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The economics of being stupid: a note on (ir)rationality in economics

Šťastný, Dan

Abstract

Economists’ habit of imputing rational motives to all human behavior gives rise to ‘rational riddles’: rational explanations for seemingly irrational behavior. In the article I argue that economists’ solutions to these riddles are, despite their sophistication, of limited scientific value as they describe mechanisms that are never both new and correct: they may be empirically correct but not new as these mechanisms have been practiced (hence known) by some people before; or they are genuinely new (previously unknown to anybody), but empirically wrong as they fail to account for the real reasons of observed behavior. I further show that the hypothesized solutions to the riddles could be easily tested by consulting the people whose behavior is examined, and point to the strange lack of economistsefforts to do so. Finally I present results of a micro survey relating to one such rational riddle: ticket underpricing (why prices of tickets for various events do not adjust to eliminate the excess demand). By interviewing managers of theatres known to sell tickets at prices that create lines, I present some evidence showing that it is much easier to explain the observed behavior in terms of plain ignorance of some elementary economic principles or facts rather than in terms of some economic sophistication on the part of the managers. No interviewees, for example, explicitly related the existence of lines to ticket underpricing, and some actually denied any link there even if prompted. I conclude by pointing to the real cost to the economic profession stemming from its decision to ignore the possibility of irrationality in economistsresearch program.

Full text

In oduc ion In oking he issue o a ionali y in economics is jus abou as in ellec ually unique, no el and exci ing as an a emp o disco e he eal message o Keynes’s Gene al Theo y. Fo many economis s, and – ankly – one canno blame hem, he a ionali y assump ion is a i e ques ion ha wa an s almos no a en ion. To compensa e o ha , one canno help bu o use ap e en ious i le. In he ollowing ex , I acknowledge he impo - ance o a ionali y assump ion o any economic heo izing, bu p opose ha economis s, in an a emp a explaining a seemingly i a ional beha io in a ional e ms, a e o en engaging in a scien i ically no e y use ul logical exe cise. I ollow some ypical examples o such solu ions and p esen a mic o-su ey o illus a e hei possible inapplicabili y. I hen a gue ha his s a e o a ai s is caused by, and u he con ibu es o, a neglec o he possibili y o i a ional beha io , and conclude by emphasizing he impo ance o allowing he possibili y o olly. Les he pu pose o his a icle be misunde - s ood, i is no conce ned wi h he p ecise meaning o con en o he a ionali y assump ion (as e.g. Sen does [15]), nei he does i c i icize he employmen o such assump ion in economic heo izing. I a he belongs o a adi ion o a icles eminding us abou de ia ions o lesh- and-blood economic agen s om he homo oeconomicus model – a adi ion made wide, long and e i able by Kahneman (see e.g. [9]) and o he s. My aspi a ion wi hin his adi ion is modes a bes : o poin o a possible me hodological slip in he way economis explica e ce ain phenomena and he economic consequences o i . 1. The Ra ionali y Assump ion Economics, i is widely g an ed, is a science abou he way people make choices and abou consequences o such choices (e.g. [10]). Any decision, as opposed o non- oli ional beha io , implies a use o eason o jux apose he p os and cons o a gi en ou e o conduc . This, howe e , does no mean ha one’s easoning mus necessa ily be a all imes co ec . The decision-make may use all his eason, and ye his decision may none heless u n ou w ong – bo h ex an e and ex pos . One commonly acknowledged sou ce o such e o s is unce ain y. Due o necessa ily impe ec knowledge o he p esen and u u e s a es o he wo ld, e e y decision is based on expec a ions and hese may p o e w ong, hus making he decision – one ha seemed pe ec ly co ec ex an e – e oneous ex pos . The e is, howe e , a di e en cause o e o . E en i one co ec ly pe cei es bo h p esen and u u e s a es o he wo ld (i.e. his expec a ion will ma ch eali y), a decision can s ill be w ong due o he indi idual being undamen ally mis aken abou he means p ope o he achie emen o his ends (i.e. abou causal ela ions be ween di e en s a es). His eason may well be elling him ha ce ain means will lead o he desi ed ends, and hus his decision is conscious and hough ul, and – no doub – pe cei ed by he decision- make as a ional. Ye , he may be mis aken, con used o simply w ong abou a pa icula means-ends ela ionship. This is he kind o si ua ion ha economis s ha e in mind when hey p oclaim a beha io i a ional – w ong om he e y beginning, e en ex an e. And, pe haps, his is p ecisely such beha io ha o he people would e nacula ly call s upid. Ekonomie 42014, XVII, 2 DOI: 10.15240/ ul/001/2014-2-001 THE ECONOMICS OF BEING STUPID: A NOTE ON (IR)RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS Dan ·Èas n˘ EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 4 Economics 52, XVII, 2014 E en hough economis s ecognize he possibili y ha people can make e o s, mos o hem p e e o in e p e human beha io in a ional – e o - ee – e ms. The e is a e y good eason o doing so. In oking he possibili y o e o is a i ial explana ion heo e ically applicable in i ually all cases. I is an an i- scien i ic solu ion, an answe equi ing and p oducing no use ul knowledge wha soe e . To any ques ion, “Why is he doing ha ?”, he uni e sally co ec answe may be ha “He is jus being s upid!” The idea o a ionali y is hen an o e ly impo an one o economics, a leas o i s main s eam. No because economis s could no a hom an i a ional decision, bu because i is a s a ing poin o wha economis s do: adding o i ial explana ions o phenomena some non- i ial ones. Thus, wi hou he concep o a ionali y he e would be no science o economics. On he o he hand, i would be mis aken o suppose ha economics is applicable only o si ua ions whe e people do indeed ac a ionally, while ha ing no hing o say abou cases o people ac ing e oneously. Fi s , hanks o economics, we a e o en able o sugges some hing abou he a ionali y o he choice in he i s place: wi hou economics we would no be able o ell a a ional om an i a ional one. This is wha economis s do when hey claim ha A is no a means ha leads o he achie emen o he end B. Second, economics being he science abou consequences o human decisions, i can poin ou consequences o i a ional beha io oo. I can claim no only ha A does no lead o B, bu ha in ac i leads o C. And ha oo is a use ul knowledge. The e o e, he p esence o i a ionali y in human decision making does no s ip economics o i s use ulness and impo ance. The a ionali y assump ion only enables economis s o say much mo e han hey would be able o wi hou i . 2. The Ques o Ra ional In e p e a ion: Ra ional Riddles A emp s o ind a ional explana ion o human beha io ha e long been pa o good economics and he p o ided explana ions a e a guably one o he mos imp essi e kinds o economics’ ou pu o laymen and he mos enjoyable ones o economis s hemsel es. In he absence o a s aigh o wa d maximizing explana ion, one can alk abou a ional iddles, a e m coined by Landsbu g [10, chap e 2]. Howe e , in his ques o a ional explana ions, some economis s seem o go as a as o implici ly assume ha he e mus be a a ional explana ion o e e y human beha io we obse e and hey de o e g ea ime and ene gy owa ds disco e ing i . In his way, an economic, o a ional, iddle was bo n and i emains o be economis s’ pas ime agenda – some hing o alk abou e en when hey ge i ed o wo king on hei eg essions o o calib a ing hei models. The a ional iddles esea ch p og am is ascina ing in mo e aspec s han jus in i s sophis ica ion and in en i eness. I wan o poin ou wo o hem ha ela e o he scien i ic alue o he solu ion and i s a ailabili y and es abili y. 2.1 Value o Solu ion The solu ion o a a ional iddle has a peculia s a us among answe s ha economic science can o e . I onically, despi e all he impeccable economic logic o hese solu ions, hey a e no likely o be e y aluable o unde s anding how ou wo ld wo ks. This is because each and e e y such solu ion (assuming i is o mally co ec ) can u n ou o be empi ically ei he co ec o inco ec . I he solu ion is co ec i means people whose beha io was examined by economis s indeed do beha e he way economis s hypo hesized. This may appea as a g ea achie emen . In a way, i is and i su ely demons a es he ingeniousness and in ui ion o he economis who made ha disco e y. Bu ha disco e y is ce ainly no as new as one would assume eal disco e y o be. And his is because, as ollows om he p emise ha i is empi ically co ec solu ion o he iddle, he economic logic o ha beha io (as a p o i - maximizing s a egy) mus ha e been known all along o hose who ha e beha ed like ha and whose beha io only caugh a en ion o acu ious economis . (I should be clea ha i agen s we e igno an o he logic, i could no hen be claimed ha hey a e ac ing acco ding o i .) The p ac ical use ulness o such solu ion hen may no ex end much beyond economis s’ men al aining o a signal o an economis ’s capabili y. EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 5 Ekonomie 62014, XVII, 2 On he o he hand, i he p oposed solu ion is no empi ically co ec , i means ha people do no beha e he way hey do o he eason economis s p opose. Despi e being empi ically inapplicable i s use ulness may be jus abou he same as he use ulness o he co ec solu ions (logical exe cise and b ain- easing). Ei he way, empi ically co ec bu no new, o jus empi ically inco ec , he same conclusion applies: wha hese economis s p oduce is an in ellec ual ea ha adds e y li le o he knowledge abou how eal-wo ld people beha e. (The e is one impo an way in which his conclusion may be sub e ed: i economis s – ins ead o asking why people do wha hey do – accep ed om he e y beginning ha people may ac on i a ional belie s abou means and unde ook o explain why people’s beha io s ill su i es. In his se up, economis s migh indeed disco e how people’s beha io is in ac e ec i e in b inging abou he desi ed end, e en i people a e unawa e o i . People may o cou se imi a e beha io hey ound success ul wi hou knowing why i wo ks, o , mo e o en, may ha e e oneous belie s abou why i wo ks. E olu ion – he na u al selec ion (su i al) on he ma ke – will p omo e hose who imi a e such beha io and punish hose who de ia e om i [1, pp. 217–220], and economis s may in such cases make uly aluable con ibu ion by explaining why he mechanism eally wo ks.) 2.2 A ailabili y o a Solu ion Ano he peculia ea u e o a a ional iddle solu ion is he ela i e ease wi h which i can be e i ied, es ed and e en disco e ed in he i s place. When ackling he iddles economis s a e ying o disco e he s a egy o some decision- make s. When hey p oduce a solu ion, when hey hink hey did puzzle ou he alleged pa adox, one would expec hem o double- check ha hypo hesis wi h he decision-make s o acknowledge i s co ec ness. I empi ically co ec , hey would ecei e an a i ma i e answe (some hing like “yes, you ha e guessed i !”- ype o a esponse), i no hey would go ahead guessing. A e all, asking he e y people whose beha io is he subjec o examina ion whe he he explana ion o hei beha io is co ec , is su ely he easies way o ind ou jus how ele an and applicable ha explana ion is. Ye , he economis s do no seem o be much in e es ed in aking ha s ep. Ins ead, hey submi he explana ion as independen om wha he decision-make s hink and many o hose alleged pa adoxes a e conside ed by economis s as un esol ed and wai ing o s ill mo e ingenious solu ion. This is oughly wha Dei d e McCloskey calls “Samuelsonian Vice” [13, pp. 63–69]. In ac , as was poin ed ou abo e, as long as he iddles ha e a ional solu ions, he e is no eason o ely on economic scien is s o come up wi h hem, no ma e how icky and ingenious i may be. I mus al eady exis in he heads o hose a ional decision-make s hemsel es – hey a e beha ing in his way now. I economis s ha e ha d imes e ealing wha i is o keep a guing abou me i s o hei espec i e explana ions, all hey would need o do o se le he a gumen is o ask he people who do know. This is a undamen ally di e en scien i ic p oblem han he one ackled by na u al scien is s. They ne e enjoy he possibili y o ac ually asking he subjec s o hei inqui y abou why hey beha e he way hey do. Economis s, on he o he hand, a id o unde s and people’s beha io , almos always could. T ying o disco e he answe p io o, and independen ly o , asking he people whose beha io economis s s udy could ce ainly cons i u e an in e es ing discipline in a “bes economis con es ”, bu may ail o con ibu e much o unde s anding he ue eali y. (I is ue ha people may no always speak u h, and may e en be mo i a ed no o e eal he u h o p o ec hei business echnology. The pheno- mena desc ibed as a ional iddles a e so widesp ead hough ha i would be an as ic o assume ha an a emp o all i s p ac i ione s o keep i sec e would e e wo k, much less o so long. Unbelie able as i is, i is p ecisely his scena io ha is implied by he economis s’ neglec o con as ing hei ideas o wha people say.) 3. Riddles Sol ed To illus a e and subs an ia e such claims I hink i necessa y o suppo i by looking a some a ional explana ions o seemingly i a ional beha io . I ha e chosen h ee popula economic iddles and oughly mapped he solu ions o hem sugges ed in economic li e a u e. EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 6 Economics 72, XVII, 2014 All cases ha e o do wi h p icing. This is because he e is a common p ejudice ha as business decisions hey a e mos likely o be unde aken a ionally as a means o p o i maximiza ion. The e o e hey cons i u e cases whe e i makes he bes sense on he pa o economis s o sea ch o a ional explana ions. 3.1 Popco n O e p icing Some economis s keep being in igued by he ac ha popco n cos s allegedly oo much in mo ie hea es. This is because he p o i maximiza ion s a egy in his si ua ion would unde con en ional assump ions en ail jus ma ginal cos p icing o popco n combined wi h an acco dingly highe en ance ee. (The con en ional assump ions include e.g. iden ical cos ume s’ p e e ences [11, p. 369].) The au ho s hen look o easons why selling popco n so dea ac ually secu es highe p o i s han ma ginal cos p icing o he con en ional heo y. All explana ions o his de ia ion om he expec ed beha io e ol e ound p ice disc imina ion. They a gue he e is a posi i e co ela ion be ween p e e ence o popco n and willingness o pay o he en e ainmen in he hea e (i.e. o he bundle o wa ching he mo ies and consump ion o snacks om concession s ands). Examples o such easoning a e p o ided by e. g. F iedman [6, pp. 51–53] o Landsbu g [10, pp. 159–161]. In o de o cha ge mo e o hose who alue coming o he hea e mo e, i is ound na u al ha p ice o popco n (soda o o he snacks) will be aised abo e ma ginal cos while he en ance ee lowe ed in o de o a ac hose, who would no o he wise come. (Mo e o mal analysis is p o ided by Luis Locay and Al a o Rod iguez [12, pp. 959–960].) Thus, he puzzling high p ice o popco n is a e all a a ional p o i -maximiza ion. The one explana ion he au ho s exp essly deny happens o be he one ou inely o e ed by lay people when con on ed wi h his ques ion: ha he hea e owne jus akes ad an age o his monopoly on he popco n ma ke wi hin he hea e . Bu hea e owne s a e lay people, and he e seems no hing an as ic abou hem doing i o he same – e oneous – eason as o he people assume owne s o beha e like ha . 3.2 9-p icing One o he p ice s a egies ha s ill a ac s some a en ion among economis s is he p ac ice o cha ging p ices ending in 9: $5.99 ins ead o $6.00, $79 ins ead o $80 o simila . (While his iddle also appea s in Landsbu g’s popula book [10, pp. 10–19], i was inaugu- a ed in he hall o iddles as ea ly as 1936 [7]. Anecdo ally, such p ac ice is supposed o ha e o igina ed wi h a Czech shoe p oduce TomበBaÈa. This may ha e been local in en ion o in oduc ion, bu , gene ally, hese “jus -below p ices” i s appea ed in 19 h cen u y a e he in en ion o a cash egis e .) Highe equency o 9’s a he end o p ices is su ely suspec in awo ld o con en ional a ional p icing models. Wha hen could, acco ding o some econo- mis s, make businesses choose his pa e n o p icing o e mo e con en ional – and in a ional e ms explainable – p icing s a egies? One eason, p esen ed by Landsbu g, is an elimina ion o he agency p oblem: employees a e less likely no o egis e sales i he p ice is such as o equi e gi ing change back o he cus ome [10, pp. 15–16]. O he au ho s specula e e.g. abou quali y signaling p ope ies o he 9-ending e sus 0-ending p ices [16]. The eason o economis s being puzzled he e is hei unwillingness o accep he man- on- he-s ee explana ion: ha 9-ending p ices a e pe cei ed by consume s as lowe han hey eally a e, which is why hey buy subs an ially highe quan i ies. While i is su ely su p ising and ha d o squa e wi h plain a ionali y ha people would ou inely ze o in on he numbe s o he le om he 9 and ound he p ice downwa d, we should no lose sigh o he ac ha cus ome s a e men-on- he-s ee . And i his is wha consume s do, hey may indeed be doing i o p ecisely his unbelie able eason. (In ac , s udies o consume choice admi bo h he possibili y o his beha io on he pa o consume s [14], and he possibili y o illusion on he pa o businesses abou he ex en o which consume s indeed beha e ha way, hus indica ing an e o on he business side [2].) 3.3 Ticke Unde p icing Pe haps he mos compelling and impo an o all iddles a e ins ances o sub-equilib ium p ices implying sho ages and queues on some ma ke s. This pu pose ul non-p ice a ioning akes place o ins ance in selling admission EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 7 Ekonomie 82014, XVII, 2 icke s. Why do hea e owne s, conce p oduce s and o he s cha ge some imes so li le despi e he ac ha he e is an excess demand and i seems hey could inc ease he p ice wi hou selling less and hus inc ease hei p o i s? He e is wha economis s submi as gene al solu ions o he selle -induced excess demand puzzle. Pe haps mos simply, he e is a conjec u e ha consume s may pe cei e a ce ain limi o he p ice beyond which hey would conside he p ice “un ai ” [8]. Selle s may hen be a aid o c ossing such h eshold, and choose o li e wi h he queues. O , i has been p oposed ha c ea ing an excess demand may cause a “buying enzy” wi h consume s being d i en o pu chase soone han hey o he wise would. This means ha consume s make less in o med pu chasing decisions and ha he p oduce can cha ge highe p ice o people who would no mally pos pone hei pu chase o become mo e in o med [5]. Fu he , i has been asse ed ha , in some cases, inducing an excess demand may be away o in luence he composi ion o he audience. As he exis ence o complemen a y goods o a ending an e en a ies ac oss he audience, he selle may ind i p o i able o ade o lowe eceip s om he box o ice o highe sales o complemen a y goods (CD’s, ideos, T-shi s and o he pa aphe nalia). P o ided he a endees who end o buy mo e complemen a y goods han o he s a e hose who a e also willing o incu ex a cos o ge ing hold o he icke s (s anding in line, buying om scalpe s e c.), selling a lowe - han-ma ke -clea ing p ice may be a p o i able s a egy. (This a gumen is a ibu ed o Kenne h McLaughlin [10, p. 13].) Finally, and pe haps mos con olu edly, i is sugges ed ha in case o some goods, he indi idual demand is dependen on he o al quan i y demanded on he ma ke . This is said o lead o a possibili y o an upwa d sloping demand (wi hin ce ain quan i ies) and a p o i - maximizing equilib ium a a p ice ha gene a es excess demand. Such equilib ium is uns able, howe e , and may be upse by a p ice hike. In such case, he educ ion o quan i y demanded migh cause he indi idual demands o al e and he ma ke o e e o a s anda d equilib ium a bo h lowe p ice and lowe quan i y and, consequen ly, lowe he le el o p o i [3]. An implici assump ion behind all hese a ionaliza ions is ha , su ely, he selle s ha e good, p o i -maximizing easons no o aise p ices, no as he con en ional wisdom would ha e i : ha lines a e a consequence o he p oduc o be o limi ed a ailabili y. Bu would i be impossible o he icke selle s o sha e such con en ional wisdom? 4. Solu ions Tes ed Some o he abo e explana ions may ha e hei me i s and p esumably may be applicable as solu ions o he pa icula iddles, e en i on alimi ed scale: ai ness cons ain s ela e mos ly o si ua ions o p ice gouging; buying enzies a e es ic ed o new p oduc s; complemen a y goods may be impo an in case o some conce s o spo s games, bu a e ha dly p esen e e ywhe e whe e he e a e lines. Many o hem, howe e , a e based on such complex economic easoning ha he e seems o be some g ounds o doub ing hei eal-wo ld plausibili y. I would be ai hen o pu hese solu ions o es , pa icula ly i he es is easie han i seems – all ha needs o be done o sol e hese mys e ies once and o all is o go and ask he people whose beha io economis s specula e abou . Now, su p isingly, his is no happening. Economis s keep ying o cons uc heo e ical explana ions, bu nobody seems o ha e gone o mo ie hea e owne s o ask hem o wha deg ee hey conside hei cus ome s di e en and wha hey hough o he co ela ion be ween willingness o pay o seeing mo ies and consump ion o popco n. Has someone asked he selle s wha hey signal wi h he “jus - below” p ices hey cha ge? Has anybody gone o he Becke ’s Palo Al o sea ood es au an and con i med ha he owne indeed assumes he indi idual quan i y o his p oduc s demanded depends on he agg ega e quan i y demanded? (The e we e s udies asking he selle s whe he hey cha ge such p ices, bu , as onishingly, no why. In ac , S i ing s a s by ci ing a mul i ude o s udies om 1954 ill 1997 ha es ablish he ac ha such p ices a e indeed cha ged by asking he company manage s [16, p. 1618], and hen spends his whole a icle on hypo hesizing when and why hey do so. Landsbu g, on he o he hand, EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 8 Economics 92, XVII, 2014 sugges s o es his idea abou agency p oblem by es ing he hypo hesis ha “99-cen p icing should be less common in s o es whe e he owne s wo k he cash egis e ” [10, p. 16].) In o de o close his empi ical oid, we ocused on he p oblem o icke unde p icing, and in e iewed head manage s o h ee pe o mance hea e s in P ague. All o he hea es a e in amous o lines a hei box o ices, anging om single hou s o o e nigh wai ing ime. We asked all o hem abou he causes o he lines, abou he in luence o p ice on hei p o i and easons o no inc easing he p ice. The su ey was conduc ed in No embe and Decembe 2007 as in e iews in pe son (wi h one excep ion). Besides h ee hea es i included o he businesses as well: 2 es au an s, 2 hai s udios, 1 ice-hockey club and 1 conce p oduce (in e iewed o e phone). The common denomina o o all he non- hea e cases was ha he lines seemed o be a p oduc o impe ec o esigh and isk a e sion and would hus no be classed as a ional iddles. Fo his eason I do no ep oduce he in e iews he e and limi mysel o hea es only. 4.1 Thea e A In he i s hea e (A), he managemen pe cei es lines as a p oblem and epea edly i ies o add ess hem. In ac , he head manage admi ed ha had she been a egula hea e isi o , she would ha e ne e a ended any o he pe o mances he e as she ha ed s anding in lines (emphasis added). The answe o a s aigh o wa d ques ion abou he causes o lines was, unwa e ingly, ha he numbe o sea s is oo small o accommoda e all he people who would like o come. The way hey ha e deal wi h he lines was o a) keep hei box o ice as he only icke dis ibu ion channel, and b) limi he numbe o icke s an indi idual is allowed o pu chase o 4. Bo h a) and b) we e designed o p e en second-hand dealings wi h pu chased icke s, which was expec ed o make su e “ he pe o mance would be a ended by as many people who wan o come as possible”. As his numbe can ha dly change due o he ixed numbe o sea s, she migh ha e possibly mean ha he audience composi ion would be a ec ed by he p ice. Indeed, la e in he in e iew she b ie ly men ions hey “a e no in e es ed in snobbish audience.” Only when explici ly cued, he head manage eluc an ly admi ed he possible ole o icke p ices bu poin ed ou immedia ely ha people could no a o d i hen. She commended he ac people had ne e complained abou p ices and hough ha aising he icke p ices would o ce hei cus ome s o limi he numbe o icke s hey buy in hei li e ime. And his, as she emphasized, was no he goal o he hea e . 4.2 Thea e B In he second hea e (B), oo, he manage has a“simple” explana ion o he lines: he numbe o people in e es ed in coming is g ea e han he hea e capaci y and “people ha e o, na u ally, come ahead o ime”. He hough his sys em is jus bu es ic i e a he same ime as i elies on limi s on pu chases and does no allow ese a ions, which, he admi ed, is pa icula ly exing o people ou side o P ague. They a e no awa e o , and hus a e no conce ned abou , second hand dealings wi h icke s. When asked wha hey would do i hey knew i was happening, he head manage poin ed o possible way o inc easing he anspa ency such as “in o ming he people abou he numbe o icke s”. The ques ion o icke p ices had o be b ough up explici ly by he in e iewe . The answe was unce ain, indica i e o no p io conside a ion and o con usion be ween all possible e ec s. P ices, on he one hand, he asse ed, “would ha e no e ec on he numbe o people who buy he icke s”. This should no be oo su p ising as he numbe o sea s is ixed. Wha he p obably mean was ha he quan i y demanded ( he numbe o people who wan o buy) would no be a ec ed.) E en i hey had an e ec , he wen on, people would esen seeing p ices inc eased. On he o he hand, almos immedia ely, he added he e migh be some oom o p ice inc eases. A he end, he low p ices (and he lines) we e a ionalized as a means o secu ing a “g ass- oo ” composi ion o he audience. 4.3 Thea e C Las ly, he in e iew wi h he ope a ions di ec o o he hi d hea e (C) had almos an iden ical plo . She claimed hey ha e lines because people like wha hey do and hei audi o ium space is limi ed. When maneu e ed o he EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 9 Ekonomie 10 2014, XVII, 2 possible ole o p ices, she hough i was o seconda y impo ance. On he o he hand, she e ealed ha hey had inc eased hei p ices and do so e e y yea , and admi ed hey y o e lec he demand o hei pe o mances. On ye ano he hand, hough, she added ha he p ice inc eases we e necessa y due o he ope a ion cos and ha he g owing demand was some hing ha enabled hem o pass he cos o he audience, mo e han being amo i a ion o p ice inc eases. Finally, she con adic ed his by admi ing ha e.g. be o e Ch is mas hey o e gi icke s a highe p ices and cha ge highe p ices o pe o mances no o ious o he lines. She no ed ha he lines ha e been educed by “almos a hal ” o hei p e ious leng hs, and a ibu es his mainly o he p ice inc eases, possibly suppo ed by asys em o in e ne ese a ions. I would be wholly imp ope o conside his mic o-su ey as obus ly exploding he whole iddle-solu ion- esea ch p og am. I s esul s a e, howe e , s ill o in e es as hey do no exac ly pain a pic u e o he hea e manage- men doing some hing e en emo ely as sophis ica ed as he economic heo is s sugges . And i is no he lack o igo ous economic hinking on he pa o he hea e manage s and hei ailu e o use he e y language and concep s o p o essional economis s. I is ha he in e iews e eal p ecisely he ype o economic hinking economis s ule ou be o e hey s a hei hinking abou he p oblem, which is why hey no only end up, bu al eady s a wo king in, a di e en wo ld. No esponden s on hei own e en linked he exis ence o lines wi h he p ices, much less wi h p ices being “ oo low”. Ins ead, all o hem hough i had o wi h sca ci y, as i o he hings in he wo ld besides hea e icke s we e no sca ce. E en when p omp ed abou he p ices, he immedia e eac ion was – wi h he possible excep ion o C – ha his would no wo k because people would no be able o a o d i , as i he low p ice made he icke s somehow gene ally mo e a ailable. (Gi en he ac ha hea e C showed subs an ially less puzzling beha io – hey do adjus p ices acco ding o demand, and e ec i ely manage o sho en hei lines – i may be o in e es o men ion ha he manage o C was a uni e si y g adua e wi h some economic educa ion. The o he manage s ( hose o A and B) we e non- business, a s educa ed pe sons. This would coincide wi h indings ci ed by B yan Caplan on he – qui e unsu p ising – nega i e co ela ion be ween economic educa ion and he le el o biases abou economics [4, pp. 50–93]). Some o he o he esponses seduce one o a ional in e p e a ion: e.g. he idea ha people would esen p ice inc eases may sound like Kahneman e al. and hei concep o ai ness cons ain [8]. O , he in luence o p ice on he audience composi ion ings a somewha a ional bell. Howe e , nei he o hese is asu icien eason o no aising he p ices and bo h a e much mo e likely o be ele an unde al e na i e – non-p o i -maximiza ion – schemes. (The hea e manage s may know ha buye s will esen he p ice hikes, and s ill i may be mo e p o i able o do so. Simila ly, e en i he hea e manage s and ensemble p e e he so o audience made o people who can pu up wi h s anding in he line o e nigh , bu s ill i may be mo e p o i able o ha e highe p ices and “wo se” audience. In hese si ua ions, hei decision no o aise p ices will hen be economic only as long as hei u ili y unc ions include eel-good a gumen s such as public app o al, o ond ela ions wi h he audience.) As will be ecalled, howe e , he economis s’ solu ions o iddles a e p o ided as a ionaliza- ions o lines unde p o i -maximiza ion assump ion – o he wise he explana ions would be conside ed as i ial impu a ion o beha io (means) igh in o he goals (ends). Ei he way, uly sophis ica ed solu ions like he one o e ed by Becke [3] seem somewha i ele an in he con ex o he business hinking he in e iews a emp o documen . Unless, o cou se, one is o a gue ha he manage s did no wan o disclose hei eal s a egies, and jus “played s upid” ins ead. Unlikely as i is, i b ings me inally o he economics o being s upid. 5. When he S upid Comes In We ha e seen abo e ha he e is in ac an easy way o es he empi ical ele ance o economis s’ solu ion o a ional iddles: by asking he e y people whose mo i es hey ha e ied o second-guess. We also saw ha such su eys a e unbelie ably a e i no non- exis en . Bu e en i hese su eys we e unde aken, hey would a bes p oduce a logic ha was al eady known and p ac iced, e en i no o mally desc ibed on pages o an EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 10 Economics 112, XVII, 2014 economic jou nal. Tha migh no be exac ly he bes use o economis s’ in ellec ual capaci y, bu a leas i would p o e he empi ical powe o he discipline (and, p esumably, made some economis s p oude o hemsel es). When, on he o he hand, he solu ions p oposed by economis s a e ound empi ically i ele an , i may only mean one o he ollowing: a) no economis s co ec ly guessed wha businesses a e up o ( he game may p oceed), o b) no such u he solu ion exis s as he puzzling beha io is indeed and simply a p oduc o i a ional hinking he economis s e used o accep in he i s place. I s i iali y no wi hs anding, his e en uali y may be empi ically e y ele an and impo an . I economis s choose o banish he possibili y o i a ionali y, hei unde s anding o wha is going on is impai ed. Wha looks like an ou wi ing game wi h no social consequence is jus a ip o he icebe g – he economis s’ de e mina ion o insis on a ionali y may c ea e imagina y puzzles whe e he e a e none and hus di e hei sca ce in ellec ual esou ces om a eas whe e hey a e mo e needed. One a ea ha was hi pa icula ly ha d by esis ance o i a ionali y is he economics o policy-making. B yan Caplan’s book, compiling and w apping up his esea ch p ojec o he pas decade o so [4], shows qui e con incingly ha a emp s o explain pe sis ence o oolish public ha e sys ema ically shunned he possibili y o he elec o a e being mis aken in unde s a ing he impac o he policies. Poli ical p ocess, pe e ed as i may be, does no explain away all he public policy oolishness. I democ acy p oduced policy ha people eally liked, i would ha e been e en mo e oolish han i is. Caplan poin s ou how much he ideas o he public a e sys ema ically biased compa ed o wha economis s hink. Indeed, my indings in he hea e su ey – he lack o app ecia ion o he ole o p ices – allies di ec ly wi h he biases he was able o iden i y. He hus shows ha he olly o he elec o a e may be he missing piece in he puzzle. Tha he a emp s o s anda d public choice heo y o accoun o pe sis ence o bad policies ha e been ailing and ha e p oduced con olu ed and useless heo e ical wo k p ecisely because economis s in he pas cen u y – unlike some o he cen u y be o e ha – u ned a blind eye o he possibili y o human olly. As Caplan concludes his book: Social science has pu sued many blind alleys – and igno ed many p omising ones – ou o misguided insis ence ha e e y model be a“s o y wi hou ools,” e en in a eas like poli ics whe e olly is cen al. A p o e b ells us ha “a wise man lea ns mo e om a ool han a ool lea ns om a wise man.” By closing hei eyes o ools and olly, he wise men o social science ha e a i icially hobbled he ad ance o hei own lea ning. [4, p. 209] Conclusion The pu pose o his a icle was wo- old. Fi s , I wan ed o b ing a en ion o wo s ange ea u es o economis s’ esea ch p og am. When economis s specula e abou why people’s beha io is a ional (which is wha hey do when c acking he a ional iddles), he esul o such scien i ic e o – all i s sophis ica ion, ingeniousness and o mal impeccabili y no wi hs anding – is ei he co ec , bu no new (i.e. i has been known be o e o he examined people), o simply w ong in he sense ha he solu ion does no apply (i.e. i is empi ically emp y). Ei he way, he signi icance o such science seems compelling bi limi ed. Mo eo e , his is jus as s ange as he way h ough which economis s ypically y o es he empi ical alidi y o hei esul s. Tes ing hypo heses implied by he esul s can, o cou se, shed much ligh on ha ques ion, bu since hei esul s ela e essen ially o a ques ion o why people do wha hey do, i is he examined people who can se le he issue. While da a can alk, so can he people. Second, I sugges economis s may be somewha uneconomical in hei esea ch e o s. By insis ing on models wi h a ional ac o s only, hey may emba k on a acuous a ional iddles esea ch p ojec in he i s place. And h ough hei isola ion om he people hey examine, hey ail o ind ou ha in many cases he a ional iddle solu ion does no exis , and ha he beha io hey specula e abou is a p oduc o con usion and olly, ha i is simply i a ional. This is in no way a plea o disca ding he a ionali y assump ion in economics. I is only aplea o emembe ing ha i is an assump ion ha may jus as well no be me . By heeding i , economis s can economize on hei sca ce esea ch esou ces, and pe haps de o e mo e EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 11 Ekonomie 12 2014, XVII, 2 o hem o, and do an e en be e job in, a eas whe e such assump ion holds. The au ho would like o hank Jose Mon ag o commen s and adminis a ing and p ocessing he mic o su ey, and o Da id Lipka and Ed S ingham o aluable commen s on p e ious e sions o he ex . O he s Ichoose o lea e unmen ioned les someone is le ou . The usual ca ea applies. Re e ences [1] ALCHIAN, A.A. Unce ain y, E olu ion, and Economic Theo y. The Jou nal o Poli ical Economy. 1950, Vol. 58, Iss. 3. ISSN 0022-3808. [2] ANDRESON, E.T., SIMESTER, D.I. E ec s o $9 P ice Endings on Re ail Sales: E idence om Field Expe imen s. Quan i a i e Ma ke ing and Economics. 2003, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, pp. 93-110. ISSN 1570-7156. [3] BECKER, G.S. A No e on Res au an P icing and O he Examples o Social In luences on P ices. The Jou nal o Poli ical Economy. 1991, Vol. 99, Iss. 5, pp. 1109-1016. ISSN 0022-3808. [4] CAPLAN, B. The My h o Ra ional Vo e : Why Democ acies Choose Bad Policies. P ince on: P ince on Uni e si y P ess, 2007. ISBN 978-0-691-129-426. [5] DeGRABA, P. Buying F enzies and Selle - Induced Excess Demand. RAND Jou nal o Economics. 1995, Vol. 26, Iss. 2, pp. 331-342. ISSN 1756-2171. [6] FRIEDMAN, D. Hidden O de : The Economics o E e yday Li e. New Yo k: Ha pe Collins Publishe s, 1997. ISBN 978-0-887-3088-57. [7] GINZBERG, E. Cus oma y P ices. The Ame ican Economic Re iew. 1936, Vol. 26, Iss. 2, pp. 296. ISSN 0002-8282. [8] KAHNEMAN, D., KNETSCH, J.L., THALER, R. Fai ness as a Cons ain on P o i Seeking: En i lemen s in he Ma ke . The Ame ican Eco- nomic Re iew. 1986, Vol. 76, Iss. 4, pp. 728-741. ISSN 0002-8282. [9] KAHNEMAN, D. New challenges o he a ionali y assump ion. Jou nal o Ins i u ional and Theo e ical Economics (JITE)/Zei sch i ü die gesam e S aa swissenscha . 1994, Vol. 150, Iss. 1, pp. 18-36. ISSN 0932-4569. [10] LANDSBURG, S.E. The A mchai Economis : Economics and E e yday Li e. New Yo k: The F ee P ess, 1993. ISBN 0-02-917776-6. [11] LANDSBURG, S.E. P ice Theo y and Applica ions. Cincinna i: Sou h-Wes e n (Thomson Lea ning), 2002. ISBN 0-324-05979-5. [12] LOCAY, L., RODRIGUEZ, A. P ice Disc imi- na ion in Compe i i e Ma ke s. Jou nal o Poli ical Economy. 1992, Vol. 100, Iss. 5, pp. 954-965. ISSN 0022-3808. [13] McCLOSKEY, D.N. The Vices o Economis s – The Vi ues o he Bou geoisie. Ams e dam: Ams e dam Uni e si y P ess, 1996. ISBN 978-9-053-562-444. [14] SCHINDLER, R.M., KIRBY, P.N. Pa e ns o Righ mos Digi s Used in Ad e ised P ices: Implica ions o Nine-Ending E ec s. Jou nal o Consume Resea ch. 1997, Vol. 24, Iss. 2, pp. 192-201. ISSN 0093-5301. [15] SEN, A.K. Ra ional ools: A c i ique o he beha io al ounda ions o economic heo y. Philosophy & Public A ai s. 1977, Vol. 6, Iss. 4, pp. 317-344. ISSN 0048-3915. [16] STIVING, M. P ice-Endings When P ices Signal Quali y. Managemen Science. 2000, Vol. 46, Iss. 12, pp. 1617-1629. ISSN 0025-1909. Dan ·Èas n˘ Jan E angelis a Pu kynû Uni e si y in Ús í nad Labem Facul y o Social and Economic S udies Depa men o Economics [email p o ec ed] EM_02_14_zlom 4.6.2014 8:53 S ánka 12