or natural gas resources, Uzbekistan is less interesting for investors than Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan. But with all these, the Uzbek state certainly remains a regional power, and has to be counted as such in any equation of regional games of power. 3 A. HYMAN, Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia, in: International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2, 1993, p. 292. 4 N. J. MELVIN, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road, Florence 2000, p. 6. 5 M. LARUELLE — S. PEYROUSE, The United States in Central Asia: Reassessing a Challeng‑ ing Partnership, in: Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No 3, p. 429. 6 A. BOHR, Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order, in: International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, p. 492. 7 C. MURRAY, Murder in Samarkand, London 2006; A. COOLEY, Principles in the Pipeline: Managing Transatlantic Values and Interests in Central Asia, in: International Affairs, Vol. 84, No 6, 2008, p. 1175. 142 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 Despite the relative strength of the Uzbek army, Karimov has not embarked on military adventures beyond his resources. Uzbekistan is always ready to threaten with repression any Tajik or Kirgiz initiative which is designed to build hydro plants on their portion of rivers which are flowing than into Uzbekistan, but in June 2010, during the massacre of Uzbek community in Kirgizstan, choose not to intervene, even if approximately 185,000 Uzbeks refugees temporarily fled in Uzbekistan.8 This attitude might seem strange for most people from the West, where economic issues are more likely to be considered negotiable than the persecution of minorities and genocide. The current state of Kirgizstan, home of the Manas epics and the air base with the same name, shows similarities and differences. Major differences between Kirgizstan and its other Central ‑Asian neighbors include Kirgizstan᾿s relative paucity of natural resources, except for water and hydroelectric potential.9 After 1919, Kirgizstan was perceived to be the most “liberal” or “western ‑type” among the five republics. Among the five new state presidents, only Kirgiz academician Askar Akaev had not once been a Communist Party official. He was also the only one of the five to lose his power dur‑ ing his lifetime, due to the Tulip Revolution. At the beginning, Kirgizstan was seen by the USA and the European democracies as “a democratic island in the region”10 and it appears that Akaev thought seriously of turning his country into the “Switzerland of Central Asia”, being very impressed by the Swiss model.11 But things evolved in a different direction: reforms suggested by the IMF brought no prosperity — similar to most of other parts of the world — and Kirgizstan was free of neither corruption nor authoritarian rule. Similar to Karimov, Akaev proved to be sensitive to the dan‑ ger of Islamic terrorist movements, due to the incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on Kirgiz territories and the activities of the Hizbal ‑Tahir,12 so he was also ready to offer help to the anti ‑terrorist coalition, in his initially proclaimed plan, for one year.13 However, the US could use the Manas14 for more not affected by the outcome of the Tulip Revolution, which caused the downfall of Akaev’s corrupt re‑ gime. Following the Americans, Russia also established a military base of its own in Kirgizstan, in 2003.15 If Kirgiz leaders play their cards well, Kirgizstan could become truly the Switzer‑ land of Central Asia, but with key differences. For Kirgizstan did not declare neutral‑ ity but shared the interest of three world powers. It shares borders with emerging 8 J. HEATHERSHAW — N. MEGORAN, Contesting Danger: A New Agenda for Policy and Scholarship on Central Asia, in: International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3, 2011, p. 605. 9 MELVIN, p. 7. 10 LARUELLE, p. 434. 11 M. M. PURI, Central Asia Geopolitics: The Indian View, in: Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 248–249. 12 P. MANN, Religious Extremism in Central Asia, in: Strategic Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 9, p. 1030. 13 L. BUZSYNSKI, Russia’s New Role in Central Asia, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2005, p. 556. 14 While writing this, the plans of Kirgiz leadership are to close it as a military base during 2014, and to turn it into a civil airport. 15 BUZSYNSKI, p. 553. ARTúR LAKATOS 143 continental China, which looks to increase its influence in the region, and arouses fears especially among Russian politicians and analysts that Kirgizstan might turn toward China in the future. Russia therefore considers its presence on Kirgiz soil to be important, while Kirgiz politicians tolerate it as a counter to Uzbek hegemonic claims16 and possible aggression against Kirgizstan. Similarly, with all the delicate procedures around closing the Manas, for the US government Kirgizstan still occu‑ pies an important geopolitical position, since it is relatively close to several states of Eastern Asia and the Muslim world which are considered to be enemies of the USA. This interest of the world powers can bear great dangers for this fragile state, but also great possibilities. The future will show how the Kirgiz government can deal with this unique strategic situation. The northernmost republic, Kazakhstan, is more than double the size of the all other four together, and regarding population, is second only to Uzbekistan. By far, it has the best potential regarding economic development, its main natural resource being its oilfields. Actually, Kazakhstan is ranked second among oil producing coun‑ tries of the ex ‑Soviet Union, behind only Azerbaijan.17 The other main advantage of Kazakhstan is its geopolitical situation: it shares borders with countries like Rus‑ sia, China and Uzbekistan. Since it was theoretically out of the range of the Soviet Union’s western adversaries, and close to China, South Asia and the Middle East, it was the site of the Soviet Union’s most strategic units, the main nuclear test site (Semipalatinsk) and also its space center (Baikonur).18 Following to the fall of the Soviet Union, the former Communist Party leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev took power as president, and remains in office. He proved to be one of the most efficient authoritarian rulers of the present time, Kazakhstan being a relatively open country for foreign investors, and a pillar of stability in the region. Most of its oil exports go to Russia, but Western companies as Chevron, Texaco, Agip and British Gas are also present in the country.19 Nazarbaev remains open to different pipeline projects of his main trading partners, a game from which Kazakhstan can only win. The country’s geopolitical importance results from this. The Kazakh leadership proved to be cooperative in the nuclear disarming process, gaining by this the trust of all involved great powers. Even if Nazarbaev is not a puppet of Moscow, he tries to avoid challenging Moscow’s strategic interests, since the Russian Federation is not only a merely powerful neighbor, but also guarantees Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity and safety against militarily strong Uzbekistan and the potentially territorial challenger, China. Kazakh gestures toward Russia illuminate the friendly attitude of Kazakh lead‑ ers: such as the Nazarbaev proposals in 1994, for a Eurasian Union, which followed on his idea of 2001 for a Eurasian Economic Union.20 On the other hand, Kazakhstan part‑ ners in several NATO projects and is currently the only state from Central Asia which 16 Ibidem, p. 556. 17 C. ARVANITOPOULOS, Geopolitics of Oil in Central Asia, Athens 2002. 18 A. SERGOUNIN, Denuclearizing Central Asia, in: Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, Vol. 11, No 3, 1999, p. 275. 19 C. ARVANITOPOULOS, Geopolitics of Oil in Central Asia, Athens 2002. 20 BUSZYNSKI, p. 551. 144 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 participates in UN peacekeeping forces with a brigade.21 Connections with stable gov‑ ernments of the Muslim world are also good, especially with Turkey. After 1989, Astana proved interested in the Turkish financial and legal system,22 which was considered by Nazarbaev at that time to be a model for a modern Islamic state. Socially, Turkmenistan, the most backward of the Central Asian Republics, re‑ mains more like a tribal confederation than a modern nation.23 The most western central Asian republic, the desert ‑dominated Turkmenistan proved to be the most isolated territory of the former Soviet Union ‑ for example, the Ashgabat earthquake from 1948, which claimed more than 100,000 death, could remain unreported in So‑ viet and international press, and was known for long time only by locals. Following independence, this isolation and backwardness was exploited to its maximum by its megalomaniac ruler, Saparmurat Niyazov. Niyazov established an authoritarian dictatorship and a megalomaniac cult of personality, this latter aspect often surpassing in absurdity even the last Stalinist dictatorship of the world, North Korea. But that was tolerated by neighbors and by the great powers of the world, partly because of the lack of great power ambitions, as well as because of the large gas reserves of the country. Niyazov played the card of the potential richness very well, keeping its population as isolated as possible from the rest of the world, and in International Relations he adopted the “positive neutral‑ ity” doctrine. Niyazov claimed his own book to be at the level of Islam’s holy book, the Quran, and advised his people that for preserving the health of their teeth, they should chew bones, like dogs; but the positive neutrality doctrine was not did not sink to the same level of absurdity, despite coming from the megalomaniac dwarf dictator of a small and relatively weak state. The policy sought to keep Turkmenistan out of any of the regional conflicts. For example, Niyazov remained neutral during America’s war on terror, without suffering reprisals from one of the sides — and continued dialogues with all of his country’s partners without being compromised in the eyes of the interlocutor’s rivals. For example, during the 1990s Turkmenistan received as gifts from the USA several patrol boats to establish its own fleet on the Caspian sea, without being pressed into formalizing any kind of strategic partner‑ ship or cooperation;24 It also developed good trading relations with the pariah of in‑ ternational life, its powerful neighbor, Iran, especially regarding railway infrastruc‑ ture, which was built only after 1989;25 and made gestures affecting Russian prestige, without suffering any reprisals. Following an attempted coup in November 2002, Niyazov accused Russia with complicity and adopted harsh measures against the Russian minority of the country. Putin, instead of responding with an iron fist, as he did in Chechnya, Georgia and recently in Ukraine, chose dialogue, respecting not so much the megalomania, but the stability of gas supplies.26 21 LARUELLE, p. 431. 22 BUSZYNSKI, p. 560. 23 HYMAN, p. 291. 24 LARUELLE, p. 434. 25 E. HERZIG, Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia, in: International Affairs, Vol. 80, No 3, 2004, p. 514. 26 BUSZYNSKI, p. 563. ARTúR LAKATOS 145 Turkmenistan’s gas reserves are strategically important on a global scale, and competition for them is vigorous. This fact was also very efficiently speculated by the leaders from Ashgabat, since even nowadays, with Niyazov replaced by a person more open toward the West, the gas reserves are still controlled by two big national companies, the Turkmengas and Turkmenneft. President Gurbanguly Berdimuham‑ edov allowed, and even invited foreign companies to exploit reserves from the Cas‑ pian Sea, attracting German, South Korean, Arab Emirates, Russian, American and Malaysian companies in the country, and the Chinese CNPC even received direct ac‑ cess to a terrestrial oilfield at Bagtyyarlyk.27 Due to its gas potential, Turkmenistan can easily become the epicenter of central Asian geopolitics: and even if currently the stability of gas supplies prevails in the face of eventual democratization attempts, similar to the Arab spring, this possibility can bring major risks also. In its first phase, risks for the actual ruling elite; and in the long term, incalculable ones. Tajikistan, with its long civil war, is the perfect example where internal instabil‑ ity can lead in Central ‑Asian republic. Probably the poorest of the five, Tajikistan is the only one inhabited by an ethnic Iranian majority, and also the one where inde‑ pendence was quickly followed by destabilization. Violence erupted in 1992, when the countries pro ‑communist leadership, strongly backed by Uzbekistan and Rus‑ sia, faced the violent challenge of a coalition of nationalists, radical Islamists and westward ‑leaning democrats. The long ‑lasting and very violent conflict ended with a negotiated compromise, which allowed the ruling president to retain power. The conflict itself was a Great Game in miniature, with multiple external powers — Rus‑ sia, Uzbekistan, Iran, Taliban Afghanistan and Al ‑Qaeda — pursuing their own in‑ terests. This devastating conflict did not reveal Tajikistan as a failed state, even if state control over its territory is the weakest in the region. The conflict didn’t produce cen‑ tripetal effects, and the country did not fall into its pieces. Moreover, Tajik official government attempts to act in favor of regional stability and security, by participat‑ ing in international organizations and different security programs. For example Ta‑ jikistan is a founding member of the Collective Security treaty Organization (CSTO) and of the Shanghai Forum.28 Despite this, training camps of radical Islamist groups still can be found on Tajik, territory, especially fighters of the IMU, which annoys Uzbek leadership, who periodically accuse Tajikistan with harboring anti ‑Uzbek ter‑ rorists.29 Tajik economic development focuses on its aluminum industry and poten‑ tial for hydro ‑plants, this latter being another source of discord with Uzbekistan, which fears that planned hydro plants might have a catastrophic impact on Uzbek water supplies.30 27 A. PETERSEN — K. BARYSCH, Russia, China and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia, London 2011, p. 48. 28 R. ALLISON, Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia, in: International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, p. 471. 29 MANN, pp. 130–132. 30 F. TOLIPOV, Micro ‑geopolitics of Central Asia: A Uzbekistan Perspective, in: Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2011, p. 637. 146 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 GREAT POWER INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND THE NEW GREAT GAME The main external power with an impact on Central Asia was, is and will be Rus‑ sia, through its economic, military and cultural influence, and also through the great number of ethnic Russians in the region. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Rus‑ sian influence has naturally weakened, and will never reach the same level. The re‑ gion will never see a return of Russian influence to the level seen in Belarus. Never‑ theless, Russia remains the main exporter of raw materials — among them gas and oil — from the republics, and its trade corridors with important partners like India and Iran cross Central Asia.31 The three eastern states also rely seriously on the Rus‑ sian military for their own security, especially against the hegemonic claims of Uz‑ bekistan, but also in their relationship with China. The “joint defense of borders and air space” translates in practice to Russian border patrols at the borders of Tajiki‑ stan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan with China,32 sending a strong message to the east‑ ern neighbor not to have irredentist ideas, and the Dragon appears to understand the message. However, Russian influence is currently challenged, especially in the economic sphere. It is no wonder that the Gazprom tried recently to lock Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan into new production agreements,33 which could assure a monopoly status for Russian investments in the regional energy field. The contestants still represent powers like the United States, China and the European Union. The USA was among the first states that opened embassies in all of the five re‑ publics, followed soon by its Western European allies. After this the Newmont Min‑ ing Corporation quickly received the concession to exploit the Maranthau gold mine from Uzbek authorities.34 But after this, relations became during the 1990s somehow distant. Following September 11th 2001, the possibility of deeper cooperation seemed greater, because regional regimes sharing the same enemy with the US. Tajik, Uzbek and Kirgiz leaders offered their help almost immediately. However, nowadays rela‑ tions are more distant. The US military has been driven out from most of its Central‑ ‑Asian bases, and cooperation has been dogged by a variety of controversies. For Central ‑Asian ruling elites, ideals like “democracy” and “civil society” are not only strange, but contain dangers similar to Islam terrorism, and are not welcomed, even when such a position is costly. For example, cotton represented 90% of the Uzbek exports to the USA, until Wal ‑Mart decided to boycott Uzbekistan,35 due to moral concerns regarding the respect of human rights by the Karimov regime. However the USA remains an important provider of security assistance to these countries espe‑ cially for Tajikistan and Kirgizstan. 31 S. BLANK, India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 149. 32 R. MENON — H. SPRUYT, The Limits of Neorealism: Understanding Security in Central Asia, in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999, p. 102. 33 A. COOLEY, Principles in the Pipeline: Managing Transatlantic Values and Interests in Central Asia, in: International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008, p. 1183. 34 HYMAN, pp. 300–301. 35 LARUELLE, p. 436. ARTúR LAKATOS 147 It remains possible that in case of a possible failure in Afghanistan — similar to the one in Vietnam — the US will pull back from Central Asia, leaving it to become the playground for other powers while following its interests elsewhere. But know‑ ing American national strategy concerning energy security and especially the nature of US based corporations, this appears unlikely, since Central Asia represents great opportunities in its energy supplies. In the field of energy supplies, US diplomacy strongly supports US ‑based compa‑ nies, like Amoco, Texaco and Chevron, not for economic and strategic reasons. The USA, as the leading oil consuming country in the world, wants its share from fossil fuel supplies of Central Asia, but the way it gets it is just as equally important. In an indirect way, the USA is also interested in reducing the energy dependency of Europe on Russia. Currently, the idea for Central ‑Asian gas intended for American customers to be transported in pipelines which goes through Russia or Iran are risky and unacceptable; therefore, pipeline projects through the Caspian sea, Turkey, the Balkans and East Central Europe are encouraged.36 Among these, the Nabucco ‑project is currently the most advertised, the most serious and the nearest to being put into practice. But due to different regional security risks — such as Turkish reprisals against Kurdish rebels — currently the Nabucco is postponed, and its immediate fu‑ ture seems gloomy.37 Even if in the energy sector the USA and Russia in the form of companies with American and Russian capital, strongly supported because of strategic reasons by of‑ ficial state diplomacy are competitors, in security issues they are rather parallel, hav‑ ing similar interests regarding stability of the region and preserving the status quo, which has immeasurably fewer risks than do a potential political upheaval. More‑ over, both of them have other concerns in the region than each other. For the USA, the main goal is preventing the rise of radical Islam, and Russia has its own uneasy and very complex relationship with communist China. If there is a chance for an external power to give direction to the region, it will not be the USA, but the — integrated or not — European Union. The EU represents currently the largest economic system of the world, and even if militarily and even in terms of foreign politics integration is advancing very slowly, it is already a ma‑ jor normative power, whose values are found to be attractive by elites of developing countries, while the USA, which shares the same values, but in promoting them is using a different approach, instead of being perceived as a “Gentle Giant” or “Police‑ man of the World” is seen more as an aggressive boogeyman. “On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. They agree on little and understand one another less and less,”38 wrote Robert Kagan in 2002 in one of his short articles, seeing the “wind of change”, which over time became increasingly visible. Several analysts and observers blame the Bush ‑government, 36 E. KIRCHNER, European Energy Security Co ‑operation: Between Amity and Enmity, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2010, p. 874. 37 More about the Nabucco: D. FINON, The EU Foreign Gas Policy of Transit Corridors: Autopsy of the Stillborn Nabucco Project, in: OPEC Energy Review, 2011, pp. 47–69. 38 R. KAGAN, Power and Weakness, in: Policy Review, No. 113, June 2002. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/kagan.htm, [2012–10–15]. 148 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 which sought moral support of its allies for its own War on Terror, but did not seek policy dialogue on a strategic level, often ignoring its “unasked” suggestions.39 It is true, that especially in the case of Iraq, the USA ignored international treaties, orga‑ nizations and understandings, which were formally respected until then, and when this was raised in discussion by major European decision ‑makers, the answer was dismissive. For leaders and their supporting elites of Central Asia, the EU is a benign giant, which represents no danger to their independence, territorial integrity or society, but actually, it could offer beneficial aid and know ‑how.40 Currently, the main instru‑ ment of EU policy in Central Asia is represented by the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS),41 which is designed to help former Soviet states in their transition toward functioning democratic market ‑economies. Except for this, there is no coherent EU foreign policy in this part of the world, nei‑ ther for the region as a unit, nor for its individual countries. The EU shares the interest of other powers in the energy resources of Central Asia. Currently, with all the efforts for implementing renewable and “green” energy strategies, energy consumption in the Union still has fossil fuels on its base. Accord‑ ing to some statistics, during the mid ‑2000s oil represented 37% of consumption in the countries of the Union, followed by natural gas (24%), solid fuels (18%), nuclear power (15%). Renewable sources provided a mere six percent,42 and this high percent‑ age is mainly based on imports. Regarding provenance of the EU’s oil imports, Rus‑ sian companies provided around 1/3 of the fossil fuel supplies, followed by Norway and several oil producing countries from the Middle East.43 Dependence on Russia for natural gas surpassed even oil: imports from Russia in 2008 represented 55% of EU imports.44 Since Russian oil and gas is cheap on the global market, and is both nearby and available, this trade functions to the interests of both buyer and seller. On the other hand, responsible European politicians perceive a strategic interest in diversification of energy imports and reduced dependence on Russia. This goal in‑ creases EU interest in direct dealing with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan; in third place based on the EU’s economic interests is Uzbekistan, which has no significant energy resources, but a series of other minerals.45 However, the lack of a common foreign policy represents a major disadvantage for the Union, but Russian ‑American competition, and the competition between the Nabucco and South Stream projects represents great opportunities for European specialized companies, especially from East ‑Central Europe. 39 A. TOJE, America, the EU and Strategic Culture, London 2008, pp. 135–136. 40 PETERSEN — BARYSCH, p. 61. 41 E. KAVALSKI, Partnership and Rivalry between the EU, China and India in Central Asia: The Normative Power of Regional Actors with Global Aspirations, in: European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 6, 2007, p. 843. 42 G. BAHGAT, The Geopolitics of Energy: Europe and North Africa, in: The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010, pp. 39–49. 43 PETERSEN, pp. 60–61. 44 KIRCHNER, p. 861. 45 PETERSEN, pp. 1182–1183.