The Political cost of reforms
Abstract
This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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The Political Cost of Reforms Alessandra Bon…glioliy IAE-CSIC and CEPR Gino Ganciaz CREI, UPF and CEPR FIRST DRAFT: January 2010 This draft: September 2010 Abstract This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future bene…ts and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries. JEL Classi…cation: E6, H3 Keywords: Elections, Reforms, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty. We thank Alberto Alesina, Allan Drazen, Georgy Egorov, Giacomo Ponzetto, Jaume Ventura, Fabrizio Zilibotti and seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute 2010, SED 2009 Annual Meeting (Istanbul), EDP Jamboree 2010 (Barcelona), University of Helsinki, IMT in Lucca, IAE and IEW-Zurich University for comments and Tomaz Cajner for reserach assistance. We acknowledge …nancial support from the Fundación Ramon Areces. yInstitute for Economic Analysis-CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, SPAIN. E-mail: alessandra.bon…[email protected] zCREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005, Barcelona, SPAIN. E-mail: [email protected] 1
1 Introduction Among the fundamental questions in political economy are why governments often fail to adopt reforms that are widely believed to be welfare-improving and what conditions make their adoption more likely. For instance, while most observers tend to agree that promoting product market competition, providing free access to markets and reducing public debt are often essential to preserve economic growth, the extent to which such measures are adopted varies enormously across countries. The existing literature has identi…ed several explanations for an anti-reform bias, with most of them placing distributional con‡icts as the cornerstone. For instance, interest groups who may lose from a reform may lobby to block it (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2001). Alternatively, uncertainty about the distribution of costs and bene…ts may lead to a status quo bias (e.g., Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) or to a war of attrition between parties resulting in an ine¢ cient delay (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). A popular view among policy makers, instead, is that governments are afraid of losing votes due to the short-run costs that reforms typically entail. As JeanClaude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg and President of the Eurogroup, once said, “We all know what to do, but we don’t know how to get reelected once we have done it.” Ever since the work of Peltzman (1992), however, economists and political scientists did not …nd evidence that reforms a¤ect adversely the chances of reelection.1If governments do not seem to be systematically punished at the ballot box for engaging in reforms, the question of why they are so politically di¢ cult remains an unresolved puzzle. In this paper, we formalize in a fully-rational model the view that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting reform and we reconcile it with the evidence that their adoption does not seem to have a negative e¤ect on reelection prospects. We do so using a model of political accountability through elections where the key elements are informational asymmetries and uncertainty. Similarly to the existing literature, we …nd that incumbent governments have too weak an incentive to invest in reforms. Contrary to existing works, however, we …nd that uncertainty is likely to make reforms politically more viable. Our theory builds on the premise that the cost of reforms is immediately observable to voters, while their actual implementation and payo¤s often are not. For example, an increase in …scal pressure is immediately evident to taxpayers, while it may take time to see how e¤ectively tax revenues are spent. In such a situation, the incumbent may not dare to embark in reforms, even when they are unambiguously welfare-improving, for the fear of losing votes and hence o¢ ce. This bias against reforms holds, even when citizens are rational and aware of political incentives, under two conditions. The …rst is 1We discuss this literature more in details in the next Section. 2
that ability of politicians is not directly observable to voters, so that it must be inferred on the basis of performance. The second is an informational asymmetry between citizens and the incumbent so that the actual investment in reforms with future returns is not observed by voters. These assumptions generate a “political cost” of reforms: there is an incentive to invest less in reforms in an e¤ort to signal high ability and thus increase the reelection probability. Despite this, however, in a rational-expectation equilibrium voters correctly foresee the strategy of the incumbent and also his expected ability. As a result, politicians cannot manipulate their reelection probability. Still, their choice to underinvest is sustained by hidden information out of equilibrium: the fact that the politician can deviate from his equilibrium strategy in ways unknown to voters.2 Interestingly, the “political cost”of reforms depends crucially on the sources of uncertainty a¤ecting the precision of the signal that voters can see. If observable measures of performance are poor signals of ability, for instance because the economy is going through a period of high turbulence, the perceived probability of being reelected becomes less sensitive to the choice of reforms thereby reducing their political cost. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the type of uncertainty highlighted in this paper promotes unambiguously the adoption of e¢ cient reforms. Yet, the welfare e¤ects are ambiguous because uncertainty worsens both electoral accountability, thereby inducing the incumbent to put less e¤ort, and the ability to select good politicians. By comparing these e¤ects, we …nd a simple condition for welfare to increase or decrease with various forms of uncertainty. The high tractability of our model allows us to use it to answer two substantive normative questions. First, we study the e¤ect of political rewards on social welfare. By increasing the value to stay in power, higher rewards exacerbate the underinvestment in reforms, but also induce the incumbent to exert more e¤ort. We characterize the socially optimal level of compensation arising from this trade-o¤ and …nd that politicians should be rewarded more when e¤ort is relatively more important than reforms and uncertainty is high. Second, since the political cost of reforms arises because incumbents care about reelection, we ask under what conditions imposing a one-period term limit may be welfare improving. A term limit promotes the adoption of reforms, but reduces political accountability and hence e¤ort, and gives up the bene…t of keeping well-performing politicians in o¢ ce. We …nd that imposing such a limit is welfare reducing when uncertainty is high and e¤ort is important. Finally, we show that the main results of our model are robust to alternative assumptions. Interestingly, when incumbents are aware of their ability and there is complementarity between ability and the return from reforms, the model can even 2Glaeser et al. (2005) show how a similar mechanisms may explain strategic extremism in a model where policy statements are not directly observable and parties compete for voters. 3
generate a positive correlation between reforms and reelection. We also show that, when reforms are modelled as a discrete choice, their political cost is proportional to their size. The con‡ict of interest between voters and politicians is an old theme in a vast literature.3Our paper builds on agency models where the role of elections is to select the most competent politician. This approach has been used extensively (e.g. see Nordhaus, 1975, Alesina, 1987, Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988, Rogo¤, 1990, Persson and Tabellini, 1990, Lohman, 1998 and Drazen, 2000a) to explain political business cycles, i.e., the incentive for incumbents to perform well just before elections so as to appear talented to the voters. Despite some similarities, these papers do not study the role of uncertainty and economic shocks on political incentives to undertake reforms, while we are not interested in studying how political incentives vary in election and non-election years. In line with the literature on electoral accountability, initiated by Barro (1973), we consider the disciplining role of elections on e¤ort choices. Yet, we argue that, when it comes to investing in reforms, electoral incentives are more likely to induce myopic behavior. Recent contributions by Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) compare models of electoral accountability and career-concerns to study how the optimal accountability mechanism depends on the characteristics of policy tasks. The e¤ect of political compensation on the quality of politicians has instead been studied, among others, by Caselli and Morelli (2004), Besley (2004), Besley and Smart (2007), and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008). Once again, none of these papers focuses on uncertainty and on the choice of reforms. Important contributions on the political economy of reforms in the presence of uncertainty are Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Ciccone (2004), Cukierman et al. (1992), Alesina and Drazen (1991). The in‡uential paper by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) has shown how uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses may lead to a status quo bias. Alesina and Drazen (1991) have instead shown that reforms may be postponed due to a war of attrition. Drazen (2000b) discusses why reforms may be more likely in periods of crisis. Alesina and Cukierman (1990), instead, have shown that uncertainty allows the politicians to follow their most preferred policy, even at the expenses of voters. Similarly to these paper, we …nd that politicians have a bias against adopting reforms. Our result, however, is based on rational myopia rather than redistributional con‡icts and can explain why reforms are so politically di¢ cult even when they do not seem to be punished by voters. Morover, the result that uncertainty lowers the political cost of reforms is to our knowledge novel. Finally, a recent literature on institutional change has emphasized that (adverse) economic shocks may speed up the transition towards more democratic political regimes (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001 and 2006, 3Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide an excellent introduction to this …eld. 4
and the evidence in Brückner and Ciccone, 2009). Di¤erently from these papers, however, we restrict attention to economic reforms in representative democracies only. Finally, the general insight that uncertainty may improve the equilibrium along some dimensions in agency models has been explored in Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999), Holmström (1999), and Prat (2005), among others. Yet, the argument that uncertainty may improve welfare by stimulating the adoption of reforms with future payo¤s has not been made in the literature and appears of …rst order relevance to understand the political economy of reforms. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical observations motivating our analysis. It reviews the existing evidence that reelection probability is a¤ected by economic outcomes, but not by the adoption of reforms, and it discusses the empirical determinants of reforms. It also unveils a new pattern in the data: in a panel of OECD countries, periods of high economic volatility are associated to a higher propensity to implement reforms. Section 3 builds a two-period model of elections and reforms that can rationalize these empirical observations. It contains the main result of the paper, that reforms entail a political cost, even if their equilibrium choice does not a¤ect the reelection probability of the incumbent government. It also shows that, by reducing the perceived political cost of reform, uncertainty promotes their adoption. Section 4 examines the implications of the model for social welfare. It provides conditions for uncertainty to be welfare improving, it shows how political rewards can be set so as to maximize the expected utility of citizens and studies the desirability of imposing a one-term limit. Section 5 explores the robustness of the main results to alternative assumptions. Section 6 concludes. 2 Motivating Evidence In this Section, we review the main stylized facts motivating this paper. First, there is growing consensus that, while economic performance often a¤ects the probability that politicians stay in power, the incidence of …scal and structural reforms – despite the economic and political costs they may entail –does not. Second, reforms are more likely to occur during times of crisis. Since the literature has not explored the link between uncertainty and reforms, we provide some original evidence on it and …nd that economic volatility is associated to a more reformist stance on behalf of governments. 5
2.1 Crisis, Reforms and Reelection The hypothesis that reelection prospects depend on current economic performance received early support in the works of Fair (1978, 2008), Kiewiet and Rivers (1985) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). In particular, Kiewiet and Rivers (1985) …nd, using data on U.S. and Western European elections, that a 1-percent decline in real income is associated with a reduction of the incumbent party’s vote share of between 0.5 percent and 1 percent. More recently, a series of papers have provided evidence that good economic performance increases the likelihood that politicians stay in power. Brender and Drazen (2008) show on a sample of 73 countries that high growth during the term in o¢ ce increases the reelection probability, particularly in less developed countries. Using a sample of 21 OECD countries, Buti et al. (2010) …nd that high levels and growth rates of the cyclical component of GDP have a positive impact on the chances of reelection for incumbent governments. Finally, Wolfers (2007) provides evidence from U.S. gubernatorial elections that good economic performance increases the likelihood that incumbent parties stay in o¢ ce. On the contrary, many papers have failed to identify empirically the often-blamed electoral cost of reforms. Buti et al. (2010), using data on product and labor market reforms across OECD countries, show that reforms in general do not a¤ect the reelection probability of incumbent governments. Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) study the political consequences of …scal adjustments in a cross section of OECD countries and …nd that …scal austerity has positive rather than negative political e¤ects. Brender and Drazen (2008) …nd that loose …scal policies have a negative e¤ect on the probability of reelection in a panel of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. Peltzman (1992), Brender (2003), and Drazen and Eslava (2010) examine the e¤ect of …scal performance on reelection at the state and local level in a single country (the United States, Israel, and Colombia, respectively) and …nd that voters punish— rather than reward— loose …scal policies. 2.2 Crisis, Volatility and the Likelihood of Reforms The literature on the determinants of reforms such as marcoeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization and deregulation, is vast. After reviewing the experiences of developing countries with market-oriented reforms, Tommasi and Velasco (1996) conclude that the hypothesis that crises lead to stabilization is part of the conventional wisdom. Systematic empirical works on the determinants of reforms (see, among others, Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, Drazen and Easterly, 2001, Hamann and Prati, 2002) con…rm that the adoption of stabilization plans aimed at reducing in‡ation, government de…cit and the black market premium, is more likely in periods of crisis, i.e., when in‡ation, de…cit and black market 6
premium are particularly high. Recently, Alesina et al. (2006) provide evidence from a large panel of countries that …scal reforms are more likely to occur during times of crisis, when new governments take o¢ ce and when governments are “strong.”Periods of economic crisis are also found to favor the adoption of structural reforms targeted to the markets for …nancial instruments (Abiad and Mody, 2003) goods and services, and labor (Høj et al., 2006). Although crisis and volatility are likely to be correlated, there is to our knowledge no evidence on the relationship between reforms and economic uncertainty. This is unfortunate because in periods of high volatility it might be easier for policy makers to blame economic shocks instead of taking responsibility for the costs of their actions, and this may relax their political constraints. In other words, governments may perceive unpopular reforms to be politically more viable in times of turmoil. We now provide some preliminary evidence on this hypothesis. To do so, we study how economic volatility is empirically related to the likelihood and the size of de…cit stabilization in a panel of 20 OECD countries observed between 1975 and 2000.4To start with, we follow the existing literature in constructing a discrete indicator of reform using data on the annual variation of central government de…cit as a ratio of GDP (DEFICIT), from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (2001). We de…ne as a reform an episode of annual fall in DEFICIT above the 80th percentile of the empirical distribution, corresponding to reductions by more than 1.17 percentage points in our sample. Our measure of macroeconomic volatility is the standard deviation of the output gap, i.e., the di¤erence between the actual and the potential GDP over potential GDP, as computed by the OECD based on estimations of the production functions. This variable is meant to capture unexpected variations in economic performance. Figure 1 plots the overall number of reforms observed between 1975 and 2000 in the sample against the standard deviation of the output gap in the same period and provides a synthetic description of the data. The line interpolating the points exhibits a positive and signi…cant slope, suggesting the existence of positive correlation between volatility and reforms. A …rst step to corroborate this graphical evidence is to test whether the cross-sectional correlation holds after controlling for other variables. The coe¢ cients estimated with ordinary least squares are reported in Table 1. In column 1, we simply replicate the linear interpolation plotted in Figure 1, showing a positive and signi…cant correlation between volatility over the period and the number of reforms. Next, we control for initial real 4These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 7
FRA BEL DEU ITA DNK CHE NLD AUS USAAUT JPN CAN GRC GBR SWE NOR ESP IRL PRT FIN 0 2 4 6 8 Number of Deficit Stabilizations, 1975-2000 1 2 3 4 5 Standard deviation of output gap, 1975-2000 Deficit Stabilizations Fitted values: slope 0.95, t-stat 2.6 Deficit Stabilization = delta(deficit/GDP) < -1.17 OECD countries, 1975-2000 Economic Volatility and Deficit Stabilization Figure 1: Economic Volatility and De…cit Stabilizations. GDP per capita and the average level of DEFICIT, in columns 2 and 3. While these variables are not signi…cantly correlated with the number of reforms, the coe¢ cient for volatility remains positive and signi…cant. Following the literature on crises and reforms, we also control for the number of …scal crises, de…ned as episodes in which government de…cit as a share of GDP is above the 20th percentile (i.e., over 7.5 per cent). As columns 4 and 5 show, the number of …scal crises is not signi…cantly correlated to the number of reforms. Finally, we also control for the following political variables: the number of left-wing governments (left), the number of governments in the …rst two years of o¢ ce (younggov) and a dummy for parliamentary systems. These indicators are obtained from the 2006 release of the Database of Political Institutions compiled by the World Bank. Consistently with previous evidence (e.g., Alesina et al., 2006), a larger number of left-wing governments is associated to more …scal adjustments, while the coe¢ cients for the other political variables are not signi…cant. Throughout all speci…cations, economic volatility remains signi…cantly and positively correlated to the number of reforms.5 To better exploit the information in the dataset we now use the annual panel to 5The results are also robust to controlling for average political fractionalization and proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) system. The estimated coe¢ cients for these variables are non signi…cant. 8
estimate the following logit for the likelihood of reforms: Pr[REFit = 1 jSDit1;t5;Xit1] = exp (b0+b1SDit1;t5+b2Xit1+ui+eit) 1 + exp (b0+b1SDit1;t5+b2Xit1+ui+eit) (1) where REFit is the dummy indicator of …scal adjustment in country iand year t,SDit1;t5 is the standard deviation of the output gap over the …ve-year period between t1and t5,Xit1is a vector of control variables, uiis the country …xed e¤ect and eit is the error term. All regressors are lagged one period to account for the fact that policies may be decided the year before they are enacted, and to avoid simultaneity. Moreover, we always include among the regressors the level of de…cit to control for the fact that reforms may be more likely when the de…cit is particularly high. The results are reported in Table 2. The …rst speci…cation suggests that the probability of reforms increases with volatility, and, consistently with the empirical literature on the determinants of reforms, it is higher the larger is the de…cit as a ratio of GDP in the previous period. Since both variables are signi…cant, we keep them in the estimation and add other covariates in the following regressions. First, we control for indicators of economic activity such as the output gap and real GDP per capita, to let the likelihood of reforms vary over the cycle. While the coe¢ cient for the output gap, in column 2, is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, the one for real output, in column 3, is negative, pointing to the fact that reforms are adopted more often in periods of bad economic performance. In column 4, we replace real GDP per capita with the indicator of …scal crisis (i.e., de…cit level above 7.5 per cent of GDP) and …nd a signi…cant and positive coe¢ cient, con…rming the existing evidence that a …scal adjustment is more likely after a …scal crisis. When we consider both economic performance and de…cit crises, in column 5, all covariates remain signi…cant, which points to the importance of all these variables as determinants of reforms. Finally, column 6 shows that political factors such as the proximity of an election, ideology and the tenure of the government do not signi…cantly a¤ect the likelihood of …scal stabilization. Independently of the covariates, the sign, magnitude and signi…cance of the coe¢ cient for economic volatility remain unaltered. The evidence in Tables 1 and 2 refers to a discrete indicator of reforms, whose de…nition depends on a threshold value for the annual variation in the de…cit to GDP ratio, and hence may be subject to discretion. To circumvent this problem and to study the intensive margin of reforms, we now replicate the panel analysis of Table 2 using as dependent variable the annual change in de…cit, DEFICIT. We therefore estimate: DEFICITit =DEF ICITit1+1SDit1;t5+2Xit1+i+it;(2) 9
Imposing r=reand a=aeinto (7) and then using (9), the reelection probability turns out to be p= Pr t+"t=1 2; which is just the unconditional probability that the incumbent be more able than the population average. Thus, in equilibrium the choice of reform does not a¤ect the probability of reelection. Yet, what drives the “political cost” of reforms (i.e., @p=@r < 0in 12) is hidden information out of equilibrium: the fact that politicians can deviate from their equilibrium strategy in ways unknown to voters. Note also that the “political cost” of reforms would disappear if there were no uncertainty about . Finally, we can solve for Et+1, i.e., the ex-ante expected ability of the politician in o¢ ce in the second period, given the equilibrium behavior of voters and the incumbent. With probability (1 p), the politician will be a new draw with expected ability . With probability p, it will instead be an incumbent who, by virtue of the voting strategy, is expected to be better than the average. Hence: Et+1 = (1 p)+pEt+1 jb t(18) =+ 2; where represents the “selection e¤ect”, that is, the di¤erence between the ex-ante expected ability of a reelected incumbent and the average. This is equal to the average of the posterior belief truncated from below at , minus the unconditional mean. Using standard properties of normal distributions yields: =22 q2 +2 "2 = 22 g: (19) Note that reelected politicians tend to be better than the average and more so when ability is highly dispersed (there is no bene…t from selection if politicians are all alike) and when noise is low (so that it is less likely to reelect bad but lucky politicians). 4 Welfare Analysis We now explore the implications of the model for social welfare. To start with, we compare the equilibrium derived above with a constrained e¢ cient benchmark and show that politicians choose a suboptimally low level of reforms. Then, we examine the impact of uncertainty on welfare and derive conditions for the e¤ect to be positive. We also study how the political reward a¤ects welfare and show how it can be set so as to maximize the 16
expected utility of citizens. Finally, we use the model to examine the role of elections and whether or not it is socially desirable to impose a one-term limit to the politician in o¢ ce. Using (3), (5) and (18), expected ex-ante social welfare is: W=r+a ++ 2+f(r):(20) where rand asolve (15) and (16), respectively. The above equilibrium is ine¢ cient. A benevolent social planner subject to the same information set would choose reforms rF B so as to equate the social bene…t to the social cost: f0rF B= 1:(21) Comparing (21) to (15), it is immediate to see that the level of reforms chosen by the politician is too low. This ine¢ ciency arises from the political cost that reforms impose on the incumbent: the fact that, by deviating from the equilibrium strategy, he can increase his chance to be reelected.13 In sum (proof in the text): Proposition 2 In the above environment, investment in reforms, r, is below the level that would maximize social welfare. Note also that, since Wis increasing in a, a social planner would set e¤ort to its maximum, amax. 4.1 Uncertainty and Welfare In the next proposition, we characterize how uncertainty a¤ects ex-ante expected social welfare (20). Proposition 3 The e¤ect on social welfare of the variance of noise (2 ") and of ability (2 ) is ambiguous: @W @2 " >0() g2 f00 (r)> 2 +2(22) @W @2 >0() 2 + 22 "2g f00 (r)> 2(23) Proof. See Appendix 13 The same distortion leading to suboptimal reforms would arise even in the absence of elections if future political compensation was increasing in current economic performance, as empirically show by Di Tella and Fisman (2004) using data on US gubernatorial salaries. 17
Var(epsilon) W Figure 2: Welfare and Uncertainty (2 ") The variance of noise (2 ") has contrasting e¤ects on welfare. First, Proposition 1 shows that noise promotes investment in reforms. Given that reforms are always suboptimally low, this e¤ect tends to increase social welfare. Second, Proposition 1 also shows that noise reduces e¤ort and this tends to lower social welfare. Third, by making luck relatively more important, a higher noise raises the probability to oust a talented incumbent or to con…rm a bad one. Thus, 2 "reduces the selection premium, ; and hence social welfare. The …rst e¤ect dominates the other two, so that noise turns out to be welfare improving, when reforms are relatively more important than e¤ort and selection. This is more likely to be the case when the political cost of reforms, g, is high (so that underinvestment is severe), e¤ort is not very valuable (low ) and ability is very concentrated (low 2 ). Given that g!0when 2 "! 1, condition (22) cannot be satis…ed when 2 "is high enough. Thus, the negative welfare e¤ect must dominate if noise is su¢ ciently high. Without additional restrictions, welfare can be a highly non-monotonic function of 2 ". Some examples are reported in Figure 2 for the case f(r) = rand a small . The dashed line represents the asymptotic level of welfare as 2 "! 1, i.e., when reforms are optimal but there is no bene…t from selection. The upper curve displays the relationship between W and 2 "for a high value of 2 . When ability is very dispersed, selection is so important that an increase in noise is always welfare-reducing, despite its positive e¤ect on reforms. The 18
lower curve corresponds to the opposite scenario in which heterogeneity in ability is very low, so that selection is not very useful. In this case, welfare increases with uncertainty until 2 "becomes very large (the point at which the curve becomes downward sloping is not shown). Two intermediate examples make the non-monotonicity more evident. The variance of ability (2 ) has contrasting welfare e¤ects too. On the one hand, more dispersion in political ability increases reforms (Proposition 1) and the selection premium, (as can be seen from 19). These e¤ects tend to increase social welfare. On the other hand, Proposition 1 shows that more heterogeneity reduces e¤ort. The positive welfare e¤ect will dominate when reforms and selection are relatively more important than e¤ort. That is, when g is high (so that underinvestment is severe), e¤ort is not very valuable (low ) and ability is dispersed (high 2 ). From (23), it is immediate to see that the positive welfare e¤ect of heterogeneity must dominate if 2 is su¢ ciently high. 4.2 Optimal Political Reward What are the welfare e¤ects of political rewards, ? If rents from o¢ ce increase, the politician will care more about reelection and this will induce him to exert more e¤ort, but also to invest less in reforms (see Proposition 1).14 The resulting trade-o¤ suggests that there might exist a socially optimal level of political rewards. This possibility is worth exploring because, although includes psychological rents and private bene…ts that may be di¢ cult to control, the pay to politicians in power can partly be chosen by the society and varies considerably across countries.15 Thus, we now turn to the analysis of the optimum and its determinant. Di¤erentiating expected social welfare, (20), w.r.t. yields: @W @ =@a @ +f0(r)1@r @ The …rst term is the marginal value of political rewards, MB (): one additional unit of increases e¤ort by @a=@, with a value proportional to . The second term is instead the marginal cost, MC (): an extra unit of biases reforms downward (@r=@ < 0) and the cost of this is proportional to the severity of underinvestment in equilibrium, [f0(r)1] >0. Using (15) and (16) and simplifying terms, the …rst-order condition for 14 Some evidence that the wage paid to politicians a¤ects their performance is provided, by Besley (2004) for the U.S., Ferraz and Finan (2009) for Brazil, and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009) for Italy. 15 For example, Besley (2004) reports that the US president is paid around $400,000, the British prime minister $270,000, while the French president $70,000. See Diermeier et al. (2005) for a pioneering attempt at quantifying and decomposing the returns to a career in the US Congress. 19
an interior optimum is: MB () = 2=@r @ =MC ():(24) To characterize the solution to (24), in Figure 3 we plot both MB and MC as a function of . The MB curve is represented by the dashed, ‡at, line.16 The MC curve (solid line) starts at zero and may be non monotonic (the Figure shows two possible cases). Its slope is analyzed formally in Lemma 1: Lemma 1 The marginal cost of is increasing if and only if f00 (r)2> f000 (r)g: Proof. See Appendix The condition in Lemma 1 is always satis…ed when !0and also if f000 (r)<0. Yet, when f000 (r)>0(e.g., for f=rwith 0< < 1), MC may be hump-shaped. In what follows, we restrict attention to the most interesting case in which MB and MC intersect once and only once over the relevant range 2[0;(amax= 1) =g].17 Under this restriction, the solution, , to (24) is unique and interior, and the MC curve must be positively sloped at . We study the comparative statics of to changes in parameters in the following proposition.18 Proposition 4 The socially optimal political reward, =2f00 (r) g; is increasing in the variance of both noise (2 ") and ability (2 ), and in the value of e¤ort (): @ @2 " >0; @ @2 >0; @ @ >0: Proof. See Appendix An increase in uncertainty (due to either ability dispersion or noise) a¤ects the marginal cost of political compensation while leaving its marginal bene…t una¤ected. Higher 16 The MB curve is ‡at because e¤ort is linear in , which in turn depends on the assumption of a quadratic cost of a. Our results generalize to su¢ ciently convex cost functions. 17 Recall that there exists an upper bound to e¤ort, amax . Therefore, it is never optimal to o¤er a compensation higher than the minimum level inducing the maximum e¤ort. 18 Thus, the upper bound on arules out the rather extreme and not very realistic case in which social welfare is maximized for ! 1 and a! 1. 20
gamma MC, MB Figure 3: Opimal : Solid = MC, Dashed = MB uncertainty means that chance plays a bigger role in reelection, implying that rbecomes less reactive to . From (24) we see that this reduces the marginal cost of . As a result, optimal political compensation increases. A higher value of e¤ort, , raises the marginal bene…t of while leaving the marginal cost una¤ected. Therefore, the optimal compensation increases with the value of e¤ort. 4.3 Term Limit A key reason why reforms are too low is that incumbents care not only about social welfare, but also their reelection. Thus, a way to align the incentives of politicians to do reforms and those of the society would be to rule out the possibility of reelection by imposing a one-period term limit. This would set both pand @p=@r to zero and restore the …rst-best investment in reforms. Yet, without electoral incentives, incumbents will put less e¤ort. Moreover, by excluding reelection, citizens forego the opportunity of retaining well performing candidates.19 Therefore, despite its negative e¤ect on reforms, the prospect of reelection may be in the interest of the society, although a one-term limit might be 19 See Besley and Case (1995) for evidence that term limits do apper to a¤ect policy choices. Yet, from their results it is di¢ cult to sort out the e¤ects on e¤ort and on reforms. 21
optimal under some conditions. We now explore this possibility formally. The equilibrium under a one-term limit is characterized by r=rFB,a=and = 0. Ruling out reelection is socially optimal if it grants an ex-ante expected social welfare, WTL, higher than W, i.e., when: WTL W=f rF BrFB (f (r)r) 2+2g>0: The …rst term in square brackets, which is always positive, is the gain from a term limit due to the higher investment in reforms. The second term, instead, is the loss in social welfare for giving up selection and lowering e¤ort. Rearranging and using (19) yields that a one-term limit is socially optimal if and only if: f rF BrFB (f (r)r)> g 2 +2(25) This condition is more likely to hold when selection is not very useful or e¤ective, ability has low value, and reforms are highly needed. More precisely, an increase in raises the RHS of (25) thereby making the optimality of a term-limit less likely. The e¤ect of uncertainty is instead more complex. First, note that 2 and 2 "do not a¤ect WT L, but have ambiguous e¤ects on W, as discussed in Proposition 3. More uncertainty lowers the LHS of (25), because it reduces the underinvestment in reforms (recall, rconverges monotonically to rFB as either 2 ! 1 or 2 "! 1). This tends to make a term limit less attractive. Yet, the e¤ect on the RHS of (25) may depend on the source of uncertainty. When there is more political heterogeneity (higher 2 ) there is more to gain from ex-post selection, but there is also less e¤ort in an equilibrium with reelections. The …rst e¤ect dominates, so that the RHS of (25) increases if: @g2 +2 @2 >0() 2 + 22 "> 2 Thus, if 2 is su¢ ciently high, a term limit is never optimal. An increase in 2 ", instead, worsens selection and lowers the RHS of (25). Since it also lowers the LHS, it is unclear whether or not it makes a term-limit more attractive. Despite this ambiguity, it can be shown that, if 2 "is high enough, imposing the term limit cannot be optimal. The reason is that, as 2 "! 1,Wconverges to WTL and @W=@2 "<0(the latter follows from Proposition 3), implying that Wmust converge from above. Thus, we must have W > WTL when the noise is su¢ ciently high. We summarize this discussion in the following Proposition (proof in the text): Proposition 5 There exists a threshold level of heterogeneity in political ability, b2 , such 22
Var(epsilon) W>W(TL) W<W(TL) Var(theta) Figure 4: Uncertainty and Term Limit that for 2 >b2 holding elections without the term limit is socially optimal. There exists a threshold level of economic volatility, b2 ", such that for 2 ">b2 "holding elections without the term limit is socially optimal. More generally, the desirability of a term limit is depicted in Figure 4 in the space (2 "; 2 ). In the region below the solid line, welfare is higher when a term limit is in place. Clearly, if 2 is high enough so that selection is su¢ ciently important, a term limit is never optimal. Similarly, if 2 "is high enough, imposing the term limit cannot be optimal either. Moreover, as the …gure shows, depending on parameters, a term limit may be more likely to be optimal for intermediate values of noise. For example, this is the case when the degree of heterogeneity in political ability corresponds to the dashed line. This happens because, for low 2 "selection is very e¤ective and e¤ort is high, this compensating the underinvestment in reforms. 5 Robustness We now study the robustness of the main results derived in Section 3 to alternative assumptions. In particular, we show that when politicians are aware of their own ability, their equilibrium choices (rand a) will depend on talent, . Yet, the political cost of 23
reform is still present in this version of the model and is still decreasing in the degree of uncertainty they face. Moreover, when good politicians are also relatively better at doing reforms, the model can generate a positive correlation between reforms and reelection, as found in some of the empirical literature (e.g., Alesina et al. 1998 and Brender and Drazen, 2008). Last, we study the extensive margin of reforms in a version of the model where the choice of ris discrete and …nd the new result that the political cost is increasing in the size of reforms. 5.1 Political Ability and Reforms If the incumbent knows his ability ibefore choosing reforms, the voting strategy does not change since citizens can only condition their choice on ytand they cannot disentangle ifrom "t. This means that they stick to the rule of reelecting any incumbent delivering an outcome above the expected mean, yty=+aere, where reand aeare the equilibrium level of reforms and e¤ort chosen by the average politician (with i=). The problem facing incumbent iis now di¤erent: max fr;agiri+aia2 i 2++pi(i+) + (1 pi)+f(ri)(26) subject to: pi= Pr (yty) = Pr (i+airi+"ty) = 1 H(yi+riai);(27) where His the c.d.f. of "N0; 2 ", with density h. The perceived reelection probability, pi, is still decreasing in reforms and increasing in e¤ort: @pi @ri =h(yi+riai)<0;(28) @pi @ai =h (yi+riai)>0:(29) The …rst-order conditions to the incumbent’s problem are: f0(ri)=1@pi @rii+;(30) ai=+@pi @aii+:(31) The main di¤erence with respect to equations (12) and (13) is that investment in reforms and e¤ort now varies with ability. In particular, compared to (21), incumbents with 24
very low ability (i< ) overinvest in reforms to voluntarily reduce their reelection probability, because the cost of having a bad politician outweighs their private bene…t from remaining in o¢ ce. All the other politicians (with i> ) adopt too little reforms, as in the previous section. Similarly, good politicians put more e¤ort to increase their reelection probability pi, because the value of staying in power is proportional to i. Although pi,riand aiare now ability speci…c, it is useful to characterize the equilibrium for the average politician (with i=), because it coincides with the ex-ante expected equilibrium. Imposing i=and rational expectations (ri= r= reand ai= a= ae) into (28)-(31), the …rst-order conditions of the average-ability incumbent become: f0(r) = 1 + h a=1 + h with h=22 "1=2. Comparing these conditions to (15) and (16), we see that the average politician now makes less reforms and puts more e¤ort than in Section 3. This is because the incumbent faces a lower degree of political uncertainty (he knows his own type, i) and, as already discussed, lower uncertainty implies less reforms and more e¤ort. For the same reason, rand ado not depend on 2 anymore, since the only source of uncertainty for the incumbent is now the noise shock, ". Yet, a higher volatility of "increases (reduces) the average level of reforms (e¤ort), precisely as in Proposition 1. It is also interesting to note that, for politicians of very high or very low ability, uncertainty may now increase the political cost of reforms. Formally, from (28), @pi=@ri becomes a positive function of 2 "for su¢ ciently high or low i, because the density h() in the tails gets fatter when the variance increases. Thus, uncertainty lowers investment in reforms of very good or very bad politicians, but politicians in the tails are a minority only. In sum, while the e¤ects are now more nuanced, uncertainty still unambiguously reduces the average political cost of reforms. The result that good politicians make less reform may appear unappealing. Yet, this result can be overturned by assuming not only that politicians know their own type, but also that political ability matters for reforms. In particular, assume that f(ri; i), with the f()function being supermodular (i.e., @2f(ri;i) @ri@i>0). In words, good politicians are also relatively better at doing reforms. Then, the new …rst-order condition for ribecomes: @f (ri; i) @ri = 1 @pi @rii+ Provided that @2f(ri;i) @ri@iis su¢ ciently high, better politician will now make more reforms. Moreover, since better politicians have a higher chance of being reelected, this version of 25
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[54] Rogo¤, Kenneth and Anne Sibert (1988). “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,”Review of Economic Studies 55(1), 1-16. [55] Tommasi, Mariano and Andres Velasco (1996). “Where Are We in the Political Economy of Reforms?”Journal of Policy Reforms, Vol. 1, pp. 187–238. [56] Windmeijer, Frank (2005). “A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear E¢ cient Two-Step GMM Estimators,”Journal of Econometrics 126, 25-51. [57] Wolfers, Justin (2007). “Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections,”Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mimeo. 7 Appendix 7.1 Proof of Proposition 1 Implicit di¤erentiation of (15) with respect to 2 ",2 and , and using (17) yields: @r @2 " = f00 (r) @g @2 " = f00 (r) g 2(2 +2 ")>0(35) @r @2 = f00 (r) @g @2 = f00 (r) g 2(2 +2 ")>0(36) @r @ =g f00 (r)<0;(37) since marginal returns to reforms are assumed to be decreasing (f00 (r)<0). Di¤erentiation of (16) with respect to 2 ",2 and , and using (17) yields: @a @2 " =@a @2 =g 2(2 +2 ")<0(38) @a @ =g > 0:(39) 7.2 Proof of Proposition 3 Di¤erencing social welfare (20) w.r.t. 2 "yields: @W @2 " =@a @2 " +f0(r)1@r @2 " + 2 @ @2 " : After replacing the term in the bracket with (15), the derivatives @a=@2 "and @r=@2 "from (38) and (35), and @=@2 "=2 g= 2 +2 ", obtains: @W @2 " =g 22 +2 "g2 f00 (r)2 2: 33
This is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e., @W @2 " >0() g2 f00 (r)> 2 +2: Di¤erencing social welfare (20) w.r.t. 2 yields: @W @2 =@a @2 +f0(r)1@r @2 + 2 @ @2 After replacing the term in the bracket with (15), the derivatives @a=@2 and @r=@2 from (38) and (36), and @=@2 =g22 (2 +2 ")1, obtains: @W @2 =g 2(2 +2 ")22 f00 (r)g+2 + 22 " This is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e., @W @2 >0() 2 + 22 "2g f00 (r)> 2: 7.3 Proof of Lemma 1 Recall: MC () = @r @ =g f00 (r) where we have substituted (37). Di¤erencing MC ()w.r.t. yields: @MC () @ =g [f00 (r)]2f000 (r)@r @ g f00 (r) =g f00 (r)1f000 (r) f00 (r)2g: This expression is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e. @MC () @ >0() f00 (r)2> f000 (r)g: 7.4 Proof of Proposition 4 From: =2f00 (r) g 34
it is immediate to see that is increasing in . To …nd the e¤ect of uncertainty, note that: @ @2 " =@ @2 =@ @g @g @2 x =@ @g g 2(2 +2 ") for x="; . Next, derive w.r.t. g: @ @g =2f00 (r)2f000 (r)g f00(r) g2<0; under the condition in Lemma 1, which is assumed to be satis…ed at . Thus, @=@2 "= @=@2 >0: 35
SD 0.946** 1.023** 0.930*** 0.929** 0.993*** 0.814** [0.371] [0.455] [0.332] [0.384] [0.334] [0.332] log(GDP_75) 0.453 [2.386] DEFICIT -0.022 0.158 [0.163] [0.140] #_CRISIS_DEF 0.022 0.084 0.091 [0.071] [0.098] [0.071] #_left 0.139** [0.063] #_younggov -0.136 [0.063] parliamentary -0.162 [0.694] R-squared 0.148 0.150 0.149 0.153 0.216 0.489 Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 Note. Dependent variable: # of Deficit Reform = number of years with the annual change in DEFICIT (= government deficit as a share of GDP) smaller than or equal to -1.17% over the sample period. Regressors are: SD = standard deviation of the output gap over the sample period; log(GDP_75) = log of real GDP per capita in 1975; DEFICIT in period average; #_CRISIS_DEF= number of years with DEFICIT less than or equal to -7.5; #_left = number of years with leftwing governments; #_younggov = number of years with governments in the first two years of office; parliamentary= dummy for parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) systems. Regressions are performed with ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. OECD Countries, 1975-2000 - Cross Section Table 1. Economic Volatility and the Number of Reforms
SD_1 0.290* 0.320** 0.346** 0.260*** 0.348*** 0.320** [0.159] [0.163] [0.164] [0.070] [0.161] [0.164] DEFICIT_1 0.153*** 0.114** 0.231*** 0.300* 0.317*** 0.321*** [0.047] [0.052] [0.058] [0.157] [0.076] [0.078] OUTPUTGAP_1 0.093 [0.060] log(GDP_1) -4.288*** -3.934*** -3.925*** [1.471] [1.480] [1.510] CRISIS_DEF_1 1.502** 1.502** 1.270* [0.675] [0.675] [0.693] election_1 -0.238 [0.334] left_1 -0.330 [0.364] younggov_1 -0.511 [0.372] Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342 Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Table 2. Economic Volatility and the Likelihood of Reforms OECD Countries, 1975-2000 - Panel Note. Dependent variable is Deficit Reform = dummy taking value 1 if the annual change in DEFICIT is less than or equal to -1.17%, zero otherwise. Covariates are lagged values of: DEFICIT = government deficit as a share of GDP; SD = standard deviation of the output gap over the previous five years; OUTPUTGAP; log(GDP) = log of real GDP per capita; CRISIS_DEF= dummy taking value 1 if DEFICIT is less than or equal to -7.5; election = dummy for legislative and/or executive elections; left = dummy for left-wing governments; younggov = dummy for governments in the first two years of office. Regressions are performed with panel logit with country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
SD_1 -0.332** -0.344** -0.352** -0.351** -0.369*** -0.334** [0.148] [0.152] [0.146] [0.148] [0.145] [0.149] DEFICIT_1 0.843*** 0.852*** 0.775*** 0.725*** 0.682*** 0.687*** [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] OUTPUTGAP_1 -0.024 [0.048] log(GDP_1) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005] CRISIS_DEF_1 -1.317*** -1.151*** -1.099*** [0.434] [0.428] [0.431] election_1 0.269 [0.263] left_1 0.353 [0.286] younggov_1 0.518* [0.290] R-squared 0.743 0.745 0.732 0.743 0.739 0.742 Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 Table 3. Economic Volatility and Reforms Note. Dependent variable is DEFICIT = government deficit as a share of GDP. Regressors are lagged values of: DEFICIT; SD = standard deviation of the output gap over the previous five years; output gap; log(GDP) = log of real GDP per capita; CRISIS_DEF = dummy taking value 1 if DEFICIT is less than or equal to - 7.5; election = dummy for legislative and/or executive elections; left = dummy for left-wing governments; younggov = dummy for governments in the first two years of office. Regressions are performed with least squares (LSDV) with country fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and consistency with Kiviet (1995) procedure. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. OECD Countries, 1975-2000 - Panel LSDV