Kierkegaard the Teacher

1 . «The Wise Contradict T h e m s e l ves». WI L D E, O. (1996) p. 57. 2 . K i e rk e g a a rd's Wr i t i n g s, tr. by How a rd V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. IXXVI, Pr i n c e t o n : Princeton Un i versity Press, 1978-1998. Enrahonar 29, 1998 7 57 9 Kierkegaard the Teacher1 Stacey Elizabeth Ake Søren Kierkegaard Forskningcenteret The scene: A sunny Sunday afternoon in Copenhagen in late Ja n u a ry of 1850. Four men, deeply immersed in conversation, are strolling through Fre d e r i k s b e r g Pa rk. They are well known to each other, two of them, Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus, appear to be related to each other, although the relation is ob - viously strained and somewhat cool. An elderl y, noble friend, Johannes de silen - t i o, is also among the group which is led by the ever watchful Vigilius Ha u f n i e n s i s , a man who always has his finger on the pulse of the city. Vigilius Haufniensis, guiding the discussion just as he guided his friends out of the city and down to the park: « Immediately considered, the genius is predominantly subjectivity […]. T h e re f o re the genius continually discovers fate, and the more pro f o u n d the genius, the more profound the discove ry of fate. To spiritlessness, this is naturally foolishness [he casts a quick glance at de silentio], but in actuality it is greatness, because no man is born with the idea of providence, and those who think that one acquires it gradually through education are greatly mistaken, although [a slight nod tow a rd An t i - C l i m a c u s] I do not there by deny the significance of education2.» (KW VIII, 98-99) Johannes de silentio, to himself:«Nullum unquam exstitit magnum ingenium sine aliqua dementia. » « For such dementia is the suffering of genius in the world, is the expre ssion, if I dare say so, of divine envy, whereas the genius aspect is the exp ression of preferment. Thus from the beginning the genius is disoriented...» (KW VI, 106-107) [Suddenly catching himself and addressing the o t h e r s] «What, then, is education? I believed it is the course the individual goes through in order to catch up with himself, and the person who will not go through this course is not much helped by being in the most enlightened age.» (KW VI, 46) 7 6 Enrahonar 29, 1998 Stacey Elizabeth Ake Johannes Climacus, his eyes brightening: « Vi ewed So c r a t i c a l l y, any point of depart u re in time is eo ipso s o m e t h i n g accidental, a vanishing point, an occasion. Nor is the teacher anything m o re, and if he gives of himself and his erudition in any other way, he does not give but takes away. Then he is not even the other's friend. T h i s is the profundity of Socratic thinking, this his noble thoroughgoing hum a n i t y, which does not exc l u s i vely and conceitedly cultivate the company of brilliant minds but feels just as akin to a tanner, and for that re a s o n [squaring his shoulders in quotation as only an academic wannabee can do] he soon “became convinced that the study of nature is not man's concern and there f o re began to philosophize about the ethical in workshops and in the market place” (Diogenes Laertius, II, V, 21) [He seeks out admi - ring glances, but none are fort h c o m i n g], but philosophized just as absolutely with whomever he spoke. With half-thoughts, with higgling and haggling, with claiming and disclaiming, as if the individual to a certain deg ree owed something to another person but then again did not, with va g u e w o rds that explain eve r ything except what is meant by this “to a cert a i n d e g re e” —with all such things one does not go beyond Socrates or re a c h the concept of re velation—, either, but simply remains in empty talk. In the Socratic view, eve ry human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because his self-knowledge is Go d - k n owledge. Mo re ove r, this is how Socrates understood himself, and in his view this is how eve ry human being must understand himself, and by virtue of that understanding he must understand.» (KW VII, 11) Anti-Climacus, exaspera t ed: « No. Why not? Because one cannot k n owanything at all about C h r i s t; he is the paradox, the object of faith, exists only for faith.» (KW XX, 25) Johannes Climacus, petulantly whining: « Socrates, howe ve r, was a midwife examined by the god himself. The work he carried out was a divine commission.» (KW VII, 10) Anti-Climacus, with a wry smirk: «Assuming that the distinctive mark of being God is (indeed, who in the whole world would have thought of this; how true that such a thing did not arise in any human heart!) to look exactly like eve r ybody else, neither more nor less: then we are all gods. Quod erat demonstra n d u m. » (K W X X , 5 1 ) Johannes de silentio, quietly bro o d i ng: « Socrates was the most interesting man who ever lived, his life the most int e resting life ever led, but this existence was allotted to him by the god, and inasmuch as he himself had to acquire it, he was not a stranger to tro u b l e and pain. To take such an existence in vain is not becoming to anyo n e who thinks more earnestly about life [de silentio casts a meaningful look in Anti-Climacus' dire c t i o n], and yet in our age, we frequently see examples Kierkegaard the Teacher. «The Wise Contradict Themselves» Enrahonar 29, 1998 7 7 of such an effort. Fu rt h e r m o re, the interesting is a border category, a c o n - f i n i u m b e t ween esthetics and ethics. Ac c o rd i n g l y, this examination must constantly wander into the territory of ethics, while in order to be of consequence it must seize the problem with esthetic fervor and concupiscence. These days, ethics rarely invo l ves itself with a question like this. The reason must be that the system has no room for it. T h e re f o re, one could do it in monographs.» (KW VI, 83) Vigilius Haufniensis, warming to the subject: « Ethics is still an ideal science, and not only in the sense that eve ry science is ideal. Ethics proposes to bring ideality into actuality. […] This ideal characteristic of ethics is what tempts one to first use metaphysical [h e looks at Climacus], then esthetic [he nods to de silentio], and then psyc h ological categories in the treatment of it [with a self-mocking smile]. Bu t ethics, more than any other science, must resist such temptations. It is, t h e re f o re, impossible for anyone to write an ethics without having altogether different categories in re s e rve.» (KW VIII, 16-17) Anti-Climacus, knocking his walking stick on the ground for emphasis: « Truly it is high time for the re q u i rements of ideality to be heard. […] Only the consciousness of sin is absolute respect. […] The simple soul who humbly acknowledges himself to be a sinner, himself personally (the single individual), has no need to learn about all the difficulties that come when one is neither simple nor humble. But where this humble consciousness of personally being a sinner is lacking [t h rowing a sidelong glan - ce at his erstwhile re l a t i o n]-- well, if a person such as that otherwise possessed all human wisdom and sagacity and all human gifts, it will be of only little benefit to him.» (KW XX, 67-68) Johannes Climacus, testily rising to the bait: « In this way the Socratic principle that all sin is ignorance is correct; sin does not understand itself in the truth.» (KW VII, 50n) Johannes de silentio interrupts, heedless of his namesake: «An ethics that ignores sin is a completely futile discipline, but if it affirms sin, then it has eo ipsoe xceeded itself» (KW VI, 98-99). [He re he pau - ses for thought] «As soon as sin emerges, ethics founders precisely on repentance; for repentance is the highest ethical expression, but precisely as such it is the deepest ethical self-contradiction.» (KW VI, 98n) Vigilius Haufniensis rubs his gloved fingers under his chin: «A consciousness of sin profoundly and seriously formed in the expre ssion of repentance is a great rarity. Howe ve r, for my own sake, as well as for the sake of thought and neighbor, I shall take care not to express it as Schelling probably would, who speaks somew h e re of a genius for action in the same sense as for music etc. Thus, without being aware of it, one can at times annihilate eve rything with an explanatory word. [He taps An t i - 7 8 Enrahonar 29, 1998 Stacey Elizabeth Ake 3 . S ø ren Kierk e g a a rd's Jo u rnals and Pa p e r s, ed. and tr. by How a rd V. Hong and Edna H. Ho n g , assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, vol. 1-6, vol. 7. Index and Composite Collation, Bloomington and London: Indiana Un i versity Press, 1967-1978. Climacus on the arm significantly.] If eve ry man does not participate essentially in the absolute, then eve rything is ove r. T h e re f o re, in the sphere of the religious, genius must not be spoken of as a special gift that is b e s t owed only upon a few, for here the gift is that of willing, and [h e re he looks away] whoever does not will should at least have the respect of not being pitied.» (KW VIII, 114) Johannes Climacus, a bit disdainfully: «The consciousness of sin […]. Only the god could teach it —if he wanted to be teacher.» (KW VII, 47) Anti-Climacus, assuming his most paternalistic tone: «Christ is a person and is the teacher who is more important than the teaching […] It is true only of a human being that his teaching is more imp o rtant than he himself; to apply this to Christ is blasphemy, inasmuch as it makes him into only a human being.» (KW XX, 124) Johannes Climacus, agre e i n g - s a rd o n i c a l ly: « Faith, then, must constantly cling firmly to the teacher.» (KW VII, 62) Anti-Climacus nods empahtically: «When a person lives in such a way that he knows no higher criterion for life than that of the understanding, then his whole life is re l a t i v i t y, working only for re l a t i ve goals; [he sighs] he does nothing unless the understanding with some help from probability can make more or less clear the a d vantages and the disadvantages, can answer his question “why and to what end.” [And here he starts picking up speed.] It is different with the absolute» (KW XX, 116), «the understanding comes to a standstill at the absolute. If there is to be any triumphant bre a k t h rough, there must be faith, for faith is a new life.» (KW XX, 120) Johannes de silentio with a sad drooping of his head: «I cannot make the movement of faith, I cannot shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd; it is for me an impossibility. […] [With a hopeless certainty he adds:] I am convinced that God is love.» (KW VI 34) A spindly-legged stranger addresses de silentio dire c t ly: « To hold fast this way to the thought that God is love just the same is the abstract form of faith, faith in abstra c t o[…] [The stranger turns to the others and points at de silentio with his umbre l l a .] This is a sign that he is being educated or brought up to faith […] Then the time will come when he will succeed in concretizing his Go d - re l a t i o n s h i p.» (J P, 1401)3[He puts a thin hand on de silentio's shoulder and looks into his eye s] «God in heav- Kierkegaard the Teacher. «The Wise Contradict Themselves» Enrahonar 29, 1998 7 9 en is my teacher, and I count it an honor to be his disciple, that he educated me.» (J P, 785) Vigilius Haufniensis, shaking his head in perplexity as the stranger walks away: «The true autodidact is precisely in the same degree a theodidact, as another author has said…» (KW VIII, 162) Suggested Bi b l i o g r a p h y S ø ren Kierk e g a a rd's Jo u rnals and Pa p e r s, ed. and tr. by How a rd V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, vol. 1-6, vol. 7. Index and Composite Collation, Bloomington and London: Indiana Un i versity Press, 1967-1978. See especially vol. 1, 649-657 (VIII 2 B 81-89-1847). K i e rk e g a a rd's Wr i t i n g s, tr. by How a rd V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. I-XXVI, Princeton: Princeton Un i versity Press, 1978-present. See especially the follow i n g : AN T ICL I M AC U S: Practice in Christianity, vol. XX. The Sickness Unto De a t h, vol. XIX. Johannes CL I M AC U S: Philosophical Fra g m e n t s; Johannes Climacus, vol. V I I . Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. XII.1 (notes: vo l . X I I . 2 ) . Johannes de S I L E N T I O : Fear and Tre m b l i n g, vol. V I . Vigilius HAU F N I E N S I S: The Concept of An x i e t y, vol. V I I I . WI L D E, O. (1996) «Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young» in No t h i n g . . . Except My Ge n i u s. Ed. Fry, S. London: Hu t c h i n s o n .