Great Britain, the Dominionsand Their Position on Japanin the 1920s and Early 1930s
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Great Britain, the Dominions and Their Position on Japan in the 1920s and Early 1930s1 Jaroslav valkoun Signature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance treaty on 30 January 1902 did not just signal the end of Great Britain’s policy of Splendid Isolation, but also meant that until the 1920s Japan would remain aloyal ally to the British Empire and its interests in the Far East. The very fact there was an alliance had asignificant influence on the traditional and specific interests of certain Dominions, in particular Australia and to alesser extent also Canada and New Zealand, in the Pacific. When Japan became agreat power, affirmed by its victory in the war with Russia in 1905, objections from the Dominions grew. The Dominion governments argued that signature of the alliance implied, or even confirmed, the Empire’s economic, political and naval weakness. When it was decided to extend the alliance in 1911, the Australians in particular vehemently opposed its renewal, referring mainly to the unwanted immigration of large numbers of Japanese to the Australian continent and adjacent islands and the strong-arm method of spreading Japanese influence in the Pacific, weakening Britain’s, and Australia’s, position.2 On the other hand, alliance with Japan provided the Pacific Dominion with acertain level of security since the alliance coming to an end would lead to adeterioration in the British Empire’s strategic position in the Far East.3 1 This study is one of the results of the grant project SGS-2016-070 Vliv dominií na směřování Britského impéria na přelomu 20. a30. let 20. století on which the author participates at the Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. 2 Cf. R.J. GOWEN, British Legerdemain at the 1911 Imperial Conference: The Dominions, Defence Planning, and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: The Journal of Modern History, Vol.52, No.3, 1980, pp.385–413; H.D. HALL, Commonwealth: AHistory of the British Commonwealth of Nations, London 1971, p.77; P.LOWE, The British Empire and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911–1915, in: History, Vol.54, Is.181, 1969, pp.213–214; N.K. MEANEY, ‘AProposition of the Highest International Importance’: Alfred Deakin’s Pacific Agreement Proposal and Its Significance for Australian-Imperial Relations, in: Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.5, Is.3, 1967, pp.201; I.H. NISH, Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1901–1911, in: The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.9, No.2, 1963, pp.207–208. 3 The National Archives, London-Kew (further only TNA), Cabinet Office (further only CAB) 1/4, No.78–C, Australia and New Zealand: Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Being Determined: Memorandum by the Committee of Imperial Defence, Whitehall Gardens, 3rd May, 1911, ff. 14–16 [242–243].
JAROSLAv vALKOUN 33 Following three joint meetings (26–30 May 1911) of the Dominion and British participants of the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Defence Committee, the beginning of negotiations with the Japanese government on an extension to the alliance for afurther ten years was agreed to.4 This, historically, was the first officially recorded shared decision which was jointly discussed on an important matter of foreign policy in the Pacific and Far East region.5 Although the course of the First World War demonstrated that Japan was acting as aresponsible British ally, the increasingly expansionist tendencies of Japanese policy in the Far East and the Pacific aroused significant concern. In early 1920, His Majesty’s Government realised it was in adifficult situation. The Foreign Office and War Office proposed acontinuation of the alliance with Japan, but Britain had marked interests in China and Korea which it was difficult to overlook.6 An extensive memorandum from the end of February 1920 put together by an employee of the Far Eastern Department at the British Foreign Office, Charles Henry Bentinck, which analysed the ambitions of the great powers and interested European powers in China and the Far East, confirmed that British and American interests in the Pacific were de facto identical, while British and Japanese interests were diametrically opposed. Bentinck referred to the fact that Japan was promoting aweak central government in China that should be economically closed, and that it aspired towards hegemony in the Far East, putting it in conflict with British endeavours for aunited strong China and maintenance of the Open Door principle and the equal trading opportunities therein. The Foreign Office saw Tokyo’s hegemonic tendencies as athreat to Britain’s power and economic status in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Pacific islands and the Yangtze basin. Disagreements between the Dominions and Japan mainly involved the practical implementation of the Dominions’ “white policy” which limited “coloured” immigration and which was in conflict with Japan’s expansive objectives in the Pacific. Bentinck in addition also stressed that the opposing positions of Japan and America in the Far East and Pacific would likely one day erupt into conflict and that Great Britain should carefully choose on whose side it was going to be.7 4 TNA, CAB 2/2, Committee of Imperial Defence: Minutes of the 111th Meeting, 26th May, 1911, f. 36. 5 Cf. N.R. BENNETT, Consultation or Information? Britain, the Dominions and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911, in: The New Zealand Journal of History, Vol.4, No.2, 1970, pp.178–194; HALL, p.82. 6 Cf. D.C. BOULGER, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Contemporary Review, Vol.118, 1920, pp.326–333; M.G. FRY, The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Journal of Modern History, Vol.39, No.1, 1967, p.48; United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers (further only PD), House of Commons (further only HoC), 5th Series, Vol.130, 24th June, 1920, cc.2365–2366; TNA, CAB 1/4, 126–C, Committee of Imperial Defence: Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Memoranda and Minutes Regarding the Renewal Anglo-Japanese Alliance Received from Foreign Office March 1920, 27th April, 1920, ff. [1]–6 [263–266]. 7 See [F 199/199/23], Foreign Office Memorandum on Effect of Anglo-Japanese Alliance upon Foreign Relationships, Foreign Office, 28th February, 1920, in: R.BUTLER— J.P. T.BURY— M.E. LAMBERT (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939 [further only DBFP]: 1919, 1st Series, Vol.6, London 1956, Doc. No.761, pp.1016–1023; P.H. KERR, The Anglo-Japanese
34 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2017 Although the First World War was atest of the alliance with Japan, providing acertain feeling of security to Pacific Dominions,8 the British Empire’s post-war marine weakness in the Far East and Pacific9 did lead to areassessment of the situation and the beginning of intensive collaboration with the United States of America in Pacific matters.10 As such, generally good relations with the Americans became the axiom of imperial foreign policy. Britain was rather sensitive in trying to maintain the appearance of an Empire of unanimous opinion towards third countries and as such feared that the Canadian cabinet might be rather pro-active in the matter and begin excessively openly to express adissenting position on the renewal of the alliance.11 As such, after the First World War the Pacific became aplace where British and American economic and political influence clashed, with alatent racist subtext of whether the Pacific should be “yellow or white”.12 Alliance, in: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol.11, Is.41, 1920, pp.93–96; G.L. KOEHN, Menace of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Current History, Vol.14, No.5, 1921, pp.738–739; P.LOWE, P., The Round Table, the Dominions and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911–22, in: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol.86, Is.341, 1997, pp.87; NORTHEDGE, F.S., The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers 1916–1939, London 1966, p.286; TNA, CAB 24/97/102, C.P.599, [M.] Ferguson, Paraphrase Telegram from the Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3rd February, 1920, f. 658. 8 H. N.CASSON, The Significance of the Imperial Conference, in: Barron’s, Vol.1, No.10, 11th July, 1921, p.5. 9 After the First World War, in regard to the distribution of maritime forces, the British admiralty had to make adecision on whether to maintain two naval bases in the Pacific— Singapore and Hong Kong. For strategic and financial reasons, and taking account of Australia and New Zealand’s positions, it eventually chose Singapore as its main base. Cf. Britain’s Navy, in: Evening Post, Vol.101, Is.48, 25th February, 1921, p.2; TNA, CAB 34/1, S.S.— 2, A.J. Balfour, Committee of Imperial Defence: Standing Sub-Committee: Naval and Military Situation in the Far East, 3rd May, 1921, ff. [1]–5 [7–11]; TNA, CAB 34/1, S.S.— 6, Committee of Imperial Defence: Standing Sub-Committee: Empire Naval Policy and Cooperation: Summary of Admiralty Recommendations in Regard to Dominions Naval Policy, 26th May, 1921, ff. [21–22]; TNA, CAB 34/1, S.S.— 12, Committee of Imperial Defence: Standing Sub-Committee: Singapore— Development of as Naval Base: Draft Conclusion, 13th June, 1921, ff. [34–35]. 10 TNA, CAB 1/4, 122–C, Committee of Imperial Defence: Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance upon Foreign Relations, 28th February, 1920, ff. 4–5 [245]. 11 Cf. Cmd. 1474, s.13; [F 1579/63/23], Memorandum by Mr. Lampson on Correspondence with Canadian Government Relating to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Foreign Office, 8th April, 1921, in: DBFP: Far Eastern Affairs April 1920— February 1922, 1st Series, Vol.14, London 1966, Doc. No.261, pp.271–276; Governor General to Colonial Secretary, Ottawa, 1st April, 1921, in: L.C. CLARK (ed.), Documents on Canadian External Relations: 1919–1925 [further only DCER], Vol.3, Doc. No.213, Ottawa 1970, pp.166–167; PD, HoC, 5th Series, Vol.143, 17th June, 1921, cc.792, 795–796; TNA, Colonial Office (further only CO) 886/9/8, The Secretary of State to the Governor General, 26th April, 1921, Doc. No.142, ff. 91–92. 12 See A.BEST, Race, Monarchy, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922, in: Social Science Japan Journal, Vol.9, No.2, 2006, pp.171–186; J.R. POYNTER, The Yo-yo Variations: Initiative and Dependence in Australia’s External Relations, 1918–1923, in: Historical Studies, Vol.14,
JAROSLAv vALKOUN 35 After the First World War, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance became very unpopular in the United States because Tokyo’s policies were taking amore marked expansionist course. America feared that extension of the alliance could be further linked with an acknowledgement of “Japan’s special interests in eastern Asia”,13 which it saw as a“treachery […] of modern civilised ideals”.14 As such, from 1920 American politicians took the position that if an Anglo-Japanese treaty was to be accepted, it would have to be renewed with certain modifications. In particular, it was to guarantee the Open Door principle in China, and Japanese foreign policy instability meant it should not be concluded for aperiod longer than five years.15 From the end of January 1921, the British government notified the Dominions that anumber of issues had to be dealt with before the summer Imperial Conference in regard to current Imperial defence problems. Discussions on the ending or extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, however, completely overshadowed other defence matters.16 Canadian politicians considered relations with Japan as of great importance, possibly affecting the direction of imperial foreign policy for many years, and as such they had awide analysis undertaken. On 1 February 1921, Loring Christie submitted amemorandum which in view of alengthy discussion of twenty years of Anglo-Japanese collaboration came down clearly against the automatic renewal of the alliance, proposing that an attempt should be made to find some kind of alternative.17 In mid-February, the Canadian government expressed its disagreement to the proposed extension of the alliance because it feared adeterioration in Anglo-American relations, specifically the unforeseeable impacts afurther alliance with Japan would likely have on Canadian interests in the North American continent. It was also against the unnecessary creation of abarrier between the English-speaking countries which should be collaborating rather than competing.18 Canada’s position was No.54, 1970, p.233; [F 3823/2635/10], V.Wellesley, General Survey of Political Situation in Pacific and far East with Reference to the Forthcoming Washington Conference, Foreign Office, 20th October, 1921, in: DBFP, Vol.14, Doc. No.404, p.438. 13 The Acting Secretary of State [Phillips] to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis), Washington, 2nd October, 1919, in: United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States [further only FRUS], 1920, Vol.2, Washington 1936, p.679. 14 F. W.EGGLESTON, The Imperial Conference, in: New Statesman, Vol.17, No.426, 11th June, 1921, p.268. 15 The Acting Secretary of State [Polk] to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis), Washington, 10th May, 1920, in: FRUS, 1920, Vol.2, pp.680–681. 16 C. P.STACEY, Canada and the Age of Conflict: AHistory of Canadian External Policies: 1867–1921, Vol.1, Toronto 1984, p.334. 17 Loring Christie, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1st February, 1921, in: A.R. M.LOWER, Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, in: The Canadian Historical Review, Vol.47, No.1, 1966, pp.42–48. 18 Cf. Governor General to Colonial Secretary, Ottawa, 15th February, 1921, in: DCER, Vol.3, Doc. No.209, pp.162–163; M.G. FRY, Illusions of Security: North Atlantic Diplomacy 1918–22, Toronto 1972, pp.91–92; TNA, CAB 1/4, 130–C, Committee of Imperial Defence: Memorandum by Sir B.Alston Respecting Suggestions for an Anglo-Saxon Policy for the Far East, 1stAugust, 1920, ff. [1]–5 [273–275]; TNA, CO 886/9/8, The Secretary of State to the Governor General, 26th February, 1921, Doc. No.140, ff. 89–90.
36 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2017 also influenced by fears of the outcome of any American-Japanese antagonism in the Far East, where Ottawa had had interests since the time of the Siberian Intervention. An unwillingness to take in Japanese immigrants also played arole.19 The other Dominions, except for the Union of South Africa, looked at the matter differently. The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand in particular perceived the alliance with Japan more as asecurity guarantee than an immediate power threat.20 Australia’s William Morris Hughes feared that after the war the Pacific would become an area in which another international crisis would break out because, “the Wars and the Panama Canal has shifted the world’s stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. […] The American Navy is now in those waters. Peace in the Pacific means peace for this [British— J.V.] Empire and for the world.”21 Although Hughes was of adifferent opinion to his Canadian opposite number Arthur Meighen, their countries had the same priorities. For both Canadian and Australian interests, an appropriate balance of power in the Pacific meant more than the international situation in Europe.22 The Anglo-Japanese treaty had been negotiated in 1902 as apurely British agreement with the Dominions not aparty to the treaty, although from the beginning the treaty terms closely affected them. Since the autonomous overseas territories and the motherland decided jointly in 1911 on an extension to the treaty for afurther ten years, they were automatically consulted on all aspects of the alliance’s renewal in 1921 too.23 When representatives of the Dominions and Britain met up at the Imperial Conference in June 1921, the London government, following months of debates with Canada, was leaning towards favouring renewal of the alliance treaty with modifications which would satisfy American objections and which would bring the treaty in line with the League of Nations’ Covenant,24 something the wording of the alliance treaty of 1911 did not conform to.25 19 M. G.FRY, The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Journal of Modern History, Vol.39, No.1, 1967, pp.46–47; WOODSWORTH, C.J., Canada and the Far East, in: Far Eastern Survey, Vol.10, No.14, 1941, pp.162–163. 20 For more on Australia’s and New Zealand’s positions cf. J.B. BREBNER, Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference, in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol.40, No.1, 1935, pp.51–52; J.GALBRAITH, The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference, in: The Canadian Historical Review, Vol.29, No.2, 1948, p.147; G.P. de T.GLAZEBROOK, Canadian External Relations, in: C.MARTIN (ed.), Canada in Peace and War: Eight Studies in National Trends since 1914, London 1941, p.164; M.TATE— F.FOY, More Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol.74, No.4, 1959, pp.536–537; R.THORNTON, Semblance of Security: Australia and the Washington Conference, 1921–22, in: Australian Outlook, Vol.32, No.1, 1978, p.66. 21 Cmd. 1474, p.21. 22 BREBNER, Canada, p.53. 23 HALL, pp.438–439; J.D. HARGREAVES, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1952, in: History Today, Vol.2, No.4, 1952, pp.257–258; C.N. SPINKS, The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Pacific Historical Review, Vol.6, 1937, pp.322–323. 24 Cf. BREBNER, Canada, p.51; FRY, The North, p.53–55; SPINKS, p.325; TNA, CAB 1/4, 121–C, Committee of Imperial Defence: Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Correspondence Regarding Strategical and International Considerations Involved in the Continuance of the Alliance,
JAROSLAv vALKOUN 37 25Furthermore, at the beginning of conference discussions, it appeared that the matter would have to be dealt with quickly, because the alliance was meant to end on 13 July 1921.26 Australia’s Prime Minister Hughes, who mostly supported the arguments of his New Zealand counterpart, William Ferguson Massey, spoke in favour of renewing the alliance. Canada’s Prime Minister Meighen in particular was vigorously against, arguing of the necessity to accept American objections to the treaty.27 In the debates on imperial foreign policy implementation, Meighen endorsed the principle that the voice of Dominions in affairs which affect them in particular should carry due weight in decision-making.28 The Dominions’ statesmen were fully aware that the issue of an alliance with Japan was an important foreign policy decision which would impact not just on relations with the United States of America, but also on the British Empire’s position in the Far East and the Pacific.29 Although Australia’s Prime Minister was aware that Japanese Far East and Pacific policies were invoking significant international controversy and had not lined up with Australia’s “white policy” for many years, he assumed that an extension to the alliance would allow the British Empire to keep them in better check or even guide them. As such, during conference discussions Hughes was the leading proponent of collaboration with Japan.30 Against him, South Africa’s General Jan Christiaan Foreign Office, 5th March, 1920, ff. 2–10 [236–240]; TNA, CAB 1/4, 122–C, Committee of Imperial Defence: Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Anglo-Japanese Alliance as Affected by the Covenant of the League of Nations, 18th February, 1920, ff. 2–3 [244]; TNA, CAB 23/25/27, Cabinet 43 (21), Conclusions of aMeeting of the Cabinet, Downing Street, 30th May, 1921, ff. 2–17 [298–313]. 25 The Chargé in Japan (Bell) to the Secretary of State, Tokyo, 26th July, 1920, in: FRUS, 1920, Vol.2, pp.685–686. 26 The alliance was able to formally continue for afurther 12 months following the declaration of the end of the alliance. Cf. G.M. CARTER, The British Commonwealth and International Security: The Role of the Dominions 1919–1939, Toronto 1947, p.44; W.R. LOUIS, British Strategy in the Far East 1919–1939, Oxford 1971, p.74; TNA, CO 886/9/8, House of Commons: Far Eastern and Pacific Policy: United States and British Empire Relations, 11th July, 1921, Encl. No.1 to Doc. No.146, f. 95. 27 Cmd. 1474, p.31; SPINKS, pp.322–323. 28 TNA, CAB 32/2, E. 22nd Meeting, Stenographic Notes of aMeeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India, 11th July, 1921, f. 8 [147]. 29 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in: Spectator, Vol.125, No.4802, 10th July, 1920, p.39; Cmd. 1474, p.13; M.PRANG, N.W. Rowell and Canada’s External Policy, 1917–1921, in: Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association / Rapports annuels de la Société historique du Canada, Vol.39, No.1, 1960, p.101. 30 Cf. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates [further only APD], House of Representatives [further only HoR], No.14, 7th April, 1920, p.7265; APD, HoR, No.37, 9th September, 1921, pp.4387–4390; Cmd. 1474, p.19; S.BRAWLEY, The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America, 1919–1978, Sydney 1995, pp.73–74; D.K. DIGNAN, Australia and British Relations with Japan, 1914–1921, in: Australian Outlook, Vol.21, Is.2, 1967, pp.135–150; LOUIS, p.55; E.L. PIESSE, Japan and Australia, in: Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review, Vol.4, No.1/4, 1925/1926, pp.475–488; POYNTER, pp.236–238; The Anglo-Japanese Pact, in: Evening Post, Vol.101, Is.48, 25th February, 1921, p.6; TNA, CAB 32/2, E. 10th Meeting, Stenographic Notes ftn
38 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2017 Smuts referred to the fact that Japan represented more of a“potential danger” than afriendly country, and that if the British Empire was to “look to world peace, we must do nothing to alienate Japan […]”. Smuts, who perceived most affairs within awider international context, considered Japan athreat to the peace settlement guaranteed by the League of Nations, and as such suggested that all interested powers should act in unison in regard to Pacific affairs.31 The South African General further made no secret of his opinion that close collaboration with the United States of America would secure the British Empire’s security in future.32 Canada’s proposal for the immediate convening of aconference of the four powers with interests in the Pacific in order to deal with the current problems was one of the reasons the Imperial Conference found itself in deadlock. Thus, Canada’s position at the turn of June and July 1921 significantly reformulated imperial foreign policy.33 When American President Warren Harding’s invitation to participate in aconference in Washington looking in depth at limiting naval arms and Pacific affairs arrived in London on 8 July 1921,34 Lloyd George took advantage of this to postpone discussions on Pacific affairs including the extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance until this forum.35 It was clear that the alliance with Japan was amajor obstacle to Anglo-American friendship and collaboration;36 the Americans prioritised multilateral treaties in the Pacific rather than bilateral pacts.37 Pressure grew on the British cabinet. During September, British public opinion began to gradually come to the conclusion that friendship with the United States was preferable to renewal of the alliance with Japan.38 of aMeeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India, 29thJune, 1921, ff. 2–8 [70–73]. 31 Influential members of the Round Table Movement held asimilar opinion to Smuts. Srv.KERR, p.96; TNA, CAB 32/2, E. 10th Meeting, Stenographic Notes of aMeeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India, 29th June, 1921, ff. 8–10 [73–74]. 32 Cmd. 1474, p.24; GALBRAITH, p.147. 33 For discussion on the influence of the Dominions on the change in British policy see I.KLEIN, Whitehall, Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1919–1921, in: Pacific Historical Review, Vol.41, No.4, 1972, pp.464–468. 34 The naval powers of the British Empire, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy, and countries with interests in the Pacific such as China, Holland, Belgium and Portugal received invitations to the Washington Conference. 35 Fruits of the British Imperial Conference, in: Current History, Vol.14, No.6, 1921, p.1048; SPINKS, pp.332–333; The Secretary of State [C. E.Hughes] to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Harvey), Washington, 8th July, 1921, in: FRUS, 1921, Vol.1, p.18; Colonial Secretary to Governor General, Downing Street, 12th September, 1921, in: DCER, Vol.3, Doc. No.429, pp.484–486. 36 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of aConversation with the British Ambassador (Geddes), 20th September, 1921, in: FRUS, 1921, Vol.1, p.73. 37 J. B.BREBNER, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, 3rd Ed., New Haven 1947, p.282. 38 A. BEST, The ‘Ghost’ of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination into Historical Myth-Making, in: The Historical Journal, Vol.49, Is.3, 2006, p.818.
JAROSLAv vALKOUN 39 On 12 November 1921, American President Warren Harding officially opened the Washington disarmament conference, which he promised would help to “minimise mistakes in international relations”.39 Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not on the officially approved conference programme, Britain attached great importance to it. There was aparallel gradual climb-down by Pacific Dominions, which had previously taken an uncompromising position. Australian politicians decided only to endorse aform of Anglo-Japanese alliance which would be acceptable to the United States of America.40 American representatives then strongly pushed for afour-party treaty, because this corresponded better to their perspective on the balance of power in the Pacific.41 In the end, Britain accepted the American proposal on 7 December 1921, after ensuring the treaty would also apply to Australia and New Zealand.42 The Dominions’ Prime Ministers agreed with the arrangement. The content of the treaty was agreat success for Canada’s representatives in particular, because it generally corresponded to Meighen’s proposals and position which he had presented at the Imperial Conference in summer 1921.43 The treaty was signed on 13 December between the four powers, and its fourth article ended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The convention was meant to apply for aperiod of ten years.44 One can claim that the Four-Power Treaty satisfied American demands and did not expressly offend Japan.45 Apotential cause of possible future Anglo-American 39 TNA, CAB 30/5, W.D. C.1, Cabinet: Washington Disarmament Conference: President Harding’s Opening Speech, Washington, 12th November, [1921], f. 6. 40 Far Eastern Problem: Quadruple Agreement Possible: Britain, America, Japan, China, in: The Sydney Morning Herald, No.26174, 24th November, 1921, p.9. 41 TNA, CAB 30/5, W.D. C.13, Cabinet: Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament: Copy of aDespatch (No.1) from Mr. Balfour to the Prime Minister, 11th November, 1921, f. 126; J.C. VINSON, The Drafting of the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference, in: Journal of Modern History, Vol.25, No.1, 1953, p.43. 42 TNA, CAB 30/5, W.D. C.52, Cabinet: Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament: Proposed Quadruple Agreement, 7th December, 1921, No.112, f. 265; TNA, CAB 30/1A, B.E. D. [No.58], British Empire Delegation: Eleventh Conference of British Empire Delegation, Washington, Franklin Square Hotel, 7th December, 1921, ff. [1]–3 [41–42]. 43 CARTER, p.54; Canadian Delegate [R. L.Borden] to Prime Minister [A. Meighen], Washington, 10th December, 1921, in: DCER, Vol.3, Doc. No.449, p.505; TNA, CAB 30/1A, B.E. D. [No.59], British Empire Delegation: Twelfth Conference of British Empire Delegation, Washington, Franklin Square Hotel, 9th December, 1921, ff. [1]–5 [44–47]; TNA, Admiralty Papers (ADM) 1/8630/142, B.E. D. [No.60], British Empire Delegation: Thirteenth Conference of British Empire Delegation, Washington, Franklin Square Hotel, 10th December, 1921, ff. [1]–2 [8]. 44 See BUELL, R.L., The Washington Conference, New York 1922, s.172–200; SPINKS, s.337; [F 4539/2905/23], Mr. Balfour (Washington Delegation) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Washington, 3rd December, 1921, in: DBFP, Vol.14, Doc. No.471, pp.541–542; The Secretary of State [C. E.Hughes] to Mr. Frank H.Simonds, Washington, 29th December, 1921, in: FRUS, 1922, Vol.1, p.40; Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, Signed at Washington, 13th December, 1921, in: FRUS, 1922, Vol.1, pp.33–36. 45 M. SULLIVAN, The Great Adventure at Washington: The Story of the Conference, New York 1922, p.236.
40 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2017 antagonism was also successfully eliminated.46 Signature of the Four-Party Treaty was agreat success for Washington, which had managed to enforce the “American perspective” on the state of affairs in the Pacific, and in particular prevent the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Nevertheless, London’s representatives continued to believe that Britain’s position was not significantly weakened; on the contrary. Despite all the unpleasantness which accompanied discussions on renewal of the alliance in 1921, they believed that British relations with Japan continued to be friendly.47 The Four-Power Treaty nevertheless affirmed along-term trend; Britain had prioritised good relations with the United States over greater ties with Japan.48 The Washington Naval Conference in early 1922 established anew balance of naval powers in the Pacific which prevented the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.49 The Four-Power Treaty was meant to serve as asufficient guarantee of the status quo in the Pacific while also helping to minimise the fears of Australia and New Zealand over future developments; though in reality the opposite was true.50 Australia and New Zealand perceived the treaty as apainful compromise which only secured their security temporarily, and not permanently.51 The Pacific Dominions were soon to find out that it was not to be apermanent security solution. The so-called Mukden Incident took place in September 1931 in Manchuria, followed by military occupation of the territory by the Japanese army and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. The international community decided to deal with the situation through the League of Nations which established afive-member commission led by Victor Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, to investigate what had taken place in Manchuria. In October 1932, the Lytton Commission announced its conclusions that it represented Japanese aggression, causing Japan to leave the League of Nations. From the start of the Far Eastern Crisis (1931–1932), Great Britain and its Dominions promoted its resolution through principles of collective security, which from its perspective was symbolised by the weight and importance of the League of Nations. The Mukden Incident and Japan’s subsequent actions in Manchuria represented not just atest for the peace mechanisms of this international organisation, but also atest of the faith of Britain and Dominion representatives in the principles of collective security in this part of Asia. At the same time, the British Empire was unwilling to do more than strive to reconcile the warring parties over anegotiating table in Geneva. Neither British, nor Dominion, representatives were prepared to risk direct or indirect conflict with Japan, which they perceived as an unacceptable form of dealing with the Far Eastern conflict. Do46 CARTER, p.55. 47 [F 4745/2905/23], Mr. Balfour (Washington Delegation) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Washington, 19th December, 1921, in: DBFP, Vol.14, Doc. No.512, pp.566–567. 48 CARTER, p.54. 49 J. A.WILLIAMSON, AShort History of British Expansion: The Modern Empire and Commonwealth, London 1947, pp.349–350. 50 S. MARKS, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918–1933, London 1976, pp.40–42. 51 POYNTER, p.246; A.M. SPENCER, AThird Option: Imperial Air Defence and the Pacific Dominions, 1918–1939, PhD Thesis, Auburn 2008, pp.118–119.