scieee Open visual document viewer

How does Economic Freedom Influence the Relationship between Government Size and Convergence?

Nádasi, Levente

Full text

623 HOW DOES ECONOMIC FREEDOM INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SIZE AND CONVERGENCE? Le en e Nádasi Uni e si y o Deb ecen, Facul y o Economics, Ins i u e o Economics, Deb ecen, Hunga y nadasi.le en [email protected] Abs ac : In his pape we p esen some empi ical esul s abou absolu e and condi ional con e gence o eal GDP wi hin 121 coun ies using c oss-coun y da a. We assume ha he e is an in e ed U-shaped cu e, which desc ibes he ela ionship be ween economic g ow h and go e nmen spending. I is mainly because he ins i u ional condi ions o p oduc i i y do no exis a lowe le els o go e nmen spending. A highe le els, he go e nmen needs o le y highe axes o inance i s expendi u es, which hinde s g ow h. So he e can be somewhe e an op imal go e nmen edis ibu ion le el ha maximizes g ow h. This op imal le el depends on ins i u ional ac o s ha can be g abbed by ce ain Economic F eedom and Wo ldwide Go e nance Indica o s. I was no ou aim necessa ily o de e mine exac ly he le el o op imal go e nmen edis ibu ion, i would be di icul because o he he e ogenei y o he coun ies, only o make a compa ison be ween ee and less ee coun ies, and d aw some conclusions abou how his le el depends on hese ins i u ional a iables. Summing up we can say ha ou aim was o compa e ee and less ee, legally “good” and “bad”, as well as co up and less co up coun ies om he aspec o go e nmen edis ibu ion le el. I we di ide coun ies in o ee and less ee coun ies and assume ha bo h g oups ha e an in e ed U-shaped cu e, he op imal le el o go e nmen spending sha e is la ge in he iche coun ies because o hei be e ins i u ional sys em. These esul s do no con adic hose indings ha decla e posi i e o nega i e ela ionship be ween go e nmen spending and economic g ow h. One pa o he li e a u e p esumes ha he e is only one op imal le el o go e nmen spending, we poin ou ha he e can be a leas wo op imal le els, and hey depend on he ins i u ional quali y. Keywo ds: Economic g ow h; con e gence; go e nmen spending; c oss-coun y analysis JEL classi ica ion: O40; O47; H50 1. In oduc ion Va ious au ho s ha e examined he ela ionship be ween go e nmen size and economic g ow h. Some o he esea che s ound a posi i e link, like My dal (1960) and Eas e lin (1974), bu some o hem ound i nega i e, o example Rubinson (1977), Came on (1982), Landau (1983) and Ma low (1986). The mos ecen ones also ound i nega i e, like Rome o-A ila and S auch (2008), A onso and Fu ce i (2010) among many o he au ho s. They used mainly c oss-coun y and panel da a o illus a e i . All in all, he e is no gene al con incing empi ical e idence abou he sign o his ela ionship, bu some o he a iables will help o unde s and he p oblem. A nai e conclusion om he gene al amewo k o Solow (1956) model leads o he inding ha poo e coun ies a e g owing wi h a as e speed han he iche ones because o he dec easing ma ginal p oduc o capi al. So heo e ically, poo e coun ies can ca ch up (Solow, 1956, 1957). On he con a y, acco ding o Ba o (1990), we know ha he e is no absolu e con e gence wi hin he coun ies o he wo ld. Absolu e con e gence occu s only wi hin mo e homogeneous g oups like Eu opean Union o Eu ope and Asia oge he . A ican coun ies o example seem o lag behind and i is mainly due o ins i u ional di e ences. I he less 624 de eloped coun ies had he same ins i u ion quali y, hey would be able o con e ge o he de eloped coun ies. Summing up, absolu e con e gence is no ue due o ins i u ional di e ences, bu he e can be a condi ional con e gence. I he go e nmen spending is nea he op imal le el in a gi en coun y, his coun y can g ow as e . As we men ioned, oo high and oo low edis ibu ion hinde s g ow h. We assume ha iche economies ha e a highe op imal le el, and he ins i u ionally unde de eloped coun ies ha e a lowe op imal go e nmen size. Acco ding o Tanzi (2005) he op imal le el o go e nmen spending is 30 pe cen . We do no suppose ha he e is only one op imal le el. We assume ha he e is a leas wo op imal le els, and i depends on ins i u ional a iables. These a iables a e measu ed by Economic F eedom, Legal Sys em & P ope y Righ s, and Con ol o Co up ion. In Chap e 2 we examine 121 coun ies. Mos o he da a come om he Wo ld De elopmen Indica o s (WDI, 2014). A i s we p o ide some desc ip i e s a is ics o asce ain whe he i is an absolu e con e gence among all o he coun ies, han we di ided he sample in o g oups acco ding o he abo emen ioned he e ins i u ional a iables: Economic F eedom, Legal Sys em and P ope y Righ s, and inally Con ol o Co up ion. I ee economies a e iche , bu g ow slowe han he o he s, less ee ones can ca ch up. We will see ha i is no ue. F ee coun ies a e much weal hie and g ow as e a he same ime, so less de eloped coun ies do ha e a chance unde hese ci cums ances o app oach hem. The esul is simila in he o he wo si ua ions. So one di iding a iable is enough o un eg essions. In Chap e 3 we un h ee eg ession, he i s is o all coun ies, bu hese coun ies a e e y he e ogeneous, so he i is no so good. A e ha we un he same on only he ee coun ies, han only on less ee coun ies. O cou se, we know ha ee economies a e also weal hie , and ha e be e legal ins i u ions. Acco ding o ou esul s ee coun ies ha e a highe op imal go e nmen edis ibu ion le el han less ee, less de eloped, so hose coun ies ha ha e wo se legal sys em. 2. Va iables, sample and da a In he nex Chap e , om he ables we can see h ee ca ego iza ions o 121 coun ies. We examined an 18-yea pe iod be ween 1995 and 2012. We ook in o accoun he ini ial eal GDP pe capi a RGDP1995, he a e age eal g ow h a e o he pe iod, indica ed by g , and he s uc u e o go e nmen spending. G o a iable means he o al go e nmen spending as a pe cen age o GDP. This expense means cash paymen s o ope a ing ac i i ies o he go e nmen in p o iding goods and se ices. I includes compensa ion o employees (such as wages and sala ies), in e es and subsidies, g an s, social bene i s, and o he expenses such as en s and di idends (WDI, 2014). Gcon a iable means he go e nmen consump ion also as a pe cen age o GDP, mo e exac ly he inal go e nmen expendi u e including all go e nmen cu en expendi u es o pu chases o goods and se ices and compensa ion o employees (WDI, 2014). Ghea, Gedu and Gmil a iables simply mean he go e nmen expendi u e spen on Heal h, Educa ion and Mili a y as a pe cen age o go e nmen expendi u e. I also used some impo an a iables o di ide he da a in o wo g oups: The Economic F eedom o he Wo ld Index, indica ed by EFW (EFW, 2012), Legal Sys em & P ope y Righ s, indica ed by Legal (EFW, 2012), which is a componen o Economic F eedom, and inally he Con ol o Co up ion, indica ed by CC, also in 2012, which is a e y impo an componen o The Wo ldwide Go e nmen Indica o s (WGI 2014). 625 3. Desc ip i e s a is ics Le ’s see a i s some desc ip i e s a is ics by di iding he sample in o g oups. The i s ca ego iza ion is acco ding o Economic F eedom o he Wo ld Index, which is annually published by he Canadian F ase Ins i u e. Table 1 shows ha he e a e 64 uni s in he sample, whe e EFW>7, and 57, whe e EFW<7. Coun ies abo e 7 a e supposed o be ee, below 7 a e less ee. We can see om Table 1 ha ee economies had mo e han i e imes la ge eal GDP in 1995, and since hen ee economies a e g owing wi h as e pace han he o he s. So less ee coun ies will ne e ca ch up, because hei ins i u ional sys em does no allow g owing mo e apidly. F ee coun ies ha e la ge go e nmen edis ibu ion, because hey a e iche and hey can a o d i . Acco ding o Wagne ’s law, he demand on public goods is g owing in he de eloped coun ies (Ram, 1987). I we ca e ully examine he di e ences in he s uc u e o he expendi u es, we can see ha money spen on heal h is la ge , bu spen on educa ion and mili a y a e lowe in he de eloped coun ies han in he less de eloped ones on he pe cen age o o al go e nmen expendi u es. Table 1: Di e gence among ee and less ee coun ies EFW N Mean S d. E o Mean RGDP1995 >= 7,00 64 14747,84 1892,79 < 7,00 57 2737,82 627,83 g >= 7,00 64 2,66 0,21 < 7,00 57 2,36 0,25 G o >= 7,00 64 29,17 1,45 < 7,00 57 21,12 1,13 Gcon >= 7,00 64 16,52 0,64 < 7,00 57 14,39 0,68 Ghea >= 7,00 64 12,50 0,44 < 7,00 57 9,91 0,40 Gedu >= 7,00 64 13,32 0,43 < 7,00 57 15,73 0,61 Gmil >= 7,00 64 8,01 0,85 < 7,00 57 10,14 0,80 Sou ce o da a: EFW (2014), WDI (2014) The second di ision is acco ding o he quali y o Legal Sys em & P ope y Righ s (EFW, 2014). I he quali y measu e o he legal sys em and p ope y igh s (Legal) is mo e han 5.5, he gi en coun y is conside ed o be legally “good”, o i i is unde 5.5, we call i legally “bad”. We can clea ly see om Table 2 ha legally “good” coun ies we e mo e han i e old iche han legally “bad” ones, and he g ow h a e (g ) was also signi ican ly la ge , so his di e ence is con inuously inc easing. We can also clea ly see ha legally “good” go e nmen s spend a la ge sha e o hei GDP han he o he s. O cou se we do no know he causal ela ionship, bu we can guess ha he legally “good” economies a e also iche , so hey can a o d o ha e a bigge edis ibu ion. 626 Table 2: Di e gence among legally “good” and “bad” coun ies Legal N Mean S d. E o Mean RGDP1995 >= 5.5 60 15506,13 1968,87 < 5.5 61 2779,51 625,12 g >= 5.5 60 2,76 0,25 < 5.5 61 2,27 0,21 G o >= 5.5 60 30,38 1,46 < 5.5 61 20,45 1,04 Gcon >= 5.5 60 17,57 0,59 < 5.5 61 13,50 0,64 Ghea >= 5.5 60 12,31 0,44 < 5.5 61 10,26 0,44 Gedu >= 5.5 60 13,84 0,47 < 5.5 61 15,06 0,59 Gmil >= 5.5 60 7,96 0,92 < 5.5 61 10,05 0,73 Sou ce o da a: EFW (2014), WDI (2014) I also di ided he sample in o wo g oups wi h espec o he con ol o co up ion index om 2012. I ound ha he median alue was abou a -0.25. The di e ence is bigge han by he ea lie wo cases. Coun ies ha a e less co up , had 9 imes la ge eal GDP in 1995 han he co up ones, and he g ow h a e o hese wo g oups we e oughly he same, so he e is only a sligh ca ch up be ween hese wo g oups. Table 3: No signi ican con e gence among “co up ” and “less co up ” coun ies CC N Mean S d. E o Mean RGDP1995 >= -.2500 59 16678,46 1950,81 < -.2500 62 1869,18 324,75 g >= -.2500 59 2,44 0,19 < -.2500 62 2,59 0,26 G o >= -.2500 59 31,52 1,43 < -.2500 62 19,53 0,92 Gcon >= -.2500 59 18,48 0,57 < -.2500 62 12,70 0,54 Ghea >= -.2500 59 12,18 0,48 < -.2500 62 10,42 0,41 Gedu >= -.2500 59 14,08 0,56 < -.2500 62 14,81 0,52 Gmil >= -.2500 59 7,29 0,89 < -.2500 62 10,65 0,74 Sou ce o da a: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 627 These desc ip i e s a is ics do no con ain new esul s, bu hese indings coincide wi h some o well-known ac s (Ba o 1990, Czeglédi 2007). I p o es ha his da ase is eliable, so we can un u he es s wi h hem. I is clea ha e e y ca ego iza ion p o ided almos he same esul , so he ea e only one a iable will be enough o di ide he sample. 4. Resul s o he eg essions As we assumed, he e mus be an in e ed U-shaped ela ionship be ween go e nmen spending and economic g ow h, because oo high and oo low go e nmen spending does no os e g ow h. So a simple eg ession model was used, in which we pu he G o and also he squa e o he G o as explaining a iables. Ou eg ession model was he ollowing: (1) This amewo k is acco ding o Mankiw a al. (1992). We omi ed some a iables, which can cause a li le bias, bu he o de o hese le els a e good. In his case we can es ima e he G o le el ha maximizes g ow h acco ding o he ollowing o mula: (2) O cou se, we know ha hese es ima ions a e no exac , because he e can be some omi ed a iable dis o ions, we only wan o use i in compa ing hese le els among ee and less ee coun ies. Table 4 shows he coe icien s o he whole sample, i con ains 121 coun ies. O cou se I ook he ini ial lnRGDP1995 as well, whe e ln means he na u al loga i hm. Theo e ically i we ge nega i e coe icien o he G o 2 and posi i e o G o , i e e s o an in e ed U- shape as we assumed, whe e G o 2 means he squa e o a iable G o . In addi ion, i we ge nega i e coe icien o he ini ial GDP, i e e s o con e gence. The op imal alue o G o can be calcula ed om he coe icien s, which maximizes g ow h. Fo he whole sample, i is 35 pe cen . O cou se we canno ake i se iously, because o he omi ed a iables, bu I will use his numbe only o compa e i o he o he cases. The Adjus ed R Squa e is e y low, i means ha he model i lea es much o be desi ed. We do no wan o d aw conclusions om his case. As we will see la e (Table 5 and Table 6), he op imal size is 49 pe cen o he de eloped coun ies and 27 o he less de eloped coun ies. Sadly hese numbe s a e no exac because o he dis o ions, hey do no show magni udes, we can only compa e hem, o which i is la ge . Table 4: Coe icien s o he i s eg ession (Adjus ed R Squa e=0,04) Model Uns anda dized Coe icien s Sig. B S d. E o (Cons an ) 3,898 ,873 4,468 ,000 lnGDP1995 -,447 ,122 -3,657 ,000 G o ,140 ,053 2,622 ,010 G o 2 -,002 ,001 -2,439 ,016 Sou ce o da a: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 2 3210 1995ln G o G o RGDPg bbbb +++= 3 2 * 2 b b -=G o 628 Table 5 con ains only hose coun ies whe e he EFW index is la ge han 7. As we saw om desc ip i e s a is ics, hese a e mainly he iche , he de eloped coun ies. We can conclude con e gence om he coe icien o he ini ial GDP, and in e ed U-shape om he G o 2. The op imal G o le el would be 49 pe cen , so bigge han in he o he s. In his case, he Adjus ed R Squa e is e y much highe han in he p ecious case, pa ly because he sample is mo e he e ogeneous. Table 5: Coe icien s o he second eg ession (Adjus ed R Squa e=0,429) Model (EFW>7) Uns anda dized Coe icien s Sig. B S d. E o (Cons an ) 8,431 1,048 8,044 ,000 lnGDP1995 -,843 ,137 -6,161 ,000 G o ,098 ,056 1,756 ,084 G o 2 -,001 ,001 -1,748 ,085 Sou ce o da a: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) F om Table 6 i is clea ha he e is also a con e gence wi hin less ee coun ies, bu he e he nega i e coe icien is s a is ically no signi ican . Despi e his, i seems ha he e is an in e ed U-shaped cu e. The op imal G o le el o hese p obably less de eloped coun ies ha maximizes g ow h is 27 pe cen . O cou se, his eg ession esul does no mean ha i is exac ly he op imal le el, bu i is qui e su e ha lowe han in he iche economies. Acco ding o some esea che s, he ela ionship be ween g ow h and go e nmen size is in e ed U-shaped (Tanzi 2005, A mey 1995, Peden 2005, Sheehy 1995). In all hese cases, he coe icien o he G o 2 is nega i e, which e e s o he in e ed U-shape. The coe icien o lnGDP1995 is nega i e o he de eloped coun ies, i means he e is a signi ican con e gence among hem. I is a li le bi su p ising ha he coe icien o lnGDP1995 is nega i e o he whole sample, which a i s glance seems o con adic o Ba o (1990), bu we mus ema k ha he whole sample is no he whole wo ld. Finally, he e is no con e gence be ween he less de eloped coun ies, because he coe icien o lnGDP1995 is no signi ican , bu i seems ha he e is a U-shape ela ionship be ween he in es iga ed a iables, he coe icien o G o 2 is e en signi ican . Table 6: Coe icien s o he hi d eg ession (Adjus ed R Squa e=0,053) Model (EFW<7) Uns anda dized Coe icien s Sig. B S d. E o (Cons an ) ,477 1,966 ,243 ,809 lnGDP1995 -,295 ,223 - 1,327 ,190 G o ,324 ,143 2,262 ,028 G o 2 -,006 ,003 - 2,010 ,050 Sou ce o da a: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 629 5. Concluding ema ks F om he desc ip i e s a is ics we can see he well-known ac , ha he ee , “legally” be e and he less co up coun ies a e also weal hie . And he e is a di e gence among hese coun ies, bu a leas does no seem o be any signi ican con e gence be ween hem. So i seems ha he ee , legally be e and less co up coun ies a e no only iche , bu g ow as e . Bu why do he poo e coun ies lag behind, and do no ca ch up? We can explain i wi h ins i u ional di e ences. I he poo coun ies had he same quali y o ins i u ional sys em, hey would be able o ake he ad an age o highe ma ginal p oduc o capi al and a ac much mo e in es men . Bu hese coun ies a e no so ee, he quali y o legal sys em is wo se, and he co up ion is bigge . We assumed acco ding o A mey (1995) and Tanzi (2005), ha he e is an in e ed U- shaped ela ionship be ween go e nmen spending and economic g ow h. I we ake he ins i u ional quali y in o accoun , we can assume ha he de eloped coun ies ha e a U- shaped cu e, and he less de eloped ha e ano he . By he de eloped coun ies, he go e nmen spending le el ha maximizes g ow h is la ge han by he less de eloped ones. We can see i om Table 5 and Table 6, ha ee coun ies ha e a la ge op imal le el. I was no ou aim necessa ily o de e mine he exac le el o go e nmen spending le el, his eg ession me hod does no make i possible because o he omi ed a iable dis o ions, bu we can conclude ha in he ee coun ies he op imal edis ibu ion is highe . The go e nmen spending sha e is highe in he de eloped coun ies, because hey ha e a highe quali y o legal sys em, which is mo e e icien and enables a highe p oduc i i y. Re e ences A onso, A. – Fu ce i D. (2010) Go e nmen Size, Composi ion, Vola ili y and Economic G ow h. Eu opean Jou nal o Poli ical Economy 26 (4): 517–532. A mey, D. (1995) The F eedom Re olu ion. Washing on, DC: Regne y Publishing. Ba o, R. J. (1990) Go e nmen Spending in a Simple Model o Endogenous G ow h. Jou nal o Poli ical Economy 98 (5): 103–125. Ba o, R. J. (1997) De e minan s o Economic G ow h: A C oss-Coun y Empi ical S udy. Camb idge, MA: MIT P ess. Came on, D. (1982) On he Limi s o he Public Economy. Annals o he Academy o Poli ical and Social Science 459 (1): 46–62. Czeglédi Pál (2007) Piaci in ézmények és gazdasági nö ekedés – a mode n osz ák iskola nézőpon ja, Philosophiae Doc o es, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapes . Eas e lin, R.A. (1974): Does economic g ow h imp o e he human lo ? Some empi ical e idence. In P. A. Da id and M.W. Rede (Eds.), Na ions and households in economic g ow h. New Yo k: Academic P ess. Landau, D. (1986) Go e nmen and economic g ow h in he less de eloped coun ies: an empi ical s udy o 1960–1980. Economic De elopmen and Cul u al Change 35: 35–75. Ma low, M. L. (1986) P i a e Sec o Sh inkage and he G ow h o Indus ialized Economies. Public Choice 49 (2): 143–154. Mankiw, N.G. – Rome D. – Weil, D. N. (1992) “A Con ibu ion o he Empi ics o Economic G ow h”, The Qua e ly Jou nal o Economics 107, 2:407-437. My dal, G. (1960) Beyond he wel a e s a e. New Ha en, CN: Yale Uni e si y P ess. Peden, E. A. (1991) “P oduc i i y in he Uni ed S a es and I s Rela ionship o Go e nmen Ac i i y: An Analysis o 57 Yea s, 1929–86,” Public Choice 86, 153–73. Ram, R. (1987) Wagne ’s hypo hesis in ime-se ies and c oss-sec ion pe spec i es: E idence om“ eal” da a o 115 coun ies. The Re iew o Economics and S a is ics, 194–204. Rome o-A ila, D. – S auch, R. (2008): Public Finances and Long-Te m G ow h in Eu ope: E idence om a Panel Da a Analysis. Eu opean Jou nal o Poli ical Economy 24 (1): 172– 191. 630 Rubinson, R. (1977) Dependency, Go e nmen Re enue, and Economic G ow h, 1955-70. S udies in Compa a i e In e na ional De elopmen , 12, 3-28. Sheehey, E. (1993) The e ec o go e nmen size on economic g ow h. Eas e n Economic Jou nal,19(3), 321-328. Solow, R. (1956) A Con ibu ion o he Theo y o Economic G ow h, Qua e ly Jou nal o Economics 70, 65-94. Solow, R. (1957) Technical Change and he Agg ega e P oduc ion Func ion. Re iew o Economics and S a is ics, 39, 3: 321-320. Tanzi, V. (2005) The Economic Role o he S a e in he 21s Cen u y, Ca o Jou nal o Economics, 25, 3: 617-638. WDI (2014) Wo ld De elopmen Indica o s, 2014. h p://da a.wo ldbank.o g/da a- ca alog/wo ld-de elopmen -indica o s, [12. Ma 2015.] WGI (2014) The Wo ldwide Go e nmen Indica o s, 2014. www.go indica o s.o g [10 Ma 2015.]