The Balkans and Austria‑Hungary 1908–1912

The Balkans and Austria -Hungary 1908–19121 Martin Urban For Austria ‑Hungary, the Balkans was the last possible region where they could ap‑ ply an active great power foreign policy. Furthermore, the Habsburg monarchy could also promote its economic, and more or less also its political and cultural, influence there, but at the beginning of the 20th century, it could do so only with great difficul‑ ties. This was due to South Slavic nationalism, which permeated the entire Balkan Peninsula and was also closely involved in the existential problems of the Habsburg monarchy. The organisation of political power within the relatively new Balkan states was based on a concept of a modern, dynamic and nationally homogenous state, and formed an opposition to the traditional approach to the state and power in the form of the Habsburg monarchy. As such, the integrity of Austria ‑Hungary was under threat from its immediate neighbours. Any rise of the Balkan states would be a dan‑ ger for Austria ‑Hungary both in terms of the territorial aspirations of its neighbour‑ ing countries, and also in the form of national and irredentist aspirations within the state. Furthermore, the Habsburg monarchy’s great power status was dependent on Austria ‑Hungary being able to maintain its position on the peninsula and being able to continue to engage in Balkan affairs. From this perspective, any rise of the Balkan states could be fateful for the monarchy’s great power interests. As such, the para‑ mount objective of Austro ‑Hungarian diplomacy was to limit any further strength‑ ening of the Balkan states, which would necessarily weaken the monarchy’s position and undermine its great power status. This study’s timeframe reflects the author’s objective to cover the general develop‑ ment of events in the Balkans in relation to the approaching Balkan Wars (1912–1913) from the perspective of Austro ‑Hungarian foreign policy. As such, the author has logically defined the observed period to that between the Bosnian Crisis (1908–1909) and the outbreak of the First Balkan War (1912). Due to the importance of the subse‑ quent Balkan Wars, it was also necessary to describe the causes of this later conflict and the forming of the Balkan bloc. 1 The study has been prepared under the students’ scientific conference Central Europe and Overseas— Economic Relations (SVK1–2014–016), solved in the Department of Historical Sciences at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia. MARTIN URbAN 113 THE BOSNIAN CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Austria ‑Hungary received its mandate to occupy the Ottoman Bosnia Vilayet and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar through the decision of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina first arose through the division of the vilayet into two regions of occupational administration. The territory, however, continued to fall under the Sultan’s sovereignty.2 It was not until the Bosnian annexation crisis (1908–1909), which almost led Europe to the edge of war, that the status quo of 1878 was disturbed, definitively bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Habsburg mon‑ archy. The annexation was preceded by diplomatic preparation, which still today raises a number of questions, in particular in regard to the timing and method of its imple‑ mentation. Apart from Germany, its ally, which had been told of the planned step just ten days in advance, nobody apart from Russia was to know in advance. Austria‑ ‑Hungary was planning to impose a fait accompli on the world. In order to secure the annexation, Austro ‑Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal3 met only with his Russian opposite number, Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky in Buchlo‑ vice Castle, South Moravia in mid ‑September, 1908. Here, an informal agreement was made with Izvolsky agreeing to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in return for Austria ‑Hungary’s support in amendments to statutes regarding the Straits.4 Aeh‑ renthal thus deftly took advantage of Russian diplomacy’s well ‑known objective of acquiring the ability to move their Bosphorus and Dardanelles naval fleet to the Medi‑ terranean Sea. While, however, Izvolsky considered this agreement as the basis for future negotiations of the Great Powers, Aehrenthal acted immediately and began an‑ nexation. Izvolsky heard about this in a somewhat unfortunate manner on 4 October 1908 from French newspapers on his journey to Paris,5 where he had wanted to begin to sound out the other Powers. When it was demonstrated that neither France’s nor Great Britain’s agreement would be acquired, Izvolsky felt Aehrenthal had deceived him. The Russian Foreign Minister’s defeat was further augmented by the fact that he did not have the consent of the government, nor of Emperor Nicholas II for his ac‑ tions.6 Izvolsky attempted to turn the situation around by holding a conference of the Great Powers. He tried to gain the Western Powers’ agreement to this idea with refer‑ ence to the protests of states concerned. Not only did the Ottoman Empire express its dissent, but Serbia too vehemently demanded compensation. The Western Powers eventually coalesced behind the Russian proposal and prepared a list of points for discussion at any eventual conference. Vienna, however, fiercely rejected the idea, 2 L. HLADKÝ, Bosenská otázka v 19. a 20. století, Brno 2005, pp. 72–75. 3 To Aehrenthal cf. A. SKŘIVAN, Muž, který mohl zachránit monarchii? Alois hrabě Lexa von Aehrenthal (1854–1912), in: Historický obzor, Vol. 22, No. 9/10, 2011, pp. 207–217. 4 B. JELAVICH, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814–1914, Philadelphia, New York 1964, p. 265. 5 A. SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika: Rakousko ‑Uhersko a Německo v evropské politice v letech 1906–1914, Praha 1996, p. 62. 6 F. R. BRIDGE, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria ‑Hungary 1866–1914, Lon‑ don, Boston 1972, p. 305. 114 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2014 and gave the impression that it considered the whole affair to be closed. Nevertheless, it became increasingly clear over time from the response of the Ottoman Empire that the High Porte was willing to settle the whole affair with a financial agreement.7 With intensifying international pressure, Austria ‑Hungary also came to accept this option at the turn of 1908–1909. Mutual agreement was reached on 26 February 1909 when a protocol was signed. The Ottoman Empire agreed to financial compensation worth 2.5 million Turkish pounds (roughly 54 million Austrian crowns).8 This agreement finally helped to end the lengthy international crisis. The Austro ‑Ottoman Protocol also took the wind from the sails of annexation opponents. They could no longer de‑ mand a conference in the interests of damaged players and demand compensation in their names, because the only damaged player was the Ottoman Empire, for whom the affair was now officially closed.9 While Russia had begun to face up to diplomatic defeat and the Great Powers began to grasp the conclusiveness of the situation, Ser‑ bia decided not to acquiesce to the annexation. From the beginning of the crisis, it had been amongst the most ardent of opponents to the annexation, in no small part a result of the large Serbian minority in Bosnia. As such, Serbia demanded the an‑ nexation be annulled, or there be territorial compensation.10 It was only once partial mobilisation of the monarchy was threatened that it realised that without Russian support, its demands could never be fulfilled. Furthermore, Germany had become involved in events, fully supporting its ally. On 22 March 1909, Germany submitted its request that the annexation be recognised to St Petersburg. Circumstances forced the Russians to respond conciliatorily. An isolated Serbia was forced to submit. Given an ultimatum by Austria ‑Hungary, Belgrade was forced to send Vienna a declaration on 31 March 1909 in which it recognised the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and promised to remain “on good neighbourly terms with the monarchy”.11 Subsequently, all the other Great Powers recognised the annexation. Despite the particularly serious international crisis, further exacerbated by the al‑ most simultaneous declaration of Bulgarian independence from the Ottoman Empire, and Crete’s declaration of union with Greece, it represented a clear diplomatic vic‑ tory by Austria ‑Hungary. In the long ‑term, however, this diplomatic success would prove to be somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory.12 Any kind of benevolence from Russia towards the Habsburg monarchy would be impossible in future, in spite of Aehren‑ thal’s original conviction that it was necessary to maintain the best possible relations 7 R. KODET, Rakousko ‑Uhersko a Osmanská říše před první světovou válkou, Plzeň 2014, pp. 144–146. 8 K. VOCELKA, Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, in: A. WAN‑ DRUSZKA— P. URBANITSCH (Eds.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918: Die Habsburger‑ monarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen, Band VI, 2. Teilband, Wien 1993, pp. 269–270. 9 KODET, p. 145. 10 R. MÖHRING, Die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich ‑Ungarn und dem Osmanischen Reich 1908–1912, Ph.D. Thesis, Wien 1978, p. 50. 11 M. HLAVAČKA— M. PEČENKA, Trojspolek: Německá, rakousko ‑uherská a italská zahraniční politika před první světovou válkou, Praha 1999, p. 210. 12 SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika, p. 120. MARTIN URbAN 115 with Russia in the interests of the monarchy’s international status remaining stable.13 The Bosnian Crisis didn’t just have serious consequences in Austria ‑Hungary’s rela‑ tion to Russia, however. The annexation permanently dogged its relations with its Balkan neighbours, and with Serbia in particular. Serbia’s promise to live with the monarchy on good neighbourly terms was just “a necessary empty gesture. Nationalist passion and desire for retribution could no longer be contained. The annexation simply ener‑ gised the activities of nationalist and terrorist organisations […]. Subsequent to 1909, anti‑ ‑Austrian propaganda flooded the whole of the Balkan peninsula and the monarchy’s south‑ ern territories”.14 As such, the Balkan Crisis had a fundamental impact on the Balkan nations’ perception of the Habsburg monarchy. AN EMPIRE IN DECAY, AND THE CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS At the beginning of the 20th century, the European part of the Ottoman Empire was made up of Macedonia, Thrace and Albania. These regions, however, were the fo‑ cus of permanent tensions in relation to the ethnic, denominational and national diversity of its citizens, and the inability of the central government to implement necessary reforms and achieve law and order. A nationalist campaign organised in neighbouring countries which succeeded in freeing them from the Ottoman yoke also played its part in the separatist tendencies and frequent revolts. These relatively young countries shared the objective of bringing Ottoman power to a definitive end in Europe, and capturing its remaining territory.15 As well as the individual objectives of these Balkan states, which were more or less incorporated within the policies of the Great Powers, the Great Powers themselves defended their own interests on the peninsula. Understandably, the most interested in Balkan issues, besides Russia, was Austria ‑Hungary. As long as the policies of both powers did not conflict in Balkan is‑ sues, and as long as it was in the interests of both powers to maintain the status quo, peace was in no great danger. The Bosnian Crisis, however, clearly undermined the possibility of a long ‑term entente between both powers. Mutual mistrust was bound to project itself into the Balkans. Subsequently, the idea of initiating the creation of a Balkan bloc (including the Ottoman Empire) came to the fore of Russian diplomacy, a bloc which would work as a system of “collective security” against further Austro‑ ‑Hungarian penetration into the Balkans.16 Although Russian diplomacy’s original intention was quite different, this initiative led to the settling of disputes between Balkan states and accelerated the formation of the future war alliance against the Ottoman Empire. The course of Russian foreign policy which prevailed after the Bos‑ nian Crisis can be seen as one of the causes of the later Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. 13 A. SKŘIVAN, Aehrenthal— das Profil eines österreichischen Staatsmanns und Diplomaten alter Schule, in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, Vol. 11, 2007, p. 184. 14 HLAVAČKA— PEČENKA, p. 217. 15 M. PEČENKA, Makedonské reformy: Evropský pokus o řešení krize, in: S. BALÍK— V. DRŠKA— F. STELLNER (Eds.), Pocta Aleši Skřivanovi: Sborník příspěvků jeho žáků k 50. narozeninám, Praha 1994, p. 35. 16 M. GLENNY, Balkán 1804–1999: Nacionalismus, válka a velmoci, Praha 2003, p. 185. 116 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2014 The internal political situation within the Ottoman Empire can also be justifiably considered another cause of the conflicts. An opposition gradually took shape against the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II which was not just made up of national minorities in the European provinces and Armenia, but also of the Turks themselves. The atmosphere became unbearable, especially due to the Sultan’s paranoia, which af‑ fected his absolutist style of rule.17 General disaffection led in 1889 to the founding of the secret organisation, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in Istanbul. The objective of this organisation was nothing more than the overthrow of absolutism, the reinstatement of the constitution of 1876 and the establishment of a liberal constitutional regime. Under government pressure, however, most of the group’s protagonists were forced to emigrate.18 Paris became the most important cen‑ tre of emigration, and here the group became known as the Young Turks. Opposition forces were also further strengthened by the formation of the Ottoman Freedom Society (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti) in 1906 in Salonica (Thessaloniki), which soon had a num‑ ber of junior army officers on its side in Macedonia. A year later, the organisation joined the Committee of Union and Progress, which subsequently definitively formulated its ob‑ jectives as unseating the Sultan “by all means, including if necessary revolutionary force”.19 The situation in Macedonia became a kind of catalyser for events, which had be‑ come markedly worse at the beginning of the century. In fear of unforeseen develop‑ ments, the Great Powers had been forced to intervene in 1903. The powers’ attempt at organising extensive reforms in Macedonia ended, however, in fiasco. Instead of the entrusted Inspectorate ‑General, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, trying to calm the situation in the province, he used his powers to crush local resistance. The seriousness of the situ‑ ation continued to grow. An open uprising in the Bitola vilayet, known as the Ilinden unprising,20 took place on 2 August 1903. A day later, this was followed in Thrace by the so ‑called Preobrazhenie21 uprising in the Adrianople (Edirne) region. Both were bloodily repressed.22 When Europe began to learn of the methods of Ottoman repres‑ sion, executions and burning of villages, the Great Powers had to intervene. After mutual consultation between representatives of Austria ‑Hungary and Russia, the Mürsteg Agreement put pressure on the Sublime Porte to accept extensive reforms for the Macedonia region.23 The Porte had no option but to submit to the pressure. It is no wonder, however, that after their previous experience the citizens were very scep‑ tical towards the promise of reforms. Ultimately, even after approval of the reform programme, the situation in Macedonia did not improve.24 There were still secret 17 KODET, pp. 117–118. 18 J. RYCHLÍK et al. Mezi Vídní a Cařihradem: Utváření balkánských národů, Vol. 1, Praha 2009, p. 308. 19 E. GOMBÁR, Moderní dějiny islámských zemí, Praha 1999, pp. 291–293. 20 According to St Ilindin (Elijah) day, which falls on 20 July according to the Orthodox cal‑ endar (2 August according to the Julian calendar). 21 The Feast of the Transfiguration (Preobrazhenie) falls on 19 August (6 August according to the Julian calendar), hence the reason for the name Preobrazhenie. 22 RYCHLÍK, pp. 305–307. 23 S. K. PAVLOWITCH, A History of the Balkans 1804–1945, London 1999, pp. 168–169. 24 RYCHLÍK, p. 307. MARTIN URbAN 117 organisations operating in the territory using guerrilla tactics and terrorist methods to provoke further Great Power interventions. This was in order that they could gain autonomy, or their land could be joined to a different country.25 The situation in Macedonia escalated once again in spring 1908. This negative development led at the end of May to a meeting between British King, Edward VII, and Emperor Nicholas II of Russia in Tallinn (Reval), Estonia. Here, the sovereigns agreed upon a joint approach towards further amendments to the Macedonian sit‑ uation. The Young Turk patriots, however, were alarmed by the Tallinn meeting, considering it a further encroachment into the sovereignty and overall integrity of the Ottoman Empire.26 Another key factor which added fuel to the fire was the widespread rumour that Abdul Hamid’s government was planning to act against the Young Turks and purge the army.27 From the perspective of the Young Turks, it was clear that time played to the Sultan’s regime’s hands and against “the interests of the homeland”. This overall configuration of internal political and foreign factors triggered revolution. On 3 July 1908, the Resne garrison unit commanded by Ahmed Niyazi Bey, number‑ ing 200 soldiers, defected, and beginning an armed revolt from the nearby mountains against the government. The rebels’ declared demand was an immediate reinstate‑ ment of the constitution of 1876. The extent of the rebellion quickly grew. Another 700 men soon joined the rebels, mostly Albanians, as did Major Enver Bey’s troops numbering 800 men.28 The uprising gained wide support. Not only did the troops of the 2nd and 3rd armies deployed in Macedonia reject their allegiance to the Sultan, but so did units called up from Anatolia to quell the uprising. By the second half of June, the rebels’ standing was so strong that the government justifiably feared they might advance to Istanbul. The circumstances finally forced the Sultan to climb down. In order to preserve at least some of his status, he anticipated developments and issued a decree on the reinstatement of the constitution and the calling of elections to par‑ liament for the end of 1908.29 He then declared a general amnesty and disbanded the secret police. Although the new constitutional establishment didn’t remove Abdul Hamid from the throne, it significantly limited his powers.30 However, the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution threatened Austro‑ ‑Hungarian interests in the Balkans. At elections, each of the Empire’s provinces would send their representative to parliament, something which Bosnia and Herze‑ govina would also naturally do. This scenario was unacceptable for Austria ‑Hungary, because it directly threatened the monarchy’s position in the occupied territory. If the occupying statute were to be withdrawn, then three decades of construction 25 GOMBÁR, pp. 293–294. 26 M. S. ANDERSON, The Eastern Question 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations, Lon‑ don, Melbourne, Toronto, New York 1966, pp. 272–273. 27 M. S. HANİOĞLU, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton, Oxford 2008, p. 149. 28 I. DESPOT, The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties: Perceptions and Interpretations, Bloomington 2012, p. 21. 29 RYCHLÍK, p. 309. 30 GOMBÁR, p. 295. 118 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2014 and investment in the region would be lost forever.31 It was this threat to the monar‑ chy’s position which forced Aehrenthal to accede to the acceleration of the annexa‑ tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, triggering the international crisis. Not even revolution improved the situation in the Ottoman Empire in the long term, however. Mehmed Kamil Pasha’s appointed cabinet of reformers did not meet the Young Turks’ expectations, and was replaced in February 1909 by a government of Macedonian Inspectorate ‑General, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. The Young Turks’ objec‑ tive of transforming the empire into a modern centralised state, however, did not find sympathy in the conservative circles of the Muslim clerics and certain officers. Furthermore, arrival of the new regime was also linked with tragic territorial losses during the international crisis, which didn’t help it in gaining in popularity.32 Last but not least, not even the sovereign was satisfied with his new position, as he “consid‑ ered instatement of the constitution as merely a temporary concession and was preparing for removing the Young Turks from power”.33 As a result of these circumstances, which aroused the dissatisfaction of the population, student demonstrations took place in Istanbul beginning in spring 1909. Over time, workers and small traders joined them, incited by radical religious leaders. A deciding factor was also the latent dissatisfac‑ tion of urban military garrisons.34 A turnaround occurred in the night from 12 to 13April 1909 when the capital’s garrison soldiers joined the demonstrators. The crowd demanded the resignation of the government and the creation of a fundamentalist regime which would strictly maintain Islamic sharia law and respect the Sultan’s au‑ thority.35 Abdul Hamid was naturally willing to accede to the demands, and in order to re ‑establish the former situation, he named a new ad hoc loyal government headed by Grand Vizier Ahmed Tevfik Pasha. The hopes of the rebels and the new govern‑ ment, however, came to nothing. As soon as the news of what was happening in the capital arrived in Salonica, the centre of the Turks’ movement, the commander of the Third Army, General Mahmud Sevket Pasha, ordered that units move to the out‑ skirts of Istanbul.36 Sevket’s army secured the protection of the Young Turk mem‑ bers of parliament in San Stefano, where they issued a manifesto condemning the Sultan’s acts.37 On 24 April 1909, the army occupied the capital without encountering much resistance. In three days, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was deposed. He was replaced on the throne by his younger brother, Reshad, as Medmed V. Along with the Sultan, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha’s ad hoc government was also disbanded, with Huseyin Hilmi Pasha returning to its head.38 This unsuccessful attempt at a countercoup boosted the Young Turks’ position. Although the situation gradually calmed, it wasn’t long before 31 B. M. BUCHMANN, Österreich und das Osmanische Reich: Eine bilaterale Geschichte, Wien 1999, p. 248. 32 More in detail cf. A. PALMER, Úpadek a pád Osmanské říše, Praha 1996, pp. 215–218. 33 RYCHLÍK, p. 311. 34 KODET, p. 154. 35 PALMER, p. 218. 36 The operation was entrusted to Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), later known as Atatürk (Fa‑ ther of the Turks). 37 GOMBÁR, p. 298. 38 PALMER, pp. 219–220. MARTIN URbAN 119 a wider section of the population, especially the Empire’s non ‑Turkish nations, felt let down by the Young Turk government.39 The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire left nobody in any doubt that it was merely a question of time before there would be open hostility in the Balkans. Insta‑ bility and violence committed on co ‑religionists represented a huge challenge, and not just for the Balkan nations and their governments. For the time being, however, neighbouring states were not ready to strike a blow to finally divide up the “Turkish prey”, not least due to the Great Powers’ unwillingness to change the status quo. One of the triggers which fundamentally forced the Balkan states to act was the Italo‑ ‑Turkish War at the end of September 1911. This war was preceded, however, by an escalation of the situation in Albania, where there had been a whole number of local uprisings since 1909. The cause of local resistance was disappointment in the Young Turk revolution, which resulted in a number of centralising measures and did not ac‑ commodate Albanian national demands.40 Tensions in the region led in spring 1910 to open rebellion, which spread from Kosovo and northern Albania. In order to restore order, around 50,000 soldiers were sent to the region.41 The use of brute force, how‑ ever, had the opposite effect. It confirmed to the Albanians that it needed complete in‑ dependence from the Ottoman Empire, and emboldened it to fight on. By April of the following year, an uprising broke out again. Once again, it was cruelly suppressed. Despite this, Albania’s uprising was supported by Italy, who helped smuggle weapons to the rebels.42 Not only did Rome wish to take advantage of the opportunity to boost its influence in the region in this way, but above all it wanted to help destabilise the Empire in the interests of its colonial ambitions. When the Italo ‑Turkish War finally broke out on 29 September 1911 over the North African provinces of Tripoli and Cyre‑ naica, Italy become the first power to begin open conflict with the Ottoman Empire since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This declaration of war in essence “had loosed the first stone in what for the next decade would turn into the avalanche which would over‑ whelm the Ottoman Empire”.43 FORMATION OF THE BALKAN BLOC The idea of creating a military alliance of Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire was not a new one. It had been around since the time of the Congress of Berlin, but it was only in the first decade of the 20th Century that it began to take clearer form,44 due to the overall situation in the Ottoman Empire, which was unable to cope with its internal problems (especially the rise of national movements etc.) and reform its sys‑ tem of administration. Essentially, Istanbul’s only measure, if consistently applied, 39 RYCHLÍK, pp. 311–312. 40 More in detail cf. ibidem, pp. 316–321. 41 PALMER, p. 222. 42 SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika, p. 144. 43 R. J. B. BOSWORTH, Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire, in: M. KENT (Ed.), The Great Powers and the End of Ottoman Empire, London, Boston, Sydney 1984, p. 60. 44 RYCHLÍK, p. 321. 120 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2014 against the growing chaos was the violent pacification of resistance in its provinces. But not only did these severe measures not deal with the situation, but they also un‑ dermined the legitimacy of the Ottoman government itself. The Balkan states were naturally aware of the difficulties of its neighbouring empire, but it took a number of years before events created the circumstances for agreement on a joint approach. From a political and strategic perspective, an understanding between the two re‑ gional powers, Bulgaria and Serbia, was most important for the creation of a Balkan bloc. As such, a number of historians45 see the beginnings of the creation of the bloc in 1904, when both states concluded a treaty of friendship, which was followed the following year by a tariff agreement. This agreement, however, brought a range of problems for Serbia. The Austro ‑Hungarian government considered it a breach of its trading interests, and responded with an embargo on Serbian exports, which became known as the “Pig War”.46 The policy of customs war, however, proved short ‑sighted in the long term for Vienna. Despite initial difficulties, in the end the Serbs managed to find other outlets for its goods. As a result of the embargo, Serbia thus rid itself of a one ‑sided economic dependence on the Habsburg monarchy.47 At that time, however, the potential of both agreements between Bulgaria and Serbia fell through. While Belgrade was dealing with the consequences of the eco‑ nomic embargo, Sofia was trying to achieve rapprochement with Austria ‑Hungary, which estranged both countries so much that until the Bosnian Crisis, the agree‑ ments were in essence worthless.48 Furthermore, there was marked disagreement between the countries regarding the future configuration of Macedonia. Serbia de‑ manded it be split up, counting on receiving the towns of Skopje and Kumanovo and adjacent regions. In contrast, Bulgaria originally demanded autonomy for the whole Macedonian territory, which Belgrade took as an attempt by Sofia to ensure future incorporation of the whole territory within Bulgaria.49 Despite mutual disagreement, it should be stressed that it is true that the Serbo ‑Bulgarian treaties of 1904 and 1905 “created an important precedence of co ‑operation between the Balkan states disregarding the great powers”.50 A key advance in the process of creating a Balkan bloc was the Bosnian Crisis. The diplomatic defeat suffered by Russia forced it to reassess its previous Balkan policy. St Petersburg now undertook major efforts to make the Balkan states co ‑operate with it and create mutual agreements which would limit further Austro ‑Hungarian expan‑ sion. It seems evident, however, that Russia did not entirely appreciate the expansive nature of the Balkan states. The original objective of St Petersburg’s diplomatic efforts 45 E.g. GLENNY, p. 184. 46 More in detail cf. B. VRANEŠEVIĆ, Die aussenpolitischen Beziehungen zwischen Serbien und der Habsburgermonarchie, in: WANDRUSZKA— URBANITSCH (Eds.), Habsburgermonar‑ chie, pp. 366–369. 47 GLENNY, p. 184. 48 SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika, p. 167; A. SKŘIVAN, Die Entstehung des Balkanbundes und die in‑ ternationale Stellung Österreich ‑Ungarns am Vorabend der Balkankriege, in: Prague Papers on History of International Relations, Vol. 7, 2003, p. 123. 49 M. PAULOVÁ, Balkánské války 1912–1913 a český lid, Praha 1963, pp. 17–18. 50 GLENNY, p. 184. MARTIN URbAN 127 the Habsburg monarchy would be prepared to tolerate, and what changes it would not tolerate,85 with a new territorial alignment in the Balkans able to significantly strengthen potential enemies to Austria ‑Hungary.86 In the end, however, the mon‑ archy chose a policy of non ‑intervention, which de facto left the course of further events in the hands of fate. As a result of this, it found it difficult to promote its key interests at peace conferences, and face up to the unfavourable configuration which arose following the Balkan Wars. ABSTRACT The position of Austria–Hungary on the Balkans changed considerably due to the Bosnian crisis in 1908/1909. The effort of the Austro ‑Hungarian foreign minister Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal to es‑ tablish cooperation with Russia on the basis of the previous entente was ruined due to this event. The annexation also completely destroyed Vienna’s prestige in Belgrade and made the Serbs a mor‑ tal enemy of the monarchy. Austria ‑Hungary therefore had to change its policy on the Balkans. Its main effort was the preservation of the status quo on the peninsula. One of its prerequisites was the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Austria ‑Hungary therefore tried to cautiously cooperate with the Porte and to force it to conduct reforms. This effort was however un‑ successful. In the meantime Vienna was not able to hinder the creation of an alliance of the Balkan states, which threatened to destroy the status quo. When these countries began their long prepared war against the Ottomans the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy on the Balkans were in mortal peril. KEYWORDS Austria ‑Hungary; Balkans; Russia; Serbia; Diplomacy; International Relations Martin Urban | Departement of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen Tylova 18, 301 24, Plzeň, Czech Republic [email protected] 85 SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika, p. 176. 86 KODET, p. 192.