Political animality

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details. Author(s): Title: Year: Version: Copyright: Rights: Rights url: Please cite the original version: CC BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Political animality © 2024 the Authors Published version Toivanen, Juhana Toivanen, J. (2024). Political animality. Southern Journal of Philosophy, Early View. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12557 2024 South J Philos. 2024;00:1–18. | 1 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/sjp 1 | INTRODUCTION Over the last decade or so, animal politics has turned into a vibrant field that focuses on human–animal relations from the perspective of political rather than moral philosophy.1 The present essay contributes to this discussion by examining the historical notion of the “political animal” and by suggesting ways in which it could be used today. In ancient and medieval philosophy, the social and political behavior of human beings was analyzed using the notion of the political animal (ζῷον πολιτικόν, animal civile). However, its popularity later waned, not least due to the influential critique by Hobbes(1997, pp. 21–22), and it rarely plays any significant role in contemporary theoretical discussions. It is sometimes mentioned as a historically influential way of emphasizing human exceptionality (humans are 1The foundational work is Donaldson and Kymlicka(2011). AriasMaldonado(2014) emphasizes the primacy of a political perspective that is compatible with but does not presuppose any particular view of the moral status of nonhuman animals. On the distinction between animal politics and more traditional animal ethics, see Cochrane etal.(2018). DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12557 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Political animality JuhanaToivanen This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2024 The Authors. The Southern Journal of Philosophy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of University of Memphis. Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland Correspondence Juhana Toivanen, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, P.O. Box35, Jyväskylä 40014, Finland. Email: [email protected] Funding information Academy of Finland, Grant/Award Number: 310490 and 331620 Abstract This essay contributes to contemporary discussions concerning socalled animal politics by drawing from the history of the notion of political animal. Two different historical meanings of the notion are identified: (1) normative political animality that is intrinsically linked with rationality, language, and justice; (2) biological political animality that focuses on collaboration for the sake of a common aim. The former is applicable only to human beings, while the latter can also be used in relation to other animals. After briefly discussing the Aristotelian background of the notion, the essay argues that in medieval Aristotelian tradition, the normative meaning prevailed and the biological one was set aside. However, it is precisely the biological notion that appears useful today. The essay suggests several ways in which it might benefit contemporary theoretical discussions concerning animals, thus laying ground for further developments in animal politics. 2 | TOIVANEN the only political animals and thus special2), or when asking whether nonhuman animals could be counted as political animals because they are members of, and agents within, our human communities.3 Any detailed analysis of the meaning of the concept itself is usually omitted. This is where the present essay steps in. My aim is to elaborate on the notion of the political animal by drawing from its history, which is remarkably complex, and to suggest ways in which it can be applied to nonhuman animals, especially in the context of animal politics. The main argument of the essay can be summarized as follows. The notion of the political animal that medieval authors inherited from ancient sources was ambiguous. On the one hand, it could refer inclusively to several species of animals that exhibit certain similarities in their natural behavior; on the other hand, it was used in a narrower sense and applied exclusively to human beings. This ambiguity was reflected in the views of medieval philosophers. They emphasized the “animality” of human beings, explained the social/political life of human beings in terms of their biological needs and desires, and in many cases were ready to accept that some nonhuman animal species (hereafter “animals”) can be called political. Yet, they also argued against the view that animals are political. They did not question the social dimension of animal behavior, but instead their arguments can be interpreted as embodying a change in the meaning of the term “political”: it was narrowed down so that it applied only to the homo sapiens. My approach is based on the observation that concepts such as “politics,” “political,” and “political animal” are not timeless and universal but historically contingent. Nowadays there are several ways to understand what the core of politics is. It can be viewed within the framework of socalled political realism, which emphasizes practical means for seizing and consolidating power, conflicts of interest, partiality, struggle for recognition, and so forth. Alternatively, it can be seen more positively (and somewhat naïvely) as the administration of common affairs, which involves normative decisionmaking. Finally, the AngloAmerican liberal tradition typically emphasizes the connection between politics and justice, especially distributive justice.4 All these perspectives emphasize the human aspect of politics and exclude other animals from the outset (with the potential exception of the first5). However, we should not read historical texts through these modern notions carelessly. Instead, we should be sensitive to the subtle differences and changes in the meaning of the concept of “political”—which is precisely what the present essay aims to do. The essay consists of four sections. The next section lays out the theoretical foundation that is needed for understanding medieval discussions by examining the notion of the political animal in Aristotle's works. Sections three and four focus on the use of this notion in medieval political philosophy and show that medieval philosophers resolved the mentioned ambiguity by adopting a narrow interpretation of the “political animal” that applies exclusively to human social life. The analysis of historical sources follows a method typical in the field of the history of philosophy and aims to provide conceptual tools for developing an interpretation of political animality that can be applied to animal politics and ethology today.6 Finally, the fifth section articulates how the broader understanding of political animality—which emphasizes human animality and the political nature of nonhuman animals— can offer novel perspectives on contemporary discussions. Namely, it can be used to place human social/political life into a continuum with many other animal species, to broaden 2See esp., Wadiwel(2002), but also Wissenburg and Schlosberg(2014, p. 2), and Wissenburg(2014, p. 30). 3See, e.g., Driessen(2014, pp. 95–96). 4For a formulation and criticism of this view, see Wissenburg(2014). 5The possibility to apply the first interpretation of politics to animals depends on how we understand the key notions, such as “power” and “recognition.” Arguably, they make sense only within a normative framework. However, even though this notion of politics is sometimes applied to animals (see below), my aim is to show that historical texts provide yet another conception that applies to them and focuses less on competition, bargaining, and the struggle for power. 6The discussion concerning the historical picture owes much to my recent publications (esp. Toivanen,2021a, 2021b, 2021c). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 3 POLITICAL ANIMALITY our understanding of the political life of human beings, and to offer new perspectives on animal politics.7 2 | BIOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ANIMALITY As is wellknown, the origins of the idea that human beings are political animals by nature is in Aristotle's practical philosophy. Yet, Aristotle never gives an explicit definition for the term “political animal” (ζῷον πoλιτικόν), and it has been argued that it does not have a single meaning in the works where it is put to theoretical use, that is, in Politics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Historia animalium (Mulgan,1974). A particular puzzle concerns the scope of the term. On the one hand, Aristotle seems to suggest that the human being is the only political animal there is. He argues in several places that the political community is not established only for the sake of life but for the sake of the good life, and in Politics 3.9 he emphasizes that the communities of slaves or any nonhuman living beings—that is, animals—are not real political communities precisely because they lack the normative dimension that enables good, that is, virtuous life. Likewise, when he makes a distinction between the communal life of humans and that of cattle in Nicomachean Ethics 9.9, he draws from his notions of the good life, rationality, and the ability to use language as necessary conditions for a human political life (see Aristotle, Pol. 3.9, 1280a31–37; EN 9.9, 1170b13–148). Aristotle, however, never explicitly rejects the possibility that animals could be considered political; by contrast, in Historia animalium 1.1 he explicitly states that some nonhuman species are political animals. He distinguishes different ways of life that can be observed in animals—scattered, solitary, gregarious, and political—and suggests that the political way of life differs from others because it involves collaboration for the sake of reaching a common aim (κοινόν έργον) with other members of the same species. As examples of political animals, he lists “the human, the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane” (Aristotle, HA 1.1, 487b32–488a14). Against this background, one of the four arguments that Aristotle presents in Politics 1.2 for the naturalness of the political community and/or the political nature of humans is particularly interesting. The argument, which I shall call “the argument from language,” is worth quoting in the full: The reason why man is more of a political animal than any bee or any gregarious animal is obvious. Nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man alone among the animals possesses speech. Now the voice is an indication of pleasure and pain, which is why it is possessed by the other animals also; for their nature does extend this far, to having the sensations of pleasure and pain, and to indicating them to each other. Speech, on the other hand, serves to make clear what is beneficial and what is harmful, and so what is just and what is unjust. For by contrast with the other animals, man has this peculiarity: he alone has sense of good and evil, just and unjust, and so forth. An association in these matters makes a household and a state. (Pol. 1.2, 1253a7–18; translation modified)9 7I will mostly leave aside questions that the application of the notion of the political animal raises in relation to the moral status of nonhuman animals. For moral implications of animal politics, see Donaldson and Kymlicka(2011) and the contributions in Wissenburg and Schlosberg(2014). 8Aristotle's(1984, 1957, 1995, 2009) works will follow standard citations. See references for editions used. 9διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν (Pol. 1.2, 1253a718). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 4 | TOIVANEN Animals play an important role in the argument. They function as the point of comparison, as “the other” that allows Aristotle to illustrate his view of the special character of human political life. However, the precise argumentative strategy that Aristotle employs is less obvious. In particular, it is unclear if the bees, mentioned at the beginning of the argument, are political animals or bundled together with gregarious animals. Scholars have suggested at least two possible general directions of interpretation, which stem from the aforementioned ways in which Aristotle seems to use the notion of the political animal. I shall call them normative and biological interpretations. According to the normative interpretation, only humans count as political animals. No other animal species is, properly speaking, political because animals lack reason and cannot participate in a community that aims for the flourishing of rational beings and is based on deliberation concerning what is just and unjust. The juxtaposition of the political nature of humans and the social behavior of animals is an analogy, and the difference between humans and other social animals is a qualitative one, that is, not a matter of degree but of kind (see Cooper,1990, pp. 222–225; Morel,2017; Mulgan,1974).10 By contrast, according to the biological interpretation, Aristotle uses the notion of the political animal in a broader sense, which is familiar from his zoological works (esp. HA 1.1, 488a7–10). According to this view, human beings are in relevant ways similar and comparable to other political animals. Ants, bees, cranes, and humans are political because the members of these species collaborate among themselves for the sake of a common aim. Rationality and the ability to speak increases the complexity of human collaboration and political life but the difference is only a matter of degree. Thus, when Aristotle begins the argument by stating that humans are political more than the bee, he seems to think that bees are political too, but to a lesser degree than humans (see Depew,1995; Labarrière,2004, pp. 61–127; Lloyd,2013, pp. 288–289). I emphasize that I am not defending either of these interpretations in the present context.11 The crucial point is that they both presuppose some kind of similarity between the social/political behavior of humans and the social/political behavior of animals. Whether real or analogous, this similarity is a precondition for the usefulness of the comparison and a central presupposition in the argument. It would undoubtedly be true to say that humans are more political than any inanimate object or plant, but this comparison would do little to our understanding of what the political nature of humans means. The similarity is taken for granted— and that is what is important for the purposes of the present essay and for medieval interpretations of Aristotle. However, before turning to them, let me briefly elaborate on the precise meaning of the normative and biological interpretations. The normative interpretation stems from Aristotle's view that only those human individuals are political who are parts of an organized political community, that is, a citystate (polis, πόλισ). The citystate is a special type of community that differs from communities of animals precisely because it is centered on justice, virtue, and laws. Aristotle states that only a community that aims at the good life counts as a true polis (Pol. 3.9, 1280a31–35), and in his view, the good life consists of activity in accordance with virtue in the context of a citystate governed by good laws. When the normative reading is applied to the argument from language, the focus is on the rational capacity to consider various things from a normative perspective and to talk about 10Aristotle's puzzling claims about practical rationality in nonhuman animals (esp. in HA 611a15–21) have been explained by appealing to an analogy between phronēsis (φρόνησις) in the proper sense and animal capacity that is analogous (but not similar) to it; the same strategy can be applied to the issue at hand. See Lloyd(2013). 11The two interpretations do not necessarily rule each other out: it is possible to hold that the political nature of humans is fundamentally biological but has a normative “superstructure” to it (see, e.g., Kullmann,1991, pp. 174–175). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 5 POLITICAL ANIMALITY them by using symbolic language. Arguably, speaking about what is just and unjust does not refer to philosophical reflection but to concrete questions such as “How is power distributed justly?,” “What is the just price of a pair of boots?,” and “Was that action just or unjust?” Rational beings can discuss these kinds of normative questions, and they can organize their social life in various ways, depending on the outcome of their discussions. The normative interpretation of political animality emphasizes this aspect: political life consists of this kind of normative decisionmaking, and only those beings who can take part in this kind of activity form citystates and count as political animals.12 The biological interpretation, by contrast, is based on the view that a broader set of behavior counts as political. All living beings naturally strive to remain alive and procreate—this also applies to plants—and some living beings need to collaborate so as to reach these aims. A bee separated from the hive dies soon, and a human infant cannot survive, or at least grow up to be a flourishing individual, without contact with other humans. According to the biological reading, animals that need a community and collaborate with their peers are political animals. The sheer survival is not the only relevant consideration, however. At least equally central is the ability to lead a life that is typical of the species: even if an individual animal could survive alone, political animals cannot develop their full potential and behave in ways that are natural to them without their community.13 A central feature of the biological interpretation is that it focuses on observable behavior. The internal mental states of individuals are not relevant when deciding whether a species is political. This means, among other things, that animals do not need to know that collaboration enables life and the preservation of the species over time; it suffices that they have psychological mechanisms that make them behave in ways that individuals and the species survive. An illustrative example is procreation: many animals have a (perhaps instinctual) desire to mate, but we do not need to presume they know that mating results in offspring, let alone that they realize that their breeding contributes to the vitality of the species. The desire to mate causes behavior that realizes these aims. Collaboration and communal life may function through a similar mechanism, and it seems likely that the social behavior of ants, bees, and the like is not based on any higherorder consideration of the usefulness of the community. But since “political animal” is primarily a descriptive notion, the lack of this type of consciousness does not prevent applying it to them. For this reason, it is also possible that the behavior of political animals stems from an instinctual striving for selfpreservation without any altruistic considerations; the dichotomy between egoistic and altruistic behavior is not relevant for the social/political behavior of animals, because communal life can emerge from selfpreservation.14 Aristotle claims that the political community “comes into existence for the sake of life, [but] it exists for the sake of the good life” (Pol. 1.2, 1252b29–30). This claim can be understood in such a way that polis has two distinct but interconnected functions. First, it enables the division of labor and thus the production and exchange of food, clothing, and other material necessities for life. Indeed, Aristotle defines polis as a selfsufficient community that provides everything that is necessary for life: it fulfills material and biological conditions 12Discussion concerning what is just and what is unjust can thus be understood in relation to public reason and deliberative rationality that are more recently emphasized by, for example, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. As Donaldson and Kymlicka(2011, pp. 55–61) argue, this is an important but limited perspective in respect to the notion of the citizen; I suggest that it is equally limited when it comes to the notion of the political animal. 13In the case of Aristotle, this idea is, of course, related to his essentialism: there is a natural way of life for a certain species. This is not the place to elaborate on whether it is possible to talk about behavior and life that is peculiar to a species without presuming some sort of essentialism, although I find it a question worth asking. 14Contemporary researchers tend to be suspicious of the presence of altruistic motives in nonhuman animals. Instead, seemingly altruistic behavior is viewed as a complex form of egoism (Koenig & Dickinson,2018, sec. “General characteristics”). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 6 | TOIVANEN that make human life possible (Pol. 1.2, 1252b29). Second, polis is a normative community that is necessary for a good life, which means lifelong activity in accordance with virtue. It is not possible to lead a good life outside the political community (Pol. 1.2, 1253a18–29; EN 1.7, 2.1, and 10.9). This normative dimension makes human communities special and attaches them to the ability to use language and to the notion of justice, which have a prominent role in the argument from language. Due to these two functions, the political community enables both human life, and human life. The biological version of the political animal goes together with the function of preserving life, while the function of enabling the good life is easy to relate to the normative version. The significance of this distinction becomes clear when we turn to medieval views concerning the reasons why humans lead a political life. However, it should be noted that the mechanism that makes the good life possible can also be understood in terms of the biological notion that focuses on collaboration and common aim: we need other human beings not only in order to become moral agents, who have the capacity to take part in discussions concerning what is just, but also to act in accordance with moral virtue (see, e.g., Morel,2017, pp. 117–119; EN 10.7 and 10.9).15 Thus, emphasizing the normative dimension does not necessarily entail that the explanation for the political life of humans would be radically different from that of animals. Both can be understood in terms of collaboration, which only assumes different forms among us and other animals. 3 | MEDIEVAL VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL ANIMAL The notion of the political animal was not a subject of philosophical inquiry in the Middle Ages. It was abundantly used in philosophical arguments, but because medieval authors usually did not give a precise definition of it, understanding its meaning requires a careful analysis of how it was used. Consequently, it is necessary to pay attention to the contexts and keep in mind that there may be subtle differences between various medieval authors. The following discussion should not, therefore, be taken as an exhaustive investigation of medieval views. Instead, I focus on two central themes. First, I examine human beings as political animals, that is, the biological aspect of the political life of humans. Second, I discuss the idea that animals other than humans count as political, especially in relation to the argument from language. As I already mentioned, my main claim is that medieval philosophers ended up rejecting the view that animals are truly political, but even so, they did not change their views concerning the actual behavior or animals or the psychological explanations behind this behavior. Instead, they narrowed the scope of “political” in conformity to the normative interpretation and resolved the ambiguity within the notion of the political animal in favor of the exclusive interpretation of the term. Medieval authors generally accepted the idea that human beings live a political life partially because of their animality. The ultimate background for this view comes from Aristotle's view that the polis is a selfsufficient community, which “comes into existence for the sake of life” (Pol. 1.2, 1252b29;1995, p. 3). Only a fullfledged political community can satisfy all material needs of individual human beings, who need food, clothing, and other material goods for their sustenance.16 Although the household can meet the immediate and daily needs, it cannot offer 15It should be noted that “morality” and “moral virtue” are anachronic terms in the case of Aristotle: he speaks of virtues of character and does not have a distinct category of moral good. See, e.g., Annas(1993). 16The political community also supports the preservation of life by providing protection from external threats (see, e.g., Giles of Rome,1607, bk. 2.1.2, p. 220; Ptolemy of Lucca,1997, bk. 4.2, pp. 219–222). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 7 POLITICAL ANIMALITY everything humans need in the long run. Thus, for instance, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) writes in his commentary on Politics: Every association of human beings collectively is directed to something necessary for life, and so that association will be perfect, which is directed to human beings having enough necessities of life. But the political community is such an association.(2007, p. 15; translation modified)17 This idea resonated with medieval authors because they were familiar with several postAristotelian sources, which emphasized: (1) the helplessness and dependency of human beings and (2) the need for acquiring material goods for the sustenance of life as an explanation for the emergence of the political community. Cicero, Augustine, Nemesius of Emesa, Avicenna, and others suggested that political communities are established, at least partially, because otherwise individual human beings and the human species could not survive (Toivanen,2021c, pp. 64–65). Thus, the view that humans are rather helpless creatures, who need to collaborate to meet their animal needs was commonly accepted. One of the most famous passages to incorporate this view is in Thomas Aquinas's De regno (the translation of this work is published in Ptolemy of Lucca's On the Government): It is natural for the human being, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal who lives in a multitude. This can be seen from natural needs. Nature has prepared food for all other animals, hair to cover them, and means for defence (such as teeth, horns, claws) or at least swiftness in flight. However, nature made human beings without any of these. Instead of them, humans were endowed with reason, by which they can procure all these things for themselves, with the help of hands. But one human alone is not able to procure all these things, because one human alone cannot provide sufficiently for life. It is therefore natural for human beings to live in the company of many. (Thomas Aquinas, in Ptolemy of Lucca,1997, p. 61; translation modified)18 The argument clearly draws on the biological dimension of the notion of the political animal (although Thomas later emphasizes also the normative side). All living creatures need material goods to stay alive, but human beings differ from many other animals because we lack the natural means for acquiring these resources alone. We need to use our collective reason to come up with means to meet our needs (Aquinas,1979, bk. 1.1, 450a; Ptolemy of Lucca,1997, p. 61), and even after inventing all the necessary arts and crafts, the community is needed for the division of labor and exchange. Mutual dependency and the ability to collaborate makes the human being more social and political than other animal species, but our social/political life ultimately stems from a fundamental metaphysical similarity between us and other natural substances, that is, plants and animals. Like them, we are biological, mortal, and finite creatures that are driven by an inclination for selfpreservation 17“Civitas est communitas perfecta. Quod ex hoc probat quia, cum omnis communicatio omnium hominum ordinetur ad aliquid necessarium vitae, illa erit perfecta communitas quae ordinatur ad hoc quod homo habeat sufficienter quicquid est necessarium ad vitam. Talis autem est communitas civitatis” (Aquinas,1971, bk. 1.1b, 77a13–b19). 18“Naturale autem est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam quam omnia alia animalia; quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat. Aliis enim animalibus natura praeparavit cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem, ut dentes, cornua, ungues, vel saltem velocitatem ad fugam; homo autem institutus est nullo horum sibi a natura praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei ratio per quam sibi haec omnia officio manuum posset praeparare. Ad quae omnia praeparanda unus homo non sufficit, nam unus homo per se sufficienter vitam transigere non posset; est igitur homini naturale ut in societate multorum vivat” (Aquinas,1979, bk. 1.1, 449b25–38). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 8 | TOIVANEN and the preservation of the species (which manifests itself as a desire to leave behind something similar to us, i.e., children). These drives are natural, and thus humans have a natural inclination to form various types of communities that enable fulfilling them (Aquinas,1971, bk. 1.1a, 73b173–187;2007, p. 10). Although Aquinas emphasizes that the human species is unique in many ways, he also acknowledges the similarity of humans and other animals and thinks that some of our abilities that make collaboration necessary and possible can be found in other animals as well (Aquinas,1948, bk. 1.96.1ad4;1971, bk. 1.1, 73b and 75b76a;2007, pp. 10 and 13; Toivanen,2021c, pp. 58–76). Ultimately he seems to think that other animals are not political in the proper sense of the word (Aquinas,1979, art. 1.1, 449b25–450a64; Ptolemy of Lucca,1997, pp. 61–62), and it is clear that the political life of humans includes features that are lacking in the communities of other animals: the normative dimension of the good life—a life that is proper to rational animals—becomes possible only with human politics (Aquinas,1971, pp. 77b–78a;2007, p. 15). As Aquinas writes in the quoted passage, setting up a community that meets our biological needs requires reasoning. However, this normative and rational dimension can be considered an additional layer that comes on top of the biological explanation for the existence and purpose of the political life of humans, or as a modification of the way in which the “biological community” comes about. The fact remains that the political nature of human beings is strongly connected to the biological level, and it can be partially accounted for by appealing to the biological notion of the political animal that is present in Aristotle's Historia animalium. Rationality modifies the way in which humans are political but does not necessarily exclude the validity of the biological notion. 4 | NO ANIMAL IS POLITICAL (EXCEPT THE HUMAN BEING) Aquinas's analysis shows that both the biological and the normative aspects of the notion of the political animal are present in medieval discussions. The political nature of certain nonhuman animals is also repeatedly mentioned, and although I focus here more on cases where it is taken up as somehow problematic, let me begin with a quotation from Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280): An animal is said to be political, if it (imitating cities) directs all its operations to one [aim] and performs an action that pertains to the common good. Not all gregarious animals, which stay with their companions, perform such a joint operation. Among those animals that collaborate, are the human, the wasp, the bee, the ant, and the crane. (Albertus Magnus, 1999, p. 16; translation modified)19 The distinction that Albert makes between gregarious and political animals is familiar from Aristotle's zoological works. The former live together but there is no collaboration between the members of the group. By contrast, political animals collaborate for the sake of their common good—which in a medieval context means, roughly, the good of the group as a whole (Haara & Toivanen, Forthcoming2024; Kempshall,1999). Human beings belong to the category of political animals, together with other collaborating animals (wasps, bees, ants, cranes). 19“Civitatense autem animal vocatur, quod ad imitationem civitatum omnia sua opera refert ad unum et agit unam actionem ad commune bonum pertinentem: nec tamen omne animal gregale cum sociis manens talem facit operationem in unum collatam. De hiis autem quae in unum conferunt operationes, est homo et vespa et apis et formica et grus” (Magnus,1916, bk. 1.1.3). 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 15 POLITICAL ANIMALITY become aware of the complexity of human–animal relations but also to place animals in a normative framework of rights and duties in a more nuanced manner. From this perspective, there is a clear difference between the notions of citizen and the biological version of the political animal: the former concerns rights, duties, and normative status, while the latter refers to abilities, behavior, and ways of life. Citizenship and the accompanying rights depend on existing laws and are thus a result of normative decisionmaking. A political community may grant these rights also to nonhuman animals, but this decision takes place on the normative level, which builds on the biological political animality. It is also possible to give citizen rights to animals that are not political, and the fact that a certain species is political does not automatically entail that its members have a different normative status—at least there is no conceptual necessity to make this conclusion. The biological notion of the political animal may, however, offer an independent justification for extending rights to certain animals. Insofar as living together, collaboration, and common aim are taken to be crucial, there is no theoretical barrier for interspecies political animality. The crucial question concerns the borderline between collaboration and exploitation. It is clear that intensive factory farming falls under the latter category, but service dogs, police dogs, and emotional support animals can perhaps be placed under the former. They live and work together with their humans, and they have common aims with us, at least in some sense of the term.31 If we think that we can form these kinds of (political) communities with animals—and the biological notion of the political animal gives us theoretical tools for understanding how this might be possible—we need only to accept that shared political animality entails shared political rights. In this manner, we would have a way to overcome the species barrier between humans and some other animals, without necessarily attributing citizenship to the latter. 6 | CONCLUSION A philosophical examination of the history of the notion of the political animal may shed light on complex developments that have, for their part, influenced the way we nowadays think of politics and political action. Historical discussions also contain elements that are somewhat alien to us. In addition to their historical interest, these elements are significant due to their ability to open new perspectives on our ways of thinking. To be sure, the ideas brought up by considering the historical sources could also be discussed without using the notion of the political animal. The similarity between human beings and other social (or political) animals has been acknowledged in many contexts, and analyzing political theories from the perspective of power struggle vs. mutual dependency is an integral part of contemporary political philosophy. For this reason, the novel ideas that the history of the notion of the political animal may bring to our discussions are not that radical. And yet, we should not downplay the importance of a notion that manages to shed light on complex issues from a fresh perspective. The present essay has defended an interpretation of the notion of the political animal that brings together three themes: (1) the similarity of the social life of human beings and other animals; (2) the distinctiveness of certain patterns of social behavior and the ensuing possibility to divide animals into social and political types; and (3) portraying sociability, mutual dependency, and collaboration along with the normative dimension of human politics as two sides of the same coin. This 31What counts as a common aim is by no means an easy question, but as with the biological notion of the political animal, I do not think the participants need to understand the aim (in the same way or at all). It suffices that collaboration in fact benefits both parties. 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 16 | TOIVANEN interpretation draws from the historical material but does not claim to be identical with any single historical view. The notion of the political animal may guide our thinking by focusing on features of social and political life that otherwise risk remaining in the margins. It also places human beings into same continuum with other animals, highlights our fundamental dependency on other people and nature, and reminds us of the importance of life and the good life (in its eudaemonist sense). By taking these perspectives seriously, we may encourage a more peaceful coexistence between human beings, a more nuanced relationship with nature, where nature and other animals are not seen only as resources or objects of politics but as something that enables, embodies, and takes part in political life. It should be noted that considering a certain animal species as political does not necessarily entail any change in its normative status. The political animality that has been the focus of the present essay is primarily descriptive and does not directly affect animal rights or our view of their social status in relation to humans. Likewise, applying the notion of the political animal to nonhuman animals does not presuppose any particular theory of the moral status of animals; it is equally compatible with utilitarianism, the capabilities approach (which derives from virtue ethics), and animal rights theories. 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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY Juhana Toivanen is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He specializes in medieval philosophy, especially in philosophical psychology, political philosophy, and ethics. His major publications include the monographs Perception and the Internal Senses (Brill, 2013) and The Political Animal in Medieval Philosophy (Brill, 2021). Currently he is working on social and political dimensions of moral vices in late medieval and early modern philosophy. 20416962, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12557 by University Of Jyväskylä Library, Wiley Online Library on [05/03/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License