Polarization in the chilean party system : changes and continuities, 1990-1999

Polarization in the Chilean Party System: Changes and Continuities, 1990-1999 LETICIA M. RUIZ-RODRÍGUEZ Universidad de Salamanca WP núm. 236 Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials Barcelona, 2005 Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials Adscrit a la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 2 The Institute of Political and Social Sciences (ICPS) is a consortium created in 1988 by the Barcelona Provincial Council and the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the institution to which the ICPS is officially linked for academic purposes. “Working Papers” (WP) is one of the collections published by the ICPS, with the previous reading committee’s report, specialising in the publication of work currently being undertaken by social researchers –in the author’s original language– with the aim of facilitating their subsequent scientific debate. Inclusion of work within this collection does not prohibit its future publication by the author, who maintains full rights over the article. The work in question cannot be reproduced without the permission of the author. Publication: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) Mallorca, 244, pral. 08008 Barcelona (España) http://www.icps.es © Leticia M. Ruiz-Rodríguez Design: Toni Viaplana Printer: a.bís Travessera de les Corts, 251, entr. 4a. 08014 Barcelona ISSN: 1133-8962 DL: B-13.639-05 3 Introduction1 The year 2000 began for the Chileans with the second round of the presidential election, the third presidential election since the reinstallation of democracy in 1989. For the first time since 1970, Chile has elected a socialist president. In addition, for the first time since the transition to democracy, the coalition of the parties on the right, traditionally identified with Pinochet’s legacy, has obtained support similar to the other coalition. The narrow victory of the socialist Ricardo Lagos, leader of the center-left coalition, is the final piece of evidence that demonstrates that the Chilean party system is undergoing a series of changes2. This paper addresses the transformation of the post-authoritarian Chilean party system in the ten years since the transition to democracy in 1990. To the debate surrounding the degree of continuity and change in the post Pinochet party system, which flourished just after the transition to democracy, must be added new evidence. In particular, I will focus on the evolution of polarization during the 1990s in Chile, and I will attempt to determine the main reasons that explain the pattern. Until 1973, Chile was one of the most stable and longest-lasting democracies in Latin America. "In 143 years, Chile experienced only thirteen months of unconstitutional rule under some form of junta" (Valenzuela, 1999, p. 192). The Chilean party system, compared to other, more elitist-oriented Latin American political regimes, was the most European-like of the region (Dix, 1989). Four factors explain this characterization: first, the Chilean party system was highly institutionalized; second, a complete ideological spectrum, in which the electorate was distributed in three thirds, existed; third, the content of the societal cleavages that had been frozen into the party system was remarkably similar to European cleavages; fourth, partisan politics was highly inclusionary and representative in character (Yocelevky, 1996, p. 132). Together with these exceptional qualities, Chile was the only country in Latin America in which the left had won a presidential election. In this context, and despite the strength of the Chilean right, in 1970 Allende became president of the Republic, supported by a minority leftist coalition, Unidad Popular (UP)3. 4 Under this government, Chile underwent a process of increasing polarization and centrifugal competition among parties. On September 11, 1973, a coup d'état interrupted Chilean democracy4. The coup led to a military government that lasted until 1989. During this period, political parties were either banned or dismantled5. The interruption of the long tradition of democratic rule and its substitution by sixteen years of military rule has had an important impact on the democratic regime that has arisen subsequently. The democratization process began with the 1988 referendum (followed by the 1989 presidential and congressional elections), and allowed the return of political parties to the political arenas6. Both the 1988 referendum and the 1989 elections confirmed the parties’ ability to organize into coalitions as an adaptive strategy to the electoral system designed by Pinochet's regime. Both processes demonstrated that a majority of Chileans supported the alliance of the parties that represented the opposition to the authoritarian regime, the Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia (CPPD). Ten years later, there are both dramatic continuities from 1990 and important changes. One crucial continuity is the continued operation of the bicoalitional logic. In addition, the CPPD remains in government: it has won the presidential election three consecutive times. Third, the religious cleavage and the class cleavage remain strong forces in structuring party competition. In addition, the left and right poles have maintained their support over the 1990s, both in terms of people who identify with the left and the right when asked about their ideology and in terms of the vote. In contrast, the center has experienced a progressive decrease in the number of people identified with it. The party that has traditionally occupied the center, Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), has experienced a decrease in its electoral support; subsequently, its relative importance within the center-left coalition has been reduced. Other important changes which will be discussed and explained below include the expansion of the apolitical sector, the widening of the gap in citizens’ perceptions between party and societal interests (Munck and Bosworth, 1998; Meseguer, 1999), the programmatic redefinition of certain political parties, the creation of new political parties, the consensus among parties on certain policy areas, and the 5 first evidence of a decrease in the salience of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage that arose in the transition to democracy. Due to the interrelated character of changes and continuities, there are grey areas when we try to comprehensively understand the evolution of all these features of the party system. For example, there are the same number of parties now as there were before the coup. This overshadows the aforementioned transformations within the parties as well as the bipolar logic of the party system. Similarly, the argument regarding the continued importance of religion and class as structuring cleavages has to be combined with a reflection on the new authoritarian/democratic cleavage, which has become crucial when dealing with Chilean politics7. This cleavage is rooted on the Pinochet experience. Parties strongly disagree on historical aspects such as the interpretation of the authoritarian past, and its echoes in debates on the current role of the Armed Forces, solutions to Human Rights violations, as well as decisions about judging Pinochet and other military elites, among other topics. In addition to these historical aspects, this cleavage also encompasses issues related to redesignment of institutional arrangements inherited from the military rule. But, if there are grey areas in the description of the transformation of the Chilean party system, even less consensus exists in the literature that explains the evolution of different dimensions of the party system. In the following pages, attention will be focused on the evolution of polarization in the 1990s in Chile as well as the reasons that have shaped its evolution. The Study of Polarization in the Chilean Party System One of the most contested arenas of literature on the Chilean party system over the last decade surrounds both the extent of polarization and the reasons for its changing degree. Authors have agreed that a much lower degree of polarization exists in the present party system as compared to the 1973 party system (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Valenzuela, 1995; Munck and Bosworth, 1998). The earlier party system has been characterized as “extreme polarized pluralism” (Sartori, 1976). Anti-system parties, bilateral oppositions (two mutually exclusive oppositions), the metrical center of the 6 system occupied by a party, a large amount of ideological distance, prevalence of centrifugal drives over centripetal ones, congenital ideological patterning, and an irresponsible opposition are the main features that Sartori highlights in describing the Chilean party system before the military coup (Sartori, 1976). However, a systematic consideration of the reasons for the high levels of polarization that the system reached has not occurred. The literature has attempted to explain the high degree of polarization in the pre-authoritarian party system through discussion of the electoral system, the type of presidentialism (Shugart and Carey, 1992), the maximalist style of the elites’ interaction, the emergence of a rigid and ideological center party (Scully, 1992), and socio-economic aspects, such as the economic recession and the nationalization of some of the industries, which made consensus difficult to reach. With regard to the evolution of polarization from 1990 to the present, scholarly dispute exists both in terms of the extent and nature of polarization and in terms of the explanatory factors that have shaped it. It is clear that the post-authoritarian party system overall displays a much lower degree of polarization than the 1973 party system; however, a consensus has not been reached on its description from 1990 on. Authors who identify a trend toward a progressive decrease in polarization over this past decade include Barrett, Agüero, and Scully. They consider the consensus reached among parties over certain policy areas as evidence of a decrease in the polarization of the party system that arose in 1990 (Barrett, 1998; Agüero, 1998; Scully, 1995). Similarly, Hinzpeter and Lehman’s analysis of the trends of convergence in the public opinion surveys lead to a diagnosis of moderated patterns in the Chilean political arena (Hinzpeter and Lehman, 1999a). A similar conclusion is reached by Rabkin, who argues that the electoral system inherited from Pinochet has had stabilizing effects on contemporary Chilean politics and that it has contributed to the emergence of centripetal competence (Rabkin, 1996). This argument about a decrease in polarization is also defended by Rehren. His characterization of the evolution of the party system “from centrifugal multipartism to centripetal coalition” suggests that the coalitional dynamic has 7 led to a decrease in polarization (Rehren,1997, p. 3). In contrast, other authors point to some evidence that indicates that polarization may well have increased over the past decade, arguing that it is questionable to conclude that polarization has continued decreasing over the nineties. Siavelis’ arguments about the strength of factors like the number and cultural importance of political parties8, the nature of electoral systems at the local and municipal level, and the continued salience of ideological cleavages demonstrate the need for caution when assessing a decrease in party fragmentation and a trend toward centripetal competition (Siavelis, 1997a). Valenzuela reaches a similar conclusion. He analyzes the effects of presidentialism in Chile, asserting that it is likely that this form of government will exacerbate conflict, leading one to question the idea of a decrease in polarization (Valenzuela, 1994)9. It can be argued that part of the disagreement regarding the degree and direction of polarization over the 1990s arises from conceptualization differences. Sanni and Sartori conceptualize polarization as the distance between the poles (Sanni and Sartori, 1983). These poles do not have to be necessarily left and right, although they argue that left-right distance is the best way to measure polarization. However, what is more useful to take from these authors’ approach is their distinction between pragmatic and ideological politics (Sanni and Sartori, 1983, p. 309). As Mair asserts, “ideological politics” refers to domains of identification. Therefore, it deals with core, and to some extent abstract, identities. Alternatively, “pragmatic politics” refers to domains of competition, dealing with particular issues, programs, or policies (Mair, 1997, p. 23). Polarization can occur in either dimension, operating at either the mass or the elite level, or both. A complementary conceptualization of polarization defines it as “the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system” (Coppedge, 1998a). In other words, “polarized party systems are those tending toward a bimodal distribution of the vote on the left-right spectrum” (Coppedge, 1998b). This definition raises the idea of the relative center. Here, the distance between the poles can be reduced not only by movements from both sides to the center, but also by unilateral movements 8 of one of the poles toward the center. As Scully argues, the existence of a center has been alternatively interpreted as an evidence of a polarized party system (for example in Sartori’s characterization of the 1973 Chilean party system), and as a sign of a moderated party system, since competition it is not reduced to a bipolar logic (Duverger, 1954). In response to these counterarguments, Scully asserts that it is not the existence of a center, but rather the nature of the center that matters for polarization (Scully, 1992). In fact, according to Scully, the nature of the center, whether programmatic or positional, is the key aspect to understanding the level of polarization. The more programmatic the center, the more likely the party system is polarized; the more positional (that is, less ideological and more flexible the center party is) the easier it is to reach agreement and to decrease polarization. The different levels at which polarization can be studied (the elite level and the mass level) is one source of disagreement in the assessment of the polarization in the post-authoritarian party system. Hinzpeter and Lehman examine the level of the electorate, whereas the other authors are looking at the elite level. As will be argued later, the Chilean elite seems to be more polarized than Chilean electorate. Among the main reasons for less polarization at the electorate level are the general lower ability of the electorate to make distinctions between programmatic options (Sanni and Sartori, 1983), and the process of depoliticization that has taken place in Chile at the mass level. The differences in the literature also arise from the dimension of politics that was being examined, whether ideological or programmatic. Here, as it will also be demonstrated, the programmatic level is more likely to experience reformulation than the ideological level. The latter aspects related to identity are less likely to change over time. A third source of disagreement arises within the programmatic dimension. Conclusions about polarization here depend on the issues that are considered. The leftright continuum has traditionally been dominated by the class cleavage. Therefore, it is understandable that the trend toward convergence on socioeconomic aspects has been frequently interpreted as a decrease in 9 polarization. This interpretation, however, ignores that other issues are structuring party competition and have to be translated onto the left-right continuum, such as religion and the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. This applies for Chile after the transition to democracy, when the meaning of left and right categories was more dominated by the democraticauthoritarian legacy than socioeconomic issues. The scenario was one where rightist parties had tended to justify Pinochet´s rule by making positive balances of that period. In contrast, parties placed near the center and left of the ideological continuum had condemned the authoritarian past and, in different degrees, remarked its negative outcomes. In addition to these conceptualizations of polarization, the term polarization has also been used to characterize the type of party competition (centrifugal and centripetal) and the ability to reach consensus within the political system. The arguments regarding institutional exacerbation or amelioration of conflict are closer to this meaning; at the same time, this meaning of polarization is more closely related to the search for the aspects that lead to a polarized situation, than to the description of it. The conceptualization of polarization that will be used here is based on the idea of polarization as distance between the left and right poles from the relative center, but it also benefits from the distinction between programmatic and ideological polarization. Based on this, I will examine how the Chilean parties that occupy different positions along the left-right continuum differ (as they move farther from the relative center) and converge (as they get closer to the relative center) on different programmatic issues. From this conception, the existence and relative importance of a center depends on the amount of distance between the left and right poles. The more distance between the poles, the more likely that a programmatic center exists, and vice versa. Objectives, Approach and Structure of the Paper This paper seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the pattern that polarization has followed in the nineties in Chile. Although there is 16 1990 26.8 28.2 14.3 32.7 1991 24.2 23.2 13.4 39.1 1992 30.7 23.2 22.8 23.2 1993 34.8 20.1 25.6 17.1 1994 28.0 17.0 28.0 26.0 1995 25.0 16.0 25.0 34.0 1996 23.0 23.5 27.0 37.0 1997 21.0 10.0 22.0 47.0 1998 26.0 10.0 23.0 43.0 1999 27.0 10.0 26.0 37.0 Source: adapted from Siavelis 2000 and some data added from surveys of CEP Table 3 Results of Elections to Congress and Senate Elections for the House of Deputies by Party and Coalition Year 1989 1993 1997 Pact Party % number % number % number votes of seats votes of seats votes of seats Concertación 51.5 72 55.4 70 49.9 70 PDC 26.0 39 27.1 37 22.3 39 PS 0 18 12.0 15 11.1 11 PPD 11.5 7 11.8 15 12.6 16 Other 14.0 2 4.5 3 3.9 4 Alianza 34.2 48 36.7 50 36.2 47 RN 18.3 32 16.3 29 16.8 23 UDI 9.8 14 12.1 15 14.4 17 Other 6.1 2 8.3 6 5.0 7 Independent 14.3 0 7.8 0 13.2 3 Elections for the Senate by Party and Coalition Year 1989 1993 1997 Pact Party % number % number % number votes of seats votes of seats votes of seats Concertación 54.4 22 55.5 21 49.9 20 PDC 31.9 13 20.3 14 29.4 14 PS 0 4 12.7 4 14.6 2 PPD 11.5 7 11.8 15 12.6 16 Other 10.4 4 7.8 1 1.6 0 Alianza 34.9 25 39.5 26 36.6 28 RN 18.8 13 14.9 11 14.8 7 UDI 5.1 2 11.2 3 4.6 6 Other 19.0 1 13.4 3 4.6 6 Appointed 0 9 0 9 0 10 Independent 10.7 0 5.8 0 13.5 0 Source: adapted from Siavelis 2000 17 A trend of depoliticization is another of the important transformations that have taken place during the nineties. At least three factors point to the depoliticization of the Chilean society. First, as table 4 shows, there has been a decline in voter turnout over the nineties12. Second, the percentage of people who do not feel identified with any of the positions of the left-right continuum has increased, as the column of “independents” and “don’t knows” in table 2 shows. Third, even though Chilean parties continue to be more representative and rooted in society than in other Latin American countries (Munck and Bosworth, 1998), a progressive decline of the traditional recognition by the Chilean society of the political parties as the main intermediates between the state and the society has occurred (Hagopian, 1998)13. Table 4 Blank and Null Votes and Abstentions in Chilean Elections (1988-1997) % Election Year Null Blank Abstention Plebiscite 1988 1.30 0.90 2.69 Presidential 1989 1.40 1.10 5.28 Senators 1989 2.90 2.10 5.28 Deputies 1989 2.68 2.37 5.28 Municipal 1992 3.06 5.86 10.20 Senators 1993 3.68 1.85 8.71 Presidential 1993 4.92 3.45 8.71 Deputies 1993 5.29 3.35 8.71 Municipal 1996 7.95 3.02 12.14 Senators 1997 12.57 4.37 NA Deputies 1997 13.54 4.22 NA Presidential 2000 NA NA NA NA = not available Source: Siavelis 2000 In addition to these transformations, the decade after the transition to democracy has seen a tendency toward consensus that contrasts with the maximalist style of doing politics that dominated part of the sixties and especially the early seventies (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 64). This pragmatic style has allowed leaders of the right, center and moderate left to negotiate agreements for important policy initiatives (Oxhorn, 1994, p. 744). Within this trend toward consensus, the center’s disposition to form coalitions, in 18 comparison to its earlier ideological character, is one of the remarkable changes (Scully, 1995, p. 136). However, the evidence is mixed with regard to this new style of interaction. Contemporary events such as the reactions to Pinochet’s detention call into question the continuity of such a moderating pattern, now that the “transitional spirit” is over. Hand in hand with the importance of the contextual features of the transition are the collaborative efforts both within parties and among branches of government. Siavelis argues that the initially high inter-party and inter-branch collaborative patterns that have occurred since the transition to democracy, despite the extreme presidentialism, show signs of temporality and likely disappearance (Siavelis, 2000). Changes and continuities are interrelated, as we have seen in the discussion of the patterns of cleavages and in the stability of the support to right and left, which goes hand in hand with decreasing support to the center. Similarly, continuities are present in the return of political parties to the electoral arena, while changes in that arena can be seen in the foundation of new ones. The UDI and the RN are new parties, but they were formed by politicians who supported the regime. The RN is the new label for the former PN14. It is less related than the UDI to Pinochet’s regime, in terms of its cadres and in terms of their interpretation of the authoritarian regime. The UDI, however, includes a larger number of political leaders in its ranks that held prominent positions in the military government and it identifies readily with the policies and programs put into place by the authoritarian regime (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997, p. 514). The UCC is another party that emerged on the right in 1992. In turn, the Party for Democracy (PPD), on the left, was conceived as an instrumental party of the PS, but it became independent when the PC and the PS were able to register legally using their old names15. The interrelation between changes and continuities is also apparent in the return of parties that existed before the coup, but returned in the postauthoritarian period with programmatic redefinitions. Especially remarkable is the encroachment of the left on more centrist positions. The 19 programmatic reformulation of the Socialist Party (PS) implied the acceptance of the role of the market in the economy, the abandonment of the Marxist component, and the acceptance of democracy as more than an instrumental and transitory stage. As Mainwaring and Scully argue, the case of the Chilean Socialist party is the most pronounced in Latin America in terms of its redefinition toward the center during the eighties (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 465). The transformation of the PS was framed in a context of generalized redefinition that is likely to take place in transitional contexts. Yocelevky argues a shared vision regarding economic development has emerged around the neoliberal model imposed by the dictatorship and continued by the democratic government (Yocelevky, 1996, p. 141). The PS is not the only party that moved positions: the PDC has moved to the right, though in a more gradual and less dramatic manner. Currently, the right wing of the PDC seems to have much more weight, leading to disagreements between the leftist parties (PS and PPD) and the PDC within the Concertación, and to a crisis inside the PDC itself (Hinzpeter and Lehman 1999c). Valenzuela asserts that the party is unable to differentiate itself from the Left on economic issues and it is divided on key issues such as divorce, driving a part of the party toward the right (Valenzuela, 1999, p. 238). The right has also undergone some transformation, although this has been mostly confined to the RN. Siavelis summarizes the changes in the reformulated RN. He asserts that it is a much more politically and technically sophisticated cadre of leaders, that it elaborates its own strategies, plans, and platforms, rather than simply reacting negatively to its opponents’ programs of transformations; and third, that the organization and leadership has improved (Siavelis, 2000, p. 117). Factors Explaining the Transformations in the Party System The electoral system, the authoritarian experience, and certain socioeconomic transformations account for the landscape described above of interrelated changes and continuities over the 1990s in the Chilean party 20 system. Electoral System The electoral system designed by the authoritarian regime, and inherited by the new democracy, must be considered in order to understand the transformation that has taken place in the Chilean party system. In designing the electoral system, the authoritarian regime considered the high degree of fragmentation, the high degree of polarization, and the excessive politicization of the society as responsible for the 1973 breakdown of democracy16. The reduction of the multiparty system into a two-party system and the overrepresentation of the progovernment forces of the right were the main goals of Pinochet’s electoral reform (Siavelis and Valenzuela, 1996). A majoritarian electoral system with two-member congressional districts was adopted and still remains. Under this system, parties or coalitions present lists that include a candidate for each of the two seats to be filled. The first seat is awarded to the candidate with the most votes from the party or coalition list that receives the plurality in that district. The second seat is awarded to the candidate with the second highest vote total only if his or her total, taken in combination with that of his or her list partner, is greater than two thirds of the vote, or at least double that of the next closest list. Hence, the system tends to favor the second-largest list because, to obtain the two seats, the largest party must receive twice the vote of the second largest party, or 66.7% of the vote of the two largest parties or coalitions17. The extent to which Pinochet’s goals have been achieved has been a matter of dicussion among authors. The military’s electoral engineering was carried out with the expectation that parties could not reach the consensus that they, in fact, exhibit now (Scully, 1995). However, parties have taken advantage of the legal possibility to form electoral pacts, and the center-left coalition has defeated the coalition of the rightist parties three consecutive times. In this context, it can be said that the great incentive for pact formation has created a bicoalitional logic: two alliances dominate the partisan landscape resembling, to an extent, the military’s ideal of a two 21 party system. Of course, as Carey argues, this claim about the effects of the reform on the reduction of the fragmentation “depends on whether one regards the traditional parties or the broader coalitions as relevant units of analysis” (Carey, 1998, p. 4). Despite the bicoalitional dynamic of Chilean party system, the identities of the parties have been preserved, and the electorate continues to be able to identify party labels (Siavelis, 1997a; Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). Two factors explain the persistence of party labels. First, the deep roots that political parties have in the Chilean society have prevented the erosion of the party labels, not only during the time when parties were banned, but also under the current coalitional logic (Munck and Bosworth, 1998). Second, in municipal elections, a proportional system exists, in which individual parties present candidates in all districts. Although they may nominate their candidates as part of pacts or even sub pacts, the proportional system contributes to the electorate’s ability to differentiate party labels. Therefore, despite the electoral system’s bicoalitional logic, there has not been a transformation of the multiparty character of Chilean partisan politics (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Siavelis, 1997a). In contrast to the partial success in transforming party loyalties, the goal of favoring the political parties that supported the military has been largely achieved. The second largest majority, which the electoral system tends to overepresent, is the right. Apart from the benefits of the disproportionality of the electoral system bestowed upon it, the right is favored by the existence of nine appointed senators. Established by the 1980 Constitution, under this arrangement some of the senators are nominated by organisms that are either favorable to or dominated by the military and which, therefore, are likely to choose candidates from the right18. The theoretical justification for this electoral system was to favor the stability and governability of the country19. However, it can be argued that this electoral system has promoted a pattern of moderation and centripetal competence. Proportionality has been undermined under this system and exclusion has increased. Siavelis and Valenzuela argue that an 22 exclusionary electoral system can also affect the internal dynamics of smaller parties on the right and the left in ways that influence the stability of the political system as a whole. “Moderate elements within these parties can fall prey to their more extremist colleagues, who have proof that participation in electoral politics has nothing to offer in regard to political influence and that extra-parliamentary routes to power may be more appropriate and effective" (Siavelis and Valenzuela, 1996, p. 92). This could be the case, for example, for the Communist Party and its current lack of influence on the partisan game in Chile, which contrasts with its strong mobilization during the transition to democracy20. Authoritarian Experience The electoral system is not the only legacy of the authoritarian period that has shaped the party system that arose in 1990. The authoritarian experience itself was the initial glue for the coalitions. During the referendum and in the first democratic elections, the main element cementing the coalitions together was the rejection of Pinochet’s regime and the struggle for democracy. Once the authoritarian regime was overcome, the memories of the former period (leaders being killed, exiled, or persecuted), the interpretations of the past, and differing conceptions of democracy have divided coalitions from one another. Part of the strength of the opposition between coalitions, which can be conceived as the strength of the authoritarian/ democratic cleavage, is explained by the electoral system. The incentives for pact formation have reinforced the continuity of this cleavage: the issues contained in the authoritarian/democratic cleavage have been the link between the coalitions. From this point of view, if it had not been for this electoral framework, the coalitions would most probably not have lasted, given the existence, as will be shown in the following pages, of programmatic disagreements within the coalitions. The strength of the Pinochet cleavage should decrease as parties cease building their identities on it21. Based on these disagreements, some authors have predicted a shift in the composition of the alliances, in which the PDC might form a coalition with 23 the RN (Siavelis, 1997a, p. 670). If this took place, it would be a clear confirmation of the decrease of Pinochet’s legacy as a cleavage among parties: the RN and the PDC have maintained confrontational positions on the issues contained in this cleavage and the alliance would be based on their agreements in economic, social, and religious/value issues. However, it would support the idea that the electoral framework is the basis for the coalitional dynamic, as opposed to the authoritarian/democratic cleavage and programmatic agreement forming the base of the coalitions. In addition to its role in the creation of Pinochet’s cleavage, the authoritarian regime has contributed to create the consensus that has characterized partisan relations over the 1990s. The learning experience of the elite is an explanation for the extensive ability of the parties to reach consensus in Chile (Scully, 1995, p. 137). This trend was initiated with the agreement that the parties made at the beginning of the transition (Godoy, 1994). These collaborative patterns have, in the case of the opposition to the authoritarian regime, a precedent in informal contacts during the authoritarian regime. These contacts were initiated by the militants of the parties, more than by the party leaders, and were translated into collaborations like the Comando por el No during the 1988 referendum (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 69). The programmatic redefinitions that have taken place in some of the Chilean parties are also partially explained by the authoritarian experience. For the left, the experience in exile allowed leaders to view the failures of “real” socialism and the merits of social democracy and led to agreement around democracy as a form of government (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 69). Concurrently, the PDC has evolved into a less ideological and more pragmatic center party willing to make pacts. In contrast, the authoritarian experience has not had the same learning effect on the parties on the right. This is especially remarkable for the case of the UDI. As will be demonstrated, the members of this party still display authoritarian tendencies, including rationalization of the 1973 military coup and the defense of authoritarian regimes in cases of economic or political crisis. Finally, the depoliticization trend has its roots in the Pinochet regime, 24 which developed a strategy of radical depoliticization that was only partially successful. Although there has been an increase of anti-partisan feelings (Meseguer, 1999), one of the goals of the military regime, obviously not realized, was to eradicate political parties (Yocelevky, 1996). Socio-Economic Transformations Part of the transformation of the party system is explained by socioeconomic changes. Pinochet’s regime implemented a package of neoliberal policies that led to economic liberalization and social transformation22. These were continued after the transition to democracy the governments of the Concertación. “The CPPD’s very preferences and objectives had undergone a significant change as it began to look increasingly favorably on the regime’s economic model and the dynamic potential of Chilean business. The importance of the latter to sustain economic growth also led the CPPD to moderate its programmatic objectives considerably so as to overcome business deep seated distrusts of the center-left and thereby avoid a destabilizing fall in investments” (Barrett, 1998, p. 30). As a result of the policies implemented, there have been important interconnected changes in the socio-economic structure. First, Chilean macroeconomic statistics, including GPD growth, private consumption, unemployment, and inflation, point to a wealthier society (Siavelis, 2000). Second, the economic transformation led to a change in the structure of employment in both the urban and rural sectors. During the authoritarian regime, the relative proportions of employment (and production) in the goods-producing sector, in utilities, and in transport declined. Especially remarkable is the decrease in public sector employment. In contrast, employment grew in commerce, finance and services (Scully, 1992). This change in employment evidences a diversification of the economy, including for example, an increase in non-copper exports. Third, there have been changes in the nature of state-labor and employer-worker relations in that much lower levels of labor activism exist (Siavelis, 2000, p. 81). The economic transformation extensively weakened 25 the labor movement. For example, transport, which had been a strongly unionized sector, experienced a decline in its relative importance in the economy. Similarly, the reduction in agricultural labor implies a decline in the bargaining power of rural labor. However, this decrease in labor activism is also rooted in some changes in labor legislation. During the authoritarian period, unions were banned and the rights to strike and bargain collectively were eliminated. As a result, and despite the 1990 reform of the 1979 labor code, union membership in the post-authoritarian period is dramatically lower than in the seventies. As a consequence of these dynamics, Chilean society appears to be less prone to class and ideological conflict, and consensus exists around the basic political and economic model that should guide the country’s future. This consensus is reflected in the party programs that display agreement on important socio-economic aspects. Especially remarkable is the programmatic reformulation of the PS as a result of the changes in Chilean society. In addition to the socio-economic context, the aforementioned learning experience and the need to form coalitions led to a moderated pattern in the center, to some extent in the RN, and especially in the left, and to programmatic redefinitions. The transformation of the Chilean left is also framed in a Latin American and international context of redefinition of the left which entailed the almost unanimous acceptance of neo liberal policies. This process was accelerated by the experience of leftist leaders in exile. However, the fact that Chilean society does not express conflict on these issues can be a function of despair more than real agreement with the current situation. Siavelis argues that despite the overall positive trends in macroeconomic statistics, there is evidence of future conflicts regarding the economic model. The consensus model has internal contradictions, around such critical areas as the distribution of income, poverty, and social benefits. The “important political divisions within Chilean society have been masked by the process of democratic transition and the forced consensus it created. This consensus is perhaps much thinner than analysts of Chilean politics have suggested” (Siavelis, 2000, p. 108). 32 has a secular profile, and the UDI maintains that society should be adjusted to the moral order that is the basis of the Christian Western civilization27. This support of the Church by the right is reciprocal: the Catholic Church aligns with the political right in opposing current government policy in areas like sex education. This is interesting given the democratic role that the Chilean Church played during the democratization process28. Table 7 Degree of Preference on the Presence of Christian Values in Politics among Chilean Congressmen, 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile Preference PS PPD PDC RN UDI (1998) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 Christian values (1) 0 0 27.6 11.8 56.3 (2) 0 8.3 31 23.5 6.3 (3) 50 41.7 34.5 41.2 31.3 (4) 12.5 16.7 0 11.8 6.3 Secular principles (5) 37.5 33.3 6.9 11.8 0 Mean 3.88 3.75 2.28 2.88 1.88 Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (16) Question: are you more in favor of the presence of Christian values in politics or secular principles? Use a scale where “1” is high preference of Christian values in politics and “5” is high preference of secular values in politics Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina As this discussion shows, there are important differences between parties regarding religious-value issues. Polarization in this decade around these issues has not decreased as much as some authors suggest. Abortion, divorce (to a lesser extent), secularization, and censorship are issues around which parties differ. However, it is clear that there are more differences within the Concertación on religious-value issues than within the Alianza. In addition, the position of the PDC on these issues is remarkable, first, because the source of disagreement within the Concertación is the PDC positions, which tend to be nearer the rightist coalition in aspects related to religion and values than to its coalition partners. Second, PDC positions are adopted by the whole coalition when presenting a shared electoral program. 33 Socio-Economic Issues We turn now to socio-economic issues. Table 8 outlines party differences on how much ability congressmen attribute to the state in the resolution of conflicts, and table 9 presents the preferred degree of state intervention in the market. Parties on the left of the political spectrum have given up their hope for a mainly state-regulated economy, but they continue to attribute greater ability to the state to affect the economy than parties on the right. RN and UDI, on the other hand, favor the market. On these issues, PDC opinions are closer to its coalition partners than to RN and UDI. A similar degree of difference is reflected in the congressmen’s perceptions of the necessity of state intervention in the economy (Table 10), although the existence of only two alternatives responses makes answers look more radical than in table 8 and table 9. Table 8 Ability of the State to Solve Problems, Opinion of Chilean Congressmen, 1994 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile State’s ability PS PPD PDC RN UDI (1994) 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 Most of the problems 14.3 0 6.7 0 0 Quite a few of the problems 42.9 63.6 30 13.6 10 Some of the problems 35.7 36.4 60 59.1 50 Very few of the problems 7.1 0 3.3 27.3 40 Total (N) (12) (12) (29) (22) (12) Question: in your opinion, The State can solve all the problems, most of them, some of them or very few of the problems from our society? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Table 9 Congressmen’s Preferred Degree of Regulation of the Economy by the State, 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile Intervention PS PPD PDC RN UDI (1998) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 State (1) 0 0 0 0 0 (2) 12.5 8.3 13.8 0 0 34 (3) 75 83.3 55.2 17.6 5.9 (4) 12.5 8.3 24.1 58.8 35.3 Market (5) 0 0 3.4 23.5 58.8 No Answer 0 0 3.4 0 0 Mean 3.00 3.00 3.18 4.06 4.53 Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (17) Question: are you more in favor of an economy regulated by the state or by the market? Use a 1-5 scale, where "1”means maximum presence of the state in the economy and “5” means maximum regulation through the market. Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Table 10 Necessity of State Intervention in the Economy, Opinions of Chilean Congressmen, 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 The intervention of the State in socio-economic life is the only possible way to reduce social inequalities Agreement 87.5 100 79.3 29.4 0 Disagreement 12.5 0 20.7 64.7 100 No Answer 0 0 0 5.9 0 The State should intervene little as possible in the society and leave in hands of the private sector the attention of the citizens’ needs Agreement 12.5 25 31 94.1 94.1 Disagreement 75.0 75 69 5.9 5.9 Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (17) Question: what is your degree of agreement with the two following assessments? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina There are pragmatic aspects in political economy that need to be considered within this cleavage. Table 11 shows congressmen’s answers regarding tax policy. The data suggests that RN, UDI and PPD are more divided on this question than PDC and PS. At the same time, there are very different views on this issue. In contrast, regarding privatization, party positions have converged much over the nineties (Table 12 and table 13). Table 12 shows that center-left parties (PDC, PPD and PS) are more willing in 1998 to privatize those industries with low benefits, than in 1994. Table 13 demonstrates that the number of members of UDI and RN willing to privatize all public services has decreased between 1994 and 1998. 35 Table 11 Opinions on Tax Policy among Chilean Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 Direct Taxes 81.8 100 81.8 66.7 66.7 82.8 27.3 17.6 30 6.3 Indirect Taxes 18.2 0 18.2 25 26.7 10.3 68.2 47.1 70 18.8 No answer 0 0 0 8.3 6.7 6.9 4.5 35.3 0 75 Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (16) Question: in case it was necessary to raise taxes, do you think that it should be done through the increase of direct or indirect taxes? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Table 12 Attitudes toward Privatization of State-Owned Industries among Chilean Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Assessments 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 Privatize all state-owned industry 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.4 50 41.2 70 56.3 Privatize only industries with low benefits 21.4 50 9.1 41.7 36.7 24.1 0 11.8 10 0 Privatize only industries which are not key to the country’s development 28.6 25 45.5 58.3 46.7 37.9 36.4 47.1 20 43.8 I would leave things as they are now 28.6 12.5 27.3 0 10 13.8 4.5 0 0 0 No Answer 21.4 12.5 18.2 0 3.3 20.6 9.1 0 0 0 Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) Question: which one of the following assessments reflects better your attitude toward privatization of state-owned industries? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Table 13 Attitudes toward Privatization of Public Services among Chilean Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Assessments 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 Privatize all public services 0 12.5 0 0 0 3.4 50 41.2 70 56.3 Privatize only services with low benefits 14.3 25 9.1 41.7 30 24.1 0 11.8 10 0 Privatize only services with low impact on the population 21.4 0 45.5 58.3 36.7 37.9 36.4 47.1 20 43.8 I would leave things 36 as they are now 42.9 50 27.3 0 16.7 13.8 4.5 0 0 0 No answer 21.4 12.5 18.2 0 16.7 20.6 9.1 0 0 0 Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (16) Question: which one of the following assessments better reflects your attitude toward privatization of public services? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina This data demonstrates that some differences across parties remain in economic matters. However, these differences are much less than in the pre-authoritarian party system. The evolution of the PS, and the position of the new created party PPD, demonstrate an important shift to the center that the left has made in the last decade. Differences among parties are reduced. A review of the party programs for the last presidential election shows that there are important points of convergence between the two coalitions in the four socioeconomic issues that have dominated the arena of discussion and there are some minor differences. Table 11 presents a summary of the policies proposed by the two presidential candidates on health, education, labor reform, and crime. The differences between the parties are lower than in the era before Pinochet’s regime, but there are still “differences of degree”. For example, the PS demands a more comprehensive reform of labor legislation as well as more state funding for health and for education than do the other parties. In contrast, UDI and RN are more cautious and reluctant to make comprehensive changes in labor legislation and tend to prefer a greater role for the private sector in health care and education. Table 14 Suggested Policies of the Two Coalitions on Four Socio-Economic Issues Issues Alianza Concertación Health -gradual adoption of a system -option of choosing private or that allows users to choose the -provide autonomy in generating service they prefer (public or plans and management of the private) centers to the 26 Health Sevices. -decentralization of the health -elimination of the need for system proving economic solvency before -creation of emergency health any intervention (cheque en insurance (seguro de garantía) emergencia) so that economic solvency does not have to be 37 proven before surgery when proving economic solvency before any surgery (cheque en garantía) Education -funding for low income families-free education for children under whose children meet six established criteria. -complete program of grants for -system of loans for those who those who attend University attend University Labor legislation -free choice of each worker to -widening of the union rights to all join a union or not. sectors -recognition of collective -defense of collective bargaining bargaining as a workers’ right -improvement of welfare: raising the minimum wage and unemployment benefits. Crime -increase of police surveillance -a faster and more efficient -fulfillment of the sentences judiciary and penitentiary system -drug rehabilitation programs, -improvement of the efficiency of especially among young people the police -active support to initiatives from communities -programs of drug prevention Source: Electoral programs for 1999/2000 Presidential Election; La Tercera, 9 January, 2000 Finally, Carey’s index of party and coalition unity, calculated from the voting behavior of parties in Congress, shows that the Concertación and the Alianza have high levels of coalitional cohesion on economic issues, and a somewhat less cohesion on social issues (though still high) (which the index analyzes with military issues)29. At the same time, this index shows more cohesion within the center-left coalition than in the coalition of the right on socio-economic issues (Carey, 1998). Authoritarian/Democratic Issues With the return of democracy, a series of issues related to Pinochet’s era and to the new democracy emerged and divided political parties. Two sets of issues can be distinguished: the first related to interpretations of the history and of political culture, and the second, a group of issues related to the organization of the Chilean political system. 38 Historical Issues and Political Culture The interpretation of the authoritarian past is the first element of polarization in the party system within these historical and cultural issues. The center and left parties unanimously reject the experience. However, there are differences within the parties on the right. According to Barrett, the fundamental issue dividing the UDI and the RN are their positions on the military regime and its “accomplishments” (Barrett, 1998, p. 51). The RN has made an effort to distinguish itself from Pinochet’s regime and to present itself as a new democratic party, whereas the UDI defends the 1973 coup d’état and it asserts that the years of authoritarian rule were necessary and positive for the country. The congressional evaluation of the military between 1973 and 1990 gives some clues about the interpretation of the past. As table 15 shows, deputies’ positions are divided into two groups. The RN and the UDI evaluate the role of the Armed Forces during the authoritarian period as positive or very positive. PDC, PPD and PS, however, remember this period as negative or very negative. This division between parties is consistent within the coalitions (Alianza por Chile and Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia). Table 15 Congressional Evaluation of the Role of the Armed Forces during Pinochet’s Regime, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 Very negative (1) 78.6 100 90.9 83.3 73.3 79.3 0 0 0 0 (2) 7.1 0 0 8.3 10 10.3 0 0 0 0 (3) 7.1 0 9.1 8.3 10 6.9 4.5 17.6 0 0 (4) 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 36.4 35.3 30 76.5 Very positive (5) 7.1 0 0 0 3.3 3.4 59.1 47.1 70 23.5 Mean 1.50 1.00 1.18 1.25 1.53 1.37 4.55 4.29 4.70 4.23 TOTAL (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) Question: given a 1-5 scale, where would you place the role of the Armed Forces in Chile during Pinochet’s regime? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Related to the memory and interpretation of the past, the positions of 39 the parties on human rights violations by the Pinochet regime is evidence of existing polarization. Crespo argues that remarkable differences across countries in the way they address human rights violations exist. Any solution has to combine the demands of the victims with a strategic calculus of political stability and the degree of threatening from the armed forces (Crespo, 1995, p. 19). In this context, there have been not only differences between coalitions but also within each of the coalitions. The Concertación represents Pinochet’s victims and it is committed to overcome authoritarian enclaves, but at the same time, the Concertación is the governing coalition, committed to a program of modernization and social democratization that requires stability and governance29. This places the Concertación in a difficult conundrum. The PS and PPD have been more maximalist in terms of the solutions to the problem, and the PDC less willing to address human rights violations. On the other side, the rightist coalition has also dealt with some internal dissent. Some members of the RN are more sensitive to human rights violations and others adopt the UDI’s strategy of ignoring the problem (Garretón, 1996, p. 48). The type of political culture within parties polarizes them and shapes party labels. Chilean parties differ in their models of democracy. Table 16 shows congressmen’s attitudes toward political parties. The elites of the parties of the Concertación believe that political parties are central to political systems, while the RN and the UDI attribute less centrality to parties. RN and UDI exhibit the lowest percentages of deputies assigning political parties a great centrality, and some of their congressmen strongly disagree that political parties are important to democracy. Table 16 Necessity of Political Parties to Democracy, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 Strong Agreement (1) 85.7 75 72.7 70 96.7 89.7 63.6 41.2 70 41.2 Agreement (2) 7.1 25 27.3 10 3.3 6.9 22.7 23.5 30 23.5 Disagreement (3) 7.1 0 0 20 0 0 13.6 17.6 0 5.9 Strong Disagreement (4) 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 17.6 0 29.4 40 Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) Question: what is your degree of agreement with the sentence “without political parties democracy cannot exist”? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina A second aspect of political culture that demonstrates distance between parties is the degree of tolerance towards differing ideologies (Table 17). PS and PPD, and to a lesser extent PDC, are highly tolerant to the legalization of all political parties, RN and UDI, conversely, could be characterized as intermediately tolerant towards the legalization of all political parties. Table 17 Congressional Attitudes toward the Legalization of Political Parties, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Assessments 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 All parties should be legalized 78.6 100 81.8 91.7 80 58.6 45.5 47.1 20 35.3 All parties legalized, except those which are clearly antidemocratic 21.4 0 18.2 8.3 20 41.4 54.5 47.1 80 64.7 There is a serious risk of instability for the system if all political parties are legalized 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.9 0 0 Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) Question: from the following statements, which one do you agree the most? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Generally speaking, PDC, PPD, and PS display higher level of trust of the democratic model that includes political parties, elections, and citizen participation. As table 18 shows, UDI and RN justify the existence of authoritarian governments when conditions of political and economic instability exist. In Garreton´s words “rightist leaders still do not have a value-based commitment to democracy; rather, they have an instrumental acceptance of it” (Garretón, 2000, p. 79). A more detailed analysis of the profile of those nine congressmen from RN and UDI who display a more 41 authoritarian profile shows that, except for one deputy of UDI, the rest are highly educated: seven have college degrees and one from UDI has postgraduate studies. Excepting one congressmen of the RN, they have been in politics from at least 1989: one entered politics in 1971 and one in 1969. All but one deputy were in politics during the transition to democracy, but this experience did not positively affect their views about democracy. Table 18 Congressional Assessment of Democracy, 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile Assessments PPD PS PDC RN UDI (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) Democracy is always the best form of government 100 100 100 64.7 64.7 Sometimes an authoritarian government is better than a democratic one 0 0 0 29.4 23.5 Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 No answer 0 0 0 5.9 11.8 Total (N) (12) (8) (29) (17) (17) Question: from the following statements, which one do you agree the most? Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina Political-Institutional Issues With regard to the political dimension of the authoritarian/democratic issue, several aspects are important in explaining party competition. Around these issues, there are different degrees of polarization. The first issue over which polarization arises is the role of the Armed Forces in contemporary Chile. The parties on the right evaluate this role much more positively than do the PS and the PPD (Table 19). Table 19 Congressional Evaluation of the Present Role of the Armed Forces, 1994 and 1998 % Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile PS PPD PDC RN UDI Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 Very negative (1) 0 0 0 0 0 3.6 0 0 0 0 (2) 35.7 75 18.2 66.6 13.3 53.6 0 0 0 0 (3) 35.7 25 54.5 33.4 43.3 14.3 4.5 17.6 0 5.9 48 the Nineties In order to complete the assessment of the evolution of polarization in the Chilean post-authoritarian party system, general conclusions will be drawn: - Consensus over certain policy areas has been reached, mostly on socio-economic issues. Important distances between parties on moral and religious issues remain, as well as on issues related to the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. - The lowest distance between coalitions is on the socio-economic cleavage, and the most polarizing issues are the authoritarian/democratic ones. - Polarization on issues occurs not only between the coalitions but also there is distance within each coalition. The most divisive issues for the Alianza are those related to the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. For the Concertación, the issues with the greatest polarizing effect are religious value-related. - The party system has moved to the right. The PS and PPD programs have been redefined and have a more centrist profile, and the PDC right wing has increased in strength, moving the party to the right. - Empirical and theoretical reasons exist to justify the contention that polarization at the elite level is higher than at the mass level. Towards an Explanation of the Polarization in the Chilean Party System (1990-1999) The description of the evolution of polarization during the 1990s demonstrates a decrease in distance between parties on socio-economic issues, but a persistence of differences over religious-value issues and the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. Polarization, depending on the issue, is higher between coalitions than within coalitions, or vice versa. In this section, the paper aims to explain the factors that produce this pattern of low polarization in socio-economic issues, in combination with a persistence of distance on religious-values issues and on the 49 authoritarian/democratic cleavage. I argue that three sets of factors have affected elites’ choices: socio-economic changes; institutional framework; including the electoral system and form of government; and the authoritarian experience. In addition, the cross-cutting nature of cleavages and differing degree of “negotiability” of issues intervene in the evolution of polarization in the 1990s. Authoritarian Experience The authoritarian period has affected polarization in two ways. First, the memory of the military period has split the party system into two coalitions, each joined by a shared experience and view of the past regime. This has contributed to a decrease in polarization among the parties of each of the coalitions. At the same time, the authoritarian/democratic cleavage has contributed to an increase in polarization between the two coalitions. The second effect of the authoritarian period on polarization is through the learning experience of elites during the military period. This has led to a general pattern of moderation. Elite experiences, together with the way that transition occurred, have contributed to a convergence on certain socioeconomic issues and, in a more unclear way, to consensus on some aspects related to democracy. As the elite data shows, parties on the right do not display a clear democratic profile. Secondly, the convergence on socio-economic issues has been almost exclusively a product of a movement of the left, as I will argue below. Over all, the authoritarian experience has been a moderating force during the 1990s, due to its interaction with other factors. The institutional framework of Chile retains certain authoritarian enclaves that prevent parties on the center-left from taking maximalist strategies that they may prefer, like the reform of the 1980 Constitution. In addition, Chile’s economic success, due in part to the neoliberal model implemented under Pinochet, made impossible a frontal attack on all the elements of the authoritarian period. Due to this interaction of factors, polarizing effects from the authoritarian experience have been attenuated during the 1990s. 50 Institutional Framework: Electoral System and Form of Government As in the case of historical memory of authoritarianism, the electoral system inherited from the authoritarian period has led both to an increase and a decrease in polarization. On one side, it promotes a coalitional system that has led to a bipolar logic, with the subsequent increase of competition between coalitions. The elite data and analyses such as Carey’s study of the voting behavior of parties in the Chilean Congress confirm the existence of sharp divisions between coalitions that are the result of coalition membership rather than the ideological difference between coalitions (Carey, 1998). However, the electoral system also contributes to the reduction of polarization. Parties need to follow a coalitional strategy in order to attain power; therefore, they must reach agreement with their coalitional partners. In addition, coalitions are important in constraining legislators’ voting behavior. These two effects of coalitions explain part of the differences that we have observed between deputies’ opinions and their official party and coalition programs. Carey argues that negotiations over nominations and policy are a constant source of tension within each coalition (Carey, 1998). However, these tensions are resolved in compromise and cohesion within the coalitions. Overall, the electoral system and its incentives for coalition formation hide some of the real divisions among parties that are evidenced when analyzing party programs individually. For example, divisions within the Concertación related to religious-value issues have been ameliorated during the 1990s through the adoption of consensus stances which have been closer to Alianza’s position than if parties within Concertación had competed individually. Another institutional aspect that should be considered, due to its effects on partisan polarization, is the strong type of presidentialism adopted by the 1980 Constitution. Siavelis asserts that it has features highly conducive to increases in political conflict. The great power of the president and the minimum role of the legislature do not tend to promote 51 interparty and interbranch collaboration and lead to increases in polarization. However, due to contextual features, this has not been fully appreciated (Siavelis, 2000). Therefore, for the case of polarization in the post-authoritarian party system, the electoral system seems to be the institutional aspect that has the clearest impact upon the pattern of polarization. In addition to the electoral system and the existence of appointed senators, other authoritarian enclaves remain in the Chilean political system. These include the constitutionally established direct and indirect presence of the Armed Forces in certain organs of the state apparatus33. They have prevented radical transformations. Concurrently, as was noted in the third section, these authoritarian enclaves are objects of polarization, and are considered here as part of the authoritarian /democratic cleavage. Socio-Economic Transformations Transformations in Chilean social and economic structure, resulting from Pinochet’s neoliberal policies, led to the reformulations of leftist parties' socio-economic policies. The Chilean Left experienced a shift to the center that, consequently, means a decrease in the distance between leftist and rightist parties on socio-economic issues. The positive economic results of Pinochet’s regime have placed the right in a privileged position because their socio-economic policies for the development of the country have been legitimized. “The economic success of the later Pinochet years bolstered confidence among neoliberals and the subsequent regeneration among political forces of the right” (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 469). As a consequence, the right has not had any incentive to reformulate their economic program, because there has been a progressive increase in electoral support. Socio-economic change and positive economic outcomes demonstrate that the convergence on socio-economic issues has been the result of a unilateral movement of the left to the center. Almost all of the agreement on socio-economic issues is derived from movement of the left and the center to the right, and in almost no issue-areas have the right moved to the 52 center. However, there is a danger of overestimating the degree of agreement on socio-economic issues between left and right. In analysis of party programs, the researcher must remember that these can be largely mediated by electoral strategies34. As the elite data demonstrates and as the electoral platforms show, differences remain between left and right regarding the intervention of the state in economy. These differences are confirmed in legislators’ voting behavior. For example, despite the apparent consensus in party programs on certain issues related to labor legislation, legislators have been unable to agree to a package of reforms regarding this issue35. Due to the traditional dominance of economic content in the meanings of left and right, the movement of the Chilean left toward somewhat more rightist positions on socio-economic aspects has tended to be interpreted as an overall movement of the entire party system to the right. However, as I have argued above, there are other issues that structure party competition and which have to be considered when assessing an increase or a decrease in the distance between left and right poles. Degree of “negotiability” of the Issues The differing nature of the issues that dominate party competition also helps to explain why convergence exists on some issues, but not on others. Lipset and Rokkan argued that the issues related to the religion-values cleavage are more difficult to negotiate, since they touch on irrational and deeply embedded beliefs, whereas on economic issues, agreement and convergence are less difficult to reach (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). This idea seems to explain why the reduction of polarization has occurred more often on socio-economic aspects and not on the religious-value cleavage in the Chilean case. As the authoritarian/democratic cleavage also deals with deep-seated beliefs, the nature of this cleavage also precludes consensus. However, it is unclear if the Lipset and Rokkan argument travels well for any country at any time. For example, part of the conflict in preauthoritarian Chile were based on the existence of three very different socio-economic projects, defended in turn by the right, the center, and at 53 that time the governing left. Despite its a priori more negotiable character, convergence on these issues among the different parties has only been reached after seventeen years of authoritarian rule. Cross-Cutting Nature of the Cleavages The opinions and policies held by the parties are structured in such a way that depending on the issue, the party that holds the opposite opinion varies. In other words, the opinion of party A on issue x is similar to the opinion of party B on issue x and opposed to the opinion of party C; while on issue y, the opinion of A is opposed to B and similar to C. This cleavage structure prevents an increase of polarization in the overall party system since conflicts between parties are combined with agreements on other issues. Despite the cross-cutting nature of Chilean cleavages, there are also overlaps between parties’ opinions on socio-economic and authoritarian/democratic issues. The origin of these overlaps lies in the fact that human rights violations, a core aspect of authoritarian/democratic issues, was targeted at the ideological opponents of the military: those who in aspects such as welfare and the role of the state had exhibited very different opinions (especially the Socialists who nationalized industries and attempted a land redistribution program in the 1970-1973 period)36. Proximity and distance between parties varies depending on the issue. Table 21 illustrates in broad terms the pattern of polarization. The existence of crosscuttings on some issues neutralizes, to some extent, interparty opposition, leading to lower levels of polarization than if confrontation occurred in a cumulative way. This balance of forces is mediated by the PDC’s positions. The religious positions of this party, dramatically different from the parties which are closer to its positions on socio-economic issues and authoritarian/democracy issues, precludes a partisan landscape of three overlapped cleavages where the opposing poles would be occupied by the same parties on the three cleavages. On the contrary, what occurs is that there is quite an overlap between socio-economic and authoritarian/democratic positions and the religious-value cleavage takes 54 the nature of a cross cutting cleavage. From a coalitional perspective it can be said that, on religious issues, the division is not coincident with coalitions composition: the PDC is nearer to the Alianza than to its Concertación partners. Table 21 General Pattern of Spatial Party proximity/distance by Issues Religious-values issues Socio-economic issues Authoritarian/Democracy UDI UDI RN UDI PDC RN RN PDC PPD PDC PPD PS PS PPD PS From an empirical point of view, given that PDC neutralizes polarization, the center is critical for the understanding of polarization in Chile. In addition, from a theoretical point of view, a great deal of discussion focuses on the impact of a center in the degree of polarization. Empirical and theoretical reasons, therefore, suggest that the drop in the ideological and electoral support of the center is a critical dynamic in explaining polarization in Chile. I argue that the decrease that has taken place in the support to the center and its movement to the right is to a great extent the result of other parties’ movements, mainly the movements of leftist parties. The left has moved to the center on some issues (socio-economic issues, but also in their acceptance of democracy and political parties and the abandonment of their Marxist claims), resulting in a decrease in the support to the center and an incentive for the party that occupies it, PDC, to move to the right, since it needs its own ideological space. If, as we argue, the movement of the center to the right is the result of tightening the space for party competition, it can be argued that the positions of the center are a reflection of the changes in other ideological options (left and right). In other words, the nature and relative importance of 55 the center depends on the amount of distance between left and right poles: a decrease in the differences between left and right poles reduces the political space, and the center loses its political space. This is contrary to Scully’s argument that it is the center that shapes the degree of polarization. Rather, in this case, polarization has shaped the center. Although electoral reasons explain why the left and right have moved to the center, not all convergence is explained in these terms. The elite data suggest that a decrease in the distance between the poles of the party system, especially on socio-economic issues, has occurred. Apart from the links with polarization, the decrease in the importance of the center has two important consequences for Chilean partisan dynamics. First, the changes within the PDC that evidence the increasing weight of the rightist wing of the party over the nineties, have reduced the ideological distance between it and the major moderate party of the right, the RN. The distance is now not so wide as to preclude formation of a center-right coalition (Siavelis, 2000, p. 132). Second, the decrease in the electoral importance of the PDC implies a loss of relative importance within the Concertación and might ameliorate a situation of dominance by the PDC. “Leaders on the left have contended that their parties’ national stature and importance have been overshadowed by the dominance of the Christian Democrats during the first ten years of democracy” (Siavelis, 2000, p. 133). Conclusions The explanation of the pattern that polarization has followed in the 1990s confirms the appropriateness of the study of the post-authoritarian Chilean party system in terms of the interrelation of changes and continuities. Some issues continue to polarize parties, whereas agreements among parties have arisen on other issues. Polarization in religious-value issues remains, but a trend toward reformulation and consensus exists with regard to socioeconomic issues. Disagreements exist on politico-institutional arrangements, on interpretations of the authoritarian experience, and in the democratic profile of the parties. In the 1990s, these have been important sources of polarization 56 in the Chilean party system. Disagreements on these issues take place in the Chilean party system at three levels. Polarization exists between coalitions and among parties. At the same, distance exists within coalitions. -polarization between coalitions: The least polarization between coalitions is on socio-economic issues. Distance between coalitions is much higher on religious-value issues and on the authoritarian/democracy cleavage. -polarization among parties: The highest polarization among parties is on religious-value issues, and the lowest distance among parties is on socioeconomic issues. -distance within coalitions: Issue disagreement within the Concertación is higher than within the Alianza on religious-value issues. In contrast, on authoritarian/democratic issues, there is much higher issue disagreement within the Alianza than within the Concertación. Distance is fairly equal within the coalitions regarding socio-economic issues, though Concertación is slightly more cohesive. The coalitional incentives established by the electoral system allow the existence of formal agreements within each of the coalitions that lead to moderated patterns. However, despite the surface convergence among parties, the individual programs and the opinions and attitudes of congressmen display a higher level of polarization than if the coalitions alone are examined. To answer the question of how much overall movement of the left and right poles to the center (and therefore, to answer the question of how much decrease in polarization has occurred), we must understand that this question is dependent on which issues are used to define the poles. Given the traditional dominance of socio-economic aspects for the definition of left and right, the consensus that has taken place over those issues has tended to be interpreted as a decrease in the polarization between parties. At the same time, the left has adopted center positions on aspects related to democracy and political parties and it has left behind its Marxist claims. This is more evidence for a movement to the center. However, there are important differences between parties on religious-value issues as well as 57 on issues related to the authoritarian past, including the institutional legacy, human right violations, and the role of the armed forces. The persistence of differences on some issues and convergence on others has led to a reformulation of the meanings of left and right. Due to this reformulation, through which parties have decreased distance on some issues, the center has lost part of its political space. Distance between the poles remains, but the meanings of left and right have changed. The authoritarian experience, the electoral system, and socio-economic transformations are powerful factors in the explanation of the evolution of polarization in Chile over the 1990s. However, two additional aspects that the polarization literature has ignored must be considered: the degree of negotiability of the issue and the nature of cleavages (cross cuttings and overlaps). These aspects, which have been considered in theoretical accounts of polarization and in other geographic areas, (Sanni and Sartori, 1983; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), illuminate on explanation of polarization in post-authoritarian Chile. Examining the degree of the negotiability of the issues enables an explanation of the persistence of polarization over religiousvalue issues and authoritarian/democratic issues, while programmatic polarization in socio-economic issues has been reduced. At the same time, the cross-cutting nature of the cleavages accounts for the lack of an increase in programmatic polarization in Chile over the 1990s. This paper has attempted to demonstrate the need of caution when assessing a decrease in programmatic polarization at the elites’ level in postauthoritarian Chile. There is a danger of overemphasizing the degree of consensus between parties. Second, the convergence of the poles has originated more from movements of the left than from movements of the right. 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