Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943
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Divided union: South African nationalist opposition from 1939 to 1943 Mikuláš Touška1 ABSTRACT South Africa’s participation in World War II was accompanied by aspecific and, to some extent, paradoxical development. The declaration of war on Germany alongside Great Britain and other dominions was preceded by agovernment crisis that resulted in the collapse of Hertzog’s cabinet. The new coalition government led by Hertzog’s long-time political rival Jan Smuts had to face strong nationalist opposition. This opposition supported by Nazi Germany was extensive but fragmented, causing it to be defeated in the 1943 elections. However, this defeat led to aparadoxical result. The ultra-conservative and fiercely anti-British politician D.F. Malan became the undisputed leader of the opposition and capitalized on his position to clinch an electoral victory in 1948. The goal of this paper is to identify the reasons for this paradoxical development based on the analysis of both the activities of various opposition groups and personal animosities among their leaders. The analysis is based on the existing literature as well as on archival materials, in particular the reports of South African counterintelligence. KEYWORDS Union of South Africa, Second World War, United Party, National Party, Afrikaner Party, James Barry Munnik Hertzog, Jan Christiaan Smuts, Daniel François Malan. “WHITE UNITY” The period after 1910 until the mid-30s in the Union’s political development is characterized by Afrikaners’ rising influence. Although English-speaking white South Africans represented about 40 percent of the Union’s white population, their impact on politics gradually declined as they focused mainly on the economy.2 It should be noted that there was no “British” political party on the South African political scene that might have constituted an adequate rival to the Afrikaner nationalists. 1 Mikuláš Touška, Department of Global History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Náměstí Jana Palacha 1/2, 116 38 Prague, Czech Republic, [email protected] 2 A.STEWARD, The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis, 1938–39, in: The English Historical Review, Vol.123, No.503 (August 2008), p.948.
74 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 Afrikaner nationalism was of particular importance to South Africa’s political scene. However, this concept should not be confused with Afrikanerdom, acomplex and eclectic phenomenon that combines the Christian values of Calvinism, pride in historical traditions, the Great Trek (Die Groot Trek), but also the republican tradition and the fight against British imperialism and, last but not least, linguistic and cultural exceptionalism.3 While Afrikanerdom is essentially ahomogeneous category, Afrikaner nationalism takes many forms that derive from specific goals and needs. Different and often hostile groups of nationalists have habitually claimed the position of the only true representative of Afrikaner values.4 By the mid-1930s, three principal streams of Afrikaner nationalism gradually formed in the South African political landscape. The first one was represented by Louis Botha and his South African Party (Suid-Afrikaanse Party), whose leadership was taken over by Jan Smuts after Botha’s premature death in 1919. To call this party nationalist is somewhat misleading, because while its main theme was the equality of Afrikaners with the British, its political agenda was based on the Union’s position as an integral part of the British Empire. As aresult, the party also appealed to alarge proportion of English-speaking voters. The belief in the Union’s limited sovereignty and its dependence on Great Britain’s foreign policies was fully reflected in 1914, when the government led by Louis Botha supported the declaration of war on Germany, suppressed the Boer rebellion against this move, and sent South African troops to fight the Germans in German-controlled South-West Africa (currently Namibia). James Barry Hertzog and his National Party (Nasionale Party) formed in 1914 represented the second form of “nationalism”. Hertzog, originally aprominent member of the South African Party, left Botha’s government to protest the declaration of war on Germany. The National Party led by him was purely Afrikaner, and the aim of its policy was to strengthen Afrikaners’ national identity and gain greater Union autonomy. General Hertzog became Prime Minister in 1924 and remained in office for 15 long years. Although he questioned the Union’s dependent position within the British Empire and was aRepublican5, his policies never departed from the constitutional framework of the Union as adominion. Despite all his efforts in the field of Afrikaner culture and language, he also respected English-speaking South Africans’ rights in the constitutional and political system of the Union.6 The instability of the coalition of the National Party and the Labour Party (Arbeidersparty) and the impact of the economic crisis in the early 1930s led Hertzog and 3 S.UYS, Apartheid: Opium of the Afrikaner, Transition, No.19 (1965), p.14; S.DUBOW, Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of ‘Race’, in: the Journal of African History, Volume 33, No.2 (1992), pp.235–236. 4 See for example D.O’MEARA: The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927–1948: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism, in: Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 3, No.2 (April 1977), pp.157–158. 5 In the South African context, the concept of republicanism is rather different from the general understanding and refers primarily to the former Boer republics. South African “Republicans” set South Africa’s full independence from Britain as the ultimate goal, which was eventually achieved in 1961. 6 K.KIRKWOOD, The Constitutional Crisis in South Africa, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), Vol.28, No.4 (Oct. 1952), pp.433–434
MIkULአTOUŠkA 75 Smuts to take aradical step for their parties, forming the United Party (Vereenigde Party) in 1934, which completely dominated the House of Assembly. In the last prewar elections of 1938, the United Party won atotal of 111 seats out of 150. The link between the two main streams of Afrikaner politics was the recognized need for socalled “white unity”. But there was still afundamental contradiction in their conceptions of the Union’s position in the Commonwealth. Hertzog’s emphasis on preserving South Africa’s then current formal status, as well as the issue of the British’s position in South African politics, and, above all, the plan to connect with his biggest opponent, General Smuts, led to arift within the National Party and the emergence of athird mainstream nationalist party in the 1930s. This split culminated after the founding of the United Party when D.F.Malan and his allies from the National Party, especially from the Cape, rejected this “great experiment”, which Malan described as abulwark of imperialism and capitalism, and formed the opposition Purified National Party (Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party— GNP).7 This party, with its fiercely anti-British, nationalist and Republican agenda, as substantially restructured in the 1940s, represented the main opposition force during the war.8 ATTITUDES TOWARDS GERMANY The United Party was the result of acompromise, so it is understandable that there were many contradictions between the two leaders. In addition to the relationship with the British Empire, there was no unity between Hertzog and Smuts on the fundamental issue of the relationship with Nazi Germany and the Union’s position in the event of aconflict between Germany and Great Britain. Like their constituents, the two wings of the United Party were divided on this issue.9 Both Smuts and Hertzog shared sympathy for Germany to some extent, but their views were vastly different when it came to the relationship with the Nazi regime. Smuts considered Nazism the dangerous consequence of an unfair post-World War Iarrangement. Although he considered the Nazi regime abhorrent, he believed in the possibility of apermanent compromise between Berlin and London, until the rest of Czechoslovakia was occupied in March 1939.10 Hertzog, on the other hand, had expressed some sympathy before the war for Nazism, in which he saw the legitimate reaction of the humiliated German nation, and was unreservedly opposed to the Union’s involvement in the war between Britain and Germany. But they both realized that apossible conflict with the Third Reich would inevitably mean aconflict within the Afrikaner population, part of which made no efforts to hide its sympathy for Nazi ideology and indeed also its antipathy to the British Empire. Smuts, who had long held pro-British positions, was convinced that, regardless of the risk of 7 H.GILIOMIE, The Afrikaners— Biography of aPeople, London, 2003, pp.408–409. 8 E.A.TIRYAKIAN, Apartheid and Politics in South Africa, in: The Journal of Politics, Volume 22, No.4 (November 1960), pp.684–685. 9 R.DAVENPORT, C.SAUNDERS, South Africa, AModern History, London 2000, p.343. 10 J.VAN DER POEL, Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume VI, Cambridge 1973, pp.139–140; 155–156.
76 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 compromising the unity of South African society, it was essential that the Union entered the war alongside Great Britain and other dominions.11 One specific fact played akey role in the consideration of its position on the war. Since 1915, the Union had been entrusted with the administration of the mandate territory of German SouthWest Africa, and the government did not want Germany to regain this colony as aresult of acompromise with Great Britain or avictory in the war. In addition, Germany was an important trading partner for the Union. Trade had resumed in the 1920s and Germany gradually became an important market for South African raw materials exports as well as asupplier of industrial products. Already in 1928, atrade agreement was signed, supplemented in 1934 by aso-called “Barter Agreement”, which facilitated the exchange of goods between the two countries.12 The fastest growing export commodity was raw wool, aproduct important to Afrikaner farmers. Germany then exported industrial products with higher added value to South Africa, in particular locomotives, machinery, cars and aircraft for civil transport. As regards the latter, in the late 1930s, the German manufacturer Junkers essentially became almost amonopoly supplier of aircraft for South African Airlines. The planned import of German weapons was suspended as aresult of increasing tensions between Britain and Germany.13 In 1938, trade with Germany accounted for 18.8 percent of Union exports and 7.9 percent of its imports.14 It is therefore clear that, in view of the importance of trade between them, there was also an economically motivated interest in maintaining neutrality in the second half of the 1930s. NEUTRALITY CRISIS AND THE FALL OF HERTZOG’S CABINET Great Britain expected that if it declared war on Germany, its dominions (with the exception of Ireland) would join it without delay, as they had in 1914. This was indeed important not only for reasons of amilitary and economic nature, but, of course, also as asymbol of the unity of the empire and its strength in the conflict that looked likely to arise. Indeed, Canada, Australia and New Zealand met these expectations and their governments, and in the case of Canada and New Zealand, also their parliaments, encountered no controversy.15 11 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, pp.342–343. 12 However, it was not atypical exchange of ‘goods for goods’ arrangement, but asystem that guaranteed the sale of acertain volume of South African wool and other raw materials and the possibility of offsetting the receivables from these transactions against the payment obligations arising from the purchase of industrial products from Germany. This contract was then amended five times, to the extent that just before the war its value was £3.7 million. W.KIENZLE, German-South African Trade Relations in the Nazi Era, in: African Affairs, Volume 78, No.310 (January 1979), pp.82–83. 13 Ibid., pp.88–89. 14 L.L.ILSLEY, The War Policy of South Africa, in: The American Political Science Review, Volume 34, No.6 (December 1940), p.1184. 15 The Parliaments of Canada and New Zealand, as well as their governments, decided unanimously to enter the war, see L.ROVNÁ, M.JINDRA, Dějiny Kanady, Praha 2000, p.210; The Times (6.9.1939).
MIkULአTOUŠkA 77 As far as the Union’s position was concerned, the issue was far more complex, and it must be said that the British government had long been somewhat naive about the possibility that the Union could remain neutral. This is despite the fact that, for several years before the outbreak of the conflict, British officials had received reports on the anti-British attitudes of anumber of politicians, as well as part of the Afrikaner public, and their sympathy for Nazi Germany. As indicated above, both the government and the Union parliament were divided into two groups of about equal number on the position regarding the possible war against Germany.16 MPs from the former South African Party led by J.Smuts, and supported by the Labour Party and the Dominion Party, were in favour of the declaration of war, while afaction of the United Party, led by Prime Minister Hertzog, and backed by Malan’s GNP, pursued neutrality.17 After Great Britain, together with France, in response to the attack on Poland, declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, it became obvious that the Union had to decide on participation or non-participation in the conflict. The government met on this issue on the same day. However, contrary to Hertzog’s expectations, there was aserious split during the session. While the Prime Minister, with the support of five ministers,18 was in favour of neutrality, the second group, i.e. atotal of seven cabinet members led by General Smuts, was in favour of the declaration of war. Hence on the same day the Prime Minister informed Governor General Patrick Duncan that the government was unable to reach acompromise on the issue of war and that he would submit this issue to the House of Assembly for avote. He was also confident that his neutrality proposal would be supported by the necessary majority, but in the event that it was not, or if the majority was tight, he would resign as Prime Minister, ask the governor to dissolve parliament and call elections. However, the Governor-General left the question of the possible dissolution of parliament for aperiod after the vote.19 On the morning of 4 September 1939, General Hertzog, on behalf of the government, submitted amotion to the House of Assembly to approve the neutrality policy. In its justification, it referred to the fact that the Union, as asovereign country should only be involved in war if the conflict affected its interests. However, as the state of war between the United Kingdom and Germany concerned European affairs, the Union should remain neutral, provided that it would honour all its obligations to Britain and other Commonwealth countries.20 The leader of the opposition group in government, General Smuts, put forward an alternative proposal that obliged the government to sever ties with Germany, to reject 16 STEWARD, pp.953–959. 17 The Times (5.9.1939). 18 These ministers were: Minister of Finance Nicolaas Havenga, Minister of Defence and, at the same time, Minister of Trade and Industry Oswald Pirow, Minister of Railways and Ports Adriaan Fourie, Minister of Lands General Jan Kemp and Minister of Education and Minister of Native Affairs and Minister of Social Affairs Henry Fagan. 19 National Archives Repository, Pretoria (NAR), Volume No.1126, Ref. 23/800A, Memorandum— Governor General of South Africa (4.9.1939). 20 This included, in particular, the functioning and defence of Simon’s Town used by the British Navy in protecting the sea route around Africa.
78 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 any form of neutrality in the conflict, and to honour all obligations to Britain and other Commonwealth countries. Furthermore, the government would be obliged to take all measures to defend the Union and its interests, on the condition that military units were not deployed outside South Africa, as was the case in the previous war. The proposal was based, inter alia, on the view that, if the Union were to stand aside in this war, it would breach its obligations to other Commonwealth members. The moral dimension of the whole issue was included in the last point of Smuts’ proposal: “The House of Assembly is deeply convinced that the freedom and independence of the Union is at stake in this conflict and that it is its true interest to oppose the use of force as apolicy instrument”. Since even Smuts’ proposal did not foresee an active deployment of the armed forces, the dispute was conducted on an ideological level rather than on practical issues.21 However, as subsequent developments showed, the Union gradually became more involved in the war effort alongside Britain and its allies than Smuts’ proposal had anticipated.22 The lengthy and tumultuous discussion of parliament resulted in avote in which the House supported the declaration of war. The pro-British group, led by General Smuts, won by atight majority of 13 votes. Only 66 United Party MPs supported by all Labour Party and Dominion Party representatives voted in favour of Smuts’ proposal.23 General Hertzog tried to salvage the situation by appealing to the Governor General’s office immediately after the vote and requesting the dissolution of the House on the grounds that the vote did not reflect the public’s will. Sir Patrick postponed his official decision until the following morning, however it was obvious that the dissolution of the House resulting in ageneral election was not in the British government’s interest. For this reason he told Prime Minister Hertzog that should general Smuts be able to form anew government that would gain confidence in the House of Assembly, he would not dissolve the House. Immediately after the meeting, the Governor General met with Smuts who asked him for amandate to form anew coalition government supported by the Labour Party and the Dominion Party. The Governor General promptly complied with this request and informed General Hertzog of this fact the following morning in aletter.24 Hertzog had no choice but to tender his resignation, which was accepted immediately after the creation of Smuts’ first war cabinet on 6 September. From that day on, the Union was also at war with Germany.25 Winston Churchill (then the First Lord of the Admiralty) demonstrated the relief that 21 NAR Volume No.1126, Ref. 23/800A, Memorandum— Governor General of South Africa (4.9.1939), Continuation of Memorandum of 4th September 1939— Governor General of South Africa (6.9.1939). 22 During the war, South African Armed Forces played an important role during various campaigns in Somalia, Ethiopia, North Africa and Italy. 23 NAR Volume No.1126, Ref. 23/800A, (4.9.1939), Continuation of Memorandum of 4th September 1939— Governor General of South Africa (6.9.1939). 24 Ibid., Annexure A 25 Ibid., Annexures B— E, Telegram— From Governor General for His Majesty the King (6.9.1939); NAR, Volume No.1126, Ref. 23/800A, Order of Precedent of Cabinet Ministers, P.M. 92/22/3 (11.9.1939); Proclamation No.197, 1939, Department of the Prime Minister and for External Affairs— Notice No.1344, (6.9.1939).
MIkULአTOUŠkA 79 certainly prevailed on the part of the British government in his telegram to General Smuts the following day, when he stated: “Irejoice to feel that we are once again on commando together”.26 The dramatic developments around the vote to declare war marked the end of “white unity” whose main instrument had been the (now divided) United Party. Thus, the Union entered the war in asituation where both white South Africans and political representation were divided into two almost equal groups. Moreover, the anti-war camp may have had alegitimate feeling that the declaration of war on Germany and the formation of awar cabinet led by General Smuts had been unconstitutional, because there were certainly reasons for the dissolution of the House.27 The epilogue of the vote on neutrality was aparliamentary debate on 1 April 1940. General Hertzog accused Smuts and other members of the last pre-war cabinet of violating an alleged agreement that the Union would remain neutral in the event of war in Europe. He claimed that on 19 September 1938, he had formulated amemorandum which he had discussed with General Smuts, Finance Minister Nicolaas Havenga and Defence Minister Oswald Pirow, who had allegedly expressed their agreement with it. Thereafter, General Hertzog had allegedly had the memorandum approved by the cabinet at agovernment meeting on 28 September 1938, which dealt with the Sudetenland crisis. Both Smuts and the other members of the pre-war cabinet (R.Stuttaford, D.Reitz, and H.G.Lawrence) rejected these claims. General Hertzog had subsequently eased and relativized his accusations by stating that the proposed neutrality was aproved by the cabinet tacitly in late September 1938 and he assumed that this consent was still valid in early September of the following year.28 This debate may seem to have been pointless, but it illustrates Hertzog’s relentless efforts to end the Union’s participation in the war. HERTZOG’S EFFORTS TO END THE WAR Thus, the Union entered the war against Germany in avery difficult position. Union Defence Forces (UDF) were in adisappointing state.29 The government also had to take anumber of economic and security measures, which were certainly not popular. However, in the autumn of 1939, the opposition to the war among South Africans was not as strong as the nationalists could have hoped for in the light of aclose September parliamentary vote. Public opinion of the white population was essentially on the government’s side. According to official estimates, around half of Afrikaners and the vast majority of English speakers (in total representing around seventy percent of South Africans of European descent) supported participation in 26 Churchill was most likely referring to his joint work with General Smuts in the War Cabinet during the First World War, VAN DER POEL, p.191. 27 ILSLEY pp.1181–1182. 28 VAN DER POEL, pp.190–191. 29 At the outbreak of war, the ground forces had only 3,300 men, there was adeficit of 39,000 trained reserves, and the Air Force had only five modern aircraft imported from Britain, see J.MERVIS, South Africa in World War II, Johannesburg, 1989, pp.7–9.
80 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 the war.30 Regardless of the support of public opinion, the war cabinet had to pass two tests of the coalition’s strength in avote in the House of Assembly. Despite his defeat in the vote on neutrality in September 1939, General Hertzog still believed that he could reverse the situation. Therefore, on 24 January 1940 he submitted to the House adraft of the following resolution: “The Chamber of Deputies is of the opinion that the time has come for the war with Germany to end and peace to be established”. As expected, Prime Minister Smuts put forward an alternative proposal that the Union should remain in the war that Germany had begun and was continuing, with aunyielding disregard for international law and that the Union would seek peace, but not on aseparate basis. Both arguments were very similar to those made by the opposing sides in September the year before. 31 However, not all opposition MPs agreed unreservedly with what General Hertzog presented, in particular anumber of them did not identify with his open support for Adolf Hitler. The parliamentary debate was very emotional, with nationalist MPs accusing General Smuts of destroying “white unity”, forcibly suppressing opposition views and illegally interning uncomfortable people. Before the vote, the House sat continuously for more than 24 hours. Despite all of Smuts’ fears and pressure from the opposition, in the vote on 27 January the House approved Smuts’ proposal by 81 votes (59 votes were against), amajority much more pronounced than in September of the previous year.32 The government subsequently gained sufficient support for an important legislative measure granting it some extraordinary powers and immunity, which Smuts considered extremely important.33 Another test of support for the war effort was the by-elections and elections to provincial councils in the spring of 1940. While the Nationalists retained their majority in the Cape, the other two provinces were won by United Party candidates who supported Smuts’ cabinet. This election only confirmed the trend that was evident back in January in the vote on ending the war with Germany.34 The military defeat of France in June 1940 led to increased pressure from the Nationalists to end the Union’s participation in the war. The government, no doubt disappointed with the course of the war so far and blaming Britain for military and political failure, realized the surrender of France would have acertain impact on the mood of the Union’s population. Moreover, it was also impossible to ignore the immediate change of course in the policy of the Vichy government’s relations with Germany and the United Kingdom and its allies and the related change in the situation in the French colonies in Africa.35 30 As mentioned above, the share between Afrikaners and English speakers was approximately 3:2, ILSLEY, pp.1184–1185. 31 The Star (25.1.1940). 32 VAN DER POEL, p.211; The Star, Rand Daily Mail (24–27.1.1940) 33 This was War Measures Act No.13 of April 1940, which authorized the government to issue so-called war measures with the power of law without the consent of parliament, VAN DER POEL, p.211. 34 ILSLEY, pp.1184–1185. 35 South African National Defence Force Archives, Pretoria (SANDFA), AI GP1, Box 19 File (10) I18A, Censorship Report (undated).
MIkULአTOUŠkA 81 Smuts tried to find amodus vivendi with the opposition that would eliminate extremism from both sides and called upon general Hertzog for consultation on 13June 1940. Hertzog however refused this offer and on 17 June addressed Prime Minister Smuts in aletter urging him to take all necessary steps to end the state of war and ensure peace for the Union. 36 Hertzog’s arguments were understandably primarily based on recent German military successes in Europe. The war seemed to be clearly evolving to the detriment of Smuts’ war time policy. Notwithstanding the fact that Smuts was aware of the critical war situation and felt acertain fatalism, Hertzog’s demands were resolutely rejected.37 In his rather emotional response three days later, Smuts recalled that the former Prime Minister had submitted this “disrespectful proposal” to the House in January already, and that the House had rejected it. He added that the neutrality proposed by Hertzog could not guarantee the Union’s independence, just as it did not ensure the independence of Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands. Smuts also sent acopy of his response to the press.38 It became clear that no form of co-operation between Smuts and Hertzog was possible any longer. At the end of August 1940, the former Prime Minister made alast attempt to push for an end to the Union’s participation in the war in the Chamber of Deputies. This time, he also supported his proposal by submitting apetition signed by nearly 150,000 women calling for an end to the war. In his speech in the House of Commons, he compared Great Britain to aboxer who is so shaken that he cannot grasp that he has already lost the match. He claimed the Union should throw in the towel for him.39 However, even this time it was the former Prime Minister who was left defeated. His motion was rejected by amajority of 18 votes.40 In December 1940, General Hertzog retired in response to the failure of his plan to unify the nationalist parliamentary opposition. This ended the former Prime Minister’s efforts to change the Union’s position in the war. While Smuts was unable to find amodus vivendi with the opposition during this period (or later), it showed that he could rely on both United Party MPs as well as his coalition partners when voting in the House. EFFORTS TO UNITE THE MALANITES AND HERTZOG’S OPPOSITION After the declaration of war on Germany and the creation of Smuts’ war cabinet with the support of the Labour Party and the Dominion Party, the United Party rapidly eroded. Although Smuts officially retained the party leadership and controlled its apparatus, 37 MPs who voted against the war switched to the opposition. This group around former Prime Minister Hertzog almost immediately left the United Party and formed anew People’s Party (Volksparty). 36 VAN DER POEL, pp.231–233. 37 Ibid., pp.227–230. 38 Ibid., pp.237–238. 39 The Star (30.8.1940). 40 SANDFA, UWH Box 243 file B.I.5— Telegram to the British Government (2.9.1940); Rand Daily Mail and The Star (27.8. –2.9.1940).
88 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 activity, sanctions were tightened and in severe cases of sabotage using explosives, the death penalty could also be imposed in proceedings before special courts.76 But the courts mostly imposed sentences rather leniently, and death sentences (if any) were commuted by grace. Given that the vast majority of offences of illegal possession of weapons or explosives and, of course, sabotage were committed by Afrikaner nationalist extremists, the government’s lenience often provoked resentment among English speakers.77 The introduction of censorship and the establishment of the Office of the Chief Censor were extremely important measures at the beginning of the war. Censorship covered not only all correspondence, but also all printed material and radio broadcasting and film production.78 The police and other authorities were allowed to enter dwellings without acourt order, carry out inspections and confiscate printed materials.79 For all military personnel, there were detailed censorship rules, which, among other things, prohibited the use of languages other than English or Afrikaans, ordered soldiers to send any correspondence only through designated censorship officers, and also to submit to them their private diaries and notes at specified intervals. Of course, soldiers were not allowed to provide certain military information in correspondence and other materials.80 Civilians located in the Territory of the Union or the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa also had to comply with the censorship measures. It was strictly prohibited to send mail other than through the official postal service, as well as to give information whose disclosure could jeopardize the security of the Union or its war effort.81 However, censors recorded asignificant number of infringements of these prohibitions, in particular as regards information relating to the movement of ships in South African ports, the location of troops in the Union and their transport to areas of overseas deployment. In most cases, however, it was sufficient to send a“Warning Card” to the persons concerned.82 Censorship of correspondence was not only atool for ensuring the secrecy of sensitive information, but also served (among other means) to monitor the mood and morale of the population and soldiers. The government was then able to respond to these findings with targeted propaganda.83 76 War Measure No.13 of 1942 (Emergency Regulations that Provide for the Trial of Serious Cases of Sabotage by Special High Courts). 77 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS (1940–1943) cited from above; SANDFA, Box 23, File(10) I21(A), Military Censorship Summary No.48, Deputy Chief Censor Durban (25.8.1942). 78 Proclamation No.201, 1939— National Emergency Regulations. 79 E.g. Proclamation No.201, 1939— National Emergency Regulations, War Measure No.4 of 1941, War Measure No.55 of 1942, War Measure No.138 of 1942. 80 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 21, File (10) I19, Important Notice (To Troops Embarking on Ships)— Censorship and Despatch of Correspondence (5.6.1940); Important Notice— Censorship and Despatch of Correspondence (25.6.1940). 81 See the regulations cited above. 82 SANDFA, Box 23, File (10) I21(A), Military Censorship Summaries (Deputy Chief Censor Durban 1942). 83 Various reports of military and civilian censorship cited above.
MIkULአTOUŠkA 89 ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE UNION The opposition movement was linked to the sabotage and subversive actions of opposition groups and German covert operations within the territory of the Union during the early part of the war. The German intelligence service, Abwehr, was, of course, aware that the pro-Nazi orientation of some Afrikaner groups represented an opportunity to destabilize the Union’s war effort. And the conditions prevailing for this activity in the Union at the beginning of the war were favourable to these plans. Moreover, Nazi Germany were able to follow up on intensive propaganda and information-gathering activities from before the outbreak of the war. The main tools of Nazi propaganda in this period were the press, various associations and organizations, the activities of missionaries and various exchange programmes of students and scientists. Representatives of German firms based in the Union were also active.84 Although the danger was obvious even before the outbreak of the war, as in other areas, the Union had entered into conflict with Germany completely unprepared for counter-espionage and defence against enemy secret operations and sabotage. It is likely that the efforts to create acounter-espionage service were sabotaged by the pre-war Defence Minister Oswald Pirow, who was known for his sympathies with Nazi Germany.85 After the outbreak of the war, however, the situation began to change. The war cabinet was aware of the danger that the “fifth column” of German origin in particular in the Transvaal and Orange Free State and some other areas represented arisk to the security of the Union. Its actions were aimed not only at establishing acounter-espionage service within the UDF, but also at coordinating its efforts with the police forces and the creation of local units to monitor suspicious activity.86 Logically, the first measure against the danger of subversive activity was the expulsion of German diplomats and consular officials from the Union. They, naturally, represented amajor threat to the Union’s internal security.87 Although it was not certain until 6 September 1939 whether the Union would declare war on Germany, there had been vigorous correspondence between the government and diplomatic missions in Germany and neutral states and, of course, with the British Foreign Office since the beginning of the month, on possible action against German diplomats and consular officials.88 First, however, it was essential to ensure the safe return of diplomats and staff of Union consulates in Germany in the event of 84 F.L.MONAMA, Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939–1945, Dissertation, Stellenbosch University (April 2014), pp.5–19. 85 K.FEDOROWICH, German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique, 1939–1944, in: The Historical Journal, Volume 48, No.1 (March 2005), pp.212–214. 86 Ibid., pp.215–216. 87 SANDFA, UWH Box 279, file B.I.30, Memorandum related to Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa (28.10.1939). 88 NAR, REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Various correspondence (4.–6.9.1939).
90 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 the outbreak of war. The situation became more complicated when London asked Commonwealth governments, including the Union, to carry out reciprocal measures in their countries in response to the detention of British consular officials in Germany.89 Such steps would however put South Africans at risk of internment in Germany, and therefore the Union government, in an attempt to buy time, responded to this request rather evasively, even though the Union was already in astate of war with Germany by that time and had severed diplomatic relations with it.90 After prolonged negotiations, all German diplomats, consular officials, employees and family members were eventually expelled from the Union, however the Union government guaranteed them safe passage to Germany via neutral countries.91 From that point on, German agents with diplomatic or consular cover operated against the Union from neighbouring neutral countries, in particular from Mozambique. From 1940, police and military counter-intelligence also began to monitor the activities of various groups that could jeopardize internal security and the undisturbed operation of the war economy. Surveillance was not limited only to subversive groups suspected of preparing sabotage operations, but also extended to all opposition Afrikaner groups, including the HNP, OB and the New Order.92 In the context of the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, various communist groups were also the subject of surveillance, but after the Soviet Union entered the war, the risk of hostilities on their part was assessed as negligible.93 Another preventive measure taken by the government of the Union at the beginning of the war was the continuous internment of unreliable persons, not only foreigners, but also Union citizens.94 However, many internees managed to escape with the help of OB sympathizers among the guard personnel of internment facilities, hiding for quite along time, and some engaged in terrorist activities.95 Even in the early period of the war, the British Imperial Staff was aware of the importance of establishing structured ties with the UDF. In the field of counter-espionage, however, this effort encountered anumber of problems that seemed to have originated on the South African side. The main problem was not only that Britain’s MI5 regarded the Union’s counter-espionage service (both police and military) as incompetent, but it also had serious doubts about the integrity of some high-ranking officers. Among them, Colonel Coetzee, ahigh-ranking police officer with aclearly anti-British stance, appeared to have “excelled” in this regard, and it was subsequently discovered that he was amember of the Bond. However, despite the initial problems, an MI5 branch was established as part of aBritish military mission under 89 NAR REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Telegram No.377, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London’s Minister for External Affairs, Pretoria (8.9.1939). 90 NAR REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Telegram No.452, Minister for External Affairs, Pretoria’s Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London (9.9.1939). 91 NAR REF. 72/13/9, Part. 1, Declaration by J.C. Smuts (26.9.1939). 92 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS (1941 to 1943). 93 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.7 (15.8.1941). 94 Proclamation No.201, 1939— National Emergency Regulations, Article. 15. 95 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22 IRBS (1941–1943).
MIkULአTOUŠkA 91 the command of Major Webster and his deputy Major Luke. Its main task was counter-espionage and anti-sabotage activities.96 From 1940, the primary target of South African counter-espionage and MI5 was the OB and its paramilitary division the Stormjaers. Although support for Smuts’ cabinet grew among the population in the early 1940s, there was aperfectly justified concern that the Axis’s military successes would not only encourage nationalist opposition, but that it could also cause those Union citizens who were still on the side of the war cabinet to join the opposition. The Stormjaers’ sabotage activities, which focused mainly on transport and communication infrastructure, also reinforced this concern. Moreover, there was evidence that the leader of the OB Van Rensburg was aGerman agent directing this sabotage activity. Sabotage and terrorist activity peaked in early 1942.97 However, anumber of actions were thwarted, and even in cases where the attacks had been successful, the damage done, with some exceptions, was not significant.98 Yet in response to increased sabotage and terrorist activity, the government decided to tighten sentences for the perpetrators caught and even impose the risk of the death penalty.99 Later, only isolated cases of terrorist attacks were reported, while others were either prevented or caused minor damage.100 The increasing frequency of violence and sabotage perpetrated by extreme nationalists led Abwehr to prepare abold plan to assassinate General Smuts. In June 1941, the former South African boxing champion Robey Leibbrandt landed on the Atlantic Coast of the Union.101 His task consisted not only in carrying out this assassination, but also in organizing terrorist and sabotage activities, including bank robberies. Leibbrandt was betrayed, however, by the head of the OB Van Rensburg, who informed the police about the presence of this German agent in the Union. His likely motivation was probably that, to Van Rensburg’s mind, Leibbrandt had jeopardized the position of the OB and, by his recklessness, he could have compromised other German agents in South Africa.102 Robey Leibbrandt was arrested on 24 December 1941 and along with seven accomplices brought before acourt on charges of high 96 FEDOROWICH, p.219. 97 Ibid., pp.221–222; SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.15 (10.2.1942). 98 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.14 (16.1.1942); IRBS No.15 (10.2.1942). 99 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.15 (10.2.1942); IRBS No.21 (3.9.1942). 100 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.25 (1.3.1943); IRBS No.31 (23.7.1943). 101 Leibbrandt, Robey (1913–1966) was aSouth African heavyweight champion who represented the Union, among other occasions, in 1936 at the Berlin Olympics. He decided to stay in Germany, signed up to the Luftwaffe after the outbreak of the war and successfully completed parachute and glider pilot training. He was subsequently chosen by Abwehr as an agent for action in South Africa. After his arrest, he was sentenced to death, but General Smuts, by grace, commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. After the 1948 elections, in which the HNP won, he and other wartime convicts were released from prison. He died in South Africa in 1966, see: http://www.leibbrandt.com/leibbrandt_archive/Sidney_Robey_Leibbrandt/Boeke_waarin_RL.htm, [cit.30.5.2020]. 102 Van Rensburg and other officials repeatedly distanced themselves from violent actions and denied any connection between the Stormjaers and other terrorist groups. However, these statements did not seem very credible to the authorities. See, for example, the
92 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 treason on 10 July 1942.103 More arrests followed, including within the ranks of the police.104 Abwehr, however, had anumber of other agents in South Africa. Their number is estimated to have totalled 100. They were recruited not only from among German immigrants who managed to escape from internment with the help of OB members, but also from among other foreigners within the Union. Among them were, for example, German communists released from concentration camps, as well as members of other foreign nations who lived within the territory of the Union.105 Among these alleged agents were also Czech citizens from the diplomatic corps and employees of the company Baťa.106 The activities of its agents in the Union were managed by the German intelligence service through its Consulate General in Mozambique. These operations were considered so dangerous by the British that the Special Operations Executive (SOE) even considered the assassination of German Consul General Paul Trompke.107 The tasks carried out by German agents were primarily of an intelligence gathering nature. Among other things, with the help of OB sympathizers, they provided information on the movement of ship transports, which were then used to plan the attacks of German submarines in the area. Other activities of the agents focused on propaganda and support for sabotage. MI5, like the South African authorities, attempted to intercept these agents with varying degrees of success. The activities of German agents weakened from 1943 onwards due to the weakening of OB and the suppression of militant pro-Nazi groups. 1943 WAR ELECTIONS The war general elections were held on 7 July 1943.108 The internal political and international situation was relatively favourable to the United Party and its allies since the opposition entered the election year unconsolidated. Pirow’s New Order, like the Afrikaner Party led by Nicolaas Havenga, had finally broken with Malan,109 and the commission’s report on the use of information provided by the authorities. SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.15 (7.2.1942) and IRBS No.20 (23.7.1942). 103 SANDFA, Box 23, File (10) I21(A), IRBS No.20 (23.7.1942). 104 FEDOROWICH, pp.222–223. 105 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.2 (16.4.1941). 106 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.5 (26.6.1941). 107 FEDOROWICH, p.225. Paul Trompke was in touch with anumber of opposition leaders and was informed in detail of their activities. See e.g. his report cited in footnote 47. 108 The term of the House of Assembly was for five years and the government had no authority to alter this term by means of statutory measures (War Measures (Amendment) Act No.32 of 1940, Art. 3 (b)). 109 Nicolaas Havenga publicly accused Dr Malan that his goal is to become the sole leader of the Afrikaner opposition rather than winning the upcoming elections. Oswald Pirow did not even run in the elections and stated that he did not believe in parliament, but only in [national socialist] revolution, see SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File(10) I22, IRBS No.31 (23.7.1943).
MIkULአTOUŠkA 93 OB had officially taken aneutral “cross-party” position, but its leadership had been highly critical of D.F.Malan. The militant groups took atotally hostile stance against the HNP after Malan condemned their sabotage and criminal activities. Plans to consolidate non-HNP political forces and create an alternative to the HNP failed in 1943, making the Malanites the only politically relevant opposition force in the upcoming election fight.110 Germany and its allies’ position in the war deteriorated rapidly. The Allies successfully ended their campaign in North Africa and were preparing to land on Italian soil, there was also aturnaround both on the Eastern Front and in the Pacific. It was therefore more than likely that the orientation of opposition forces to an Axis victory in the war did not have arealistic basis. As the elections approached, it became increasingly clear that this would be aduel between Smuts’ United Party and Malan’s HNP. The coalition parties— the Labour Party and the Dominion Party— focused on retaining their current seats rather than competing for new seats in the House.111 Given the fragmentation of the nationalist opposition, it was almost certain that the candidates of Oswald Pirow’s New Order and the Afrikaner Party led by Nicolaas Havenga did not have much chance. Election polls were more favourable to the United Party, which, unlike the HNP, appealed to alarge proportion of English-speaking voters and predicted asimilar gain to that in the last pre-war elections in 1938.112 As expected, the main theme of the election was the ongoing participation in the war. However, the HNP also addressed voters with more general themes, such as the future of the Union as aracially segregated state independent of Britain, the need to improve the economic and social conditions of Afrikaners, and the dangers of the spread of communism. To some extent, anti-Semitic rhetoric also emerged.113 The United Party and its coalition partners, on the other hand, appealed to voters with acall to support the war effort and amoral appeal to fight Nazism.114 The opposition suffered an expected defeat in the July 1943 elections. However, its defeat was far more pronounced than even Smuts himself had expected.115 Nationalists won only 43 seats, while Smuts’ United Party won 89 seats and its coalition partners the Labour Party 9 and the Dominion Party 7. The Afrikaner Party of supporters of the late opposition leader General Hertzog, led by Nicolaas Havenga, received just under two percent of the vote and remained unrepresented in the House.116 The New Order’s independent candidates also failed. This gave Smuts’ new war cabinet acomfortable parliamentary majority without the need for coalition partners. An 110 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, pp.352–353; SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.25 (1.3.1943). 111 Rand Daily Mail (26.4.1943) 112 The Star (31.5.1943) 113 SANDFA, AI, GP1, Box 24, File (10) I22, IRBS No.31 (23.7.1943). 114 SANDFA, Box 241, File (10) B.I.3, Rand Daily Mail (11.6.1943, 23.6.1943), The Star 31.5.1943, 1.6.1943). 115 VAN DER POEL, p.446. 116 More detailed results available at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html#1943_ House_of_Assembly_Election, [cit.30.5.2020].
94 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 important factor in Smuts’ significant victory was, among other things, the fact that UDF members, including those serving overseas, for the first time had the right to vote.117 It is assumed that the majority of voting soldiers supported General Smuts in the election. But the results of the 1943 elections can also be seen from adifferent perspective than the United Party’s convincing victory. The opposition lost 23 seats in the House of Assembly in total, but those losses came at the expense of the Afrikaner Party and the independent candidates of Pirow’s New Order. However, the HNP, as the successor to the pre-war GNP, won 16 new seats compared to the 1938 elections.118 The HNP became the only opposition political party with representation in the House of Assembly and in the new parliamentary term it pragmatically dropped the topic of ending the state of war. It turned out that breaking with radical pro-Nazi groups such as Pirow’s New Order and the OB, and its shift to broader issues, particularly appeals against the dangers of communism and the racial question, were the “right” choice.119 CONCLUSIONS Smuts’ first war cabinet had to deal not only with the country’s complete unpreparedness for the conflict, and the failures of the anti-Hitler coalition on the battlefield, but (unlike most warring states) also with alarge, though fragmented, opposition sabotaging its war effort. All Smuts’ attempts to re-establish “white unity” failed. For the nationalist opposition, this was aperiod marked by the diversity of individual concepts and currents and the inability to agree on acommon vision. It also failed to unite, but further developments led to the consolidation of nationalists under Malan’s leadership and the marginalization of its competitors. The war elections of 1943 were marked by nationalist opposition against the United Party and Smuts’ policies, the end of the stage when various opposition groups focused only on political struggle, and agitation against participating in the war against Germany (of course contrary to other countries for different than pacifist reasons), which in many cases even involved embracing violent actions threatening the war effort and cooperation with Nazi Germany. The development of the war in favour of the anti-Hitler coalition however diminished the hopes of defeating Great Britain and the immediate disintegration of the British Empire. After the war elections, Prime Minister Smuts might have considered the opposition totally defeated. Its representation in the House was so weak that it did not represent aserious obstacle to his second war cabinet. However, this period of United Party dominance lasted only one parliamentary term. Further developments have shown that not only Smuts’ complacency and mistakes in domestic and foreign post-war politics, but above all, the focus of Malan’s 117 Active Service Voters Act No.37 of 1941 and War Service Voters Act No.34 of 1943. 118 More detailed results available at: http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html#1938_ House_of_Assembly_Election, [cit.30.5.2020]. 119 DAVENPORT, SAUNDERS, p.353.
MIkULአTOUŠkA 95 HNP on the issue of the future form of racial segregation, the improvement of the position of Afrikaners, and the danger of the spread of communism, appealed to voters better than anti-war and pro-Nazi rhetoric. Over the next five years, the HNP consolidated its status as the main opposition force, and in the first post-war elections in May 1948, it achieved (even for Malan himself) asurprise victory. And it maintained its position as the ruling political force until South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994.