Redefining habits and linking habits with other implicit processes

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details. Author(s): Title: Year: Version: Copyright: Rights: Rights url: Please cite the original version: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Redefining habits and linking habits with other implicit processes © 2019 Elsevier Inc Accepted version (Final draft) Hagger, Martin S. Hagger, M. S. (2019). Redefining habits and linking habits with other implicit processes. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 46, Article 101606. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2019.101606 2019 Journal Pre-proof Redefining habits and linking habits with other implicit processes Martin S. Hagger PII: S1469-0292(19)30471-6 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2019.101606 Reference: PSYSPO 101606 To appear in: Psychology of Sport & Exercise Received Date: 27 June 2019 Revised Date: 30 September 2019 Accepted Date: 1 October 2019 Please cite this article as: Hagger, M.S., Redefining habits and linking habits with other implicit processes, Psychology of Sport & Exercise (2019), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.psychsport.2019.101606. This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 1 Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Other Implicit Processes Martin S. Hagger University of California, Merced and University of Jyväskylä Author Note Martin S. Hagger, Psychological Sciences, University of California, Merced, USA and Faculty of Sport and Health Sciences, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland. Martin Hagger’s contribution was supported by a Finnish Distinguished Professor (FiDiPro) award from Business Finland (1801/31/2015). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Martin S. Hagger, SHARPP Lab, Psychological Sciences, University of California, Merced, 5200 North Lake Road, Merced, CA 95343, USA. Email: [email protected] RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 1 Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Other Implicit Processes RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 2 Abstract In their commentaries on Hagger (2019), Gardner, Rebar, and Lally (2019) and Phillips (2019) provide welcome debate on the conceptualization and operation of habits in physical activity. In this response, I extend their comments by (i) calling for a redefining of habits to encompass contemporary views of habit, and (ii) suggesting that descriptions of physical activity habits should make reference to their relations with other implicit constructs that reflect automatic processes. Specifically, I contend that extant definitions of habits for complex behaviors like physical activity should move away from definitions of unitary responses to specific cues or contexts, and, focus on ‘macro’ expressions of the behavior that comprise multiple sub-actions, which can each be controlled by habitual or deliberative processing. It may also be useful for definitions to make the distinction between habitual instigation and execution, affording greater precision in descriptions of the processes that generate habitual behaviors. Finally, physical activity habits as cue-action relations are unlikely to be enacted in the absence of activation of other implicit processes, consistent with behavioral schema. Recognizing this, I contend that descriptions of habit should accommodate these links, and that they may be useful in elaborating on the processes by which habits determine subsequent physical activity behavior. Keywords: behavioral automaticity; habitual behaviors; automatic processes; dual-process theories; behavioral schema RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 3 Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Other Implicit Processes Phillips’ (2019) and Gardner, Rebar, and Lally’s (2019) commentaries on my review of habits in physical activity (Hagger, 2019) have provided welcome debate on the definitions and operationalization of key concepts and mechanisms relevant to understanding habitual behaviors in this domain. Common to both commentaries is the importance of clarifying the defining characteristics of habit (e.g., viewing habits as a construct or behavioral impulse, defining habitual actions as a hierarchy of higherand lower-order actions and sub-actions), and the distinction between different types of habitual acting (e.g., habitual instigation and execution). Related to these points, both authors challenge the view of strictly characterizing habitual behaviors as an exclusively automatic process, and suggest that habits for complex behaviors like physical activity often comprise blends of sub-actions, some of which are controlled by non-conscious, automatic processes, and others controlled by reasoned, deliberative processes, consistent with contemporary views of action derived from dual process models. In this response I contribute to this debate by (i) suggesting that definitions of habits should be revised to reflect the relativist view of complex habitual behaviors as blends of sub-actions each under deliberative or habitual control; and, (ii) proposing that descriptions of physical activity habits should make reference to relations of habits with constructs that reflect other automatic, non-conscious processes that determine behavior, and call for research that explores the extent to which these analogs of automatic processes coincide. Redefining Definitions of Habits A key issue emerging from contemporary research on habits in the physical activity domain, which was also lucidly highlighted in the commentaries (Gardner et al., 2019; Phillips, 2019), is the extent to which, and the ways in which, habitual behaviors are controlled by automatic, non-conscious processes. Because definitions of habits place considerable emphasis on the non-conscious, automatic characteristic, it often engenders the false belief that habitual behaviors, insofar as they are global actions observed at the ‘macro’ level, are exclusively controlled by such processes. However, RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 4 developments in theory on habit have made it clear that complex behaviors like physical activity are unlikely to be exclusively controlled by non-conscious processes 1 . Such behaviors involve multiple sub-actions and strategic sequencing of those actions in order for the observed behavior at the ‘macro’ level to be performed. It is, therefore, unlikely that the behavior and all its sub-actions are performed automatically and non-consciously. As Phillips (2019) suggests, “to enact… a complex health behavior without conscious awareness is unlikely in the extreme, and no data exists to show exercising can be done without conscious awareness of one’s actions” (p. 8). This is echoed by other authors. For example, Wood (2017), invoke the distinction between reasoned, deliberative decision making and automatic, non-conscious processes proposed in dual process models of behavior (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Hagger, 2016; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006), suggest that “any dualist comparison between acting on habit versus acting on deliberate thought is overly simplistic. Many behaviors… are complex and probably draw on both memory systems” (p. 393). The notion, advocated by Gardner et al. (2016; 2019) and Phillips (2019), that complex behaviors are a blend of behaviors that are consciously enacted and automatic processes has utility in advancing theoretical understanding on habits, and is consistent with research evidence (Botvinick & Plaut, 2006; Clegg, DiGirolamo, & Keele, 1998; Graybiel, 2008; Savalia, Shukla, & Bapi, 2016). For example, research has shown that, over time, experience of executing a behavior in the presence of relevant contextual features or cues, which could be external or internal to the individual, as Phillips (2019) so eloquently argues, will lead to a gradual transition from conscious to automatic control (Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 2010). Of course, this does not mean that the behavior becomes entirely controlled non-consciously, rather that some aspects of performing the behavior become less reliant or dependent on conscious, deliberative control with control shifting toward non-conscious, 1 It is important to note that many everyday behaviors could be considered complex from this analytic perspective. As Gardner (2015) points out, “there is a disconnect between these relatively complex behaviours and the simple actions that have been the focus of investigation within other sub-disciplines of psychology” such as research by behaviorists, which tends to focus on simple behaviors like “pulling strings and lifting latches”, and research by neuroscientists that continues to “investigate habit through observations of key presses, lever pushes and simple object selection tasks” (p. 281). From this perspective, therefore, even relatively mundane actions like getting dressed or making a cup of tea should be considered complex, and can be broken down into sets of sub-actions that could vary in the extent to which they are controlled by automatic or conscious processes. RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 5 automatic processes. For example, if one were to conduct a ‘meso’ or ‘micro’ level analysis of the subactions that comprise the performance of a particular physical activity, it is possible that some will still be consciously determined and others controlled by automatic processes. For example, sets of actions required for the ‘macro-level’ observable behavior of ‘going cycling’ is likely to require identifying an appropriate time, evaluating feasibility (e.g., weather traffic conditions), assembling necessary kit and getting changed, collecting bike, riding the bike out of the driveway, and so on. Each of these behaviors may be controlled by conscious, deliberative, or habitual, automatic processes. If sufficient sub-actions that comprise the behavior observed at the ‘macro’ level come under automatic control, then the ‘net’ effect will be for the behavior to experienced as habitual. Similarly, the distinction between habitual instigation or initiation and habitual execution is also helpful for describing the processes controlling performance of complex behaviors, and chimes well with evidence and anecdotal experience (Gardner et al., 2016; Gardner et al., 2019; Phillips, 2019; Phillips & Gardner, 2016). Complex behaviors like physical activity not only require strategic coordination of sets of sub-actions to perform, but also considerable planning, forethought, and decision making to instigate in the first place. As an individual develops a habit for that behavior, the high effort and costly deliberation involved in the decision to perform the behavior is likely to become less so. For example, having undergone all the thought processes involved in the decision to go to the gym (e.g., weighing up the costs and benefits of doing so; identifying the time, place, clothes, partner, and equipment required) on multiple occasions, an individual is likely to become less dependent on such processes or make such decisions extremely rapidly and efficiently. This shift is likely manifested in the habitual instigation of the behavior – the decision to act will be arrived at in a rapid, efficient manner. The enactment of the behavior itself may still require planning and conscious decisions to execute, but the decision itself bears the hallmarks of a habit. Habitual instigation, therefore, focuses on habitual ‘decision making’ or formation of a commitment to action (Gardner et al., 2019), as opposed to the habitual enactment of the chain of sub-actions that comprise the behavior observed at the ‘macro’ level. RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 6 Of course, some of the sub-actions involved in the execution of the behavior may also shift in control from deliberative to automatic processing, and if the ‘net’ control over sub-actions shifts toward automatic control the execution of the behavior will be experienced as habitual. This is corroborated by research that has demonstrated that health behaviors, including physical activity, are experienced as ‘more habitual’ as experience with making the decision and enacting the behavior increases (Lally et al., 2010). This perspective also entails that the opposite can happen – that changes in the context may lead to some sub-actions that form part of a behavioral sequence to shift from habitual to deliberative control, consistent with the habit discontinuity hypothesis (Verplanken, Roy, & Whitmarsh, 2018). Taken together, these proposals provide a more nuanced view of habitual behaviors and the processes involved in developing habits for complex behaviors. As a habitual behavior develops, just as some sub-actions that make up the ‘macro’ behavior become less controlled by conscious processes, the experience of the behavior as one that is deliberatively controlled may shift. People will likely be aware of their actions and behavior, but also note changes in the extent to which the behavior requires deliberative, effortful control. This is likely to be reflected in meta-cognitive measures like the self-report habit index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), which ask people to reflect on the extent to which their behavior is determined by automatic processes (e.g., “Physical activity X is something I do without thinking”). Although sometimes individuals may not have complete access to the processes that control their behavior, and may sometimes erroneously attribute control over their behavior to one process or another (Hagger, Rebar, Mullan, Lipp, & Chatzisarantis, 2015), generalized shifts in experience are likely to reasonably track generalized shifts in relative control from deliberative (slow, time-costly, considerable processing required) to automatic (fast, efficient, less processing required). Recently, Gardner et al. (2016) have modified these scales to track reflections on habitual instigation (e.g., “Deciding to do physical activity X is something I do without thinking”) and execution (e.g., “Once I have decided to do physical activity X, it is something I do without thinking”) of habits. These inventories may, therefore, be appropriate to capture the extent to RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 13 References Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2000). Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal-directed behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 53-63. doi: 10.1037/00223514.78.1.53 Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715-729. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.36.7.715 Botvinick, M. M., & Plaut, D. C. (2006). Such stuff as habits are made on: A reply to Cooper and Shallice (2006). Psychological Review, 113, 917-927. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.4.917 Chung, P. K., Zhang, C. Q., Liu, J. 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Fiske (Ed.), Annual Review of Psychology (Vol. 67, pp. 289-314). Palo Alto: Annual Reviews. Zacks, J., & Tversky, B. (2001). Event structure in perception and conception. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 3-21. doi: 10.1037//0033-2909.127.1.3 RUNNING HEAD: Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Implicit Processes 17 Figure 1. Illustration of how different non-conscious constructs for a behavior may be related. The behavior is depicted at the apex with associated constructs and memory structures represented below with increasing specificity. Physical activity behavior Implicit evaluations of the behavior Action representations Cues Affective reactions Implicit attitudes Implicit efficacy beliefs Implicit intention/ motives Goals Intrinsic/ satisfaction Extrinsic, ends, rewards, attainment ‘Chunks’ of action (‘motor’) units Higher-level actions (e.g., ‘get keys’; ‘get kit’; ‘drive car’; change into swimming gear’; ‘get into pool’ Lower level actions (e.g., ‘arm movements in swimming’) Internal cue (e.g., mood, emotion) External cues - context and environment (e.g., time of day, place, location, people) User defined contingencies (e.g., time, alarm, placing exercise ‘kit’ by the door) General Specific Conflict of Interest Statement The author declares no conflicts of interest.