Policy transfer in higher education policy formation
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67 Policy transfer in higher education policy formation Johanna Moisio Introduction The year 2006 marked the start of preparations leading to university reform in Finland. The national discussion on university reform was held concurrently with the higher education (HE) modernisation discourse in the Council of the European Union (EU). There is existing research on the development of EU-level cooperation and the development of Finnish HE policy, but relatively little research on the significance of EU HE policy cooperation in member states. The research problem, then, is the connection between EU and nationallevel discussions on HE policy. The research presented in this chapter evaluated the connection between national higher education policy formation and EU-level discussion on higher education. Policy transfer theory has been tested by Moisio (2014) as an explanatory model for studying the success or failure of EU cooperation in HE policy. The policy transfer method pays particular attention to the policy formation process and the possibility of transfer of ideas, policies and arrangements from one political setting to another setting or system (Radaelli 2000; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).
68 Johanna Moisio Elias Pekkola & Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki & Yuzhuo Cai & Anu Lyytinen (Eds.) Policy learning and policy transfer There is some evidence that the EU education policy discourse has been transferred to EU member states. Lange and Alexiadou’s (2010) research differentiates various policy learning styles (mutual learning, competitive policy learning, imperialistic policy learning and surface policy learning) in education policy by categorising different types of interactions between the same range of public policy actors (member states themselves and member states and the European Commission). The concept of mutual learning holds that qualitative knowledge about different practices is as important as quantitative information. Participation in mutual learning is voluntary, and participating countries/member states have positive incentives to participate (in clusters and peer learning activities) when the knowledge from these events may help them solve national policy problems. According to Lange and Alexiadou, the concept of competitive policy learning focuses more on the quantitative side of cooperation. Various EU institutions (Eurostat, Cedefop and the European Training Foundation) develop statistical analyses of education practices in the EU. Competitive learning starts from specific assumptions, indicators or benchmarks, and discussions are limited to the selected problems. While mutual learning is aimed at the deep learning of traditions and politics, the goal of competitive learning is to open up international comparisons. Competitive learning depends on the pressure created on member states. Because states are motivated to preserve their good reputation, pressure becomes effective when combined with media attention. Since statistics are created mainly by formal institutions, competitive learning is less of a bottom-up process than mutual learning (pp. 452–454). Lawn and Lingard’s (2002, 300) earlier study also stresses the importance of statistical production—previously done mainly by the OECD but latterly by the EU as well—and the statistical comparison that is central to harmonisation. However, Erkkilä (2014) argues that the European Commission has increased its role in HE policy by using global university rankings. These rankings have created “a political imaginary competition, where European universities must be reformed if they are to be successful” (p. 92).
69 Policy transfer in higher education policy formation Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives on Higher Education Management and Transformation The concept of imperialistic policy learning refers to the attempt by some countries to export their national education policies to others as well as to the European Commission’s policy agenda (Lange & Alexiadou 2010, 452–454). There is some evidence that this has been one of the goals of the United Kingdom’s HE policy (Alexiadou & Lange 2011). Conversely, surface policy learning refers to a more passive or negative response by a member state, which is an attempt to minimise the influence of the Commission or other member states. Learning, for the most part, entails only observation of possible infringements of national sovereignty that should be reported back to national administrations. Another manifestation of surface policy learning, according to Lange and Alexiadou (2010, 455–456), is the national progress reporting for Education and Training 2010/2020, which sometimes only describes member states’ own national education policies, even with regard to benchmarks that differ in scope or timeline from those mutually agreed at the EU level. As members of international structures or regimes, national governments may have to adopt policies as part of their obligations. The question here is whether policy transfer within the EU can be interpreted as coercive, given that individual nations have, in principle, joined the EU voluntarily. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, 14–15) point out that each member state does have influence over the adoption of EU policies; thus, they actively and voluntarily shape EU politics. It is therefore possible to argue that policy transfer in the EU is both obligated and negotiated. Contemporary policies are increasingly affected by policy transfer, especially in the European context, because of close cooperation between many policy fields. As part of globalisation and Europeanisation, politicians and civil servants have become acquainted with each other, and at the same time, international organisations and policy entrepreneurs “sell” policies around the world. Teichler (2004) wisely reminds us, however, that although the increase of knowledge transfer across nations has typically been seen as a phenomenon of globalisation, one must keep in mind that governments are highly active in shaping the rules of knowledge transfer, doing so in order to maximise their
70 Johanna Moisio Elias Pekkola & Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki & Yuzhuo Cai & Anu Lyytinen (Eds.) national gains (p. 13). The penultimate section of this chapter examines the concept of policy transfer in greater depth. Policy transfer and explaining lesson drawing Radaelli (2000) and Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) define policy transfer as a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting or system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting or system. Dale (1999) identifies a total of eight mechanisms under policy transfer: borrowing, learning, teaching, harmonisation, dissemination, standardisation, installing interdependence and imposition. Policy transfer is the comprehensive term for all these mechanisms, covering both voluntary and coercive transfer in different circumstances and by various actors. The concepts of policy transfer and policy diffusion are both founded on the notion that the ideas of other countries or systems may be worth testing elsewhere. These policies may either spread or be transferred to new environments. The difference between policy transfer and policy diffusion is that diffusion studies tend not to reveal anything about the content of new policies, focusing more on process than on substance (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 345). In the globalised world of the twenty-first century, policy transfer is a policy formation tool that has gradually increased in use between nations.1 Public policy is something that is both global and national, and policy-makers study other political systems for new ideas about policies, programmes, institutions and jurisdictions, which they look to apply to their own context. The policy transfer concept can be used either as an independent variable—to explain 1 Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) mention three reasons for increasing policy transfer: global economic pressure, rapid growth of communications and the influence of international organisations.
71 Policy transfer in higher education policy formation Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives on Higher Education Management and Transformation why a particular policy was adopted—or as a dependent variable, to explain why transfer occurs (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 354). The following questions can usefully be asked about policy transfer. Why engage in policy transfer? Who transfers policy? What is transferred? From where and why? How is the transfer composed, and what are the different degrees of transfer? How is the process related to policy success or failure (see Radaelli 2000; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000)? It has been shown that at least six main categories of actors are involved in policy transfer: elected officials, political parties, civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts and supranational institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 345). Policy transfer may be either voluntary or coercive and includes objects such as policy goals, structure and content, instruments and techniques, institutions, ideology, attitudes and concepts as well as negative lessons (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 350). Voluntary transfer is usually based on a perceived dissatisfaction with a current state or even on observed policy failure. Uncertainty about the reasons behind problems or the effects of previous decisions may prompt actors to search for policies they might wish to borrow. As Haas (quoted in Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 347) put it: “International collaboration…is an attempt to reduce uncertainty”. Coercive transfer can take place either directly or indirectly. Direct coercive transfer occurs when transfer is required by an external actor. However, that obligation is rarely imposed by another state; international institutions are typical players in direct coercive actions, and EU legislation is a good example of this kind of measure. Indirect coercive methods derive from a variety of situations, including technological development, economic pressures and international consensus. Fears of being left behind on an important public issue may also generate attention and lead to policy transfer: “A country can indirectly be pushed towards policy transfer if political actors perceive their country falling behind its neighbours or competitors” (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 347–349). This can be driven by international comparisons, which are made against the current best. The international flow of national data has increased, and comparison is now an everyday business, usually conducted
72 Johanna Moisio Elias Pekkola & Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki & Yuzhuo Cai & Anu Lyytinen (Eds.) between countries. It has been argued that comparison is a highly visible tool for governing at all levels: at the organisational level for management purposes and at the state level for governing and measuring performance (e.g. PISA) (Grek, Lawn, Lingard, Ozga, Rinne, Segerholm & Simola 2009, 10). Another question concerns why countries engage in policy transfer. Both supporters and opponents of various policies use reasoning, as needed, to win support for their ideas. It has been noted that policy lessons from abroad can also be used as neutral truths, but equally, these truths can also be used as political weapons (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 346). Dale observes that policy borrowing, in particular, is often related to policy legitimation and political usefulness since borrowing is voluntary and is conducted between more or less compatible systems: “We don’t usually borrow something we don’t know we have a use, even a need for…” (Dale 1999, 9). The factors that may constrain policy transfer are multiple, and the viability of the transferred subject will be judged at a national level according to existing norms and expectations (p. 9). The more complex the policy or programme, the more difficult it is to transfer, and differences or similarities between host and target countries or systems also matter. However, the simpler the expected outcomes are to predict, the easier the transfer becomes. Bureaucratic size and efficiency may also influence transfer, as well as economic resources, since implementation often requires financial measures (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 354). Policy learning can be understood as one of the tools of policy transfer,2 which entails learning about organisations, programmes or policies. The definition of the term is quite broad and may mean that some form of learning is likely to be present in any mechanism of policy transfer. According to Dale (1999, 10–11), normal policy-making is associated with learning about instruments, while learning about policy goals arises in relation to reforms or shifts in policy paradigms. 2 According to Hill (1997), policy transfer theory builds on Rose’s (1991; 1993) work on policy learning.
73 Policy transfer in higher education policy formation Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives on Higher Education Management and Transformation Policy transfer through harmonisation is commonplace in some areas of European integration. The harmonisation mechanism works through collective agreement, whereby all member states pool some of their sovereignty for the benefit of the EU. Dissemination differs from harmonisation in its dimension and extent: the OECD is a good example of an international actor that disseminates ideas to participant countries that do not have the competency to harmonise policies. Installing interdependence is a policy transfer mechanism that usually concerns issues that go beyond the scope of any nation state (peace, environment or human rights). It is focused purely on policy goals and usually works in a bottom-up manner, including the whole of civil society. Finally, imposition is coercive and is the only mechanism that does not require learning, persuasion or cooperation (Dale 1999, 9–15). Bulmer and Padgett (2004) use another typology to define different types of policy transfer. Emulation or copying is the strongest form of transfer, involving the borrowing of a policy model, in its entirety, from another jurisdiction. Conversely, synthesis includes elements of a policy from several sources. Influence is a weak form of transfer, which only inspires a new policy. Finally, an abortive measure occurs when transfer is hindered by the borrower (p. 106). In order to understand policy transfer, it is necessary to recognise several other factors. It is not enough to treat transfer as if it were an “all-or-nothing” process: the motivations involved must also be taken into consideration. The policies may develop over time, especially when borrowing policies from elsewhere. Second, different actors may have different motivations. It is likely that politicians and policy entrepreneurs will introduce a process on a voluntary basis, but when international organisations become involved, this is likely to result in some coercive policy transfer—although, of course, this depends on the particular action. Finally, the timing of the transfer also affects the process. In times of political and economic stability, transfer is likely to be voluntary. However, during political crises, policy transfer is likely to have some coercive elements (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 16-17).
74 Johanna Moisio Elias Pekkola & Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki & Yuzhuo Cai & Anu Lyytinen (Eds.) The concept of policy diffusion is a little different from that of policy transfer. Policy diffusion is analysed to identify why some governments come to adopt policies brought from elsewhere and why others are more reluctant—why governments differ in their readiness to act. At one end of the scale is immunity, where no diffusion of a policy is possible because the organisational or state unit is not open to new external ideas; at the opposite end is isomorphism, meaning that diffusion of ideas and concepts occurs quite easily, producing homogenisation across states. In reacting to external policy pressure, there are three means or strategic choices: resistance, imitation and adaptation. Resistance is a likely initial reaction to external pressure, protecting already established values from external ideas. Strong resistance may make the state or organisation immune to new ideas and concepts. Imitation relates to the concept of isomorphism, whereby new ideas are adopted smoothly and receptively (Bache & Olsson 2001, 218). Adaptation may occur on a conceptual level or in practice, or even both. On the conceptual level, an organisation or state may adopt ideas from the external world as a rational strategy. However, changes at the conceptual level may also change practice. The discourse around new ideas in an organisation or a state unit may impact “like a virus that spreads and infects the behaviour” (Bache & Olsson 2001, 218). Adaptation may also work like a translation process, in which ideas and concepts may be given a local perspective (see Bache & Olsson 2001, 218; Karakhanyan, van Veen & Bergen 2011, 23–24). While policy diffusion emphasises structures, the concept of policy transfer stresses policy content and the role of agency in transferring ideas and practices; thus, the concepts are interactive (Karakhanyan et al. 2011, 58). Policy transfer in the EU Radaelli (2000) attempts to understand policy change within the EU by utilising the concept of policy transfer. He observes that the EU is in fact an enormous platform of different policy transfers from dominant countries and/ or from advocacy coalitions to other countries and coalitions. The European
75 Policy transfer in higher education policy formation Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives on Higher Education Management and Transformation Commission can be seen as an active policy entrepreneur in this process, acting in concert with other “policy transfer activists” such as pressure groups or policy experts. Policy transfer implies that “policy diffusion is a rational process wherein imitation, copying and adaptation are the consequences of rational decisions by policy-makers” (Radaelli 2000, 26, 38). Radaelli (2000, 31–32) describes the legitimation of the European Monetary Union by a transfer process that included several central elements: history and learning, bargaining, the anchoring power of the Deutschmark and consensus on the paradigm of policy credibility. Policy transfer can occur both as dependent and independent variables. One can explain policy transfer as a process or use policy transfer to explain policy outcomes (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 8). Radaelli (2003, 12) argues that policy learning within the EU context is mostly about power. The formation of indicators, peer reviews and common guidelines supports this view as they produce hierarchies of various responses to political problems and create different pressures on member states to adapt. According to Bulmer and Padgett (2004), there has been little consensus on how policy transfer really works in the EU. Their argument is that because there are varied governance structures within the EU, they generate various transfer types. This, in particular, explains why the EU is such a good “laboratory” for testing the policy transfer concept. The authors identify three different forms of governance in EU politics, which will be introduced next and summarised in Table 1 (see also Bulmer et al. 2007). Hierarchical governance operates in policies related directly to the single market, where the EU may exercise supranational power granted by the treaties and utilise coercive measures of policy transfer. These measures are based on supranational European law, but they are also based on the powers delegated to supranational institutions, such as the Commission’s powers in relation to competition policy. A state must adopt such a policy as a member of an international organisation or as a condition of financial assistance from it. This form of governance involves a high level of institutionalisation. Hierarchical transfer is related to “negative” integration, which is the purest form of this
82 Johanna Moisio Elias Pekkola & Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki & Yuzhuo Cai & Anu Lyytinen (Eds.) in so doing, they reflect the policy choices of other governments or perceived European developments. It is possible to conclude, however, that policy transfer can be useful when explaining the outcomes of the four categories of description here. Moreover, the results suggest that the theoretical development could be further improved by introducing the concepts of interaction and/or policy spin. The outcome space below shows how the significance of EU cooperation arises according to the understandings of Finnish HE policy experts, from category D (irrelevance and resistance) to category A (change)—that is, from entirely voluntary cooperation (OMC) to semi-coercive negotiated transfer (the Lisbon Strategy implementation). The categories are different and separate, but their contents are mutually supportive. For instance, the notion of a new kind of interdependence in category A supports the understanding of a variety of influences on a member state from EU cooperation. Category C, in describing fusion, supports category A in characterising change in EU-level cooperation: other forms of cooperation (OECD and Bologna) were seen to be important, but the relevance of EU cooperation increased at the turn of the century. The understandings in category D of the irrelevance of the OMC and soft law can also be supported by category C, where the interviewees observed that the EU is only one form of international cooperation. Clearly, although they can be introduced separately, the categories are also interconnected. Figure 1 presents the completed outcome space for the four results categories. The preliminary outcome space improved with the scale of policy transfer (according to Bulmer et al. 2007). EU HE policy cooperation does not reach the point of entirely coercive transfer, moving from completely voluntary policy transfer to semi-coercive policy transfer when connected with overall EU goals, such as the Lisbon Strategy. To date, there has been no direct imposition of implementation of EU HE policy; thus, the outcome space stops at semi-coercive transfer. Here, the term “to date” is of relevance, as the new EU2020 strategy and its follow-up, with the European semester and new financial regulation, may change the situation in the near future. This may be a theme for further research.
83 Policy transfer in higher education policy formation Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives on Higher Education Management and Transformation With reference to the scale of policy transfer (from Bulmer et al. 2007, 15), EU HE policy cooperation has changed from voluntary to semi-coercive policy transfer, but it has yet to become entirely coercive. Conclusion Effective policy analysis requires knowledge of how policy works. If reformers do not understand causation in public policy, they cannot assess whether or not their choices will work. A failure to understand decision-making procedures and the context within which they work often results in inappropriate choices when transforming methods of policy-making (John 1998, 10). The purpose of this chapter was to describe how, through the transferability and functionality of transfer mechanisms, it is possible to study the effectiveness of policy cooperation. Policy transfer theory may help in understanding what is significant in EU cooperation and which methods of EU cooperation transfer Figure 1. Outcome space: From voluntary to semi-coercive transfer Entirely Coercive (direct imposition) Perfectly Voluntary (lesson-drawing) Semi-Coercive (negotiated, perceived necessity)
84 Johanna Moisio Elias Pekkola & Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki & Yuzhuo Cai & Anu Lyytinen (Eds.) policies to the national level. In the post-2006 context of Finnish HE policy formation, there was a clear connection between EU-level and national-level decision-making. The theoretical framework offers an approach to combining the different findings and observations and can be used as an “overcoat” for the study, but theory alone cannot explain all possible results (Maxwell 1996, 33).
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