Fran¸cois, K., L¨
owe, B., M¨
uller, T., Van Kerkhove, B., editors,
Foundations of the Formal Sciences VII
Bringing together Philosophy and Sociology of Science
Knowledge, the context distinction and its
impact on the relation between philosophy and
sociology of science
Sabine Ammon
Nationaler Forschungsschwerpunkt eikones“Bildkritik. Macht und Bedeutung der Bilder”,
Rheinsprung 11, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
E-mail: [email protected]
1 Introduction
The relation between philosophy and sociology of science can be charac-
terized by an impressive gap, which seemed to be unbridgeable for several
decades. This might be astonishing as both disciplines deal with the same
subject matter and both disciplines try to understand what science is. In-
disputably, there are various overlaps between the two disciplines and one
would expect a lively, interdisciplinary discussion. However, the opposite is
the case. To this day, there are persistent obstacles, which hamper a fruit-
ful exchange. Bringing together philosophy and sociology of science, but
also history of science, to a joint interdisciplinary field remains a desidera-
tum. Since the early 1970s, there has been progress in establishing science
studies, which include historical, sociological, ethnological, psychological,
cultural, political and economical aspects. However, to this day there have
been serious difficulties to integrate mainstream philosophy of science into
this dialogue. The historians of science Schickore and Steinle state that
exchanges between philosophy of science, history of science and sci-
ence studies have been rather sparse; in fact, the disciplines have
drifted further and further apart. (Schickore and Steinle, 2006a, p. ix)
Consequently, Weingart, a sociologist of science, concludes that
the differences between the formal orientation of theory of science
and the empirical orientation of sociology of science are too large,
Received by the editors: 24 January 2009; 18 November 2010; 5 April 2011.
Accepted for publication: 14 April 2011.
2 Sabine Ammon
and the institutional interests of the developed fields relate to these
differences. (Weingart, 2003, p. 12; translation by the author)1
These quotations show us a concise, but rather depressing diagnosis of
the status quo. However, we should not leave it at that diagnosis, as the
loss for both, philosophy and sociology of science, is remarkable. A pressing,
present-day problem, which demands for a joint treatment, is the question of
knowledge in its relation to science and society. Especially in the German-
speaking context, a virulent debate in social science on the effects of the
knowledge society is taking place.2Knowledge has become a key concept
for analysing especially the fields of education, research, science and poli-
tics. However, despite its prominent role the notion of “knowledge” usually
remains diffuse and vague. Philosophy of science could be the ideal part-
ner for sociology of science to tackle this problem, as clarifying concepts
is a genuine philosophical endeavour. Nevertheless, philosophical treatises
on theory of knowledge rarely enter into writings of sociology of science
or sociology of knowledge. Why is this so? At first glance, some causes
are ready at hand. The debate in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
on theory of knowledge3is confusing (not only for insiders) as we find a
great variety of positions. The majority of debates centre on the notion
of knowledge as “justified true belief” in search of necessary and sufficient
conditions. The price of this approach is a very narrow notion limited to
propositional knowledge (e.g., Steup, 2008; Baumann, 2002, esp. pp. 40 ff.).
Many occurrences of knowledge like knowing-how, knowledge by acquain-
tance or the difference between manifestations of knowledge and personal
knowledge cannot be covered by these definitions,4which result in frag-
mented conceptions of knowledge. Therefore, most of the analysis done in
theory of knowledge seems unsuitable for use in social studies. By discussing
the relation between society, individuals, science and knowledge, sociology
1German original: “Zu groß sind die Unterschiede zwischen der formalen Orientierung
der Wissenschaftstheorie und der empirischen Orientierung der Wissenschaftssoziologie,
und mit diesen Unterschieden verbinden sich die institutionellen Interessen der gewach-
senen F¨
acher.”
2For an overview, cf., e.g., Weingart (2003, pp. 127–141), Knoblauch (2005, pp. 255–
284), Maasen (2009, pp. 77–83).
3Bringing together Philosophy of Science and Epistemology means bridging another
far-reaching gap lurking in theoretical philosophy, which should be mentioned here but
will not be discussed further. With the beginning of the 20th century, Philosophy of Sci-
ence and Epistemology started to drift apart and developed into different fields. There-
fore, the discussion of problems of knowledge—which is crucial to both fields—has led to
different approaches, which remain mostly unrelated. A proposal for how to solve many
problems concerning theory of knowledge by bringing together Philosophy of Science and
Epistemology can be found in Ammon (2009), which develops a procedural notion of
knowledge.
4As, e.g., argued in Gottschalk-Mazouz (2007, pp. 22 ff).
The context distinction 3
of science needs a comprehensive theory of knowledge, which is able to ex-
plain how different forms of knowledge interact, how knowledge changes in
history or how knowledge depends on cultural and societal influences.
Given these facts, the need for an integrative discussion of philosophy
and sociology of knowledge for opening traditional lines of argumentation
and analysis is clear. This is astonishing as one can observe an increasing
mutual interest during the last two decades.5In epistemology, the field of so-
cial epistemology emerged, which acknowledges and investigates the social
dimensions of knowledge with influential writings by Steve Fuller (1988),
Alvin Goldman (1999) or Helen Longino (2002)—to mention only some
protagonists. In philosophy of science, we could for example observe a re-
evaluation of the discovery process by the “friends of discovery”6and an
evolving literature on the epistemology of experimentation when we look at
texts like Nickles (1980a,b), Hacking (1983), Franklin (1986) or Rheinberger
(1997). However, in spite of this body of literature, mainstream debates ap-
pear rather reluctant when it comes to a renewal of discourse concerning the
problem of knowledge. There seem to be obstacles deeply anchored in the
disciplinary discourse, going beyond different methodological approaches.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to single out one of these obstacles in
the field of theory of knowledge which must be seen in close relation to the
context distinction. The establishment of the context distinction—as the
separation into a context of discovery and a context of justification—goes
back to the beginning of the 20th century and leads to a specific handling
of problems in theory of knowledge.7Using the example of Carnap’s Auf-
bau (1928), it is possible to show a reconstructional attitude, which is not
only paradigmatic for the traditional theory of knowledge in philosophy8
but also contributes to the isolation of epistemological from sociological
points of view to this day. However, the discussion of Carnap’s approach
can also fuel the search for a solution for how to overcome this obstacle.
The writings of Nelson Goodman, who has developed the epistemic concept
of the Aufbau further, can serve as a point of departure, and allow us to
contrast the reconstructional approach to a constructional emphasis. Based
5The conference FotFS VII at which this paper was presented can be seen in this line
as well; cf. also Ammon et al. (2007a).
6Cf. Sintonen and Kiikeri (2004, pp. 214 ff.); according to Schickore and Steinle, the
expression “friends of discovery” goes back to Ronald Giere (Schickore and Steinle, 2006a,
p. viii).
7For a detailed overview of the different usages of the notion “context distinction”, cf.
Hoyningen-Huene (1987, 2006).
8To be more precise, Carnap’s Aufbau exemplifies a common approach to theory
of knowledge in Philosophy of Science: The Aufbau develops a notion of knowledge
originating from the notion of system. Herein lies an important difference: Theories of
knowledge in epistemology usually originate in discussing the conditions of knowledge of
a person (as it occurs in the standard expression “Sknows that p”).
4 Sabine Ammon
on a dynamic plurality of knowledge systems, a shift in theory of knowl-
edge becomes possible, allowing us to adjust the relation of philosophy and
sociology of science.
2 The relevance of the context distinction for the
relation of philosophy and sociology of science
The separation into context of discovery and context of justification became
a paradigm for philosophy of science in the 20th century. Although not
explicitly addressed, the context distinction is up to now highly influential
for the disciplinary attitude. Schickore and Steinle (2006a, p. vii) observe
that
[the context distinction] still informs our conception of the content,
domain, and goals of philosophy of science. The fact that new devel-
opments in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology
of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philos-
ophy indicates that the context distinction still pervades philosophical
thinking about science.
The context distinction draws a demarcation line between anything that
relates to the process of discovering insights and a justification of the knowl-
edge gained in these processes. Nevertheless, it is more than a line between
different research areas as only the latter is usually of interest for philoso-
phy of science. According to Schickore and Steinle (2006a, p. vii), one can
expect two effects of this demarcation line. On the one hand, it limits the
scope of philosophy of science and hence, one can characterize its domain
and fix its methods. On the other hand, it is possible to adjust the relation
of philosophy of science to other disciplines. As a consequence, philosophy
of science becomes a self-assured discipline, which deals with the results of
science on a meta-level. Rival disciplines, which also deal with science as a
subject matter, but concentrate on the process of discovery, do not need to
be considered.
Although there are earlier manifestations of the context distinction, it
rose to fame through Reichenbach’s “Experience and Prediction” (1966).
Reichenbach claims that epistemology should limit itself to “rational recon-
struction” of epistemic processes. What is of interest is a logically based re-
formulation of the insights achieved in epistemic processes, not the thought
proces itself that has led to the result. Reichenbach stresses the point that
there are differences in the form “in which thinking processes are commu-
nicated to other persons” and the form “in which they are subjectively per-
formed” (Reichenbach, 1966, p. 6). As an example, he discusses the results
of the work of a mathematician or of a physicist. There is, he states, “the
well-known difference between the thinker’s way of finding this theorem and
The context distinction 5
his way of presenting it before a public” (Reichenbach, 1966, p. 6). And he
continues:
I shall introduce the terms context of discovery and context of justi-
fication to mark this distinction. Then we have to say that episte-
mology is only occupied in constructing the context of justification.
(Reichenbach, 1966, pp. 6 f.)
Due to the difference in ways of discovery and ways of justification, Reichen-
bach concludes that it is possible to investigate the context of justification in
isolation. The context of discovery that mingles with psychological and so-
cial aspects can be left aside. By this, it was possible to separate epistemol-
ogy from psychology, which was a strong concern in that era (Richardson,
2006, p. 41). Nevertheless, not only psychological, also social and political
considerations could be excluded—a motivation targeted at Otto Neurath,
Philipp Frank, and the left wing of the Vienna Circle, as Don Howard (2006)
argues. Finally yet importantly, Reichenbach intended to establish “scien-
tific philosophy” as a proper discipline and to guarantee the autonomy of
epistemology by his argumentation (Schiemann, 2006, pp. 23 f.).
In fact, the distinction became not only extremely influential for the
foundation of the discipline of philosophy of science; it also set the standard
for handling systematic problems in theories of knowledge. The justification
of knowledge through epistemological analysis became a major focus. The
genesis of knowledge can be neglected—only those aspects that relate to the
results of the processes are of epistemic interest. This, in turn, leads to the
establishment of the gap between the disciplines mentioned above: On one
side of the gap, historians and sociologists concentrate on questions related
to discovery and usually ignore the ongoing discussions in philosophy.
[H]istorians and sociologists have largely ignored epistemological con-
cepts and debates in their historical studies and thick descriptions of
specific scientific episodes. (Schickore and Steinle, 2006a, pp. ix–x).
On the other side of the gap, the exclusive concentration on the results of
epistemic processes in philosophy of science leads to a stereotypical notion
of knowledge, which is far from reality.
[P]hilosophers working in the analytic tradition continue to exclude
historical as well as sociological and psychological studies of science
from philosophical reflection. [. . .] Many [. . .] simply presuppose that
investigations of the material culture, the historical changes, and the
cultural and social environments of science lack epistemological sig-
nificance. (Schickore and Steinle, 2006a, p. x).
Indisputably, there is a long tradition of mutual neglect in both disci-
plines. As argued before, it is important to bridge this gap; but why are the
6 Sabine Ammon
communities still so reluctant to build this bridge? The answer seems simple.
As long as theorists of knowledge can argue, as Schickore and Steinle have
pointed out, that the context of discovery lacks epistemological significance,
there is no need for building a bridge. The crucial question is therefore,
why should discovery matter for epistemology? The situation changes if
it is possible to show that a theory of knowledge exclusively based on the
context of justification turns out to be inconsistent. In fact, many problems
haunt traditional theory of knowledge. If it is possible to show that many
of those problems vanish when the context of discovery is reconsidered for
justification, a strong argument against the context distinction would be
found.
3 A reconstruction of knowledge
In order to gain further clarification, it helps to go back to the roots of
the problem. The method of rational reconstruction, to which Reichenbach
is referring, originally stems from (Carnap, 1928). We do not only owe the
terminology of the method to him, but also a first paradigmatic formulation
of the context distinction.
It must be possible to give a rational foundation for each scientific
thesis, but this does not mean that such a thesis must always be
discovered rationally, that is, through an exercise of the understanding
alone. After all, the basic orientation and the direction of interests
are not the result of deliberation, but are determined by emotions,
drives, disposition and general living conditions. ... The justification,
however, has to take place before the forum of the understanding;
here we must not refer to our intuition or emotional needs. (Carnap,
1928, p. xvii)
Carnap’s aim is to ground knowledge on a firm basis, separating it from
findings that are wrong, senseless or meaningless: that is to say, no knowl-
edge at all. The thrust is twofold: on the one hand, knowledge should be
characterized; on the other hand, a critique of metaphysics should show
what cannot qualify as knowledge. The intention is to unmask so-called
pseudoproblems and to free epistemology from pure speculation. Carnap
talks of purification and cleaning; he stresses the point that it is important
to lock out feeling, instinct, disposition or circumstances of one’s life. They
might be relevant for the genesis of knowledge, but not for the justification
of knowledge.
In order to realize his aim, Carnap goes on to collect all findings that
exist at a certain time in a unifying system. The focus is language-based:
knowledge is characterized as coming in statements that relate to each other.
Therefore, rational reconstruction is a reconstruction in language by using
means of modern logic. By choosing basic concepts, it is possible to develop
The context distinction 7
a so-called family tree of concepts. Within the “constructional system”9,
it is possible to derive any meaningful concept from the basis. Carnap’s
way of approaching the problem promises a breakthrough for theory of
knowledge. Any meaningful statement can be reformulated—and the re-
formulation uses only precisely determined concepts. A complex system
emerges which can integrate not only any currently available knowledge,
but also any future knowledge. It is possible to draw an unambiguous line
between statements that represent knowledge and statements that are false
or meaningless. Knowledge claims which can be reformulated within the
system count as knowledge. On the other hand, those which cannot, are
revealed as metaphysics as one does not succeed in tracing them back within
the constructional system.
Obviously, it is Carnap’s procedure to build constructional systems,
which implements the context distinction. Rational reconstruction can be
described more precisely according to the terms involved. On the one hand,
the method used is a rational procedure. That is, it follows certain criteria
considered as rational. It simplifies, idealizes, systematizes and it follows
the requirements of logic. On the other hand, the method comes as a re-
construction: Carnap chooses a retrospective perspective to systematize all
available knowledge. To be fair, Carnap gives priority to epistemological
primacy in this process of reconstructing. However, this is not mandatory,
and Carnap stresses the point that the genesis of knowledge is not to be
considered; what matters is its justification.
In a certain respect, Carnap’s way of handling the problem of knowledge
is paradigmatic. His rational reconstruction reveals a solution for a classical
problem within the new framework provided by the linguistic turn. Knowl-
edge becomes a system of statements that evolve from some fundamental
units and principles. These circumstances lead to a notion of knowledge
which can be characterized as follows: (a) knowledge can be reformulated
within a system of statements; the focus is therefore on propositional knowl-
edge; (b) the aim is to draw a strict line between what proves to be knowl-
edge and that what is senseless, false and therefore not knowledge; this can
be attained by an appropriate procedure of justification; (c) knowledge turns
out to be true and certain as it has passed a rigorous procedure of justifica-
tion; (d) therefore, knowledge is timeless and objective; as a consequence,
it accumulates.
9In order to find an equivalent for the original German term “Konstitutionsystem”,
the English translation of Carnap’s Aufbau from 1967 by Rolf A. George (Carnap, 2003)
uses the expression “Constructional System”; and already Goodman (1951) introduced
the terms “construction”and“constructional” when discussing the Aufbau. Therefore, the
notion “Constructional System” is widely used in the secondary literature on the Aufbau.
However, this translation is rather misleading as Carnap names the method employed for
system-building “rational reconstruction” which differs significantly from a construction.
Nevertheless, for sake of consistency, this article uses the established English terminology.
8 Sabine Ammon
Although ways and means vary in the ongoing discussion, it is the im-
plicit reconstructional attitude within these characteristic features that re-
mains highly influential and sets the direction for theory of knowledge to
this day. In this line of argumentation, it is possible to dismiss any criti-
cism which refers to the limited scope of the notion of knowledge or to the
lack of social and historical aspects as it remains external. Its internal set-
ting is consequential and conclusive. As the reconstructional perspective on
knowledge only works with the results of the process of knowing, it causes
ahistoricity and the ignorance of social questions in theory of knowledge.
For the setting of the system of knowledge, the process of discovery does
not need to be considered. By this, rational reconstruction not only rein-
forces the context distinction. The reconstructional perspective also leads
to an immunization of traditional theory of knowledge.
At first sight, the only problem for traditional theory of knowledge is
to give an account of the justification of knowledge. However, this problem
is not easily solved. The solution of Carnap’s Aufbau is not satisfying in
the long run. Problems of foundations, testing and verification make clear
that it becomes impossible to attain the certainty wanted. For example,
sentences are embedded in a holistic setting of other sentences; they are in-
volved in dynamic practices and use. The process of drawing a line between
knowledge and non-knowledge turns out to be less strict and certain. Es-
pecially language, which seemed to be such an appropriate means, creates
many problems. Language is no neutral means for reformulating statements
of knowledge: on the contrary, it turns out to be full of assumptions. Lan-
guage itself represents knowledge that captures the world in its notions and
structures. In the train of uncovering the prerequisites of language and its
relation to the world, modes of acquisition, translation and construction
come into focus. In order to ground knowledge on a solid basis, it seems
essential to clarify these prerequisites first.
4 Constructing understanding
Not astonishingly, there are many attempts to resolve the deficiencies of
traditional approaches in theory of knowledge. An especially fruitful exam-
ple is represented by the writings of Nelson Goodman, as his ideas evolve
through a critical analysis of Carnap’s Aufbau. Goodman’s own treatment
of constructional systems lays the foundation for a revised epistemology in
his late writings, especially in “Ways of Worldmaking” (Goodman, 1978)
and “Reconceptions in Philosophy and other Arts and Sciences” (Goodman
and Elgin, 1988). In these works, Goodman demonstrates the shortcom-
ings of classical theory of knowledge that led his way from reconstructional
systems to constructional systems and from knowledge to understanding.
The context distinction 9
An important insight precedes Goodman’s epistemological shift. It is
the fact that we can find cognition in manifold processes: when we analyse
and synthesize, when we observe and create, when we discern, order, weigh
or structure. The “cognitive work” is done
with achieving a firmer and more comprehensive grasp, removing
anomalies, making significant discriminations and connections, gain-
ing new insights (Goodman and Elgin, 1988, p. 158).
The notion of understanding summarizes all these processes. What they
share is a novel epistemic focus, a change in current structures and sys-
tematizations that relates to epistemic merit. According to Goodman’s
approach, cognitive functioning relates to symbols. With this, he opens a
broad range for epistemology. From this point onwards, not only language-
based systems are worth considering, but also any symbol system found in
science, in our every-day world or in the arts.
Goodman describes the processes of understanding as ways of construct-
ing which are equivalent to the usage of symbol systems. However, it is not
just any construction that is the sought-after cognitive activity. It is im-
portant to single out those ways of constructing which lead to epistemic
success. Therefore, the search for rightness of construction is of primary
concern in the novel epistemic focus. The model of justification developed
by Goodman (1954) became famous under the heading of reflective equilib-
rium (cf. also Rawls, 1971; Elgin, 1996, pp. 106 ff.; Elgin, 1999, pp. 49 ff).
Rightness is to be found with the help of a reflective equilibrium between
existing structures and new changes.
Since rightness is not confined to those symbols that state or describe
or depict, the fitting here is not a fitting onto—not a correspondence
or matching or mirroring of independent Reality—but a fitting into a
context or discourse or standing complex of other symbols. (Goodman
and Elgin, 1988, p. 158)
New symbols are brought in interplay with existing symbol structures in an
active and creative process. Changes are made, often on both sides. If the
procedure succeeds, if it is possible to attain a new structuring, we have
gained a new understanding.
To appreciate the implied dynamics it is important to notice that the
process never finds a definite ending. Goodman and Elgin describe the pro-
cesses that lead to a reflective equilibrium, such as searching, testing and
trying out. Novel circumstances, alterations in assessment, or new findings
put the established usage in question, which, in turn, leads to a reassessment
of the reflective equilibrium. Therefore, those processes never really come
to an end. Granted, there are well-entrenched constellations that hardly
10 Sabine Ammon
lead to adjustments—but in principle, any element of established system-
atizations can become part of the equilibration. Additionally, the criteria
of rightness can change. Being part of the processes, they are implicitly
tested while probing and examining the fitting of a novel structure. If nec-
essary, the changes not only affect symbols and systems, but also the criteria
themselves. Thereby, gaining insights turns out to be an ongoing process of
transformation.
Goodman and Elgin (1988, pp. 161 f.) call both the process of con-
structing and its results “understanding” in order to stress the novel focus
in epistemology. However, the chosen terminology conceals the crucial dif-
ference between the process and its results. Therefore, in the following
argumentation, “understanding” will be restricted to the cognitive process,
whereas “knowledge” will used to describe the results of the process of un-
derstanding.10 Consequently, the novel focus in epistemology leads to a
revised notion of knowledge which can be characterized as follows: (a) the
scope of knowledge is wide-ranging as knowledge is no longer limited to
systems of statements but embraces all symbol systems; (b) the rightness
of knowledge is found in a dynamic equilibrium process; the drawing of the
line between what proves to be knowledge and what does not prove to be
knowledge is therefore dynamic as well; (c) knowledge is now described as
inherently dynamic: it is a snapshot of permanently evolving processes; it
changes, it can be revised, it can become dominant, it can become outdated
or it can be forgotten.11
Apparently, the constructional focus manages to solve many of the prob-
lems of the traditional, reconstructional notion of knowledge. As a dynamic
concept, the revised notion of knowledge is able to depict evolution and
change. By considering cognitive processes in general, other symbol pro-
cesses come into focus. Knowledge is no longer limited to sentences and
language systems but embraces all symbol systems. These appear in many
areas and they occur in many media. Therefore, it is a misunderstanding to
limit the notion of knowledge to a fixed branch of science. It rather relates
to certain structures and systematizations. Finally, the concept of rightness
releases the debate on knowledge from exaggerated demands of an idealized
certainty and absoluteness. The focus on the actual usage and processes of
production leads to a more pragmatic point of view.
10Goodman and Elgin propose another usage of terminology, which does not prove
suitable for the purposes here. They apply the notion of understanding in three different
ways: as a skill, as a process, and as “what the cognitive process achieves” (Goodman
and Elgin, 1988, pp. 161 f.).
11A certain type of dynamics could also be attributed to the traditional theory of
knowledge, but it differs significantly from the dynamic concept introduced by Goodman
and Elgin. The former is the dynamic of growth as an accumulation of knowledge within
a static system. The latter sets the system itself in motion, the system itself is under
permanent reconception. Within this model, it becomes possible to explain changes in
ordering, weighing or focus, modification of criteria of rightness and so on.
The context distinction 11
What is of major interest here are the consequences for the dogmatic dis-
tinction into context of justification and context of discovery. The lesson we
learn from Goodman’s critique and his model of justification is far-reaching:
in short, it says that discovery matters for justification. The process of gain-
ing insights turns out to be the justification of those insights at the same
time. Searching, probing, scrutinizing, testing, and assessing go hand in
hand. Hence, we have the astonishing result that in order to solve prob-
lems related to the context of justification we need to consider the context
of discovery. If we take the findings of Goodman and Elgin seriously, the
separation of the context distinction turns out to be a severe misunderstand-
ing of the epistemic analysis of knowing; as genesis shows up as a part of
justification.
Nevertheless, Goodman’s approach not only helps to identiy how the
context distinction leads us on the wrong track but also gives us a far bet-
ter understanding of the method of reconstruction. In contrast to ways of
constructing, reconstruction focuses on the results of the epistemic genesis,
which are brought in an idealized, abstracted and formalized system. Re-
construction works with the results of the construction process. It simplifies
and emphasizes, it draws sharp boundaries and distinctions in order to at-
tain a better understanding. Many manifestations of knowledge can serve as
an example: encyclopedias, textbooks, symbolic or pictorial representations.
As shown above, there are important interrelations between methods of re-
construction and processes of construction. If one considers the results in
isolation, severe misunderstandings can result. Only if we investigate them
within their context of construction do they lead to a consistent theory of
knowledge.
5 An outlook: The reconciliation of philosophy and
sociology of science within a revised theory of
knowledge
Given the complex relation between ways of constructing and the method
of reconstruction that leads to a reconciliation of the context of discovery
and the context of justification, what are the consequences for philosophy
and sociology of science? In Goodman’s writings, we learn much about how
to gain a better understanding and how to justify these findings, but his
analysis remains limited to aspects of symbolic functioning and character-
istics of symbol systems. However, in order to discuss the consequences for
the relation of philosophy and sociology of science, we need to know more
about the impact of historical and cultural influences on dynamic epistemic
processes. Therefore, the challenge for further investigations is to analyse
in detail the epistemic genesis, to question which circumstances become in-
fluential and which aspects intervene epistemically. Already a first glimpse
12 Sabine Ammon
tells us that creative inventions and novelties play a crucial role in epistemic
genesis. Adjustment, modification, improvement, testing, performing, and
so on seem to be individually set off. Is epistemic genesis in the end driven
by individual novelties?
For the theory of knowledge, these consequences turn out to be a ma-
jor challenge heralding substantial change. At the core of the theory of
knowledge, individual processes become visible. Nevertheless, it is crucial
to notice that the focus on individual, dynamic and active processes is not
equivalent to an epistemic solipsism. Individually triggered mutations and
dynamics do not happen in isolation. Those processes are inseparable from a
transindividual public sphere. There is a permanent interrelation between
the individual and its life-world, which has an effect in both directions.
By this, we gain on the one hand latitude for negotiation, for exchange
and influence on a personal level. On the other hand, we can explain rules,
practices, and usage beyond an individualized validity. We therefore have to
shift the perspective. Starting points are singular processes of construction
within a dynamic relationship with other individuals, in context, practice
and usage. Those settings become part of the epistemic genesis and become
influential for the results of the process. By this, cultural, historical and
sociological aspects enter into theory of knowledge. In turn, knowledge can
be investigated in its cultural, historical and social embedding.
Therefore, these readjustments not only help to overcome persistent ob-
stacles in epistemology but they also open novel perspectives in research. To
give an example: on this ground, it becomes possible to develop the episte-
mological framework for investigating questions concerning the dynamics of
epistemic diversity. To this day, we have difficulties to explain how different
forms of knowledge relate to each other.12 In the succession of pluralistic
approaches we have some means at hand to characterize specific kinds of
knowledge. However, based on a revised theory of knowledge, it will be pos-
sible to describe the intersections and interactions between different kinds
of knowledge, which remains a desideratum so far. When local knowledge
is confronted with scientific knowledge, when expert knowledge meets the
knowledge of a layman, when technical knowledge gets involved with every-
day knowledge, they can trigger processes of mutual change, marginalisa-
tion, emancipation, alteration or reinforcement. In order to describe these
kinds of processes from an epistemic point of view, a theory of knowledge
is needed that is grounded both in a pluralistic and dynamic concept of
12E.g., Weingart (2003, p. 141) points to the necessity of exploring the “inferences”
between scientific and other forms of knowledge; B¨
oschen and Schulz-Schaeffer (2003,
pp. 210 f.) and B¨
oschen and Wehling (2004, p. 20) focus on the “areas of interaction,
overlapping, and conflict” of different forms of knowledge as a novel research agenda;
Maasen (2009, p. 81) mentions the “interaction of different forms of knowledge” as a
challenge for theory.
The context distinction 13
knowledge, and which is able to capture historicity and contingency as well
as societal influences on knowledge (cf. Ammon, 2007; 2009, especially pp.
178 ff.).
These insights have an important impact on the relation of philosophy
and sociology of science. When philosophy of science starts to acknowledge
that the context of discovery matters epistemically, we have built the foun-
dations for tackling the gap. Within the setting of traditional theory of
knowledge, it was standard practice to investigate philosophical theory of
knowledge in a decontextualized manner on an abstract level of formalized
systems. With the processes of genesis as the new perspective in epistemol-
ogy, related topics such as creativity, actions and interests, social, political
and historical conditions come into focus as well. However, this is not equiv-
alent to the thesis that knowledge is a purely social construction. It only
leads to a reassessment of individual and social factors in theory of knowl-
edge. By this, looking at reconstruction and construction reassesses the
relationship of philosophy and sociology of science. Within the new setting,
they have found common ground. If this leads to an exchange of concepts
and theories, it can be the basis for bridging the gap in the near future.
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