Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

Documents de Treball Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, LABOR AND MARKET REGULATIONS AND GROWTH Raquel Fonseca Natalia Utrero Document de Treball núm. 05/3 © Raquel Fonseca; Natalia Utrero Coordinador / Coordinator Documents de treball: Carles Gispert http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/recerca/Documents.htm e-mail: [email protected] Telèfon / Phone: +34 93 5814296 Fax: +34 93 5812555 Edita / Publisher: Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials Edifici B 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès), Spain Tel. 93 5811209 Fax 93 5812555 Maig / May, 2005 La sèrie Documents de treball d'economia de l'empresa presenta els avanços i resultats d'investigacions en curs que han estat presentades i discutides en aquest departament; això no obstant, les opinions són responsabilitat dels autors. 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FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, LABOR AND MARKET REGULATIONS AND GROWTH Raquel Fonseca Natalia Utrero Document de Treball núm. 05/3 Financial Development, Labor and Market Regulations and Growth Raquel Fonseca Natalia Utreroyz April 2005 Abstract This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and …nancial imperfections have on …rm growth. We analyse institutions affecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the bene…cial effects of …nancial development, a …rm will get less …nancing, and thus invest less, in a weak …nancial market (…nance e¤ect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also a¤ect …rm growth (labor e¤ect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the in‡uence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor e¤ect overcomes the positive …nance e¤ect. JEL classi…cation codes: G2, G32, J32, L10 Key words: Financial development, labor and product market institutions, growth. CSEF, University of Salerno, e-mail: [email protected]. yUniversity Autonoma de Barcelona, e-mail: [email protected] zWe are grateful to Dimitris Christelis, Sergio Destefanis, Tullio Jappelli and Frederic Vermeulen. We also thank the audiences for presentations of drafts of this paper at the EEA Congress (Madrid, 2004), AIEL (Modena 2004). 1 Starting with Schumpeter´s seminal paper (1911), the relationship between the …nancial system and economic growth has been extensively analyzed. Financial development is said to foster economic growth both at the macroeconomic and the microeconomic level (Levine 1997, Demirguç-kunt and Maksimovic 1999). Furthermore, Coase (1992) and North (1994) in their Nobel speeches emphasize the importance for economic growth of getting the institutional and legal environment right. La Porta et al. (1998) contribute to this debate, analyzing the relevance of the institutional framework in …rm capital structure and …nancial development. In particular they …nd that common law countries enjoy more developed …nancial markets than continental Europe.The bulk of these studies analyze the …nancial development e¤ects in an isolated way, not paying attention to product market competition and labor market ‡exibility are also considered to a¤ect economic growth. However, there are large di¤erences in product and labor markets across countries, in particular, OECD countries remain characterized by widely di¤erent approaches to their markets, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). Interactions between labor and product market regulations have received considerable attention in recent years. When we talk about labor regulation we are thinking about Employment Protection Legislation (EP), which encompasses any set of regulations, either legislated or written in labor contracts. EP is generally thought to a¤ect …rm cost structure; it leads to higher direct costs and thus lower employment (Blanchard and Tirole 2003 and Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). Product Market Regulation (PM) are the burdens and administrative procedures to entry into an industry and are considered opportunity costs for the …rm. Both EP and PM are costs that …rms have to face and then discourage entrepreneurship. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), according to the degree of strictness of these regulations identify two main groups. The common-law countries, on the one hand, which are characterized by a relatively liberal approach in both the labor and product markets and most continental European countries and Japan on the other, which share relatively restrictive product market policies and EP. Despite the relation between …rm …nance, labor and market regulations and economic growth, these various branches of the literature have not been combined in investigating empirically the e¤ects of …nancial and labor frictions on growth. The goal of this paper is shed some light on these relationships. We 2 expand the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) (hereafter RZ) to assess the relationship between …nancial development, labor and product regulation and …rm growth. We use UNIDO data from 29 industrial sectors across 15 developed countries. The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the related literature. Section 2 presents the data used in our empirical application. Sections 3 and 4 present the model speci…cation and main results respectively and Section 5 concludes. 1 Related literature and Hypothesis Our work is related to several strands of the literature. The …rst one is the …- nance literature. There are several papers that have established an empirical link between …nancial development and …rm behavior. In particular, well-developed …nancial markets have seen shown to make it easier for …rms to attract external …nancing for their investment needs. Therefore, …rm debt structure di¤ers across institutional frameworks and …nancial market imperfections a¤ect …rm …nancing and investment decisions (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999, Booth et al. 2000). Furthermore, King and Levine (1993) and Levine (1997) show that …nance matters for economic growth. The second strand we draw on is the labor market literature. This literature studies the impact of labor market regulation on employment. Speci…cally, entry regulation and EP are shown to a¤ect job creation and entrepreneurship. If EP legislations were optimally set they could be considered as ways to provide insurance against job loss and internalize the social costs of dismissals (Lindbeck and Snower 1988, Pissarides 2001, Blanchard and Tirole 2003), with no e¤ects on economic activity. In practice, however, they may a¤ect the equilibrium level of employment. EP may enhance productivity performance, as workers will be more willing to cooperate with employers (Akerlof 1984). Moreover, to the extent that EP leads to long-lasting work relationships, it may encourage employers to provide training to workers. A better skilled workforce may also increase internal ‡exibility and thus lead to a better functioning of production activity (Piore 1986). However, if EP is very strict, as in many European countries, …rms may become more cautious about adjusting their workforce with the ultimate e¤ect of reducing labor turnover (Bertola 1992). Thus, EP provisions 3 that increase hiring and …ring costs are likely to be particularly detrimental for employment and economic activity (OECD 2004). PM are generally motivated on public interest grounds. The e¤ects of some regulatory provisions often drift away from the original public interest, resulting in the protection of special interest groups. As a result, existing regulations are likely to be unnecessarily restrictive of market mechanisms. PM regulations may include restrictions on …rm decisions over entry, exit, the use of inputs, the quantities and the types of output produced as well as prices. Entry regulations create …xed costs of entry that generate rents (Fonseca et al. (2001), Spector 2002; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003), reducing the number of competing …rms and output in the long-run. Empirical analysis helps to gauge the relevance of interactions between product and labor markets. Using a standard Layard- Nickell-Jackman framework, Boeri et al. (2000) and Nicoletti et al. (1999) …nd that various measures of product market regulation are negatively related to employment rates. Messina (2003) relates negatively a measure of entry costs to the overall employment rate. Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) …nd that anti-competitive product market regulations are negatively associated with productivity performance. Nicoletti et al. (1999) argue that labor institutions and …rm structure matter to growth. Koeniger (2002) …nds that EP decreases incentives to innovate and thus productivity growth depends on the degree of labor market competition. Therefore, PM and EP have an in‡uence on job creation and industry performance, the more detrimental the stricter the regulations. The third strand of literature is related to studies which combine …nancial and labor markers. Wasmer and Weil (2004) develop a matching model and introduce labor market institutions and …nancial markets imperfections and they conclude that …nancial restrictions are important in explaining growth when there are frictions in the labor market. Blanch‡ower and Oswald (1998) show that di¢ culties to access external …nance discourage entrepreneurship and employment. Furthermore, there are papers that relate …nancial constraints to the duration of employment contracts. Rendon (2000) shows that liquidity constraints restrict job creation even when the labor market is ‡exible. In this paper we link the strands of literature just commented to analyze the relationship between the …nancial development and the rigidity of labor markets on growth. We claim that it may be e¢ cient for a …rm operating in a rigid labor market to employ few workers compared to a …rm operating in 4 an environment with a ‡exible labor markets. Several papers in the law and …nance literature have shown that …rms operating in more developed …nancial markets are able to attract more external …nance to realize investment projects and have more possibilities to grow. Rigidities in product and labor market have shown to reduce job creation and …rm size. Therefore, …rm growth is a¤ected by the capacity to attract external funds to invest and the possibility to adapt workforce to business cycle. We identify two di¤erent aspects of the growth drivers: the …nance e¤ect and the labor and product e¤ect Figure 1 develops the di¤erence between the …nance e¤ect and the labor e¤ect. We assume that the optimal production point entails combinations of assets and labor force that lay along the line from the origin through point A. Imagine that there is an increase in demand and that the …rm wants to expand in order to attend this demand increase. If the …rm operates in a well developed …nancial market, the …rm would be able to raise enough external funds to …nance the desired expansion (in terms of assets and workforce) in point D. If the supply of external …nancing is limited, the …rm may only be able to reach point C. The di¤erence between point C and D could then be entitled to a more limited supply of external funds, the …nance e¤ect. However, it may be e¢ cient for the …rm to choose point B rather than point C. This would be the case if the …rm has high labor cost. The …rm will choose few workforce than optimal in order to avoid facing high …ring costs when demand decrease. This may be the case of many European countries, where the high dismissal impede …rms adapt rapidly to business cycle. With labor rigidities, it will be less attractive for a …rm to increase labor force. Similarly, we can argue for the product market restrictions, if a …rm wants to initiate activity in a industry di¤erent where it is at present to take advantage of knowledge, synergies or economies of scale. The more product restriction or barriers to entry may cause underinvestment problems (a lower combination of assets and labor force than optimal). [Insert Figure 1 here] If it was the case that there are no frictions in …nancial markets but there were rigidities in labor or product market, …rms would choose a point like E. Thus, point E illustrates the case where the …nance e¤ect is absent and the deviation from the optimal allocation (point D) can be contributed fully to the 5 [Insert table 5] Column 2 in panel A introduces the interaction with EP. The sign of the interaction is negative and signi…cant. Therefore, industrial sectors using relatively more working force develop more slowly in countries with tighter labor protection. In other words, more ‡exible labor regulation foster economic growth as they facilitate the adaptation to the business cycle. Moreover, it will be more important for industries which require more labor turnover. The most of real growth comes from growth in size of the existing …rms and from new …rms (RZ). Then, industries with a larger need of job creation will be a¤ected negatively by a strictness EP. Column 3 presents the two interaction e¤ects together. Both maintain the signs and signi…cance found in previous realisations. Financial development and EP enter with di¤erent sign, furthermore, the co- e¢ cient of labor is signi…cantly larger than that of the EP, hence, strict labor regulation overcomes the positive e¤ect of …nancial development. Therefore, governments that want to promote economic activity should pay attention not only to frictions in …nancial markets but also to rigidities in labor markets. Panel B presents the results for PM regulation. In column 1, it appears the …nancial interaction alone. Column 2 introduces the interaction with the “time” variable. The …nancial interaction presents a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient and the “time”interaction is signi…cant but negative. Therefore, the more time needed to establish a corporate or sole proprietor business the more detrimental e¤ects for growth in those sector more labor intense. Column 3 presents the results for the “procedure”interaction. The number of procedures has a signi…- cant and negative e¤ect on growth. In this case, however, …nancial development interaction presents a positive but insigni…cant coe¢ cient. Hence, there is a hindering e¤ect associated with the number of procedures but not a positive effect derived from a developed …nancial environment. Finally, column 4 includes the interaction with barriers to entry that presents a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient. Therefore, the more barriers to entry the lower growth for sectors with more working force demand. In this case, …nancial interaction is positive and signi…cant again. Both the coe¢ cient of “time”and “barriers”interactions are greater than the …nancial interaction term coe¢ cient. But being all signi…- cant, …nancial development alleviates the detrimental e¤ects that PM originates on growth. However, the coe¢ cient of “procedures”is not compensated by the …nancial interaction term. 12 As we have seen for the EP, industries with a more job creation need, i.e. existing …rms which growth in size or start ups …rms, are negatively a¤ected by more PM regulations. 5 Robustness tests We next present evidence that results are robust to di¤erent measures of …- nancial development and economic growth (see Table 6). In panel A, we use a di¤erent measure of …nancial development: domestic credit over gdp instead of the stock market capitalization over gdp. Both of them have been widely used in the …nancial literature. Results are qualitatively similar to those explained above in terms of signs and signi…cance. In panel B, we use an alternative dependent variable de…nition. We use growth in the number of establishment. Around two third of real growth comes from growth in the average size of the existing establishments and one third comes from growth in the number of the new establishments. Our results are con…rmed. The only di¤erences are the non signi…cant …nancial interaction when EP interaction is introduced (column 2). And the non signi…cant procedures interaction (column 4). Henceforth, results maintain with alternative measures of …nancial development and economic growth. [Insert table 6] 6 Conclusions Countries di¤er in their labor and product market regulations. This paper shows empirically the relationship between …nance market, labor and market regulations and economic growth. These regulations a¤ect …rm growth sig- ni…cantly. Our estimation results show that the interaction between external …nancial needs and …nancial development is positive and signi…cant. Industrial sectors that are in need of external …nance are larger in countries with more developed …nancial markets. This is a well known result. What we …nd of interesting is that strictness EP legislation and PM regulation overcome the positive e¤ect of …nancial development. These regulations have a negative e¤ect on growth of those sectors more labor intensive. Therefore, the main insights of our results are that reforms in …nancial 13 sectors are important to help performance, but reforms in product and labor markets are also relevant. Hence, politicians should turn attention to market regulations that impede the normal market mechanism, which hinder growth signi…cantly, especially to those sectors that are more labor intensive. More development in …nancial markets together with new EP and PM regulation should be implemented. There is evidence of the evolution and development of European …nancial markets in the nineties although there still exists a gap with the US …nancial market, but di¤erences in labor and product markets continue to be very signi…cant. Further comparative research at institutional level should be done across these both economies. 14 References [1] Akerlof, George A. 1984. An Economist’s Book of Tales, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [2] Bertola, Giuseppe. 1992. "Labour turnover costs and average labour demand", Journal of Labour Economics, No. 4. [3] Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi. 2003. “Macroeconomic e¤ects of regulations and deregulation in goods and labor markets”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, No. 3:879-907 [4] Blanchard, Olivier and Jean Tirole. 2003. "The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass. mimeo, MIT. [5] Blanchard, Olivier and Justin Wolfers. 2000. 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"The Macroeconomics of Labour and Credit Market Imperfections" American Economic Review, 2004, 94 (4), 944-963. 18 19 Figure 1: Finance and Labor and Product Effect Inspired in Claessens and Laeven (2001) Assets Labor and product Finance A D C B E Labor force 20 TABLE 1: DEFINITION AND SOURCE OF THE VARIABLES Variable Name Description Fraction of sector Fraction of NACE three-digit industry in value added of total manufacturing sector in 1980. In value added Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. Market cap (CAP) Stock market capitalization divided by GDP in 1980. Source RZ (1998) Domestic credit (Dcredit) Domestic credit divided by GDP in 1980. Source International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. Fin Dependence External financial dependence of U.S. sectors averaged over 1980 - 1989. Source RZ (1998). EP Employment Protection Law data. This index captures the strictness of employment protection laws. Sources: OECD, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)and Nickell et al. (2003) Time Product Market Regulation data. This varible measures the days needed to the creation of corporate and sole proprietor businesses. Source: Djankov et al. (2001) Procedures Number of procedures to set a firm. Source: Djankov et al. (2001) Weeks Number of weeks to set a firm. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997) Barriers (BARR) Barriers to competition. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997) and Nicoletti.et at. (1999). Index The index is defined as (no. of weeks + no. of procedures/average procedures per week)/2 Source: Fonseca et al. (2001) Start-up costs Administrative burdens on startups Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997) Regulation Regulatory and administrative opacity.Source: LOGOTECH S.A. (1997) Growth in number Average growth in number of establishment by ISIC sector over the period 1981 to 1998. Of establishment Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. Growth in value added Average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector by ISIC in a particular country over the period 1981 – 1998. Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. Corruption Source: La Porta et al. (1999). Legal origin Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 21 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC OF INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in our study. For each variable, we report the mean of the period for each country. The definition and sources of the variables are reported in table 1. Country EP Procedures Time Barr Dcredit Cap Austria 1.293 9 3.610 1.6 0.77 0.89 Belgium 1.461 8 3.496 2.55 0.29 0.651 Canada 0.3 2 0.693 0.8 0.45 0.98 Denmark 0.956 3 1.098 1.32 0.42 0.56 Finland 1.152 5 3.178 1.93 0.48 0.52 Germany 1.447 10 3.737 2.1 0.78 1.08 Ireland 0.503 3 2.772 1.2 0.5 0.5 Italy 1.911 16 4.127 2.74 0.42 0.98 Japan 1.4 11 3.25 2.33 0.86 1.31 Netherlands 1.311 8 3.433 1.41 0.6 0.91 New Zeland 0.8 3 1.098 1.21 0.49 0.85 Norway 1.485 4 2.890 1.33 0.34 0.63 Portugal 1.933 12 4.330 1.46 0.52 0.82 Spain 1.811 11 4.406 1.77 0.76 1.02 Sweden 1.68 6 2.564 1.8 0.42 0.79 UK 0.35 5 1.386 0.48 0.25 0.78 Edicions / Issues: 95/1 Productividad del trabajo, eficiencia e hipótesis de convergencia en la industria textil-confección europea Jordi López Sintas 95/2 El tamaño de la empresa y la remuneración de los máximos directivos Pedro Ortín Ángel 95/3 Multiple-Sourcing and Specific Investments Miguel A. 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Labeaga (UNED & Universitat Pompeu Fabra) 96/5 An Approach to Asset-Liability Risk Control Through Asset-Liability Securities Joan Montllor i Serrats María-Antonia Tarrazón Rodón 97/1 Protección de los administradores ante el mercado de capitales: evidencia empírica en España Rafael Crespí i Cladera 97/2 Determinants of Ownership Structure: A Panel Data Approach to the Spanish Case Rafael Crespí i Cladera 97/3 The Spanish Law of Suspension of Payments: An Economic Analysis From Empirical Evidence Esteban van Hemmen Almazor 98/1 Board Turnover and Firm Performance in Spanish Companies Carles Gispert i Pellicer 98/2 Libre competencia frente a regulación en la distribución de medicamentos: teoría y evidencia empírica para el caso español Eva Jansson 98/3 Firm’s Current Performance and Innovative Behavior Are the Main Determinants of Salaries in Small-Medium Enterprises Jordi López Sintas y Ester Martínez Ros 98/4 On The Determinants of Export Internalization: An Empirical Comparison Between Catalan and Spanish (Non-Catalan) Exporting Firms Alex Rialp i Criado 98/5 Modelo de previsión y análisis del equilibrio financiero en la empresa Antonio Amorós Mestres 99/1 Avaluació dinàmica de la productivitat dels hospitals i la seva descomposició en canvi tecnològic i canvi en eficiència tècnica Magda Solà 99/2 Block Transfers: Implications for the Governance of Spanish Corporations Rafael Crespí, and Carles Gispert 99/3 The Asymmetry of IBEX-35 Returns With TAR Models M.ª Dolores Márquez, César Villazón 99/4 Sources and Implications of Asymmetric Competition: An Empirical Study Pilar López Belbeze 99/5 El aprendizaje en los acuerdos de colaboración interempresarial Josep Rialp i Criado 00/1 The Cost of Ownership in the Governance of Interfirm Collaborations Josep Rialp i Criado, i Vicente Salas Fumás 00/2 Reasignación de recursos y resolución de contratos en el sistema concursal español Stefan van Hemmen Alamazor 00/3 A Dynamic Analysis of Intrafirm Diffusion: The ATMs Lucio Fuentelsaz, Jaime Gómez, Yolanda Polo 00/4 La Elección de los Socios: Razones para Cooperar con Centros de Investigación y con Proveedores y Clientes Cristina Bayona, Teresa García, Emilio Huerta 00/5 Inefficient Banks or Inefficient Assets? Emili Tortosa-Ausina 01/1 Collaboration Strategies and Technological Innovation: A Contractual Perspective of the Relationship Between Firms and Technological Centers Alex Rialp, Josep Rialp, Lluís Santamaria 01/2 Modelo para la Identificación de Grupos Estratégicos Basado en el Análisis Envolvente de Datos: Aplicación al Sector Bancario Español Diego Prior, Jordi Surroca 01/3 Seniority-Based Pay: Is It Used As a Motivation Device? Alberto Bayo-Moriones 01/4 Calidad de Servicio en la Enseñanza Universitaria: Desarrollo y Validación de una Escala de Medida. Joan-Lluís Capelleras, José M.ª Veciana 01/5 Enfoque estructural vs. recursos y capacidades: un estudio empírico de los factores clave de éxito de las agencias de viajes en España. Fabiola López-Marín, José M.ª Veciana 01/6 Opción de Responsabilidad Limitada y Opción de Abandonar: Una Integración para el Análisis del Coste de Capita. Neus Orgaz 01/7 Un Modelo de Predicción de la Insolvencia Empresarial Aplicado al Sector Textil y Confección de Barcelona (1994-1997). Antonio Somoza López 01/8 La Gestión del Conocimiento en Pequeñas Empresas de Tecnología de la Información: Una Investigación Exploratoria. Laura E. Zapata Cantú 01/9 Marco Institucional Formal de Creación de Empresas en Catalunya: Oferta y Demanda de Servicios de Apoyo David Urbano y José María Veciana. 02/1 Access as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management. Pablo Arocena, Mikel Villanueva 02/2 Efficiency and Quality in Local Government. The Case of Spanish Local Authorities M.T. Balaguer, D. Prior, J.M. Vela 02/3 Single Period Markowitz Portfolio Selection, Performance Gauging and Duality: A variation on Luenberger’s Shortage Function Walter Briec, Kristiaan Kerstens, Jean Baptiste Lesourd 02/4 Innovación tecnológica y resultado exportador: un análisis empírico aplicado al sector textil-confección español Rossano Eusebio, Àlex Rialp Criado 02/5 Caracterización de las empresas que colaboran con centros tecnológicos Lluís Santamaria, Miguel Ángel García Cestona, Josep Rialp 02/6 Restricción de crédito bancario en economías emergentes: el caso de la PYME en México Esteban van Hemmen Almazor 02/7 La revelación de información obligatoria y voluntaria (activos intangibles) en las entidades de crédito. Factores determinantes. Gonzalo Rodríguez Pérez 02/8 Measuring Sustained Superior Performance at the Firm Level Emili Grifell - Tatjé, Pilar Marquès - Gou 02/9 Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Financial Intermediaries Rafel Crespi, Miguel A. García-Cestona, Vicente Salas 02/10 Endeudamiento y ciclos políticos presupuestarios: el caso de los ayuntamientos catalanes Pedro Escudero Fernández, Diego Prior Jiménez 02/11 The phenomenon of international new ventures, global start-ups, and bornglobals:what do we know after a decade (1993-2002) of exhaustive scientific inquiry? Àlex Rialp-Criado, Josep Rialp-Criado, Gary A. Knight 03/1 A methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both magnitudes Stephan Hecking 03/2 Assessing the structural change of strategic mobility. Determinants under hypercompetitive environments José Ángel Zúñiga Vicente, José David Vicente Lorente 03/3 Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants Alberto Bayo-Moriones, Pedro Ortín-Ángel 03/4 El empresario digital como determinante del éxito de las empresas puramente digitales: un estudio empírico Christian Serarols, José M.ª Veciana 03/5 La solvencia financiera del asegurador de vida y su relación con el coste de capital Jordi Celma Sanz 03/6 Proceso del desarrollo exportador de las empresas industriales españolas que participan en un consorcio de exportación: un estudio de caso Piedad Cristina Martínez Carazo 03/7 Utilidad de una Medida de la Eficiencia en la Generación de Ventas para la Predicción del Resultado María Cristina Abad Navarro 03/8 Evaluación de fondos de inversión garantizados por medio de portfolio insurance Sílvia Bou Ysàs 03/9 Aplicación del DEA en el Análisis de Beneficios en un Sistema Integrado Verticalmente Hacia Adelante Héctor Ruiz Soria 04/1 Regulación de la Distribución Eléctrica en España: Análisis Económico de una Década, 1987-1997 Leticia Blázquez Gómez; Emili Grifell-Tatjé 04/2 The Barcelonnettes: an Example of Network-Entrepreneurs in XIX Century Mexico. An Explanation Based on a Theory of Bounded Rational Choice with Social Embeddedness. Gonzalo Castañeda 05/1 IFRS Adoption in Europe: The Case of Germany. Soledad Moya, Jordi Perramon, Anselm Constans 05/2 Efficiency and environmental regulation: a ‘complex situation’ Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, Diego Prior 05/3 Financial Development, Labor and Market Regulations and Growth Raquel Fonseca, Natalia Utrero