Challenges of the Energiewende from a Policy
Analysis Perspective:
Understanding the goals and improving the
policy instruments of Germany’s energy
transition
vorgelegt von
Fabian Joas M.Sc.
geb. in Starnberg
von der Fakultät VI – Planen Bauen Umwelt
der Technischen Universität Berlin
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktor der Philosophie
Dr. phil.
genehmigte Dissertation
Promotionsausschuss:
Prof. Dr. Jan-Peter Voß (Vorsitz)
Prof. Dr. Ottmar Edenhofer
Prof. Dr. Prof. Dr. Markus Lederer
Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 19.05.2017
Berlin 2017
2 Contents
Contents
Summary 7
Zusammenfassung 11
Acknowledgements 15
1 Introduction 19
1.1 Definition of the Energiewende 21
1.2 The multiple streams framework: background, origin and application 24
1.3 Policy streams and application 25
1.3.1 Multiple streams application to the events of Fukushima and the
nuclear phase-out 26
1.4 Description of streams and linking to chapters 28
1.4.1 Problem stream 28
1.4.2 Political stream 30
1.4.3 Policy stream 31
1.5 References 35
2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the German
Energy Transformation 41
2.1 Introduction 42
2.2 Concepts and methodology 43
2.2.1 Concepts: goals and systems of goals 43
2.2.2 Approach and method 44
2.3 Results 45
2.3.1 List of goals 45
2.3.2 Survey findings and discussion 46
2.4 Conclusions and policy implications 50
3
4 Contents
3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on Electricity prices
and CO2 Emissions 53
3.1 Introduction 54
3.2 Methodology and model 55
3.3 Impact on electricity prices and CO2 emissions 55
3.3.1 Scenario definition and model description 55
3.3.2 Projection of conventional replacement capacity 57
3.3.3 Impact on electricity prices 58
3.3.4 Impacts on CO2 emissions 60
3.4 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with other studies 61
3.5 Policy Implications of the modelling results 65
3.6 Conclusions 67
3.7 References 69
4 EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische Aufarbeitung der De-
batte zur EEG Reform 71
4.1 Einleitung 72
4.2 Gesellschaftliches Kostenrisiko & Risikokosten der EE Förderung 75
4.3 Risikoallokation bei unterschiedlichen EE Förderinstrumenten 80
4.4 Investitionsrisiken & Effizienzanreize bei unterschiedlichen EE Förderin-
strumenten 85
4.5 Diskussion & Schlussfolgerung 93
5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument Choice:
an Analysis of the EU and the US 99
5.1 Introduction 100
5.2 Literature review 101
5.3 Definitions and approach 103
5.4 Instrument comparisons 106
5.4.1 Emissions trading 107
5.4.2 Tax 113
5.4.3 Carbon-pricing TCs: upstream versus downstream points of reg-
ulation 113
5.4.4 Technology standards 114
5.4.5 Performance standards 115
5.5 Conclusions 116
5.6 References 120
Contents 5
6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research 125
6.1 Synthesis summary of the chapters 126
6.2 Review & discussion of methods and methodological lessons 129
6.3 Ideas for further research 131
6.4 General lessons and concluding remarks 134
6.5 References 136
Statement of Contribution 137
Tools & Resources 139
6 Contents
Summary
7
Summary
Germany is currently restructuring its energy system, an endeavor its chancellor, Angela
Merkel, called the project of the century. This Energiewende has moved into rough waters in
recent years. The relatively high and rapidly growing shares of fluctuating renewable energy
sources (mainly wind and photovoltaic) have led to numerous technical and socio-economic
challenges. The unclear and sometimes contradictory policy goals of the Energiewende as
well as suboptimally designed policy instruments in key areas of the Energiewende are the
two major areas of concerns of this dissertation.
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the solution of selected challenges of the
Energiewende in the context of goals and policy instruments.
In this regard, the following four research questions are addressed:
1. What are the goals of the Energiewende and how do they interact with the design of
policy instruments?
2. What are the impacts of the German nuclear phase-out on the electricity market and
the security of supply?
3. How do different designs of support mechanisms for renewable energy affect the risk-
distribution between society, investors in renewable energy and investors in
conventional power plants?
4. What is the impact of ex-post transaction costs on the cost-effectiveness of selected
climate policy instruments?
The main results and the subsequent policy conclusions of this thesis can be summarized as
follows:
The research on the goals of the Energiewende was based on a survey among elite policy
actors, which showed that climate protection is the most important goal of the Energiewende.
However, climate protection is neither the only goal, nor an indispensable one. Additional
goals such as the nuclear phase-out, import independence from fossil fuels and job creation
also play an important role. A large majority agrees that the Energiewende would make sense
even if climate change did not exist.
The following policy conclusions can be derived: first, there should be a clear, transparent and
public debate on the goals of the Energiewende, i.e. a debate on what the Energiewende is
actually bound to achieve. Second, economic policy analysis of the Energiewende should
acknowledge the multiplicity of political goals and take them into account in their models.
Regarding the phase-out of the German nuclear power plants it is found that the precise date
for the complete shut-down of Germany’s nuclear power plants has a relatively small effect
on the wholesale electricity price and security of supply.
The following policy conclusion can be derived: the German nuclear phase-out will neither
have a substantial effect on the wholesale electricity prices, nor on the security of supply.
Regarding the design of RES-support schemes it is found that the distribution of long-term
electricity price risk between society and investors strongly depends on various set ups. A
8 Summary
design that exposes RES-investors to higher risks may result in more efficient investments.
However, more risks for RES-investors means that small actors (e.g. cooperatives) have less
opportunities to invest in the Energiewende, because they are less capable to hedge long-term
price risks efficiently.
The following policy conclusion can be derived: the question whether investors in RES,
investors in conventional power plants or society should carry the long term electricity price
risk is a political (i.e. distributional) issue, which crucially depends on political goals such as
actor diversity.
On the question of transaction costs of climate policy instruments: the ex-post transaction
costs are relatively low for instruments such as emissions trading systems and affect the cost-
effectiveness only slightly.
The following policy conclusion can be derived: Given the minor role of ex post transaction
costs, they can be neglected as a source of significant distortions. However, this statement
only refers to regions with strong institutions (such as the EU or the US). The focus in policy
instrument design should be on properties that fundamentally influence cost effectiveness as
well as equity and political economy considerations.
Summary 9
10 Zusammenfassung
Zusammenfassung
11
Zusammenfassung
Deutschland befindet sich aktuell in einem umfassenden Umbau seiner Energieversorgung,
den Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel als Jahrhundertprojekt bezeichnet hat. Diese
Energiewende ist in den letzten Jahren in schweres Fahrwasser geraten. Die relativ hohen und
schnell wachsenden Anteile fluktuierender erneuerbarer Energien (vor allem Wind und
Photovoltaik) haben zu zahlreichen technischen und sozioökonomischen Herausforderungen
geführt. Problematisch erscheinen vor allem die unklaren und teilweise widersprüchlichen
Zielsetzungen der Energiewende. Zudem wurden die Politikinstrumente in wesentlichen
Handlungsfeldern suboptimal konzipiert.
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, Lösungen für ausgewählte Probleme in diesem Zusammenhang
zu finden. Dazu stellen sich folgende Fragen:
1. Was sind die Ziele der Energiewende, und welchen Einfluss haben diese auf die
Ausgestaltung von Politikinstrumenten?
2. Wie werden sich die unterschiedlichen Abschaltzeitpunkte der deutschen
Atomkraftwerke auf den Strommarkt und die Versorgungssicherheit auswirken?
3. Wie beeinflussen unterschiedliche Fördermechanismen für erneuerbare Energien
die langfristige Risikoverteilung zwischen Gesellschaft, Investoren in erneuerbare
Energien und Investoren in konventionelle Kraftwerke?
4. Welchen Einfluss haben ex-post Transaktionskosten auf die Effizienz von
ausgewählten Klimapolitikinstrumenten?
Die zentralen Ergebnisse und die sich daraus ergebenden politikrelevanten
Schlussfolgerungen dieser Doktorarbeit lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen:
Die Forschungsergebnisse zu den Zielen der Energiewende basieren auf einer Befragung
politisch relevanter Akteure. Sie zeigen, dass Klimaschutz als das wichtigste, aber nicht als
das einzige Ziel der Energiewende anzusehen ist. Auch der Atomausstieg, die Reduzierung
der Importabhängigkeit von fossilen Rohstoffen und die Schaffung neuer Arbeitsplätze
werden häufig als relevante Ziele genannt. Eine große Mehrheit der Befragten stimmt sogar
der Aussage zu, dass die Energiewende selbst dann sinnvoll wäre, wenn es keinen
Klimawandel gäbe.
Daraus ergeben sich folgende politikrelevante Schlussfolgerungen: Erstens sollte eine
transparente und öffentliche Debatte über die Ziele der Energiewende geführt werden. Also
eine Debatte, was genau mit der Energiewende eigentlich erreicht werden soll. Die
Wissenschaft sollte zu dieser gesellschaftlichen Diskussion mit fundierten Informationen
beitragen und Wirkungszusammenhänge verständlich erläutern. Zweitens sollten
ökonomische Studien zur Energiewende transparent mit der Frage umgehen, auf welchen
Zielsetzungen ihre Politikempfehlungen basieren.
Zur Frage der Abschaltzeitpunkte der deutschen Atomkraftwerke: Der Zeitpunkt des
vollständigen Atomausstiegs in Deutschland hat nur einen relativ geringen Einfluss auf die
Großhandelsstrompreise und die Versorgungssicherheit. Die Ergebnisse der
Simulationsrechnungen haben deutlich gemacht, dass bestimmte Modellannahmen (wie
Brennstoff- und CO
2
-Preise) einen deutlich höheren Einfluss haben.
12 Zusammenfassung
Politikrelevante Schlussfolgerung: Der deutsche Atomausstieg wird weder zu einem starken
Anstieg des Großhandelsstrompreises noch zu maßgeblichen Problemen bei der
Versorgungssicherheit führen.
Zur Frage der Ausgestaltung von Fördermechanismen für erneuerbare Energien: Die Wahl
des Förderregimes für erneuerbare Energien hat einen starken Einfluss auf die Verteilung der
langfristigen Strompreisrisiken zwischen Gesellschaft und Investoren. Förderinstrumente, die
Investoren in erneuerbare Energien höheren Risiken aussetzen, können zu
gesamtwirtschaftlich effizienteren Ergebnissen führen. Gleichzeitig sinken jedoch die
Chancen für kleine Akteure (z.B. Bürgerenergiegenossenschaften), sich am Ausbau der
Energiewende zu beteiligen. Denn kleine Akteure sind kaum in der Lage, langfristige Risiken
effizient zu streuen.
Politikrelevante Schlussfolgerung: Die Wahl eines Förderinstruments für erneuerbare
Energien ist eine vornehmlich politische Frage, da sie die Verteilung von Kosten und Risiken
zwischen bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen regelt.
Zur Frage der Transaktionskosten bei Klimapolitikinstrumenten: Für Instrumente wie
Emissionshandelssysteme sind die ex-post Transaktionskosten relativ gering und beeinflussen
die Effizienz eines Instruments nur geringfügig.
Politikrelevante Schlussfolgerung: Für die Ausgestaltung von Instrumenten wie dem
Emissionshandel spielen ex-post Transaktionskosten eine untergeordnete Rolle. Als Ursache
von bedeutenden Marktverzerrungen können sie daher ausgeschlossen werden. Diese Aussage
bezieht sich jedoch nur auf Regionen mit starken Institutionen. Der Fokus bei der
Konzipierung von Klimapolitikinstrumenten sollte somit auf Faktoren liegen, welche einen
stärkeren Einfluss auf die Effizienz eines Instruments haben.
Zusammenfassung 13
14 Zusammenfassung
Acknowledgements
15
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Amani Joas, Michael Pahle, Christian Flachsland, Karoline Steinbacher, Brigitte
Knopf, Lion Hirth, Dorothe Ilskens, Cornelius Schneider, Albert Joas, Susanne Holtz-Joas, Gabriela
Jardim, Simon Hillmann, Cathy Marich, Florian Sanktjohanser, Markus Lederer and Ottmar
Edenhofer.
This dissertation would not have been possible without your support.
Furthermore I would like to thank the Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft e.V. for a PhD scholarship.
16 Acknowledgements
Dedicated to my grandfathers Günter Holtz, deceased in 2000 and Michael Joas, deceased in 1997.
Acknowledgements 17
18 CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Introduction
19
Challenges of the Energiewende from a Policy Analysis Perspective
Understanding the goals and improving the policy instruments of
Germany’s energy transition
I Introduction:
The Energiewende
1
has been described as the project of the century (Merkel, 2013) and
Germany’s Man-to-the-Moon-Project (Steinmeier, 2015). To achieve the G7 leaders’ pledge to
“decarbonise the global economy in the course of this century,” and especially the UN’s COP
21 Paris agreement to keep the increase in global average temperature “well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels”, a global transformation of energy systems is necessary. With most
models identifying the electricity sector as the first logical target of decarbonisation (IPCC WG
III, 2014), the world is paying close attention to Germany, which has made significant steps in
this area. However the rapid expansion of renewables in the electricity sector has been posing
profound technological, economic, political and social challenges. These led Sigmar Gabriel,
Vice Chancellor and Minister of the Economy and Energy, to liken the endeavour to open heart
surgery (Gabriel, 2014). Transforming the energy production of a large industrialized country
from a largely coal and nuclear-based system to a renewable energy sources (RES)-based
system is a herculean task, which produces ample questions and contradictions to be tackled by
researchers. This dissertation was motivated by these challenges and strives to contribute to the
solution of practical policy problems by means of a thorough analysis of policy instruments as
well as a definition of policy problems themselves.
While the Energiewende is often understood as mostly a technological revolution, from fossil
and nuclear fuels to RES, it has a lasting impact on the economic and political features of
Germany’s energy landscape. The Energiewende has disrupted the domination of a few large
companies in the energy system and is continuing to disaggregate the landscape into multiple
smaller players who benefit from Germany’s policy driven subsidies for RES. This
development seems to be partially driven by a paradigm shift in the political sphere, where
formerly radical green policies have become mainstream and are now adopted by Germany’s
centre left and centre right parties. Aspects of this substantial shift in the political economy of
Germany’s energy policy have been widely covered (see e.g.: Brunnengräber & Di Nucci,
2014; Gründinger, 2015; Jacobsson & Lauber, 2005, 2006; Lauber & Mez, 2004, 2006; Mez,
2003; Toke & Lauber, 2007; Weidner, 2008). This dissertation contributes to this stream of
literature by analysing the goals and motives of this paradigm shift. It also goes a step further
by analysing selected policy problems, using economic analysis.
Contributing to Policy Analysis
This dissertation is situated in the field of policy analysis. Policy analysis, according to Dunn
(2012: 5), is a field of research at the cross-section of political science and economics that “is
designed to provide policy-relevant information”. Policy analysis is driven by a predefined set
of questions. Each chapter of this dissertation can be attributed to one of these. The selection
1
The term Energiewende is usually translated as energy transformation or energy transition.
20 Chapter 1 Introduction
of the topics depended on the policy issues that played a role (or were expected to play a role)
in the political agenda at the time of writing.
Questions of policy analysis and questions of chapters of this dissertation are (Dunn, 2012: 5):
1. Problem Definition: What is the problem to which a potential solution is sought?
Treated in Chapter 2: What are the goals (or problems) of the Energiewende?
2. Forecasting: What are the expected outcomes?
Treated in Chapter 3: What are the expected outcomes of different nuclear phase-out
dates?
3. Prescriptions: Which policy should be chosen?
Treated in Chapter 4: Which policy for reform of the German Renewable Energies Act
(EEG) should be chosen in order to reach certain political goals?
4. Evaluation and monitoring: What ex-post policy outcomes are observed? To what
extents do observed policy outcomes contribute to the solution of the problem?
Treated in Chapter 5: What are observed ex-post policy outcomes concerning
transaction costs for different climate policy instruments?
Purpose of the Introduction
This introduction serves to embed and connect the chapters of this cumulative dissertation
consisting of scientific papers that have previously been published elsewhere. Furthermore, this
introduction is intended to provide the broader background and historical context of the
Energiewende by briefly analysing and connecting selected historical events that have
influenced it. For this purpose, the multiple streams framework developed by John Kingdon in
the 1980’s is applied. Kingdon’s framework describes the incremental and non-linear agenda
setting process
2
of policymaking and is applied in this introduction to explain how the
Energiewende became such an important item on Germany’s policy agenda. The introduction
is structured as follows:
Section 1.1 defines the concept Energiewende. Section 1.2 gives insights on the background
and the origin of the multiple streams framework and explains the decision to apply it in this
introduction. Section 1.3 explains the concept of the streams and of the policy window of
opportunity and illustrates the application of the multiple streams framework in a case study on
the events following the nuclear incident in Fukushima. Section 1.4 links selected historic
events of German energy policy to the three streams and, furthermore, relates the chapters of
this dissertation to the different streams, also indicating the research questions of each chapter.
1.1 Definition of “Energiewende”
The term Energiewende was first introduced in 1980 by the German think tank Institute for
Applied Ecology and described a transition from an energy system based on fossil fuels and
nuclear energy to a system based on RES (Öko-Institut, 1980). Accordingly, the Energiewende
2
The agenda is defined as “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of
government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 2014: 3).
1.1 Definition of the Energiewende 21
describes a broad and evolutionary (policy) process, which has existed as a concept for more
than 30 years.
However, the term Energiewende only entered the political community and the public debate
with some prominence in 2009. It gathered significant public recognition in the aftermath of
the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear incident of 2011. Graph 1 shows Google search hits for
Energiewende, indicating that in the German public debate, the term only started to develop
into a political brand as late as 2009 and became more prominent in 2011.
3
At this time a heated
discussion regarding the lifetime extension of existing nuclear plants combined with a long-
term strategy for Germany’s energy policy occupied the political agenda. Within expert policy
circles, however, the term Energiewende had already developed into a customary label.
Graph 1: Google search hits for the term Energiewende from 2005-2015 Source: Google Trends
In the course of the 2011 post-Fukushima debate on Germany’s future energy policy, politicians
and the media eagerly adopted the term to describe the stipulated renewed exit from nuclear
power, whereas previously, it was more closely linked to the expansion of renewable energies
(Öko-Institut, 1980). The rapid increase in searches in March of 2011 shows that the Fukushima
incidents are closely and directly related to the term’s evolution (see Graph 1).
4
At the same
time, a collection of other, long on-going transformative processes within Germany’s energy
policy —including the move towards sustainable transportation, increasing energy efficiency,
improving the insulation of buildings, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and especially the
expansion of RES —were subsumed in the public debate under the new trending term
Energiewende (Bundesregierung, 2011).
This dissertation distinguishes between the long-evolving notion of the Energiewende, which
has been ongoing for over 30 years, and the Energiewende decisions of 2011. These decisions
set the course for the achievement of several policy goals, laying down quantitative objectives
that were adopted in 2010 by the liberal-conservative coalition in the so-called energy concept
(Bundesregierung, 2010) and the decision of 2011 to exit nuclear power by 2022 (see Table 1)
(Bundesregierung, 2011).
3
Google Trends provides a time series index of the volume of queries users enter into Google in a given geographic area.
The query index is based on query share: the total query volume for the search term in question within a particular
geographic region divided by the total number of queries in that region during the time period being examined. The
maximum query share in the time period specified is normalized to be 100 and the query share at the initial date being
examined is normalized to be zero (Choi & Varian, 2012; Google Support, 2016).
4
A mere accidental correlation without any causal relation is unlikely in this case, since alternative explanations for this
sudden rise are not apparent.
22 Chapter 1 Introduction
Category
Medium-term-objectives
Long-term-objectives
GHG Emission
Reduction by 40% by 2020 (base
year 1990).
Reduction of at least 80% by 2050
(base year 1990).
Renewables (all sectors)
By 2020 renewable energies are to
account for 18% of gross final
energy consumption.
Increase to 30% by 2030, 45% by
2040 and 60% by 2050.
Renewables (electricity)
By 2020 electricity generated from
renewable energy sources is to
account for 35% of gross electricity
consumption.
Increase to 50% by 2030, 65% by
2040 and 80% by 2050.
Efficiency
Decrease primary energy
consumption by 20% by 2020.
Decrease electricity consumption
by around 10% by 2020.
(base year for both 2008)
Decrease primary energy
consumption by 50% by 2050.
Decrease electricity consumption
by around 25% by 2050.
(base year for both 2008)
Nuclear Power 2010 decision (pre
Fukushima incident):
The operating lifetimes of the 17
nuclear power plants in Germany
will be extended by an average of
12 years. In the case of nuclear
power plants commissioned up to
and including 1980 there will be an
extension of 8 years. For plants
commissioned after 1980 there will
be an extension of 14 years.
Long-term nuclear phase-out is
confirmed as there is only
mentioning of a „limited
extension“.
Nuclear Power 2011 decision
(post Fukushima incident)5:
The role assigned to nuclear power
in the energy concept was
reassessed and the seven oldest
nuclear power plants and the one at
Krümmel were shut down
permanently.
Phase-out operation of the
remaining nine nuclear power
plants by 2022.
Phase-out by 2022.
Table 1: Quantitative objectives according to the energy concept and legislative package of the nuclear phase-out
decision (BMUB, 2011)
The term Energiewende has also been embraced internationally and is now frequently used to
describe Germany’s energy transformation (Steinmeier, 2015). One reading of this
development suggests that Energiewende’s adoption as a loanword signals the unique
characteristics of this peculiar policy endeavour. It remains to be seen, however, whether its
connotation will be coined by a perceived irrational German angst over nuclear power or
5
On 6 June 2011 the Federal Government adopted the energy package, which supplements the measures of the energy
concept of 2010 and speeds up its implementation. The decisions on both the energy concept of 2010 (with the exception of
the passage on nuclear power) and the transformation of the energy system of 2011 describe the Federal Government's
current energy policy.
1.1 Definition of the Energiewende 23
whether it will be associated with a new leitmotiv as Germany’s transformation into a modern
and sustainable industrial powerhouse. For the purpose of this dissertation, Energiewende (in
the electricity sector) is defined more narrowly than in the public discourse, namely as
Germany’s long-term transition into the age of renewables with the intention to combat climate
change.
6
In order to explain how the Energiewende grew into such an important item on
Germany’s policy agenda, I next apply John Kingdon’s multiple streams framework.
1.2 The Multiple Streams Framework: Background, Origin and Application
The multiple streams framework, developed by John Kingdon in the 1980’s is very helpful to
illustrate how different historic events culminated into the bundle of policies that is today
known as the Energiewende. While the multiple streams framework is one of the theories of the
policy process (Sabatier, 1999) it mainly focuses on the agenda setting process. According to
Kingdon, agenda setting is driven by three largely independent policy streams (described
below). According to Blum & Schubert (2011), John Kingdon’s work is regarded as the most
renowned and influential in the field and has inspired a significant body of literature (e.g.
Birkland, 1998; Howlett, 1998; Liu, Lindquist, Vedlitz, & Vincent, 2010; Pollack, 1997;
Scheberle, 1994). In his main work, Kingdon (2014: 2) “[aims] to understand why important
people pay attention to one subject rather than another, how their agendas change from one
time to another, and how they narrow their choices from a large set of alternatives to a very
few.”
Origins of the Multiple Streams Framework
Kingdon builds on the work of Lindblom’s model of incremental policy making, i.e. the method
of progressing in many small steps instead of large jumps, thereby recognizing the cognitive
limitations of policy makers (Lindblom, 1959). However, in empirically analysing the agenda
setting process, Kingdon raises issues with Lindblom’s argument that policy making is
incremental, and concludes that it is only true in some foreseeable and regular policy making
processes such as the budgetary process. Instead, Kingdon finds that the agenda setting process
can be quite non-linear and discontinuous. To account for these jumps in attention, Kingdon
develops a revised version of the Cohen-March-Olsen Garbage Can model of organizational
choice in order to explain agenda setting and the creation and selection of policy alternatives
(Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). The Garbage Can model explains the political process as an
organized anarchy with problematic preferences and "a loose collection of ideas [rather than]
a coherent structure”. It "is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings
looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to
which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work” (Cohen et al., 1972).
6
The definition of the term Energiewende can however be only preliminary. Chapter 2 discusses the issue that the
Energiewende is linked to various goals. A solid definition can only be stated after a debate in society has taken place what
the Energiewende is actually bound to achieve.
24 Chapter 1 Introduction
Critique of the Comprehensive Rational Model of Policy-Making
Kingdon also follows Lindblom in his criticism of the comprehensive rational model of policy-
making (Lindblom, 1959). Weimann (2006: 10), for instance, takes a normative approach,
demanding that politicians set clear goals and implement means to achieve them because
“without clarity over goals no rational policy decisions are possible”.
Kingdon criticizes such demands, arguing that this model presupposes intellectual capacities
and sources of information that policy makers do not possess. Rational policymaking would
require policy makers who “first define their goals rather clearly and set the levels of
achievement of those goals that would satisfy them. Then they would canvass many (ideally,
all) alternatives that might achieve these goals. They would compare the alternatives
systematically, assessing their costs and benefits, and then they would choose the alternatives
that would achieve their goals at the least cost” (Kingdon, 2014: 78). Because Kingdon believes
that this model is unrealistic, he uses a framework that is descriptive rather than normative,
describing how things are, not how they ought to be.
The role of political goals in the policy process will be treated in more detail in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2, on the one hand, follows the normative claim that for the sake of effective and
efficient policies, a public debate and a clear specification of the top-level goals are
indispensable. On the other hand, it shows that goals are often not used as ends to be achieved,
but rather instrumentally, i.e. understanding them as means to induce consensus among
different societal groups.
Focus on Agenda Setting
The multiple stream framework can be used to examine how the topics related to the
Energiewende made it to the top of the agenda. The multiple streams framework explicitly does
not specify which actors are involved and how decisions are made but instead tries to explain
how a topic comes to the decision stage. It does not aim to describe the entire policy cycle
7
(Jann & Wegrich, 2009).
1.3 Policy Streams and Application
Explaining the Streams and Policy Window of Opportunity
Kingdon conceives of three process streams flowing through the political system: streams of
problems, policies, and politics. They are generally independent from one another, and each
stream behaves according to its own dynamics and rules. However, at critical moments they
link together, and the changes with the most impact on policy emerge from the simultaneous
convergence of problems, policy proposals, and politics (Kingdon, 2014: 19; Sabatier, 1999).
The three streams are described below, supplemented with a case example, namely the political
events in Germany following the nuclear incident in Fukushima.
7
According to Jann and Wegrich (2009) the stages of the policy cycle are: agenda setting, policy formulation and decision
making, evaluation and termination. These stages also correspond with the central questions of policy analysis as introduced
by Dunn (2012) and mentioned above.
1.3 Policy streams and application 25
The problem stream describes the process of problem recognition in a society. Various topics
are struggling in this stream for policymakers’ attention. Depending on various factors, one
problem may receive more attention than the other. The Energiewende can be understood as
the answer to a set of policy problems, which decision makers deemed sufficiently important
and pressing to be considered for the political agenda. The Energiewende’s history is closely
connected to a specific set of problems, with risks of nuclear power and climate change being
the most notable.
The political stream consists of political events such as public mood, pressure group campaigns,
election results and changes of administration (Kingdon, 2014: 145). The election of the Red-
Green coalition in 1998, and the strong bipartisan opposition to nuclear power after the
Fukushima incident in 2011, are examples of changes in the political stream.
Kingdon considers the policy stream as a policy primeval soup, where policy ideas, much like
small organisms in the beginning of evolution, compete for survival (Dawkins, 2006). It is
where specific policy alternatives are formed, discussed, taken apart and recombined. The
policy stream is a space inhabited by experts including bureaucrats, interest group
representatives, parliamentarian staff, specialist journalists, consultants and above all
academics, who work within a rather intimate policy community. This is an area where ideas
matter more than political pressure and where a fair evaluation of policy proposals is possible
(Kingdon, 2014: 116).
The separate streams can merge at critical times, creating a policy window of opportunity. Such
situations occur, when a problem is recognised, a solution is available, a political impulse is felt
and potential constraints are negligible (Kingdon, 2014: 165). In such constellations, a topic
becomes hot or the political constellation is such that an issue moves up the agenda. The chance
that a decision regarding this topic will be made increases significantly as policymakers
collectively shift their attention towards this issue.
1.3.1 Multiple Streams Application to the Events of Fukushima and the Nuclear Phase-
Out
It may seem at first difficult to rationalize that an earthquake on March 11, 2011 off the coast
of Japan triggered not only a catastrophic wave and a nuclear incident in the Fukushima-Daiichi
nuclear plant, but also caused a tsunami that swept the political landscape in Germany, 9.000
kilometres away. These events opened a political window of opportunity in Germany, which
ultimately led to the nuclear phase-out of 2011. This window of opportunity was the result of a
problem being recognized, a solution lying at hand and a political class that was ready to act.
The events in each stream that enabled the policy change shall be briefly described:
Problem Stream: The German media coverage of the events was unparalleled in any country
outside of Japan. Graph 2 shows the Google search hits of the term Fukushima in Germany in
comparison to France, the UK and the US, all countries that use nuclear power and were
geographically comparably far away from the events.
8
One would think they would have had
8
Google Trends provides a time series index of the volume of queries users enter into Google in a given geographic area.
The query index is based on query share: the total query volume for the search term in question within a particular
geographic region divided by the total number of queries in that region during the time period being examined. The
maximum query share in the time period specified is normalized to be 100 and the query share at the initial date being
examined is normalized to be zero (Choi & Varian, 2012; Google Support, 2016).
26 Chapter 1 Introduction
equally large reasons to be worried. However, the analysis shows that the subject received
unmatched attention in Germany, indicating the extraordinary importance of the nuclear power
issue in the German consciousness. In April of 2011 a poll reported that 86% of Germans would
support a nuclear phase-out by 2020 (Gründinger, 2015). Advocates of nuclear power had
practically disappeared and were no longer heard in the public debate.
Graph 2: Google search hits for the term Fukushima from 2004-2015
Policy stream: This stream provides implementable solutions for a problem. This was an easy
task in this case since an action plan to phase-out nuclear power in Germany already existed.
The 2002 exit plan and the energy concept of 2010 had predefined a policy path for a nuclear
phase-out, which only needed to be adjusted for earlier shut down dates. Furthermore, a phase-
out agreement for the nuclear phase-out of 2000
9
had already been negotiated and merely
needed to be revived. Given the overcapacity of conventional energy, the increasing
interconnectedness to its EU-neighbours and the rise in RES, Germany was ready to
immediately shut down seven nuclear plants without noticeable dangers to the security of
supply. Studies (see Chapter 3) also showed that foreseeable effects to prices and CO2 emissions
seemed manageable depending on the workings of the EU ETS as well as the German
Renewable Energy Act (EEG). Therefore, Germany’s policy stream enabled decision makers
to enact a quick phase-out.
10
Political stream: The intensive debate over nuclear power following the Fukushima-incident
led to an unseen rise in the polls for the Green party, a group that had always strongly opposed
nuclear power. The pending regional elections in March 2011 in the highly important state of
Baden-Wurttemberg, where the Green party had become a serious challenger to the Christian-
Democrats (CDU), put immense pressure on Angela Merkel’s pro-nuclear stance.
11
It is fair to
speculate that adverse polling data influenced the federal CDU-led government to announce a
moratorium on nuclear energy, which meant that eight out of 17 nuclear power plants were
taken off the grid three days after the incident in Japan. Despite this quick reaction, the Green
party managed to win the state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg, posting their first Minister
9
This nuclear phase-out plan was taken back and changed into a lifetime extension in 2010.
10
Substantial legal questions regarding potential compensation payments to nuclear providers were, however, unsolved.
11
According to the polling institute Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, in March of 2011 only 10 % of the total electorate of Baden-
Wurttemberg and a mere 20% of CDU followers supported the CDU’s 2010 decision to extend the lifetimes of nuclear
plants. The Greens were identified as the party with competence for nuclear policy (53%), in contrast to the CDU (18%)
(Gründinger, 2015).
1.3 Policy streams and application 27
President in history. However, national polls continued to show the Green party at historic
heights.
12
With the obvious significance of energy policy influencing these results, there was
immense pressure for the federal conservative-liberal coalition to act in order to regain the
public’s trust regarding energy issues. The immense public opposition to nuclear power and the
bad election result in the state election in Baden-Wurttemberg for the governing coalition had
created opportunity in the political stream. With the announcement of the moratorium on
nuclear energy, a political window of opportunity had opened. The fear of nuclear power
dominated the problem stream, solutions from the previous nuclear phase-out plan were
available in the policy stream and the political stream provided the necessary political pressure
to act.
After the expiration of the three months moratorium on nuclear energy in June 2011, the
government passed a rapidly constructed policy package on a new nuclear phase-out, renewable
energies, grid expansion, and energy efficiency (Bundesregierung, 2011). This legislative
package of 2011 was passed in parliament with a cross-party consensus and is understood by
many to mark the launching point of Germany’s Energiewende (e.g. BWE, 2015).
1.4 Description of Streams and Linking to Chapters
The following section links selected historic events in Germany’s energy policy to the streams,
and associates the chapters of this dissertation to the problem stream and the policy stream and
thereby gives a short summary of the research questions of each chapter.
1.4.1 Problem Stream
The Energiewende can be understood as the answer to a set of policy problems which decision
makers deemed sufficiently important and pressing to be considered for the political agenda.
The Energiewende’s history is closely connected to a set of problems, which attained significant
attention in the problem stream. The following paragraphs illustrate typical examples of historic
issues that were perceived as problems relating to energy policy:
• The German nuclear programme of the 1960s and 1970s and its perceived danger for
the population.
• Environmental damages such as the increase of acid rain due to emissions from coal-
fired power plants and transport emissions, leading to forest dieback.
• The perceived dominance and power of Germany’s (formerly state-owned) energy
utilities, which were perceived as impervious to citizen demands.
• Advancing climate change and the lack of abatement measures.
These problems are not fully independent from one another. However, historically they
appeared at different times. While acid rain was a problem of the 1980s that has widely
disappeared from people’s minds today (Der Spiegel, 1981; Spelsberg, 1990), climate change
only emerged as a major problem in the early 1990s. The United Nations Conference on
12
In April 2011, the Forsa (Forsa, 2015) institute reported the Green Party polling at an all -time high of 28 %, the SPD at 23
%, the CDU at 30 %, and the FDP at a dismal 3 %, giving a potential Green-SPD coalition a 20 % lead over the incumbent
CDU-FDP government.
28 Chapter 1 Introduction
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, also known as the Rio Earth Summit, and
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) assessment reports AR1 in 1990 and
AR2 in 1995, are events that brought the issue into Germany’s public debate.
Nuclear power, on the other hand, became a perennial issue starting in the early 1970s when
massive protests rose against nuclear power (Roth, 2010). With the nuclear meltdown in
Chernobyl in 1986 and the Fukushima incident in 2011, the risk of nuclear power has been a
permanent issue in Germany’s energy policy debate.
The perceived problem of dominant energy providers is closely connected to nuclear energy,
since the four large conventional power producers, formerly state oligopolies,
13
also operate
Germany’s nuclear plants. The concentration of power was deemed a problem from both market
and political perspectives. From a market perspective, oligopoly power was seen to inhibit ideal
competitive market outcomes (Brunekreeft & Keller, 2000) and the companies’ political power
was seen to inhibit Germany’s transformation towards alternative forms of energy production
(Jungk, 1977). The Energiewende, therefore, seems to be historically connected to several
different problems. Chapter 2 of this dissertation analyses the problems (or goals) that motivate
the Energiewende today.
Chapter 2 – Which Goals are Driving the Energiewende? Making Sense of the German Energy
Transformation
Chapter 2 researches the seemingly straightforward question regarding the political goals of
Germany’s Energiewende. Rather surprisingly, the particular goals that drive and justify this
project of the century (Merkel, 2013) have been left largely undefined by the government,
leaving observers from both Germany and abroad to puzzle over what the Energiewende is
actually bound to achieve. This fact concerns economists who state that without clarity over
goals, no rational policy decisions are possible (Weimann, 2006: 10). Government should set
out a clear, overarching vision and top-level goals – something that, according to (Hepburn,
2010), can be reasonably expected from it, and not doing so can be termed a government failure
in the terms of economists. The lack of clearly defined goals seems to motivate others (often
scientists) to fill this vacuum and formulate goals themselves. However, it should not be the
objective of science to formulate goals, as the deliberative process of balancing diverging goals
and finding compromise between them is the inherent field of politics and not science
(Edenhofer, 2011). However, in the past years numerous studies gave recommendations on
policy design for the Energiewende, largely disregarding this principle (Diekmann, Kemfert,
Neuhoff, Schill, & Traber, 2012; Feld et al., 2014; Haucap, 2013; Lehmann & Gawel, 2013;
Monopolkommission, 2013; Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen (SRU), 2013;
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR), 2013;
Weber & Hey, 2012). These studies either omitted a discussion of goals and went straight to
policy recommendations, or they put forth certain goals without properly discussing their
origin. It appears that many studies made policy recommendations based on the normative
values of their authors or of the institutions that commissioned the study. These studies, mostly
13
The big four German utilities are: E.ON, RWE (Rhine-Westfalia Power Plant), EnBW (Energie Baden-Württemberg AG)
and Vattenfall.
1.4 Description of streams and linking to chapters 29
written by renowned experts, often produced diametrically opposing policy recommendations
and played a prominent role in the public debate causing confusion among leading political
actors. The lively political discussion over means (i.e. policy instruments) such as carbon
pricing vs. renewable support schemes often seems to be a proxy debate over differing ends
(i.e. policy goals). Against this background this study attempts to move the debate from a
discussion over policy instruments to a discussion of the goals of the Energiewende.
In particular the chapter aims to answer the following questions:
• What are the goals that are commonly used to justify the Energiewende in the public
discourse?
• How do German elite policy actors rank these goals? Do they leave goals out or add
others?
• Are there goals that are often ranked higher than other goals?
• Is there a justification for intentionally leaving political goals vague?
1.4.2 Political Stream
Political events in Germany strongly influenced the decisions on energy policy in Germany.
The political stream may be the key to understanding why the Energiewende is taking place in
Germany and not in other large industrialized countries with similar problems. The issues
described in the problem stream can be found in other major industrialized nations; however,
the political stream is where the differences may be found that may explain why the
environmental pillar of energy policy issues is so prominent in Germany compared to other
countries. While analysing this stream in detail is not part of this dissertation, this issue would,
however, be subject to further interesting research. Selected events that significantly impacted
Germany’s energy policy in the political stream shall be briefly described.
Anti-Nuclear Sentiment:
As described above, anti-nuclear sentiment originated in the US (Radkau, 2011), and entered
the political discussion in Germany in the 1970s. The movement celebrated its first success in
1975, when activists prevented a nuclear power plant already under construction in Whyl in the
state of Baden-Wurttemberg from being finished (Jungk, 1977). Also, the 1976 protests and the
attempts to stop the construction of the nuclear power plant in Brokdorf (in northern Germany)
can be understood as a success that increased support for the movement. The (partial) nuclear
meltdowns in Three Mile Island, USA (1979), Chernobyl, Ukraine (1986), and Fukushima,
Japan (2011) further increased the importance of the movement in Germany.
The movement was also fuelled by the protests against the nuclear rearmament (based on the
NATO-Twin Track decision of 1979). Although the topics of nuclear power for electricity
production and strategic nuclear weapons are somewhat distinct, the two movements reinforced
each other (Radkau, 2011). Many of the groups that had been organizing the anti-nuclear and
the anti-rearmament protests merged in 1980 and formed the Green party. Despite its
heterogeneous make-up, the party had a clear stand on nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In
this anti-nuclear melting pot, the two subjects intermingled, as some protagonists such as Petra
Kelly and Gert Bastian fought prominently for both goals (Der Spiegel, 1992). It is fair to
assume that the combination of these subjects was not accidental. It rather seems that the topics
were intentionally linked in the political debate so that the fear associated with nuclear weapons
30 Chapter 1 Introduction
would also be associated with the peaceful use of nuclear power for electricity production
(Radkau, 2011). This anti-nuclear movement represented by the Green party first made its way
into the federal parliament in 1983. It continuously campaigned for an exit from nuclear power
and gave the anti-nuclear movement a loud voice in the German parliament. The public mood
against nuclear power was so strong that in 1998 the Greens and the Social Democrats (SPD),
who withdrew their support for nuclear power in the late 1980s, campaigned with a promise to
phase-out nuclear power and won the federal election. Today about 80% of the population in
Germany, and all parties represented in the current parliament (2013–2017), advocate for the
nuclear phase-out (Emnid, 2015).
Growing Strength of the RES-Lobby
An often-underestimated political force supporting the Energiewende has been the ever-
growing influence of the RES lobby. The RES industry had for a long time been well connected
with environmental NGOs and had its allies (mainly) in the Federal Ministry for the
Environment. Strongly increasing revenues in the RES industry, and, therefore, more funds for
governmental relations, led to a professionalization of the lobby (Gründinger, 2015).
Furthermore, several companies, often in structurally weak regions, had grown large enough to
make meaningful economic arguments as providers of jobs. Therefore, the pro-renewables
coalition could count powerful organizations such as the IG Metal (metal workers union) and
the VDMA (engineering association) as their allies. The renewables lobby also benefited from
historic animosity against the large utilities, and a public mood that favoured the idea of
autonomous, self-reliant, energy production. This fight between the powerful German utilities
and the dispersed supporters of decentralized renewables with their solar cells and their small
windmills had the ingredients of an epic struggle. The narrative of arrogant large utilities on
the one side and of renewable pioneers on the other side steadily increased the public and
political support for these perceived underdogs. This power shift in favour of renewable
interests changed the political landscape as politicians favouring renewable energy now also
had a powerful industry lobby behind them, meaning that not only environmental but also
industrially oriented policymakers could support renewable energy (Gründinger, 2015).
1.4.3 Policy Stream
The policy stream is where experts such as public servants, consultants and academics form
and adapt policy proposals. This stream is relevant for agenda setting insofar as an issue may
fall off the political agenda if no plausible policy solution is available.
The constant academic and political debate over policy instruments has yielded a broad fundus
of policy ideas that are more or less fitting solutions for the problems in question. The
applicability of the various proposals are furthermore a function of external factors such as
technological change, fossil fuels prices and a changing regulatory framework. For instance,
the cost reductions of technologies such as RES or fracking, the ban on technologies such as
subcritical coal plants and nuclear plants, as well as political changes such as the continuing
integration of European energy markets strongly influence the course of the policy stream. In
this context the evolution of some influential Energiewende-policies shall be briefly illustrated.
The Renewable Energy Act (EEG)
1.4 Description of streams and linking to chapters 31
The ideas and proposals underlying Germany’s Electricity Feed-in Act
(Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) of 1991, the predecessor of the EEG, were created in an
evolutionary and incremental process. In the 1980s, the so-called association agreements
(Verbändevereinbarungen) set tariffs for hydropower plants. Due to several conflicts between
the power companies and the owners of RES-plants, payments were legally formalized in the
Stromeinspeisungsgesetz in 1991 (Lauber & Mez, 2004). Payments to RES plants depended on
the average proceeds of the regional energy operators (regulated monopolies), who were
responsible for the payments to RES within their region. The EEG (2000) changed this system
and guaranteed renewable installations fixed tariffs for 20 years as well as unlimited priority
feed–in and access to the grid. The costs of these tariffs, far above market prices, were now
allocated to the transmission system operators and distributed nationally in the form of a
surcharge on electricity rates (Leuschner, 2010). The fixed, cost-covering tariffs with a feed-in
guarantee were designed to give security to a wide range of RES investors, who could now
experiment with the technologies and lead them to market maturity (Bensmann, 2010). The
significance and complexity of the policy stream surrounding the EEG has grown along with
the law: while the EEG of 2000 was a relatively straightforward law developed by
parliamentarians, consisting of 12 articles on 6 pages, the EEG of 2016 has grown into a highly
complex piece of legislation running to 79 articles on over 400 pages and occupying several
ministry units and an armada of lobbyists. In 2016, € 24.8 billion annually were transferred
through the EEG surcharge (TSOs, 2015).
The EU Emission Trading Scheme
Another example of a policy that has developed from an idea in the policy soup is emissions
trading. The thoughts underlying the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) can be
traced back to John H. Dales (1968) who based his cap and trade ideas on the Coase Theorem
famously developed by Ronald Coase in The Problem of Social Cost (Coase, 1960). The idea
was first implemented in the US Lead Phasedown Program of 1974 (Newell & Rogers, 2003).
The use of this instrument for the reduction of GHG emissions gathered traction in the course
of the negotiations regarding the Kyoto protocol (1997). The EU ETS was therefore based on
a substantial body of academic literature as well as first trials with emissions trading schemes
in the US. The development of the EU ETS, with its complex exemptions and free allocation
mechanisms, was aided by a range of consultants and academic institutes.
32 Chapter 1 Introduction
Germany as Policy Front-Runner
Due to the novelty of the endeavour to transform an energy system to RES, the expert
community often finds itself in the position of having to innovate new policy solutions and
answer partially unforeseen questions. Consequently, the Energiewende’s policy stream is a
rich fishing ground for other countries looking for proposals, which can be adapted for their
own needs. Research in policy diffusion shows that this is in fact happening (Steinbacher, 2015)
and that many countries around the world have adopted guaranteed feed-in tariffs that are very
similar to the ideas of the EEG (Jacobs, 2012). The Energiewende can therefore be considered
as a front-runner for driving not only technological, but also regulatory innovation in the
globally transforming energy sector. Germany has made it a part of its foreign policy initiatives
to help facilitate the uptake of sustainable energy policies abroad (Steinbacher & Pahle, 2015).
Chapters 3 through 5 of this dissertation add to the analyses of three policies within the
Energiewende’s policy stream: the nuclear phase-out, the reform of the Renewable Energy Act
(EEG) and the issue of transaction costs for climate policy instruments with a focus on the EU
ETS. The role of policy relevant research in the context of agenda setting has been described in
general terms above. The (possible) contribution of each Chapters 3 - 5 to the German agenda
setting process in the policy stream of the years 2011-2016 will not be undertaken since this
would be outside the scope of this introduction. Here, merely the central ideas and the research
questions of Chapter 3 to 5 shall be briefly described.
Chapter 3 – Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on Electricity Prices and
CO2 Emissions
The chapter is based on a study that was commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Knopf
et al., 2011). It contributed to the debate on a possible German nuclear phase-out after the
reactor accident in Fukushima in 2011. The study was aimed at policy makers who faced
decisions under high uncertainty.
The chapter aims to answer the following questions:
• What options are available for replacing nuclear energy and how are they to be
evaluated economically and environmentally?
• How would CO2 emissions and the electricity prices (on the wholesale market and for
end consumers) develop for different nuclear phase-out scenarios and with different
replacement options?
• How is security of supply affected?
• How do the results change when individual model assumptions are varied?
• How do the results compare to other studies with similar research questions?
Chapter 4 – RES Support Schemes and Associated Risks: an Economic Analysis of the Debate
of the EEG Reform in Germany
In summer 2014 the German government implemented a reform to the EEG. The two major
changes consisted of (i) making direct marketing of RES power compulsory and (ii) the
implementation of an auction scheme. After a decade of largely shielding RES investors from
1.4 Description of streams and linking to chapters 33
economic risks, one motivation of this reform was to carefully rebalance the risk distribution
between RES investors, investors of conventional power plants and electricity consumers (i.e.
society at large). The hope behind this reform was that it would lead to more efficient
investments (i.e. lower support costs), better capacity control, better system integration and
finally to achieve the Energiewende objectives with lower overall societal cost.
This chapter was written prior to the decision in the parliament, and aimed to analyze the
various reform options concerning their risk distribution using economic analysis. Despite the
fact that the risk distribution is the major distinguishing feature between the different proposals,
it was treated superficially in most other studies that covered this issue.
The chapter aims to answer the following questions:
• What is the purpose of risk in the electricity sector and how does it relate to
uncertainty?
• What particular risks are involved in the promotion of RES?
• How do different support schemes influence risk, and how does this influence the risk
distribution between RES-investors and the society?
• Can increased risk for RES-investors increase the system friendliness of RES
installments and thus their overall efficiency?
• How does the question of risk distribution relate to the achievement of political goals
such as actor diversity?
Chapter 5 –The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument Choice: an
Analysis of the EU and the US
This chapter is concerned with transaction costs of various GHG abatement policies focusing
on the EU and the US. Many experts in the scientific community see carbon pricing as the
policy tool, which should drive the transition into a low-carbon economy not only in Germany
but also around Europe and, eventually, on a global level (Edenhofer, 2015; EEEP Symposium,
2015). Although a seemingly minor aspect, transaction costs may become an important issue in
the future when more countries start setting up climate policy instruments and focussing on
implementing them at the lowest possible costs. This chapter adds to this research by comparing
the transaction costs of various climate policy instruments, such as emission trading versus an
emission tax.
The chapter aims to answer the following questions:
• Do transaction costs play an important role for climate policy instrument design?
• How do different climate policy instruments compare with respect to their transaction
costs and how does this influence cost-effectiveness?
• How can transaction costs considerations be incorporated in climate policy instrument
design?
• How do different cost components (e.g. monitoring costs) scale with certain variables
such as the number of regulated entities or the level of abatement?
34 Chapter 1 Introduction
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38 Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2
Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense
of the German Energy Transformation∗
Fabian Joas
Michael Pahle
Christian Flachsland
Amani Joas
∗published in Energy Policy as Joas, F., Pahle, M., Flachsland, C., Joas, A. (2016): Which goals are
driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the German Energy Transformation. Vol. 95, pp. 42-51.
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.04.003
39
Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
Fabian Joas
a,b,
n
, Michael Pahle
a
, Christian Flachsland
b,c
, Amani Joas
d
a
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Telegraphenberg A 31, 14473 Potsdam, Germany
b
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Torgauer Straße, 12-15, 10829 Berlin, Germany
c
Hertie School of Governance, Friedrichstraße 180, 10117 Berlin, Germany
d
Next Kraftwerke GmbH, Lichtstraße 43 g, 50825 Köln, Germany
HIGHLIGHTS
We examine the goals of German energy policy called the “Energiewende”.
We show that policy experts relate up to 14 goals with the Energiewende.
So far the political goals of the Energiewende, and especially their ranking is unclear.
We call for a public debate and a clear specification of the top-level goals of the Energiewende.
article info
Article history:
Received 28 September 2015
Received in revised form
2 April 2016
Accepted 4 April 2016
Keywords:
Energiewende
German energy transition
Goals and objectives of energy policy
Co-benefits
abstract
In 2010, Germany agreed a plan to increase the share of renewables in power consumption to 80% by
2050, and in 2011 the decision was taken to phase-out nuclear power by 2022. This policy is now widely
known as the “Energiewende”. While many global observers consider this program to be primarily driven
by the need to tackle climate change, the precise political goals of the Energiewende are, by and large,
unclear. In our study we compiled a list of 14 goals put forward in political debates and conducted a
“mapping”survey among more than 50 policy experts. We asked them to prioritize the goals based on
their personal views and provide arguments for their rankings in ensuing interviews. Our main findings
are as follows: (i) a large majority named climate protection among the top-level goals of the En-
ergiewende; at the same time, around 80% of all participants also identified additional goals; (ii) when
asked if the Energiewende would make sense even if climate change did not exist, two thirds of the
participants agreed, which, when taken with the first finding, demonstrates that the goals and motiva-
tions driving the Energiewende are more complex than often assumed. We conclude that for the sake of
effective and efficient policies and ever rising climate policy ambition, a public debate and clear speci-
fication of the top-level goals are indispensable.
&2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In 2010 the German Federal Cabinet approved a policy package
that included a long-term objective to achieve an 80% share of
annual renewable power consumption by 2050,
1
and in 2011 the
phase-out of nuclear power by 2022 was decreed. This has become
known as the “Energiewende”
2
and sparked many comments
around the globe ranging from acclaim to scepticism. At first
glance the intention behind it seemed apparent. The New York
Times for example commented that “[o]f all the developed nations,
few have pushed harder than Germany to find a solution to global
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Energy Policy
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.04.003
0301-4215/&2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
n
Corresponding author.
michael.pahle@pik-potsdam.de (M. Pahle),
fl[email protected] (C. Flachsland), [email protected] (A. Joas).
1
This legislative package furthermore included greenhouse gas reductions of
80–95%, decrease of primary energy consumption by 50%, both by 2050, and in-
creased R&D in new technologies.
2
The term “Energiewende”entered the German public debate around 2009. In
the course of the 2011 post Fukushima debate on Germany's future energy policy,
politicians and the media eagerly adopted the term to describe the renewed exit
from nuclear power. However in expert circles the term has been known since the
1980s when the Öko-Institut, a think tank, published a study titled “Energiewende -
Growth and Prosperity without Oil and Uranium”(Öko-Institut, 1980). The policies
that are today considered as the “Energiewende”can also be traced back to at least
the 1990s.
Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–51
40
Chapter 2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
warming”(Gillis, 2014). In fact the particular goals that drive and
justify this “project of the century”(Merkel, 2013) have been left
largely unclear by the German federal Government –leaving in-
terested observers from both Germany and other countries puz-
zled over what the Energiewende is actually meant to achieve.
Current discussions in German research and politics sur-
rounding the Energiewende reveal divergent viewpoints about
relevant goals and their prioritization. One extreme view held by
some economists is that climate change mitigation is the only
legitimate goal of the Energiewende (Sinn, 2013;Weimann, 2013).
In the same vein the expert commission that monitors the En-
ergiewende states that the reduction of GHG emissions and the
nuclear phase-out are the two major goals (Löschel et al., 2014). In
contrast, other researchers argue that additional goals such as
reduced import independence from fossil fuels, technology de-
velopment, job creation, industrial policy and the reduction of air
pollution are equally important (Lehmann and Gawel, 2013). Not
surprisingly, divergent views also prevail among politicians. The
Federal Minister of Economy and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel, has de-
clared the following five goals for the Energiewende: (i) nuclear
phase-out, (ii) the reduction of dependence on imported oil and
gas, (iii) the development of new technologies, growth and new
jobs, (iv) climate change mitigation, and (v) motivation of others to
imitate the Energiewende (Gabriel, 2014). Hans-Josef Fell, co-au-
thor of the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and former
member of the Bundestag for the Green Party, adds the following
goals to the list: environmental protection, health, homeland se-
curity, landscape protection and the protection of human rights
(Fell, 2014).
In addition, legal documents are ambiguous in their description
of the goals of the Energiewende. The Renewable Energy Act (EEG,
2014),
3
which is the central policy driving renewable deployment
in the power sector, states that the following goals should be
achieved through this law: (i) climate and environmental protec-
tion, (ii) sustainable development of energy supply, (iii) reduction
of the economic cost of energy and internalization of long-term
external effects, (iv) conservation of fossil energy resources, and
(v) development of technologies for the production of electricity
from renewable energy sources (RES). The latest government re-
port on the progress of the Energiewende (Bundesregierung, 2015)
states the following goals and framework conditions: security of
supply, nuclear phase-out, competitiveness, power grid expansion,
research and innovation, investment and jobs.
At first glance, there is overlap in stated goals and many of
those mentioned seem complementary. However, there are sig-
nificant trade-offs. For example, considering climate protection as
the only goal nuclear power is a viable option for some. Most
others however consider nuclear phase-out as a major En-
ergiewende-goal. Therefore, adding, scratching and re-weighting
specific goals within an overall system of goals can fundamentally
affect policy choice, justifying a discussion aimed at clarification in
this regard.
Is this apparent lack of clarity over the goals driving the En-
ergiewende problematic? The answer is positive in a rational
policy design perspective, where policy instruments, programs,
and strategies are needed to achieve a clear and specific set of
policy goals (Dunn, 2007;Howlett, 2011;Weimer and Vining,
2011). Policy design, guided by unclear or even contradicting goals,
can lead to ineffective and opposing policy outcomes. Some even
consider a lack of a clear set of explicit policy goals as a “govern-
ment failure”(Hepburn, 2010).
Robert and Zeckhauser (2011) suggest that in situations where
policy goals are unclear and/or contested, clarification of such
goals held by key actors can catalyse policy debates to help iden-
tify novel compromises. Building on Edenhofer and Kowarsch
(2015), it can be further argued that explicit discussions of goal
systems and related means can induce individual and collective
changes with a potential convergence of the systems. This would
facilitate policy design in the sense of the rational tradition.
4
In
addition, Robert and Zeckhauser (2011) point out that empirically
reconstructing the debates over goals driving policy programs can
guide research towards clarifying the key factual relationships that
are assumed in the underlying lines of arguments. This would be
particularly relevant where empirical claims underpinning policy
goals are strongly contested.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to inform the
debate by providing an empirical map of the goals and related
lines of argument put forward by 54 elite policy actors engaged in
the German Energiewende. To the best of our knowledge, Keeney
et al. (1987) is the only comparable study for Germany and is
clearly outdated given the many fundamental developments that
have occurred since then.
In particular, this paper aims to address the following ques-
tions: what are the goals and related arguments that are used to
justify the Energiewende; are there policy goals that are more
widely shared by policy actors (offering perhaps a particularly
solid basis for the design of Energiewende policies); and which
goals are particularly contested in terms of their underpinning
factual claims, indicating where future research might contribute
to resolving related key controversies?
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines key con-
cepts required to capture the Energiewende goal debate and ex-
plains the approach and method of the study; Section 3 presents
the results of the survey and interviews, and offers a reconstruc-
tion and discussion of the arguments for each goal; Section 4
concludes.
2. Concepts and methodology
2.1. Concepts: goals and systems of goals
A“goal”is a widely used concept across different disciplines
and is also used in colloquial language. In psychology, a goal is
defined as a desirable future state to be attained by a person
(Schmidt-Sudhoff, 1967). The main difference between personal
goals and political goals is that the former are geared towards
maximizing personal well-being while the latter are guided by a
normative notion of a “good society”. In this sense Fischer, (2006,
78) describes political goals as “vehicles for moving concrete ac-
tion in the direction of broadly understood social and political
values. They seek to realize the conditions, institutions, and
practices that make possible the realization of these values”.
The terms,”goals”,“aims”,“objectives”and “targets”are often
used interchangeably in both colloquial language and the scientific
literature (see e.g. Dunn, 2007;Edvardsson and Hansson, 2005;
IPCC WG3, 2014;Rosencrantz, 2008). For the purpose of this study
we follow the definition provided by Dunn (2007, 134):“Goals are
not quantifiable; but objectives may be and often are. Statements
of goals usually do not specify the time period in which policies
are expected to achieve desired consequences, while statements of
objectives do”. With this definition of “goal”it is clear that we are
not interested in the (quantitative) objectives of the
3
The EEG first entered into force in 2000. The 2014 version is after 2004, 2009,
and 2012 already the fourth revision.
4
The Energiewende itself may be considered an example for such long-term
change in goals across different societal groups: at its core it ended decades of
societal conflict and debate over the goal of phasing out nuclear power (Leipprand
et al., 2015).
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–51 43
2.2 Concepts and methodology 41
Energiewende, e.g. achieving 80% renewables share in annual
power production by 2050, but more fundamentally in its value for
society. In other words, to attain a high share of renewables in the
energy system will not usually be of value to society as such, but is
rather a means of achieving a certain goal such as climate pro-
tection, technology development, market leadership etc.
If several goals exist in parallel, the interrelationships between
them are also important. Goal relations can take one of the fol-
lowing three forms: preference, interdependency, and instru-
mental (ZFOG, 2007); for a more formal treatment see Rosencrantz
(2008):
The preference relationship indicates whether the achievement
of one goal is valued as being superior to the achievement of
another goal, i.e. if it has higher priority. In our study, this was
investigated by asking participants to rank goals related to the
Energiewende.
The interdependency relationship can be characterized by com-
plementarity, neutrality or competition. Complementarity
means that the achievement of one goal also leads to the
achievement of another goal. Neutrality means that the
achievements of two goals do not influence each other. Com-
petition means that the achievement of one goal makes the
attainment of another goal more difficult and is often also re-
ferred to as a trade-off.
The instrumental relationship describes the link between fun-
damental goals and instrumental goals, i.e. the achievement of
the latter supports the achievement of the former. The dis-
tinction between fundamental and instrumental goals depends
on the empirical decision context and value systems (Eisenführ,
2003). A goal is only “fundamental”in a certain decision context
(e.g. the Energiewende), and goals can be fundamental and
instrumental at the same time. In the words of Dewey (1986,
179):“[…] there is a continuum of ends and means: Means of
one inquiry can become the ends-in-view [goals] of another
inquiry […].”Hence goals in this study are always considered in
the context of the decision, i.e. the Energiewende, for which
they can, in principle, have both meanings.
2.2. Approach and method
The empirical study comprised two steps. In the first step we
collected and conceptualized the goals that are commonly used to
justify the Energiewende, through content analysis of oral and
written statements in the public discourse. Studies, newspaper
articles and other documents on the Energiewende, appearing
mainly between 2009 and 2014, were used, but most goals were
derived from a content analysis of 175 speeches in the federal
parliament (Bundestag) between 1999 and 2012. The Bundestag
debates cover the legislation of the Renewable Energies Law (EEG)
and the Energy Industry Act (EnWG), being the two major laws
associated with the Energiewende (Joas, 2013). Altogether we
identified 14 goals
5
that were frequently mentioned and although
survey participants (in the second step) were given the opportu-
nity to add goals, they rarely did so.
6
Therefore we assume that the
most important goals were indeed identified in this first step.
In the second step, a survey complemented by an interview
(60 min on average) on these goals was conducted among 54
German elite policy actors. Elite policy actors are those promi-
nently involved in the German energy and climate policy debates
and/or policy making at high-level in key organizations and in-
stitutions. The sample included representatives from politics,
public administration, lobby organizations and enterprises, sci-
ence, and media (see Table 1). Theory, in particular the “Advocacy
Coalition Framework”(Sabatier, 1998;Sabatier and Weible, 2007),
suggests that these are the main organizations capable of influ-
encing the policy process. Individuals were asked for their personal
Energiewende-related goal rankings, their understanding of the
goals, and the arguments for their ranking.
The interviewees were selected in order to achieve balance
across the entire political spectrum represented in the German
parliament. The study, however, does not claim to be re-
presentative in this respect, nor does it claim to be representative
of the opinions of the German population. The primary reasons for
focusing the empirical analysis on elite policy actors are: (i) this
approach delivers an overview of positions within the expert
policy debate which is of particular relevance for eventual policy
formation; (ii) these individuals can be expected to be articulate
and reflective in their views over goal rankings and the arguments
underpinning them; (iii) in a democratic system, it can be ex-
pected that the positions of policy actors reflect, at least to some
extent, the views held by the broader population –although this
need not always be the case. A final reason are that resources are
limited; combining a survey of goal ranking with an interview is
costly in terms of time, and requires careful selection and re-
striction of the survey panel.
The survey and accompanying interviews were conducted over
a period of eleven months beginning in late 2013. Ninety percent
were conducted in person and 10% via telephone. They were
structured as follows. After a brief introduction, the respondents
were asked to rank the 14 potential goals of the Energiewende
based on their relative importance from top (most important) to
bottom (least important). The respondents were explicitly asked to
consider their own goals for the Energiewende, stating how the
goals relate to each other in their personal view. It was made ex-
plicit that the interviewers were looking for their personal goals
rather than the goal rankings of the organizations and institutions
for which the interviewees were working. This was done on pur-
pose because pre-tests indicated that the aggregate goal rankings
of organizations are often unclear (due to internally diverging
views) and it would not have been possible for individuals to
consistently answer in the name of their organization.
A methodological difficulty that may have caused bias must be
flagged in this context; it is possible that, in their answers, inter-
viewees prioritized certain goals (e.g. climate protection) for
strategic reasons, i.e. that they did not answer “truthfully”. This
could be the case if they actually pursue certain goals with the
Energiewende but believe that these goals can be best achieved in
the slipstream of other goals. In fact, the survey could be inter-
preted as indicating some evidence for such strategic behavior.
However, the main interest of this study is to identify which goals
are put forward and supported in the public policy debate, and the
5
In a first step all identified goals were collected as mentioned in the Bun-
destag-speeches or in media publications. In a second step the goals were clustered
and consolidated along their thematic overlap. In the next step goals were for-
mulated in a way that (i) they captured the concept of the goal as clearly as possible
and (ii) that they were mutually exclusive with minimal conceptual overlap. In
most cases we used the formulations from Bundestag-speeches that were deemed
precise and self-explanatory. Goals that were mentioned only very rarely or
seemed too far-fetched were excluded.
6
The following goals were added by interviewees to the list of goals: Afford-
able electricity prices, long-term affordable electricity prices, safeguard Germany as
an industrial producer, safeguard of competitiveness, safeguard competiveness for
(footnote continued)
German industry (all of these were interpreted as complying with the goal “Low
short- to medium-term electricity prices for end-consumers”see Fig. 1); increase of
energy efficiency, Investment in RES, creating a regulatory and institutional fra-
mework, EU integration, better coordination with European neighbours, market
opening and democratization, integration of electricity and heating sector, better
coordination of RES expansion and grid planning, and strengthening of munici-
palities and districts.
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–5144
42
Chapter 2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
arguments backing these as advocated in public. It is not con-
cerned with goals that policy actors actually want to achieve “in
secret”.
In order to assess the participants’rankings, goals were written
on cards and their meaning as conceived by the interviewers was
explained according to the goal descriptions and conceptualiza-
tions in Section 4 below. Interviewees could ask questions on the
meaning of the goals while defining their goal hierarchy. It was
also possible to rank goals of equal importance at the same level,
to exclude “non-goals”, and add extra goals. The goal ranking ex-
ercise usually took about 15 minutes. After the ranking, inter-
viewees were asked to explain the arguments underpinning their
personal goal-hierarchy, thereby further specifying the meaning of
the goals and their relationships.
7
A particular focus was put on
understanding the rationale underpinning the highest ranked
goal, i.e. the fundamental goals justifying the Energiewende.
Subsequently, a number of open-ended questions were asked
which were tailored to the position and affiliation of the
interviewee.
3. Results
3.1. List of goals
From the previous content analysis we identified the following
14 goals that had been repeatedly mentioned in the context of the
Energiewende debate. The list provides an overview of these goals
together with a brief general characterization. The descriptions
were used to explain the goals to the interviewees.
In order to provide structure, the goals are grouped
thematically.
3.1.1. Prevention of global climate change
Prevention of climate change by reducing national GHG emissions:
reference to Germany's contribution to global GHG emission
reductions, as for example implied by the IPCC AR4, i.e. reducing
GHG emissions by 80-95% by 2050 in industrialized countries in
order to achieve the global 2 °C target.
Front-runner in global climate protection:the early achievement
of GHG emission reductions by high shares of RES so as to
provide an example to other nations.
Cost reduction of RES through learning effects:the realization of
learning effects, and therefore global technology cost reduc-
tions, through the support of RES development in Germany. This
Table 1
Elite policy actor groups and institutional affiliations of survey and interview participants, and criteria for selection.
Actors Institutions Criteria Interviews Partners:
a
Politicians Federal Lower House of
German Parliament
(Bundestag)
Specialised politicians in the area of energy and cli-
mate policy. Members of the parliamentary commit-
tees „Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
Safety“and / or „Economics and Technology“
11 Interviews:
Christian Democratic Union (CDU): 3
Christian Social Union (CSU): 1
the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): 0
b
Die Linke: 1
The Greens: 4
Free Democratic Party (FDP): 2
State Parliament
(Landtag)
Specialized politicians in the area of energy and cli-
mate policy
1 Interview:
The Greens: 1
Civil servants /
administration
Federal ministries Members of the two lead ministries of the En-
ergiewende (Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology, and Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety)
2 Interviews: Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology (BMWi),
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Con-
servation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)
State ministries Responsible for energy and climate issues and the re-
presentation of the state's interests at the federal level
5 Interviews:
Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy,
State chancellery North Rhine-Westphalia, Federal
Chancellery of the Free State of Saxony, Ministry of
Energy and the Environment Schleswig-Holstein,
State chancellery Brandenburg
Lobbyists and association
representatives
Government relations
offices
Responsible for energy and climate issues 19 Interviews:
Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI), Wacker
Chemie AG; Association of the Energy and Power In-
dustry (VIK); Confederation of German Industry (BDI);
Association of the German Energy and Water In-
dustries (BDEW); EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg
AG; E.ON SE; EWE AG; 8KU; Association of Municipal
Companies (VKU); Thüga group; 50Hertz Transmis-
sion GmbH
Union for the Mining, Chemical and Energy industries
(IG BCE), Ernst & Young GmbH, G5-Partners Dynamic
Decision Advisory, European Climate Foundation
(ECF), Federal Renewable Energy Association (BEE),
World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), Clean Energy
Sourcing GmbH
Scientific policy advisors Universities, research in-
stitutes, think tanks
Publications of studies in the context of the
Energiewende
10 interviews
c
Journalists Print media with national
distribution
Responsible for energy and climate policy coverage 6 interviews
c
a
If not otherwise indicated, only one person per organization was interviewed.
b
Four members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) were asked for an interview but declined due to a lack of time.
c
Anonymity was guaranteed to the interviewees. Since a disclosure of their organisation would easily create a link to the interviewed individuals the names of the
organisations are not named.
7
Due to time constraints not every interviewee was asked to state their view
on each goal. The interviewers focused the questions on the goals that seemed to
generate the most relevant replies. This is the reason why the numbers in Section 4
do not total 54.
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–51 45
2.3 Results 43
is usually closely associated with climate front-running.
3.1.2. Protection and conservation of the national and global en-
vironment (beyond climate change)
Nuclear phase-out: giving up the use of nuclear power and mi-
tigating the related risks by an early phase out of nuclear power
plants.
Protection of the regional and national environment (e.g. clean
air):avoiding harmful emissions by fossil power plants and
environmental damage from fossil mining activities.
Conservation of exhaustible resources:preserving all natural re-
sources that are finite.
3.1.3. Further “energy triangle”goals
Maintain the current level of security of supply:the maintenance
of security of supply at current levels as usually determined by
power black-outs.
Low short to medium term electricity prices for final consumers:
reference to the broader goal of “competitiveness”, interpreted
as avoiding rising electricity prices in the near to medium term,
or alternatively limiting electricity prices to a level which is still
affordable.
Import independence from fossil fuels (economic dimension):an
increase in the security of supply by means of reducing the
dependence on fossil fuels whose supply in terms of both
physical volumes and prices is insecure, particularly oil and
natural gas. For a second meaning of this goal, see below.
3.1.4. Goals related to other policy domains
Job creation and regional value-added in RES industries:regional
creation of jobs and income through the deployment of RES;
thus closely related to structural economic policy.
Technology and market leadership in RES:building up of domestic
companies that can become international market leaders; thus
a form of industrial policy.
3.1.5. Other goals related to political ideals
Import independence from fossil fuels (political dimension):by redu-
cing the dependence on imported fossil fuels, political conflicts
related to their production, trade and use (blackmailing, violent
conflicts, etc.) could be avoided or at least reduced.
Weaken the power of the German electricity oligopoly: reduction
of the economic and political power of the market oligopoly
usually associated with the four largest German utilities (RWE,
E.On, EnBW and Vattenfall).
Decentralization of the energy system (e.g. private roof solar PV
and wind-cooperatives): the overall society should participate
(or even be locally autonomous) in the production of essential
goods and services, rather than relying on a few large and
powerful companies.
Creating identity: uniting the German population behind a pro-
ject which is internationally highly regarded. People should
identify with the Energiewende which establishes societal in-
tegration and a collective sense of purpose.
3.2. Survey findings and discussion
3.2.1. Goal ranking
The major results of the study, in search of the fundamental
goals of the Energiewende as viewed by elite policy actors, are as
follows (see also Figs. 1 and 2):
Fig. 1 shows the goals of the Energiewende as ranked by 54 elite
climate and energy policy actors in Germany. The horizontal
axis indicates the number of interviewees that placed the
respective goal at the first level of their personal goal hierarchy.
A large majority (40 of 54 respondents) consider “climate pro-
tection by reducing GHG emissions”as a top-level goal of the
Energiewende (first level in their hierarchy of goals). Moreover,
another goal related to climate change, i.e. “front-runner”is
ranked on position 6. This underlines that combating climate
change is widely viewed as an important goal underpinning the
Energiewende.
Fig. 1. Ranking of goals by survey participants.
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–5146
44
Chapter 2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
Many of the highest-ranked goals can be attributed to the energy
policy triangle (comprising competitiveness, security of supply,
and sustainability) in the wider sense, which confirms its re-
levance among policy actors. Fig. 2 illustrates the goals of the
Energiewende as incorporated into the ranking by 54 elite
climate and energy policy actors in Germany. The horizontal axis
indicates how often a goal was acknowledged as a relevant goal
and used in the ranking. The figure does not state how
high the goal was ranked. Fig. 2 also shows that nearly all
interviewees included many goals in their ranking. The results
however also show that energy triangle goals are not exclusive
and that other goals, such as “job creation”or the “decentraliza-
tion of electricity production”,are also important. In fact, 43 out
of 54 respondents considered that at least 10 of the 14 suggested
goals are part of the Energiewende's goal system. Only eleven
participants excluded four or more goals from their goal system.
For most interviewees the goals other than climate change are
important enough to justify the Energiewende policy project.
We asked the following control question at the end of the sur-
vey: “Would the Energiewende make sense even if climate
change did not exist?”because it is unclear exactly how all the
goals and their rankings are weighed and totalled, and how they
interact and to compare to the highest-ranked goal (climate
protection). Over two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the
statement, although the majority of them (24) ranked climate
protection as their top goal (see Fig. 3).
3.2.2. Lines of argument
After determining their individual goal hierarchy the inter-
viewees were asked to explain the reasoning underpinning their
rankings. The main arguments are analysed in the following. Note
that it is not the aim of this study to determine the validity of the
arguments, but rather to reconstruct and report them so as to
stimulate further discussion and research.
3.2.2.1. Prevention of dangerous global climate change
3.2.2.1.1. Prevention of climate change by reducing national GHG
emissions. The argument most frequently put forward by propo-
nents of this goal was that Germany, as a rich and industrialized
country, carries a responsibility to significantly reduce GHG
emissions (8 interviewees explicitly cited this argument
8
). Some
claim that Germany should reduce GHGs unilaterally even if others
do not follow (5) while eight respondents did not prioritize climate
protection at all. Most of these stated that national emission re-
ductions only make sense in the context of a global climate
agreement (5). Moreover, five interviewees from the entire sample
reported that climate protection is an important goal, but only for
instrumental reasons. They argued that climate protection serves
as a “spiritual and moral superstructure”or a “common denomi-
nator”which is used by politicians in “soap-box speeches”and as
an “aesthetic theme”.
9
Fig. 2. Goals of the Energiewende incorporated into goals ranking.
Fig. 3. Responses to the question: “would the Energiewende make sense if climate
change did not exist? ”.
8
In the following, numbers in brackets indicate the number of interviewees
explicitly supporting a statement in the interview.
9
These interviewees prioritized the goals of job creation, nuclear phase out,
import independence and creation of identity. Also, they obviously deviated from
the task by only presenting their personal goal hierarchy. One interpretation of this
behavior would be that they also use climate mitigation as a strategic argument
underpinning Energiewende policies in public (because they know it is widely
shared), while they are not personally convinced by it and actually support the
Energiewende for other reasons.
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–51 47
2.3 Results 45
3.2.2.1.2. Front-runner in global climate protection. Proponents
of this goal argue that Germany can only substantially contribute
to climate protection by taking a front-runner role since its con-
tribution to global GHG emissions is very small (only 2% of global
GHG emissions) (18). It is argued that Germany should provide and
finance a “lead market”.
10
In such a market the current problems of
power-system RES, such as variability, electricity market design,
institutional barriers and demand-side management would be
solved (10). Once these problems are solved, the lessons on how to
deal with the challenges of energy system transformation would
be available to other countries, reducing cost and uncertainty.
Other countries are then thought to be more likely to begin
switching from fossil fuels to RES in the power sector or aban-
doning fossil energy system path dependencies in favor of RES
capacity additions, thereby contributing to global climate protec-
tion. It is argued that if this strategy proves successful, i.e. coun-
tries begin investing in relatively low-cost RES because this creates
national welfare benefits, it could become a “game changer”for
global climate negotiations and pave the way for a meaningful
global agreement (8).
Interviewees distinguish two front-runner strategies. First, it is
argued that the reduction of domestic GHG emissions should be
the focus. Only if Germany quickly and substantially reduces do-
mestic emissions and maintains attractive business conditions,
will others follow (13). By contrast, other respondents state that
while climate protection is the major goal, the reduction of do-
mestic GHG emissions should not be the first priority (8). This
group claims that it is, in the long run, more important to develop
a showcase for a low-carbon energy system, with high shares of
RES, which can be readily adapted by other countries to achieve
emission reductions elsewhere. Cost-effective low carbon tech-
nologies and systemic and institutional solutions on the integra-
tion of high shares of RES into the energy system are considered
important to achieve this (10).
Interviewees agree that the Energiewende is closely watched
by other countries (10). However, several respondents (5) state
that in their view, for other countries, the Energiewende primarily
provides an example for the attainment of goals other than climate
protection. These include cleaner air, import independence, job
and regional added value creation, or covering a rapidly growing
energy demand. These goals are especially important for emerging
economies such as China and India which are expected to demand
a substantial increase in energy over the next decade. More gen-
erally, there is broad consensus that other countries will only
follow if the Energiewende turns out to be an economic success
(i.e. if the costs of RES are not higher than conventional power
plants from an overall welfare perspective) (23). Interviewees ar-
guing against the front-runner goal consider the Energiewende to
be a dangerous pathway; they claim that Germany will remain a
“leader without followers”and that currently the Energiewende
serves as a warning, rather than a good example, especially in
terms of costs and efficiency (8).
3.2.2.1.3. Cost reduction of RES through learning effects. This goal
is closely linked to the front-running goal. Supporters of this goal
claim that Germany has responsibility for providing “climate de-
velopment aid”(10) because it has the know-how and the financial
resources to do so (4). Furthermore it is claimed that bringing
down the learning curve of RES is a fair price for Germany to pay
for its “climate debt”caused by its relatively high cumulative his-
toric emissions (4). One interviewee even went so far as to link this
point to the German moral responsibility for World War II and the
holocaust. Opponents of this goal see no moral obligation or re-
sponsibility on Germany to pay for the learning curves (7), espe-
cially since they claim that the rest of the world is free-riding at
the expense of German electricity consumers, which is not clearly
communicated to the German public. It could be considered that
pursuing “climate development aid”in this manner cannot be
politically legitimized (1).
3.2.2.2. Protection and conservation of the national & global en-
vironment (beyond climate change)
3.2.2.2.1. Nuclear phase-out. This goal is supported by the fol-
lowing arguments: (i) the uncontrollability of the technology and the
associated potential for catastrophe after natural disasters, technical
or human failure (6) or terrorist attacks (1); (ii) the unresolved dis-
posal of nuclear waste, its subsequent risks for future generations,
and the long term costs of storage (8); (iii) the incompatibility of
inflexible nuclear power plants with high shares of fluctuating RES
(1); and (iv) the potential high societal costs that result from the non-
insurability of nuclear power plants (2). The high costs for newly
built plants are also cited, which, however, does not apply in the
German context, since new nuclear power plants have not been
seriously planned in recent decades (6). Furthermore the argument
of “settling a long lasting societal dispute”was often used by actors
who have continued to support nuclear power until recently. This
group argues that they do not fully agree with the phase-out but
accept it since it obviously reflects the majority opinion in Germany
(5). Opponents of the phase-out consider the risks of nuclear power
plants to be overestimated and disagree with the phase-out using
economic- and climate-related arguments (12). A majority of this
group considers the phase-out as politically irreversible (8). However,
other members of this group believe that another life-time extension
mightbepossibleinthefutureifRESandotherbackupcapacities
and grids are not built in time and the security of supply goal
threatens to be compromised (3).
3.2.2.2.2. Protection of the regional and national environment (e.g.
clean air). Respondents consider this goal as minor in the context
of the Energiewende or consider that major environmental pro-
blems in Germany are resolved (3). Several respondents stated,
however, that this goal is important from a political perspective
since local issues such as air pollution, agricultural monocultures,
and selection of disposal sites for nuclear waste or power grids
have much greater potential to cause political conflicts through
powerful local initiatives than “abstract threats”such as climate
change (2).
3.2.2.2.3. Conservation of exhaustible resources. Given the va-
gueness of this goal, interviewees were asked to define the specific
resources they understood it to relate to. Answers range from
(i) fossil fuels (7), (ii) rare earths (2), (iii) uranium (1), (iv) soil and
land that is needed for renewable raw materials (2), (v) land for
open-cast mining (1), and (vi) the environment in general (2). Two
respondents also claim that this goal is deliberately ill-defined
since its role is largely to induce an agreement (2). Proponents of
the goal express a general discomfort with the fact that resources,
which were built up over millions of years, are being exhausted in
only a few generations and that “such precious materials”should
rather be saved for physical and material use (8). Furthermore a
wide range of global problems were cited as relating to the ex-
traction of energy resources, including global injustice (9), wars
over fossil resources (2), “resource extractivism”(3) and the capi-
talist economic system based on growth (1). Critics of this goal
claim that there is no shortage of resources and that the market
mechanism will resolve scarcity problems by price changes and
substitution (2). This group claims that a reduced demand for
10
Lead markets are defined as “geographic markets characterized by producing
or processing innovations, which are designed to fit local demand preferences and
local conditions. They can also subsequently be introduced successfully in other
geographic markets and commercialized world-wide without many modifications.
In the model of international diffusion of innovations a lead market is the core of
the world market where the local users are early adopters of an innovation on an
international scale (Beise, 1999)”.
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–5148
46
Chapter 2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
fossil fuels by some world regions (e.g. Europe) would not change
the picture because the savings would be offset by higher con-
sumption in other world regions (2). They point out that the
limiting factor is the disposal space in the atmosphere rather than
scarce fossil resources. A goal of conserving finite resources is
therefore redundant to a goal of climate protection (1).
3.2.2.3. Further “energy triangle”goals
3.2.2.3.1. Maintain the current level of security of supply. This
goal is considered by most interviewees as a necessary boundary
condition
11
in the sense that the current very low level of blackout
periods in Germany must be maintained (28). They argue that
these very low blackout times guarantee Germany's attractiveness
for industry (3). Many state that this is not only a matter of energy
security but also of communication. If the impression was created
that high shares of RES lead to more blackouts this would be a
public relations disaster for the national and international mar-
keting of the Energiewende (6).
3.2.2.3.2. Low short- to medium-term electricity prices for end-
consumers. There is wide agreement that costs are a key concern
since distributional matters play a major role in the political dis-
course (16). Most respondents agree that price increases are still
acceptable for most households (22). However the regressive ef-
fect of rising electricity prices can become a problem if they are
not remedied e.g. by an increase in welfare payments (8). Most
respondents also state that electricity prices play an important role
for energy intensive industry and that excessive price increases
must be avoided in order to prevent carbon leakage (17). Propo-
nents of low prices argue that generous exemptions should be
granted to industry since even the relocation of seemingly insig-
nificant production processes could lead to a break-up of the close-
loop value chains, which are one of Germany's main locational
advantages (8). It is furthermore argued that for industries that
compete on the world market there is no “high”or “low”price of
electricity, but only a “competitive”or a “non-competitive”price
(2). Thus, the falling spot market price for electricity in Germany
plays only a minor role from a competition perspective since pri-
ces in the US have declined even further due to low gas prices (1).
Others argue that it is only companies that fulfil strict criteria of a
high export share and high energy intensity that should be gran-
ted privileges (5). Several interviewees explicitly called for elec-
tricity prices to be further increased, as they lead to efficiency
improvements and stimulate innovation (9).
3.2.2.3.3. Import independence from fossil fuels (economic di-
mension). This goal is supported by the following arguments. First,
it was argued that reduced import dependence would stop the
financial flows towards fossil resource rich countries and that
these funds could instead be invested in domestic RES. In this way
foreign fossil fuel expenditures would be substituted by domestic
labor (6). Second, it is expected that growing fossil resource de-
mand and decreasing reserves will lead to increasing prices of
fossil fuels in the long run (4). However one interviewee contra-
dicts this view by pointing out that technological progress in re-
source extraction technologies might overcompensate for fossil
demand increases and RES cost reductions for several decades.
Furthermore, reduced imports are considered to make the do-
mestic economy less vulnerable to extreme price fluctuations that
have been a characteristic of energy resource markets in the past
(3). Several interviewees explicitly expressed that import in-
dependence should not be a goal of the Energiewende for the
following reasons. First, for a country that profits substantially
from international trade, it should not be a goal to become self-
sufficient in one sector (9). Second, and more importantly, less
trade would lead to welfare losses on both sides, as trade is only
carried out if both parties gain from it (as importing and using
fossil fuels is cheaper than implementing domestic RES) (10).
3.2.2.4. Goals related to other policy domains
3.2.2.4.1. Job creation and regional added value in RES in-
dustries. There is relatively wide agreement among proponents
and critics of this goal that jobs play a crucial role in the political
discussion of the Energiewende (10). The job argument is also a
major benefit for promoting the Energiewende abroad because
creating jobs is a major political goal of politicians all over the
world (1). Proponents argue that the Energiewende has led to
positive net job effects (7) because RES is a substitute for fossil fuel
imports (2) and because RES industries have a high export share
(1). Furthermore it is argued that RES can create a positive future
for rural areas (1) because jobs are mainly built up in the per-
iphery (7). In this sense RES investments are useful for regional
structural policy, especially for the economically underdeveloped
regions in the east and the north of Germany (3). Jobs in RES are
considered by one interviewee as particularly valuable because
“social capital”is created. Working in the RES sector also provides
meaning because employees get the feeling of contributing to a
higher cause (1). Finally it is argued that the direct participation of
the population (such as those employed in RES) can stabilize po-
litical support for the Energiewende (2). Critics respond that the
creation of subsidized jobs in the renewables sector necessarily
means job losses in other sectors. The net job balance is therefore
considered at best zero but is more likely to be negative (5).
3.2.2.4.2. Technology and market leadership in RES. Proponents
of this goal claim that an industrial policy for RES technologies fits
with the comparatively advanced German industrial capabilities
(10). There are advantages in areas such as mechanical engineer-
ing, which can be applied to efficiency technologies and gearboxes
for wind turbines as well as biogas plants (9). Furthermore Ger-
many has a strong electrical engineering industry, which either
has enabled or might enable the country to become or remain
market leader for inverters for PV and energy management sys-
tems, system solutions such as smart grids, load management
systems, storage, and virtual power plants (5). The chemical and
materials industry is also considered to lead, for example, the
development of high quality materials. These are used, for ex-
ample, in corrosion coatings for offshore wind turbines (3). Critics
consider technology leadership not as a goal but, at most, a de-
sirable side effect (11). They claim that industrial policy in the area
of RES has failed spectacularly, referring to the dramatic reduction
of German photovoltaic (PV) panel production over recent years,
and that this should have provided a lesson (12).
3.2.2.5. Other goals related to political ideals
3.2.2.5.1. Import independence from fossil fuels (political dimen-
sion). This goal is supported by the following arguments. First, it is
considered imperative that security policy keeps the dependence
on other governments as low as possible in order to avoid political
blackmail (13). In this context, independence from Russia and
Gazprom was explicitly mentioned several times (5) although the
Ukraine political crisis had not begun at the time of the interviews.
Several interviewees point out that international conflicts over
raw material extraction can cause wars, human rights violations
and poor working conditions (7). There was also criticism over the
neglect of geostrategic aspects in Germany's energy policy debate
(1). However, while arguing against import independence as a
political goal, the point is made by many that international inter-
dependencies (especially in the area of strategic resources) and
integration can promote peace and stability in the international
system (14), and that the risk of political blackmail and boycotts of
fossil imports is considered extremely low (2).
11
A boundary condition is a goal that must always be fulfilled.
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–51 49
2.3 Results 47
3.2.2.5.2. Weaken the power of the electricity oligopoly. None
of the interviewees considered this as a top-level goal of the
Energiewende. This stands in sharp contrast to the evaluated
speeches of the Bundestag, in which the Green and the Left Party
(die Linke) in particular, often put a focus on this goal (Joas, 2013).
3.2.2.5.3. Decentralization of the energy system (e.g. private roof
solar PV and wind-cooperatives). Most respondents consider this as
an instrumental goal (13), or as an inevitable consequence due to
the nature of RES, but not as a major goal of the Energiewende.
Supporters of this goal claim that it generates a “democratization
of the power supply”, which is necessary because services of
general interest should be owned by citizens and not by compa-
nies (2). They argue that those who produce their own electricity,
derive value and status from it as they feel independent from large
power utilities (6). This creates a sense of autarky (apparently
considered a fundamental goal) and furthermore helps to break
the German oligopoly in the electricity sector (6). Ownership is
believed to create a sense of participation in political processes,
which is widely considered to increase political support for the
Energiewende (16). In this role this goal serves an instrumental
purpose. Many interviewees did not consider decentralization as a
legitimate goal of the Energiewende (they removed the respective
card from their goal-set) (19); they altogether reject arguments in
favor of decentralization, with some even scoffing at proponents of
this goal as having a “romantic understanding”of energy supply
(7). Furthermore, some claim that only high subsidies, rather than
ethical value decisions, have induced the large decentralization
over recent years (4). This group considers electricity a homo-
genous good that should be produced in the most economically
efficient way. Location and ownership questions must be sub-
ordinated or should not play a role at all (12). They furthermore
warn that decentralization will lead to an erosion of solidarity in
society since decentralized “prosumers”
12
do not carry the in-
creasing system costs and strain of other electricity consumers
who bear the additional costs (12).
3.2.2.5.4. Creating identity. Few agree that the Energiewende
has the potential to increase the cohesion in society (2). The large
majority do not see the integrative effect of a project to establish
identity (5). One respondent even called the idea of using major
political projects for social integration as “totalitarian.”.
3.2.2.6. Trade-Offs. In the interviews the trade-offs between goals
played an important role. It became clear that views on trade-offs
strongly depend on the personal normative views towards the
Energiewende. While proponents of the Energiewende claim that
all (or at least most) goals are mutually enforcing and trade-offs
are minimal, others see major contradictions between the goals.
Several trade-offs that were largely unambiguous are briefly de-
scribed below.
The clearest example is the trade-off between the nuclear
phase-out and the reduction of GHG emissions. The baseload
electricity production from the phased-out nuclear power plants
must be replaced by fossil fuels that harm the climate, at least in
the short- term. Another example is the trade-off between large
shares of variable renewables and the security of supply. Large
shares of variable renewables require additional (and often costly)
measures such as demand-side management, grid reinforcements
and the readiness for flexibility by power consumers, to maintain a
high security of supply. Finally the trade-off between short-term
electricity costs for end-consumers and several other goals
(such as the nuclear phase-out, job creation and decentralization),
that create costs (at least in the short-term) were repeatedly
mentioned.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
There are three major findings emerging from this study. First,
a large majority of respondents named climate protection as the
most important or one of the most important goals of the En-
ergiewende. At the same time, around 80% of all participants also
believe that additional goals are achievable with the
Energiewende.
Second, two thirds of the participants go as far as to agree that
the Energiewende would make sense even if climate change did
not exist, thus questioning the singular importance of the climate
protection goal. This more generally demonstrates that the em-
pirical goals and motivations behind the Energiewende go beyond
“finding a solution to global warming”.
The third major finding relates to the controversies and trade-
offs around the different goals, as revealed by the further analysis
of arguments and reasonings. Here climate protection stands out
as the goal receiving the strongest consensus. Many of the other
goals do not benefit from such consensus. Particularly prominent
controversies in the positive domain concern the attainability of
the goals of job-creation and climate front-running. Research in
these directions would be particularly worthwhile to put related
factual claims on a more solid evidence base. This particularly
holds for the goal of climate front-running as measured by the
impact German climate action has on inducing climate action in
other countries. The achievement of this goal, however, is very
difficult to assess (Steinbacher and Pahle, 2015).
Turning to policy implications, it is important to first put the
above findings into perspective. The reason why the German
government has left the goals largely unclear may be that there
are major controversies over them. As Fischer (2006: 158) points
out “politicians find it advantageous […] to leave the meanings [of
goals] vague, permitting different groups to read into them what
they want. The ambiguity of meanings is often the very thing that
makes political compromise between groups with conflicting
views possible”. Or as stated by one respondent: “the PV boom in
Germany was only possible because it fulfilled goals of different
societal groups. The farmers in the south received additional rev-
enues, it filled the order books of engineers and installers of
photovoltaic plants, politicians in eastern Germany could use it as
structural policy and green groups got what they always wanted”.
A broad and stable consensus is arguably an essential requirement
for a long-term energy transformation –and many rather vague
goals reflecting different societal interests seem to be helpful in
achieving it.
However, using goals instrumentally, i.e. understanding them
as means to induce consensus or avoid conflict rather than as ends
to be achieved, has two potentially important implications. The
first, as described in Section 1, is that unclear or even contradicting
goals are likely to lead to ineffective and counteracting policy
outcomes, especially when ambitions are rising and hard trade-
offs occur. More specifically, in such a situation it is very challen-
ging to design policies because it is unclear what they should
achieve. For the same reason, it is equally challenging to evaluate
these policies; the performance of policies in terms of effective-
ness and efficiency –also with a view towards policy and societal
learning –can only be evaluated relative to the policy goals they
were meant to achieve. If these goals were never clearly commu-
nicated or confounded in a thorough policy process, a later eva-
luation becomes difficult or even impossible. This is also ex-
emplified in the analysis of US energy policy by Ellerman (2012)
who argues that the conflation of climate protection and energy
security goals has led to ineffective policies that achieve neither
12
Prosumers are market participants who consume (i.e. buy electricity on the
market) and produce (i.e. sell electricity to the market).
F. Joas et al. / Energy Policy 95 (2016) 42–5150
48
Chapter 2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
goal. A necessary remedy to this situation is to clearly define goals.
This could be done for example along the lines of the pragmatist
approach to policy deliberation and analysis outlined by Edenhofer
and Kowarsch (2015).
The second implication concerns the existence of multiple goals.
Unlike the missing clarity of goals, this is not per se problematic. It
may just reflect the fact that different societal groups have different
policy preferences that do not fall together into a single goal.
However, this complicates policy design and particularly implies
that from the point of view of any single goal, policies must ne-
cessarily be second best –and thus are more costly and potentially
less effective. For the particular case of climate change, being the
most widely shared top-level goal in our survey sample, an esca-
lation of policy costs over time may mean that it will become dif-
ficult to attain currently envisaged future national greenhouse gas
reductions in Germany. Consequently, and as underlined by current
trends, Germany may fail to reach its quantitative climate objectives
and thus not live up to its self-ascribed aspiration of being a climate
leader.
Finally, the plea for stable, long term and clearly ordered top-
level goals can conflict with the free formation of political will in a
democracy. Political goals in society can, and do, change due to
new and changing knowledge and problems perceived by citizens,
and can be expressed by supporting parties and civil society
groups that promise to change policies accordingly. While this
fickleness may seem inefficient and suboptimal from the rational
policy design perspective, it is a central feature of democracy,
where the primacy of politics holds. There is a trade-off between
stable long-term goals enabling the implementation of reliable
policies, and resulting in intertemporally efficient governance on
the one hand, and the constitutional obligation of the executive to
translate the (potentially changing) will of the people (represented
by parliament) into law on the other hand. This is an irreconcilable
tension in any democratic system. Good governance requires bal-
ancing this trade-off.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Nora Azzaoui, Aida Azzaoui and
Christoph Leitsch for transcribing many hours of interviews and
for helpful comments. We would also like to thank Cornelius
Schneider for help with the figures. Furthermore we want to thank
Brigitte Knopf, Ottmar Edenhofer, Michael Jakob, Anna Leipprand
and especially Karoline Steinbacher for lively discussions and
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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2.4 Conclusions and policy implications 49
50
Chapter 2 Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the
German Energy Transformation
Chapter 3
Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts
on Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions∗
Brigitte Knopf
Michael Pahle
Hendrik Kondziella
Fabian Joas
Ottmar Edenhofer
Thomas Bruckner
∗This article first appeared in Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, Vol. 03, No. 1, pages 89-
105, 2013, DOI 10.5547/2160-5890.3.1.bkno, as: Knopf, B., Pahle, M., Kondziella, H., Joas, F., Edenhofer,
O., Bruckner, T. (2013): Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on Electricity prices and
CO2 Emissions. Reproduced by permission of the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE).
51
89
Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities
and Impacts on Electricity Prices and CO
2
Emissions
Brigitte Knopf,
a,
*
Michael Pahle,
a
Hendrik Kondziella,
b
Fabian Joas,
a,c
Ottmar Edenhofer,
a,c,d
and
Thomas Bruckner
b
Following the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima Daiichi, in summer 2011 the Ger-
man parliament decided to phase-out nuclear power by 2022. When this decision
was taken, a number of model-based analyses investigated the influence this deci-
sion would have on electricity prices and CO
2
emissions. They concluded that CO
2
emissions would be kept at levels that are in line with national reduction targets
but that the phase-out would result in an increase in wholesale electricity prices.
We show by means of a sensitivity analysis that results crucially hinge on some
fundamental model assumptions. These particularly include the development of
fossil fuel and CO
2
prices, which have a much larger influence on the electricity
price than the nuclear phase-out itself. Since the decision of the nuclear phase-out,
CO
2
prices have decreased and deployment of renewables increased ever since. This
partly counteracts the negative effect of the nuclear phase-out on electricity prices,
but on the other hand challenges the mitigation of CO
2
emissions and security of
supply. This underlines the importance of sensitivity analyses and suggests that
policy-makers need to consider scenarios that analyze the whole range of possible
future developments.
Keywords: Nuclear policy, Climate protection, Renewable energy, Electricity
market modeling, Energiewende
http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.3.1.bkno
f1. INTRODUCTION g
Following the nuclear reactor accident in Fukushima Daiichi, the German Parliament decided
in summer 2011 to phase-out nuclear power by 2022. This involved a controversial public
discussion (e.g. Ethics Commission, 2011) and the decision also raised a lot of interest on the
international level (e.g. The Economist, 2011; New York Times, 2011; Nature News, 2011).
But the phase-out in 2011 was not the first decision to withdraw from nuclear power. In
2002, the former Government already agreed to phase-out nuclear through the “nuclear con-
sensus” between the Federal Government and the industry. Based on an average operational
life-time of 32 years for a nuclear power plant, a phase-out was agreed upon with the last
nuclear power plant to go off the grid by around 2023. However, in 2010, the new conservative
a
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Research Domain Sustainable Solutions.
b
Institute for Infrastructure and Resources Management (IIRM) at the University Leipzig.
c
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) Berlin.
d
TU Berlin, Chair Economics of Climate Change.
Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1. Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
52
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
90 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Government opted for a life-time extension of nuclear power up to 2038 as a “bridging
technology” in order to facilitate the “road into the age of renewable energies” (Federal Gov-
ernment, 2010), i.e. the energy transition (Energiewende). In that sense, the second decision
on the phase-out in 2011 constituted (again) a strategic reversal. Without discussing the details
of this decision and the potential political reasons for the life-time extension, this leaves the
question not only on the influence of the phase-out on prices and emissions but also if the
now earlier phase-out might imply serious challenges for the overall energy transition com-
pared to the previously mandated prolongation. In this paper, we analyze different pathways
for the nuclear phase-out and narrow our scope by looking at its impacts regarding the orig-
inally envisaged role, i.e. to curb the increase of electricity prices and to decrease CO
2
emis-
sions. Although already a number of analysis of the nuclear phase-out are available (e.g. enervis
energy advisors (2011), Prognos/EWI/GWS (2011), IER/RWI/ZEW (2010), r2b energy con-
sulting/EEFA (2010), Nestle (2012), Samadi et al. (2011), Fu¨rsch et al. (2012)) the added
value of this paper is to explore a range of sensitivities, including a model comparison, and
to provide a fresh perspective of the model results in light of current developments.
The first part of the analysis looks back at the time before the nuclear prolongation was
revoked and allows us to evaluate the different policy options that were discussed then. Besides
the precise date of exit from nuclear energy, an important and long-term political discussion
concerns the possible replacement options of nuclear power. We identify how much generation
capacity needs to be replaced and use a power market model to analyze the differences in
prices and emissions between early (2015 and 2020), the currently decreed (2022) and the
previously planned (2038) phase-out. In that context, a range of different replacement options
(for example, giving priority to coal or gas-fired power plants) is evaluated. As model results
depend heavily on input assumptions, these paths are tested for their robustness in sensitivity
analyzes in which individual assumptions are varied. In this way, a range of alternative scenarios
is explored. This sensitivity analysis is completed by a comparison with electricity prices from
other model-based studies that evaluate the difference between a phase-out in 2022 and a life-
time extension until 2038.
While the model-based analyses concentrates on the effect of the nuclear phase-out on
wholesale electricity prices and CO
2
emissions, in the second part of the analysis we relate the
model-based analysis to the current situation. The comparison of different studies in combi-
nation with the results from the sensitivity analysis allows us to assess the range of results for
the situation-as-is and their potential underlying causes and to distil some policy implications
over the whole portfolio of available scenarios. We widen the perspective from the isolated
effect of the nuclear phase-out towards the challenges of the overall Energiewende (see e.g.
Nature, 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the scenario set-up, the applied
electricity market model and evaluate the effect of the nuclear phase-out on electricity prices
and CO
2
emissions. In Section 3, we accomplish this with a sensitivity analysis and a com-
parison with results from other studies. Section 4 reviews the modeling results in view of
current developments and derives some policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
f2. IMPACT ON ELECTRICITY PRICES AND CO
2
EMISSIONS g
Scenario definition and model description
For exploring the different pathways, an assessment of different scenarios is required. We
define them along two dimensions: the year of the nuclear phase-out and the different tech-
3.2 Methodology and model 53
91Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
TABLE 1
Scenario definition
Scenario Name Exit year Replacement by conventional power plants based on
...
Exit2015-gas 2015 gas
Exit2015-coal 2015 coal
Exit2020-gas 2020 gas
Exit2020-coal 2020 coal
Exit2022 2022 combination of gas and coal
Exit2038 2038 combination of gas and coal
TABLE 2
Exogenous input assumptions to the model
2015 2020 2025 2030
Gas price* [€/MWh] 27.4 30.6 34.2 37.1
Coal price (hard coal) [€/MWh] 12.6 14.4 15.8 16.9
CO
2
price [€/tCO
2
]26.0 31.2 34.3 36.4
Electricity production from RES [TWh/yr] 165 227 293 360
Gross electricity consumption [TWh/yr] 575 560 550 550
* The gas price refers to the border price.
nologies by which nuclear capacities are to be replaced, i.e. gas or coal power plants. Both
aspects were most heavily debated at the time shortly after the nuclear accident in Fukushima
Daiichi in March 2011. The full set of scenarios is shown in Table 1.
Regarding the development of renewable capacities, we assume the deployment path
described in Nitsch et al. (2010) for all scenarios. It breaks down to an increase in renewable
energies from 165 TWh in 2015 to 360 TWh in 2030 leading to a share of renewable energies
in the electricity mix of 65% by 2030. Our assumptions for electricity demand, electricity
production from renewable energy sources (RES), fossil fuel and CO
2
prices are based on the
same study (price path B). The full set of assumptions is shown in Table 2.
All scenarios are analyzed with regard to the development of electricity prices and CO
2
emissions using the MICOES (Mixed Integer Cost Optimization Energy System) model.
MICOES is a bottom-up electricity market model for power plant scheduling based on Theo-
filidi (2008) with an extension by Kondziella et al. (2011), Bruckner et al. (2010), Harthan
et al. (2011). From a methodical point of view, MICOES is a mixed-integer optimization
model that is capable to consider short-term marginal cost, start-up and shut-down costs as
well as limited ramp rates. It uses a least-cost approach to optimize the hourly scheduling of
the conventional fleet of power plants in the market. Going beyond a simple merit order
54
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
92 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
approach, it is therefore able to take into account the constrained flexibility of conventional
power plants.
The input to the model stems from a database with fossil-fired power plants in operation
in Germany (block by block for a unit capacity of greater than 100 MW, aggregates for smaller
units). For each power plant, installed net capacity and electric efficiency are available (or
estimated from literature). Furthermore, technical restrictions of thermal power plants such
as minimum load, load change ratios, minimum downtime, minimum uptime, etc., are in-
corporated in the model. Renewable generation serves as an exogenous input and hourly
fluctuations by intermittent sources like wind and solar power are taken into account.
For this analysis we assumed that Germany has to manage the nuclear phase-out with
own capabilities. However, the model is able to utilize an additional supply opportunity
(import) at a very high price (300€/MWh). This additional degree of freedom is used by the
model only in a limited number of hours. More details concerning the input assumptions and
the modeling approach are given in Knopf et al. (2011a) and Knopf et al. (2011b).
Projection of conventional replacement capacity
A complete withdrawal from nuclear energy in Germany means that 21 GW in net power
plant capacity have to be replaced until 2022 that equals 21 % of the total conventional
capacity. The first eight out of 17 nuclear power plants that were taken off the grid by March
2011 (the so-called “Moratorium on nuclear energy”, Federal Government, 2011) so that
around 10 GW in power plant capacity were out of operation in mid-2011. This capacity
was replaced by making use of existing overcapacity as well as by reducing net electricity
exports. Furthermore, according to the German Association of Energy and Water (BDEW)
(BDEW, 2013a), a series of fossil fuel-fired power plants are under construction whose capacity
of around 9.2 GW, mainly coal-fired power plants, will be available by 2015. Another net
extension of 2 GW was already commissioned between 2011 and 2013. This was taken into
account by the model-based analysis. In this way, the capacity of the nuclear power plants
could be completely replaced by 2015. However, it is also planned to shut down 14 GW in
power plant capacity from old fossil fuel-fired power plants. And by 2020, a further 13 GW
in fossil fuel-fired power plant capacity are to be shut down because they reach the end of
their technical lifetime. This means that, in addition to the exit from nuclear energy, a total
of 27 GW in fossil fuel-fired power plants will have to be replaced within the next decade.
The options primarily deployed in our model for filling this gap include the expansion of
renewable energy and of (centralized and decentralized) cogeneration capacity, the reduction
of electricity demand by increasing energy efficiency and the import (although only for a
limited number of hours per year) of electricity from other European countries. Apart from
these replacement options the construction of fossil fuel-fired power plants or the refurbish-
ment of older fossil fuel plants has to be considered. Based on economic considerations and
our model-based analysis, 8 GW of additional conventional capacity is required (see Figure
1).
The scheduling of the capacity expansion can be deferred further into the future depend-
ing on the date of exit (Figure 1). This means, e.g. in the case of a nuclear exit in 2020, not
only all the power plant capacities currently under construction need to be ready, but that
further fossil fuel-fired power plants currently planned or to be planned will have to be put
into service. Alternatively, a prolonged use of older coal-fired power plants may be considered.
An even earlier exit in 2015 would represent an even greater challenge and would probably
3.3 Impact on electricity prices and CO2 emissions 55
93Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
FIGURE 1
Replacement capacity required in conventional power plants. Comparison of scenarios Exit2015-coal,
Exit2020-coal and Exit2022
endanger energy security. This involves many other open questions and assumptions requiring
further investigation that is beyond the scope of this paper (see discussion in Section 4).
Impact on electricity prices
Within liberalized electricity markets, spot market prices are based on the supply-cost
curve (merit order) of all plants in the market. The marginal plant, i.e. the plant with the
highest (short-term) generation costs still needed to meet a given demand, establishes the spot
market price. Accordingly, nuclear energy, with low generation costs, would be the economi-
cally preferred technology within the merit order followed by lignite, hard coal and gas-fired
power plants.
If nuclear power plants are to be decommissioned, the spot market price will rise in average
in response, at least temporarily, since then gas fuelled power plants will set the marginal price
due to the shift of the supply curve to the left. The increasing proportion of renewable energy
in the German electricity mix (23% in 2012 (BDEW, 2013b), and envisaged at 40 % in 2020
and 65 % in 2030 according to the Government’s decision (Federal Government, 2010)) will
work in the opposite direction, bringing about a long-term fall in the spot market price level
by shifting the supply curve to the right. The reason is that, in accordance with the feed-in-
tariff system (and the low short-term generation cost), renewable energy must be supplied at
“negative” cost at the wholesale market in order to be able to ensure the obligation of grid
operators to purchase all renewable energy and sell it to the market. As a result, the spot
market price will rise until 2020 but then fall again to below the initial level by 2030 due to
the ever increasing proportion of renewable energy (Figure 2).
For the scenario Exit2015-coal, the spot market price in that year would be 67 €/MWh
and thus 8 €/MWh higher than the price in the corresponding year in the case of an exit in
56
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
94 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
FIGURE 2
Development of the electricity price at the spot market (baseload). For comparison: The average
price at the spot market (baseload) was 56 €/MWh in 2011
2020 or 2022. The reason for this is the need to draw on cost-intensive replacement capacities
ahead of time. However, prices in the Exit2015-coal scenario are not higher in 2020 than
those of the Exit2020-coal scenario since replacements only occur a few years later but still
before 2020 (cf. Figure 1). In the case of Exit2022, replacements are put back a bit further
so that the prices in 2020 will be 4 €/MWh lower. Long-term spot market prices, however,
remain slightly lower in the case of an early exit with coal (Exit2020-coal) as the replacement
option than under the Exit2022 scenario. This is due to the intensified expansion of gas-fired
power plants in the case of Exit 2022 (Figure 2) which have a slightly higher cost level.
Furthermore, the results show that prices will reach nearly equal levels if nuclear power
plants are replaced by either gas or coal-fired power plants. The reason is that, on the basis of
the assumed fuel and CO
2
prices, electricity production costs for both technologies are ap-
proximately equal. Accordingly, if—apart from the projects under construction—exclusively
gas-fired power plants are built instead of coal-fired power plants, for the scenario Exit2020-
gas the spot market prices in 2020 will be only around 1 €/MWh higher than those under
the scenario involving intensified expansion of coal-fired power plants Exit2020-coal.
Figure 2 also makes clear that a life-time extension of nuclear power (Exit2038) would
have led to much lower wholesale prices and would thus have indeed facilitated the energy
transition in Germany by reducing costs. In numbers, there is a price increase of 11% between
Exit2038 and Exit2022 in 2015 and 23% in 2020.
The prices for household consumers are determined only to a minor extent by the whole-
sale market price and the distribution that together currently make up only about 30% of the
overall consumer price (BDEW, 2013c), while taxes and other expenses are responsible for
50%, while grid charges account for another 20%. From these 50% the feed-in-tariff (FIT)
3.3 Impact on electricity prices and CO2 emissions 57
95Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
FIGURE 3
CO
2
emissions from conventional power plants 2015–2030
levy is the most important component which makes up around 19% of the consumer price.
The German FIT levy which is paid by all electricity consumers with some exceptions for
electricity-intensive industries is based on the difference between compensation under the FIT
system and the average electricity procurement costs on the electricity exchange. Thus, a price
increase on the spot market is compensated by a reduced FIT levy for the end consumers and
vice versa. The largest influence on the consumer prices is therefore determined by the inter-
play between spot market prices and renewables deployment. As the latter is given exogenously
in the model, it is not subject of the model-based analysis and will be discussed in Section 4.
Impacts on CO
2
emissions
The year of the nuclear phase-out has a clear impact on CO
2
emissions (see Figure 3) as
the substitution with coal-fired power plants or gas-fired power plants the CO
2
emissions of
the electricity generation sector would increase. The earlier the phase-out, the higher are the
emission at least until 2025. In the long term, however, for the scenarios Exit2015,Exit2020
and Exit2022, the emissions would be similar. An exit in 2020 instead of 2022 would of
course mark only a short-term rise in CO
2
emissions (Figure 3). Nonetheless, a complete exit
in 2015 would increase CO
2
emissions: In 2015, they would be 64 MtCO
2
higher than in
the case of Exit2020 or Exit2022. The additional emissions could be reduced by 20 % if the
expansion of gas-fired power plants was pursued instead of coal-fired power plants. An increase
of 64 MtCO
2
would raise German CO
2
emissions of the electricity sector by almost a quarter
in 2015.
A life-time extension of nuclear power until 2038 would have reduced emissions in Ger-
many by 45 to 70 MtCO
2
between 2015 and 2030 but the Exit2022 scenario still reaches
roughly 70% reduction against 1990 by 2030 solely in the power sector. In fact, the German
58
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
96 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
nuclear energy phase-out in 2022, as consensually enacted in 2011, only means a return to
the old “status quo” before the prolongation of the operational life of nuclear power plants in
autumn 2010. Climate protection is not endangered by the earlier phase-out since the total
quantity of emissions in the European electricity sector is limited by the cap of the EU
emissions trading system that was set up in 2005 when the decision on the first nuclear phase-
out in Germany was already taken. In that sense, the nuclear phase-out has no effect on the
overall CO
2
emissions of the EU. This means that larger emissions in one region are offset
with lower emissions in a different region. This may indeed affect the regional distribution of
CO
2
emissions across the EU but not the overall emissions.
Nevertheless, increasing emissions can lead to an increase in CO
2
prices. This is not
considered here but is topic of the sensitivity analysis in Section 3. Increasing CO
2
prices
would mean that across Europe, power plants would be utilized that emit less CO
2
. Since
nuclear power plants have lower marginal costs, their capacities are, as a rule, already fully
utilized within the framework of the existing possibilities. Rising CO
2
prices would therefore
lead mainly to the utilization of more efficient fossil fuel-fired power plants across Europe.
Our analysis solely focuses on the electricity sector but the emission path is very much in
line with that of the Nitsch et al. (2010) that reaches an economy-wide emission reduction
of 85% by 2050 with CO
2
emissions from the electricity sector accounting for 213 MtCO
2
in 2020 and 105 MtCO
2
in 2030 compared to 188 and 113 MtCO
2
in our scenario Exit2022.
f3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES g
In this Section we analyze how the results depend on come critical modeling input assumptions
and how our results compare to other studies in terms of outcome and assumptions. Within
the framework of a sensitivity analysis the following assumptions were considered (for the
numbers see overview in Table 3):
(a) Stronger increase of fuel and CO
2
-Prices
The reference scenario assumes a moderate increase of the input prices according to
the “Lead study 2010” (price scenario B) of the German environmental ministry (Nitsch
et al., 2010). That price scenario relates to price forecast of the WEO 2007. Due to
optimistic assumptions the price scenario B turns out to be at the bottom line of the
future price trend. The sensitivity of a stronger increase of future input prices according
to price scenario A of the “Lead study” is analyzed for the scenario “Exit 2020” in the
year 2020. That stronger increase of fuel prices is derived from oil price forecasts of the
WEO 2009.
(b) Constant instead of decreasing electricity consumption
The reference scenario assumes a slight decrease of gross electricity consumption for
Germany from 587 TWh (2010) to 550 TWh (2030) due to economic and demographic
forecasts (Nitsch et al., 2010). Hence the increase of the annual primary energy produc-
tivity has to reach 2.7 % relating to efficiency targets of the federal government (for
comparison: the average value is 1.8 % for the period 1991–2008). The sensitivity analysis
investigates a failure of the efficiency target and keeps the gross electricity consumption
at a constant level.
(c) Only modest expansion of decentralized cogeneration
According to the reference case the contribution of decentralized cogeneration units to
electricity demand is doubled until 2030. For the sensitivity analysis in 2020 we regard
3.4 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with other studies 59
97Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
TABLE 3
Model parameters for the sensitivity analysis for 2020
Reference Sensitivity Difference
a) Higher fuel and CO
2
prices
Gas [cts
2007
/kWh] 3.86 4.85 26%
Hard coal [cts
2007
/kWh] 2.59 3.30 27%
Lignite [cts
2007
/kWh] 1.70 2.09 23%
CO
2
[€/t] 31.17 40.52 30%
b) Constant instead of decreasing
electricity consumption [TWh]
560.0 587.0 5%
c) Only modest expansion of
decentralised cogeneration [TWh]
63.8 49.5 ⳮ22%
d) More rapid expansion of
renewable energy [TWh]
227.0 267.0 18%
e) Additional system flexibility 5GW and 30GWh
a temporal failure of capacity extension targets about five years. Comparing to the refer-
ence case the capacity is reduced by 3 GW (14.3 TWh) that has to be substituted by
conventional generation.
(d) More rapid expansion of renewable energy
The share of renewable energies in the German electricity market is expected to reach
40% by 2020 in the reference scenario (Nitsch et al., 2010) that is equivalent to an
electricity generation of 227 TWh. Recent projections have frequently underestimated
the extension path that is triggered by the German feed-in-tariff-system. Therefore in this
sensitivity analysis renewable extension targets are pushed up by three years, i.e., in 2020
we assume the renewable capacity available in 2023 for the reference case, leading to
additional supply from renewable generation of about 40 TWh in 2020.
(e) Effect of additional system flexibility
The integration of large amounts of fluctuating renewable energies requires a flexible
energy system to match supply and demand instantaneously. One option assumed in the
model is pumped-hydro storage. The installed capacity in Germany is about 7 GW and
40 GWh. The sensitivity analysis assumes an additional flexibility of 5 GW and 30 GWh.
This can be seen as a proxy for other flexibility options, such as demand-side-management
or grid expansion.
For these five sensitivities, we take the scenario Exit2020-gas as the reference and compare
results for the year 2020. The largest influence on spot market prices is exercised by the
assumption about the future development of increasing fossil fuel and CO
2
prices which lead
to a 25 % increase from 69 to 86 €/MWh in 2020. The reason for the large influence of the
fossil fuel price and especially the gas price lies in the merit order (see section 2.3). As in most
60
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
98 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
TABLE 4
Sensitivities in relation to spot market prices (baseload) in 2020 with regard to the scenario
Exit2020-gas
Spot market price
(baseload) in 2020 [€/
MWh]
Reference scenario: Exit2020-gas 69
Sensitivities:
Higher fuel and CO
2
prices 86 (25%)
Constant instead of decreasing electricity
consumption
76 (10%)
Only modest expansion of decentralized cogeneration 72 (4%)
More rapid expansion of renewable energy 66 (ⳮ4%)
Additional system flexibility 68 (ⳮ1%)
cases, the power plant with the highest (short-term) generation costs is a gas turbine; the gas
price therefore has a large influence on the spot price.
The assumption of not fulfilling energy efficiency improvements also exerts a big influence.
If electricity consumption, contrary to policy targets, remains at its current level, wholesale
prices will increase by 10%. The influence of these assumptions on the electricity price is thus
similar to or even greater than the timing of the exit itself, compare Figure 2. In contrast, the
impact of load shifting measures (demand-side management) can reduce prices only slightly:
Likewise less cogeneration has also a relatively low impact on prices. Again, as already explained
in Section 2.3 the influence on the price for households is very limited, the spread is between
22.3 ct/kWh (with DSM) and 23.5 ct/kWh (for high fossil fuel and CO
2
prices), i.e. only
an increase of 4%.
As the sensitivity analysis shows, the assumptions have a strong influence on the electricity
prices that is even stronger than the exact year of the phase-out. Therefore, it can be expected
that other studies likely differ in their projected price paths—given different assumptions. We
compare our results (labeled as PIK/IIRM in Figure 4) with results from other studies that
analyze a phase-out in 2022 compared to a phase-out in 2038 and that have been performed
in the years 2010 and 2011 to inform the discussion about the life-time expansion of nuclear
power. These studies are enervis energy advisors (2011), Prognos/EWI/GWS (2011), IER/
RWI/ZEW (2010) and r2b energy consulting/EEFA (2010).
1
Whereas the difference between a phase-out in 2022 and a life-time extension until 2038
leads to differences in wholesale prices between 6 €/MWh in 2015 and 17 €/MWh in 2030
(see Figure 4, cf. also German Council of Economic Experts (2011)), the absolute numbers
show a very large divergence between the studies (see Figure 5a) as large as 26 €/MWh already
in 2015. This means that the differences in absolute price levels between the different studies
1. The models in these studies differ in terms of regional and temporal resolution or investment decisions are modeled, but this
kind of analysis is beyond the scope of the paper.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with other studies 61
99Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
FIGURE 4
Difference in wholesale prices between a nuclear phase-out in 2022 and 2038 for different studies.
For enervis a comparison between 2020 and 2038 is shown. PIK/IIRM refers to this publication.
are much larger than the relative differences between the scenarios with and without a life-
time extension of nuclear power.
The electricity price path for the different studies does not only show a large divergence
in absolute numbers but also the tendency of increasing (in three studies) or decreasing prices
(in two studies) is not clear. In Knopf et al. (2012), the reasons for these differences are
analyzed in more detail. It turns out that the studies are based on very different assumptions
concerning i) fossil fuel and CO
2
prices, ii) the future electricity demand and iii) the deploy-
ment path of renewable energies and, see Figure 5b–d.
It is not astonishing that electricity prices are so different given the widely differing
assumptions on the future gas price and CO
2
price development (see Figure 5b and c). As
seen in the sensitivity analysis, energy efficiency—represented by the reduction of electricity
demand—is also an important driver for the electricity prices. Whereas the demand decreases
in three studies (PIK/IIRM, Prognos/EWI/GWS and r2/EEFA), it increases in the two others
(IER/RWI/ZEW and enervis), see Figure 5d. This partly explains the low prices for PIK/
IIRM and Prognos/EWI/GWS. The decreasing prices in the PIK/IIRM scenario can mainly
be explained by the assumption of a very ambitious deployment path for renewable energies
along the numbers in Nitsch et al. (2010) that reaches 360 TWh in 2030, whereas in the
other studies only between 212 to 267 TWh (not shown here).
The sensitivity analysis and the comparison show that many other factors besides the
decision of the nuclear phase-out determine the electricity prices. These driving factors are
often exogenous assumptions in the models and can only to a certain degree be influenced by
political decisions and regulatory frameworks. We will elaborate on the policy implications of
this in the next section.
62
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
100 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
FIGURE 5
Results and assumptions from different studies. a) Wholesale prices for a nuclear phase-out in 2022,
and input assumptions for b) gas prices, c) CO
2
prices and d) gross electricity consumption. PIK/
IIRM refers to this publication. Enervis assumes a phase-out by 2020.
f4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODELING RESULTS g
The model-based analyses were mainly performed in the years 2010 and 2011, so the results
are based on core assumptions that reflect the expectation of that time, namely the develop-
ment of renewable capacities and the development of CO
2
prices. Do the assumptions of that
time hold in the current debate about the Energiewende? And what can we learn from these
modeling results today and for the future, retrospectively, around two years after the decision
on the nuclear phase-out was taken? In the following, we relate the policy implications of this
analysis to the three energy policy goals of competitiveness, environmental effectiveness and
security of supply. We compare model results with de facto developments and trace back the
differences to model assumptions.
The model-based studies concentrated mainly on the aspect of competitiveness in terms of
the magnitude of spot market prices, as increasing prices might potentially challenge the
competitiveness of the German industry (e.g. dpa, 2011; Handelsblatt, 2012; Manager-Ma-
gazin, 2012). Most models show increasing spot market prices, while at the moment the
opposite is observed. The modeling studies all assumed increasing fossil fuel prices and, more
importantly, increasing CO
2
prices (except in one study). However the situation today is very
different: we are a long way off the assumed starting price of at least 15 €/tCO
2
in 2015 (see
Figure 5c), and currently face the lowest prices since 2008 at 3€/tCO
2
in May 2013 (EEX,
2013). This, inter alia, has an effect on the spot market price which at 32€/MWh as a monthly
3.5 Policy Implications of the modelling results 63
101Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
average in May 2013 is at its lowest level since 2009 (IWR, 2013). In addition, fossil fuel
prices have increased only slightly between 2011 and 2012 and currently show a decreasing
trend (BDEW, 2013c). These two developments—together with the merit-order effect of
renewables (see below)—explain why retail prices for industrial consumers (excluding taxes
and FIT levy) have been stable between 2009 and 2012 and are decreasing in 2013 (BDEW,
2013c). Thus the expected effect of the nuclear phase-out on the spot market price has been
partly compensated for, and the burden for the German industry from the nuclear phase-out
is in fact smaller than projected by the model-based analyses. This emphasizes that nuclear
energy is mainly important for curbing the increase of electricity prices when CO
2
prices are
high. In response to the low spot market prices the FIT levy increased considerably from 3.6
ct/kWh in 2012 to 5.3 ct/kWh in January 2013, due to the counteracting effect of both price
components described in Section 2.3. As a result, the most debated issue in the context of
the Energiewende is currently the increase in consumer electricity prices and the related dis-
tributional issue (Neuhoff et al., 2013), but this goes beyond the model analysis.
Environmental effectiveness, i.e. the influence of the nuclear phase-out on CO
2
emissions,
was not the key aspect of the modeling studies. However, it is becoming increasingly important
in Germany and Europe, due to the decreasing CO
2
allowance price. This not only affects
the spot market price directly, but also via the merit order, so that coal will be more cost
competitive in comparison to gas (see Section 2.3). However, since coal is more emission
intensive than gas, this would result in an increase in total CO
2
emissions. This has important
implications both in the short-term and the long-term. In the short-term, as argued in Section
2.4, emissions are capped at the EU level. However, this could endanger the national target
of 40% GHG emission reduction by 2020 (Ziesing, 2013). In this context it is important to
note that energy related CO
2
emissions have increased slightly in 2012, partly due to a colder
winter and more heating demand, but also due to higher emissions from hard coal and lignite
(AGEB, 2013). For the long-term, a low CO
2
price sets problematic incentives: if investments
into coal capacities instead of gas power plant are incentivized, this has an effect on future
CO
2
emissions. In Figure 3 we have shown, based on the model results, that a switch from
coal to gas could decrease the emissions, which would not happen at low CO
2
prices. For the
future, the low CO
2
price at the European level and a switch from gas to coal could endanger
not only Germany’s emissions targets, but also European emissions, especially if no clear signal
for a GHG reduction target at 2030 is provided. Therefore, the discussion about a new EU
framework for 2030 is of considerable importance (European Commission, 2013). Otherwise
a lock-in into coal-based power plants might occur in Germany and in the EU, driven by the
combination of the nuclear phase-out and a low CO
2
price (see Pahle et al., 2013) that reflects
the lack of a reliable future framework and targets.
Security of supply is not directly addressed by the models, but it is implicitly assumed that
enough replacement capacities are available. This might be the strongest (model) assumption
and—besides increasing consumer prices—currently one of the most debated and crucial issues
in the nuclear phase-out discussion (BMWi, 2013). As assumed in the models and as planned
during the first decision of the nuclear phase-out, fossil fuel replacement capacities are indeed
being built, see Section 2.2. In addition, the increase in renewable capacities has greatly
exceeded expectations. The models in Section 3 assume that electricity generation from re-
newables will account for about 130–165 TWh in 2015. In fact, renewables were already
generating 135 TWh in 2012 (BDEW, 2013b), so that expected deployment by 2015 will
be higher than assumed by the models. In general, this has a positive effect on the security of
supply, but it also comes with some drawbacks.
64
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
102 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
First, renewables are not necessarily deployed where nuclear power plants are taken off
the grid. Current transfer capacity is limited or is under construction (Bundesnetzagentur,
2012) and is often not yet available. This might lead to regional supply problems, especially
in Southern Germany. Many observers expect this to become apparent when the nuclear power
plant in Grafenrheinfeld in Bavaria is switched off in 2015 with no available (regional) re-
placement capacities or new power grids (BMWi, 2013). This problem is exacerbated by the
current price developments (see above), which cause gas power plants to become increasingly
unprofitable and go offline. While this is not worrying from the overall market perspective,
the plants located in the south are deemed relevant for system stability. Largely for this reason,
there is currently a political debate as to whether an energy only market can provide the
relevant price signals, or whether specific capacity mechanisms are needed (see Agora Ener-
giewende (2013) for an overview of different proposals). However, from an economic point
of view, such a market-wide long-term mechanism is clearly the wrong solution for a transitory
and regional problem (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2012). Moreover, if such a mechanism is to
be set up, it should be considered, for efficiency reasons, in the framework of the European
internal energy market. This requires European coordination.
To conclude, model projections differ from current observations because some crucial
assumptions of the model-based analysis have not held. This implies that it is not possible to
isolate the effect of the phase-out decision on electricity prices and CO
2
emissions. In such a
context it is important to note that the results stem from partial electricity sector models that
only investigate the influence of the phase-out on some central variables, such as the electricity
price. In all of these models the deployment of renewables is given exogenously. Therefore,
they miss the (positive or negative) welfare effects of the expansion of renewable energy (Ed-
enhofer et al., 2013) and the interplay with the nuclear phase-out. The deployment of renew-
ables has largely grown through policy intervention and the justification and the degree of
subsidies for renewables is part of the current debate. These questions are beyond the modeling
frameworks and need further research. This is in addition to the analysis of the interaction of
renewable supporting schemes with other instruments, such as the EU ETS (Kalkuhl et al.,
2012).
f5. CONCLUSIONS g
In this paper we have reconsidered modeling studies that were performed to analyze the
German nuclear-phase out of 2011. The core of the modeling exercise, with the electricity
market model MICOES, was an extensive sensitivity analysis on critical input assumptions,
such as fossil fuel prices, CO
2
prices and the development of renewable energy deployment.
By comparing our model results to those of other studies, we have concentrated on the crucial
drivers behind the results and have deduced some policy implications for the situation-as-is.
The model-based analysis shows that the nuclear phase-out has a visible effect on the
wholesale electricity prices. On the other hand, uncertainty in some input assumptions, such
as the development of the gas price or energy efficiency, has a stronger effect than the timing
of the nuclear phase-out. This implies that exogenous drivers and assumptions determine the
electricity prices to a much greater extent than the phase-out itself. From comparison with
other studies, we can conclude that different assumptions lead to a variety of developments
of the electricity price which implies that the future development of electricity prices in
Germany is highly unpredictable. For the period between 2015 and 2030, three out of five
3.6 Conclusions 65
103Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
models show an increase in electricity prices while two show a decrease. We make the point
that crucial assumptions at that time, for example concerning increasing CO
2
prices, have
developed differently. This partly counteracts the negative effect of the nuclear phase-out on
electricity prices, but on the other hand challenges the mitigation of CO
2
emissions.
The sensitivity analysis has revealed that some assumptions have a substantial influence
on the model output, i.e. the electricity price. Whereas some of these assumptions, for example
the expansion of renewables or developments regarding energy efficiency, can be addressed by
policy measures, some others, for example the gas price, are independent of national policies.
This implies that policy-makers need to consider scenarios that analyze the whole range of
possible future developments. For this task, a structured model comparison with harmonized
input assumptions is required. Robust pathways that are valid under a range of assumptions
and across a range of models could be identified from such an analysis.
The modeling studies presented have tried to isolate the effect of the nuclear phase-out
by reflecting other important drivers through exogenous assumptions. Two years after the
decision to phase-out nuclear it turns out that some assumptions valid at that time have
changed and that the nuclear phase-out cannot be assessed in isolation from the broader
context. This context incorporates other developments such as the European CO
2
price or
the development of renewable capacities. Some of these aspects point towards a European
solution (Fischer and Geden, 2011). The EU ETS should be considered as crucial element
for a German mitigation strategy and more effort should be put on re-strengthening this
instrument. With a well-functioning EU ETS, CO
2
is avoided where emission reduction is
cheapest, thus enabling cost reduction of mitigation in Germany and all other European
countries. The further development of the EU emissions trading system is extremely important
for future climate and energy policy, although it might be difficult to implement a scheme
with a high enough carbon price and one that is able to cover all emissions. With this in
mind, an early agreement on a European GHG reduction target for 2030 should be an urgent
issue on the policy maker’s agenda. The security of supply also needs to be considered in a
European perspective to avoid lock-ins into national mechanisms considered necessary to
ensure adequate capacity. It goes without saying that this requires European coordination
beyond the current extent.
As initially indicated, we concentrated solely on the effect of the nuclear phase-out on
electricity prices for industry and on CO
2
emissions. Most modeling studies failed to inves-
tigate some of the most relevant factors in the current context, for example the decrease of
CO
2
prices, the rapid increase of renewables and the aspect of security of supply. But the
sensitivity analysis and the policy implications that we deduced from that indicates that the
different interacting instruments of renewable supporting schemes, emission pricing and ca-
pacity mechanisms for ensuring the security of supply emerge as the future challenges that
have to be tackled today. However these are the challenges of the entire “Energiewende”, i.e.
the transformation towards a “road into the age of renewables”. The influence of the nuclear
phase-out on this strategy seems to be only one of several challenges—and probably a small
one at that.
fACKNOWLEDGMENTS g
The authors would like to thank Mario Go¨tz (Institut fu¨r Infrastruktur und Ressourcenman-
gement, Leipzig) for supporting the modeling work with MICOES, Eva Schmid and two
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
66
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
104 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright 䉷2014 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
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pub/zew-docs/gutachten/Energieprognose_2009_Hauptbericht.pdf (accessed 11/06/2012).
Kalkuhl, M., O. Edenhofer and K. Lessmann (2012). Learning or Lock-in: Optimal Technology Policies to Support
Mitigation. Resource and Energy Economics, 34(1): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.08.001.
Knopf, B., H. Kondziella, M. Pahle, M. Go¨tz, T. Bruckner, and O. Edenhofer (2011a). Scenarios for Phasing Out
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Knopf, B., H. Kondziella, M. Pahle, M. Go¨tz, T. Bruckner, and O. Edenhofer (2011b). Der Einstieg in den
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Knopf, B., M. Pahle, and O. Edenhofer (2012). Der Erfolg der Energiewende ha¨ngt vom Strompreis ab—aber
eine robuste Energiestrategie ist noch nicht in Sicht. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 6/2012.
Kondziella, H., B. Mu¨ller, and T. Bruckner (2011). Preisdeterminanten des Stromgroßhandels in Frankreich. Eine
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0052-2 (accessed 11/06/2012).
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Deutschland bei Beru¨cksichtigung der Entwicklung in Europa und global. ’Leitstudie 2010’. Bundesministerium
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Pahle, M., Lessmann, Edenhofer, Bauer (in press). Investments in Imperfect Power Markets under Carbon Pricing:
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68
Chapter 3 Germany’s Nuclear Phase-out: Sensitivities and Impacts on
Electricity prices and CO2 Emissions
Chapter 4
EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische
Aufarbeitung der Debatte zur EEG Reform∗
Michael Pahle
Oliver Tietjen
Fabian Joas
Brigitte Knopf
∗Published as PIK-Diskussionspapier as: Pahle, M., Tietjen, O., Joas, F., Knopf, B. (2014):EE Förderin-
strumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische Aufarbeitung der Debatte zur EEG Reform, März 2014.
Link: https://www.pik-potsdam.de/members/pahle/pahle-et-al-forderung-ee-und-risiken-marz-2014.pdf
69
EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische
Aufarbeitung der Debatte zur EEG Reform
Diskussionspapier, März 2014
Dr. Michael Pahle*
Oliver Tietjen
Fabian Joas
Dr. Brigitte Knopf
*Kontakt: michael.pahle@pik-potsdam.de
70
Chapter 4 EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische Aufarbeitung
der Debatte zur EEG Reform
[1]
1. Einleitung
Die neue Bundesregierung hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, das Gesetz zur Förderung der EE noch in diesem
Jahr grundlegend zu reformieren und dafür am 10. Februar einen Gesetzentwurf vorgelegt. Weil sich
eine solche Maßnahme schon seit längerem abzeichnete, sind dafür in den letzten zwei Jahren eine Rei-
he von Vorschlägen für die Ausgestaltung eines entsprechenden Förderinstruments veröffentlich wor-
den, von denen Tabelle 1 eine Auswahl zeigt. Allen Studien ist gemeinsam, dass Kosten bzw. Effizienz als
Designkriterium für die Ausgestaltung des Förderinstruments eine besondere Rolle spielen. Dies liegt
nicht zuletzt daran, dass die gestiegenen Förderkosten des EEG als ein wesentlicher Grund genannt wer-
den, um die Förderung zu reformieren. Auch wenn in vielen Studien eine Reihe von weiteren Kriterien
zum Einsatz kommt, sind die Kosten politisch von besonderer Relevanz.
Autoren / Auftraggeber
Studie
Agora Energiewende (2013)
Ein radikal vereinfachtes EEG 2.0 und ein umfassender Marktdesign-
Prozess
BDI (2013)
Energiewende ganzheitlich denken
BDEW (2013)
Vorschläge für eine grundlegende Reform des EEG
Enervis & BET (2013)
[im Auftrag des VKU]
Ein zukunftsfähiges Energiemarktdesign für Deutschland
Frondel et al. (2012)
[RWI; im Auftrag der NISM]
Marktwirtschaftliche Energiewende: Ein Wettbewerbsrahmen für
die Stromversorgung mit alternativen Technologien
Frontier Economics (2012)
[im Auftrag von EnBW]
Die Zukunft des EEG – Handlungsoptionen und Reformansätze
Haucap & Kühling (2012)
[im Auftrag des SMWA]
Marktintegration der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien
Jacobs et al. (2013)
[IASS]
Eckpunkte für die Gestaltung der Energiewende
Kopp et al. (2013)
[arrhenius, Ecofys, MVV & Takon]
Wege in ein wettbewerbliches Strommarktdesign für erneuerbare
Energien
Leprich et al. (2013)
[IZES, Universität Würzburg & BET;
im Auftrag der BW Stiftung]
Stromsystem-Design: Das EEG 2.0 und Eckpfeiler eines zukünftigen
Regenerativwirtschaftsgesetzes
Löschel et al. (2013)
[ZEW]
Den Strommarkt an die Wirklichkeit anpassen: Skizze einer neuen
Marktordnung
Monopolkommission (2013)
Energie 2013: Wettbewerb in Zeiten der Energiewende
SR Umwelt (2013)
Den Strommarkt der Zukunft gestalten
SR Wirtschaft (2013)
Energiepolitik: Warten auf die dringend notwendigen Weichenstel-
lungen. Kapitel 10 des Jahresgutachten 2013/14
Tabelle 1: Vorschläge zur EEG Reform bzw. zum Strommarktdesign
Im Hinblick auf die Kosten ist ein Aspekt von zentraler Bedeutung: die mit der Wahl des Förderinstru-
ments verbundenen Risiken bzw. deren Verteilung zwischen Investoren und Konsumenten. Dies zeigt
sich vor allem am Beispiel der handelbaren Grünstromzertifikate (Quote). Befürworter dieses Instru-
ments verweisen darauf, dass Investoren durch die damit verbundene Übernahme von Risiken Anreize
zu effizienterem Handeln haben. Gegner dieses Instruments hingegen verweisen auf die anfallenden
Kosten durch vergleichsweise hohe Risikoprämien. Dieses Beispiel zeigt, dass Risiko – in Form von „Ver-
meiden“ und „Übernehmen“ – gleichzeitig als Argument für und gegen ein und dasselbe Förderinstru-
ment angebracht wird. Diese unterschiedlichen Standpunkte ziehen unterschiedliche Forderungen nach
4.1 Einleitung 71
[2]
der Allokation des Risikos mit sich, die letztendlich den Kern der Debatte um die Reform des EE Förder-
instruments darstellen.
Doch obwohl Risiken eine wichtige Rolle spielen werden sie in den Vorschlägen – wenn überhaupt –
meist nur oberflächlich behandelt. Dabei gibt es eine Reihe von wichtigen Fragen, die in diesem Zusam-
menhang immer wieder auftauchen: Was bedeutet Risiko überhaupt und in welchem Zusammenhang
steht es mit Unsicherheit? Können Risiken reduziert bzw. komplett vermieden werden? Welche Risiken
sind überhaupt mit der Förderung der EE verbunden und wie werden sie durch unterschiedliche Instru-
mente auf Investoren und Konsumenten verteilt? Und in welchem Zusammenhang stehen Marktintegra-
tion und Risiken?
Dieses Papier beleuchtet diese Fragen aus ökonomischer Sicht und ordnet die Ergebnisse abschließend
politisch ein. Dabei werden an wesentlichen Stellen Argumente und Positionen aus ausgewählten Vor-
schlägen aufgegriffen, um davon ausgehend den jeweiligen Sachverhalt zu erörtern bzw. um diese Ar-
gumente zu beleuchten. Das Ziel dieses Papiers ist damit, die Debatte um die EE Förderinstrumente im
Hinblick auf die mit Bezug zu Risiken vorgebrachten Argumente aus ökonomischer Sicht aufzuarbeiten;
eine unmittelbare Bewertung der Instrumente erfolgt nicht.
Das Papier ist wie folgt aufgebaut: Abschnitt 2 beginnt mit einer grundlegenden Betrachtung des Risikos
für die Kosten der Stromversorgung aus gesellschaftlicher Sicht. Es wird dargestellt, worin dieses Risiko
besteht, wie es ggf. reduziert werden kann und ob es in dieser Hinsicht eine Unterscheidung zwischen
öffentlichen und privaten Investitionen geben sollte. Auf dieser Basis wird erläutert, dass die Reduzie-
rung von Risiken für EE Investoren durch bestimmte Förderinstrumente lediglich zu einer Verschiebung
dieser Risiken auf andere Investoren bzw. Stromkunden und damit unterschiedlichen Risikoallokationen
führt, das gesellschaftliche Gesamtrisiko dabei allerdings erhalten bleibt. In Abschnitt 3 werden die Risi-
koallokationen unterschiedlicher Förderinstrumente genauer betrachtet und erläutert, welche konkre-
ten Risiken bestehen und wie sich diese ggf. durch die Steuerung eines Instruments reduzieren lassen. In
Abschnitt 4 werden die unterschiedlichen Risiken der verschiedenen Förderinstrumente für EE Investo-
ren genauer beschrieben. Es wird dargestellt, dass die Marktintegration der EE gleichbedeutend mit der
Übernahme von Risiken ist, deren letztendlich erwünschter Effekt eine Verhaltensänderung ist, die das
Eigeninteresse der Investoren im Markt in unternehmerische Initiative zum gesellschaftlichen Wohl
übersetzt (dynamische Effizienz). Dabei wird auch diskutiert, welche Auswirkungen das Tragen von Risi-
ken auf die Struktur der Akteure bzw. Investoren hat. In Abschnitt 5 werden die obigen Befunde zusam-
mengefasst und vor diesem Hintergrund die aktuellen Eckpunkte der Bundesregierung zur EEG Reform
eingeordnet und diskutiert.
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Chapter 4 EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische Aufarbeitung
der Debatte zur EEG Reform
[3]
2. Gesellschaftliches Kostenrisiko & Risikokosten der EE Förderung
Im Hinblick auf die Risiken der EE Förderung stellt sich zuallererst die Frage, welches konkrete Risiko aus
gesellschaftlicher Sicht überhaupt von Belang ist und wodurch es entsteht. Aus ökonomischen Sicht wird
im Fall gegebener politischer Ziele in der Regel die Kosteneffektivität als Evaluationskriterium herange-
zogen, also zu welchen Kosten dieses Ziel jetzt und in Zukunft erreicht werden kann. Dabei muss jedoch
berücksichtigt werden, dass die Erzeugung von EE Strom mit der sonstigen Stromversorgung interagiert.
Aus diesem Grund sind volkswirtschaftlich gesehen nicht allein die Förderkosten für EE Strom relevant,
sondern die gesamten Kosten der Stromversorgung bei einem gegebenen Ziel für den EE Stromanteil.
Ganz allgemein – und vorerst unabhängig von den EE – besteht hinsichtlich dieser Kosten der Stromver-
sorgung dahingehend ein Risiko, dass aus heutiger Sicht Unsicherheiten darüber bestehen, mit welchem
Technologiemix zukünftig die geringstmöglichen Gesamtkosten zu erreichen sind. Denn wesentliche
Kostenfaktoren wie zum Beispiel Anlagen- und Brennstoffpreise verändern sich im Lauf der Zeit und sind
langfristig nur schwer vorhersagbar1. Daher ist das Tätigen von Investitionen bzw. der Ausbau des
Kraftwerkparks mit einem Kostenrisiko verbunden, das in Anlehnung an die Risikodefinition von Kast &
Lapied (2006:2) wie folgt definiert werden kann: Heutige (sichere) Investitionen in Erzeugungskapazitä-
ten transformieren sich in eine Verteilung von zukünftigen Stromversorgungskosten. Von Bedeutung
dabei ist, dass sich nach der gängigen Definition von Knight (1921) Risiko nur auf den Teil der Unsicher-
heit bezieht, der sich über konkrete Wahrscheinlichkeiten quantifizieren lässt. Das bedeutet, dass Risiko
eine prinzipiell kalkulierbare Größe ist und sich wie in Abbildung 1 schematisch dargestellt aus einer
Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung ableitet. Die blaue Linie entspricht der Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung der
zukünftigen Kosten (C); die rote vertikale Linie kennzeichnet den Mittelwert und die rote horizontale
Linie die Standardabweichung, die häufig als Maß für das Risiko herangezogen wird.
Abbildung 1: Schematische Darstellung des Risikos zukünftiger Kosten
Angesichts dieser Situation stellt sich die Frage, ob und wie das Kostenrisiko gegebenenfalls reduziert
werden kann. Ansätze und Verfahren dafür liefert die Portfoliotheorie, die Investitionsverhalten und -
strategien an Kapitalmärkten untersucht; eine kurze Darstellung der Grundlagen findet sich zum Beispiel
bei Awerbuch & Berger (2003). Die auf Basis dieser Theorie ermittelten effizienten Portfolien kennzeich-
nen sich dadurch, dass sie die erwarteten Kosten für ein gegebenes Risiko minimieren bzw. für gegebe-
ne erwartete Kosten das Risiko minimieren. In anderen Worten: ein effizientes Portfolio nimmt kein
unnötiges Risiko in Kauf (Awerbuch & Berger 2003:4). In der Menge aller möglichen Portfolios bilden die
effizienten Portfolios den sogenannten „effizienten Rand“ (risk efficent frontier), der in Abbildung 2 als
blaue Kurve entlang der (effizienten) Portfolien A-B-C schematisch für die gesellschaftliche Kostenper-
1 Analog zum Kostenrisiko besteht auch ein Nutzenrisiko, das allerdings hier nicht betrachtet wird.
4.2 Gesellschaftliches Kostenrisiko & Risikokosten der EE Förderung 73
[4]
spektive2 dargestellt ist. Die Menge aller möglichen Portfolien liegt „rechts“ dieser Kurve und ist bei-
spielhaft durch das (nicht-effiziente) Portfolio D dargestellt.
Abbildung 2: Schematischer effizienter Rand (gesellschaftliche Perspektive)
Kernidee der Portfoliotheorie ist, dass das Risiko von Investitionen durch Diversifizierung reduziert wer-
den kann. Diversifizierung beruht auf dem Umstand, dass die Varianz der zukünftigen Kosten – also das
Risiko – eines Portfolios geringer ist als die Summe der einzelnen Varianzen aller Anlagen innerhalb des
Portfolios, sofern deren Risiken nicht vollständig miteinander korreliert sind (portfolio effect). Übertra-
gen auf die Stromversorgung bedeutet dies, dass sich das Kostenrisiko durch eine geeignete Diversifizie-
rung des Technologiemixes bzw. der entsprechenden Investitionen reduzieren lässt. Beispielsweise kann
es bei unsicheren Brennstoffpreisen weniger riskant sein, ein Kohlekraftwerk und ein Gaskraftwerk zu
bauen als nur ein Kraftwerk (Gas oder Kohle) mit der gleichen Gesamtkapazität, da das Preisrisiko beider
Brennstoffe nicht vollständig miteinander korreliert ist. Diese Theorie wird im Stromsektor seit den 70er
Jahren sowohl aus gesellschaftlicher als auch privatwirtschaftlicher Perspektive angewendet; eine Über-
sicht über bisherige Arbeiten und weitere Anwendungen finden sich bei Roques et al. (2008) und Lynch
et al. (2013).
Die Reduzierung des Risikos durch Diversifizierung bedeutet allerdings gleichzeitig, dass sich der Erwar-
tungswert der Kosten der Stromversorgung erhöht. Das ergibt sich aus dem Verlauf des effizienten
Rands: je geringer das gegebene Risiko, desto höher die erwartete Kosten des Portfolios. Ein gegenüber
zukünftigen Kostenrisiken besser abgesicherter Technologiemix führt also zu höheren erwarteten Kos-
ten der Stromversorgung und entsprechend zu höheren Strompreisen. Dieser Effekt ist in Abbildung 3
dargestellt.
2 Bei privaten Investoren ist der Bezugspunkt der Ertrag und nicht die Kosten. In diesem Fall ist der effiziente Rand
konkav und nicht konvex.
74
Chapter 4 EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische Aufarbeitung
der Debatte zur EEG Reform
[5]
Abbildung 3: Schematische Darstellung der erwarteten Kosten & Risiken zweier Portfolien
Wie entscheidet sich nun die Wahl zwischen einem eher riskanten (aber erwartet günstigerem) und
einem eher weniger riskantem (aber erwartet teurerem) Portfolio? In dieser Hinsicht maßgeblich ist die
Risikoaversion der Gesellschaft bzw. der Investoren, die diese Entscheidung treffen. Risikoneutrale In-
vestoren sind indifferent gegenüber Risiko und entscheiden sich für das „günstigere“ Portfolio, wohin-
gegen sich risikoaverse Investoren für das „weniger riskante“ Portfolio entscheiden. Entscheidend dafür
ist, in welcher Form die Stromversorgung organisiert ist bzw. durch welche Akteure die Gesellschaft
Investitionen tätigt. In einem liberalisierten Markt sind die dezentralen Risikoaversionen der privaten
Akteure ausschlaggebend, in einem regulierten Markt hingegen die „zentrale Risikoaversion“ des Regu-
lierers bzw. Staates. Die Frage, ob und wie sich die Risikoaversion in beiden Fällen unterscheidet bzw.
unterscheiden sollte wird weiter unten diskutiert. Davon abgesehen gilt auf individueller Ebene, dass
Menschen in der Regel umso risikoaverser sind, je höher der Wert der Investition ist (risk averse at the
margin) (Harrison 2010:39)3. Die grundsätzliche Risikobereitschaft bzw. -wahrnehmung wird dabei ver-
mutlich durch kulturelle und genetisch Faktoren bedingt (Barnea, Cronqvist, et al. 2010).
Wenn das Risiko einer Investition die Risikobereitschaft eines Investors überschreitet stehen drei mögli-
che Kontrakte zum Transfer von Risiko (risky contracts) zur Verfügung, die entweder auf Finanzmärkten
oder bilateral gehandelt werden (Kast & Lapied 2006:2): (a) Risikoteilung (risk sharing) zwischen mehre-
ren Akteuren bzgl. der Investitionen und Erträge, (b) Aufnahme von Fremdkapital mit entsprechender
Übertragung des Risikos, und (c) Versicherung. In den beiden letzten Fällen verlangt die Gegenseite (Ka-
pitalgeber bzw. Versicherer) eine zusätzliche Risiko- bzw. Versicherungsprämie, die der Differenz zwi-
schen erwartetem Ertrag und dem sogenannten Sicherheitsäquivalent (certainty equivalent) entspricht.
Diese Prämien erhöhen als sogenannte Risikokosten (cost of risk) zwar die Kosten einer Investition, füh-
ren allerdings gleichzeitig zu einer effizienten Risikoallokation: Jeder Akteur trägt genau das Risiko, das
er bereit ist zu tragen. Im Hinblick auf die Stromversorgung bedeutet dies, dass sich die Wahl des Risiko-
Kosten-Verhältnis des Technologiemixes bzw. Portfolios als Konsequenz der sich über die Märkte
(Strommarkt und Finanzmarkt) einstellenden Risikoallokation ergibt.
3 Dies trifft insbesondere auf „einseitiges“ Risiko zu; beispielsweise werden beim Lottospiel geringer Beträge in
Hoffnung auf mögliche hohe Gewinne gesetzt, während mögliche hohe Verluste durch Versicherungen abgesi-
chert werden (Friedman & Savage 1948).
4.2 Gesellschaftliches Kostenrisiko & Risikokosten der EE Förderung 75
[6]
Was bedeuten diese Ausführungen nun im Hinblick auf die Debatte um das Förderinstrument für EE?
Numerische Analysen wie beispielsweise von Kitzing (2014) für Windenergie in Dänemark bestätigen,
dass Instrumente mit höheren Marktrisiken für Investoren auch höhere Risikoprämien und damit Vergü-
tungssätze erfordern. In dieser Hinsicht wird wie oben beschrieben häufig argumentiert, dass vor allem
die Quote wegen vergleichsweiser hoher Risikoprämien letztendlich „zu teuer“ sei. Wie allerdings erläu-
tert stellen diese Prämien keine zusätzlichen bzw. „nicht notwendigen“ Kosten dar, weil sie prinzipiell zu
einer effizienten Allokation des Risikos und damit einem im Verhältnis von Risiko und Kosten effizienten
Technologiemix führen. Daher gilt für den Fall der Förderung durch das EEG, wo aufgrund der festgeleg-
ten Vergütung keine oder nur sehr geringe Risikoprämien fällig werden, dass das Risiko nicht „ver-
schwindet“, sondern lediglich von EE Investoren auf Investoren in Konventionelle und Stromverbraucher
übertragen wird. Dies ist ein entscheidender Aspekte, der in der Debatte vor allem bei der Kritik an der
Quote häufig außer Acht gelassen wird; siehe dazu auch die Ausführungen der Monopolkommission
(2013:148).
Aus Sicht von Bofinger (2013) bestehen an dieser Schlussfolgerung jedoch Zweifel, weil das Tragen des
Risikos durch den Verbraucher letztendlich mit geringeren Kosten verbunden sei. Ausgangspunkt seiner
Kritik ist die mit der Monopolkommission übereinstimmende Feststellung von Frontier Economics
(2012), dass es aus gesellschaftlicher Sicht irrelevant sei, ob die Risiken von Investoren oder Stromver-
brauchern getragen werden. Er kritisiert dies wie folgt: „Diese Argumentation übersieht […], dass man
Risiken in einer Volkswirtschaft durch Diversifikation reduzieren kann. Genau hierin besteht der entschei-
dende Vorteil der Preissteuerung. Die EEG-Umlage beläuft sich derzeit auf rund 0,5 % der Ausgaben eines
durchschnittlichen Privathaushalts. Selbst eine unerwartete Verdopplung der Kosten der Preissteuerung
würde für die meisten Haushalte somit keine merkliche Belastung bedeuten. Die Risiken der Preissteue-
rung werden also aufgrund ihres sehr geringen Anteils an den Verbrauchsausgaben nahezu perfekt
diversifiziert.“ (Bofinger 2013:30).
Die Details dieses Arguments erläutert Bofinger zwar nicht, aber im Kern handelt es sich dabei um das
sogenannte Arrow-Lind Theorem (Arrow & Lind 1970)4. Es lässt sich nach Baumstark & Collier (2013)
wie folgt zusammenfassen: „When an investment project yields socio-economic net benefits that are
uncertain but independent of the systematic risk of the economy, these benefits should be discounted at
the risk free rate if they are disseminated among a large population of stakeholders. This may be the
case of a public project whose benefits are distributed within the large population of taxpayers“. Seine
beiden Kernaussagen sind die folgenden (vgl. Jensen & Bailey 1972:4): Erstens, aufgrund der angenom-
menen Unabhängigkeit vom systematischen Risiko stellt das Projekt eine Versicherung gegenüber der
gesamten makroökonomischen Entwicklung dar (Risikodiversifizierung). Zweitens, durch die Verteilung
des Risikos auf eine sehr große Zahl von Steuerzahlern fällt der anteilige Betrag relativ gering aus. Unter
Annahme sinkender Risikoaversion bzw. marginalen Risikokosten einzelner Individuen bei sinkenden
Risiken (siehe oben) wäre die individuelle Risikoprämie damit quasi null (Reduzierung der Risikokosten
durch Risikoteilung), was in Abbildung 4 verdeutlicht ist.
4 Weiterhin sprich Bofinger von einer Risikodiversifizierung, meint allerdings in dem von ihm beschriebenen Argu-
ment eine Risikoteilung (siehe oben). Diversifizierung ist jedoch auch ein Bestandteil des Theorems.
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[7]
Abbildung 4: Individuelle Risikokosten (nach Baumstark & Gollier 2013)
Beiden Aussagen unterliegen jedoch relativ spezifische Annahmen, die nicht ohne weiteres auf jedes in
der Praxis durchgeführte öffentliche Projekt übertragen werden können. In dieser Hinsicht ist das Arrow
Lind Theorem vielfach kritisiert bzw. weiter differenziert worden, z.B. ursprünglich von Jensen & Bailey
(1972) und in den letzten Jahren von Kast & Lapied (2006), Harrison (2010) und Baumstark & Gollier
(2013). Dies betrifft einerseits die Unabhängigkeit des Risikos vom gesamten makroökonomischen Risiko
(systematic risk): Man kann nicht davon ausgehen, dass öffentliche Projekte tendenziell eine geringere
Korrelation haben als private Projekte5. Da sich das „gesellschaftliche Portfolio“ aus der Summe aller
privaten und öffentlichen Portfolien zusammensetzt, besteht also hier kein systematischer Unterschied.
Dementsprechend findet auch keine Diversifizierung bzw. Reduzierung des Risikos statt6. Im Hinblick auf
die Risikoteilung gibt es zwei wesentliche Gegenargumente: Erstens, anders als die Kosten sind die Nut-
zen öffentlicher Projekte in der Regel nicht wie von Arrow und Lind angenommen gleich verteilt. Zwei-
tens, Finanzmärkte können die Risiken insgesamt effizienter als der Staat verteilen. Effizient bedeutet
dabei, dass jeder Einzelne durch individuelle Beteiligungen an mehr oder weniger riskanten Anlagen
bzw. Investitionen an diesen Märkten selbst entscheiden kann, wie viel Risiko er eingehen möchte. Das
Risiko wird also insgesamt von den Akteuren und Individuen getragen, die bereit sind es zu tragen bzw.
für die es mit den geringsten Kosten einhergeht. Zumindest aus theoretischer Sicht sind damit die ge-
samtgesellschaftlichen Risikokosten minimal bzw. das Risiko effizient verteilt (siehe oben)7.
Anders als von Bofinger postuliert reduziert das EEG bzw. eine Preissteuerung mit Übertragung der Risi-
ken auf die Stromverbraucher daher weder das gesellschaftliche Gesamtrisiko noch dessen Kosten. Zwar
unterscheiden sich die Risikoprämien bei den Förderinstrumenten – aber nur, weil sie die tatsächlich
vorhandenen Risiken bzw. deren Kosten wiederspiegeln bzw. in unterschiedlichem Maß auf die EE Inves-
toren übertragen. Insbesondere ist daher eine Kritik der Quote auf dieser Basis irreführend, denn „this
bang for the buck measure neglects the impacts on actors other than investors in renewables and those
who pay subsidies” (Schmalensee 2012:50). Diese Auswirkungen bzw. die Risikoallokationen der unter-
schiedlichen Förderinstrumente werden im nächsten Abschnitt genauer betrachtet.
5 Jensen & Bailey (1972) nennen als Beispiel Infrastrukturen wie Straßen und Strom, deren gesellschaftlicher Wert
mit dem wirtschaftlichen Output steigt bzw. fällt, deren Risiken also korreliert sind.
6 Darüber hinaus bestehen angesichts einer Reihe von historischen Beispielen Zweifel, ob der Staat bei öffentlichen
Investitionen überhaupt aktiv das Risiko steuert (Harrison 2010:40).
7 In der Praxis gilt dies in vollem Umfang allerdings nur dann, wenn „perfect markets for the fractional claims on
the return on assets“ existieren (Jensen & Bailey 1972:12).
4.2 Gesellschaftliches Kostenrisiko & Risikokosten der EE Förderung 77
[8]
3. Risikoallokation bei unterschiedlichen EE Förderinstrumenten
Im Folgenden werden die Risikoallokation der gängigen Instrumente – also welche Akteure bei welchem
Förderinstrument welches Risiko tragen – in einem stilisierten quasistatischen Modellrahmen unter-
sucht, wobei aus formalen Gründen nur Risiken für Investoren betrachtet werden8. Die Analyse unter-
scheidet vereinfachend nicht zwischen Erzeugung und Investitionen (Kapazität) und geht davon aus,
dass nur über die Grenzkosten der EE Unsicherheit besteht. Die durch Wetterunsicherheiten bedingten
Unsicherheiten der Erzeugung von fluktuierenden EE werden vorerst nicht betrachtet, aber im Anschluss
diskutiert. Weiterhin wird nur eine generische EE Technologie betrachtet und idealisierte Märkte bzw.
Förderinstrumente angenommen9. Der Ablauf der Entscheidungen innerhalb des Modells ist wie folgt:
Im ersten Schritt legt ein Regulator die Förderhöhe des Instruments so fest, dass gemäß den erwarteten
Kosten ein bestimmtes EE Mengenziel erreicht wird. Im zweiten Schritt löst sich die Unsicherheit auf und
das jeweilige Marktgleichgewicht zwischen erneuerbarer und konventioneller Erzeugung stellt sich ein.
Da diese Analyse eine Reihe von vereinfachenden Annahmen trifft wird abschließend diskutiert, in wel-
chem Umfang die Ergebnisse auf die konkrete deutsche Situation übertragbar sind und was dies für den
Unterschied bzgl. des regulatorischen Risikos bedeutet.
Im Fall einer fixen Einspeisevergütung wie in Abbildung 5 dargestellt legt der Regulator eine Vergütung
fest, durch die sich die EE vollständig finanzieren. Die Menge an erzeugten EE Strom (qEE) ist von links
nach rechts dargestellt und ergibt sich damit ausschließlich über die Grenzkosten der EE und die Höhe
der Einspeisevergütung (EV). Die Menge an erzeugtem konventionellem Strom (qKV) ist von rechts nach
links dargestellt und ergibt sich aus der Differenz von Gesamtnachfrage (Q) und erzeugtem EE Strom.
Der Strompreis entspricht den Grenzkosten der konventionellen Stromerzeugung. Der Regulator legt wie
beschrieben die Einspeisevergütung (EV) so fest, dass sich bei den erwarteten Grenzkosten die durch
das Ausbauziel vorgegebene Menge an EE einstellt. Weichen die tatsächlichen Kosten allerdings nach
unten oder oben ab, so ergeben sich unterschiedliche EE Mengen, die nur durch die Kosten der EE be-
stimmt sind, weil der Strompreis nicht Teil der Erlöse ist. Diese Spreizung stellt ein EE Mengenrisiko
(∆QEE) dar, das sich auf den Anteil an konventioneller Erzeugung bzw. den Strompreis überträgt, und
somit ein Strompreisrisiko (∆p) für Investitionen in Konventionelle darstellt.
8 Das Risiko für Konsumenten setzt sich aus zwei zusammenhängenden Komponenten zusammen (Strompreisrisi-
ko, Vergütungsrisiko). Die relative Höhe dieses Risiko kann nicht ohne weiteres grafisch bestimmt werden.
9 Eine ähnliche, aber weniger umfangreiche Analyse findet sich bei Schmalensee (2012).
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[9]
Abbildung 5: Fixe Einspeisevergütung
Im Fall einer Förderung mittels einer Quote wie in Abbildung 6 dargestellt setzt der Regulator lediglich
die Menge, die immer „sicher“ erreicht wird, da EE Investoren genau in diesem Umfang die Differenz
zwischen Kosten und Strompreis durch den Verkauf von Zertifikaten ausgleichen können. Für EE Investo-
ren besteht jedoch hinsichtlich des Zertifikatspreises ein Vergütungsrisiko, das sich unmittelbar aus der
Unsicherheit über die aggregierte EE Kostenkurve ergibt. Durch die konstante EE Menge allerdings be-
steht kein EE Mengenrisiko (∆QEE) und somit auch kein zusätzliches Strompreisrisiko (∆p) für Investitio-
nen in Konventionelle.
Abbildung 6: Quote
Im Fall einer Förderung mittels einer fixen Marktprämie wie in Abbildung 7 dargestellt stellt sich die
Situation komplexer dar. In diesem Fördersystem übernehmen Investoren zwar ein Preisrisiko, tragen
allerdings kein Vergütungsrisiko, weil ihnen eine fixe Prämie garantiert wird. Das Tragen des Preisrisikos
führt dazu, dass sie die Änderung des Strompreises durch die EE Erzeugung mit einkalkulieren und sie
entsprechend anpassen. Stellt sich beispielsweise heraus, dass die Kosten der EE niedriger sind als er-
wartet, so erhöhen sie ihre Erzeugung soweit, bis die Summe aus Strompreis und Prämie gleich den
Grenzkosten der EE ist – jedoch weniger stark als bei der fixen Vergütung, weil sie das dadurch resultie-
4.3 Risikoallokation bei unterschiedlichen EE Förderinstrumenten 79
[10]
rende Absinken des Preises berücksichtigen. Durch diese „gegensteuernde“ Anpassung der Menge redu-
ziert sich im Vergleich zur fixen Einspeisevergütung das EE Mengenrisiko (∆QEE) und damit das Strom-
preisrisiko (∆p) für Investitionen in Konventionelle.
Abbildung 7: Fixe Marktprämie
Wird die fixe Marktprämie regulatorisch festgelegt, so hat auch eine eventuelle Kostenunsicherheit der
Konventionellen Auswirkungen auf die entsprechenden Risiken. Dieser Fall ist in Abbildung 8 dargestellt:
Das potentielle Mengenrisiko der EE (∆QEE) wird größer, weil im Fall hoher Kosten für die EE und niedri-
ger Kosten für die Konventionellen (Punkt A) noch weniger bzw. im umgekehrten Fall (Punkt D) noch
mehr EE Strom produziert wird. Das potentielle Strompreisrisiko (∆p) steigt ebenfalls, weil im Fall hoher
Kosten für die EE und hoher Kosten für die Konventionellen (Punkt B) noch mehr bzw. im umgekehrten
Fall (Punkt C) noch weniger EE Strom produziert wird. Die letztendliche Ursache dieser Effekte ist, dass
der Regulator bei der Festlegung der Marktprämie den späteren Strompreis berücksichtigen muss, über
den allerdings durch die Kostenunsicherheit der Konventionellen ebenfalls Unsicherheit besteht. Wie
sich dadurch das Gesamtrisiko für Konventionelle in diesem Fall im Vergleich zu einer Einspeisevergü-
tung verändert, kann allerdings in dieser einfachen Analyse nicht ermittelt werden.
Abbildung 8: Fixe Marktprämie mit zusätzlichem Strompreisrisiko
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[11]
Diese höheren Risiken lassen sich jedoch auch vermeiden, wenn die Prämie nicht regulatorisch, sondern
über eine Auktionierung festgelegt wird. Der Grund dafür ist, dass es sich bei einer Auktionierung eben-
falls um eine Form der Mengensteuerung handelt, sofern festgelegte Mengen bzw. Kapazitäten auktio-
niert werden. Der prinzipielle Vergütungsmechanismus ist damit – zumindest in dem hier verwendeten
Modellrahmen – identisch mit einer Quote, auch wenn die Höhe der Vergütung grundsätzlich über einen
anderen Marktmechanismus festgelegt wird. Dementsprechend sind auch die EE Mengenrisiken und die
Vergütungsspannen (auktionierte Prämien bzw. Zertifikatspreise) bei beiden Instrumenten identisch
(vgl. Abbildung 6).
Die Identität zwischen beiden Instrumenten löst sich jedoch auf, wenn man explizit zwischen Investition
und Erzeugung unterscheidet. Denn mit einer auktionierten fixen Marktprämie wird in der Regel der
Zubau von Kapazitäten gesteuert, wohingegen eine Quote die tatsächliche Erzeugung im Prinzip „punkt-
genau“ steuern kann. Dabei muss jedoch berücksichtigt werden, dass im Fall von dargebotsabhängigen
EE wie Wind und Sonne wetterbedingte Unsicherheiten der Erzeugung bestehen, die sich auch durch
eine Quote nicht genau steuern lassen. Werden beispielsweise zum großen Anteil Windenergieanlagen
gefördert, so ist die gesamte EE Menge in einem Schwachwindjahr relativ gering und in einem Stark-
windjahr relativ hoch. Die Erfüllung der Mengenziele kann zwar bilanziell durch Zurücklegen und Vor-
wegnehmen (banking & borrowing) der Zertifikate erreicht werden, die Volatilität der EE Erzeugung
hingegen bleibt davon unberührt. Langfristig spielt diese Volatilität zwar nur eine geringe Rolle, da sich
extreme Wetterlagen über die Jahre ausgleichen und Betreiber durch den Bau bzw. das Abschalten von
Anlagen auf ein längerfristiges Über- bzw. Unterangebot von Zertifikaten reagieren. Kurz- bis mittelfris-
tig allerdings besteht auch bei einer Quote ein (wetterbedingtes) Mengenrisiko und ein damit verbun-
denes Strompreisrisiko.
Zusammenfassend zeigt sich im Rahmen dieser theoretischen Analysen, dass die Reduzierung der Inves-
titionsrisiken für EE durch die Wahl eines entsprechenden Förderinstruments nicht nur mit einer Über-
tragung des Risikos auf die Konsumenten, sondern auch mit einer Erhöhung des Investitionsrisikos für
Konventionelle einhergeht. Der letztendliche Grund dafür ist die Form der Steuerung durch Preise oder
Mengen (vgl. Menanteau, Finon, et al. 2003) bzw. die Einbeziehung des Strommarktes in die Förderung.
Bei Unsicherheiten über die Kosten führt eine Steuerung durch Preise (Vergütung) grundsätzlich zu Un-
sicherheiten über die erzeugte Menge an EE Strom. Muss der EE Strom vermarktet werden (Marktprä-
mie), so wirkt der Strompreis als Korrektiv, da höhere EE Mengen deren Marktwert senken. Wird der EE
Strom hingegen nicht vermarktet (Einspeisevergütung), so übersetzt sich die Kostenunsicherheit voll-
ständig in eine Mengenunsicherheit und ein dementsprechendes Investitionsrisiko. Bei einer Mengen-
steuerung und gleichzeitiger Vermarktung des EE Stroms (Quote) tritt – zumindest langfristig – keine
Mengenunsicherheit auf.
Dass es in der Tat zu beachtlichen EE Mengenrisiken durch Kostenunsicherheiten im Fall einer fixen Ein-
speisevergütung kommen kann zeigt das Beispiel der PV Förderung durch das EEG in den Jahren 2010
bis 2012. In diesem Zeitraum wurden entgegen den ursprünglichen Plänen nach NREAP jährlich jeweils
rund 7 GW neue Kapazität zugebaut. Ursache dafür waren vor allem die in dieser Zeit unerwartet stark
sinkenden Kosten von PV und die relativ langen Reaktionszeiten für grundlegende Anpassungen der
Förderungen, die nur im Rahmen einer EEG Novelle möglich waren. Zwar hat der unmittelbare Effekt auf
4.3 Risikoallokation bei unterschiedlichen EE Förderinstrumenten 81
[12]
die Kosten der EE Förderung einen Eingang in die Debatte gefunden, der indirekte Effekt des damit ver-
bundenen Risikos für Konventionelle allerdings fand weit weniger Beachtung. Genauer gesagt: Investo-
ren in Konventionelle konnten in diesen Jahren ihren Marktanalysen lediglich den nicht verbindlichen
Ausbau der PV gemäß NREAP zugrunde legen, der jedoch tatsächlich weit übertroffen wurde. Anekdoti-
scher Evidenz zufolge hätte eine Kenntnis des tatsächlichen Ausbaus zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine un-
günstigere Bewertung von Investitionen in Gaskraftwerke zur Folge gehabt.
Die historischen Probleme des EEG beim Ausbau der PV sind jedoch keine grundlegenden Unzulänglich-
keiten dieses Instruments und können in einem gewissen Umfang korrigiert werden. Denn das tatsächli-
che Ausmaß der steuerungsbedingten Unsicherheit der EE Erzeugung bestimmt sich durch zwei wesent-
liche Faktoren: (a) die Höhe der Unsicherheit über die zukünftigen Kosten der EE und (b) die Schnellig-
keit und Flexibilität mit der der Regulator in der Lage ist, auf unerwartete Kostenentwicklungen zu rea-
gieren. Im Hinblick auf (a) ist das Risiko umso größer, je dynamischer bzw. volatiler die Märkte für EE
Technologien sind. Bei relativ beständigen Investitionskosten ist die Notwendigkeit von Anpassungen
der Vergütungen also relativ gering. Im Hinblick auf (b) ist das Risiko umso größer, je länger die Reakti-
onszeiten des steuernden politischen bzw. administrativen Prozesses sind. Ist der Regulator also in der
Lage, auf Kostenschocks der EE relativ kurzfristig durch Anpassungen der Vergütungen zu reagieren, so
fällt die Über- bzw. Untersteuerung vergleichsweise gering aus.
Daher ist es grundsätzlich auch mit einer fixen Einspeisevergütung möglich, zumindest den Kapazitäts-
ausbau vergleichsweise akkurat zu steuern. Die wesentliche Voraussetzung dafür ist eine schnelle An-
passung durch den Regulator in Verbindung mit möglichst konkreten Mengenzielen so wie in Form des
„atmenden Deckel“ für die PV, der mit dem EEG 2012 implementiert wurde; siehe dazu auch die Ausfüh-
rungen von Leprich et al. (2013:44). Vor diesem Hintergrund sind auch die im Gesetzesentwurf zur EEG
Reform vorgeschlagenen „verlässlichen Ausbaukorridore“ für die übrigen Technologien ein wichtiger
Schritt – und eine durch den PV Ausbau der Jahre 2010-2012 teuer erkaufte Lektion im Hinblick auf die
instrumentelle Ausgestaltung der Förderung durch eine fixe Einspeisevergütung.
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[13]
4. Investitionsrisiken & Effizienzanreize bei unterschiedlichen EE Förderin-
strumenten
Die unterschiedlichen Risikoallokationen geben Aufschluss darüber, wie die bestehenden Risiken verteilt
sind, aber nicht welche Risiken EE Investoren aus ökonomischer Sicht tragen sollten. Der erste Schritt zur
Klärung dieser Frage ist die Identifizierung der mit den Instrumenten verbundenen Investitionsrisiken.
Diesbezüglich unterscheiden sich die Instrumente dahingehend, ob Investoren das Strompreisrisiko und
ggf. ein zusätzliches Vergütungsrisiko tragen müssen (siehe Tabelle 2)10. Bei einer fixen Einspeisevergü-
tung werden Investoren keinem Risiko ausgesetzt. Bei der gleitenden Marktprämie tragen Investoren
lediglich ein relatives Strompreisrisiko, d.h. ein Risiko für Abweichungen vom durchschnittlichen Börsen-
preis (steuerbare EE) bzw. dem durchschnittlichen Marktwert der Technologie (fluktuierende EE). Da
sich die Vergütung aus der Differenz zwischen durchschnittlichem Strompreis bzw. Marktwert und Ein-
speisevergütung ergibt (contract-for-difference), tragen sie somit kein separates Vergütungsrisiko. Bei
einer fixen, regulatorisch festgelegten Marktprämie tragen Investoren das volle Strompreisrisiko, aber
weiterhin kein Vergütungsrisiko. Bei einer fixen, per Auktionierung festgelegten Marktprämie tragen
Investoren das Strompreisrisiko und ein „upfront“ Vergütungsrisiko, das darin besteht, bei der Auktion
keinen Zuschlag zu erhalten. Bei einer Quote tragen Investoren das Strompreisrisiko und ein dynami-
sches Vergütungsrisiko, das darin besteht, dass sich über die Laufzeit der Investition die Höhe des Zerti-
fikatspreises ändert.
Strompreisrisiko
Vergütungsrisiko
Fixe Einspeisevergütung
(regulatorisch)
-
-
Gleitende Marktprämie
(regulatorisch)
/-
(„relativ“, nur für Abweichung vom
Durchschnitt)
-
Fixe Marktprämie*
(regulatorisch)
-
Fixe Marktprämie*
(auktioniert)
(Projektzuschlag)
Quote
(Markt)
(Laufzeit)
*Hier wird nicht zwischen einer Prämie auf Leistung und einer Prämie auf Erzeugung unterschieden, die sich nur durch das
Tagen des Mengenrisikos (Prämie auf Erzeugung) unterscheiden.
Tabelle 2: Wesentliche Investitionsrisiken unterschiedlicher EE Förderinstrumente
Da es sich bei beiden Risiken um Marktrisiken handelt ist das Tragen dieser Risiken gleichbedeutend mit
einer marktbasierten Förderung. Dabei bezieht sich „markt-“ sowohl auf den Strommarkt als auch auf
einen eventuellen „Vergütungsmarkt“ (vgl. Klessmann, Nabe, et al. 2008:3646). Im Hinblick auf die
strommarktbasierte Förderung wird auch oft von der „Marktintegration der EE“ gesprochen, die begriff-
10 Darüber hinaus gibt es noch eine Reihe von weiteren Preisrisiken, technischen Risiken und finanziellen Risiken
sowohl auf der Kosten- als auch Ertragsseite; siehe Tabelle 3.1 in Gross et al. (2007). Diese werden hier nicht näher
betrachtet.
4.4 Investitionsrisiken & Effizienzanreize bei unterschiedlichen EE
Förderin-strumenten 83
[14]
lich jedoch ungenau bzw. mehrdeutig ist11. Zielführender ist es, die Marktintegration der EE beispiels-
weise als Unterwerfung unter das allgemeine Marktpreisrisiko Gawel & Purkus (Gawel & Purkus
2013:43) bzw. das Agieren an den gleichen Märkten wie die Konventionellen und das Tragen des ent-
sprechenden Marktpreisrisikos zu verstehen (2013:126). Dies gilt in ähnlicher Weise auch für das Vergü-
tungsrisiko bzw. die vergütungsmarktbasierte Förderung. Dort steht allerdings nicht die Integration in
einen bestehenden Markt zur Disposition, sondern die Schaffung eines neuen „Markts für Vergütung“
für den Grünanteil des produzierten Stroms (Auktionierung bzw. Zertifikatsmarkt).
Die besondere ökonomische Bedeutung des Tragens von Marktrisiken liegt darin, dass dadurch Anreize
für langfristig effiziente Investitionsentscheidungen unter Unsicherheit erzeugt werden. Beim Bau einer
neuen EE Anlage müssen Investoren drei Entscheidungen treffen: (1) die Wahl der allgemeinen Erzeu-
gungstechnologie, (2) die Wahl des spezifischen Anlagentyps innerhalb dieser Technologie, und (3) die
Wahl des Standorts der Anlage. Bei einer marktbasierten Förderung kombinieren Investoren diese von-
einander abhängigen Wahlentscheidungen so, dass der über die finanzielle Laufzeit einer Anlage erwar-
tete Ertrag möglichst hoch bzw. die Kosten möglichst gering sind. Entscheidend ist, dass sie dabei not-
wendigerweise die zukünftige Entwicklung der jeweiligen Märkte bzw. Preise in ihre Entscheidung ein-
beziehen müssen. Weil diese Entwicklungen unsicher sind, besteht dabei ein entsprechendes Investiti-
onsrisiko. Müssen Investoren dieses Risiko tragen, bedeutet dies, dass sie für negative Abweichungen
von den erwarteten Erträgen bzw. Kosten aufkommen müssen bzw. von positiven Abweichungen profi-
tieren. Sie haben somit einen Anreiz, die Investitionsentscheidungen bestmöglich vorausblickend und
unter Abwägung der Unsicherheiten zu treffen12. Nach den Grundsätzen der ökonomischen Theorie
führen diese Investitionsentscheidungen in der Summe zu einem langfristig effizienten Ausbau der EE,
der die im Markt bestehenden Unsicherheiten so gut wie möglich berücksichtigt.
Die konkreten mit dem Tragen des Strompreisrisikos verbundenen Anreize betreffen grundsätzliche alle
drei oben beschriebenen Wahlmöglichkeiten. Bei einer technologiespezifischen Förderung wie im aktu-
ellen Förderregime wird jedoch der Effekt des Strompreisrisikos auf die Technologiewahl nivelliert; es
bleiben also lediglich die Wirkungen auf Anlagentyp- und Standortwahl. Maßgeblich für die Investitionen
ist in dieser Hinsicht (a) die standortabhängige Ressourcenverfügbarkeit (erwartete Erzeugung) sowie (b)
die standort- und anlagentypabhängige Kovarianz zwischen Einspeisung und Marktpreis (erwarteter
Marktwert). Numerische Analysen unterstreichen, dass durch eine entsprechende marktbasierte Förde-
rung die Kovarianz zwischen Winderzeugung und Residuallast zunimmt (Schmidt et al. 2013:269), was
einer Erhöhung des Marktwerts der Anlage bzw. effizienteren Stromerzeugung aus Systemsicht gleich-
kommt.
11 Beispielsweise verstehen Leprich et al. (2013:2) darunter relativ allgemein die stärkere Teilnahme der EE an
bestehenden Märkten und eine besseren Koordination mit der konventionellen Erzeugung. Gelegentlich wird wie
von der Agora Energiewende (2013:11) darunter sogar das Entfallen jeglicher Förderung verstanden, was allerdings
durch „vollständige Marktintegration“ (Enervis & BET 2013:126) bzw. „Wettbewerbsfähigkeit“ (BDEW 2013:25)
zutreffender beschrieben werden kann.
12 Sie haben darüber hinaus auch Anreize, diese Unsicherheit durch Innovationen zu reduzieren. In diesem Sinn ist
Risiko auch ein „energetisierendes Prinzip“ (Giddens 1999).
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[15]
Die konkreten mit dem Tragen des Vergütungsrisikos verbundenen Anreize hängen hingegen von den
spezifischen Vergütungsrisiken des Instruments ab. Wie in Tabelle 2 dargestellt kann eine solche Förde-
rung durch eine Quote oder durch eine fixe auktionierte Marktprämie implementiert werden, mit denen
jeweils unterschiedliche Vergütungsrisiken bzw. Unsicherheitsfaktoren verbunden sind (vgl. Frontier
Economics 2012:77; Bofinger 2013:31-34).
Bei einer Auktionierung besteht lediglich Unsicherheit über das aggregierte Angebot zum Zeitpunkt der
Auktion. Die beste „Entscheidung“ von Investoren unter dieser Unsicherheit ist, die Kosten einer Anlage
im Vorfeld soweit wie möglich zu reduzieren, um den Zuschlag zu bekommen. Letztendlich handelt es
sich also nur um einen statischen wettbewerblichen Effekt. Damit ist allerdings insofern ein Risiko ver-
bunden, als dass im Fall eines Zuschlags die tatsächlichen Kosten eines Projekts das ursprüngliche Gebot
überschreiten können (winners’s curse). Diese Situation ergab sich beispielsweise bei den Auktionierun-
gen in Großbritannien in den 1990er Jahren (NFFO) und in China Anfang der 2000er Jahre (Batlle, Pérez-
Arriaga, et al. 2012). Aktuell erfolgt der Einsatz dieses Instruments zum Beispiel in Brasilien, wo seit 2009
mehrere Auktionen von langfristigen Stromlieferverträgen (PPA) durchgeführt worden sind. Das dort
verwendete Auktionsdesigns kann allerdings noch nicht umfassend bewertet werden (Cozzi 2012), nicht
zuletzt weil der Verpflichtungszeitraum zum Bau von geförderten Anlagen drei bis fünf Jahre beträgt.
Einige allgemeine Erfahrungen liegen allerdings schon vor (vgl. Rego 2013).
Bei der Quote hingegen kommen zwei langfristige Unsicherheitsfaktoren zum Tragen: (a) die politische
Unsicherheit des Förderrahmens bedingt zum Beispiel durch mögliche nachträgliche Anpassungen der
Förderung an den tatsächlichen EE Zubau13 und (b) die Unsicherheit über die zukünftigen Kostenent-
wicklungen der EE Technologien, die sich beide in einem Zertifikatspreisrisiko widerspiegeln. Der poten-
zielle Effizienzvorteil im Hinblick auf (b) bestehen darin, dass Investoren auch nach dem Bau einer Anla-
ge Anreize zur weiteren Kostenreduzierung haben (Menanteau, Finon, et al. 2003:810), was zum Beispiel
durch die Senkung der Betriebskosten (z.B. Pacht) oder eine Modernisierung der Technik
(„Repowering“) möglich ist. Im Hinblick auf (a) besteht für Investoren die generelle Schwierigkeit, allge-
meine politische Unsicherheit in ein kalkulierbares Risiko zu übersetzen. Je höher also die politische Un-
sicherheit, desto weniger wahrscheinlich sind effiziente Investitionen. Im Umkehrschluss leitet sich dar-
aus ab, dass bei der Quote ein langfristig stabiler regulatorischer Rahmen essentiell ist14.
Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich im Rahmen der Debatte um das Förderinstrument die Frage, wie in
den unterschiedlichen Vorschlägen für bzw. gegen das Tragen von Risiken argumentiert wird und wie
diese Argumente zu bewerten sind. Wie oben dargestellt ist dieser Aspekt zentral, was zum Beispiel
auch in der Gegenüberstellung der Argumente für eine gleitende Marktprämie und eine fixe Marktprä-
mie durch den BDEW (2013) deutlich wird, die sich beiderseitig auf „Marktrisiken“ und „Risikoübernah-
men“ konzentrieren. Zur genaueren Analyse der Argumente ist es hilfreich, vorab die einzelnen Studien
im Hinblick auf ihre diesbezüglichen Empfehlungen einzuordnen (siehe Tabelle 3). In mehreren Studien
13 Das bedeutet nicht, dass für Investoren bei der auktionierten fixen Marktprämie keine politische Unsicherheit
besteht, denn auch der Bestandsschutz bzw. die Verträge können prinzipiell aufgehoben werden.
14 Die tatsächliche Stabilität des regulatorischen Rahmens zeigt sich natürlich erst im Nachhinein. Daher ist für das
politische Risiko vielmehr die Glaubwürdigkeit dieses Rahmens entscheidend.
4.4 Investitionsrisiken & Effizienzanreize bei unterschiedlichen EE
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[16]
werden aus politischen Gründen mehrere Reformschritte unterschieden; in diesen Fällen wird nur der
langfristige Vorschlag berücksichtigt.
Risiken
Vorschlag
Keins bzw. relativer
Strompreis Strompreis Strompreis + Vergü-
tung (Zuschlag)
Strompreis + Vergü-
tung (Laufzeit)
Zunehmendes Investitionsrisiko ->
Agora Energiewende
(2013)
X
(kurzfristiger Fokus auf
2014-2017)
Jacobs et al. (2013)
X
SR Umwelt (2013)
X
(gleitende MP)
Leprich et al. (2013)
X
(Option A)
X
(Option B)
BDEW (2013)
X
(Zielmodell)
BDI (2013)
X*
(Auktionierung zu prüfen)
Enervis & BET (2013)
X
Frontier Economics
(2012)
X*
Kopp et al. (2013)
X
(Zieldesign)
Löschel et al. (2013)
X*
Frondel et al. (2012)
X
Haucap & Kühling
(2012)
X
Monopolkommission
(2013)
X
SR Wirtschaft (2013)
X
*Festlegung der Prämie (regulatorisch bzw. wettbewerblich) nicht spezifiziert
Tabelle 3: Übersicht der zu tragenden Risiken in den Vorschlägen zur EEG Reform
Im Hinblick auf das Strompreisrisiko sind die genannten ökonomischen Gründe gegen das Tragen dieses
Risikos wenig überzeugend. Wie die Übersicht zeigt gibt es insgesamt vier Vorschläge, die vorsehen, dass
EE Investoren weiterhin kein bzw. nur ein einseitiges Strompreisrisiko tragen sollten. Die Agora Energie-
wende begründet dies nicht explizit sondern weist lediglich daraufhin, dass eine Integration der EE auf-
grund der für eine Refinanzierung zu niedrigen Strompreise überhaupt nicht möglich wäre (2013:11).
Wie oben erläutert liegt dem allerdings ein bestimmtes Verständnis von Marktintegration zugrunde
(„Vollständige Marktintegration“ ohne weitere Förderung), dass weit über das Tragen des Strompreisri-
sikos hinausgeht. Jacobs et al. (2013:7) verweisen darauf, dass das Tragen des Strompreisrisikos (a) die
Risikoprämien und damit die Förderkosten erhöhe und (b) bei fluktuierenden EE nicht „produktiv“ sei,
da dargebotsabhängige Erzeugung nur begrenzt auf Marktpreise reagiere. Im Hinblick auf (a) stellt die
Erhöhung der Förderkosten jedoch kein Gegenargument dar, sondern wie erläutert lediglich eine Abwä-
gung zwischen Risikokosten in Form von Risikoprämien und dem Kostenrisiko durch die anfallenden
Mehrkosten im Falle geringerer Rentabilität der EE. Im Hinblick auf (b) wird übersehen, dass die effizi-
enzsteigernde Wirkung des Risikos vor allem bei der Investitionsentscheidung entsteht und nicht bei der
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[17]
Produktion. Der SRU (2013:105) verweist ebenfalls auf die höheren Risikoprämien und argumentiert
darüber hinaus, dass Investoren in der Konsequenz mit „Investitionszurückhaltung“ reagieren würden.
Warum letzteres generell der Fall sein sollte bleibt jedoch unklar. Das elaborierteste Argument findet
sich bei Leprich et al. (2013:44) und betrifft die Diversifizierung des Risikos durch Umlage auf die Strom-
verbraucher – an seiner Gültigkeit bzw. der Anwendbarkeit des zugrundeliegenden Arrow-Lind Theo-
rems bestehen jedoch gewisse Zweifel (siehe Abschnitt 2). Auch andere im Rahmen der weiteren Debat-
te vorgebrachte ökonomische Argumente sind wenig überzeugend bzw. begründet: Gawel & Purkus
(2013:59) zum Beispiel sehen das Tragen des Strompreisrisikos als nicht sinnvoll an, „solange keine
Netzparität erreicht ist und Unsicherheit besteht, ob das gegenwärtige Strommarktdesign überhaupt
zukunftsfähig ist“. Warum dies überhaupt ein Argument darstellen sollte führen die Autoren allerdings
nicht aus.
Im Hinblick auf das Vergütungsrisiko konzentriert sich die Debatte auf die Frage, in welchem Ausmaß es
getragen werden sollte. Eine wichtige Feststellung ist, dass die Vorschläge, die das Tragen des Strom-
preisrisikos vorsehen, auch – zumindest perspektivisch – das Tragen des Vergütungsrisikos in Form einer
Auktionierung vorsehen. Diese „Trennlinie“ zu den Vorschlägen ohne Risiko legt nahe, dass es eine ge-
wisse Grundüberzeugung zu geben scheint, ob marktliche Elemente in der Förderung sinnvoll sind oder
nicht. Innerhalb der ersten Gruppe haben die Befürworter einer Quote einen gewissen Sonderstatus,
nicht zuletzt weil sie in der Regel keine Reformzwischenstufen vorsehen und darüber hinaus für eine
technologieneutrale Förderung plädieren. Der entscheidende Aspekt im Hinblick auf das Vergütungsrisi-
ko ist also nicht ob es überhaupt getragen werden sollte, sondern nur in welchem Ausmaß.
Die in diesem Zusammenhang vorgebrachten ökonomischen Gründe sind in der Regel differenzierter
und stichhaltiger. Vorschläge, die sich kritisch mit der Quote auseinandersetzen, betrachten sehr unter-
schiedliche Aspekte: die Notwendigkeit der Stabilität des Förderregimes (Kopp, Engelhorn, et al. 2013:4;
Frontier Economics 2012:74), die Preisvolatilität (Löschel, Flues, Pothen, et al. 2013:11) bzw. Liquidität
(Kopp, Engelhorn, et al. 2013:4) des Zertifikatsmarkts sowie eventuelle Fragen von Marktmacht (SRU
2013:94). Doch die Kritik ist zum Teil auch methodisch problematisch: Der SRU (2013:93) weißt bei-
spielsweise auf die im internationalen Vergleich höheren Förderkosten der Quote bei gleichzeitig gerin-
gere Effektivität hin; an der Grundlage eines solchen Vergleichs bestehen jedoch erhebliche Zweifel.
Ebenso wird relativ einseitig mit der Höhe der Risikoprämien argumentiert (2013:93)15, obwohl sich
diese wie erläutert im Hinblick auf das Kostenrisiko der Förderung relativieren. Darüber hinaus werden
ganz allgemein Zweifel geäußert, ob den hohen Investitionsrisiken auch entsprechende Effizienzgewinne
gegenüberstehen; siehe z.B. Kopp et al. (2013:4). Begründet werden diese Zweifel jedoch in der Regel
nicht. Insgesamt werden die möglichen positiven Wirkungen des beständigen Kostendrucks bei vielen
Kritikern kaum gewürdigt, auch wenn aus empirischer Sicht unklar bleibt, ob sie sich tatsächlich einstel-
len würden.
Die Debatte um das Förderinstrument bzw. die Risiken wird jedoch nicht allein mit ökonomischen Ar-
gumenten geführt. Es gibt auch ein politisches Argument, das allgemein gegen das Tragen von Risiken
vorgebracht wird. Es beruht auf der Annahme, dass zur Umsetzung der Energiewende eine breite Ak-
15 Siehe dazu auch Dieckmann et al. (2012).
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[18]
teursstruktur auch mit kleinen bzw. privaten Investoren notwendig sei, weil durch die entsprechende
ökonomische Teilhabe die notwendige Akzeptanz geschaffen werde. Jacobs et al. sprechen hier vom
„Gemeinschaftswerk Energiewende“ und einer entsprechenden Finanzierung (2013:7), der SRU weißt
auf (a) die Gefährdung der Akzeptanz durch eine verminderte Zahl an Investoren und Betreibern und (b)
ein mögliches Ausbleiben von Investitionen hin (2013:94) und Leprich et al. sehen die Stärkung der Ak-
zeptanz durch Partizipation an den Verdienstmöglichkeiten als erforderlich an (2013:80). Die „Benach-
teiligung“ kleiner Investoren bei entsprechenden Förderinstrumenten beschreiben Mitchell et al.
(2006:31): „As many renewable generators are small generators, they tend to be relatively risk averse
due to a less diverse fuel portfolio and a limited ability to finance projects through the balance sheet.
They are therefore likely to be disadvantaged by high-risk markets“. Man muss daher davon ausgehen,
dass Investitionsrisiken dazu führen, dass sich insbesondere Privatpersonen bzw. Einzeleigentümer, die
zurzeit im Besitz von rund einem Viertel der EEG-geförderten Anlagen sind (trend:research & Universität
Lüneburg 2013), nicht mehr am Ausbau der EE beteiligen können bzw. werden. Dementsprechend set-
zen die obigen Vorschläge die Maßgabe, dass EE Investoren keine oder nur sehr geringe Risiken tragen
sollten16.
Im Hinblick auf die Akzeptanz wird jedoch auch die Annahme vertreten, dass die Unterstützung für die
Energiewende entscheidend von ihrer Kostenentwicklung bestimmt sein wird; siehe z.B. Appelrath et al.
(2012:4). In diesem Fall würden die potenziell realisierbaren Effizienzgewinne bzw. die wettbewerbliche
Bestimmung der Vergütung grundsätzlich für das Tragen von Risiken sprechen. Die tatsächliche Bilanz
lässt sich allerdings nur schwer quantifizieren und kann lediglich an Beispielen veranschaulicht werden.
Eines davon sind die Pachtkosten von Flächen für den Betrieb von EE Anlagen. Deutsche WindGuard
(2013) beziffert den durchschnittlichen Anteil der Pachtkosten an den Stromgestehungskosten einer
WEA mittlerer Standortqualität auf rund 7% (0,5 ct/kWh). Laut einem einschlägigen Medienbericht be-
tragen die absoluten Kosten in der Spitze an besonders windreichen Standorten bis zu 100.000 EUR pro
Jahr und Windrad bei relativ geringem Flächenbedarf (Handelsblatt Online 2013). Solche Renten seitens
der Landbesitzer erhöhen in der Summe die Förderkosten und senken damit ggf. die Akzeptanz. Eine
wettbewerbsorientierte Förderung bzw. das Tragen von Risiken könnte hier also gegenläufig wirken17.
Welche Rolle die Risikoprämien in dieser Hinsicht spielen ist allerdings weniger eindeutig als oft darge-
stellt. Grundsätzlich erhöhen die Risikoprämien die Förderkosten, wobei nicht notwendigerweise davon
auszugehen ist, dass die wettbewerbliche Festlegung der Vergütung diesen Aufschlag nicht mehr als
kompensiert; siehe dazu die Diskussion der Ergebnisse im Vergleich mit anderen Studien bei Kitzing
(2014:9). Nichtsdestotrotz stellen die Risikoprämien zusätzliche Kosten dar, die die gesamten Förderkos-
ten erhöhen. Doch wie oben dargestellt bedeuten höhere Risikokosten auch ein niedrigeres Kostenrisiko
für die Förderung. In dieser Hinsicht ist die entscheidende Frage, ob die Akzeptanz lediglich mit der ab-
16 Bei Leprich et al. (2013) wird in dieser Hinsicht zwischen zwei Optionen unterschieden. Die obige Argumentation
bezieht sich dabei lediglich auf Option A (Bürgermodell).
17 Im konkreten Fall der Pachtkosten muss man allerdings berücksichtigen, dass die zögerliche Ausweisung neuer
Flächen ein limitierender Faktor ist, der nicht unmittelbar durch Wettbewerb selbst behoben werden kann. Dieser
würde jedoch für mehr Transparenz sorgen und könnte damit den Prozess vermutlich beschleunigen.
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[19]
soluten Höhe der Förderkosten zusammen hängt oder ob auch unerwartete Schwankungen dabei von
Bedeutung sind. Wäre letzteres der Fall, so müssten die Risikoprämien gesondert bilanziert werden.
Über die Frage der Akzeptanz hinaus wirft das Tragen bzw. Nicht-Tragen von Risiken noch einen weite-
ren Aspekt auf, der die Debatte auf eher subtile Weise durchzieht: Verantwortung. Diesbezüglich be-
steht ein breiter Konsens, dass die EE mehr Systemverantwortung durch das Erbringen von Sys-
temdienstleistungen wie z.B. Netzstabilisierung übernehmen müssen. Entsprechende Regelungen wer-
den bereits seit dem EEG 2009 umgesetzt. Der BDEW (2013:13) weist allerdings treffend darauf hin, dass
diese Verantwortung eine technische ist, d.h. im übertragenen Sinn von den Anlagen und nicht etwa von
den Investoren übernommen wird. Eine Verantwortung für Investoren bzw. Erzeuger hingegen würde
bedeuten, dass sie sich die folgende Frage stellen müssten: „Was richtet die von mir erzeugte Kilowatt-
stunde Strom im System an?“ (Matthes 2012:11). Verantwortung bzw. Verantwortlichkeit kommt somit
ins Spiel, wenn Einzelne die Konsequenzen der Auswirkungen ihrer Entscheidungen auf das Gesamtsys-
tem tragen müssen. Wenn diese Entscheidungen wie im Fall von Investitionen zudem langfristig sind
und unter Unsicherheit erfolgen, dann bedeutet Verantwortung notwendigerweise auch das Tragen von
Risiken (vgl. Giddens 1999:8). Doch für was genau übernehmen EE Investoren die Verantwortung?
Grundsätzlich übernimmt jeder Investor durch das Tragen der Risiken lediglich die Verantwortung für
die eigene Investition bzw. deren Profitabilität. Wie oben dargestellt führt dies dazu, dass ein Investor
seine Anlage so auslegt, dass sie unter den gegebenen Unsicherheiten Strom zukünftig zu möglichst
hohen Preisen produziert. Hohe Preise bedeuten jedoch gleichzeitig, dass es im Gesamtsystem eine gro-
ße Nachfrage gibt und der Strom somit dann erzeugt wird, wenn er gebraucht wird. So übernimmt der
Investor neben der Verantwortung für die eigene Investition auch indirekt eine Verantwortung für die
bedarfsgerechte Stromerzeugung aus Sicht des Gesamtsystems, die wie oben dargestellt nur dadurch
entsteht, dass er die Konsequenzen seiner Entscheidung tragen muss. Bei einer Förderung ohne das
Tragen von Risiken ist eben dies nicht der Fall, weil dort das Prinzip „Invest, produce & forget“ gilt und
Investoren die Konsequenzen ihrer (Investitions-)Entscheidungen nicht oder nur sehr eingeschränkt
tragen müssen. Das Nicht-Tragen von Risiken befreit also EE Investoren von der Übernahme der Ver-
antwortung für eine bedarfsgerechte Stromerzeugung.
Insgesamt gesehen ist die Akteursbreite damit keine Frage von „ganz oder gar nicht“, sondern vielmehr
eine Abwägung, die im Kontext der Gesamtentwicklung des Ausbaus getroffen werden muss. Die
Markteinführung der Windenergie beispielsweise wurde anders als zum Beispiel in Spanien zum Großteil
von Privatpersonen bzw. unabhängigen Projektentwicklern getragen, während sich die großen Energie-
unternehmen dieser Entwicklung aus verschiedenen Gründen nicht daran beteiligten (vgl. Stenzel &
Frenzel 2008). Mittlerweile haben die wesentlichen EE Technologien jedoch Marktreife erreicht und ihr
Anteil an der Gesamterzeugung beträgt rund 25%. Damit sind einerseits Geschäftsmodelle für Investiti-
on und Betrieb solcher Anlagen etabliert, die die Marktbarrieren für Investoren senken. Zudem sind
neue Geschäftsmodelle für die Vermarktung von Kleinanlagen entstanden. Privatpersonen haben damit
die Möglichkeit, sich auch im Fall einer marktbasierten Förderung an der Energiewende ökonomisch zu
beteiligen, wenn auch nicht notwendigerweise über die PV Anlage auf dem eigenen Dach.
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[20]
Darüber hinaus wird bei steigendem Marktanteil der EE das Gesamtsystem zunehmend koordinations–
bzw. steuerungsintensiver, nicht zuletzt weil die Zahl der Anlagen bzw. deren unterschiedliche ökonomi-
schen Bedingungen rapide wachsen. Das hat zur Folge, dass bei einer nicht-marktbasierten Förderung
auch die regulatorische Komplexität bzw. die entsprechenden Anforderungen zunehmen, wodurch sich
tendenziell die Ineffizienzen und damit die Kosten erhöhen; siehe dazu auch Klessmann et al.
(2008:3659). In dieser Hinsicht illustrativ sind etwa die vom SRU angedachten Kilowattstundenkontigen-
te zur spezifischen Förderung unterschiedlicher EE Anlagen. Laut Vorschlag wäre deren Berechnung
beispielsweise auf Basis der standortspezifischen Sonneneinstrahlung für PV bzw. der überstrichenen
Rotorfläche für Wind möglich (SRU 2013:101). Doch selbst wenn diese Informationen für jede einzelne
Anlage verfügbar wären bleibt völlig unklar, wie damit konkret Anreize geschaffen werden können, um
EE Anlagen effizient auszulegen und zu betreiben. Dieses Beispiel unterstreicht, dass mit zunehmendem
Marktanteil der EE die „Durchregulierung eines sehr koordinationsintensiven Systems kaum funktionie-
ren wird“ (Matthes 2013:2) und eine marktbasierte Förderung immer dringlicher wird. Entsprechend
wird es sich nicht vermeiden lassen, dass das dafür notwendige Tragen von Risiken die Akteursbreite
reduzieren wird.
Insgesamt gesehen spricht also Vieles dafür, dass ein Übergang zu einer marktbasierten Förderung zur
Erreichung des „Strommarktdesigns der Zukunft“ notwendig ist. Streitbar ist allerdings der Zeitpunkt des
Übergangs – aber aus mindestens zwei Gründen wäre die Politik gut damit beraten, diesen eher früher
und gezielt als später und nur reagierend einzuleiten: Erstens, die Bereitschaft der Gesellschaft, die zu-
nehmenden Kosten zu tragen, scheint sich zunehmend auf der Kippe zu befinden. In einer repräsentati-
ven Befragung vom Herbst 201318 stimmten beispielsweise nur 55% der Befragten zu, dass die damals
anstehende Erhöhung der EEG Umlage von 5 ct/kWh auf 6 ct/kWh angemessen (50%) oder noch zu
niedrig (5%) sei. Eine einzelne Befragung ist zwar kein definitiver Gradmesser, aber zumindest ein Indi-
kator für die aktuelle Situation. Zweitens, mit der Erlangung der Marktreife von PV und Wind hat der
Ausbau der EE eine Phase erreicht, in der man eigentlich nicht mehr von einer Förderung sprechen
kann. Verschiedentlich wird daher wie zum Beispiel bei Kopp et al. (2013), dem SRU (2013) oder Leprich
et al. (2013) nicht mehr von einem Förderinstrument, sondern von einem Finanzierungsinstrument ge-
sprochen. Wenn aber nur noch „Anlagen finanziert“ und nicht mehr „Technologien gefördert“ werden
läuft die Energiewende Gefahr, im Hinblick auf eines ihrer wesentlichen Ziele – der Weiterentwicklung
von EE Technologien wie als Ziel im EEG formuliert – in einen statischen Zustand zu verfallen. Das Tragen
von Risiken ist in dieser Hinsicht sicher kein Allheilmittel, aber zumindest eine Triebkraft für Innovation
und Fortschritt, um die Entwicklung der EE und ihre systemische Einbindung weiter zu voranzutreiben.
18 http://unendlich-viel-energie.de/media/image/3838.aee_akzeptanzumfrage2013_eeg_umlage_72dpi.jpg
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[21]
5. Diskussion & Schlussfolgerung
In diesem Papier wurden verschiedene Aspekte im Hinblick auf die Rolle von Risiko bei der Förderung
der EE erläutert und diskutiert. Es wurde insbesondere klargestellt, dass (a) sich das gesellschaftliche
Kostenrisiko nicht durch die Wahl eines Förderinstruments reduzieren lässt und (b) das Tragen von In-
vestitionsrisiken auch bei fluktuierenden EE nicht „unproduktiv“, sondern langfristig effizient ist, sofern
die zugrundeliegenden Märkte funktionsfähig sind. Es wurde ebenfalls dargestellt, dass das Tragen von
Risiken im Konflikt mit der Erhaltung einer großen Akteursbreite beim Ausbau der EE steht, da kleinere
Akteure diese Risiken tendenziell nicht tragen wollen oder können. Aufgrund der steigenden Kosten der
Förderung und den steigenden regulatorischen Anforderungen bei einer nicht-markbasierten Steuerung
bei zunehmenden EE Anteilen liegt es jedoch nahe, dass EE Investoren in zunehmendem Umfang Risiken
tragen sollten.
Vor diesem Hintergrund gibt der aktuelle Gesetzentwurf für die EEG Reform eine vergleichsweise klare
Vorgabe in die entsprechende Richtung. Zwar gelten die unmittelbaren Maßnahmen vornehmlich der
Kontrolle der absoluten Förderkosten und nur die verpflichtende Direktvermarktung mittels gleitender
Marktprämie für Neuanlagen erhöht geringfügig die Effizienz. Doch eine marktbasierte Förderung in
Form von technologiespezifischen Ausschreibungen (Auktionierung) soll in einem Pilotprojekt vorberei-
tet und ab 2017 bzw. 2020 (Wind Offshore) umfassend eingesetzt werden. Wenn eine entsprechende
umfassende Förderung durch Ausschreibungen zumindest für Wind Onshore und PV tatsächlich bis zum
Ende der Legislaturperiode eingeführt werden würde, wäre dies angesichts der Herausforderungen der
Energiewende ein wichtiger Schritt und eine große politisch Leistung.
Längerfristig stellt sich allerdings unabhängig vom Instrument die Frage stellen, ob eine dauerhafte För-
derung der EE notwendig bzw. sinnvoll ist. Der Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD stellt diesbezüg-
lich klar, dass die EE perspektivisch ohne Förderung am Markt bestehen sollen. Ob dies allerdings im
Rahmen der aktuellen Ausbauziele möglich ist bzw. ab wann genau die EE ohne Förderung auskommen
sollen bleibt unklar. In dieser Hinsicht wird zukünftig sicherlich auch der gesellschaftliche Nutzen des EE
Ausbaus ein zunehmend wichtigeres Thema werden. Hier stellt sich allem voran die Frage, welche Ziele
die Politik bzw. Gesellschaft dadurch erreichen möchte.
Aus Sicht des Klimaschutzes als einem wesentlichen Ziel der Energiewende spricht Einiges dafür, EE
Technologien zumindest bis hin zur Erreichung der allgemeinen Marktreife zu entwickeln. Die Vermei-
dung von THG Emission ist allerdings noch mit einer Reihe von anderen Technologien möglich, die schon
bekannt und erprobt oder vielleicht noch gänzlich unbekannt sind. Ein langfristig stabiler und angemes-
sen hoher Preis auf CO2 zusammen mit einer Intensivierung der F&E Förderung könnte allen diesen
Technologien eine Chance zur Entwicklung geben, sofern sich dafür im jeweiligen Fall die gesellschaftli-
che Unterstützung findet. Und er könnte ebenso dafür sorgen, dass die EE ohne weitere Förderung und
nur durch Berücksichtigung der externen Kosten einen hohen bis sehr hohen Anteil in der Stromerzeu-
gung erreichen. Wenn die Politik nicht schon frühzeitig die Weichen für einen Übergang von einem EE-
Förderregime zu einem CO2-Vermeidungsregime stellt, stellt dies vielleicht sogar das größte Risiko für
das Gelingen der Energiewende dar.
4.5 Diskussion & Schlussfolgerung 91
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4.5 Diskussion & Schlussfolgerung 95
96
Chapter 4 EE Förderinstrumente & Risiken: Eine ökonomische Aufarbeitung
der Debatte zur EEG Reform
Chapter 5
The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy
Instrument Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US∗
Fabian Joas
Christian Flachsland
∗This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Climate Policy on 01
December 2014 as: Joas, F., Flachsland, C. (2014). The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate
Policy Instrument Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US. Vol. 16, Issue 1, pp. 26-49. Available online:
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14693062.2014.968762
97
V The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy
Instrument Choice: An analysis of the EU and the US
Authors: Fabian Joas and Christian Flachsland
Abstract
This article assesses the relevance of ex post transaction costs in the choice of climate policy instruments
in the EU (focusing mainly on the example of Germany) and the US. It reviews all publicly available
empirical ex post transaction cost studies of climate policy instruments broken down by the main private
and public sector cost factors and offers hypotheses on how these factors may scale depending on
instrument design and other contextual factors. The key finding from the evaluated schemes is that it is
possible to reject the hypothesis that asymmetries in ex post transaction costs across instruments are
large and, thus, play a pivotal role in climate policy instrument choice. Both total and relative ex post
transaction costs can be considered low. This conjecture differs from the experience in other areas of
environmental policy instruments where high total transaction costs are considered to be important
factors in the overall assessment of optimal environmental policy choice. Against this background, the
main claim of this article is that in climate policy instrument choice, ex post transaction cost
considerations play a minor role in large countries that feature similar institutional characteristics as the
EU and the US. Rather, the focus should be on the efficiency properties of instruments for incentivizing
abatement, as well as equity and political economy considerations (and other societally relevant
objectives). In order to inform transaction cost considerations in climate policy instrument choice in
countries that adopt new climate policies, more data would be desirable in order to enable more robust
estimates of design- and context-specific transaction-cost scaling factors.
Policy relevance:
The findings of this study can help inform policy makers who plan to set up novel climate policy
instruments. The results indicate that ex post transaction costs play a minor role for large countries that
feature similar institutional characteristics as the EU and the US. For instrument design the focus should
rather be on efficiency properties of instruments in incentivizing abatement, as well as equity and
political economy considerations (and other societally relevant objectives).
Keywords:
Carbon tax; climate policy instruments; emissions trading schemes; EU Emissions Trading Scheme;
OECD; transaction costs
98
Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
1. Introduction
A significant body of literature has evolved in recent years that analyses the optimal design of climate
policy instruments for correcting market failures, such as the external costs of emitting harmful GHGs
or research and development (R&D) underinvestment due to technology spill-overs (e.g. Fischer &
Newell, 2008; Goulder & Parry, 2008; IPCC, 2007). As demonstrated by Stavins (1995) and Coggan,
Whitten, and Bennett (2010), the design, implementation, and enforcement of such policy instruments
involve transaction costs (TCs) that might affect optimal policy choice. In other words, the ranking of
policy instruments regarding the economic cost-effectiveness criterion might change when TCs are
included in the analysis (Ofei-Mensah & Bennett, 2013). Transaction costs are defined as ‘the ex ante
costs of establishing environmental policy in all of its aspects, and the ex post costs of administering,
monitoring and enforcing the policy once established’ (Krutilla & Krause, 2010). This article provides
an assessment of the relevance of ex post TCs in the choice of climate policy instruments, such as permit
trading, taxes, and standards, by reviewing and comparing the available data on their transaction-cost
performances. This is done by reviewing all publicly available empirical ex post TC studies of climate
policy instruments broken down by the main private- and public-sector cost factors. In order to inform
TC considerations in climate policy instrument choice in countries that adopt or change their
instruments, hypotheses are offered on how they can be expected to scale depending on various
instrument designs or regulatory context factors, such as the number of regulated entities or the level of
abatement. Different design options (e.g. the point of regulation and the design of trading schemes) and
their influence on TCs are discussed. Where quantitative data are not available, qualitative
considerations and hypothetical plausibility deductions supplement the analysis. Ex ante TCs are not
considered because very little empirical data are available, even though these costs may be important
factors influencing the implementation of climate change policies. The key finding from the evaluated
schemes is that it is possible to reject the hypothesis that asymmetries in ex post TCs across instruments
are large and thus play a pivotal role in climate policy instrument choice. Both total and relative ex post
TCs incurred by the public and private sectors can be considered low. In Germany, for instance, they
range from € 28 to € 81 million
1
annually for different instruments on which relatively robust empirical
evidence is available. This represents between 6 and 18 Euro cent (€ct) per regulated ton of CO2 in
2011, or less than 2% of the certificate price in the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS)
in 2011 (€ 10), or less than 1% of German net renewable electricity subsidies in 2011 (€ 12 billion)
(Frontier Economics, 2012).
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on TCs in climate policy instrument
choice. Section 3 introduces the TC definition and the methodical approach of this study. Section 4
offers the results and a discussion on TCs for (1) trading schemes, (2) taxing schemes, (3) a comparison
of different points of regulation for tax and trading schemes, (4) technology standards, and (5)
performance standards. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
Stavins (1995) was the first to demonstrate analytically that in the context of environmental policy
instruments, the TCs of trading permits can significantly affect the efficiency of an ETS. He finds that
if TCs drive a significant cost wedge between a firm’s option to abate internally or to trade permits on
the market, this can significantly reduce the efficiency gains of harmonizing marginal abatement costs
(MACs) across regulated entities. This hypothesis has been confirmed empirically for several
environmental ETSs in the US. Kerr and Mare (1998) found that the TCs of permit trading reduced cost-
1
Throughout this article, all € values have been adjusted for inflation to the year 2011.
5.2 Literature review 99
effectiveness by around 10–20% in the US lead phase-down scheme. Gangadharan (2000) showed that
the presence of trading TCs reduced the probability of trading by about 32% in California’s Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) scheme. Hahn and Hester (1989) demonstrated that high TCs
decreased trading activity in the Fox River scheme in Wisconsin. In this context, it must be noted that
TCs have two distinctly different effects. First, TCs cause direct costs (such as the costs of monitoring,
reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions, brokerage, and trading) that can be readily measured
and are the subject of this study. Second, TCs can also distort optimal abatement and lead to welfare
losses (Stavins, 1995). The latter effect is discussed in the following, but its quantification is not the
subject of this study.
Empirical studies of TCs in the environmental policy literature remain patchy, because most authors
have limited their TC definitions and analyses to the narrow neoclassical definition – the cost of using
the market mechanism – that has usually been operationalized as the brokerage costs of trading permits.
This narrow definition has two problems. First, it covers only a small portion of total TCs. Second, it
does not allow for a comparison of TCs with other policy instruments where no trading takes place, such
as taxes or standards. Against this background, McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, and Kuperan (2005)
and Krutilla and Krause (2010) developed a more inclusive taxonomy (see Section 3) that provides a
useful framework to analyse the environmental policy instruments comparatively. This broader
perspective has been adopted by several empirical studies in recent years, which revealed that in trading
schemes, brokerage costs are small compared to other TC components, such as the costs of MRV
(Brockmann, Heindl, Löschel, Lutz, & Schumacher, 2012; Jaraite, Convery, & Di Maria, 2010;
Lo¨schel, Brockmann, Heindl, Lutz, & Schumacher, 2011; Löschel, Kiehl, Lo, Koschel, & Koesler,
2010; VBW, 2011).
Three other recent studies have investigated the relative TC performances of different climate policy
instruments. Betz, Sanderson, and Ancev (2010) compared the total costs (abatement costs plus TCs) of
achieving a certain reduction target by means of uniform firm coverage under an ETS to a scheme where
small emitters opted out of the ETS and, instead, were covered under a performance standard. They
found that with modest emissions reduction targets, shifting from uniform to partial coverage led to
overall cost savings. Yet, if the level of ambition for CO2 abatement increased, overall savings decreased
due to the relatively lower abatement efficiency of the performance standard.
Ofei-Mensah and Bennett (2013) compared three climate policy instruments in the Australian transport
energy sector: two standards providing enhanced consumer information (the Fuel Label Program and
the voluntary Fuel Efficiency Program) and a hypothetical Tradable Permit and Fee System. They
identified strong asymmetries in TCs per tCO2e abated between the standards (about $2.5/tCO2e abated)
and the Tradable Permit and Fee System (about $7.2/tCO2e). However, this conclusion critically hinged
on their chosen cost metric of cost-per-ton abated and the assumption that the trading system would
yield only 6.7MtCO2e total cumulated emissions reductions over a 15-year period. If more cumulative
abatement occurred in this time span – e.g. 67 MtCO2e – the TCs of trading according to this metric
would drop (in the example, to $0.72/tCO2e abated). This shows that the chosen metric is critical for a
comparison with other policy instruments, in this case because TCs depend on the assumed abatement
level.
A recent synthesis article by Mundaca et al. (2013a) describes TCs as ‘an important factor in public
policy’ in the context of climate policy instruments. The article reviews TCs in the context of energy
efficiency technologies, renewable energy technologies, offset carbon markets, and the EU ETS.
However, the TCs are not presented in a consistent metric across the instruments, which makes it
difficult to draw broader conclusions. Clearly, TCs have been high or even exorbitant for some projects
of the Kyoto mechanisms (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Michaelowa & Jotzo, 2005).
100
Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
This article complements the existing literature by reviewing and comparing all publicly available
empirical studies on climate instrument TCs. The aim is to discern whether TCs critically affect the
efficiency rankings of different climate policy instruments.
3. Definitions and approach
This study adopts the following TC definition: ‘Transaction costs are the ex ante costs of establishing
environmental policy in all of its aspects, and the ex post costs of administering, monitoring and
enforcing the policy once established’ (Krutilla & Krause, 2010; based on McCann et al., 2005). In other
words, ‘[transaction costs are all costs of the policy] excluding abatement costs.’ This definition covers
all phases and aspects of costs that are needed to carry out a meaningful comparison across different
policy instruments (see Table 1 for a general list of public sector TCs and Tables 2 and 3 in the following
sections for a list of private- and public-sector TCs in the case of emissions trading, which further
differentiates the general ex post TC components, as indicated in Table 1).
The focus of this article is on ex post TCs, because only very limited data exist on the ex ante stages for
climate policy instruments (categories (i)–(iii) in Table 1). In the short term, if these ex ante costs are
significant, they may influence a firm’s decision and could lead to an investment hiatus, implying
adverse impacts on cost-effectiveness. However, in the long run, ex post costs will usually be the
dominant factor (Betz, 2010).
Other studies that have investigated the TCs of policy instruments apply concepts such as information
costs, search costs, administrative costs, compliance costs, legal expenses, monitoring costs, and
enforcement costs (Destatis, 2011; Kossoy & Guigon, 2012; LECG, 2003; Margaree Consultants Inc.,
1998; McMahon, Chan, & Chaitkin, 2000; DR Roever & Partner KG 2006; Sandford, Godwin, &
Hardwick, 1989; Smulders & Vollebergh, 2001; VBW, 2011). The definition adopted here allows for
the integration of all these cost components.
Table 1. Transaction costs associated with public policies.
Transaction Costs
(i) Research and information
(ii) Enactment or litigation
(iii) Design and implementation
(iv) Support and administration
(v) Contracting
(vi) Monitoring/detection
(vii) Prosecution/enforcement
Source: McCann et al., 2005.
Table 2. Classification of private-sector ex post transaction costs in the EU ETS.
Private sector ex post Transaction Costs
(i) Assembling information on cost-effective abatement at the facility level
(ii) Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
(iii) Application for free allocation (unless permits are auctioned)
(iv) Legal expenses
(v) Trading permits
5.3 Definitions and approach 101
Table 3. Classification of public sector ex post TCs in the EU ETS.
Public sector ex post Transaction Costs
(i) Compliance agency
(ii) Registry
(iii) Auctioning
As pointed out by Mundaca et al. (2013b) and Macher and Richman (2008), the existing empirical
literature on TCs for policy instruments lacks a well-developed and comprehensive theoretical
foundation. Although this article does not attempt to systematically fill this gap, it aims to contribute to
the development of TC theory by introducing conceptual distinctions of how ex post TC dimensions for
climate policy instruments can scale with respect to differing regulatory contexts and policy designs.
The need for such a specification of the scaling of TCs arises when attempting to compare estimates of
TCs across empirical cases. This is done in order to draw conclusions regarding the anticipated TCs
when introduced in other regulatory contexts, that is, to inform the choices and set-ups of novel climate
policy instruments.
Building on the empirical studies reviewed in this article, as well as conceptual considerations, we
suggest distinguishing the following dimensions along which TC components of climate policy
instruments can be scaled:
1. The number of regulated entities
Firms’ MRV costs make up a large share of total TCs. The more entities being regulated, the higher the
total private-sector TCs will tend to be.
2. The size of regulated entities
Small installations tend to have smaller total TCs than large installations. However, the TCs per tCO2
regulated tend to be smaller for large installations due to economies of scale.
3. The number of regulated appliances (in the case of an appliance standard)
For homogenous mass-produced goods, such as household appliances or vehicles, certification must be
carried out for each model of appliance (e.g. fridge or dryer) that is offered in a certain market.
Therefore, TCs scale based on the number of different models of appliances being regulated, but not on
the total number of appliances sold.
4. The level of abatement
Identifying abatement options at the firm level and establishing an abatement cost curve is costly.
Therefore, increasing levels of abatement should raise TCs.
5. The volume of market transactions (in the case of trading mechanisms)
The trade of TCs includes brokerage costs, which must be paid for each traded unit (e.g.CO2 certificate).
Accordingly, the TCs vary with the number of traded certificates.
6. Other instrument or TC-specific factors
The magnitude of TCs from legal disputes, for example, partly depends on how firms estimate the costs
of lawsuits versus the chances of winning the case. The more favorable this ratio, the more likely legal
action will be. Other factors, such as the costs of lawsuits, corporate law, and legal norms, can also play
a role in this specific cost factor.
7. Time
Time, as a TC-scaling factor, cuts across the basic TC categories and the previous scaling dimensions.
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Cost factors, and the degree to which they are scalable, are likely to change over time. For example, due
to learning-by-doing and technological change, absolute TCs may generally fall over time (e.g. trading
costs in the US SO2 allowance market fell 98% over time) (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1998; LECG,
2003).
These dimensions can interact. Consider a limiting case. When, over time, the level of abatement
becomes so ambitious that emissions approach zero, fewer entities will require regulation, and absolute
trading volumes will fall. TCs will probably rise with respect to abatement cost information, but decline
with respect to the other factors.
In addition, there are fixed costs during the inception of the policy instrument that occur only once (such
as the administrative, informational, and capital costs involved in setting up novel compliance
structures), as opposed to the annual running costs of a scheme over the long term (Jaraite et al., 2010).
Finally, for clarity, it is useful to distinguish TC components and scaling factors at the firm- and
aggregate- system level (indicating total TCs). This article focuses on the latter.
The methodical approach of this article is to assemble all publicly available ex post TC data on existing
climate policy instruments and to use evidence from other policy instruments that were plausible
analogies. The latter approach was taken only where TC data on climate policy instruments were scarce
or unavailable (e.g. CO2 tax). Data were obtained from case studies, consultant reports, government
reports, interviews, and our own calculations. Where possible, the data were broken down into the ex
post cost components defined above. Overall, data were limited but available for the EU ETS, the US
SO2 ETS, US RECLAIM, the UK excise duties on hydrocarbon fuels, and the US Residential Appliance
Standard. When different studies reported different values for a scheme, we focused on the higher
estimates to ensure that our aggregation was on the conservative (i.e. high-cost) side. However, by
indicating ranges, we also display the low-cost estimates. For policy instruments where neither data nor
useful analogies existed (e.g. technology standards for large point sources) the costs were assessed
qualitatively.
The use of the metric for reporting TCs depends on the quality of data and the purpose that it is intended
to serve. If the aim is to inform the comparison and choice of climate policy instruments in countries
that consider adopting novel policies, there is no single metric that can convey all of the desired
information in a satisfying manner. This is because, as argued above, cost components are scaled based
on context- and policy-specific dimensions. Quantitative scaling factors cannot (yet) be reliably
estimated based on the very few existing data points. This can be illustrated with regard to two prominent
TC metrics used in the literature.
First, reporting TCs per regulated GHG units (such as € ct/tCO2e) is an elegant way of expressing TCs
in a given ETS, relative to the visible price of an emissions allowance. It is most often used for
comparing MRV costs across firms in order to identify MRV TC-scaling effects with respect to firm
size (e.g. Jaraite et al., 2010; Löschel et al., 2011).We make use of this metric when discussing these
dimensions, but using this metric more generally to compare TCs across policy instruments and regions
could mask potentially significant context-specific factors, such as the mix of large and small regulated
entities in a scheme.
Second, reporting TCs per unit of GHG abated only makes sense when considering cases with
comparable abatement levels. Consider the following example. In the first trading period of the EU ETS
(2005–2007), little abatement occurred (Ellerman, Convery, & Perthuis, 2010, p. 191), while the EU
ETS incurred full TCs. Thus, TCs per abated emissions were relatively high. If the cap had been much
tighter, TCs per abated tCO2 would have been much lower, without changing the absolute TCs, because
these are likely to scale only to a limited extent with regard to abatement levels (see Section 4.1). This
cost metric would be very high in one case and very low in another, while absolute TCs would have
5.3 Definitions and approach 103
remained roughly constant. Without further qualification, such information is not very helpful and is
potentially misleading for comparing costs across instruments and regions.
To sum up, if multiple data points on TC components in different contexts were available – and they
might become available in the future – it could inform numeric estimates of the different scaling factors.
This is currently not the case. This study copes with this challenge by reporting total TCs per country,
using Germany and the US as examples. For specific (climate) policy instruments, the magnitudes of
different cost components are reported in detail. Potential scaling factors, if these instruments were
transferred to other contexts, are discussed. Furthermore, some sensitivity analyses of TCs with respect
to programme design were conducted (i.e. upstream versus downstream points of regulation for the EU
ETS). The main limitations of this approach are the same as for the other metrics, i.e. the results and
policy instruments are not directly comparable to other countries due to differences in the coverage and
levels of abatement that are induced. Bearing this caveat in mind, the existing data indicated that the
total TCs of different instruments in Germany and the US are low compared to other macroeconomic
figures. Finally, the relative costs of the different instruments fall within a range of similar orders of
magnitude.
4. Instrument comparisons
Policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions can be divided into two groups: market- and non-
market-based instruments. Market-based instruments address the market failure of the GHG externality
by incorporating external costs. While the regulator sets the price (or quantity), the market determines
the quantity (or price). Examples are permit-trading schemes (quantity instruments) and GHG taxes
(price instruments) (IPCC, 2014). In the case of non-market-based instruments (i.e. standards), the
regulator sets either a limit for maximum emissions (in absolute or relative terms) or prescribes a certain
technology. Examples are vehicle performance standards (CO2 emissions per driven km) and
technology standards (e.g. banning coal-fired power plants). This section analyses and discusses the
available empirical TC data components for market- and non-market-based instruments for GHG
mitigation. Section 4.3 compares different points of regulation (upstream or downstream) for GHG
trading and taxation schemes. The discussion of each TC component for each instrument is
complemented by a plausibility analysis of its potential scaling dynamics.
4.1 Emissions trading
Emissions trading is a quantity instrument, because the maximum amount of permissible emissions for
the regulated entities is set by the regulator (Tietenberg, 2006). Emissions permits are distributed either
by free allocation or auctioning and can be traded among polluting entities. Firms engage in abatement
efforts and permit trading until the equilibrium permit price emerges. Under ideal conditions, the
instrument is cost-effective because MACs are indicated by the market permit price and equalized across
all participating firms.
The EU ETS is by far the largest application of emissions trading worldwide, and a number of TC studies
of the EU ETS have been conducted, particularly in Germany and Ireland. They are usually based on
questionnaires handed out to companies or expert estimations.
These studies exclusively focus on private-sector TCs. However, the analysis in this article adds public-
sector costs. Due to the relatively good availability of data for both private and public TCs in Germany,
we have used this country as a case study for EU ETS data and compared it with Irish data to show that
private-sector figures seem to be robust. Public agency costs in Germany were considered to be on the
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higher end (on a TC-per-regulated-entities basis), compared to the rest of the EU (Transaction Costs of
DEHSt, W. Seidel, personal communication, April 20, 2011, Berlin, DEHSt). We therefore used the
German public-sector TCs as the basis for the calculation of the EU-wide public-sector TCs.
4.1.1. Private-sector costs
The EU ETS TC components for the private sector are displayed in Table 2.
The first component is ‘assembling information on cost-effective abatement at the facility level’. Before
firms can engage in abatement, they need to assemble information on their abatement cost schedule.
This involves financial and technical analysis, as well as an analysis on how production and product
quality will be affected (Hein & Blok, 1995). This requires additional personnel expenditures and advice
from experts, including calculations and risk assessments for payback periods. It can be expected that
these costs will rise with increasing abatement ambition because it becomes more difficult to find new
abatement options once the easy abatement options have been exploited. However, with only €
0.9million in annual costs regulated to the EU ETS in Germany (Löschel et al., 2011), these costs are
currently very small and are seen as negligible compared to other cost components. If these costs were
significant, they might affect overall cost-effectiveness along the lines identified by Stavins (1995) by
driving a wedge between the theoretically cost-effective allocation of abatement and the actually
realized one in the presence of TCs.
Figure 1 EU ETS annual MRV running costs for small and large installations in €/tCO2 regulated.
Sources: Jaraite et al. (2010) and Löschel et al. (2011).
Notes: *median; **average costs.
The MRV of emissions is crucial to all market-based schemes because regulators require reliable
emissions data, and firms have an incentive to under-report and over-emit. In the EU ETS, firmsmust
report their emissions annually, then have these reports verified by an external verifier who must be
accredited by a government agency (DEHSt, 2012). A firm’s MRV costs can differ strongly with the
size of regulated installations. This non-linearity in firms’ MRV costs (see Figure 1) is due to economies
of scale in the MRV process, which feature relatively high facility-level fixed costs that have been well
documented by several studies (Betz, 2005; Frasch, 2007; Heindl, 2012; Jaraite et al., 2010; Löschel et
al., 2010, 2011; Schleich & Betz, 2004). It has been argued that this may lead to a competitive
5.4 Instrument comparisons 105
disadvantage for small emitters (Jaraite et al., 2010). Heindl (2012) suggests that this effect may
theoretically lead to a larger optimal firm size and might even induce increasing market power in the
permit market. However, given the low orders of magnitude involved – a firm emitting 10,000 tCO2 per
year at an average TC of € 0.76 would face annual costs of € 7,600 – it seems that the empirical effect
will be practically irrelevant. Yet, TCs of € 1.51 per tCO2, as reported by Jaraite et al. (2010) for Ireland,
may lead to disproportionate hardships for certain firms.
From 2009 to 2011, the average annual private-sector MRV costs in Germany were reported to be
between € ct2/tCO2 (Löschel et al., 2011) and € ct9/tCO2 emitted (Destatis, 2011). In terms of absolute
average-per-entity costs, this translates into roughly € 2,500 per annum (p.a.) for small installations
(annual emissions below 25,000 tCO2) and roughly € 8,600 for large installations (annual emissions
above 25,000 tCO2).
2
For Germany, total MRV TC estimates range from € 11 to € 40 million p.a. As
illustrated in Figure 2, MRV constitutes the largest share of private-sector TCs (61–81% of total private
costs; Destatis, 2011; Löschel et al., 2011; own calculation).
Aggregate MRV costs are scaled to the number of regulated facilities and the mix of large- and small
sized entities (small/large emitters have lower/higher absolute, but higher/lower per unit GHG costs)
(Frasch, 2007; Jaraite et al., 2010; Löschel et al., 2011). These costs are independent of the abatement
level, because MRV processes have to be carried out for all emissions, independent of the level of
abatement. It can be expected that MRV costs will fall over time due to the effects of learning and
improved technology.
2
This calculation is based on firms’ MRV cost data, provided by Löschel et al. (2011). The high cost estimates
(used in Figure 2) could not be used because no differentiation was made between the small and large firms in
the studies by VBW (2011) and Destatis (2011).
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Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
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Total costs in 2011 million €
MRV Firms
11 - 40
Application for Allocation
2.4 – 2.6
Legal Expenses
10.7
Abatement Information
0.9
Registry Costs
0.8
Compliance Agency
15
Auctioning
0.13
Trading costs
11
Total Trading
51 - 81
Total Tax
41 - 71
Figure 2 Year 2011 EU ETS and hypothetical carbon tax TCs for different cost components for
Germany based on data from the first and second trading periods in total costs.
Sources: 1, Destatis (2011); 2, Brockmann et al. (2012), Destatis (2011); 3, VBW (2011); 4, Löschel et al. (2011); 5, DEHSt
(2011a); 6, DR Roever & Partner KG (2006), DEHSt (2011b), DEHSt (2008), CEC (2012); 7, EEX (2012), Point Carbon
(2011); 8, Kossoy and Guigon et al. (2012), M. Weber, personal communication, September 10, 2012, Berlin, GreenStream
Network Plc, EEX (2012).
If the numbers differed across the studies for the same cost components, the highest estimate was used in order to ensure
robustness of the results.
Notes: Bar chart (left) provides cost components using conservative (higher) cost data. Table (right) provides cost ranges. CDM
TCs are excluded to focus on the direct costs of the EU ETS.
Concerning the allocation of permits, firms covered by the EU ETS received the largest amount of
certificates for free in the first two trading periods (2005–2012). In the third trading period (2013–2020),
free certificates will be handed out based on firms’ export shares and relative efficiency (benchmarking).
Brockmann et al. (2012) found that for the third trading period, the median TC for the free allocation of
certificates amounted to a one-time expenditure of € 25,000 for personnel and external costs per firm at
the beginning of the trading period. Extrapolating to all covered firms and distributed over eight years,
this amounts to roughly € 2.5 million annually for all firms in Germany. The dynamics of this cost
component depends on the number of firms that qualify for free allocation and, therefore, on the
eligibility criteria for obtaining a free certificate. The higher the number of eligible entities, the larger
the aggregate TCs from this component will be.
Auctioning is the alternative to the free allocation of certificates. The costs charged by exchanges to
carry out auctions on behalf of governments are about € ct0.3 per certificate (Point Carbon, 2011). A
10% share of auctioned permits in Germany in 2011 amounted to roughly € 0.13 million in TC, while a
5.4 Instrument comparisons 107
50% share (as implemented from 2013 onwards) would amount to € 0.7 million in TCs per year. These
costs are clearly scalable to the number of auctioned certificates. As in the case of trading, these costs
may fall over time.
Because the rules for granting free certificates are not clearly defined, firms can exercise their rights to
legally dispute allocations in court.
3
A survey by VBW (2011) found that these figures translated into €
5,400 in litigation per installation in Germany, or € 10.7 million overall p.a.
4
The scalability of this
component is not obvious. However, it can be expected that legal action is scalable to the success rate
in relation to the costs of litigation. However, other factors such as legal traditions, corporate law, and
political acceptance of regulations by companies may also have an effect.
Permit trading is central to an ETS because it leads to equalization of MACs across all firms. In his
seminal study on TCs, Stavins (1995) shows that TCs for permit trading, which he defines as the ‘direct
financial costs of brokerage services’, can lead to the inefficient allocation of abatement across firms.
From a cost-effectiveness perspective, trading costs drives a wedge between firms’ MACs. TCs reduce
beneficial permit exchanges and corresponding adjustments in the allocation of abatement, thus reducing
the cost-effectiveness of the policy instrument (Stavins, 1995). In the EU ETS in 2011, the trading
volume amounted to 9.7 billion certificates (Kossoy & Guigonet, 2012). Trading TCs ranged from €
ct0.1/tCO2 to € ct10/tCO2, with costs apparently falling towards the lower end of this range over time
(Convery & Redmond, 2007; EEX, 2012; J. Hacker, personal communication, January 24, 2012, Berlin,
UMB; Kossoy & Guigonet, 2012; M. Weber, personal communication, September 10, 2012, Berlin,
GreenStream Network Plc). In the EU ETS, the overall trading costs amounted to roughly € 46 million
in 2011 and about € 11 million p.a. for Germany. These trading costs are small and there is no empirical
indication that they discouraged trading (Jaraite˙ et al., 2010). Therefore, the impacts of negative cost-
effectiveness – Stavins’ central concern – are likely to be minor for the case of the EU ETS. Trading
TCs is scalable to the volume of trading because brokerage costs arise for each transaction. In the EU
ETS, it can be observed that the majority of trades are carried out by market intermediaries who are
seeking arbitrage opportunities, and not by regulated firms (M. Weber, personal communication,
September 10, 2012, Berlin, GreenStream Network Plc). It is therefore likely that price fluctuations (that
give rise to profit opportunities for market intermediaries) determine trading levels rather than the
amount of regulated GHGs or the amount of abated emissions, even though in a larger trading system,
overall higher aggregate trading levels would be expected compared to smaller schemes. It can also be
expected that trading costs will fall over time, as illustrated by the comparison with other environmental
permit-trading schemes in the following.
4.1.2. Public-sector costs
Table 3 presents the EU ETS TC components for the public sector.
The compliance agency is the central authority that administers the ETS. It oversees the MRV process
by conducting sample checks, allocates free certificates, appoints exchanges to auction certificates,
provides information, and engages in litigation. The total annual costs for these tasks amounted to
roughly € 15 million or roughly € 7,700 per regulated entity for Germany from 2005 to 2011 (CEC,
3
In the first trading period, 806 appeals were lodged against 1600 allocation decisions and 604 appeals against
cost decisions in Germany (UBA, 2009). There were 373 appeals against allocation decisions in the second
trading period (UBA, 2009).
4
It has been stated that the enthusiasm for legal disputes is a special German phenomenon (Seidel, personal
communication, April 20, 2011 Berlin, DEHSt; VBW, 2011). Litigation costs in Spain and France were
substantially lower at only € 960 and € 60 per installation or € 0.9 million and € 60,000 total p.a., respectively
(VBW, 2011). No data are available for other instruments and other countries.
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Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
2012; DEHSt, 2008; DR Roever & Partner KG, 2006; Seidel, transaction costs of DEHSt, personal
communication, April 20, 2011, Berlin, DEHSt).
The compliance agency for TCs is scalable based on several factors, of which the number of regulated
entities is probably the most decisive. Furthermore, there are initial start-up costs, such as setting up
administrative processes and communicating and coordinating these processes with the regulated
entities. It is likely that the cost of the compliance agency is also scalable to the quality of its performance
because rigorous and more frequent verification would be more costly than relaxed control. The per-
entity costs may decline with the increasing number of regulated entities due to economies of scale. The
public registry is the electronic database for reconciling certificate accounts and the emissions data of
all regulated entities and is usually run by the compliance agency. The costs related to the registry are
mainly software and servicing costs. In Germany, they averaged about € 0.76 million per year for the
first and second trading period (DEHSt, 2011a).
This is largely a fixed component because the costs are determined by the licensing and maintenance
costs of the software. However, this cost also contains a variable component because it is likely that the
costs of the software are scalable to the number of accounts. Due to improved technology, such costs
may fall over time. However, they could also rise due to higher regulation requirements and safeguards
against fraud (European Voice, 2013).
4.1.3. Offsets for Kyoto mechanisms
In the EU ETS, firms can also use credits from the Kyoto offset mechanisms (the Clean Development
Mechanism [CDM] and Joint Implementation [JI]) for compliance. These credits are usually cheaper
(due to lower abatement costs) than the EU ETS allowances, but tend to feature higher TCs (due to
costly project cycles). In the second trading period, 302 million Kyoto offset credits were used for
compliance in Germany (CEC, 2014; DEHSt, CDM und JI in zweiter Handelsperiode, W. Seidel,
personal communication via e-mail, 2014; Emissions-euets.com, 2014). Based on data from Krey
(2005), Antinori and Sathaye (2007), and Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005), we found a range of TCs, from
€ 15 to € 32 million p.a., which resulted from the use of offset credits for Germany. However, it must
be noted that these TCs do not affect the companies in the EU ETS directly because the TCs are already
incorporated into the offset price, which is usually lower than the costs of the European Union
allowances (EUAs). Nevertheless, these costs hamper the efficiency of the EU ETS link to the CDM via
the distortive effect identified by Stavins (1995).
Due to the various cost components of theCDMprocess cycle, a separate analysis of the dynamics of
these cost components should be subject to further research; however, this is outside the scope of this
study. For the EU ETS, the total TCs incurred by the offset credits is clearly scalable to the number of
credits used for compliance.
5.4 Instrument comparisons 109
Figure 3 Ranges of ETS per unit (permit) of trading costs compared to the private sector.
Sources: Joskow and Schmalensee (1998), Margaree Consultants (1998), LECG (2003), EEX (2012), Convery and Redmond
(2007), J. Hacker, personal communication, January 24, 2012, Berlin, UMB, M. Weber, personal communication, September
10, 2012, Berlin, GreenStream Network Plc.
4.1.4. Summary, discussion, and comparison with other environmental permit trading schemes
Figure 2 aggregates the ex post TC estimates for the EU ETS in Germany. The total annual costs in the
one-year trading period from 2010 to 2011 amounted to € 81 million in Germany or € ct18/tCO2
regulated. Private-sector costs are 68–80% of total TCs, while public-sector costs are 20–32%.
Several studies have analysed the effects of trading costs on trading schemes targeting other
environmental pollutants (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1998; LECG, 2003; Stavins, 1995). These schemes
feature much higher trading costs, especially during inception. The RECLAIM scheme featured costs
from € 3 to € 72 per traded unit (tNOx and tSOx), the US NOx budget trading scheme featured trading
TCs from € 5 to € 27 per unit (LECG, 2003), and the US SO2 scheme is currently in the range of € 0.15,
but started at around € 23 (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1998; LECG, 2003) (Figure 3). Due to the effects
of learning by market participants and brokers, as well as improved technology, the costs have dropped
by more than 98% over time.
The claim of inefficient abatement and resulting welfare losses due to the TCs of permit trading (Stavins,
1995) seems to be more relevant for these schemes (e.g. Gangadharan, 2000), especially at the time of
their inception, than for the EU ETS where it seems sensible to assume that the relevance of this effect
is negligible.
The comparison of public-sector TCs reveals that US environmental permit trading schemes are leaner
than the EU ETS. While the EU ETS and the NOx budget ETS in the US have running costs of € 3,900
and € 7,700 per regulated entity, respectively, the US SO2 scheme is far less costly with only € 780 per
regulated entity (DEHSt, 2008, 2011b; LECG, 2003; McLean, 1997; DR Roever & Partner KG, 2006).
For the US SO2 scheme, the total firms’ MRV costs amounted to approximately € 100 million and the
trading costs were approximately € 3.5 million. Including the € 1.6 million from public-sector costs, this
amounts to TCs of € 105 million (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1998; LECG, 2003; US Environmental
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Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
Protection Agency (EPA), 2001).
5
All of these metrics suggest that the TCs of the EU ETS are not prohibitively high in absolute terms
from a macro-economic perspective. In any case, when choosing a policy instrument, it is the relative
costs of the instruments that matter. This point is addressed in the concluding remarks.
4.2 Tax
Emissions taxation is a price instrument, because the regulator sets the emissions tax, while the quantity
of emissions is determined by firms’ market behaviours. Much like a permit-trading scheme, a carbon
tax can achieve the equalization of MACs across all regulated entities. Under standard assumptions of
competitive markets, trading and taxation schemes are symmetric. Asymmetries in instrument
performance have been discussed for conditions of uncertainty (Hepburn, 2006; Weitzman, 1974) or
incentive structures for subnational jurisdictions in a federal system (Shobe & Burtraw, 2012). This
study investigates how taxing and trading compare with TCs performance.
A comparison of TCs between the tax and trading schemes needs to be careful not to compare ‘apples
with oranges’, as is sometimes done in public debates where real-world ‘second best’ schemes (such as
the EU ETS) are compared with theoretical ‘first best’ taxation schemes. In particular, specifications
regarding the point of regulation and rent distribution need to be treated in a conceptually equivalent
manner. A downstream trading scheme with a large portion of grandfathered certificates (such as the
EU ETS) should be compared with a downstream taxation scheme with an equivalent level of tax
exemptions. Even though the incentives for abatement may be different, the two options (grandfathering
and exemptions) should be regarded as analogous responses to identical political economy
considerations.
6
Firms’ MRV costs as the major TC cost component would be the same in both tax and trading schemes
for the firms that are subject to MRV, because data requirements for the MRV process are identical.
Also, other private TC factors would be identical except for trading and auctioning costs, which do not
accrue for taxes.
Drawing on data from the previous section, a downstream taxation scheme for Germany with tax
exemptions equivalent to the free allocations in the EU ETS would thus result in TCs of approximately
€ 41 to € 71 million (see Figure 2). This is approximately € 10 million (the costs of trading and
auctioning) less than the TCs of a trading scheme, which seems negligible from a macro-economic
perspective.
A different approach to determining the TCs of a CO2 tax is to compare it to other taxes that require
similar administrative efforts by the private and public sector. Because a CO2 tax would be designed to
act as a levy on fuel according to its CO2 content, excise duties on hydrocarbon fuels are a good proxy.
Data from a study on administrative and compliance costs of excises on hydrocarbon oils are available
for the UK (Sandford et al., 1989, p. 155). The tax covers light oil, road vehicle fuel, fuel oil, and gas
oil. The major findings from this study are that the majority of costs are the MRV costs of installations
and the reading of meters (Sandford et al., 1989, p. 156). From 1986 to 1987, public-sector costs
amounted to € 14.2 million and private-sector costs were E31.7 million for all of the UK.
5
Firms’ MRV costs are substantially higher for the US SO2 scheme than for the EU ETS. In 2001 there were
2100 regulated entities with average MRV costs of € 47,000 (or $50,000) (EPA, 2001). Initial capital costs were
also large. Ellerman (2000) estimated them to be approximately $700,000 per generating unit (at 371MWe per
unit).
6
We assume that, due to political economy considerations (i.e. the rent distribution interests of firms), the taxing
scheme would also be designed in a downstream manner.
5.4 Instrument comparisons 111
The TCs for taxation schemes feature the same cost components (except for auctioning and trading) as
an ETS. Thus, the same considerations apply concerning the scaling of these cost factors with respect
to different context and design variables (see Section 4.1).
4.3 Carbon-pricing transaction costs: upstream versus downstream points of regulation
The point of regulation is the location in the fossil-fuel processing chain where the regulator carries out
MRV and requires the submission of emissions permits. Options can be distinguished according to up,
mid-, and downstream regulations. For upstream schemes, the point of regulation is during the
exploitation or importation of fossil resources. In this case, all other downstream consumers would not
be subject to MRV and trading, thus eliminating all TCs for downstream firms. The upstream carbon
price can be expected to be devolved to the downstream level, as is standard procedure with vehicle fuel
excise duties. This approach would eliminate the inefficiency of non-linear MRV costs for small
companies, as discussed in Section 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 1. By contrast, midstream regulation is
carried out at the processing or storage level, and downstream regulation is exercised at the firm (as in
the EU ETS) or even the final consumption level (Flachsland, Brunner, Edenhofer, & Creutzig, 2011).
Table 4 Potential savings from switching to EU ETS upstream regulation in Germany
Downstream
Upstream
TC per t CO2
(€)
TC total
(in million €)
TC per t CO2
(€)
TC total low
(million €)
TC total high
(million €)
Large firms
€ 0.02
€ 9
Producers
and
Importers
€ 0.01a
€ 2.7b
€ 10c
Small firms
€ 0.5
€ 3
Small firms
No costs
Total
€ 12
€ 2.7
€ 10
Savings: € 2 - € 9,3 million
a) Very large installations have TCs of about € 0.01 (Löschel et al., 2011).
b) For the low estimate, we calculated the MRV costs for a large refinery (1.8 million tCO2 emissions; MRV costs of € 18,000
per year) and used this number as the average TC for the 150 importers and producers.
c) This calculation is based on the TC for large installations in Ireland (assuming that they have similar TCs as large installations
in Germany). These costs amount to € 66,000 per year (Jaraite et al., 2010).
The TC savings that result from adopting an upstream scheme compared to a downstream scheme
depend on two factors: (1) the difference in TCs per emitted tCO2 between small and large entities and
(2) the ratio between small and large entities within a scheme.
7
,
8
The calculations in Table 4 show that switching the point of regulation from downstream to upstream
could result in savings ranging from € 2 to € 9 million p.a. for Germany. Small firms that currently
7
In this context, ‘large entities’ refers to the producers and importers of fossil fuels.
8
There are 900 large installations (.25,000 tCO2) and 1100 small installations (25,000 tCO2) in Germany that
make up almost 99% of emissions (Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), 2013).
112
Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
feature high relative TCs would benefit most from these savings. However, the savings are limited in
absolute terms because most emissions (over 99%) in Germany come from large sources that already
have small TCs. The scope for total TC reductions from a macro-economic perspective is limited. This
may be different for other sectors that might be included in the EU ETS, in particular heating and
transport. The cost savings roughly calculated here also need to be pitched against the full ex ante
(opportunity) TCs of negotiating and implementing such a major regulatory change. However, the
calculations suggest that a newly set up ETS should opt for upstream coverage from inception from an
ex post TC perspective.
4.4 Technology standards
Technology standards are the most traditional instruments for environmental policy making. One major
reason is that they are quite easy to design and monitor (Sterner, 2003, p. 80); i.e. ex ante and ex post
TCs are often considered to be low. The drawback of this instrument is that an equalization of MACs
across facilities is not possible. Strongly differing MACs among firms leads to low overall cost
effectiveness of the instrument. This has led to a relative decline in the adoption of technology standards
compared to market-based instruments in recent years (Aldy & Stavins, 2011).
From a TCs perspective, some forms of technology standards for point sources have the advantage of
requiring very little MRV. Because, in many instances, it is not worth the effort to remove technologies
once installed, sporadic monitoring is sufficient to enforce compliance, and public-sector efforts and
data requirements are low (Hepburn, 2006). Other forms of technology standards, such as the
requirement to inspect domestic heating systems for CO2 emissions in German MRV must be carried
out regularly. Such forms of technology standards might therefore incur substantial MRV TCs; however,
data are unavailable. Data for a standard for the regulation of large point sources – e.g. the planned CO2
standards for power plants in the US (US EPA, 2013) or the regulation of SO2 via scrubbers in Germany
– are also unavailable. For the purpose of this study, no general quantitative estimates for MRV costs of
technology standards for large point sources could be identified or could be plausibly determined by
analogy. It seems safe to assume that they will be lower than those of any other policy instrument
considered in this study.
4.5 Performance standards
A performance standard limits the amount of emissions for a certain unit of output (e.g. CO2 per ton of
cement, CO2 per driven km, kWh per litre refrigerator capacity). In contrast to a technology standard,
it has the advantage of allowing firms to choose from various emissions reduction options during the
production process, rather than being obliged to fulfil specific technical requirements. It also has the
advantage that the standard can be adapted to technological progress (e.g. Japan’s Top Runner Program).
Non-tradable performance standards have the disadvantage that harmonization of MACs across firms is
impossible.
From a TC perspective, a performance standard for heterogeneous point sources of pollution entities
(e.g. cement factories or steel mills) does not entail significant cost reductions. This is the case because,
analogous to an ETS, all emissions have to be monitored and verified, and trading costs also arise (in
the case of white certificate trading). The costs of monitoring are reduced if a performance standard is
set for homogeneous non-point source pollution goods that are subject to mass production (e.g. vehicles
or household appliances) and no regular inspection is required. Each model of an appliance (e.g. fridge
or dryer) that is offered in a certain market must be certified only once. TCs for three different
performance standard programmes are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
5.4 Instrument comparisons 113
The US Appliance Standard covers a variety of appliances, such as refrigerators, space heaters, water
heaters, and other electrical equipment. For compliance, the products must perform better than a
maximum limit of energy consumption per unit of the relevant output. Standards setting, test procedures,
certification, and enforcement are carried out by the US Department of Energy.
The calculation of annual TCs from different sources is summarized in Table 5. The total annual public
sector TCs for the US Appliance Standard range from € 4.1 to € 17.4 million in 2011. These TCs are
substantially lower than for the other climate policy instruments reviewed in this article, indicating that
regulation via appliance standards is relatively cheap. This advantage needs to be considered against the
abatement opportunities that are related to this instrument (which are likely to be limited) and the inferior
overall cost-effectiveness of the technological standards. The reason for the lack of cost-effectiveness is
incomplete MAC harmonization, the salience of which will increase with the rising stringency of the
programme. This point is discussed further in Section 5.
Table 5 Annual public sector TCs for the US Appliance Standard in € (2011)
Total costs
(million €
2011)
Source
4.1
Levin et al. (1994)
5
McMahon et al. (2000)
9.3
Meyers et al. (2003)
10.1
McMahon et al. (2000)
11.6
Meyers et al. (2003)
13.9
Gillingham et al. (2004)
17.4
Gillingham et al. (2004)
Note: The cost data are adjusted for inflation and converted into € (see note 1); therefore, it no longer matches the original data.
In general, the TCs of an appliance standard are likely to scale with respect to the number of different
appliances covered, as MRV (i.e. certification) must be carried out for each model. There are also
ongoing fixed TCs for governments and firms. If regular inspection of a device is required (e.g. home
heating systems in Germany), the number of appliances, as well as the inspection procedure, will affect
the total TCs for that instrument.
A hypothetical performance standard for large point sources in Germany, which would cover the sectors
regulated under the EU ETS, would result in TCs of roughly € 41 to € 71 million p.a. The rationale
behind this calculation is that the costs of MRV, registry, and the public agency will be roughly identical
to those of an ETS or tax.
TCs for the EU Emission Vehicle Standard and the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
programme are likely to be low, but no data are available. The scaling properties for these TCs are likely
to be analogous to an appliance standard. Each model (but not every single vehicle) has to be certified
prior to sales, but regular inspection of each vehicle is not necessary. Furthermore, there are also ongoing
fixed TCs for governments and firms.
5. Conclusions
Table 6 and Figure 4 summarize the reviewed TC data for different climate policy instruments. They
show that ex post TCs of policy instruments in large industrialized countries are relatively low in
macroeconomic terms. For example, the TCs for the EU ETS in Germany are less than 1% of the
subsidies for renewable electricity in Germany, which was € 12 billion in 2011 (Frontier Economics,
2012). Furthermore, the comparison shows that TCs do not differ strongly across instruments. Compared
to the potential orders of magnitude of macroeconomic inefficiencies from non-optimal policy
114
Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
instruments, especially in the longer run, the magnitude of TC differences (as indicated in Table 6)
appear to be very small or negligible. For example, using a numerical dynamic general equilibrium
model, Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and Lessmann (2013) calculate that relying exclusively on a feed-in tariff
instead of an optimal carbon tax can increase the costs of climate policy by 0.8% of total consumption
in terms of balanced-growth equivalents (see also Fischer & Newell, 2008).
Table 6 Aggregated TCs for all instruments considered
Scheme
Country
Pollutant
Total TC
(million € 2011)
Regulation
Method
EU ETS
(Downstream)
Germany
CO2
51 - 81
Downstream; Point
sources
EU ETS
(Upstream)
(hypot.)
Germany
CO2
28 - 35
Upstream; Point
sources
EU TAX (hypot.)
Germany
CO2
41 - 71
Downstream; Point
sources
UK TAX
UK
CO2
46
Upstream; Point
sources
EU Industrial
Performance
Standard (hypot.)
Germany
CO2
41 - 71
Downstream; Point
sources
US Appliance
Standard
US
CO2
4 - 17
Downstream; Non-
point sources
CDM/JI used for
EU ETS a
CDM/JI Host
Countries /
Germany
CO2
15 – 33a
Certification; Point
sources
US SO2 ETS
US
SO2
105
Downstream /
CEMS; Point
sources
Notes: Ranges are indicated where data from multiple sources were available. The column ‘Regulation method’ indicates how
MRV is carried out.
a) TCs for offset credits used for compliance for the EU ETS in Germany. For data see Section 4.
5.5 Conclusions 115
Figure 4 Aggregated total TCs for different climate policy instruments.
Notes: Ranges are indicated where data from multiple sources were available. Grey bars indicate that the calculations are
based on hypothetical schemes. Black bars indicate that the data originated from empirical studies on schemes that were in
operation. For data, see Section 4.
Figure 5 Optimal policy instrument choice for different issues (issue A, low level of abatement; issue
B, high level of abatement) when both the cost-effectiveness, defined as total abatement costs (ACs),
and TC properties of instruments are taken into account
Note: Total ACs are assumed to be lower for market-based instruments due to the equalization of MACs.
Figure 5 offers a framework to discuss TCs in relation to different abatement levels in order to discern
whether TCs are relevant to the total cost-effectiveness ranking of climate policy instruments (for a
116
Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
similar line of argument, see Betz et al., 2010). It depicts two scenarios for the regulation of GHGs in
one country
9
by comparing the abatement levels (low and high), the sums of the total system-level
abatement costs, and total TCs of technology standards and market-based instruments.
Standards tend to have lower TCs than market-based instruments, but are inferior in terms of MAC
harmonization across regulated entities. The magnitude of this adverse cost-effectiveness property will
increase with the overall quantity of abatement, thus increasing the relative total abatement costs of the
instrument with rising programme stringency. Hence, standards may be superior instruments at low
levels of abatement (issue A), but for ambitious abatement programmes (issue B), market-based
instruments can be expected to perform better due to lower total abatement costs. It can be argued that
climate policy in large countries is generally a B-level policy issue because ambitious emissions
reductions will be required in the long term.
Related to these considerations, the incorporation of TC considerations into policy instrument choice
might principally also affect the optimal choice of the level of policy stringency in the context of an
overall efficiency analysis (i.e. balancing the marginal costs (including TCs) and benefits of abatement
using a specific instrument). However, given the small TC differences across climate policy instruments
observed in this study, it seems that TCs are practically not relevant in such considerations, at least in
regulatory contexts similar to the EU and the US, and instead the relative abatement cost performance
as well as other societally relevant evaluation criteria are relevant to the optimal choice of climate policy
instruments. However, several limitations to this finding have to be considered.
First, as discussed in Sections 3 and 4, TCs scale with respect to different country- and design-specific
factors. For example, TCs may be substantially higher in other jurisdictions with different institutional
structures, governance capacities, and market infrastructures. This may be true for other Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, but especially for emerging economies
and developing countries. Research on schemes such as the CDM and Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) have shown that TCs can be large and are therefore likely
to distort optimal abatement (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Boettcher et al., 2009; Fichtner, Graehl,&Rentz,
2003; Michaelowa&Jotzo, 2005). The same may apply to jurisdictions with few abatement opportunities
(such as cities). In such cases, the differences in TCs of different instruments may outweigh the
advantages of MAC harmonization (indicating that the issue is A-level in the framework of Figure 5).
Furthermore, in very small jurisdictions with little abatement, such as cities, differences in TCs may
outweigh the advantages of MAC harmonization, which would also indicates A-level situations and
related policy choice. To better inform the choice and set-up of novel climate policy instruments with
respect to relative TCs, more empirical TC data from applications in different contexts would be required
to be able to robustly estimate the magnitude of these scaling effects.
Second, the TCs in this study relate to average ex post costs over a longer time period. Short-term
changes in regulation, such as new MRV requirements, may affect investment behaviour and may imply
financial hardship for certain firms in the short term, which can create costs at the system level.
Furthermore, other ex ante costs such as setting up administrative processes and communicating and
coordinating these with regulated entities, but especially the societal costs of political bargaining, may
be important factors that can limit the development of climate change policies. A comprehensive
analysis of the interdependence of TCs and policy instruments would, therefore, need to put a stronger
focus on ex ante TCs. The interplay between ex ante TCs, ex post TCs, and the cost-effectiveness of
instruments should be subject to further research.
Third, it has been pointed out that economies of scale, resulting in different MRV costs for firms, may
lead to a competitive disadvantage for small emitters, but the effect seems to be small in the case of the
9
The numbers of regulated emissions and entities are assumed to be identical in both scenarios.
5.5 Conclusions 117
EU ETS (see Figure 1 and Section 4.1.1).
Fourth, TCs may alter the shape of a firm’s marginal abatement supply curve and subsequently affect
cost-effectiveness and efficiency. This may be the case if TCs for assembling information on cost-
effective abatement at the facility level vary among different abatement options. The respective TCs for
different abatement options at the firm level and their potential to distort programme cost-effectiveness
should, therefore, be subject to further research.
Despite these caveats, current evidence indicates that, for large jurisdictions in OECD countries such as
Germany and the US, ex post TC considerations play a minor role in climate policy instrument choices.
In these contexts, the focus of policy-choice considerations should instead be on the cost effectiveness
properties of the instruments for incentivizing abatement and other societally relevant objectives (e.g.
equity or political economy considerations).
This conjecture differs from experiences in other areas of environmental policy, such as pollution trading
in the Minnesota River basin and the US- led phase-out trading programme, where very high ex post
TCs were observed and thus considered to be important in the overall assessment of optimal
environmental policy choice.
Clearly, some caution is warranted given that the underlying data are somewhat meager and patchy
outside of the EU ETS. Therefore, the results of this study should be viewed as preliminary until further
evidence is provided. Such research should be based on more observations that are founded on clear and
uniform reporting rules for TCs. The relevant question here is whether better data would alter the general
findings of this study. As this discussion has attempted to demonstrate, it seems unlikely that, for large
countries with similar institutional settings to the US and Germany, new data will change the picture
dramatically and make ex post TCs a substantial factor for climate policy instrument choice from a
macroeconomic perspective.
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Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
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_emissionshandel_entwaechst_den_kinderschuhen.pdf
US EPA. (2001). The United States experience with economic incentives for protecting the environment
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122
Chapter 5 The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument
Choice: an Analysis of the EU and the US
Chapter 6
Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
123
VI Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
The main theme of this dissertation has been to analyze selected economic and political
challenges
1
of the Energiewende in Germany’s electricity sector.
Applied to the subject at hand, these are:
1. What are the goals (or problems) of the Energiewende (Chapter 2)?
2. What are the expected outcomes of certain policies (in this case different nuclear
phase out dates) (Chapter 3)?
3. Which policy for EEG reform should be chosen to reach certain political goals
(Chapter 4)?
4. What are observed ex-post policy outcomes concerning transaction costs for climate
policy instruments (Chapter 5)?
This synthesis chapter is structured as follows: section 6.1 provides a synthesis of the central
ideas as well as the main research questions and findings of the Chapters 2-5. Section 6.2
gives an overview over the methodological approaches used in each chapter and the lessons-
learned in their application. Section 6.3 outlines ideas for further research. Section 6.4
concludes with thoughts on how to improve interaction at the science-policy interface.
6.1 Synthesis Summary of the Chapters
The following section provides a synthesis of the core chapters (2-5) of this dissertation by
briefly summarizing the research questions and findings of each chapter:
Chapter 2, titled Which goals are driving the Energiewende? Making sense of the German
Energy Transformation addressed research into the political goals of Germany’s
Energiewende based on 54 interviews with policy experts.
In particular the chapter aimed to answer the following questions:
• What are the goals that are commonly used to justify the Energiewende in the public
discourse?
• How do German elite policy actors rank these goals? Do they leave goals out or add
others?
• Are there goals that are often ranked higher than other goals?
• Is there a justification for intentionally leaving political goals vague?
The key finding is that a large majority of respondents named climate protection as the most
important goal of the Energiewende. However, around 80% of all participants also pursue
additional goals with the Energiewende, and around two thirds go as far as to agree that the
Energiewende would make sense even if climate change did not exist. This seemingly
1
Chapters 2 to 5 inform central questions of policy analysis, as defined by Dunn (2012: 5).
124 Chapter 6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
contradictory finding suggests that the goals and motivations behind the Energiewende are
manifold and go far beyond just climate protection, as suggested by many prominent studies.
It became clear that different actors pursue different goals with the Energiewende. Other
important goals are, for example: the nuclear phase-out, import independence from fossil
fuels, and job creation and regional added value in RES industries. The study also illustrated
the discrepancy between the normative claim by economists that rational policy making is
only possible if the goals are clear (e.g. Weimann, 2006: 10), and the instrumental usage of
goals as described by Fischer (2006: 158): “politicians find it advantageous […] to leave the
meanings [of goals] vague, permitting different groups to read into them what they want. The
ambiguity of meanings is often the very thing that makes possible political compromise
between groups with conflicting views.”
Chapter 3, titled Germany’s nuclear phase-out: Sensitivities and impacts on electricity prices
and CO
2
emissions, was aimed at policy makers who must make decisions under high
uncertainty.
The chapter aimed to answer the following questions:
• What options are available for replacing nuclear energy and how are they to be
evaluated economically and environmentally?
• How would CO
2
emissions and the electricity prices (on the wholesale market and
for end consumers) develop for different nuclear phase-out scenarios and with
different replacement options?
• How is security of supply affected?
• How do the results change when individual model assumptions are varied?
• How do the results compare to other studies with similar research questions?
We found that in the short term, all nuclear power plants that were shut down according to the
moratorium on nuclear energy can be replaced by making use of existing overcapacities as
well as by reducing net electricity exports. In the medium term, a series of fossil fuel-fired
power plants that are under construction can replace a large share of the nuclear fleet. To
secure electricity supply in the long term, the options primarily deployed in our model include
the building of new gas and/or hard coal power plants, the expansion of renewable energy and
(centralized and decentralized) cogeneration capacity, the reduction of electricity demand by
increasing energy efficiency and the import of electricity from other European countries. If
nuclear power is replaced with fossil plants and no other mitigating actions are taken, the CO
2
emissions of the German electricity sector are likely to rise.
In the study we expected an increase of wholesale electricity prices following the shutdown of
eight nuclear power plants since gas power plants were expected to set the marginal price in
more hours of the year. This turned out to be a false prediction. In the model assumptions we
had overestimated the CO
2
price and underestimated the large increases in RES production. In
reality, the wholesale price decreased, and did not increase, as predicted by our model results.
Furthermore we found that the results in the model crucially hinge on some fundamental
model assumptions. The most important is the development of fuel and CO
2
prices, which
have a much larger influence on the price of electricity than the nuclear phase-out date itself.
6.1 Synthesis summary of the chapters 125
When we compared our results to the results from other studies, we found substantial
differences in the projections for the wholesale electricity price for different nuclear phase-out
dates. The reasons for the differences can mainly be found in different model assumptions
concerning fossil fuel prices, CO
2
prices, the demand for electricity in the future and the
deployment path of renewable energies.
Chapter 4, titled RES Support Schemes and Associated Risks: an Economic Analysis of the
Debate of the EEG Reform in Germany was designed to contribute to the debate over the
reform of the EEG in summer 2014.
The chapter aimed to answer the following questions:
• What is the purpose of risk in the electricity sector and how does it relate to
uncertainty?
• What particular risks are involved in the promotion of RES?
• How do different support schemes influence risk, and how does this influence the
risk distribution between RES-investors and the society?
• Can increased risk for RES-investors increase the system friendliness of RES
installments and thus their overall efficiency?
• How does the question of risk distribution relate to the achievement of political
goals such as actor diversity?
The analysis shows that reducing the risk of RES investors shifts the risk to other investors
(e.g. conventional power plants) and to electricity consumers. Yet the overall risk is not
reduced. If increased efficiency of RES investment is the goal, RES investors should carry
risk. This would increase efficiency of investment decisions, even though the costs for RES
installments would increase in consequence due to higher risk premiums. However,
increasing investor risk conflicts with the goal of maintaining a large variety of actors, as
smaller players tend to be unable to manage larger risks. The issue of optimal risk distribution
is therefore also a political (i.e. a distributional) question.
Chapter 5, titled The (Ir)relevance of Transaction Costs in Climate Policy Instrument Choice:
an Analysis of the EU and the US is concerned with transaction costs of various GHG
abatement policies focusing on the EU and the US. This study adds to the research regarding
climate policy instruments by comparing the transaction costs of various climate policy
instruments, such as emission trading versus an emission tax. The findings of this chapter can
contribute to a more informed debate on this issue. This topic currently does not feature high
on the political agenda. However, if more carbon pricing schemes are implemented
internationally (as planned by many countries), the issue of optimal policy design (with the
goal of minimal transaction costs) may play a larger role in the future. Thus, the political
relevance of this chapter may still be ahead.
The chapter aimed to answer the following questions:
• Do transaction costs play an important role for climate policy instrument design?
• How do different climate policy instruments compare with respect to their transaction
costs and how does this influence cost-effectiveness?
126 Chapter 6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
• How can transaction costs considerations be incorporated into climate policy
instrument design?
• How do different cost components (e.g. monitoring costs) scale with certain variables
such as the number of regulated entities or the level of abatement?
The key finding is that the hypothesis that ex-post transaction costs are large and thus play a
pivotal role in climate policy instrument choice can be rejected for the evaluated instruments
(among them the EU ETS). Both total and relative ex-post transaction costs incurred by the
public and private sector can be considered low. The results indicate that ex-post transaction
costs play a minor role for large countries that feature similar institutional characteristics as
the EU and the US. In those countries, the focus should be on the efficiency properties of
instruments for incentivizing abatement, as well as equity and political economy
considerations (and other societally relevant goals). For countries with weak institutions,
transaction costs may play a larger role. This should be subject to further research (see also
section 6.3).
6.2 Review & Discussion of Methods and Methodological Lessons
This section reviews and discusses the different methods used in the five chapters of this
dissertation and highlights methodological lessons learned. This dissertation can be classified
as research in the field of policy analysis which is, according to Dunn (2012: 3),
methodologically eclectic. The methods applied in this dissertation are qualitative as well as
quantitative and stem from economics and social/political science. The section is structured
along the chapters of this dissertation.
6.2.1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 researches the Goals of the Energiewende applying social science methods. To
answer the research question we carried out a two-pronged approach. In the first step,
qualitative content analysis was applied to collect and conceptualize the goals of the
Energiewende from oral and written statements in the public discourse. In a second step, 54
expert interviews were carried out to receive a personal Energiewende-related goal ranking.
One methodological challenge in the interviews was to extract the personal preferences
regarding the Energiewende goals from the respondents, as many interviewees tended to
recite the goals stated in the public discourse irrespective of whether he or she believed that
they were relevant.
Another challenge was drawing a line between goals and means during the interviews. This is
conceptually difficult because the separation also depends on the normative stance of the
interviewee. For instance, the decentralization of electricity production could be regarded a
goal in itself, or as a means to weaken powerful corporations in the electricity sector.
Weakening those corporations can, in turn, be a stand-alone goal in the spirit of skepticism
towards large industry, or could be understood solely as a means to ensure efficient markets
by ensuring that large corporations do not have pricing power. Having identified the various
goals, it was crucial to explain and discuss the decision context (or frame) of the goals to the
interviewees so that they could separate the goals and balance their importance against each
6.2 Review & discussion of methods and methodological lessons 127
other. A major methodical lesson is, therefore, that the differentiation between goals and
means is always dependent on the decision context (in this case the Energiewende)
(Eisenführ, 2003). This fact needs to be made clear to interviewees prior to interviews.
The task of separating and prioritizing goals also showed that many interviewees did not
initially think of them of separate goals that could be weighed and traded against one another.
Rather, many interviewees thought in terms of Energiewende-narratives, i.e. that various
goals are necessarily linked and that prioritization among them is not possible or desirable.
6.2.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, which deals with Germany’s nuclear phase-out, mainly quantitative modeling
methods were applied. To answer the question of possible developments of electricity prices
and CO
2
-emissions for different phase-out years, various scenarios were analyzed using the
quantitative modeling tool MICOES (Mixed Integer Cost Optimization Energy System), a
bottom-up electricity market model for power plant scheduling. MICOES applies mixed-
integer optimization and incorporates short-term marginal cost, start-up and shutdown costs,
as well as limited ramp rates. It uses a least-cost approach to optimize the hourly scheduling
of the conventional fleet of power plants in the market. Additionally, the model results were
tested for their robustness in sensitivity analyses, in which individual assumptions were
varied. In this way, ranges of alternative scenarios were explored. Furthermore, a comparison
of studies that attempted to answer similar questions (price and CO
2
developments for
different nuclear phase-out dates) was carried out.
As mentioned earlier, the projections of the wholesale electricity price for different nuclear
phase-out dates did not match the actual developments. The reason can be found in exogenous
model assumptions that turned out to be quite far off (e.g. RES electricity production and
CO
2
-prices). The methodological lesson from this modeling exercise can be, again, that model
results crucially depend on the input assumptions.
6.2.3 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 applies fundamental theoretical economic analysis and evaluates the risk
distribution among different societal actors for certain policies using a general equilibrium
framework. In a second step, a theoretical analysis was carried out indicating how the results
from the economic analysis relate to different and conflicting political goals. The theoretical
analysis proved to be useful in obtaining a fundamental understanding of the relationship
between the risk for investors, the risk for society and the effects on costs (and risks) for RES
and other market participants.
However, the lesson can be that for actual policy advice, the results of the theoretical analysis
are only of limited use since assumptions were made that do not hold in reality (e.g. perfect
capital markets and perfect information of all actors).
6.2.4 Chapter 5
In Chapter 5 a twofold approach was applied in order to compare transaction costs of various
climate policies. First, a systematic review of all publicly available empirical ex-post
transaction cost studies was carried out. Where quantitative data were not available,
128 Chapter 6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
qualitative considerations and plausibility checks supplemented the analysis. Over the course
of the research it became ever clearer that the concept of transaction costs for climate policy
instruments lacked a well-developed and comprehensive theoretical foundation. Therefore,
we made a first step in filling this gap by introducing conceptual distinctions of ex-post
transaction costs dimensions. To apply the findings of this chapter to other countries and
regions, it is crucial to identify which cost components decrease, increase, or remain constant
as the scale of the system expands or decreases. Accordingly we hypothesized how the
scaling of these dimensions can affect the choice of policy instruments in differing regulatory
contexts.
The methodological lesson from this chapter is that a clear and agreed upon theoretical
concept for transaction costs is needed before data is collected and compared. Given the
extreme conceptual differences in the definitions of transaction costs in the past, this issue
needs to be solved in the scientific community before detailed and comprehensive empirical
cross-country comparisons of transaction costs are feasible.
6.3 Ideas for Further Research
This section shall provide an outlook on interesting questions for future research. The section
is structured along the chapters of this dissertation.
6.3.1 Introduction (Chapter 1)
The introduction (Chapter 1) examines the history of the Energiewende applying Kingdon’s
multiple streams framework and also discusses different definitions of the term
Energiewende. Both endeavors could be touched upon only superficially in this chapter and
there leave ample room for further research.
First, a closer look at the definition of the term Energiewende is needed. Politicians, scientists
and the media in Germany and also internationally widely use the term. However, very often
different concepts and ideas are related to this term. In order to enable a well-founded
discussion on the merits and problems of the Energiewende a widely accepted definition is
necessary. Otherwise discussions over the Energiewende will remain superficial and create
confusion rather than solutions.
Second, a deeper analysis of the Energiewende using Kingdon’s multiple streams framework
could be fruitful. The application in Chapter 1 was merely a scratch on the surface. However
it gave a first indication that the seemingly erratic energy policy decisions in Germany over
the past 30 years can be quite well explained with Kingdon’s approach. If this high
explanatory power also holds under closer scrutiny, the multiple streams framework could be
established as a powerful tool for analysis of German energy policy.
Third, further research in the politics stream may bring interesting results. The chapters of this
dissertation contribute to the problem stream (Chapter 2) and the policy stream (Chapters 3, 4
and 5). Analyzing the politics stream may give answers to the question why the
Energiewende is taking place in Germany and not in other countries with comparable
problems.
Fourth, going beyond Kingdon’s analysis of the agenda setting process, it would be
6.3 Ideas for further research 129
interesting to analyze the policy process after a problem has made it onto the political agenda.
How did various interest groups, societal actors and political parties position themselves in
relation to a certain policy? For this analysis the multiple streams framework is not helpful,
and approaches such as Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1987) may be
more useful.
6.3.2 Chapter 2
The research in Chapter 2 regarding the political goals of Germany’s Energiewende also
raises numerous questions. The next logical (yet very challenging) step for further research
would be to provide tools for policy makers which would help them to better understand what
the achievement of certain goals would mean quantitatively (i.e. make related costs
transparent). This would have to take account of all interdependencies and the various trade-
offs between goals. Ideally, scientists could show how much it would cost to achieve certain
goals. This would give answers to, for example, the question of how much more expensive it
is to secure actor diversity in an RES-auction. Policymakers could then decide if they are
willing to pay this price in order to secure a specific political goal. Edenhofer and Kowarsch
(2015) suggest approaching this problem by carrying out assessments of alternative policy
pathways and applying different methodologies.
Secondly, further interesting research would be to examine the arguments of the interviewees
in order to assess their validity under scrutiny. This was deliberately avoided in the research
underlying Chapter 2. Numerous claims will be (in the near to medium term) open to
empirical evaluation, such as the claim that RES support will create German market leaders.
An assessment of such claims would enable a better discussion on the validity of certain
arguments.
Third, Germany’s Energiewende discourse is often merely about policy instruments without a
debate about the goals that should be achieved. This poses the question of why political goals
play such a small role in the public discourse. It seems that the debate about policy
instruments (means) is often a proxy-debate about ends, made unnecessarily complex and
muddled. An example is the debate over emissions pricing versus direct support for RES.
There is a heated ongoing debate over the pros and cons of these two instruments. Taking a
closer look, this really seems to be a debate about the goals that are connected to these
instruments rather than the instruments themselves. The hypothesis is that proponents of
emission pricing consider climate protection as the only valid goal, whereas proponents of
direct RES support put more weight on other goals such as cost reductions in RES, regional
added value or actor diversity. It is, however, unclear why these different normative views
(i.e. differing goals) are hidden behind the discussion of policy instruments (means).
Fourth, it would be interesting to evaluate to what extend the opinion of the interviewed
experts corresponds to that of the public at large. In the pre-test for the expert interviews, the
methodology was tested on non-expert subjects and proved to be a viable tool. Increasing the
scope and the sample size of the questionnaire respondents may also lend more weight (and
possibly another outcome) to the empirical claims made in this chapter.
Fifth, the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1987), could be utilized in the next step of
analysis. It could be tested whether certain persons could, according to their answers in the
130 Chapter 6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
questionnaire or the ensuing discussion, be allocated to various advocacy coalitions.
Lastly, analyzing the interviewed persons with regard to their inclinations and attitudes would
be interesting. For the research in Chapter 2, interviewees were asked explicitly to express
their personal goals as opposed to those of the organizations they represent. Given the control
question as to what the agreement between the interviewees personal and official position
was, the majority estimated an overlap of 80-100%. This high overlap raises the question of
whether persons with certain attitudes find matching organizations (or the other way around),
or whether people adapt their personal views to those of their organizations, or even whether
certain persons are able to commit their organization to their previously held private
convictions.
6.3.3 Chapter 3
The results in Chapter 3 have once again shown how significantly model assumptions affect
the results. In a next step, new model runs with updated assumptions could help to verify the
results as well as the model. Additionally, further research could take other variables into
account e.g. grids, new power plant installments and increased flexibility options.
6.3.4 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 describes a field of analysis in which the theory of the second best needs to be
applied since the application of the first best solution (e.g. carbon pricing) is not possible
(Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956). Direct RES support is an established policy instrument and the
protection of legitimate interests demands that promised subsidies are paid. This forces
German policymakers into a path-dependency, making adjustments of the existing scheme
more likely than a complete overhaul of the funding scheme (e.g. to a system of R&D support
in combination with a high price for CO
2
). Therefore, further research on possible
adjustments to the current funding landscape (i.e. the EEG) would be of high value to policy
makers. One concrete question could be how the political goal that RES should be “better
integrated into the electricity market” can be achieved (BMWi, 2016a). This entails the idea
that RES investors should increasingly carry long-term price risks and receive an ever-
decreasing amount of subsidies. Research on policy instruments or design features, which
gradually rebalance the risk between RES investors, conventional power plant investors and
the society, is in ample demand from political decision makers and is therefore an interesting
field for further research.
Second, an assessment of international experiences with different funding schemes and
resulting effects on risk distributions and consequences for risk premiums, efficiency of
installments, and actor diversity would also be interesting further research. Preliminary work
in this area was published by Pahle und Schweizerhof (2015).
Thirdly, it would be interesting to research how the arguments relating to risk allocation
between investors and society change when Germany opens its RES funding scheme to
foreign RES-plants as planned by the German government (BMWi, 2016b).
6.3.5 Chapter 5
Chapter 5 also raises intriguing questions for further research. First, the analysis could be
extended to more policy instruments, sectors and especially countries and regions. This could
6.3 Ideas for further research 131
enhance the empirical robustness of results and verify whether the findings also hold for
countries with weaker institutional environments.
Second, ex-ante transaction costs could be added to the analysis. This means that the costs
that occur prior to the implementation of a policy instrument (e.g. research, design and
enactment) could be included in the analysis because they may play an important role in the
overall assessment of transaction costs. This is, however, a challenging task, since the existing
data required for such analysis is currently very scarce and chronically inconsistent. A
precondition for such an analysis would therefore be an extensive effort to gather data on
transaction costs applying a uniform definition.
Thirdly, the conceptual foundation of transaction costs of climate policy instruments should
be strengthened. Chapter 5 makes an analytical attempt to establish which kind of costs (fixed
or variable) has the largest impact on transaction costs. Further research is necessary to better
understand the dynamics of transaction costs, especially with respect to the scalability of fixed
versus variable components.
6.4 General Lessons and Concluding Remarks
Germany’s Energiewende is a tremendously complex infrastructure and societal project that
will likely become more rather than less complex in the foreseeable future. With a low- to
moderate share of RES in the electricity sector, the system has remained fairly manageable.
However, with strongly increasing shares of variable RES, major difficulties arise. New
issues such as a revised electricity market design, demand side management, sector-coupling
and grid extension will play an increasing role in the future and will add new layers of
complexity to the endeavor. Possible disruptive technological developments (e.g. cheap
electricity storage) have the potential to change fundamental assumptions such that long term
plans (e.g. grid planning) may prove to be outdated whilst still being implemented.
Policymakers and bureaucrats, responsible for these decisions, often lack qualifications or the
capacity to comprehend and oversee the technical and socio-economic interdependencies of
this highly complex system, leading to mistakes and faulty regulatory frameworks.
Germany’s Minister of the Economy and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel openly admits that:
“[energy policy] is a web, and whenever someone pulls on one end, something probably
moves in places, which one did not intend to move” (Gabriel, 2015).
Since the complex workings of energy policy are, at this point, beyond the grasp of many
decision makers, expert scientists take on a crucial role. By writing studies, expert statements,
and actively engaging with society and policy makers, they are essential to explain causal
relations, the functioning of policy instruments and the trade-offs between conflicting goals.
This science-policy interaction could be improved if scientists whose research is related to
current policy debates could develop a better understanding for the challenges and constraints
policy makers face. They should be willing and able to incorporate political constraints (i.e.
settings that cannot be changed in the short term) into their models and analysis by working
on second-, third- or fourth best solutions. It seems that scientists (in this case mostly
economists) often misinterpret political constraints as cumbersome restrictions standing in the
way of straightforward welfare maximization. Instead, they should be regarded as an integral
132 Chapter 6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
part of a democracy, where balancing interests between different societal groups is often more
important to policy makers than pure economic welfare maximization. This demand must,
however, be confined to scientists who are dealing with immediate policy advice. Those
scientists who make suggestions against the background of longer time horizons and towards
society at large are justified in ignoring immediate political constraints since such constrains
are never set in stone and can change in the long run. In general scientists (or in this case
economists) should, of course, continue to make politicians aware of social welfare losses,
which may result out of the existing political constraints.
In this dissertation, I have on the one hand used economic analysis to assess policy
instruments and on the other hand, political analysis to consider the political goals of
Germany’s Energiewende. I hope that my work will contribute to manage a successful
transition towards a low-carbon (energy) economy. Should the Energiewende succeed, it may
well serve as a role model for other countries all over the world. In this case, Germany’s
Energiewende may at last develop into an important building block in the fight against
climate change.
6.4 General lessons and concluding remarks 133
6.5 References
BMWi. (2016a). Fortgeschriebenes Eckpunktepapier zum Vorschlag des BMWi für das neue
EEG. https://www.bmwi.de
BMWi. (2016b). Öffnung des EEG für Strom aus anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen der
Pilot-Ausschreibung für Photovoltaik-Freiflächenanlagen. http://www.bmwi.de/
Dunn, W. N. (2012). Public policy analysis: an introduction (5th ed). Boston: Pearson.
Edenhofer, O., & Kowarsch, M. (2015). Cartography of pathways: A new model for
environmental policy assessments. Environmental Science & Policy, 51, 56–64.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.03.017
Eisenführ, F. (2003). Rationales Entscheiden. Berlin: Springer.
Fischer, F. (1995). Evaluating public policy. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers
Gabriel, S. (2015). Rede beim BDEW-Kongress: Gute Grundlage für zukünftiges
Strommarktdesign gelegt. Retrieved 21 August 2015, from http://www.bmwi.de
Joas, A. (2013). Policy Goals of the German ‘Energiewende’ An Application of the Advocacy
Coalition Framework. Hertie School of Governance.
Knopf, B., Kondziella, H., Pahle, M., Götz, M., Bruckner, T., & Edenhofer, O. (2011).
Scenarios for phasing out : nuclear energy in Germany. WISO Diskurs.
http://library.fes.de
Lipsey, R. G., & Lancaster, K. (1956). The General Theory of Second Best. The Review of
Economic Studies, 24(1), 11. http://doi.org/10.2307/2296233
Pahle, M., & Schweizerhof, H. (2015). A risk perspective on market integration and the
reform of support of renewables in Germany. PIK Discussion Paper, https://www.pik-
potsdam.de
Sabatier, P. A. (1987). Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change an advocacy
coalition framework. Science Communication, 8(4), 649–692.
Sabatier, P. A. (1999). The Need for Better Theories. In Theories of the Policy Process (pp.
3–17). Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
Weimann, J. (2006). Wirtschaftspolitik Allokation und kollektive Entscheidung. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
134 Chapter 6 Synthesis, Discussion & Further Research
Statement of Contribution
135
Statement of Contribution
The four core chapters of this thesis are the result of collaborations between the author of this
thesis, the two mentoring postdocs Dr. Michael Pahle, Prof. Dr. Christian Flachsland and the
advisor of this thesis, Prof. Dr. Ottmar Edenhofer, sometimes involving additional colleagues
as indicated below. The author of this thesis has made extensive contributions to the contents
of all four papers, from conceptual design and technical development to writing. This section
details the contributions of the author to the four papers and acknowledges major
contributions of others.
Chapter 1 (Introduction)
The author was solely responsible for the idea and conceptual design of the introduction.
Amani Joas provided support for the literature review on the history of the Energiewende.
Chapter 2
The author was responsible for the original idea, the conceptual design, the interviews and
their evaluation as well as the writing of the article. Michael Pahle provided crucial
contributions on conceptual design, especially methodological questions and in writing the
article. Michael Pahle also participated in several interviews and also made large
contributions in the review phase. Christian Flachsland made useful contributions to the
conceptual design and contributed to the conclusions and policy implications section. The
evaluation of the 175 speeches in the Bundestag, an essential preliminary step, was carried out
by Amani Joas, who also based his master thesis on these results (Joas, 2013). Ottmar
Edenhofer gave due support not least by establishing contacts to many of the interviewees.
Chapter 3
This paper was a collaborative work by the authors Brigitte Knopf, Michael Pahle, Hendrik
Kondziella, Ottmar Edenhofer, Thomas Bruckner and the author. The paper was based on a
study for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Knopf et al., 2011) where the author was responsible
for the Chapter on the possible effects of the nuclear phase out on EU energy and climate
policy. The author contributed to the overall framing of the paper and carried out the literature
review. He furthermore supported the lead author in writing the paper.
Chapter 4
The author partly conceived the original idea and introduced the aspect of combining
economic and political analysis. The author evaluated a large share of the analyzed studies
and contributed to the writing of the paper.
Chapter 5
The author was responsible for the original idea, the conceptual design, the data evaluation
and the overall handling of the article. Christian Flachsland contributed to the writing of the
article, the overall discussions and especially to theory development for transaction costs for
climate policy instruments. Ottmar Edenhofer contributed in discussions to the article.
136 Statement of Contribution
Tools & Resources
137
Tools and Resources
All texts were written with Microsoft Office Word 2010/15. The analytic and illustrative
graphs have been created using Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2010/2015. The data collection
and evaluation for Chapter 5 was carried out using Microsoft Office Excel 2010. For the data
management of the transcribed interviews and for the evaluation of the goal rankings in
Chapter 2 Office Excel 2013 was used.
This document was prepared using LATEX2, particularly the pdf pages package 3 to include
Chapters 2 to 5 in their given layouts.
138 Tools & Resources
