scieee Science in your language
[en] (orig)
[111]
omission
in
the
simulation
literature.
This
refers
to
the
neglect
of
potentialities
of
simulation
as
a
scientific
research
technique
enabling
a
sophisticated
and
rigorous
approach
to
analyzing
&dquo;simulation
models.&dquo;
I
wished
to
point
out
that
relatively
too
much
effort
has
at
times
been
invested
in
the
modeling
stage,
while
neglecting
simulation
as
a
model
analysis
technique.
Thus,
Schultz
and
Sullivan
may
disagree
with
my
definition
and
propose
an
alternative
which
may
be
more
useful
for
their
purpose.
(Although
it
seems
that
their
five-point
definition
is
not
strictly
in
line
with
Aristotle’s
advice
to
definition
makers.)
It
seems
that
part
of
their
misinterpreting
my
argument
stems
from
our
different
disciplinary
backgrounds.
I
used
the
operations
researcher’s
approach
(see,
for
example,
Hillier
and
Lieberman’s
definition
in
their
&dquo;Introduction
to
Operations
Research&dquo;
[Holden
Day,
1967] :
&dquo;Simulation
typically
is
nothing
more
or
less
than
the
technique
of
performing
sampling
experiments
on
the
model
of
the
system&dquo;
[p.
4~0] )
which,
I
believe,
should
be
that
of
the
social
scientist
as
well.
Hence,
my
implicit
assumption
concerning
experimentation
with
quantitative
models,
for
whose
solution
computer
simulation
is
an
appropriate
technique.
(Pencil
and
paper
or
a
desk
calculator
are
other
possibilities,
but
one
would
not
recommend
them
too
often
in
this
day
and
age.)
Surely,
if
one
deals
with
a
conceptual
model,
expressed
in
verbal
terms
or
general
symbols,
some
of
my
remarks
are
presently
irrelevant.
In
the
latter
case,
the
word
&dquo;simulation&dquo;
assumes
a
different
connotation,
closer
to
Schultz
and
Sullivan’s
definition,
in
the
same
sense
that
a
word
such
as
&dquo;significance&dquo;
has
a
different
meaning
in
statistical
theory
as
compared
to
everyday
usage.
-Mordechai
Shechter
Technion
Haifa,
Israel
Comments
on
"Simulation
and
the
City"
0
In
the
December
1970
issue
of
this
journal
(pp.
411-428),
Berger,
Boulay,
and
Zisk
have
outlined
some
general
difficulties
which
in
their
opinion
have
slowed
the
development
of
simulation
as a
method
for the
scientific
study
of
urban
society
(p.
412).
Although
I
accept,
confimmed
by
my
personal
experiences
gained
in
the
United
States,
the
authors’
[112]
conclusion
of
basic
intellectual
difficulties
being
responsible
for
this
situation
(p.
413),
I
disagree
with
several
of
their
interpretations.
In
my
view,
some
of
their
statements
lead
to
an
increase
in
the
general
confusion
and
disagreement
in
this
field
instead
of
facilitating
a
reduction
of
it,
and
I
would
like
to
reply
to
these
authors
with
the
following
arguments:
(1)
Presupposition
for
any
simulation
of
an
urban
phenomenon
or
process
is
its
definition
as
a
system,
i.e.
as
a
theoretical
structure
consisting
of
elements
(subsystems),
relationships,
and
orders
of
action
(rules).
(2)
Depending
on
the
kind
of
descriptiveness
and
determinativeness,
different
approaches
for
the
simulation
of
one-and-the-same
system
have
to
be
provided-e.g.,
an
approach
to
investigate
the
unknown
relationships
or
orders
of
action
between
elements
of
an
urban
system
(mainly
those
between
the
social,
cultural,
or
political
elements
and
their
ecotechnical
environment)
will
differ
significantly
from
an
approach
that
tries
to
derive
optimal
solutions
from
a
system
completely
determined.
(3)
An
excellent
and,
in
my
view,
still
valid
description
and
determi-
nation
of
such
different
approaches
is
presented
in
an
early
RAND
publication
by
Geisler,
Haythorn,
and
Steger
(1962:
5-8;
see
also
Steger,
1965).
These
authors
define
a
continuum
of
systems
analysis
techniques
ranging
from
least
to
most
abstract:
Increasing
Degree
of
...
Abstraction
and
Formalization
(4)
The
three
simulation
techniques
defined
by
the
terms
One-to-One
Simulation,
Game
Simulation,
and
All-Computer
Simulation
(p.
413.
Ray
and
Duke
use
the
terms
Gaming,
Gaming
Simulation,
and
Simulation;
the
previous
editor
of
this
journal
has
employed
the
terms
Man
Simulation,
Man-Machine
Simulation,
and
All-Machine
Simulation
[Inbar,
1970:
4] )
differ
significantly
in
relation
to
the
type
of
initial
empirical
bases,
of
research
approach
and
procedures,
and
of
results
obtainable.
The
often
cited
statement
of
Abt
that
all
games
are
simulations,
but
not
all
simulations
are
games
(p.
416)
does
not
provide
any
further
understanding
since
it
neglects
completely
the
contribution
of
the
formal
&dquo;Theory
of
Gwnes&dquo;
to
the
techniques
oaf
all-computer
simulation
and
mathematical
analysis.
[113]
(5)
Thus,
turning
to
the
argumentation
of
Berger
et
al.
(pp.
414-415),
I
would
conclude:
There
is
an
essential
difference
between
the
techniques
described
by
Ray
and
Duke,
and
the
failure
to
recognize
their
identity
and
efficiency
has
greatly
contributed
to
the
failure
of
simulation
to
develop
generally
adoptable
models
of
urban
social
forceS,2
and
the
choice
between
these
different
simulation-types
should
only
be
made
on
the
basis
of
the
relation
between
the
objectives
of
an
analysis
or
design
and
the
kind
of
initial
empirical
material
available.’
(6)
These
conclusions
lead
to
an
assumption
of
a
principal
interde-
pendence
between
the
objectives,
empirical
bases,
and
techniques
of =an
urban
simulation
approach,
and
thus
to
the
request
for
the
investigation
of
efficient,
if
not
optimal
combinations
of
these
three
components.
Such
kind
of
theoretical
concept
of
a
&dquo;general
appropriateness&dquo;
of
urban
simulations
could
provide
an
important
contribution
for
the
still
outstand-
ing
comparison
and
evaluation
of
past
and
present
activities,
which
in
turn
prove
to
be
in
my
view
the
inevitable
presuppositions
for
any
valid
contribution
to
this
field
in
the
future.
-Henning
Schran
Technische
Universität
Berlin,
Germany
NOTES
(1)
Depending
on
the
occasional
ability
to
abstract
and
formalize
the
process
investigated,
war
games
(p.
416)
have
always
been
based
on
these
three
different
simulation
techniques:
the
gaming
type
("free"
game),
the
all-computer
type
("rigid"
game),
and
the
hybrid
type
of
gaming
simulation.
(2)
An
instructive
example
of
this
failure
in
the
recognition
of
identity
and
resulting
confusion
is
presented
in
the
same
issue
of
this
journal:
the
"Genealogy
of
Urban
Simulation
Models"
(p.
481)
shows
an
assignment
of
several
projects
to
the
sector
"Games,"
which
proves
to
be
not
valid
in
relation
to
the
a.m.
typology.
(3)
This
conclusion
in
no
way
neglects
the
influence
that
costs
may
have
on
this
decision.
From
a
general
theoretical
view,
however,
this
influence
has
to
be
seen
as
an
exogenous
variable
to
the
simulation
approach,
not
as
an
endogenous
one.
[114]
REFERENCES
GEISLER,
M.,
W.
HAYTHORN,
and
W.
STEGER
(1962)
"Simulation
and
the
logistics
systems
laboratory."
RAND
Memorandum
3281,
Santa
Monica,
Calif.
INBAR,
M.
(1970)
"Editorial
introduction."
Simulation
and
Games
1
(March).
STEGER,
W.
(1965)
"Review
of
analytic
techniques
for
the
CRP."
J.
of
Amer.
Institute
of
Planners
2
(May).
A
Reply
to
Dr.
Schran:
. If
we
understand
Mr.
Schran
correctly,
he
diverges
from
us
on
only
one
important
point:
the
usefulness
of
commonly
accepted
schemas
for
classifying
simulations.
In
our
assessment
of
developments
in
urban
simulation
(and,
by
implication,
simulation
in
social
science
generally)
we
took
the
position
that
classificatory
categories
used
to
differentiate
among
different
tech-
niques
for
simulating
had
taken
on,
perhaps
more
by
default
than
by
design,
epistemological
status.
We
will
still
insist
on
this
point.
Granted,
simulation
techniques
may
be
placed
on
a
continuum
which
reflects
an
&dquo;increasing
degree
of
abstraction
and
formalization.&dquo;
The
formality
or
abstractness
of
a
model
does
not
affect
the
relationship
between
the
referent
system
and
simulation
findings.
The
kinds
of
knowledge
produced
by
each
technique
are
directly
comparable.
We
would
even
extend
this
notion
to
purely
deductive
systems
such
as
game
theory
since
they
are
relevant
to
social
science
concerns
only
as
they
are
&dquo;applied.&dquo;
The
structures
and
processes
which
social
scientists
investigate
are
exactly
as
&dquo;simple&dquo;
or
&dquo;complex,&dquo;
as
&dquo;abstract&dquo;
or
&dquo;real&dquo;
as
are
the
schemes
we
use
to
describe
and
explain
them.
Thus,
a
social
choice
payoff
function
may
be
a
very
&dquo;simple&dquo;
thing
for
a
welfare
economist,
since
the
behavior
involved
may
be
represented
by
a
&dquo;simple&dquo;
equation.
The
same
social
choice
behavior
may
be
catastrophically
&dquo;complex&dquo;
for
another
social
scientist
investigating
such
an
event
through,
let
us
say,
&dquo;gaming-
simulation.&dquo;
We
must
not
let
such
differences
in
technique
obscure
the
fact
that
it
is
one
and
the
same
social
process
which
is
being
modelled
in
the
above
examples.
The
&dquo;real
world&dquo;
referents
remain
the
same.
The
logic
of
inquiry
applies
to
both
sorts
of
models
in
the
same
way.
The
results