Social mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution: Potential explanatory mechanisms

Political Psychology. 2024;00:1–19. | 1 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pops INTRODUCTION The economic gap between the richest and the poorest is continuing to grow around the world (Christensen etal.,2023). Redistributive policies are recognized as one of the most effective routes for reducing economic inequality (Alvaredo etal.,2018; Piketty,2015) and its aversive personal, interpersonal, and societal consequences (Sánchez- Rodríguez etal.,2019; DOI: 10.1111/pops.13042 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Social mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution: Potential explanatory mechanisms JuanMatamoros- Lima 1,2 | SilviaGaldi 3 | MiguelMoya 1,2 | Guillermo B.Willis 1,2 This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2024 The Author(s). Political Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of International Society of Political Psychology. 1Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), University of Granada, Granada, Spain 2Department of Social Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain 3Department of Psychology, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Caserta, Italy Correspondence Juan Matamoros- Lima, Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC), University of Granada, Granada, Spain. Email: [email protected] Silvia Galdi, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università della Campania Luigi Vanitelli, Viale Ellittico 31, Caserta 81100, Italy. Email: [email protected] Funding information Regional Government of Andalusia, Grant/ Award Number: A- SEJ- 72- UGR20 and P20_00199; Grant/Award Number: PID2019- 105643GB- I00 Abstract Economic inequality is a significant problem of modern society, and redistributive policies are one of the most effective tools for reducing it. Previous studies have highlighted the importance of social mobility to understand attitudes toward redistribution. Across three preregistered studies (N = 2475; one crosssectional and two experimental) in different countries (Italy and Spain), we investigated the relationship between upward and downward societal mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution, as well as potential explanatory mechanisms. Results showed that when people believe that it is easy to improve the socioeconomic status in their society, they oppose redistributive policies; conversely, when people believe that is difficult, they support redistributive policies. Importantly, meritocratic beliefs explained the upward mobility effect on redistribution, and perceived personal economic risks accounted for the downward mobility effect. Implications of these results for the design of policies to reduce economic inequality are discussed. KEYWORDS downward social mobility, meritocracy beliefs, perceived personal economic risk, redistribution, upward social mobility 2 | MATAMOROSLIMA etal. Willis etal.,2022). However, although higher levels of economic inequality are associated with greater support for government intervention (Evans & Kelley,2018; Schmidt- Catran,2016), people often fail to support redistribution strategies (e.g., Kuziemko et al., 2015; Lupu & Pontusson,2011). A crucial issue is, therefore, to identify the factors driving the support for redistribution in society. From this perspective, many studies have documented that differences in social mobility—the change in the socioeconomic status of a person over time (Day & Fiske,2019)—are crucial predictors of differences in people's preferences for redistribution (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara,2005; Benabou & Ok,2001; Piketty,1995). Interestingly, other research has suggested that believing that it is possible to move up the social ladder influences attitudes toward redistribution (Garcia- Muniesa,2019; Shepelak,1989). Nevertheless, the relationship between various types of social mobility beliefs (e.g., upward vs. downward; Davidai & Wienk,2021) and attitudes toward redistribution, as well as the possible psychological mechanisms that explain these relationships, have not been studied in depth. This research sought to investigate the relationship between upward and downward social mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution, also addressing the role played by two psychological explanatory mechanisms of this relationship: meritocratic beliefs and perceived personal economic risks. Social mobility and attitudes toward redistribution Attitudes toward redistribution can be understood as the support or opposition to social spending programs aimed at reducing the gap between the better off and the less well off (Luebker,2014). Social sciences have tried to explain people's motivation for supporting (or not) redistribution policies. One of the most endorsed perspectives is the Rational Choice Theory, which suggests that people support redistribution as a rational decision based on selfinterest (Kim & Lee,2018; Meltzer & Richard,1981). However, whether or not people support redistributive policies can be affected by some factors other than rational selfinterest (Corneo & Grüner,2002; Fong,2001). For example, support for redistribution may be negatively affected by the individual's subjective, rather than objective, socioeconomic status (Brown- Iannuzzi etal.,2015). Also, preferences for redistribution may be guided by ideologies. Studies have shown that people who endorse systemjustifying ideologies and citizens positioned on the right of the ideological spectrum are less inclined to support redistribution (Alesina etal.,2012; Ballard- Rosa etal.,2017; García- Sánchez etal.,2020; Rodriguez- Bailon etal.,2017). In this regard, the Wealth Paradox research (Mols & Jetten,2016, 2017) highlights the difficulty of understanding realworld patterns, such as voting behavior, solely through rational actor models. This underlines the complexity of factors influencing attitudes toward redistribution, suggesting that selfinterest, socioeconomic status, and ideological orientation are only part of the broader picture. However, whether or not people support redistributive policies can be affected by a number of factors other than selfinterest (Corneo & Grüner,2002; Fong,2001). For example, support for redistribution may be negatively affected by the individual's subjective, rather than objective, socioeconomic status (Brown- Iannuzzi etal.,2015). Also, preferences for redistribution may be guided by ideologies. Studies have shown that people who endorse systemjustifying ideologies and citizens positioned on the right of the ideological spectrum are less inclined to support redistribution (Alesina et al., 2012; Ballard- Rosa et al., 2017; García- Sánchez etal.,2020; Rodriguez- Bailon etal.,2017). Social psychology distinguishes various types of social mobility (Davidai & Wienk,2021; Day & Fiske,2019); for example, according to time frame (past, current, or future), trajectory (upward or downward), or target of comparison (personal or societal). In the same vein, 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 3 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND REDISTRIBUTION previous studies have shown that upward (i.e., improving subjective status over time) and downward (i.e., getting worse subjective status over time) social mobility beliefs can be considered two separate constructs with different consequences (Browman etal.,2022; Davidai & Gilovich,2015, 2018; Matamoros- Lima etal.,2023; Melita etal.,2023). Objective social mobility plays a role in predicting differences in preferences for redistribution regardless of the person's SES (Alesina etal.,2018; Alesina & La Ferrara,2005; Benabou & Ok,2001; Piketty,1995), showing that people who have experienced downward social mobility (i.e., personal intergenerational deterioration of socioeconomic status) favor redistribution, whereas those who have experienced upward social mobility (i.e., personal intergenerational advancement in socioeconomic status) resist it (Alesina etal.,2018; Mérola & Helgason,2016). According to some scholars, however, the effects of people's experience on preferences for redistribution may be limited. For example, Garcia- Muniesa(2019) found that although individuals who had experienced downward social mobility during the 2008 Great Recession were more likely to support tax progressivity, the correlation between both variables was not homogeneous among all citizens, depending on people's social mobility beliefs. Specifically, citizens who had experienced downward social mobility but believed that their economic situations would improve in the future did not show increased support for progressive taxation. These results suggest that just the belief in the likelihood of socioeconomic advancement can be a powerful force for explaining why those at the bottom or middle socioeconomic status might not fully embrace redistribution policies (Garcia- Muniesa,2019; Shepelak, 1989). Psychology has highlighted the importance of subjective (vs. objective) reality in explaining human behavior (Adler etal.,2000; Davidai etal.,2012; Willis etal.,2022). Although preferences for redistribution may therefore depend on subjective social mobility, very little attention has been paid to the role of mobility beliefs in affecting support for redistribution policies. Thus, this work aimed to investigate the relationship between mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution policies, distinguishing between upward and downward social mobility beliefs. Holding upward mobility beliefs may encourage people to maintain the status quo, reinforcing systemjustifying ideologies. According to system justification theory, “people are motivated to defend, justify, and bolster aspects of the status quo, including existing social, economic, and political systems, institutions, and arrangements” (Jost etal.,2015, p. 321). A particularly relevant type of legitimizing or hierarchyenhancing belief is meritocracy (i.e., the myth that hardworking, personal ability, and worth allow individuals to succeed regardless of their circumstances; Goldthorpe,2003). People who endorse meritocratic beliefs typically oppose to redistributive policies (García- Sánchez etal.,2020) and associate achievement expectations with individual responsibility (Kuppens etal.,2018), neglecting the role that social structure plays in the likelihood of success. Upward social mobility is often related positively to meritocracy (Day & Fiske,2017; Matamoros- Lima etal.,2023; Mijs, 2022), being possible that upward mobility beliefs increase meritocratic beliefs, thus decreasing attitudes toward redistribution. Regarding downward social mobility beliefs, the potential psychological mechanisms that may explain their effects may be related with the threats of losing their social status. For example, by decreasing their status, people may lose their health insurance and loss of financial resources to pay for necessities, such as clothing, food, and shelter. Literature has substantiated that exposure to risks stemming from various forms of economic challenges stimulates individual demand for the expansion of social spending and public provision of welfare, even among the more welloff (Anderson & Pontusson,2007; Margalit,2011; Rehm,2009; Rehm etal.,2012). Hacker etal.(2013), for instance, found that Americans who worried about losing their income were more likely to support policies that buffered these risks than those who did not worry. Building on this research, it could be predicted that downward mobility beliefs would increase perceived personal economic risks, thus increasing attitudes toward redistribution. 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 4 | MATAMOROSLIMA etal. Overview of this research Our aim was to investigate the relationship between beliefs about upward and downward social mobility and attitudes toward redistribution (Objective 1) and to test the mediating role of meritocracy and perceived economic threat in the relationship between upward and downward social mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution (Objective 2). We conducted three studies. Study 1 was crosssectional and examined the relations among upward and downward social mobility beliefs, meritocratic beliefs, perceived personal economic risks, and attitudes toward redistribution. Using an experimental paradigm, in Studies 2 and 3, we tested the causal relationship between these variables. The research was conducted in Italy and Spain, two countries with a similar culture, Gini Index, and economic situation (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],2022). However, the two countries show differences in redistributive policies. Although in both countries, the richest receive more public transfers than the poorest, this gap is greater in the Italian context (OECD,2022). Therefore, Italian and Spanish samples allowed us to explore support toward redistribution policies in similar contexts with different redistributive policies. We conducted the analyses using R software (R Core Team,2023). Preregistrations, data, code to reproduce analyses, materials, and supplementary material are available at OSF (Link). STUDY 1 Study 1 was aimed at investigating the relationship between upward and downward societal mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution, as well as potential psychosocial mechanisms. Preregistered hypotheses included the following (see bridging document in OSF): Hypothesis 1. Upward societal mobility beliefs would be positively related with meritocratic beliefs (H1a) and negatively related with perceived personal economic risks (H1b) and support for redistribution (H1c). Hypothesis 2. Downward societal mobility beliefs would be negatively related with meritocratic beliefs (H2a) and positively related with perceived personal economic risks (H2b) and support for redistribution (H2c). Hypothesis 3. Meritocratic beliefs would mediate the relationship between upward societal mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution (H3). Hypothesis 4. Perceived personal economic risk would mediate the relation between downward societal mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution (H4). Method Participants and procedure Data were collected through a participantrecruiting company (i.e., NETQUEST). The final Spanish sample (N = 1536) consisted of 746 women and 790 men, with Mage = 48.41 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 5 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND REDISTRIBUTION (SD = 17.21; TableS1). The sample was stratified by quotas based on social class, gender, age, and region of residence (as established by the Nielsen standards) following the distribution of the Spanish population stated by the National Statistics Institute of Spain. A sensitive power analysis using pwr package (Champely,2020) revealed that the sample permits the detection of an effect size of r ≥ .07 (alpha level = .05, 80% power). The study received approval of the University Ethics Committee. All participants provided informed written consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Measures Attitudes toward redistribution scale The scale (García- Sánchez et al., 2022) is composed of four items to measure attitudes toward redistribution (e.g., “The government should impose higher taxes on those with higher incomes”). Answers were provided on a 7- point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Higher scores reflect positive attitudes toward redistribution (αChronbach = .81). Bidimensional social mobility beliefs scale We used an abridged form of the bidimensional social mobility beliefs scale (Matamoros- Lima etal.,2023; fit indices from CFA in TableS2) including six items: three items (e.g., “In Spain, children often achieve a higher socioeconomic status than the household in which they grew up”; αChronbach = .87) assessed upward societal mobility, and three items (e.g., “The majority of the Spanish population worsens in socioeconomic status over the course of their lives”; αChronbach = .84) measured downward societal mobility beliefs. Answers were provided on a 7- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Higher scores reflect high upward/downward societal mobility beliefs. Meritocratic beliefs scale Two items (Castillo etal.,2019) measured descriptive meritocratic beliefs (i.e., “In Spain people are rewarded for their efforts”; “In Spain people get what they deserve”). Answers were provided on a 7- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The mean between the two items for each participant was calculated (αChronbach = .77; rmeaninteritem = .63), such that higher scores indicate high descriptive meritocratic beliefs. Perceived personal economic risk scale Two items of the perceived personal economic risk scale (Marjanovic etal.,2015) were used (i.e., “How you feel about your current financial situation: How uncertain do you feel?”; “How much do you feel at risk?”). Answers were provided on a 7- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). For each participant, ratings to the two items were averaged. Higher scores reflect high perceived personal economic risk (αChronbach = .88; rmeaninteritem = .79). Sociodemographics Participants provided information about their gender, age, educational attainment, occupation, income, subjective socioeconomic status (from 1 = worst off to 10 = best off; Adler etal.,2000), and political orientation (from 0 = left to 10 = right). 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 6 | MATAMOROSLIMA etal. Results Preregistered hypotheses Zeroorder correlations among variables were performed (TableS3). Upward societal mobility beliefs correlated positively with meritocratic beliefs (r = .25, p < .001), and negatively with perceived personal economic risks (r = −.08, p < .001) and attitudes toward redistribution (r = −.12, p < .001). Also, downward societal mobility beliefs correlated negatively with meritocratic beliefs (r = −.10, p < .001), and positively with perceived personal economic risks (r = .19, p < .001) and attitudes toward redistribution (r = .15, p < .001). Therefore, Hypotheses1 and 2 were confirmed. As a robustness check (see TableS4), we ran a hierarchical multiple regression analyses using mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution as criterion variable (model 1a). In the second step, we added meritocratic beliefs and perceived personal economic risks (model 1b). Finally, we included demographic variables (age, gender, income, subjective socioeconomic status, and political orientation; model 1c). Results were in line with preregistered Hypotheses1 and 2. To test Hypotheses3 and 4, two mediation analysis were performed (Model 4, bootstrapping 5.000 samples, 95% CI; Hayes, 2013) using lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). First, we tested the indirect effect of upward societal mobility beliefs on attitudes toward redistribution through meritocratic beliefs (Figure1). A significant indirect effect of meritocratic beliefs emerged (IE = −.05, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI [−.08, −.04]). We then tested the indirect effect of beliefs about downward societal mobility on attitudes toward redistribution through perceived personal economic risks (Figure2). Results revealed a significant indirect effect of perceived personal economic risks (IE = .02, SE = .00, p = .001, 95% CI [.01, .03]). Therefore, Hypotheses3 and 4 were confirmed. Furthermore, the indirect effect of upward societal mobility beliefs (H3) was maintained even controlling for downward societal mobility beliefs, perceived personal economic risks, subjective socioeconomic status, and political orientation (H3: IE = −.02, SE = .00, p < .001, 95% CI [−.03, −.01]). Also, the indirect effect of downward societal mobility beliefs (H4) remained even controlling for upward societal mobility beliefs, meritocratic beliefs, subjective socioeconomic status, and political orientation (H4: IE = .01, SE = .00, p = .01, 95% CI [.00, .02]). FIGURE 1 Meritocratic beliefs mediate effect of upward social mobility beliefs on attitudes toward redistribution. Indirect effect in brackets. Total effect in bold; Study 1 (Spain); **p < .05; ***p < .001. Bootstrap = 5000. 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 7 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND REDISTRIBUTION Discussion Results from Study 1 suggest that upward and downward societal mobility beliefs are related in opposite ways with attitudes toward redistribution. In particular, when people believe it is likely to improve in the future their social position in the society they live in, they oppose redistributive policies but support them when they believe it is likely to worsen their social position. Study 1 also showed that upward societal mobility has an indirect effect on attitudes toward redistribution through meritocratic beliefs. That is, believing that one lives in a context where upward societal mobility is relatively high increases the endorsement of meritocratic beliefs, which, in turn, fosters negative attitudes toward redistribution. In addition, we found that downward societal mobility beliefs have an indirect effect on attitudes toward redistribution through perceived personal economic risks. In other words, believing that one lives in a context where downward societal mobility is very likely increases concerns for personal economic risks, which, in turn, increase support for redistribution policies. STUDY 2 The correlational nature of Study 1 prevented us from assuming a causal direction of the emerged relationships. Therefore, we conducted an experimental study in which societal mobility beliefs were manipulated (see bridging document in OSF). We predicted upward societal mobility to have an indirect effect on attitudes toward redistribution through meritocratic beliefs (H1), whereas downward societal mobility beliefs to have an indirect effect on attitudes toward redistribution through perceived personal economic risks (H2). Method Participants and procedure Italian participants were contacted through a participantrecruiting company (Prolific) and authors' social networks (Facebook and Twitter). Paid advertisements were not employed to expand the reach of our recruitment efforts. After granting informed consent, 329 participants FIGURE 2 Perceived personal economic risk mediate effect of downward social mobility beliefs on attitudes toward redistribution. Indirect effect in brackets. Total effect in bold; Study 1 (Spain); **p < .05; ***p < .001. Bootstrap = 5000. 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License 8 | MATAMOROSLIMA etal. completed an online questionnaire. Once the preregistered exclusion criteria were applied, the final sample included 301 participants (Mage = 32.24, SD = 9.97), and 163 were females (135 male and 3 others; TableS5). We calculated a priori the minimum sample size needed (with alpha level = .05 and power of .80) to detect the indirect effects based on data from a previous study. A Monte Carlo simulation (Schoemann etal.,2017) showed that we needed a minimum sample size of 300 participants (150 per condition). The IRB of the Psychology Department of University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli” approved the procedure and materials of the study. All participants provided informed written consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. All measures used were translated into Italian. Measures1 Societal mobility manipulation Societal mobility was manipulated using an adaptation of the Bimboola Paradigm (Jetten etal.,2015; Sánchez- Rodríguez etal.,2019) developed by Melita etal.,2024. However, unlike the original paradigm, the level of economic inequality remained constant in all conditions (high inequality). Participants were informed that they would become part of a (fictitious) society called Bimboola, which was divided into five income groups. All participants also learned that they belonged to the middleincome group (Group 3). Then, respondents were allowed to choose, from a subset of goods, a house and a car they could afford to start their new life. Next, participants were randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions (upward and downward societal mobility). In the upward societal mobility condition, participants learned that, in their lifetime, most people in Group 3 had a high probability to improve their socioeconomic position. In the downward societal mobility condition, it was reported that, in their lifetime, most people in Group 3 had a high probability of worsening their socioeconomic position. In the second part of the study, participants completed two manipulation checks asking to what extent they perceived upward or downward societal mobility (i.e., “People in Group 3 are likely to improve their socioeconomic position in Bimboola”; “People in Group 3 are likely to worsen their socioeconomic position in Bimboola”). Answers were provided on a 7- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Then, they completed the following scales adapted to Bimboola (see materials in OSF), and provided sociodemographics. Attitudes toward redistribution scale This scale (Dawtry etal.,2015) includes four items aimed at measuring attitudes toward redistribution (e.g., “The government should redistribute wealth through heavy taxes on the rich”). Answers were provided on a 7- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). We used mean scores with higher values of the scores reflecting more positive attitudes toward redistribution (αChronbach = .68). Meritocracy beliefs scale This scale (García- Sánchez etal.,2022) is composed of six items aimed at assessing meritocratic beliefs (e.g., “If people work hard they do get what they want”) on 7- point Likert scales 1The measures in Study 1 were taken from a national Spanish sample study in which variables of interest for different lines of research were included. For this reason, we use different scales (attitudes toward redistribution and meritocratic beliefs), and all scales present a lower number of items with respect to the original scales. 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License | 9 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND REDISTRIBUTION ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). We used mean scores with higher values reflecting a greater endorsement of meritocratic beliefs (αChronbach = .93). Perceived personal economic risks scale This scale (Marjanovic etal.,2015) includes five items assessing perceived personal economic risks (e.g., “How you feel about your current financial situation: How uncertain do you feel?”; “How much do you feel at risk?”). Answers were provided on a 5- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). We used mean scores with higher scores indicating higher perceived personal economic risks (αChronbach = .91). Sociodemographics Participants provided information about their gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, occupation, income, subjective socioeconomic status (from 1 = worst off to 10 = best off; Adler etal.,2000), and political orientation (on a scale ranging from 1 = farleft to 7 = farright). Results Preliminary analyses Zeroorder correlations As shown in TableS6, mobility condition (0 = downward societal mobility; 1 = upward societal mobility) correlated positively with meritocratic beliefs (r = .67, p < .001), and negatively with perceived personal economic risk (r = −.72, p < .001) and attitudes toward redistribution (r = −.20, p < .001). Manipulation checks We investigated whether the experimental manipulation had worked as intended using rstatix package (Kassambara,2022). Participants in the upward societal mobility condition perceived higher upward mobility (M = 6.41; SD = .92) compared to the downward societal mobility condition (M = 2.58; SD = 1.42), t(299) = −21.84, p < .001, d = −2.52, 95% CI [−3.08, −2.07]. By contrast, participants in the downward societal mobility condition perceived higher downward mobility (M = 5.97; SD = 1.41) compared to the upward mobility condition (M = 2.85; SD = 1.77), t(327) = 20.79, p < .001, d = 2.39, 95% CI [1.95, 2.96]. Attitudes toward redistribution A twotailed ttest was performed to investigate the effects of experimental conditions (upward vs. downward) on attitudes toward redistribution. A significant difference emerged between participants in the upward (M = 5.17; SD = 1.04) and downward societal mobility condition (M = 5.57; SD = .88) on attitudes toward redistribution, t(288.53) = 3.66, p < .001, d = .42, 95% CI [.20, .66]. Preregistered hypotheses To test Hypotheses1 and 2, two mediation analyses (Model 4, bootstrapping 5.000 samples, 95% CI; Hayes,2013) were conducted using lavaan package (Rosseel,2012). Experimental conditions (0 = downward societal mobility and 1 = upward societal mobility) were entered as predictors.2 2Due to an error in the preregistration of Study 2, we preregistered that we would use manipulation checks (MC) as predictor variables. However, following the recommendation of one of the reviewers and considering the error, we decided to deviate from this approach and use the experimental conditions as predictor variables instead. Importantly, the results remain consistent regardless of whether MC or experimental conditions are used as predictors. 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. 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Nature Reviews Psychology, 1(5), 301–309. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1038/ s4415 9- 022- 00044 - 0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article. How to cite this article: Matamoros- Lima, J., Galdi, S., Moya, M., & Willis, G. B. (2024). Social mobility beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution: Potential explanatory mechanisms. Political Psychology, 00, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.13042 14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.13042 by Universidad De Granada, Wiley Online Library on [22/10/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License