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The influence of gender on financial decisions: evidence from small start-up firms in spain

Hernandez-Nicolas, Carmen Maria

Abstract

The presence of women in management positions in companies is one of the topics that have generated the most interest and controversy over recent years. This has also been the case in Spain, where several legal initiatives have promoted the presence of women on decision-making bodies of companies. These important and pioneering legislative initiatives focus on the recommendation of positive discrimination in favour of women in large firms. This measure is justified not only for reasons of ethics or social justice, but also for the purposes of efficiency and rational economic behaviour. These laws have created an open debate in Spain and in other countries where they have been enacted and they have attracted the attention of researchers. In this context, the majority of the studies have attempted to analyse the effect of gender diversity among top managers on corporate performance of listed firms. On the contrary, this paper analyses the influence of gender on some financial decisions, using a sample of 12,376 Spanish small and micro start-up firms. Unlike previous papers, this manuscript examines not only the level of debt but also the cost and maturity of the debt. To control the endogeneity of the variables, a system of simultaneous equation with Three Stage Least Squares methodology is employed. The results show that companies run by women and boards with gender diversity tend to borrow less, have lower costs for debt and longer term debt, reinforcing the hypothesis that females are more risk averse. These results are robust for diverse measures of gender diversity (the presence of a woman as CEO, the percentage of female directors and Blau and Shannon diversity indexes).

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93 4, XVIII, 2015 Business Adminis a ion and Managemen DOI: 10.15240/ ul/001/2015-4-007 In oduc ion The s udy o he cha ac e is ics o sha eholde s and manage s and hei e ec on a ious a iables ela ed o he company, mainly i s alue, is ex ensi e. Among he mos analyzed cha ac e is ics a e he sha eholde s uc u e [84], he composi ion o he boa d o di ec o s [1], and he combining o he posi ions o CEO and chai man o he boa d o di ec o s in he same pe son [10]. One o he cha ac e is ics ha has been he ocus o inc easing in e es o esea che s is he p esence o women on co po a e boa ds o di ec o s ( o a comp ehensi e su ey on he p esence o women on co po a e boa ds o di ec o s, see [79]). Howe e , he p esence o women on he boa d has become an impo an opic, no only o academic easons bu also o social easons. In ecen yea s he e has been p essu e om socie y o include women on he boa ds o di ec o s. As a consequence, he a e age numbe o women in boa d ooms has inc eased in he Eu opean Union om 5% in 2001 o 8.1% in 2007, bu i is s ill a small i gu e. Focusing on 2007 da a, e en i he gap has been educed in ecen yea s [36], i gu es a e la ge o he Uni es S a es (13.6%) and Canada (11.2%) han o Eu ope. Inside he Eu opean Union he e a e also impo an di e ences by coun y. Fo example, Po ugal is he coun y ha has ewes women on boa ds wi h only 0.7%. In con as , No way and Sweden ha e a highe p opo ion, wi h 37% and 21.3% o emale di ec o s, espec i ely. In Spain he p esence o women in boa d ooms (o IBEX-35 index i ms – 35 op companies in capi aliza ion) is abou 3.1% o all di ec o s, a i gu e ha is simila o I aly (2.3%) and Japan (2%) [24]. To co ec his si ua ion se e al s eps ha e been aken in Spain. In May 2006 he Comisión Nacional del Me cado de Valo es, CNMV, (Spanish Secu i ies and Exchange Commission) passed he Código Uni i cado de Buen Gobie no (Uni i ed Code o Good Go e nance). In A icle 15, his Code ecommends ha he boa d o di ec o s e l ec he di e si y o knowledge, gende and expe ience equi ed o pe o m i s unc ions wi h e ec i eness, objec i i y and independence. To achie e his objec i e, he Code sugges s posi i e disc imina ion in o de o balance i gu es o men and women on boa ds. In Ma ch 2007 he Spanish pa liamen app o ed he Ley de Igualdad (Gende Equali y Ac ). On he opic o he boa d o di ec o s, his law sugges s a leas 40% o di ec o s be women by 2015, bu his quo a is no manda o y and me ely a ecommenda ion. Howe e , companies ha do no comply wi h his quo a will be unable o bid o public con ac s. This law came in o e ec he 24 h o Ma ch, 2007 and i applies o public and p i a e i ms wi h mo e han 250 employees. The equi emen ha 40% o boa d membe s should be women is an imi a ion o a No wegian law app o ed in Janua y 2003. Tha law equi ed he achie emen o he quo a o 40% emale ep esen a ion on boa ds in i e yea s. Be ween 2003 and 2008 he pe cen age quad upled o a alue o 38% [37], and No way is a he head o Eu opean coun ies o emale ep esen a ion on boa ds o di ec o s. All hese ules made in Spain in he business i eld ha e ocused on la ge companies. Howe e , mic o-en e p ises and small en e p ises a e no only mo e nume ous, bu hey a e also he main engines o economic g ow h and employmen . In Spain, on 1s Janua y 2009, 99.88% o i ms we e SMEs (Cen al Companies Di ec o y). Ano he aspec ha has a ac ed he in e es o esea che s in ecen imes is he p esence o women as CEO [14]. T adi ionally, his posi ion has been i lled p edominan ly by men. Howe e , e idence has shown ha i ms THE INFLUENCE OF GENDER ON FINANCIAL DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM SMALL START-UP FIRMS IN SPAIN Ca men Ma ia He nandez-Nicolas, Juan F ancisco Ma ín-Ugedo, An onio Mínguez-Ve a EM_4_2015.indd 93EM_4_2015.indd 93 1.12.2015 8:44:451.12.2015 8:44:45 94 2015, XVIII, 4 Ekonomika a managemen whose CEO is a woman ha e highe le els o e u ns on a e age [82]. Mo e pa icipa o y managemen s yles may lead o highe e u ns [5], as women a e mo e p one o coope a e wi h o he manage s [38]. Ano he explana ion o highe e u ns o companies whose CEOs a e women is p o ided by Moh and Wol am [56]. Acco ding o hese au ho s, commi men o he i m and employee sa is ac ion in he wo kplace s ongly in l uences he pe o mance o a i m. Communica ion wi h he employees is essen ial o c ea e a posi i e clima e o us . Acco ding o Moh and Wol am [56], women a e mo e e ec i e communica o s. Based on p e ious a gumen s, i would seem ha he e should be la ge numbe o women as CEOs. Howe e , esea ch shows ha e en i he numbe s o men and women in managemen jobs in gene al a e ela i ely close, his is no he case o CEOs ([15] and [18]). Un il now, mos s udies on his i eld ha e ocused on analyzing he e ec o gende di e si y on he pe o mance o la ge companies [25], [32]. Acco ding o Sol ane [77], he mo e women a e on he boa d, he be e is he pe o mance in he company. O he s udies examined legal en i onmen s, en i onmen al ac o s and p ocesses ha in l uence en ep eneu ship among women [12], [13], [49]. Resea ch on i nancial decisions and hei ela ionship wi h he gende o manage s is e y limi ed, especially in he i eld o small en e p ises. These companies a e especially in e es ing o he s udy o he con ibu ion o women as di ec o s, gi en ha hei go e ning bodies end o be smalle , less s uc u ed and less complex, so ha each membe has a g ea e capaci y o in l uence decision-making [42]. Gende may in l uence he le el o co po a e deb , as well as i s cos and ma u i y. The e a e wo main a gumen s why his should be he case. On he one hand, women o en p e e o accep lowe le els o isk [23], [76]. On he o he hand, he e may be disc imina ion o easons o gende on he pa o he c edi supply [12], [17]. This s udy has se e al no el ea u es. Fi s , he i ms analyzed a e small, unlike he i ms ha p o ide mos o he p e ious empi ical e idence. Second, we examine companies in hei i s yea o li e (s a -up i ms) whe e he di e ences in p e e ence o i nancing, disc imina ion on he pa o he supplie s o unds and di i cul y in accessing i nance may be mo e e iden . Finally, unlike p e ious pape s, we discuss h ee a iables ela ing o he i nancial s uc u e: le el o deb , deb ma u i y and deb cos . In addi ion, he Spanish ma ke is gene ally hough o be pa o he con inen al sys em o ci il law sys em, in con as wi h he Ame ican ma ke , which p o ides mos o he a ailable e idence, and belongs o he common law o Anglo-Saxon sys em. The di e ences be ween he wo sys ems a e la ge, bu can be summa ised in h ee poin s: companies in he Anglo-Saxon sys em end o ha e much mo e dispe sed sha eholde s uc u es, he e is mo e in es o p o ec ion and he ex e nal con ol mechanisms a e ela i ely s ong [46], [47]. Because o hese cha ac e is ics, he s udy o he composi ion o boa ds o di ec o s may be mo e ele an in ma ke s like Spain. The esul s e eal a nega i e in l uence on i ms’ deb le els o he p esence o women on he boa ds o as CEO. This nega i e e ec can also be seen when boa ds a e mo e gende - di e se. In addi ion, gende di e si y d i es owa d lowe cos s and highe deb ma u i y. The e o e, i seems ha isk a e sion on he pa o women is a be e explana ion o he esul s han disc imina ion on he supply side. The es o he pape is s uc u ed as ollows. The Sec ion One p esen s he heo y and hypo heses. Sec ion Two desc ibes he sample, he da a and he me hodology. The esul s a e p esen ed in Sec ion Th ee. Finally, we p esen he main conclusions. 1. Theo y and Hypo heses Financing and capi al s uc u e a e one o he mos examined opics in he i nancial li e a u e. In 1958, Modigliani and Mille [54] published one o he mos in l uen ial pape s in he i nancial li e a u e whe e hey demons a ed ha he le e age adop ed by a i m is i ele an in pe ec capi al ma ke s [56]. A e his pape , many o he s ha e examined he in l uence o ax conside a ions [26], [53], [55], i nancial dis ess [3], [6], [83], and in o ma ion asymme y and agency cos s [30], [40], [59], [60]. As a consequence o hese and many o he pape s, he e exis wo main non-excluding heo ies ha a emp o explain exis ing i ms’ capi al s uc u es: ade-o heo y and pecking o de heo y. EM_4_2015.indd 94EM_4_2015.indd 94 1.12.2015 8:44:461.12.2015 8:44:46 95 4, XVIII, 2015 Business Adminis a ion and Managemen The ade-o heo y conside s ha each i m has an op imal deb le el ha may be eached balancing he ad an ages and disad an ages o ma ke impe ec ions (mainly axes, cos s o i nancial dis ess, and agency cos s and in o ma ion asymme y). Pecking o de heo y was i s modelled by Mye s and Majlu [60]. Mye s and Majlu conside ha he empi ical e idence is no consis en wi h a i nancial policy ha is de e mined by a ade-o o he ad an ages and disad an ages o ma ke impe ec ions [60]. Ra he , companies’ i nancial policies seem o be be e explained by he beha iou desc ibed by Donaldson [29]. He es ablishes a hie a chy desc ibing company p e e ences o in e nal i nancial sou ces o e ex e nal i nancial sou ces; in he case o ex e nal i nancial sou ces, a company p e e s deb i s , hen hyb id ins umen s like con e ible bonds, and i nally equi y issues. Howe e , ade-o and pecking-o de a e no he only ele an heo ies ela ed o capi al s uc u e. Ano he in l uen ial heo y is he i nancial g ow h cycle heo y [7]. Acco ding o his heo y, he e a e se e al a iables ha in l uence he le el o in o ma ion asymme y in companies, and he age and he size a e amongs he mos impo an ones. No mally, olde companies a e conside ed o ha e lowe le els o in o ma ion asymme y. This is due o he ac ha olde companies a e conside ed o be mo e consolida ed and ex e nal in es o s know abou he company’s si ua ion [27], [85]. On he o he hand, young companies, and especially s a -ups, p esen highe economic g ow h and oppo uni ies. This could imply new in es men p ojec s and hus la ge in o ma ion asymme y. Size may also educe he in o ma ion asymme y. This is because la ge companies a e less isky, as hey a e usually mo e di e si i ed [67], [69], [83]. La ge companies also p oduce mo e accoun ing and i nancial in o ma ion o c edi o s and in es o s in gene al [31], so ha i is less cos ly o con ol hem. Se e al pape s, among which is he one by Be ge and Udell [7], es ablish he explana ion ha companies i nance hemsel es in di e en ways depending on he phase hey occupy in hei i nancial g ow h cycle. The main sou ces o ex e nal i nancing o small s a -up i ms a e comme cial c edi s and (sho - e m) bank loans. Some o he empi ical implica ions o he i nancial g ow h cycle ha e al eady been es ed in he Spanish ma ke [73]. Se e al pape s ha ollow his line o s udy conclude ha he size o a company is a ac o ha in l uences no only on he a ailabili y, bu also he ma u i y and he cos , o c edi o companies [65], [66], [74]. Small en e p ises ha e mo e p oblems secu ing long- e m and low-cos unds [80]. The p oblems a ising om he exis ence o asymme y o in o ma ion mean ha i nancial ins i u ions canno p ope ly assess hei bo owe s’ in es men p ojec s (ad e se selec ion p oblem), o con ol hei oppo unis ic beha iou s (mo al haza d p oblem). In addi ion, la ge companies may nego ia e a o able access o a ious ypes o i nancial sou ces, since hey ha e mo e angible asse s ha can be used as colla e al [33]. This implies ha small en e p ises ha e ouble accessing i nance, and a e consequen ly le wi h he limi ed choices o sel - i nancing [22], he in es men o money o he owne s (o amily) [64], [72], [81] and (sho e m) bo owing. Focusing on di e si y, g oup di e si y is de i ned as he a ie y o indi idual a ibu es wi hin a g oup [8]. Mos a gumen s ela ed o in o ma ion/decision-making heo ies p edic a posi i e in l uence o di e si y on g oup ou comes. Thus, Robinson and Dechan [70] a gue ha g ea e di e si y in wo king g oups implies a be e knowledge o he ma ke and a be e iden i i ca ion wi h cus ome s and employees, he eby inc easing he company’s abili y o pene a e ma ke s. Simila ly, he mo e di e se a g oup is, he mo e di e en iews and pe spec i es i s membe s will ha e, as well as mo e al e na i e solu ions o a p oblem, leading o mo e ealis ic decisions being aken [57]. Howe e , he e a e also a gumen s ha inc eased di e si y may ha e nega i e e ec s on g oup ou comes. These a gumen s come om social iden i i ca ion and social ca ego iza ion heo ies. Acco ding o hese heo ies, indi iduals di ide he g oup membe s in o in-g oups (indi iduals simila o hemsel es) and ou -g oups (indi iduals dissimila o hemsel es), ha ing a endency o pe cei e he o me posi i ely and he la e nega i ely [61]. Gende di e si y is pa o g oup di e si y and i may also ha e an in l uence on i m beha iou . As an example, Loden [50] a gues ha women a e quali a i ely o ien ed while men a e o ien ed quan i a i ely, an a gumen which could suppo he belie ha women a e EM_4_2015.indd 95EM_4_2015.indd 95 1.12.2015 8:44:461.12.2015 8:44:46 96 2015, XVIII, 4 Ekonomika a managemen mo e success ul in some speci i c asks. Thus, women di ec o s may exe a posi i e in l uence on he i m in asks ela ed o co po a e social esponsibili y and s a egic con ol. In con as , he p esence o women on he boa d may ha e a nega i e in l uence, as hey may ha e ewe ela ionships wi h boa ds o o he i ms [86], and a e less likely o ha e business occupa ions [45]. Wi h ega d o i nancial decisions, he di e en le el o isk a e sion be ween men and women may be ex emely impo an . Many pape s p o ide a gumen s and e idence o show ha women end o p e e a lowe le el o isk [76], [41], [11], [23], [63], [20], [75]. As an example, i seems ha women en ep eneu s end o un smalle companies and hei i ms a e mo e concen a ed in he se ice sec o [20], [44], [51]. They also end o un i ms ha ha e lowe deb le els, which may be because hey y o educe he cos s o bank up cy and a e eluc an o p o ide he necessa y gua an ees o ob ain a loan [19]. Romani e al. [71] also i nd ha women in es less money in hei businesses and expec lowe e u ns han men. Howe e , lowe le els o deb in en e p ises un by women may also be explained by o he ac o s ela ed o gende such as disc imina ion on he pa o c edi supplie s [58]. The e is e idence ha he decisions o he banks abou loan eques s a e di e en o men and women, e en when businesses a e simila in e ms o liquidi y and sol ency. Bu ne and Rosen [16] ound ha banks pe cei e ha men ha e mo e p obabili y o business success han women. O he pape s show ha gende disc imina ion no only appea s in he i nal decision o g an ing o c edi bu also h oughou he applica ion and nego ia ion p ocess, placing women a a disad an age o discou aging hem du ing ha p ocess [12], [75]. These a gumen s (g ea e isk a e sion among women and disc imina ion on he pa o he supplies o c edi ) may in l uence no only he le el o deb o i ms, bu also he cos and ma u i y o deb . Thus, a highe cos o deb in companies whe e women pa icipa e in managemen would be a clea sign o disc imina ion, while a lowe cos could be seen as e idence ha he pa icipa ion o women in managemen educes he isk o he company and hus he cos o i nancing. Simila ly, a longe e m o ma u i y o deb in companies managed by women would be a sign o hei g ea e isk a e sion [62]. Al hough he e a e con l ic ing a gumen s, based on he discussion in he li e a u e we p esen h ee hypo heses: Hypo hesis 1 (H1): Companies un by women and g oups wi h gende di e si y will ha e lowe deb le els. Hypo hesis 2 (H2): Companies un by women and g oups wi h gende di e si y will enjoy a lowe cos o deb . Hypo hesis 3 (H3): Companies un by women and g oups wi h gende di e si y will ha e deb ha has longe e ms o ma u i y. 2. Sample, Da a and Me hodology 2.1 Sample The empi ical s udy is ca ied ou by using he SABI da abase (The Ibe ian Balance Shee Analysis Sys em c ea ed by Bu eau Van Dijk). This da abase p o ides accoun ing in o ma ion o Spanish and Po uguese companies, ob ained om he annual published accoun s. Companies belonging o he i nancial and insu ance sec o s a e excluded. The sample includes small i ms, namely i ms ha ha e no mo e han 50 employees, an annual u no e no exceeding €50 million, and o al asse s no exceeding €43 million ( ecommenda ion 2003/361/CE o he Eu opean Commission, 6 May 2003). The ini ial da abase was i l e ed o elimina e companies ha had nega i e equi y and i ms whose o al asse s o o al liabili ies we e no equal o he sum o hei componen s. In addi ion, gi en ha ou pu pose is o analyze he in l uence o gende in i nancing, we also emo ed i ms con olled by o he companies om ou sample. The i nal da a base includes 12,376 s a -up companies, ounded in 2007, whose i s yea o li e is 2008. 2.2 Da a The dependen a iables conside ed a e deb (DEBT), he cos o he deb (COSTD) and he ma u i y o he deb (MATUR). Fo he model o deb le el, he dependen a iable is calcula ed as he a io o deb o o al asse s [74]. The cos o deb is compu ed as he a io o i nancial expenses o o al deb . The ma u i y o he deb EM_4_2015.indd 96EM_4_2015.indd 96 1.12.2015 8:44:461.12.2015 8:44:46 97 4, XVIII, 2015 Business Adminis a ion and Managemen is calcula ed as he a io o long- e m deb o o al deb [4]. To measu e he p esence o women and gende di e si y we employ he ollowing a iables: A dummy a iable, DWOMEN, which akes he alue 1 when he CEO is a woman and 0 when i is a man; ADM, compu ed as he o al numbe o women on he boa d di ided by he o al numbe o membe s o he boa d. Two indices a e used o measu e gende di e si y. On he one hand, he BLAU index is de i ned as:  n ii P 1 2 1, whe e Pi e e s o he a io o women on he boa d. The alues o his index ange be ween 0 and a maximum o 0.5; he la e occu s when he e is he same pe cen age o men and women on he boa d. On he o he hand, he SHANNON index is de i ned as: P n ii 1    1n Pi , whe e Pi is es ima ed as in he BLAU index. The alues o his index ange be ween 0 and a maximum o 0.69; The la e co esponds o he g ea es possible di e si y [35], [78]. The con ol a iables in ela ion o he deb model a e he ollowing: i ms’ e u ns on asse s (ROA), measu ed as he ea nings be o e axes and i nancial expenses di ided by o al asse s [39]; he i m size (SIZE), calcula ed as he na u al loga i hm o o al asse s [33]; he angible asse s a io (FIXED), measu ed as ne angible asse s di ided by o al asse s [33], [68]; he economic isk (ECRISK), compu ed as he squa e o he di e ence o he annual e u ns o a company and he annual p o i abili y o all businesses, mul iplied by he sign o such di e ence [34]; and he liquidi y a io (LIQ), measu ed as he wo king capi al di ided by o al asse s [2]. In addi ion, we conside deb ma u i y (MATUR) and deb cos (COSTD) which a e de i ned abo e. Thus, o he analysis o he deb le el we de i ne he ollowing model: iii MATURGENDEBT  210  iii FIXEDSIZEROA  543   i ECRISK  6  iii uCOSTDLIQ  87  (1) whe e i = 1,..., n, deno es he company and GEN is one o he al e na i e measu es o gende di e si y de i ned abo e. The second model examined ocuses on he cos o deb (COSTD). I includes as con ol a iables, he i ms’ size (SIZE); he i ms’ e u ns on asse s (ROA); he g ow h oppo uni ies (GROWP), compu ed as he dep ecia ion o asse s di ided by o al asse s [74]; he deb le el (DEBT); he deb ma u i y (MATUR); and he sol ency a io (SOLV), which de e mines he abili y o he company o mee hei commi men s in he long e m, measu ed as cash l ow di ided by o al asse s. The cos o deb model is de i ned as ollows: iii SIZEGENCOSTD  210  iii SOLVGROWPROA  543   i DEBT  6  ii uMATUR  7  (2) whe e i = 1,..., n, deno es he company and GEN is one o he al e na i e measu es o gende di e si y de i ned abo e. The hi d model ocuses on he deb ma u i y (MATUR). I includes, as con ol a iables, he angible asse s a io (FIXED); he sales o a ion a io (ROTAT), compu ed as o al sales di ided by o al asse s [2]; he deb le el (DEBT); he i ms’ e u ns on asse s (ROA); he g ow h oppo uni ies (GROWP); he i m size (SIZE); he liquidi y a io (LIQ); and he cos o deb (COSTD). The ma u i y o deb model is de i ned as ollows: iii DEBTGENMATUR  210  iii FIXEDGROWPROA  543   ii LIQSIZE  76  i ROTAT  8  ii uCOSTD   9  (3) whe e i = 1,..., n, deno es he company and GEN is one o he al e na i e measu es o gende di e si y de i ned abo e. Desc ip i e s a is ics a e p esen ed in Table 1. The mean le el o deb (DEBT) is 74.8%, exceeding 60%, he a e age i gu e o Spanish companies. The mean o he cos o deb (COSTD) is 3.5%. I mus be highligh ed ha he sample examined includes mic o and small i ms ha usually ge hei unds om bank c edi [7], hei own i nance o om amily and iends and, especially, mic oc edi s. The mean o he deb ma u i y (MATUR) is 21.3%, con i ming ha hese i ms la gely employ sho e m deb . This may be due o he op imism o he en ep eneu o he g ea es isk ha he banks un when lending money o such companies [48]. EM_4_2015.indd 97EM_4_2015.indd 97 1.12.2015 8:44:461.12.2015 8:44:46 98 2015, XVIII, 4 Ekonomika a managemen Rega ding he a iables o gende , 21% o he i ms ha e a woman as CEO. The p opo ion o women on he boa d is high, 19%, compa ed wi h la ge companies whe e he co esponding i gu e is only close o 5% [52]. These i gu es may be ela ed o sel -employmen as well as o amily businesses. 2.3 Me hodology The me hodology employed is Th ee S age Leas Squa es (3SLS). This me hodology con ols he endogenei y o he a iables, using a sys em o simul aneous equa ions [21]. This me hodology has been used because o he peculia cha ac e is ics o he sample, composed, as i is, o s a -up i ms wi h only a yea o li e. This ci cums ance makes i impossible o use a mo e powe ul me hodology such as panel da a. 3. Resul s The esul s o he es ima ion o Models 1, 2 and 3 a e p esen ed in Tables 2, 3 and 4, espec i ely. In Table 2 i can be seen ha a woman as CEO o he p esence o women on he boa d exe s a signi i can nega i e in l uence on he le el o a i m’s deb . The same in l uence is obse ed when employing di e si y indexes (Blau and Shannon indexes). The e o e, he Hypo hesis 1 is con i med: Companies un by women and g oups wi h gende di e si y will ha e lowe le els o deb . These esul s a e consis en wi h mos p e ious esea ch. I may well be ha women ha e g ea e a e sion o isk [64], [9], [75], [41] which in l uences he i m’s deb le el. Following he same easoning, i should be no ed ha he e is a majo di i cul y o he e ogeneous g oups o each ag eemen . The need o seek consensus o en leads o less isky s a egies [41]. Howe e , his esul could also be explained by disc imina ion on he supply side, which migh esul in banks lending less money o companies un by women. Wi h ega d o he con ol a iables, all o hem a e signi i can and ha e a nega i e ela ionship wi h he deb le el, wi h he excep ion o he isk and he ma u i y o he deb , which ha e a signi i can posi i e ela ionship wi h he deb le el. Deb may be used in o de o secu e ax ad an ages [67], bu he e a e o he ax deduc ions such as dep ecia ion o i xed asse s [26] which could lead o a nega i e ela ionship be ween angible asse s (FIXED) Va iable Mean Median S anda d D. Minimum Maximum DEBT 0.748 0.837 0.246 0.000 1.000 COSTD 0.035 0.016 0.234 0.000 12.561 MATUR 0.213 0.053 0.283 0.000 1.000 DWOMEN 0.210 0.000 0.428 0.000 9.000 ADM 0.190 0.000 0.356 0.000 1.000 BLAU 0.060 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.500 SHANNON 0.079 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.693 ROA -0.144 0.028 1.797 -92.059 20.263 SIZE 5.149 5.108 1.397 0.065 10.610 FIXED 0.238 0.153 0.245 0.000 1.000 ECRISK -3.015 0.030 117.926 -8,448.367 416.438 LIQ -0.177 0.015 1.989 -106.740 1.000 SOLV 0.121 0.071 0.274 0.000 20.653 GROWP 0.038 0.020 0.266 0.000 1.112 ROTAT 2.897 1.823 20.441 0.000 2,149.829 Sou ce: [2] Tab. 1: Desc ip i e s a is ics EM_4_2015.indd 98EM_4_2015.indd 98 1.12.2015 8:44:461.12.2015 8:44:46 99 4, XVIII, 2015 Business Adminis a ion and Managemen and he deb le el ha we i nd in Table 2. Fi m size [80] and liquidi y also leads o educed le els o deb . In Table 3 he esul s ela ed o he cos o deb can be ound. We i nd a signi i can nega i e in l uence o he di e en a iables ela ing o he p esence o women and gende di e si y on he cos o deb . This esul does no suppo he a gumen ha he e is possible disc imina ion on he pa o hose who o e unds o women. On he con a y, i would suppo he a gumen ha he p esence o women in decision making may educe isk ha he i m is exposed o, leading o a lowe cos o deb [62]. The e o e, Hypo hesis 2 (H2) is con i med: Companies un by women and g oups wi h gende di e si y will enjoy a lowe cos o deb . Rega ding he con ol a iables, we obse e a nega i e in l uence o i ms’ e u ns on asse s and he ma u i y o deb on he cos o he deb . No mally, longe e ms o deb ma u i y lead o lowe in e es a es [7] and la ge e u ns. On he o he hand, we obse e a posi i e e ec o deb le el, i m size and sol ency a io on he cos o deb . This las esul may be consequence o he ac ha mo e sol en i ms ha e inc eased access o deb [81] and, he e o e, bea highe cos s. In Table 4 we obse e ha he p esence o women on he boa d o as CEO leads o longe e ms o deb ma u i y. We also obse e ha gende -di e se boa ds use longe e m deb . The e o e, Hypo hesis 3 (H3) is con i med: Companies un by women and g oups wi h MODEL DEBT DWOMEN ADM BLAU SHANNON Cons an 0.195*** 0.935*** 0.926*** 0.926*** (16.78) (76.93) (74.62) (77.14) GEN -0.030*** -0.040*** -0.108*** -0.078*** (-4.24) (-5.14) (-6.32) (-6.46) MATUR 0.904*** 0.887*** 0.882*** 0.885*** (91.11) (93.98) (90.58) (93.85) ROA -0.043*** -0.024* -0.027* -0.026** (-2.86) (-1.67) (-1.87) (-1.85) SIZE -0.006** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.006*** (-2.32) (-3.62) (-3.05) (-2.84) FIXED -0.719*** -0.750*** -0.742*** -0.748*** (-59.21) (-64.65) (-62.37) (-64.65) ECRISK 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** (5.66) (4.26) (4.15) (4.44) LIQ -0675*** -0.704*** -0.696*** -0.701*** (-64.47) (-71.08) (-68.50) (-70.89) COSTD -2.163*** -1.924*** -1.862*** -1.929*** (-41.35) (-39.83) (-38.85) (-40.02) R2 -2.278 -1.613 -1.583 -1.621 X2 11,306.62*** 12,295.33*** 11,518.00*** 12,299.31*** Obs. 6,782 7,316 6,906 7,316 z-S a is ic in pa en hesis * Signi i can a he 90% le el, **Signi i can a he 95% le el and *** Signi i can a he 99% le el. X2-Tes o explana o y a iables Sou ce: [2] Tab. 2: Es ima ion o model 1 – deb le el EM_4_2015.indd 99EM_4_2015.indd 99 1.12.2015 8:44:471.12.2015 8:44:47 100 2015, XVIII, 4 Ekonomika a managemen gende di e si y will ha e deb ha has longe e ms o ma u i y. In e ms o he con ol a iables, he le el o deb , he angible asse s, he size o he i m, liquidi y and he cos o deb ha e signi i can posi i e in l uence on he deb ma u i y [43], [28]. The in l uence o he g ow h oppo uni ies [59] and sales o a ion is nega i e. Conclusions Gende and i s in l uence on di e en a iables o he i m ha e been a ac ing he a en ion o esea che s. Se e al pape s ha e indica ed di e ences in he way ha men and women un businesses and he in l uence o gende di e si y in wo king g oups. Mos o hese s udies ha e examined he in l uence o gende di e si y on i m alue o i m isk. Howe e , he e a e no many s udies examining he in l uence o women on he i nancial decisions o he i m, especially o small companies. Small i ms a e cha ac e ized by ha ing e y limi ed access o unding sou ces, and depending hea ily on bank i nancing. Resea ch on gende di e si y has been inc easing in ecen yea s. The eme gence o gende equali y laws in many coun ies, including Spain, has helped his phenomenon. Se e al laws ha e been adop ed in Spain o p o ide equal oppo uni ies o women. The Código Uni i cado de Buen Gobie no (Uni i ed Code o Good Go e nance) ecommends posi i e disc imina ion o women in A icle 15, in o de o balance he numbe s o men and women on boa ds. The Ley de Igualdad (Gende Equali y Ac ) equi es a 40% emale ep esen a ion on boa ds o di ec o s o companies wi h mo e han 250 employees, MODEL COSTD DEWOMEN ADM BLAU SHANNON Cons an 0.195*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 0.187*** (16.78) (17.08) (16.63) (166.99) GEN -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.108*** -0.043*** (-3.04) (-3.45) (-6.32) (-4.45) SIZE 0.002 0.003* 0.003** 0.004** (1.02) (1.67) (1.97) (2.18) ROA -0.377*** -0.289*** -0.279*** -0.292*** (-11.11) (-8.57) (-7.94) (-8.68) GROWP -0.062 0.056 0.071 0.051 (-1.31) (1.17) (1.41) (1.07) SOLV 0.391*** 0.300*** 0.288*** 0.302*** (11.10) (8.56) (7.90) (8.65) DEBT 1.803*** 1.617*** 1.660*** 1.614*** (29.20) (26.94) (26.19) (26.93) MATUR -2.219*** -2.212*** -2.296*** -2.217*** (-36.82) (-37.35) (-36.86) (-37.47) R2 -0.203 -0.178 -0.176 -0.178 X2 2,607.64*** 2,466.64*** 2,341.10*** 2,475.17*** Obs. 6,782 7,316 6,906 7,316 z-S a is ic in pa en hesis * Signi i can a he 90% le el, **Signi i can a he 95% le el and *** Signi i can a he 99% le el. X2-Tes o explana o y a iables. Sou ce: [2] Tab. 3: Es ima ion o model 2 – cos o he deb EM_4_2015.indd 100EM_4_2015.indd 100 1.12.2015 8:44:471.12.2015 8:44:47 101 4, XVIII, 2015 Business Adminis a ion and Managemen i hey a e o bid o public sec o con ac s. Howe e , hese and o he ules ha e ocused on la ge companies and no on small i ms, which a e mo e nume ous and gene a e mos o he employmen in Spain. This a icle examines he in l uence o gende on some i nancial decisions o Spanish mic o and small s a -up en e p ises. These i ms ha e la ge p oblems secu ing unding and he cha ac e is ics o he owne s and manage s a e c ucial o ob aining i nancing, as well as he cha ac e is ics o speci i c p ojec s. In con as wi h p e ious pape s, he p esen s udy examines no only he le el o deb bu also wo o he ele an i nance a iables: he cos o he deb and he ma u i y o deb . All his is examined in he Spanish con ex , cha ac e ized by a dominan p esence o bank i nancing. Fo he sample examined, only 21% o CEOs a e women and he pe cen age o emale di ec o s is 19%. These alues a e a o he objec i e o gende equali y on op managemen posi ions o small s a -up en e p ises bu a e much la ge han he i gu es o Spanish lis ed i ms. The amily ies and he g ea e possibili y o c ea e mic o i ms by women may explain hese alues. MODEL MATUR DWOMEN ADM BLAU SHANNON Cons an -0.943*** -0.965*** -0.959*** -0.957*** (-70.10) (-77.63) (-75.37) (-77.81) GEN 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.081*** 0.059*** (4.49) (5.48) (5.94) (6.10) DEBT 0.957*** 0.953*** 0.955*** 0.954*** (106.18) (111.55) (107.35) (111.41) ROA -0.007 -0.019* -0.014 -0.018* (-0.61) (-1.86) (-1.28) (-1.69) GROWP -0.430*** -0.419*** -0.418*** -0.423*** (-11.76) (-11.74) (-11.30) (-11.86) FIXED 0.871*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.905*** (81.84) (90.71) (87.92) (90.93) SIZE 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** (6.47) (9.24) (8.49) (8.44) LIQ 0.808*** 0.837*** 0.835*** 0.837*** (81.94) (90.56) (87.53) (90.48) ROTAT -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** (-3.08) (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.36) COSTD 1.737*** 1.504*** 1.454*** 1.508*** (36.04) (34.32) (33.13) (34.40) R2 -0.686 -0.309 -0.298 -0.313 F15,337.66*** 17,765.38*** 16,556.80*** 17,717.96*** Obs. 6,782 7,316 6,906 7,316 z-S a is ic in pa en hesis * Signi i can a he 90% le el, **Signi i can a he 95% le el and *** Signi i can a he 99% le el. X2-Tes o explana o y a iables Sou ce: [2] Tab. 4: Es ima ion o model 3 – ma u i y o he deb EM_4_2015.indd 101EM_4_2015.indd 101 1.12.2015 8:44:471.12.2015 8:44:47