US relations with Eastern Europe Realities and perspectives

US relations with Eastern Europe Realities and perspectives Artur Lakatos It is probable, that relations between the USA and the small countries of East-Central Europe have never been as important as nowadays. This may be because of the globalization process, which reduce the importance of frontiers and distances, or because of the new US geopolitical strategy. It may also be simply the result of an uncalculated, but natural evolution of international realities. During the XIX century, the USA was an emerging power, not yet strong enough to interfere in European great power politics, and in East-Central Europe, a region not yet organized into nation-states, authoritarian great powers were dominant The World War I’s result was decided by the intervention of US troops on the side of Entente powers, and President Wilson’s idealistic vision played a great role in the reshaping of borders in this specific area. After Wilson’s political defeat, the leading Republicans chose to remove the USA from international politics and adopted an isolationist general policy. Just as Henry Kissinger wrote in his famous book (Diplomacy) for American policy-makers, Europe seemed to be too distant, with quarrels between states which often seemed for Americans to be senseless.1 And for Eastern European small states, new, insecure, and usually embroiled in quarrels with their neighbors, alliances with European powers were much more important than connections with the distant USA, which lacked both power and will to intervene in these disputes. During World War II, some of the East-Central European states found themselves in the Axis camp, others in the Allied one, and their wartime positions determined their positions and treatment among either the postwar winners or losers. Those which fought alongside the Axis (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) declared war to the USA too, but this did not lead to serious repercussions, it seems, for further relations. The Western world considered these nations primarily as victims of Nazi Germany and their own pro-Fascist governments rather than real aggressors. Besides, after 1948, all the countries which were “freed” by the Red Army became parts of the Soviet Communist Empire, reinforcing their victim status. During the Cold War, these countries were integrated into the bloc considered to be the enemy by the Western democracies. Yet, the inhabitants of these countries were 1 KISSINGER, H., Diplomaţia, Bucureşti 1998, p. 343. OPEN ACCESS 10 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 seen by American politicians2 much more as the victims of a cruel totalitarian system than as enemies, and were treated in this way. There existed many cases in which one or more countries of the region received American sympathy for some act which was against Soviet interests, and this good will was often concretized in economic and political advantages too. Examples include Tito’s opposition to Stalin, the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968 and the Romanian Ceausescu’s opposition toward Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and Polish Solidarnost. After a while, the USA even commercial relations and trading privileges to certain states, based on mutual cooperation and understanding at a certain moment, but these concessions could be used as coercive tools too. For example “most favored nation:” treatment was given to Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland, but was withdrawn from Poland in 1981, because of the imposition of martial law.3 In Romania’s case, the “most favored nation” treatment was revoked in 1988,4 as part of American pressures for the respect of Human rights by Ceausescu’s regime.5 These relations never exceeded in importance those with the Soviet Union, till the collapse of Communist world order, in 1989. After the repressive Communist regimes collapsed in East-Central Europe, these states and nations choose to adopt the model of Western democracy, trying to developwith more or less successfunctional pluralist democracies, with well-working administrative institutions, and economic welfare. On the level of foreign policy, the general goal was integration into “Euro-Atlantic” structures, mainly NATO and the European Union. But American and Western European politicians were suspicious regarding the viability of these new democracies, and asked for serious proofs and guarantees of their competence. The enthusiast application of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 1991 for “Western” structures was politely, but firmly rejected by Western governments in general.6 In 1990 and 1991 important Western leaders, like Francois Mitterrand, John Major and James Baker promised to Gorbaciov that NATO would not expand into former Communist countries.7 Even after the Soviet Union was gone, its main successor, the Russian Federation was immersed in its own internal troubles. Neither the USA, nor the European Union’s main members were in 2 American foreign policy during Cold War has a large bibliography, and among its resources we have to mention: KISSINGER, H., op. cit.; MCCAULEY, M., Russia, America and the Cold War 1949–1991, New York 2004; MAIER, Ch. S., The Cold War in Europe (era of a divided continent), New York 1991; MCWILLIAMS, W. C., The World since 1945: politics, war and revolution in the Nuclear Age, Colorado 1988; WESTAD, O. A. (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War, Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London 2000; etc. 3 HOLSTI, K. J., International Politics, London 1995, p. 168. 4 PUŞCAŞ, V., Sticks and Carrots. Regranting the most-favored Nation Status for Romania (US Congress, 1990–1996), Cluj-Napoca 2006, p. 318. 5 HARRINGTON, J. F. — COURTNEY, B. J., Relaţii româno-americane 1940–1990, Bucureşti 2002, pp. 505–538. 6 ZHONY, Y., The Fallen Wall and its Aftermath: Impact of Regime Change upon Foreign Policy Behavior in Six East European Countries, in: East European Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 235–239. 7 SOLJENÎŢIN, A., Rusia sub avalanşă, Bucureşti 2000, pp. 31–32. ArTur LAkATOS 11 a hurry to embrace former Communist countries, and even less enthusiastic about accepting them as new members in Euro-Atlantic structures. For example, Ronald Steel in one of his essays wrote: “For the time being Eastern Europe is a no-man’s-land, detached from Soviet control, but not yet capable of being absorbed into the democratic West without dangers for all concerned.”8 Professor Stephen Fischer-Galaţi summarized that: “The highly competitive economies are only marginally interested in providing economic assistance or in developing markets in heavily indebted countries with worthless currencies, inefficient work forces, and obsolete industrial plants.”9 In 1997, admission in NATO was refused to most of the candidates with the exception of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. And in the immediately following years there was no sign that this kind of attitude would change into a more permissive one. Jonathan Dean wrote, arguing against further expansion, in 1998: “defending Romania and Bulgaria in the south will require major NATO ground, air and naval installations on the Black Sea, challenging Russia’s traditional influence there.”10 What were the reasons for this attitude of the USA − and other Western states − toward the efforts of former Communist countries to become part of the “club”? They were multiple. One of them could be their cautious approach to offending Russia. Russia ceased to be a superpower for most of the nineties, but its large size and nuclear arsenal made it a presence to be reckoned with, at least in its immediate neighborhood. Looking back on American foreign policy of the nineties, there can be distinguished two main currents in the Department of State: one more enthusiastic, dedicated to enlargement, whose main representative was Richard C. Holbrook, and the “Russia first” current, represented mainly by Strobe Talbot.11 Even if during the last two decades, in most of the cases a violent reaction of the Russian Federation did not happen, and fears from it seemed to be exaggerated, the current situation in Ukraine is proving that Russia is still a force to recon with. Another reason could be that fears regarding the unprepared condition of these states for becoming full members of the Western community. There were real reasons for these concerns, notably the economic decline during the years of transition, the rise of unemployment, poverty and organized crime, the rise of extreme right and Nationalist tendencies in many countries A third motive could be that there existed internal fears in the USA that hasty expansion could have major financial consequences that exceeded the benefits that might accrue. For example there were three major studies of the costs of NATO’s 1997 enlargement, by the Congressional Budget Office the RAND Corporation and a Pentagon report to Congress. Based on their data, experts deduced the following: “The costs of incorporating the backward states and armies of such countries as Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia into NATO — not to mention providing a credible 8 STEEL, R., Europe after the Superpowers, in: HELD, J. (ed.), The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, New York 1992, p. 171. 9 FISCHER-GALAŢI, S., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century: “Old Wine in New Bottles”, in: HELD, J., op. cit., p. 15. 10 MENDELSOHN, J. et al., The Case Against NATO Expansion, in: Current History, Vol. 97, March 1998, pp. 133–135. 11 STAN, V., România şi eşecul campaniei pentru Vest, Bucureşti 1998, p. 37. 12 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 defense of the Baltic republics — will be staggering. If those factors are considered, even the high-end CBO estimate of $ 125 billion might have to be doubled”. It seems this was one of the motives invoked by US officials in private meetings to their Romanian counterparts, at least this is said by analysts familiar with both the American and Romanian culture.12 And there existed a fourth reason, which can affect very seriously National pride of several people, but which is no less important than the others: for the USA, in this period, Central and Eastern Europe represented only some secondary interests in comparison with other region of the world, like Western Europe, the Far East, the Middle East or Latin-America. Representing relatively inconsequential military power, reduced and unsure prospects for economic investments and fertile ground for revival of aggressive nationalist tendencies, Eastand Central European countries could only be seen as “poor relations” by the Western powers. The situation changed a lot after September 11, 2001. This date can even be seen as the point at which visible unipolarity and US hegemony (illustrated by statistics of economic development, high living standards in the country, strong corporations and wars waged with full success and small losses) started to decline and the world began moving toward a more complex and diverse international structure. The USA is still the world’s largest power from political, military and economic perspectives, and it will probably remain so for the next decades. But the terrorist’s attacks demonstrated that the world’s only superpower is also vulnerable, and the expensive, but unsuccessful hunt for Osama bin Laden provides a constant reminder of the limits on US power. The Bush administration’s disastrous management of the Iraqi problem has also revealed these limits. Clearly there are other independent − and formidable − actors in the world, including China, the world’s future superpower, a resurgent Russia, the “Big Tiger” Japan, and perhaps even the European Union too. In these conditions, the strategic importance of EastCentral European states has to be reinterpreted, especially from a strategic point of view. Nowadays, the most important ally of the USA from the region is Poland. The causes are multiple: Poland is the biggest state from the region, with strongest army and largest population, the only one from non-Soviet former Communist states which can be a really useful ally for the US in its worldwide plans. Poles consider the USA, by definition, a traditional friend and ally. In a Paris Match poll, taken in 1983 (after suppression of Solidarnost) Poles rated France, Hungary and the USA as their country’s “best friends”, and USSR, GDR and Czechoslovakia as their “worst enemies”. And things did not change from this perspective. Traditional Polish nationalism perceives the nation as “being squeezed between a Russian rock and a German hard place “13 And Polish lobby is extremely important in the USA’s internal affairs, because of its size and its power. Americans of Polish origin represent the largest ethnic group among Americans of East European origins. From the beginnings of America’s image as “the promised land “, Polish immigration has always been large, In 1930 there 12 GROSS, P. — TISMĂNEANU, V., No NATO Shelter for Romania, in: Transitions, Vol. 4., No 7, December 1997, pp. 26–32. 13 SHARP, J. M. O., Security Options for Central Europe, in: CRAWFORD, B. (ed.), The Future of European Security, Berkeley 1992, p. 64. ArTur LAkATOS 13 were almost 2 millions of first and second generation Poles in the US, concentrated mostly in the great cities,14 and their number grew in time. Probably because of this important group of US voters, but also because of Poland’s size and relative power in its geographic region, Poland is one of those countries which feels free occasionally to Us policies, when they are not affecting truly important problems. When the Clinton administration launched with great fanfare the “Partnership for Peace “ program, the Polish president of those years, Lech Walesa could adopt a skeptical position, calling the initiative “ too little “, and “ blackmailing “.15 But this does not mean that AmericanPolish relations ever suffered some serious crises. Actually, Poland is one of those allies of the USA which can offer not only moral, but serious military and diplomatic help too as, it did several times. Poland supported recent US military actions, and in case of Iraq, it was rewarded with command of a whole region. During Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, the Deputy Secretary of the US was in regular contact all the time with Polish president Kwasniewski too16 — among other important politicians-for information exchange and coordination of strategies. Overall, Poland remains a steadfast ally of the United States.. The F-16 affair early in 2004 provides a good example of this stance. Poland decided to buy 48 US-built F-16 (Fighting Falcon) airplanes to modernize its air force, in this way refusing two European alternative offers. The gesture was not welcomed by European powers, but this was secondary for the Polish administration. As Janusz Reiter a former Polish ambassador to Germany, head of the Warsaw Center for International Relations noted: “If you make people in Poland choose between the U.S. and Europe in the security field, they will choose the U.S. Why? Because of history, but also the feeling that in security policy, Europe still is a promise. The U.S. is reality.”17 The bilateral cooperation was even more strengthened recently by the current crisis in Ukraine, Poland acting as a loyal ally of the West in its conflict with the Russian interests. Another reliable ally for the USA from the region is the Czech Republic. As Professor Murray Wanderbaum wrote, “Traditionally, the United States has a very special relationship with the Czech people. There is a substantial reservoir of goodwill towards Americans. The United States was instrumental in establishing an independent Czechoslovakia”.18 The USA offered important help to the Czechs during the nineties for a successful transition into an open market economy, and the US remains ranked among the top five foreign sources of investment. Investors were and are among the first five in the country. The Czech Republic committed itself also to the American 14 GARRET, S., Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy, in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 2, Summer 1978, p. 302. 15 ALBRIGHT, M., Doamna secretar de stat, Bucureşti 2004, pp. 226–227. 16 CLARK, W., Broken Engagement. The strategy that won the Cold War could help bring democracy to the Middle Eastif only the Bush hawks understood it, in: http://www.washingtonmothly.com/fetures/2004/0405.clark.html [20. 11. 2006]. 17 MORAN, M., For Poles, the choice was easy. But Warsaw’s U.S.-Europe balancing act will get harder, in: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4038199/ [28. 08. 2006]. 18 WANDERBAUM, M., An American Look at the Czech Republic, in: Vital Speeches of The Day, Vol. 72., Nov. 2006, Issue 25, p. 736. 14 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 side in the international struggle against terrorism, which is acknowledged by US officials. The Czech Republic and its government can be vulnerable to serious pressures, as an example from the middle of the nineties shows. In 1996, Czech officials had to answer to international pressure, coming from the Council of Europe, US Congress and US State department, and the Parliament amended the provision requiring two years of residence and five years of a clean criminal record for obtaining citizenship, and gave to the Ministry of Internal Affairs discretion to enforce this condition for Slovak citizens residing permanently in the country since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.19 Czech intellectuals — especially from the nineties — do not necessarily follow blindly any kind of Western directives. For example, Vaclav Havel in first postCold War years proposed the dismantling of both NATO and Warsaw Pact and the removal of American forces Europe.20 But these proposals never caused any serious conflict, not even at a diplomatic level, and ties between the two countries continue to be strong. The vote given in November 2012 in the General Assembly of the UN concerning the according to Palestine the status of non-member observer state, illustrated well how stable harmony is between American and Czech diplomatic actions. From the nine votes against, the Czech vote was the only one coming from Europe, A similar, but in some aspects different evolution took place in American relations with the second successor state of former Czechoslovakia, Slovakia. Slovakia always kept good and correct relations with the USA, but some aspects of Slovakian internal political life, notably the strong nationalism, often causes disquiet among neighboring countries and Western officials. The example of the Meciar government (1994–1998) clearly shows how damaging an extremely Nationalist government can be for integration of a country in transition. Slovakia became under Meciar’s rule the pariah of the Visegrad Four, and at the NATO summit in Madrid Madeleine Albright told him frankly that because of him, Slovakia was not accepted in the same wave of NATO enlargement with the other three.21 And in his book about American supremacy George Soros openly admits, that his Foundation did everything to contribute to Meciar’s fall from 1998, just as it did later in the cases of Milosevic and Tudjman too.22 But there existed no serious sanctions, just as they do not exist right now, when another Nationalist coalition is on power, and official US-Slovak relations continue on a positive track. Diplomatic relations are normal, the flow of investments and people are not made harder, and Slovakian troops were also in Iraq, along with those of neighboring countries. Aggressive aspects of Slovak nationalism can be source of tensions for the future, but it is less likely to affect general strategic issues. Hungary is one of the most stable pillars of Central Europe, from a general Western point of view, and US officials generally hold this view. Diplomatic and political 19 KAVAN, Z. — PALOUS, M., Democracy in the Czech Republic, in: KALDOR, M. — VOJVODA, I. (eds.), Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, New York 2002, p. 90. 20 FAWN, R., Symbolism in the Diplomacy of Czech President Vaclav Havel, in: East European Quarterly, Spring 1999, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 3. 21 ALBRIGHT, M., op. cit., p. 344. 22 SOROS, G., Supremaţia americană: un balon de săpun, Cluj-Napoca 2004, p. 113. ArTur LAkATOS 15 relationships are and continue to be strong, and officials of both countries often talk about the need to develop these connections. American sympathy toward Hungary started to become strong after the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and in the following decades, Hungary took a somewhat different path from other Communist countries in the region: at the level of official foreign policy it created no problems for the USSR, and in exchange it was allowed to liberalize its economy. The existence of private small businesses, and foreign companies were also welcome in the country’s economy. The transition during the nineties was not as painful and worrying as in neighboring countries, so Hungary was — for most western officials — quite a positive example, and relations of the country were strengthened with Western states, among them the USA too.23 American government officials generally view with approval events which improved Hungarian relations with it neighboring states. As an example, in September 1996, US ambassadors to Hungary and Romania jointly wrote a congratulatory text in the “Washington Post “newspaper on the occasion of the signing of the “basic” treaty between the two neighbor countries.24 But there existed cases of unhappiness as well. After September 2001 Hungary decided to buy Swedish Grippens instead of American F-16s for modernizing its air force, a decision which was not very welcomed by USA officials, and according to Hungarian diplomatic sources, this seems to be one of the reasons Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was not received in Washington by Bush during the next year.25 But since Hungary otherwise committed itself to the war against terror, there were no visible angry disputes between the two countries. On the other hand, Hungary considers itself part of Western civilization and desires to act in this way. As former Socialist Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, László Kovács pointed out with the NATO ascension of the country, in 1997: “In seeking to join NATO, Hungary is not motivated by the fear of a military threat. Our determination to become a member of the Alliance is based on shared values and the desire to contribute to a favorable security environment. In our opinion, NATO enlargement represents the eastward expansion of the region of security and stability in Europe. It is our goal to be part of this region, and to enjoy the benefits of security that NATO membership guarantees. At the same time, we clearly understand the obligations of membership and intend to make our contribution to mutual defense and enhanced security and stability in our region and Europe as whole.”26 And even if US officials tend to criticize the current Orbán government, it is less likely that these could turn into sanctions, and they certainly do not affect interstate level affairs. The current relative coldness installed in American-Hungarian relations is a consequence of 23 GOLDMAN, M. F., Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Political, Economic and Social Challenges, New York 1997, p. 212. 24 MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, A., Romania: From Procedural Democracy to European Integration, in: KALDOR, M. — VOJVODA, I. (eds.), op. cit., p. 145. 25 András KIRÁLY, Összefoglalja a Csurka-táviratokat a külügy, in: http://index.hu/politika/ belfold/ujcikk9390/ [15. 08. 2006]. 26 KOVÁCS, L., Hungary’s contribution to European security, in: NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 5., September-October 1997, p. 9. 16 DVACÁTÉ STOLETÍ 1/2015 personal and principia-based misunderstanding, and does not seem to affect major strategic goals. Romania’s importance for the USA increased considerably in recent years. In the first half of the nineties, Romania, mostly because of its economic problems was a kind of outsider for the West among those countries which sought to become parts of the prosperous world. Even if after the fall of Ceausescu’s regime US-Romanian relations improved, especially with Romanian support for the Gulf War there remained serious question marks regarding the commitment of the Romanian post-Communist elite to individual and communitarian human rights, the market economy and democracy.27 For Romanian public opinion, it was especially shocking that their country — in spite of all its efforts — was not admitted in the first wave of NATO enlargement, despite of the support of several European powers. Madeleine Albright admits in her memories that US officials felt themselves a bit guilty regarding this, during their visit to Romania.28 There is no wonder that after Madrid, beside Poland, Romania was the only country visited by Clinton and Albright. Nevertheless, Romanian public opinion did not turn against the USA, not even in the bitterness caused by this. As Vladimir Tismăneanu writes: “Romania’s leaders understood that in 1997 they were rejected because of US internal political issues, even the leaders of opposition did not speculated it.”29 The situation for Romania changed drastically after September 11th 2001. The new conditions favored the geopolitical situation of the country. At NATO summit in Prague, Romania was admitted without any question, and was also one of the two countries which President Bush visited immediately after the summit. Romanian troops participate with American forces in peacekeeping actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and former Yugoslavian territories, and Romanian foreign policy is very pro-American, but also tries to exploit some traditional, historical ties with European powers like France, Germany and Italy. When there are disputes, Romanian diplomacy traditionally tries to balance between the EU and the USA. As president Băsescu formulated in one of his recent speeches from January 20, 2006: “Romania will remain a strong supporter of a strong connection between Europe and the United States.“30 Currently, since Romania’s access is still denied in the Schengen zone, Romanian leading politicians are going to search even more improvement of relations with the USA. Due to the current events in Ukraine and the Middle East, the geopolitical importance of Romania can only grow for politicians and military leaders of the USA. Bulgaria is an even more special case. Perhaps Bulgaria is the least enthusiastic regarding relations with the USA of all these countries, but at the same time, it is a potentially important ally too. Traditionally, Bulgarian nationalism was pro-Russian and pro-German at the same time, and even today, in Bulgaria frustration because of former Soviet domination is incomparably much lower than in Poland, Hungary or 27 GOLDMAN, M. F., op. cit., pp. 296–298. 28 ALBRIGHT, M., op. cit., pp. 345–347. 29 GROSS, P. — TISMĂNEANU, V., op. cit., p. 27. 30 Extract from President Băsescu’s speech at January 20 2006, in: Lumea, 2006, Year XIII, Nr. 2 (154), p. 14. ArTur LAkATOS 17 Romania. Just as Romania, Bulgaria was considered to be in a second later group than the Visegrad Four regarding integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, partly because the Bulgarians always have been much less enthusiastic regarding this, than their neighbors from the North. During 1997’s NATO enlargement, in Sofia, US academics were much more interested in events surrounding the expansion process than their Bulgarian hosts.31 Bulgaria in the level of its foreign policy kept its distance from Yugoslav conflict and strengthened economic cooperation with Western Europe, especially with Germany and Italy.32 However, exactly the Kosovo phase of the Yugoslav conflict illustrated the importance of Romania and Bulgaria in the Balkans, a conflict where Bulgaria took the side, with all of its sympathy for Russia, of the Western powers.33 In 2002, it became a member of NATO, and from January 1st 2007, also a member of the European Union, together with Romania. Bulgarian troops also participated in Iraq, and the country’s territory is playing a key role in US strategy for the Middle East, Black Sea and Balkan areas. It is very probable that in the nearby future, USA relations with Eastern European countries are going to be strengthened, and the American government is going to take steps in this direction, even if they will never reach the importance of relations with regional great powers of the world. The causes for this are multiple: political, geostrategic and economic causes can be distinguished. Political causes are simple, the need to nurture the new democratic regimes of the region and the strength of ethnic lobbies in the United States, and their influence on domestic politics. Their role is not decisive in absolute terms (these immigrants represents a relatively small minority in comparison with African Americans or Hispanics) but they are not to be neglected. Larry Diamond characterized the former Communist countries from East and Central Europe: “… do not generate problems for the United States. For the most part, they are our pillars of regional stability and freedom or at least countries with which we can do business and expect cooperation. They are not sources of the criminal and terrorist violence that threaten the United States.”34 And this fact is especially important from a propagandistic point of view for American foreign policy. Traditionally, the USA defines itself as the main promoter of the values of liberal democracy in the world, among which the most important are pluralist liberal democracy, open-market economy and respect for individual human rights. The USA in both World Wars, and after them, in regional conflicts during Cold War, proclaimed the importance of protection of these values from their enemies. But many times circumstances caused the US to ally itself with states seen elsewhere 31 LEONARD, T. M., NATO expansion: Romania and Bulgaria within the Larger Context, in: East European Quarterly, Vol. 33, January 2000, p. 517. 32 LEFEBVRE, S., Bulgaria’s foreign relations in the Post-Communist Era: A General Overview and Assessment, in: East European Quarterly, Vol. 28, January 1995, p. 453. 33 GALLAGHER, T., Balcanii în noul mileniu în umbra războiului şi a păcii, Bucureşti 2006, p. 255. 34 DIAMOND, L., Building a World of Liberal Democracies, in: HENRIKSEN, H. T., Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Perspectives, Stanford 2001, p. 54.