Characteristics of Political Institutions in the Meiji period

Characteristics of Political Institutions in the Meiji period Ivana Králiková ABSTRACT Newly created institutions: the Japanese government and Diet brought Japan closer to the advanced modern countries, which was the goal of all the reforms the new government sought. This complex and difficult process has had positive results and has met the expectations of its creators. Among other things, the reformers succeeded in involving the entire population in the process of modernising the country. The purpose of the creation of the House of Peers was to involve the entire nobility, both court and military, in participation in governance. In addition, the reforms of the noble titles also brought together the court aristocracy and the military nobility. In addition, representatives of the former lower nobility were elevated to the level of the formerly high-ranking nobility as areward for their contribution to establishing the new political order. The creation of modern governmental institutions was necessary above all to strengthen Japan’s international position. The newly established Diet, although its powers were limited, was also of great significance in that it involved all sections of society in participating in the modernisation of the country, thus achieving in arelatively short period almost equal status with Western countries. KEYWORDS: Japanese history, Meiji reforms, Emperor, 19th-20th century, Japanese government, Japanese Diet, Constitution INTRODUCTION The article focuses on the political institutions that were created in the Meiji period and were supposed to influence the country’s modernization process and strengthen its national unity. The creation of the institutions was supposed to equalize the position of Japan vis-à-vis the countries with which Japan had concluded unequal treaties. The article characterizes the political institutions that were created in the Meiji period and were supposed to influence the country’s modernization process and strengthen its national unity. The first part summarises all the events that led to the establishment of the institutions. The beginning of the modern history of Japan is considered to be the restoration of the emperor’s authority in 1868. After seven centuries, the period of military rule in the country and the almost three-hundred-year history of unilateral isolation of Japan ended, with the emperor playing OPEN ACCESS 22 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2022 an exclusively symbolic and ceremonial role. It seems likely that the rise in loyalty to the Imperial House in the mid-19th century was due to the conclusion of unequal treaties between the military government and the United States, followed by other powers. The imperial court became the core of opposition to the foreign policy of the shogunate. This period was mainly marked by the transformation and reaction of Japanese society to the West, both in the context of modernization and the strengthening of national power and unity. The second part describes institutions and their functioning. It deals with the emperor’s position in society before the Meiji Restoration and subsequently in theMeiji period, when his legal status was restored (3rd January 1868). It also covers the transition to constitutional government and the establishment of anational parliament and independent jurisdiction. This period was not easy because it was difficult for the Japanese to move from traditional institutions to new ones originating in the West. Thetransformation of institutions also required some changes in traditional thinking. The creation of modern government institutions was necessary primarily to strengthen Japan’s international standing. THE REFORMS OF THE MEIJI RESTORATION The Meiji Restoration (the political revolution in 1868 which returned control of the country to direct imperial rule), was not only of great significance to Japan itself as it underwent the process of transformation into amodern state, but it was also an important event in world history as Japan gradually became amajor power on the Asian continent. The reforms of the Meiji Restoration were the outcome of the Confucian ideology of kokutai (aterm of state philosophy in the sense of „national togetherness“ and „national identity“ arose in the tradition of Japanese thought) as developed by the Mito School of Learning (mitogaku, school of Japanese historical and Shinto studies). The Mito School derived its ideas from the teachings of the Chinese Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi in the twelfth century. But while Zhu Xi emphasized individual morality, the Mito School claimed that acountry is governed well when its ruler practices proper morality. The book Shinron (1825) by Aizawa Seishisai (Japanese nationalist thinker), of the latter Mito School, was of great influence in its time because it combined the ideology of emperor reverence with the ideology of rejecting western imperialism.1 During this period, fears of the penetration of Western cultural influences, especially Christianity, were growing. Therefore, emphasis was placed on the ideology of kokutai, which advocated respect for the emperor as the basis of the state and the goal of which was to build astrong nation-state with the involvement of the people in this political action.2 Events at the turn of 1867 and 1868 can be characterized in two ways. Firstly, it was arivalry between great lords and secondly, it was not awar of ideology but apower 1 B.A.SHILLONY, The Emperors of Modern Japan, Brill 2008, p.61. 2 Ibid, p.61. OPEN ACCESS IVANA KRáLIKOVá 23 struggle, i.e. whether the vassals of the Tokugawa who exercised authority on behalf of the shogun should be replaced by vassals from Satsuma and Chōshū who would exercise it on behalf of the emperor, hence it was not achange in fundamental institutions. Opponents of the Bakufu spoke only in general terms of ōsei-fukko, “the restoration of imperial rule,” or fukoku-kyōhei, “enriching the country and strengthening the army.”3 EmPEROR We should look at what position the Emperor had in the country. For centuries the Japanese Emperor had been asymbol, not aruler, the embodiment of “national independence, national historic continuity, national unity, harmony within the government, and harmony between rulers and ruled.”4 For these reasons, the emperor was immensely important to the Restoration leaders because he could give them legitimacy, as his predecessors had to give Shogun for nearly 700 years.5 During the reign of Emperor Meiji (1852–1912), Japan underwent great changes in all areas of social life. All these changes can be examined in two contexts. One is modernization and the other is the pursuit of national unity. Politically, this translated into the search for astrong government and ensuring national unity. Gaining national strength and unity also involved the West, though not in quite the same way. While national unity depended to some extent on „Japaneseness“, that is, on the preservation of certain traditional attitudes and institutions that embody it, the national strength of government required the provision of Western technology. It was clear from the experience gained from the contacts with the West that institutions needed to be reformed and Western technology adopted to stabilise the country and achieve economic growth.6 Gordon describes the different processes of change in Japan as follows: Although sharing much with aglobal history of modernizing societies, the Japanese revolution did take place through aprocess that differed from the revolutions in Europe of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Europe, members of newly powerful classes, especially the urban bourgeoisie, challenged and sometimes overturned the privileges of long-entrenched aristocrats. By contrast, in Japan of the Meiji era, it was members of the elite of the old regime, the samurai, who spearheaded the attack on the old order. Their role has led historians to describe Japan in the nineteenth century as undergoing a„revolution from above“ or an „aristocratic revolution“.7 3 W.G BEASLY, The Meiji Restoration, Redwood City California, 1972, p.300. 4 Ibid, p.302. 5 Ibid, p.302. 6 J.W.HALL The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol.5. New York 2008, pp.618–619. 7 A.GORDON, AModern History of Japan, Fourth Edition, Oxford 2020, p.62. OPEN ACCESS 24 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2022 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE MEIJI PERIOD ESTABLISHING AGOVERNmENT In 1868, the Imperial Government was formed, which was composed of the revolutionary factions of the Imperial Court and the domains of Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa. The highest positions were held by the court nobles Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjō Sanetomi and several other daimyō who supported the reform of society. Middle— and lower-class officials such as Ōkubo Toshimichi, Saigō Takamori, Kido Kōin, and others, including Western experts such as Ōkuma Shigenobu, Etō Shimpei, and Yokoi Shōnan, among others, took the initiative in shaping government policy.8 Their goals were very few and very simple, outlined in the Imperial Oath of 1868 (usually called the Charter Oath). This document committed the new government to the convocation of an assembly and “public discussion” on matters of state, unity of “all classes high and low” in promoting the national welfare, abandonment of “absurd customs of olden times” and conformity to “the principles of international justice,” and an effort at “seeking knowledge from all over the world.”9 Charter Oath made only apassing reference to the forthcoming changes that led first to the surrender of domain registries (hanseki-hokan) in 1869, which meant that daimyo became imperial governors of the lands they held in fief, and then to the complete abolition of domains (haihan) in 1871.10 On 15August 1869, the central government was further reorganized by giving high status to the Religious Council (Jingikan) introducing anew system of judicial ranks and strengthening the executive branch (hereafter referred to as the Dajōkan, Council of State), along with areduction in the number of members. The highest post, minister of the right (Udaijin), was given to Sanjō Sanetomi followed by three grand councils (Dainagon); these positions initially belonged to two court nobles (Iwakura Tomomi and Tokudaiji Sanenori) and one former daimyo (Nabeshima Naomasa of Hizen). In December 1869 and November 1870, two more court nobles and councillors (Sangi) were appointed to this office, all of whom were samurai (Soejima Taneomi of Hizen, Maebara Issei of Chōshū, Ōkubo Toshimichi of Satsuma, and Hirosawa Saneomi of Chōshū). Over the next two years, the number of Sangi varied (from aminimum of two to amaximum of seven). Six other samurai held office at one time or another (Kido Kōin of Chōshū, Ōkuma Shigenobu of Hizen, Saigō Takamori of Satsuma, and Sasaki Takayuki, Saito Toshiyuki, and Itagaki Taisuke, all of Tosa). Six ministries were responsible for the Dajōkan: civil affairs (Mimbushō), finance (Ōkurashō), war (Hyōbushō), justice (Kyō-bushō), imperial household (Kunaishō), and foreign affairs (Gaimushō). They were usually headed by imperial princes, court nobles, or daimyo (e.g., Matsudaira Shungaku and Date Muneki), but were generally samurai representatives. Several samurai from the four domains who took the initiative to propose the surrender of the registers occupied key positions in the government. On 15September 1869, six officials holding high positions 8 P.DUUS, The Rise of Modem Japan, Boston 1976, p.74. 9 Ibid, p.75. 10 BEASLY, The Meiji Restoration, p.325. OPEN ACCESS IVANA KRáLIKOVá 25 (the Udaijin, two Dainagon, and three Sangi) pledged in writing to work closely together to enforce the collective decision.11 The abolition of the domains was therefore another step towards political unity, which is seen as aprerequisite for consolidating national strength.12 For the new Meiji State to create acentralized government structure, it first needed to secure the support of as many domains as possible. The basic policies of Meiji rule were spelt out in the Charter of Oaths (Gokajō no Goseimon), which the Meiji Emperor presented to the court nobles and daimyō on April 6, 1868. The first article welcomed the participation of the domains in the government, and the new structure of the government was subsequently revealed in the Seitaisho (“Document on Government Structure,” June 1868). Article 5 of this document stated that “each fu, han, and ken shall provide representatives (kōshi) to serve as delegates.” Aconsultative body will be created to allow for open discussion of public opinion. Seven bodies known as kan have been created within the Dajōkan, the central government. One of these, the Giseikan, which served as the legislative body of the system, consisted of adecision-making Jōkyoku (upper house) and an advisory Gekyoku (lower house). The Gekyoku consisted of one to three representatives from each fu, ken, and domain. The Giseikan ensured each domain’s participation in the government however the removal of the domains’ power was anecessary first step towards centralization of power because it was clear that Japan could not become amodern state without acentralized government structure. The titles of court nobility and daimyō were abolished and replaced with titles from the newly created peerage. The specifics of the Dajōkan system, which had been ambiguous until then, were clarified in August.13 The reform concerning the abolition of the feudal domains was followed by another important reform concerning the tax system. The creation of anew tax system can be considered the most important economic reform of the 1870s. The significance of the new tax system went beyond securing revenue, as it changed the economic relationship of individual landowners to the state and each other.14 Taxes and state budgets are said to have become the two most contentious political issues of the Meiji era.15 According to Shinichi: “Public finances are, along with military strength, one of the most important aspects of power. For that reason, land tax reform regulations establishing aland tax of 3 per cent of the land price were distributed in July 1873. The government’s efforts focused on aland tax because other revenue streams were impossible.”16 Achieving the centralization of power was only one aspect of political modernization because it was clear that power alone could not be enough for the government to create amodern state. The government also needed “citizens” in the modern sense 11 Ibid, pp.335–337. 12 Ibid, p.350. 13 K.SHINICHI, The Political History of Modern Japan: Foreign Relations and Domestic Politics, Abingdon 2018, pp.24–25. 14 GORDON, AModern History of Japan, p.70. 15 Ibid, p.71. 16 SHINICHI, The Political History of Modern Japan, p.27. OPEN ACCESS 26 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2022 of the word, that is, people who identified the state’s fate with their own and acted accordingly.17 In 1868, the government in accordance with the provisions of the Oath Charter established abicameral “National Deliberative Assembly” (Kōgisho). The Assembly consisted of two houses and was appointed, not elected, but had legislative powers. Over the next two decades, the governing structure was changed several times. This first assembly was adjourned in July 1869, and subsequently, the second consultative assembly was also dissolved after about ayear. In the early years of Meiji, the question of whether to create aconstitutional order became acentral concern in theexpanding world of public debate. Debate on these matters took place in the thriving new forums of opinion magazines and newspapers of what came to be called the “Japanese Enlightenment” of the 1870s.18 In the following years, efforts to create astrong government by being more Westernized increased, the decisions being taken against abackground of rising criticism at home about the arbitrary behaviour of the Meiji leadership and aseries of clashes with China over Korea, which in 1884–85 brought the two countries close to war. The same concern with political stability and strength was evident in the creation of aWestern-style peerage.19 “An imperial decree of July 1884 announced that the emperor wished to honour two groups: those who were “high-born descendants of illustrious ancestors” and those who had distinguished themselves “in the restoration of my rule.” For this purpose, he established new ranks and titles, those of prince (or duke), marquis, count, viscount, and baron.”20 For the initial appointment, the names of members of the old court and feudal nobility were put forward, who were to be accorded appropriate levels of prestige to ensure their continued cooperation. They were to provide the basis for areliably conservative House of Peers in the new constitution then under discussion. In addition to members of the aristocracy, government ministers, generals, and admirals, mostly ex-samurai, were appointed to noble status to give them astatus commensurate with their political importance. The principle of selection was present usefulness, not past performance. There was as great aneed to reconcile inherited status with contemporary power within the government itself as there was in the wider circle of the privileged. The Dajōkan system had not solved all the problems of welding men of disparate origins into agoverning elite. Although the feudal lords had vanished from the political scene, there remained atension between samurai “upstarts” and surviving court nobles, particularly as several of the latter had potentially powerful positions in the emperor’s entourage. The only man who could balance these tensions was Iwakura, who died in 1883. His passing weakened the influence of the nobility and created an opportunity for institutional adjustment that Itō, aspiring to overall leadership in the government, was to take. There were also internal differences about coordinating government policy, which assumed an added importance in the atmosphere of foreign crisis during 1884–85. Coordination between the 17 Ibid, p.28. 18 GORDON, AModern History of Japan, p.79. 19 J.W. HALL, The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol.5. New York 2008, p.646. 20 Ibid, p.646. OPEN ACCESS IVANA KRáLIKOVá 27 dominant Central Chamber of the Dajōkan and the advisory body of senior executive officials, the Right Chamber, had been achieved by avariety of devices: by interlocking appointments, ensuring that some councillors (sangi) were also departmental ministers; by the use of an informal Inner Council (Naikaku) to provide aforum in which key officials could discuss major issues; and by exploiting the personal links among former members of the antibakufu movement. Some of these devices provoked opposition from men who found themselves becoming “outsiders,” like Ōkuma and Itagaki. Others were being weakened by time.21 In 1884 Itō took the initiative in proposing the replacement of the Dajōkan with aWestern-style cabinet and entrusted the task of drafting suitable regulations to Inoue Kowashi, his principal assistant in constitutional matters. In some respects, Inoue exceeded Itō’s brief, for he not only envisaged raising the status of samurai in government by making them eligible for the ministerial title of daijin, hitherto reserved for court nobles— astep parallel to that which had made them members of the peerage the year before— but also proposed to strengthen the government’s public authority by providing for the emperor’s personal participation in cabinet meetings. Itō, following discussions with Sanjō, ordered arevision of this clause. The new structure was announced in December 1885. All laws and ordinances issued by the government were to be signed jointly by the prime minister (sōri daijin) and the appropriate departmental minister. The prime minister was also to receive reports on the work of the various ministries and to be responsible for major matters of general policy. Thus, though the ministers continued to be in theory responsible directly to the emperor in departmental matters, they were subordinated to the prime minister.22 Shinichi states the following: “The Dajōkan system in place until that point had had three tiers: the three ministerial (daijin) posts of primee minister (dojo daijin), minister of the left (sa-daijin), and minister of the right (u-daijin) were at the top; below them were the councillors (sangi), finally, there were the ministers (kyō) who served as the heads of the ministries. It had been Iwakura Tomomi, the minister of the right and aman of rare ability for amember of the nobility, who had enabled this system to function; it thus became dysfunctional following his death in 1883.”23 The creation of the cabinet system, was amore functional and rational system than thedaijin-sangi-kyō hierarchy. Itō Hirobumi served as the first prime minister of the new cabinet. Itō, who came from alowly foot soldier stock, now held the highest position in the government, second only to the emperor. The Meiji Restoration was thus also revolutionary in terms of the selection of personnel for office.24 mEIJI CONSTITUTION Meiji Constitution, the constitution of Japan from 1889 to 1947. The government’s efforts to create aconstitution began around 1871. 21 HALL, The Cambridge History of Japan, pp.646–647. 22 Ibid, p.648. 23 SHINICHI, The Political History of Modern Japan, p.50. 24 Ibid, pp.50–51. OPEN ACCESS 28 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2022 Japan was essentially the first non-Western country to adopt amodern constitution. Unlike in the West, where constitutions were generally created as aresult of revolutions or clashes between monarchs and their feudal legislatures, and thus contained provisions relating to limitations on royal authority and defining the forms that the exercise of royal authority could take. In Japan the demands from below, although playing asignificant role in the enactment of the constitution, were clearly of lesser importance. The Japanese government undertook the creation of the constitution for the following reasons. The first was the reason that was “from abroad” rather than “from below” and that was that advanced Western nations have constitutions, hence aconstitution is aself-evident necessity for a“rich country, strong army”. The Constitution was also asymbol of civilization. The great powers took the position that they could not sign an equivalent treaty with acountry that did not even have aconstitution and that did not protect the rights of its citizens. Secondly, the government understood that it was necessary to give the people asuitable status. However, anecessary prerequisite for asystem where the people would rule themselves was external security and acertain degree of maturity in the knowledge of the people, and since Japan lacked both, it was necessary to create asystem where the king and the people shared power. The third reason was the need to create aframework in which the exercise of power was institutionalized, and different forces within the Meiji government could work together.25 There was only asmall opposition at the time the constitution was being drafted, and so the constitution was needed to ensure that it too would be provided with sufficient benefits under the new regime to make it work together. The decisions that were taken during the 1880s regarding recruitment to the bureaucracy and the nature of local assemblies needed to be incorporated into the written constitution. But the document being prepared also had another function: to convince the world of Japan’s enlightenment. Other decisions were relevant to this. Changes in the nobility and governmental system, for example, were made not only for reasons of elite unity but also because they would present Japanese institutions to the West in afamiliar and favourable form. The Japanese leadership, however, faced acritical problem in pursuing the path of Westernization. The ground on which its power rested was imperial absolutism, derived from the emperor’s divine origin. The belief in divine origin was part of acomplex of traditionalist sentiments that were widespread in Japanese society. It was therefore necessary to find aconstitutional formula that would reconcile Western norms with Japanese imperial tradition if maximum advantage was to be achieved. In early 1882 it was agreed that this task would be entrusted to Itō, who would visit Europe to study Western models.26 After returning from Europe, Itō created the Institutional Research Bureau (Seido Torishirabekyoku) within the imperial court in March 1884. Subsequently, he began to promote the introduction of various institutions, such as the imperial household (kōshitsu) and peerage (kazoku) systems. He further strengthened the foundations of the imperial household by passing the Imperial Household Law (Kōshitsu Tenpari) and setting out the nature of the imperial household’s property. These actions were intended to render the imperial household 25 Ibid, pp.46–47. 26 HALL, The Cambridge History of Japan, pp.659–660. OPEN ACCESS IVANA KRáLIKOVá 29 immune from the influence of the new legislature. He created anew nobility through the Peerage Law (Kazokurei), enacted in July 1884. The peerage was to serve as abulwark protecting the imperial household (even being called the Kōshitsu no Kanpei) and was expected to form the basis for the upper house of the new legislature.27 The most significant characteristic of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (the Meiji Constitution) was that the emperor personally possessed total authority: he controlled and exercised the rights of sovereignty (tōchiken), passed legislation with the “consent” of the Diet, gave sanction to laws, appointed and dismissed civil and military officials, determined the organization of the army and navy, had supreme command (tōsuiken) over them, could declare war, make peace and conclude treaties, declare martial law, confer titles of nobility, orders, and other honours, and grant amnesty and pardons.28 As for the protection afforded to civil rights, it was weak. But it is also necessary to take into account the state of society at the time and the inexperience of citizens with democracy. The theoretical framework for these rights in Japan was that they were being conferred upon the people by the constitution. Associated with these rights was the caveat that they were applicable only within the limits of the law. The traditional affection for the people by the imperial ancestors was given as the basis for this conferral.29 The powers of the House of Representatives, nominally intended to reflect the opinions of the public, were also limited. The House of Peers was created, among other things, to prevent any unwanted laws from being passed. Ministers of state were responsible not to the Diet but to the emperor. Also, the most important power granted to the Diet, the right to oversee the budget, did not extend to “already fixed expenditures” based on the constitution (Article 67). In the case of afailure by the Diet to pass abudget, the government could carry out that of the previous year (Article 71). The authority of the Diet also failed to extend to items related to the emperor, and it had no diplomatic powers such as treaty ratification.30 There is much discussion of the emperor’s prerogatives regarding the military. Shinichi states: “The limitations of the Diet seen as the most problematic were those related to the military. Matters having to do with the administration of the military, that is, those related to its organization, were conducted through advice given by the war and naval ministers to the emperor. Matters having to do with military orders (commands)— those related to the operational command of the military, in other words— were under the immediate control of the emperor. Accordingly, although the authority of the prime minister extended to matters of military administration to acertain degree, he had no power over military orders, and the Diet was even more powerless. This state of affairs is famously known as the independence of the supreme command (tōsuiken no dokuritsu).”31 Although the powers of the emperor as set out in the constitution were extensive, in reality, all of his powers were exercised in alimited fashion by advice provided 27 SHINICHI, The Political History of Modern Japan, p.50. 28 Ibid, p.51. 29 Ibid, p.51. 30 Ibid, p.51. 31 Ibid, p.51. OPEN ACCESS